









# Foreign Relations of the United States

Diplomatic Papers

1942

(In Seven Volumes)

Volume II

Europe



United States  
Government Printing Office  
Washington : 1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7357

HISTORICAL OFFICE  
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

---

For sale by the  
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C. - Price \$3.25 (Buckram)

## PREFACE

The principles which guide the compilation and editing of *Foreign Relations* are stated in Department of State Regulation 045 of December 5, 1960, a revision of the order approved on March 26, 1925, by Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, then Secretary of State. The text of the current regulation is printed below:

### 045 DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

#### 045.1 *Scope of Documentation*

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. These volumes include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. When further material is needed to supplement the documentation in the Department's files for a proper understanding of the relevant policies of the United States, such papers should be obtained from other Government agencies.

#### 045.2 *Editorial Preparation*

The basic documentary diplomatic record to be printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, shall be edited by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs. The editing of the record shall be guided by the principles of historical objectivity. There shall be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing shall be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents or parts of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

- a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
- b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
- c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
- d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.

- e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternatives presented to the Department before the decision was made.

#### 045.3 Clearance

To obtain appropriate clearances of material to be published in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, the Historical Office shall:

- a. Refer to the appropriate policy offices of the Department and of other agencies of the Government such papers as appear to require policy clearance.
- b. Refer to the appropriate foreign governments requests for permission to print as part of the diplomatic correspondence of the United States those previously unpublished documents which were originated by the foreign governments.

The responsibilities of the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, for the preparation of this *Foreign Relations* volume were entrusted, under the general supervision of the Director of the Office, G. Bernard Noble, to the Foreign Relations staff under the direction of the Officer in Charge of the Foreign Relations Series (Editor of *Foreign Relations*), E. R. Perkins. The compilers of *Foreign Relations*, 1942, Volume II, Europe were Rogers P. Churchill for Finland, Francis C. Prescott for the sections on France relating to North Africa, Mr. Prescott and Herbert A. Fine for Greece, and N. O. Sappington for the remainder of the volume.

The Division of Publishing Services is responsible with respect to *Foreign Relations* for the editing of copy, proofreading, and preparation of indexes. Under the general direction of the Chief of the Division, Norris E. Drew, the editorial functions mentioned above are performed by the Foreign Relations Editing Branch in charge of Elizabeth A. Vary, Chief, and Ouida J. Ward, Assistant Chief.

For 1942, the arrangement of volumes is as follows: Volume I, General, the British Commonwealth, the Far East; Volume II, Europe; Volume III, Europe; Volume IV, The Near East and Africa; Volume V, The American Republics; Volume VI, The American Republics. The *Foreign Relations* series for 1942 also includes the unnumbered volume on 1942, China, previously published.

E. R. PERKINS

*Editor of Foreign Relations*

FEBRUARY 5, 1962.

# CONTENTS

	Page
<b>PREFACE</b> . . . . .	III
<b>BELGIUM:</b>	
Preliminary agreement between the United States and Belgium regarding mutual aid in the prosecution of war against aggression, signed June 16, 1942 . . . . .	1
Military service agreement between the United States and Belgium . .	1
Negotiations between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Belgium for a tripartite agreement relating to imports from and exports to the Belgian Congo . . . . .	1
<b>BULGARIA:</b>	
Decision of the United States to recognize that a state of war existed with Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania . . . . .	20
<b>CZECHOSLOVAKIA:</b>	
Preliminary agreement between the United States and Czechoslovakia regarding mutual aid in the prosecution of war against aggression, signed July 11, 1942 . . . . .	20
<b>FINLAND:</b>	
Relations between Finland and the Soviet Union, and the attempts of the United States to prevent further Finnish participation in the war against the Soviet Union in association with Germany . . . .	21
<b>FRANCE:</b>	
Concern of the United States over Vichy collaboration with Axis Powers, especially with respect to campaign in Libya; severance of diplomatic relations between the United States and Vichy . . . . .	123
Representations to the French Government with regard to the movement of the battleship <i>Dunkerque</i> from Oran to Toulon . . . . .	204
Representations to the French Government with regard to the French warships at Alexandria, Egypt . . . . .	210
Interest of the United States in political and economic conditions in French North Africa:	
I. Continued suspension of economic aid program except for two shipments; negotiations and policies regarding possible United States assistance to resistance movement; resumption of economic aid program (January-April) . . . . .	224
II. Suspension of the economic aid program following Laval's return to power in France; considerations for revival of program (April-June) . . . . .	285
III. Resumption of economic aid program (June-July) . . . . .	313
IV. Acceleration of economic aid program by direction of the President; inter-departmental difficulties regarding implementation of the program (August-September). . . . .	348
V. Plans for securing French assistance for the landing in North Africa of American military forces (September-November) . .	379
VI. Invasion and occupation of French North Africa (November-December). . . . .	429
Relations of the United States with the Free French forces. . . . .	502

<b>FRANCE—Continued</b>	<b>Page</b>
Protest by French Government at Vichy regarding establishment of an American Consulate at Brazzaville, French Equatorial Africa. . .	557
Negotiations with the Free French respecting use by the United States of air base at Pointe-Noire, French Equatorial Africa . . . . .	564
Efforts by the United States to bring about peaceful collaboration of French Somaliland with the United Nations . . . . .	596
Efforts of the United States to reach agreement with Admiral Robert concerning the maintenance of neutrality by the French possessions in the Caribbean . . . . .	611
Concern of the United States over the seizure of St. Pierre-Miquelon Islands by Free French forces . . . . .	654
Efforts of the United States to keep France from permitting use by Japanese forces of French vessels in the Far East; seizure of ships by Japan . . . . .	671
Policy of the United States regarding the protection of French island possessions in the Pacific and Indian Oceans; British occupation of Madagascar . . . . .	687
Agreement for reciprocal Lend-Lease aid between the United States and Fighting France, effected by exchange of notes signed September 3, 1942 . . . . .	708
Representations to the Vichy Government concerning treatment of American Jews and other Jews of foreign nationality in France . .	709
Representations to the Vichy Government regarding ban on showing of American films in France and transit of American films through France . . . . .	716
<b>GERMANY:</b>	
Arrangement between the United States and Germany pertaining to repatriation and hospitalization of prisoners of war . . . . .	723
<b>GREECE:</b>	
Participation by the United States in the negotiations concerning relief supplies for Axis-occupied Greece . . . . .	724
Attitude of the United States toward the desire of the Greek Government to abolish the International Financial Commission . . . . .	794
Visit of King George II to the United States . . . . .	797
Consideration by the United States of requests by the Greek Government for financial assistance . . . . .	798
Lend-Lease agreement between the United States and Greece, signed July 10, 1942. . . . .	814
Formation of separate battalions of Greek subjects in the United States Army . . . . .	815
Representations by the Greek Government respecting postwar frontiers of Greece . . . . .	822
Sympathetic consideration by the United States of Greek pleas for lenient treatment for persons of Greek race from the Dodecanese Islands . . . . .	829
Unwillingness of the Department of State to comply with Greek request that the Department verify certain facts in a court action between private parties . . . . .	831
<b>HUNGARY:</b>	
Decision of the United States to recognize that a state of war existed with Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania . . . . .	833
<b>INDEX.</b> . . . .	<b>845</b>

## BELGIUM

### PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND BELGIUM REGARDING MUTUAL AID IN THE PROSECUTION OF WAR AGAINST AGGRESSION, SIGNED JUNE 16, 1942

[For text of agreement, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 254, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1504.]

---

### MILITARY SERVICE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND BELGIUM

[Effected by exchanges of notes signed at Washington March 31, July 31, and October 10 and 16, 1942. For texts of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 304, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1889.]

---

### NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND BELGIUM FOR A TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT RELATING TO IMPORTS FROM AND EXPORTS TO THE BELGIAN CONGO

641.5531/13a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, March 16, 1942—8 p. m.

1094. The Department understands that negotiations for the renewal of the Anglo-Belgian economic agreement affecting the Belgian Congo,<sup>1</sup> which expired August 31, 1941, are now in progress. In view of the interest of this Government in many of the products of the Belgian Congo, you are requested to report as to the status of these negotiations. It seems to the Department that it might be desirable for you to be represented in these discussions; and your opinion on this subject is requested.

WELLES

---

<sup>1</sup> For text, see British Cmd. 6248, Treaty Series No. 1 (1941) : *Agreements . . . relating to the Belgian Congo in respect of Finance and the Purchase of Commodities*, London, January 21, 1941, pp. 6-8.



641.5531/14 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, March 21, 1942—2 p. m.  
[Received March 21—11:30 a. m.]

1362. Department's telegram 1094, March 16, 8 p. m. I elicited the following information at the Foreign Office this morning with reference to the status of Anglo-Belgian economic negotiations affecting the Belgian Congo. It appears that ever since the expiration of the agreement last August negotiations for its renewal have dragged on in rather desultory fashion and subject to frequent interruptions. Following the death of the Belgian official engaged in the discussions much delay was due to the difficulty in finding a qualified successor. The latter arrived here some 2 months ago. Since then further difficulties appear to have arisen over differences in purchase prices which the British appear willing to pay for Belgian Congo products and those which the Belgians are asking. My informant remarked that this was due in part to the higher prices which the Belgians said they were offered by American buyers. Furthermore, the powerful trading interests in the Congo area were placing obstacles in the way of the negotiations pending receipt of higher prices.

On the other side of the picture while the Belgians have expressed urgent desire to obtain certain British products in return and are particularly interested in such things as mining machinery, they have never formulated the general programme of their total requirements that the British have requested.

In the light of developments in the Far East, my informant said, the need for a number of Belgian Congo products is naturally more urgent. The British are anxious to coordinate their policy with ours and have accordingly within the last few days despatched several telegrams to Washington to discuss the question with our interested Government organizations.

The Foreign Office has offered to keep us informed here as to the progress of their talks with the Belgians. There are, however, apparently no "negotiations" in the usual sense of the word in progress at this stage, but merely occasional calls at the Foreign Office by the Belgian official to discuss some specific item or aspect of the situation with the interested Foreign Office official (Makins).<sup>2</sup> The latter has offered to send me a memorandum on the subject, and in view of the recent Foreign Office telegrams to Washington mentioned above, I perceive no advantage for the present in participating in these occasional talks.

---

<sup>2</sup> Roger M. Makins, Acting Counsellor in the British Foreign Office.

I shall telegraph a summary of the memorandum as soon as it is received.

MATTHEWS

---

641.5531/15 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, March 24, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received March 24—1 : 15 p. m.]

1396. I have now received the promised memorandum on present negotiations for a renewal of the Anglo-Belgian economic accord ("purchase agreement") on the Belgian Congo referred to in my telegram 1362, March 21, 2 p. m. The following is a summary of the pertinent paragraphs of this memorandum:

Since the expiration of the previous purchase agreement on August 31 last certain new factors have become operative. In the light of developments in the Far East the importance to the war effort of the Allies of many of the raw materials produced in the territories of West Africa "has been enormously enhanced". The British Government has accordingly pressed the Belgian Government to increase production of wolfram, tin, copper, palm oil and rubber. The Belgian Government is prepared to do all it can to stimulate production but is find[ing] it increasingly difficult to bring effective pressure to bear on Congo producers in the face of apparently conflicting competitive offers from Allied buyers.

It was agreed in the first purchase agreement that in general Congo produce should be granted treatment with respect to price and customs duties not less favorable than that accorded to produce of British colonies. The discussions for the renewal of the agreement have likewise been based on this principle. In view of the fact, however, that "Congo producers have received offers from the United States for example for palm oil and rubber at prices of pounds 40 to pounds 50 and 14 pence, respectively, as against United Kingdom prices of pounds 18 and 8½ pence, the Belgian Government finds itself in a difficult position. This matter, which in view of its repercussions, political and economic, in all West African territories is of considerable importance, has been taken up urgently with the United States Government through the appropriate channels." (In this connection please see Embassy's telegram number 1273, March 17, 11 p. m.) \*

A further obstacle, continues the memorandum, has been the difficulty in the absence of "any coordination of orders and programs on the Belgian side" of assessing and meeting Belgian requirements of ma-

---

\* Not printed.

chinery, steel and other goods essential for the maintenance and increase of production in the Congo area. The British hope that this difficulty will be eliminated through the submission by the Belgian Government of a comprehensive program covering its essential requirements for the next 12 months.

While the memorandum does not so state, I understand that an additional difficulty arises from the fact that the Belgians would rather have dollars than pounds.

MATTHEWS

---

641.5531/16a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Belgian Government in Exile (Biddle), at London*

WASHINGTON, April 28, 1942—7 p. m.

Belgian Series No. 2. Department's 1094, March 16, 1942, your [*Embassy's*] 1362 of March 21 and your [*Embassy's*] 1396 of March 24. As you are aware, there has been some confusion in the past in the satisfaction of UK and US supply requirements in the Belgian Congo and likewise in satisfying Congo needs. This has arisen in part from the failure of the Congo Government to inform the UK and the US of its needs on a comprehensive basis. Last week the Ministry of Supply in London telegraphed its representatives in Washington, its conclusion that a broad over-all arrangement should be reached with the Government of the Belgian Congo which would comprehend the Congo's requirements as well as UK and US purchases in the Congo. The Ministry proposed that the UK and the US, through appropriate representatives in London, should together approach the Belgian Minister of Colonies for the purpose of negotiating such an arrangement. Before doing so, it was obviously necessary to secure assurances from the US Government that the latter was willing to participate jointly in such negotiations and further that the US Government would sympathetically consider the future requests of the Belgian Congo for those materials of which the US would be the supply source.

Several meetings have been held in Washington, in which representatives of the Department, the Board of Economic Warfare, the Combined Raw Materials Board and the British Embassy have participated. There was unanimous and complete agreement at such meetings that the suggestions of the Ministry of Supply provided a constructive procedure for simplifying and coordinating the problem of exports to and imports from the Belgian Congo on the part of both the UK and the US.

Confirming the agreement reached at these meetings, the British Embassy is telegraphing London that they found the Department

and other interested agencies entirely favorable to the objectives in view and willing to give assurance of their sympathetic consideration to such future applications for equipment etc. on the part of the Belgian Congo. Such assurances are naturally subject to the reasonableness of the requests and our own supply situation. The specific procedure suggested is that the Belgians should submit to London a single statement of the total quantities of materials which they can supply, and a similar statement of their total requirements from both the UK and the US. These lists would then be considered both in London and Washington, with reference as necessary to UK and US experts on the spot. In connection with the latter, the US Government believes that technical experts should proceed to the Congo as soon as possible so that their reports would be available when detailed discussions with the Belgians occur. The present proposal is to send Dean Frasc  , of the War Production Board, as tin expert and another technical man to review the mining situation as a whole. A third man would be dispatched to study Belgian needs for equipment, consumers goods and other materials. In this same telegram from the British Embassy to London it is strongly urged that the UK send corresponding representatives to cooperate on the spot and join with the US representatives in the framing of joint reports.

The Department requests that you immediately consult with Harri-man<sup>4</sup> and the Minister of Supply with a view to initiating the projected negotiations with the Belgian Government. It is desired that this Government be represented directly in all such negotiations. The Department wishes to be kept continuously and fully informed of all developments in this matter.

The Department understands that the Belgian Minister for Colonies may be contemplating a trip to Washington in connection with the general question of Congo requirements. On the assumption that negotiations discussed in this telegram will proceed in London, the Department regards it as important that the Minister be promptly informed of projected discussions in order to assure his continued presence in London.

HULL

---

641.5531/19 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Belgian Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 30, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received April 30—7:40 p. m.]

Belgian Series No. 3. Your 2, April 28, 7 p. m. I have spoken in a preliminary way to Belgian Colonial Minister de Vleeschauwer

---

<sup>4</sup>W. Averell Harriman, Special Representative of President Roosevelt in the United Kingdom to facilitate Lend-Lease aid to the British Empire.

regarding problem of Congo purchases and supplies and he is postponing contemplated trip to Washington.

[BIDDLE]

---

641.5531/18: Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the  
Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 30, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received April 30—8:45 p. m.]

2308. Embassy's 1362, and 1396 of March 21 and 24 respectively. Department's 1095 [1094], March 16 and No. 2 Belgian Series to Biddle, April 28.

1. Meeting at which were present representatives Ministries of Production, Supply, Harriman and Embassy held last night to discuss method of joint Anglo-American approach to Belgian colonial authorities with respect to purchases from and supplies to Belgian Congo.

It is expected that Mr. Lyttelton<sup>5</sup> and Ambassador Biddle will together approach Belgian Colonial Minister early next week along the lines of Department's telegram no. 2, April 28.

2. Suggestion was also advanced at meeting that any new Anglo-American-Belgian Congo supply arrangements might be drawn up in form of tripartite agreement rather than separate United States-Belgian and United Kingdom-Belgian agreements.

3. The second Anglo-Belgian purchasing agreement runs from September 1, 1941 to August 31, 1942. For reasons explained in my 1362 of March 21 this agreement (a summary of which was given in Embassy's telegram No. 2289 of April 30<sup>6</sup>) has not yet been signed. In view of current developments Foreign Office official at yesterday's meeting described it as a "hangover arrangement" which Foreign Office nevertheless felt must be concluded because of Anglo-Belgian financial agreement of January 21, 1941<sup>7</sup> (Embassy's despatch No. 116, March 19, 1941).<sup>6</sup> Foreign Office seem to feel that after the joint United Kingdom-United States of America meeting with Belgians next week latter will be prepared to sign second purchasing agreement without further delay.

4. As a matter of convenience and to avoid possible confusion from overlapping of any new arrangements with this agreement, the tenta-

---

<sup>5</sup> Sir Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of Production.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

<sup>7</sup> For text, see British Cmd. 6248, Treaty Series No. 1 (1941): *Agreements . . . relating to the Belgian Congo in respect of Finance and the Purchase of Commodities*, pp. 2-5.

tive proposal has been made that any tripartite agreement should only become operative as from September 1, 1942.

5. Any comments Department might see fit to make concerning paragraphs 2 and 4 above would be helpful.

MATTHEWS

---

641.5531/18a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1942—10 p. m.

1979. For Biddle. Embassy's 2308 April 30, 11 p. m., Embassy's 2289 April 30, 5 p. m.,<sup>s</sup> and Belgian Series 3 April 30, 10 p. m.

1. The Department sees no objection to suggestion that new Anglo-American-Belgian Congo supply and purchase arrangements be drawn in the form of tripartite agreement. The Department further agrees that such tripartite agreement should only become operative as from September 1, 1942. There appears to be every reason to operate under the second Anglo-Belgian purchasing agreement until that date. Our objective, however, should be to have the proposed tripartite arrangement concluded and signed prior to September 1, 1942, and to this end it is urged that you press the negotiations forward in London.

2. Department was glad to learn that the Belgian Colonial Minister has postponed his trip, since his presence in London seems obviously necessary for rapid progress in the negotiations. Please keep the Department continuously informed of developments in this matter.

HULL

---

641.5531/19 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Belgian Government in Exile (Biddle) to  
the Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 13, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received May 13—8:35 a. m.]

Belgian Series No. 8. My 3, April 30, 10 p. m. Vleeschauwer now plans to leave for Congo via United States on May 15. He feels he cannot longer postpone departure since this would dislocate his entire program.

Joseph Jennen, Economic Adviser to Colonial Ministry, however has been given full power to negotiate the United States-United Kingdom-Belgian Congo agreement.

[BIDDLE]

---

<sup>s</sup> Telegram No. 2289 not printed.

855A.24/29 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the  
Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 20, 1942.

[Received May 20—1 : 26 a. m.]

2798. 1. The following is text of a self-explanatory letter which Foreign Office desires to send to Mr. Spaak, Belgian Secretary of State.

"In connection with the agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Belgian Government relating to the Belgian Congo in respect of the purchase of commodities, which has been signed in London today, Your Excellency has asked for an assurance that the requirements of the Belgian Congo for equipment and other supplies essential to the maintenance and increase of production would be met.

2. I am glad to be able to give Your Excellency an assurance that His Majesty's Government in conjunction with the United States Government will make every effort, consistent with the restrictions and limitations imposed by the united war effort, to meet the requirements of the Belgian Congo for the purposes specified."

Foreign Office has inquired whether United States Government have any objection to reference to United States of America in above paragraph 2. The Department will recall the joint memorandum (Embassy's telegram 2671 [2670], May 15)<sup>10</sup> which was delivered to the Dutch and Belgian [*Norwegian*] representatives on May 14 with respect to post-war relief purchases. It seems likely that there will be a considerable number of instances in the future when the consent of this Embassy and the Biddle mission will be sought in connection with further joint communications addressed to the various Allied Governments.

It would therefore be helpful to know the Department's viewpoint with respect to the general policy involved, i. e., whether the joint approach to these Allied Governments as expressed in the above letter may be continued in those instances where they reflect American policy or whether it would be preferable, where a joint approach is desirable, for the mission to address a parallel communication to the Allied Government concerned stating that United States Government is in accord with the viewpoint advanced in His Majesty's Government's note or memorandum et cetera.

3. Other than exceptional cases, I am inclined to opinion that a parallel rather than joint approach would be preferable procedure and Ambassador Biddle concurs.

WINANT

---

<sup>10</sup> Not printed.

641.5531/22 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, June 3, 1942.

[Received June 3—1 : 16 p. m.]

3092. Department's 1094 March 16. Embassy's 1362 and 1396 of March 21 and 24 respectively.

(1) Foreign Office has today informed Embassy that renewal of Anglo-Belgian agreement to September 1, 1942, with respect to finance and purchase of commodities from Belgian Congo, will be signed tomorrow.<sup>11</sup>

(2) Embassy's 2798, May 20. As no reply has been received to this telegram Foreign Office is omitting reference to United States Government in section 2. Otherwise this letter will be handed to Belgian authorities tomorrow unaltered.

WINANT

---

855A.24/29 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1942.

2627. Your 2798, 20th. With reference your "3" Department agrees that parallel approach is preferable procedure.

HULL

---

855A.24/22 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Belgian Government in Exile (Biddle), at London*

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1942—midnight.

Belgian Series No. 3. For Biddle and Feis:<sup>12</sup>

1. Reference your 3092, June 3. Has agreement referred to in first paragraph been signed?

2. Discussions have been under way here with the Belgian Minister for Colonies, Max Horn of the Belgian Congo Purchasing Mission, representatives of the British Embassy and British missions, the Board of Economic Warfare, Lend-Lease Administration and the Combined

---

<sup>11</sup> Signed June 4, 1942; for text, see British Cmd. 6365, Treaty Series No. 1 (1942): *Agreement . . . renewing the arrangements for the Regulation of Purchases of Commodities from the Belgian Congo and Ruanda Urundi*.

<sup>12</sup> Herbert Feis, Adviser on International Economic Affairs.



Raw Materials Board. These discussions have reached general agreement along the following lines.

3. It being understood that the Anglo-Belgian agreement referred to in paragraph 1 of this telegram will be signed and will terminate on August 31, 1942, a new three-party agreement between the Belgian, British and American Governments should be entered into to become effective September 1942 and to terminate December 31, 1943. This agreement will relate to the purchase of goods from and the importation of goods into the Belgian Congo as hereinafter more fully described. This new three-party agreement will not affect the existing financial agreement between the United Kingdom and the Belgian Congo dated January 21, 1941, which agreement will continue to remain in force.

4. The proposed three-party agreement will have attached to it a schedule setting forth the requirements of the Belgian Congo which are to be supplied by the British and American Governments. A tentative list has already been supplied by the Belgian authorities here and is under consideration by the Combined Raw Materials Board, the Board of Economic Warfare and Lend-Lease. It is clear, however, that a more detailed list will have to be prepared and that the final list cannot be established until after the Belgian Minister for Colonies reaches the Congo, to which point he is proceeding in the near future. It is expected that as soon as the Belgian Government has received the Minister's reports from the Congo, the final list will be submitted to the British and American Governments. It is also expected that reports will be received from the representatives of the British and American Governments who in the near future will proceed to the Congo, with the consent of the Belgian Government, to study the requirements of the Congo and make recommendations with respect thereto. The Minister for Colonies has stated his willingness to approve the sending of three American representatives and one British representative.

5. The Anglo-Belgian agreement which expired August 31, 1941 as well as the renewal of this agreement, which it is understood was signed in London recently, contain no detailed provisions as to the exports from the United Kingdom to the Belgian Congo. It is felt here, however, that it is desirable that in the proposed new three-party agreement a list, as definite as possible, as to the goods to be shipped from the United Kingdom and the United States to the Congo should be included. It is the sense of the meetings here that it may be possible, when the definitive list is received from the Belgian authorities and when the reports of the British and American experts are in hand,

to establish a schedule for the proposed three-party agreement which will recite the goods to be furnished by the United States and United Kingdom respectively, and will classify them in three categories. The first category would be goods, the shipment of which to the Belgian Congo could be regarded as assured, subject only to shipping conditions and substantial changes in the world situation. The second class would consist of goods as to which every effort would be made to make them available to the Congo, but where it would be understood that a slight fluctuation in the supply or shipping situations might result in inability to ship the goods. The third category would be those goods which in all likelihood would not be available for shipment to the Congo but which the two supplying governments would be disposed to make available to the Congo in the event of substantial favorable changes in the supply and shipping factors.

6. The proposed division of goods in the three categories referred to in the preceding paragraph has been discussed with the Board of Economic Warfare, the Combined Raw Materials Board and Lease-Lend, all of which agencies have agreed that the establishment of such categories is desirable and practicable.

7. There will also be included in the proposed three-party agreement a list of the materials to be exported from the Congo to the United Kingdom and the United States respectively. Such a list is being prepared here by the Combined Raw Materials Board and the Board of Economic Warfare and will be telegraphed to London as soon as available.

8. It seems desirable that the agreement should be negotiated with the Belgian authorities in London. This is the desire of the Belgian Minister for Colonies and the Department sees no objection to this course. It is accordingly suggested that the procedure be that when the schedules of imports from and exports to the Congo are established to the satisfaction of the three Governments concerned, the proposed three-party agreement be drafted in London and the text thereof telegraphed to the Department for its approval.

9. The representatives of the British Embassy who have participated in these discussions with the Belgian Minister for Colonies are in agreement with the program set forth in this telegram, but since they have no authority to speak finally for their Government on the suggested procedure, are telegraphing the substance of these proposals to the Foreign Office. It is accordingly suggested that you consult with your British colleagues and inform the Department by telegraph of your opinion of the proposals contained in this telegram.

HULL

855A.24/36 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Belgian Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, June 17, 1942—midnight.

[Received June 17—11 : 33 p. m.]

Belgian Series No. 11. Preliminary meeting between Makins and Price of British Foreign Office and Ministry of Supply, and Biddle, Feis, Schoenfeld<sup>13</sup> and Steyne<sup>14</sup> was held yesterday to discuss contemplated United States-United Kingdom-Belgian Congo Agreement. It was consensus of opinion that procedure outlined in your 3, June 10, midnight, formed a satisfactory basis for negotiations.

The suggestion was advanced, however, that since considerable delay may be encountered in obtaining the final schedules of the Congo production and requirements, there would be advantages in trying to work out in advance the general framework of the agreement.

The British are obligated under article 6 of the current Anglo-Belgian agreement to enter into negotiations for a new agreement by the end of June. In the circumstances they propose next week to address a letter to the Belgians suggesting an early three-cornered meeting. At that meeting we propose to explore the possibility of drafting the general sections of the agreement into which the schedules could later be fitted.

[BIDDLE]

855A.24/93

*The Ambassador to the Belgian Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State*

No. 36

LONDON, July 14, 1942.

[Received July 23.]

SIR: Referring to this Mission's telegram No. 11, of June 17, 12 midnight and the Department's telegram No. 5 of June 22, 6 p. m.<sup>15</sup> regarding negotiation of a United States-United Kingdom-Belgian Congo Agreement, I have the honor to enclose a preliminary draft of the general provisions of such an Agreement. The enclosed draft seeks to provide a framework into which the schedules of Congo exports to the United States and the United Kingdom and Congo imports from the United States and the United Kingdom may later be fitted.

An informal meeting to discuss this draft was held today. Present at the meeting were Mr. Roger Makins and Mr. Geoffrey Harrison

<sup>13</sup> Rudolf E. Schoenfeld, Counselor of Embassy to the Belgian Government in Exile.

<sup>14</sup> Alan N. Steyne, Second Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom.

<sup>15</sup> Latter not printed.

of the British Foreign Office, Viscount de Lantsheere, Counselor of the Belgian Embassy and Mr. Jennen, Economic Adviser at the Belgian Ministry of Colonies, and Mr. R. E. Schoenfeld, Counselor of this Mission and Mr. A. N. Steyne, Second Secretary of the London Embassy.

With regard to Art. 1 providing that the Agreement should run until December 31, 1943, Viscount de Lantsheere suggested that the Belgian authorities might desire a clause permitting revision of the Agreement at an earlier date if Belgian territory should meanwhile be liberated, for in that case the Belgian Government might wish to be free to send Congo products to meet Belgian needs.

Referring to Art. 3, the Belgian representatives sought more light on the procedure for fixing prices and the question of including prices in the Agreement. The resulting discussion revealed that the Article as phrased was designed not to disturb those price arrangements which were already regulated by special agreements; that the task of fixing detailed prices might well extend beyond the time limit for the conclusion of the Agreement; and that in the circumstances it seemed desirable to exclude actual prices from the Agreement itself and to permit of the future fixing of prices by subsidiary arrangements.

With regard to Art. 4 dealing with payment, Mr. Jennen brought up the question of receiving dollar exchange for all Belgian exports to the United States. He made the point that the Belgian Government was in short supply for dollars and needed increasing amounts of dollar exchange to meet its purchases in the United States. Mr. Makins drew attention to the fact that by Art. 4 of the United Kingdom-Belgian Finance and Purchase Agreement of January 21, 1941 (enclosure to London's despatch No. 116 of March 19, 1941<sup>16</sup>), the British Treasury undertook to make available to the Belgian Government foreign exchange for necessary Belgian imports and financial services.

Mr. Makins referred to the fact that there was no Article in the Agreement that specifically dealt with shipping, but pointed out that this factor was thought to be adequately covered by the three categories of supplies for the Congo listed in Schedule 2<sup>17</sup> and referred to in Art. 6.

Mr. Jennen suggested that the Belgian Government might wish to have an Article in the Agreement specifically assuring it of the necessary shipping. He remarked that the Anglo-Belgian Shipping Agreement provided that Belgian ships in the shipping pool should be made available for the transport of supplies from the Congo to the United States but that in practice those ships had not been made available despite Belgian requests for them. Mr. Makins suggested that the

---

<sup>16</sup> Not printed.

<sup>17</sup> Printed on p. 16.

problem of securing the execution of a provision of the Shipping Agreement should be pursued with the British Ministry of War Transport as the competent authority. Mr. Jennen indicated that the Belgians were inclined to push the matter wherever they could and suggested that since the Agreement under negotiation would be three-cornered, i. e. with the United States as well as with the British, the inclusion of a reinforcing shipping Article might help. Mr. Makins said that since all shipping was pooled, including that of the United States, there would seem to be no reason to transfer the question from the authorities which should deal with it. Mr. Steyne suggested that if Mr. Jennen so desired, it could be arranged for the Belgian authorities to discuss the problem with Mr. A. C. Kerr, the American Shipping representative of the Harriman Mission.

The question also arose as to an overlapping period in the execution of the current United Kingdom-Belgian Agreement and the entry into effect of the new United States-United Kingdom-Belgian Agreement. The suggestion was advanced that the new Agreement should start with a clean slate and that any uncompleted transactions in the old Agreement should lapse and be assimilated to the provisions of the new Agreement.

In advancing the foregoing views, all concerned stressed that these observations were informal. They are therefore submitted merely to show the lines along which problems may develop.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

[Enclosure]

#### DRAFT AGREEMENT

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of the United States of America, and the Belgian Government, recognising the importance to the common war effort of the orderly regulation of purchases of commodities from the Belgian Congo and Ruanda Urundi (hereafter referred to as "the Congo") and the supply to the Congo of industrial and other material essential to the maintenance and increase of the production of those commodities, have agreed as follows:—

##### Article 1

During the period from 1st September, 1942 to 31st December, 1943, inclusive, the Belgian Government shall undertake to make available to buyers in the United Kingdom or in the United States, including departments or agencies of the Government of the United Kingdom or of the Government of the United States, as the case may be, the quantities of exports from the Congo enumerated in the first Schedule of this Agreement.

## Article 2

The quantities of the various products specified in the first Schedule of this Agreement constitute *minima* only, and further purchases of these or other commodities from the Congo for import into the United Kingdom and United States of America according to current requirements and available stocks are not precluded.

## Article 3

Purchases shall be made at prices which have been or may be agreed between the Belgian Government on the one hand and the Government of the United Kingdom or the Government of the United States, as the case may be, on the other hand.

## Article 4

Payment for all purchases covered by this Agreement shall be made in the manner usual for such purchases. If however it proves impossible to ship the agreed quantities, the purchasing Government shall—

(a) In the case of copper, cotton and copal, pay for and take title to any unshipped balance where it lies in the Congo during the month of December 1943.

(b) In the case of palm oil, palm kernels and ground-nuts pay for and take title to any unshipped balance where it lies in the Congo not later than December, 1943.

## Article 5

The Government of the United Kingdom shall, if necessary, take such measures as may be required so that the products referred to in Article 1 or any other commodity which may be purchased by the Government of the United Kingdom shall not be placed as a result of customs duty in a position less favourable than British colonial products.

## Article 6

The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States undertake to make every effort consistent with the restrictions and limits imposed by the united war effort to deliver to the Congo industrial and other supplies as specified in the three categories under the second Schedule of this Agreement.

## Article 7

The Belgian Government shall ensure the introduction, where necessary, and the maintenance in force in the Congo of administrative orders or legislation prohibiting commercial and financial transactions which may be of assistance to any Power with whom the three contracting Governments are at war.

## Article 8

The Belgian Government shall ensure the introduction, where necessary, and the maintenance in force in the Congo of a licensing system controlling exports from the Congo for economic warfare purposes, which shall be coordinated in policy and practice with the system at any time prevailing in territories in Africa administered by the Government of the United Kingdom.

## Article 9

This agreement shall come into force on signature.

In witness whereof the undersigned duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in triplicate in London, the . . . . . day of . . . . . 1942.

## SCHEDULE 2

Category I, comprising goods the shipment of which may be regarded as assured, subject only to shipping considerations and to substantial changes in the world situation:—

Category II, comprising goods as to which every effort will be made to render them available for the Congo, but in regard to which it is understood that slight fluctuations in the supply situation may result in inability to ship:—

Category III, comprising goods which in all probability will not be available for shipment, but which the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States will be disposed to make available for the Congo in the event of favourable developments in the supply and shipping position:—

---

855A.24/50 : Airgram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Belgian Government in Exile (Biddle), at London*

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1942—7:25 p. m.

A-17. Your despatch no. 36, July 14. Department desires to make following comments upon matters discussed your meeting July 14.

There is no objection to clause in tripartite agreement permitting revision of agreement before December 31, 1943 if Belgian territory should meanwhile be liberated.

Department desires a list of those prices which have been agreed upon between the Belgian and British Governments in their agree-

ment of June 4th, as a basis for considering the prices to be established in the pending tripartite agreement.

The United Kingdom-Belgian Finance and Purchase Agreement of January 21, 1941 would appear to take care of the question of foreign exchange. In considering this question, however, care should be taken that adequate incentive is offered to secure maximum production. With respect to Article IV, it seems doubtful whether we should pay for and take title to unshipped balance of commodities where they lie in the Congo in December, 1943. It would seem more reasonable to pay for and take title to such commodities at least against warehouse receipts, if possible, at the respective export points for each commodity.

It is out of the question that there be an article in the agreement specifically assuring Belgian Government of necessary shipping. Mr. Makins' remark that since all shipping is pooled, including that of the United States, there would seem no reason to transfer this question from the authorities which should deal with it, is approved.

Department has no objection in principle to the lapsing of any uncompleted transactions in the old agreement and their assimilation to the provisions of the new agreement. Specific information desired, however, as to these transactions.

In addition to above comments with regard to discussion at your meeting, Department desires to advance following suggestions.

Articles I and II of proposed agreement should state not only that Congo products should be made available according to the quantities enumerated in the first schedule of the agreement, but that United Kingdom and United States should have an option on entire output of all products enumerated.

Effort should be made to secure inclusion of a further article providing for development work in the Congo. A report, for example, from our Consul at Leopoldville dated April 23, 1942<sup>18</sup> stated that pyrethrum, for which we have urgent need, will be produced in 1942 in the maximum amount of 539 long tons. The Consul further reports, however, that the maximum possible production in 1943 is 1470 tons. The proposed article might be drafted along the following lines:

"It is recognized by the contracting parties that it may become desirable to undertake active development work for the purpose of increasing supplies of Congo products. Such development work might involve the sending of governmental organizations to the Congo, or perhaps encouraging private firms to engage in procurement of materials or cultivation of forest projects. It is agreed that the Belgium Government will facilitate such activity if it should become desirable and will place no restrictions upon such activity."

---

<sup>18</sup> Not printed.



Have received following telegram from Day: <sup>19</sup>

"Expect to forward by August 10 complete list of commodities including manufactured goods agreed to by local government as suitable basis for negotiations contemplated agreement covering Belgian Congo civilian consumption requirements. Complete survey of annual quantities and our final will require an additional 6 weeks. Will cable next few days preliminary report on automotive requirements. Gray's section of report expected by August 15 and Frasc  s by end of August." <sup>20</sup>

HULL

---

855A.24/49e : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 13, 1942—6 p. m.

3829. Department is informed that Belgium Minister for the Colonies is under the impression that memoranda, regarding the requirements of the Belgian Congo and regarding the commodities which the Congo is in a position to supply to the British Empire and the United States, should go primarily to the British Foreign Office. Will you please advise the Belgium Government, and request the British Foreign Office to do likewise, of the fact that the Combined Raw Materials Board in Washington and the Combined Production and Resources Board are expected to be the authorities which will allocate both supplies for the Congo and commodities from the Congo, and that consequently it is desirable, in order to expedite matters, that data concerning reciprocal supplies should be sent as soon as possible by the Belgian Congo Government simultaneously to the Foreign Office, and to the Department of State for transmission to these Boards.

This telegram is sent to clarify the situation for the Belgian authorities and also because the local representatives in the United States of the Belgian Congo are being asked to supply data and are hesitant to confuse the issue by asking authorities in Congo for information which is expected shortly in the form of official lists.

HULL

---

855A.24/50 : Airgram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Belgian Government in Exile (Biddle), at London*

WASHINGTON, August 17, 1942—7:45 p. m.

A-22. Department's airgram A-17, August 12. Department informed that export duties have recently been increased in Belgian

---

<sup>19</sup> Samuel H. Day, Chairman of American Economic Mission in the Belgian Congo.

<sup>20</sup> Anton Gray and Dean Frasc  , members of American Economic Mission in the Belgian Congo.

Congo on palm nuts and oil of geranium. Please consider advisability of suggesting paragraph in tripartite agreement providing that Congo export duties shall not be increased during term of agreement on commodities listed in the agreement as of interest to us.

HULL

---

811.20 Defense (M)/8533: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1942—4 p. m.

4116. Your A-17, August 18, 12:50 p. m.<sup>21</sup> Department understands from British Embassy that decision has been reached in London to postpone signing of tripartite Belgian agreement, but to make it retroactive to expiration date of present Anglo-Belgian agreement. Department considers this arrangement satisfactory.

HULL

---

[Negotiations on this subject continued through 1942 and 1943 without an agreement being reached and were then discontinued by mutual consent, problems of Congo supplies and purchases being taken care of by existing machinery. An Office of Economic Warfare mission went to the Congo in 1943 and an informal Tripartite Supply Committee was set up.]

---

<sup>21</sup> Not printed.

**BULGARIA**

**DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES TO RECOGNIZE THAT A STATE  
OF WAR EXISTED WITH HUNGARY, BULGARIA, AND RUMANIA**

[See *post*, pages 833 ff.]

**CZECHOSLOVAKIA**

**PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND  
CZECHOSLOVAKIA REGARDING MUTUAL AID IN THE PROSECUTION  
OF WAR AGAINST AGGRESSION, SIGNED JULY 11, 1942**

[For text of agreement, see Department of State Executive Agree-  
ment Series No. 261, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1562.]

## FINLAND

### RELATIONS BETWEEN FINLAND AND THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE ATTEMPTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO PREVENT FURTHER FINNISH PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION IN ASSOCIATION WITH GERMANY<sup>1</sup>

701.60D11/205a

#### *The Secretary of State to the Finnish Minister (Procopé)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of Finland<sup>2</sup> and has the honor to request that whenever a member of the Finnish Legation staff desires to go to a point outside of Washington and its immediately contiguous suburbs, such as Alexandria, Bethesda, et cetera, the Finnish Legation make inquiry of the Department of State as to the practicability of such a trip. When making such an inquiry, information regarding places to be visited, time and duration of visit, and methods of transportation to be used should be furnished the Department. Similar inquiries should be made in those instances in which Finnish Consular personnel in the United States desire to proceed to points outside of their respective Consular districts. Each inquiry will be answered in writing by the Department.<sup>3</sup>

It is understood that procedures similar to the foregoing have been made applicable to the personnel of the American Legation in Helsinki by the Finnish Government since June 1941.

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1942.

---

701.60D11/2114

#### *Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. L. Randolph Higgs of the Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] January 3, 1942.

Mr. Solanko<sup>4</sup> telephoned me this morning regarding the Department's note of today's date which he had just received relating to movements of Finnish officials in the United States. Mr. Solanko said that he would like information regarding the exact meaning of

---

<sup>1</sup> Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 1-116.

<sup>2</sup> Hjalmar J. Procopé.

<sup>3</sup> The Minister in Finland, H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld, was advised of this action in telegram No. 5, January 3, 1942 (124.60D/52).

<sup>4</sup> Risto Solanko, Counselor of the Finnish Legation.

certain aspects of our note. He inquired whether "personnel of the Legation" applied to everybody connected with the Legation, including the Minister, chauffeurs, and families of officials. I said all persons who had been officially notified to the Department as being officials of the Finnish Legation came within the purview of the note and the restrictions set forth therein. He then inquired whether honorary consuls were included and I said that in my opinion they were, since the Legation had notified us of their official status and also that it did not make any difference whether they were Finnish citizens. He inquired then as to the meaning of "Consular district". I said that I did not know the exact boundaries of the various Finnish Consular districts in the United States but that I presumed this had been the subject of communications from the Finnish Legation in the past. He said that in that case the Finnish Consul General in New York could travel anywhere in the United States, since he had consular jurisdiction over the whole country. I said that if that were the case, the Legation would not have to make the inquiries mentioned in the note regarding his visits in the United States. (When we have had some experience with the procedure set forth in our note and how the Finnish Government will react to these restrictions, we might wish to consider amending the restrictions upon movements of Finnish Consular officers in the United States to make it necessary that inquiries be made regarding any visits which they may wish to make outside of the corporate limits of the cities in which their respective consular offices are situated.) Mr. Solanko then inquired whether inquiry would have to be made of the Department when his children desired to go to Glen Echo.<sup>5</sup> I said that to give him a definitive answer I would have to give him a map but that I presumed that this would not be necessary in as much as there were no intervening suburbs. He replied that there were some intervening woods, to which I commented that I was sure that minor details of this character could always be worked out satisfactorily to all concerned.

Mr. Solanko then brought up the question of the First Secretary of the Finnish Legation, Mr. Mikkola, who was at the time in New York. He said that the Legation had endeavored to get in communication with Mr. Mikkola by telephone to order him to return to Washington immediately but so far had been unable to complete their call. I inquired when Mr. Mikkola was expected to return and upon learning that he was scheduled to be back in Washington on Monday, said that it would hardly be necessary for him to return any earlier; that in instances of such a character the Legation could assume our note was effective only in respect to future visits outside of Washington of Legation personnel. I took the opportunity then to inquire of Mr. Solanko as to the present whereabouts of Mr. Wrede, an Attaché

---

<sup>5</sup> An amusement park northwest of Washington, in Maryland.

of the Legation, who, so far as I knew, has spent very few days in Washington since his arrival in the United States. Mr. Solanko said that the Legation had already gotten in touch with Mr. Wrede who was in New York and had instructed him to return to Washington immediately. I did not suggest that the Legation might countermand this instruction so as to permit Mr. Wrede to return at a later date as in the case of Mr. Mikkola.

Mr. Solanko inquired whether we are acquainted with the precise details of Finnish restrictions upon the movements of American consular and diplomatic personnel in Finland. I said that I was not but that from what I knew of those restrictions they were similar in effect to those communicated to the Finnish Legation in its note under reference. We did not discuss this matter further.

Mr. Solanko suggested that considerable delays might be encountered from time to time in submitting and receiving written communications regarding proposed visits of the Legation personnel. He inquired what Division of the Department would be handling these matters. In reply I remarked that the Department would make every effort to expedite replies to any inquiries which the Legation might make in regard to these matters, but that any delays encountered would be the result of the pressure of work at the time inquiry was made. I said that several Divisions in the Department had to be consulted on each inquiry received from the Legation but that if the Legation so desired, they could bring the inquiries to me and I would undertake to expedite consideration of the inquiries by the other Divisions.

Throughout the conversation Mr. Solanko confined his inquiries and comments almost entirely to facts. There was, however, a discernible note of surprise at the terms of our communication. In only one instance did he depart from what might be termed legitimate inquiry. He made one reference to "prison regulations" which I quickly corrected.

---

701.60D11/228

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 8, 1942.

The Finnish Minister came in at his own request and said that he had communicated with his Government and had obtained an answer to the effect that no restriction was placed upon the movements of American diplomats in Helsinki which was not placed upon all other diplomats. In other words, there was a universal application of the restriction in Helsinki on the theory that Helsinki was a "war area". I pointed out to the Minister that it was hardly pertinent that they were confined to a war area because supposedly the whole

of Finland was a "war area". He replied that Helsinki was a special war area in that there were many war activities there and movements concerning the war which involved the safety of Finland. I mentioned the fact that they were allowing the diplomats to move around the city where there were these particular movements which the Minister mentioned.

The Minister said that he felt that we should relieve the restrictions placed upon him because many missions in Washington were allowed to move around the country at liberty and the American mission in Helsinki was not encumbered with any restrictions which were not applicable to all other members of the diplomatic corps. I told him we would communicate with him in due course.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

---

740.0011 European War 1939/18303 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, January 8, 1942—noon.

[Received 5:51 p. m.]

15. Department's 214, October 17, 1941.<sup>8</sup> The following summarizes our report on public opinion in Finland for the period December 21, 1941–January 4:

Public opinion toward the United States in this fortnight was conditioned by two factors: first, military reverses suffered by the United States in the Far East, and second, evidences of increasingly close co-operation between the United States, Great Britain and Finland's arch enemy the Soviet Union as exemplified by the conferences in Washington<sup>9</sup> and Moscow.<sup>10</sup> The public felt a rather savage satisfaction at the injuries inflicted upon the United States by Japan in East Asia tinged with ill-concealed alarm that the United States whose moral prestige was still higher than that of other nations in the Finnish mind should have become openly a comrade in arms with the loathed and feared U.S.S.R.

Official statements in the United States regarding the war received but scant treatment in the Finnish press and passed almost unnoticed.

The Finnish attitude toward Germany was one of increasing irritation at the presence of German troops who, it was felt, had not pulled

---

<sup>8</sup> Not printed; in this telegram the Department asked to receive a bi-weekly analysis of public opinion in Finland (740.0011 European War 1939/15898a).

<sup>9</sup> Meetings were held between British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and President Roosevelt and their advisers between December 22, 1941, and January 14, 1942. Correspondence on this First Washington Conference is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

<sup>10</sup> For correspondence regarding the visit of the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, in Moscow toward the end of December 1941, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 192–205.

their own weight in the war on the Finnish front but had merely shivered helplessly in the forests waiting for the Finns to win the campaign. At the same time it was recognized that Finland was wholly dependent on Germany for military supplies and to an increasing degree for food. German influence continued to be manifest, particularly in the increasingly dictatorial tone toward the Finnish press of the German Press Attaché Metzger and in such examples of Nazi editing as the suppression of certain points of the Pope's Christmas Eve message which ran counter to Nazi doctrine.

Signs of increasing restiveness in the Social Democratic Party continue to be manifest. Most significant of these was the presentation of a memorial to the Prime Minister <sup>11</sup> on behalf of the Central Federation of Finnish Trade Unions on January 3 pointing out that a continuation of the war would lead to increased difficulties in all spheres and requesting amelioration of a number of conditions which were particularly onerous for the working class, particularly maldistribution of food. The very fact that such a petition could be addressed to the Government at this time was significant of how far the acid of war weariness had eaten into the social fabric in Finland. The schism between the Socialists and the powerful Conservative class in Finland seemed to be growing wider and some thought there might even be the possibility of an open break. Certainly the prospect of a voluble and widely spread socialist peace movement in Finland, the acclaimed North Star of the New Order, would cause no rejoicing in Berlin.

Reflecting the ground swell of popular discontent with the war were the exhortations at New Year's time of the Field Marshal <sup>12</sup> and the speaker of the Diet <sup>13</sup> calling upon the home front to stand firm. Despite such exhortations there were evidences of an increasing impatience on the part of the common man with the aims of conquest proclaimed by the Field Marshal. The man in the street and the common soldier could not see why the army should hold distant Soviet Karelia when the men are needed at home.

It seemed probable that if Russia should continue to keep the Finnish front moderately active resistance here would eventually be worn down through inability of the people and the internal economy to stand the strain.

SCHOENFELD

---

<sup>11</sup> Jukka (Johan) Wilhelm Rangell.

<sup>12</sup> Karl Gustav, Baron Mannerheim, commander of the Finnish armies against the Soviet Union.

<sup>13</sup> Väinö Hakkila.



740.0011 European War 1939/18467 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the  
Secretary of State*

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), January 13, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 7:01 p. m.]

43. Inquired of Vyshinski <sup>14</sup> last night with respect to rumors (reported to the Embassy by both the AP <sup>15</sup> and UP <sup>16</sup> representatives) to the effect that conversations are in progress between the Soviet and Finnish Governments.

Vyshinski replied that he had not heard of the matter.

THURSTON

124.60D/54

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. L. Randolph Higgs of the  
Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] January 16, 1942.

Mr. Toivola <sup>17</sup> called on me this afternoon pursuant to my request made after consultation with Mr. Atherton.<sup>18</sup>

I immediately handed to Mr. Toivola without comment Helsinki's telegram no. 42 of January 15 <sup>19</sup> (transmitted in plain language). After he had read the telegram, I said that I wanted to make it clear that we were not protesting against Finnish censorship of our Legation's telephone conversations, but that I was bringing this matter to his attention because it, taken together with many recent instances of unjustified Finnish press attacks on the United States and the Administration in particular, was having an unfortunate and cumulative effect on all persons in this country who had knowledge of these developments. I said that we could afford to overlook these matters in so far as the damage which they did to our own interests was concerned but that I did not think that Finland could do so. After recalling to Mr. Toivola the often expressed opinion in Finland that Finland could depend upon Britain and particularly the United States not countenancing any measures at the peace table contrary to basic Finnish interests, I remarked that their sense of prudence should warn the Finnish Government and people not to go too far along the lines recently manifested, lest they put too great pressure upon the friends of Finland in the United States and Great Britain. Mr. Toivola

<sup>14</sup> Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinski, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

<sup>15</sup> Henry Cassidy was Associated Press correspondent in the Soviet Union.

<sup>16</sup> Henry Shapiro was United Press correspondent in the Soviet Union.

<sup>17</sup> Urho Toivola, Counselor of the Finnish Legation.

<sup>18</sup> Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

<sup>19</sup> Not printed.

readily agreed that the recent trend of events in Finland did carry with it the danger which I had mentioned and he said that he was going to send a personal telegram to Helsinki strongly urging that more careful consideration be given to measures of the character in question. He said that the Finnish press could not be strictly neutral in its comments, in as much [as] it could obviously never criticize Germany in any way because of Finland's complete dependence upon Germany at this time for foodstuffs. I said that I understood this but that to me it seemed unnecessary for the Finnish press to attack the United States and the President in the way they had been doing lately. I pointed out that an analysis of these attacks strongly suggested German inspiration and I intimated that I believed that the press attaché of the German Legation in Helsinki might be exerting pressure on the Finnish press and the Information Central along the lines he considered desirable. Mr. Toivola readily agreed that this was a reasonable conclusion.

As another instance of what I had in mind, I showed Mr. Toivola an intercept of a Tokyo radio broadcast allegedly quoting a statement of the Finnish Legation in Tokyo to the effect that recent rumors regarding a Soviet-Finnish peace were "nothing but Anglo-American machinations". I made it clear to Mr. Toivola that I was not convinced that the Finnish Legation had, in fact, made any such statement but that if it had done so, I thought it a mistake from the point of view of Finland's own interests, because, as he knew personally, this Government had had absolutely nothing to do with any of these recent rumors.

Mr. Toivola was obviously disturbed at all of these matters which I brought to his attention. Our conversation was entirely friendly and reasoning. He expressed appreciation for my bringing the matters to his attention.

---

701.60D11/2181

*The Finnish Minister (Procopé) to the Secretary of State* <sup>20</sup>

The Minister of Finland presents his compliments to His Excellency The Secretary of State and has the honor to refer to his note of January 5th, 1942 <sup>21</sup> concerning certain restrictions, mentioned in the Secretary of State's note of January 3, 1942, as to the travels of members of the staff of the Finnish Legation and of Consular Officers of Finland.

In the aforesaid note of January 5th the Finnish Minister had submitted the question whether the restrictions mentioned in the Secretary

---

<sup>20</sup> Handed to Assistant Secretary of State Long by the Minister on January 20.

<sup>21</sup> Not printed.

of State's aforesaid note are to apply to American citizens acting as honorary consuls or serving at the offices of the Legation or the Consulate General or who are in the service of any of the officers attached to the Legation or the Consulate.

Referring to the above mentioned and also to several verbal conversations which at different times he has had in the State Department, the Minister of Finland has the honor hereby to repeat what in the conversations he has brought to the knowledge of the Department, viz. that pending a reply to his aforesaid note of January 5th, the Legation of Finland, having brought the contents of the Secretary of State's note to the attention of all Finnish citizens concerned, has not up to the present informed the American citizens referred to in the note of January 5th about the matter.

At the same time the Minister of Finland most respectfully reiterates the following facts brought forward in his aforementioned verbal conversations.

As far as there are restrictions in Finland as to travels of members of the diplomatic corps, they apply to all foreign diplomats in the country.

It is further to be noted that the Finnish capital Helsinki is in the war zone.

Finnish citizens who are serving as honorary consuls or at the offices of legations or consulates or who are in the service of officers attached to legations or consulates are not subject to other restrictions concerning their travels than Finnish citizens in general.

The restrictions mentioned in the Secretary of State's note of January 3rd do not, as far as the Finnish Legation is informed, likewise apply to the personnel and the staff of other embassies, legations and consulates in general.

WASHINGTON, January 20, 1942.

---

760D.61/1620

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The British Minister at Stockholm <sup>22</sup> has learnt from his Soviet colleague <sup>23</sup> that she has informed the Finnish Government through unofficial Swedish channels that she would be prepared to enter into contact with them and has hinted that Finland might expect more favourable terms now than later. The Soviet Minister has expressed

---

<sup>22</sup> Victor Alexander Louis Mallet.

<sup>23</sup> Alexandra Mikhailovna Kollontay.

a wish that these contacts should be kept strictly secret for the time being.<sup>24</sup>

WASHINGTON, 20 January, 1942.

---

740.0011 European War 1939/18729

*Memorandum by Mr. L. Randolph Higgs of the Division of European Affairs to the Acting Chief of the Division (Atherton)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 21, 1942.

MR. ATHERTON: You will recall that yesterday Mr. Reed<sup>25</sup> of the British Embassy told Mr. Achilles<sup>26</sup> that the British Government believed it would be making it easier for Finland to make peace with the Soviet Union, if the British and American Governments should make it clear to the Finnish Government that we are not disposed to be lenient in our attitude toward the continuance of present Finnish policy. Mr. Reed said that at present British propaganda was following this line and in response to his inquiry you approved Mr. Achilles' informing Mr. Reed that our own attitude coincides with the British attitude in this matter.

To follow out the policy mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, you may wish to consider whether we should have the Minister at Helsinki deflate the present optimistic attitude taken by Witting<sup>27</sup> as reported in the Minister's telegram no. 58 of January 20.<sup>28</sup> I attach a draft of a telegram<sup>29</sup> to the Minister along these lines.

---

740.0011 European War 1939/18828a. Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld)*

WASHINGTON, January 21, 1942—11 p. m.

23. Please make occasion to see Witting and state that you wish to convey to him the following as your views, based on information in your possession, because of his remarks of January 20 (your 58):<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>24</sup> In another *aide-mémoire* of February 4, 1942, the British Embassy reported that Mme. Kollontay had no further information on establishing contact with the Finns, and no serious approach on the part of the Finnish Government to the Allies was considered likely (760D.61/1621).

<sup>25</sup> J. L. Reed, Second Secretary of the British Embassy.

<sup>26</sup> Theodore C. Achilles of the Division of European Affairs.

<sup>27</sup> Professor Rolf J. Witting, Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>28</sup> Not printed; the Foreign Minister, on the grounds of reports received from Procopé, professed to believe in an increasingly friendly attitude toward Finland developing in Washington, which was being reflected generally in the American press.

<sup>29</sup> Not printed, but see telegram No. 23, January 21, to the Minister in Finland, *infra*.

<sup>30</sup> See footnote 28, above.

I. You are fearful of Procopé's interpretation of the underlying temper of the American press and public towards Finland. The public remembers that Finland disregarded America's timely advice as to cessation of hostilities with Soviet Russia.

II. Official opinion remains unchanged since my comments to the press of last November.<sup>81</sup>

III. Our estimate of British attitude toward Finland at present is that it is stiffening in accordance with policy of ever closer cooperation with the Soviet Union. Finnish Government should not overlook natural effects of British policy on our own in questions affecting our common effort against the forces of Axis aggression.

HULL

---

740.0011 European War 1939/18842 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, January 23, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received 9:12 p. m.]

66. Your 23, January 21. I called on Foreign Minister Witting this afternoon and after saying that I had been pondering his statements to me January 20 regarding reported basic attitude of American public and press towards Finland I expressed concern lest I had not made clear my view that his advices were not in accord with my own knowledge of those matters. Accordingly I said I had tried to formulate my views in a personal note addressed to him which I read and which embodied the three points of your telegram omitting mention of Procopé personally. I left the letter with him.

Witting said he presumed I had gained impression from his statements that he felt attitude towards Finland in United States was more favorable than it really is and I answered in affirmative. He then said that Procopé had qualified his report regarding more friendly American attitude by adding that he had not changed his own opinion regarding long range outlook as to which he was not optimistic. I expressed regret that I had not previously understood him to say so as in fact he did not. I said I was relieved to learn this since I should not wish Finnish Government to be under any misapprehension that we no longer stood by our position as stated by you or under your instructions last fall.

He then launched again into exposition of necessity for achieving Finnish strategic aims saying for first time to me they included

---

<sup>81</sup> Concerning comments made by Secretary of State Cordell Hull in November 1941, see telegram No. 226, November 3, 1941, to the Minister in Finland, and memoranda by Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles of November 13 and 18, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, pp. 88, 99, and 106, respectively; and footnote 77, *ibid.*, p. 107.

control of Karelian and Onega Isthmuses because of development of Murmansk railroad area for aggression. I asked whether on assumption Finland should control Isthmian areas mentioned and Russians should develop Archangel-Vologda railroad area in same way Finland would then consider it necessary for same reasons of defense to move further east and cover new areas. Witting said Finland would not be able to do that. I then suggested that it seemed futile to build Finland's security only on so-called strategic lines adding that Americans believed in necessity of basing security on sound political foundations. I said we were optimists as to that possibility and this pointed to the great issue of present war. Witting answered that if German and British statements regarding rights and sovereignty of small nations were compared they would be found substantially identical and there was little to choose between them. I asked whether he thought German action in Norway, Holland and Belgium among other smaller countries was to be compared with action of Britain and he said Germans merely got there first.

I asked whether the "realism" of which President Ryti <sup>32</sup> had often spoken as characteristic of Finns and which was also mentioned in Finnish answer of November 11, last,<sup>33</sup> to our representations <sup>34</sup> was to be understood as describing above reported views. Witting said Finnish realism was based on age old experience with Russians and that each generation of Finnish leaders tried to preserve this nation for their own time. They had succeeded thus far against hopeless odds and could only go on trying.

During conversation Witting mentioned that according to Procopé views expressed "privately" in State Department circles included thought that small nations of Europe must be put under Anglo-Russian control after war and their sovereignty correspondingly limited, and as to Germany that her industrial equipment must be purged of any facilities for waging war.

Manifest tendency of my statements today in pursuance of your number 23 was by no means lost upon Witting whose response was grave in tone but it was also clear that he was at loss to know what Finland could do in present circumstances. I should say Witting realizes as indeed he has doubtless done for some time that his Government is increasingly the toy of forces beyond its control.

SCHOENFELD

---

<sup>32</sup> Risto H. Ryti had become President of Finland on December 19, 1941, following the resignation of Kyösti Kallio.

<sup>33</sup> See telegram No. 572, November 12, 1941, from the Minister in Finland, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 91.

<sup>34</sup> See telegrams No. 220 and No. 222, October 25 and 28, to the Minister in Finland, *ibid.*, pp. 81 and 84, respectively.

701.60D11/206

*The Secretary of State to the Finnish Minister (Procopé)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of Finland and has the honor to inform the Minister in reply to the inquiry made in his note no. 20 dated January 5, 1942<sup>86</sup> that the inquiries described in the Secretary's note of January 3, 1942 apply equally to personnel of the Finnish Legation and Finnish Consulates who are American citizens, since such personnel, because of their official capacities, are under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Finland. The Minister would appear to be entirely justified in requiring such personnel of American citizenship to conform to the Secretary of State's request of January 3, 1942 or, in the case of their refusal to do so, in severing their official connections with the Finnish Government.

This opportunity is taken to modify the Secretary's request of January 3 to make it necessary for Finnish consular personnel in the United States to make inquiries of the character in question whenever they desire to depart from the city limits of the cities in which their respective consular offices are situated.

WASHINGTON, January 27, 1942.

---

740.0011 European War 1939/19060 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, January 30, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 12: 51 p. m.]

77. In conversation last night with former Foreign Minister Erkkö he told me there was no doubt of the overwhelming majority of Finnish people for withdrawal from war. Question was how to secure this end and when. He thought the time was not yet and believed that it would depend upon right combination of external circumstances which might be presented at moment when it would be to distinct advantage of Russians to see Finland out of war and when Germans had success somewhere which would make them relatively indifferent to Finland's withdrawal. It would be necessary to watch carefully for opportunity presented by some such combination of events and to seize it with skill and firmness.

He said prime consideration from Finnish standpoint remains assurance that Russians keep out of this country. If this were assured it might even be possible to face risk German displeasure perhaps involving outright attack on Finland but in this event question of supply

---

\* Not printed.

from overseas would be paramount and there would have to be some guarantee in that respect to save Finns from starvation.

Although Erkkö did not say so I am convinced he also believes Finnish Government missed opportunity to reach settlement afforded by our intervention last year because he adverted to his own experience when Minister at Stockholm in establishing contact which led to Moscow peace,<sup>37</sup> saying that contact was tenuous enough at first but became most definite with careful handling. I gathered he feels next opportunity must not be missed.

Erkkö said that being in military service he cannot express his views openly, but that he can discuss such questions with a few people in authority including Prime Minister Rangell and does so.

He confided that from purely human standpoint friction between Finnish troops and Germans is growing and that there is increasing dissatisfaction in military circles with German incapacity on Finnish front. Indeed he intimated that Finns were inclined to question that capacity on rest of the front and asked how it was that Finns were able consistently to throw Russians back and Germans could not do so.

SCHOENFELD

---

740.0011 European War 1939/19216a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld)*<sup>38</sup>

WASHINGTON, February 2, 1942—5 p. m.

31. Following treacherous Japanese attack on December 7, and subsequent declarations of war on us by Germany and other Axis powers on December 11, 1941, we have been compelled to review in the light of those events the military and political situations in all other countries not signatory to the Declaration by United Nations<sup>39</sup> or at war with us. In the case of Finland we find that probably the most outstanding factor at this time is the use which German troops are

---

<sup>37</sup> For correspondence on negotiation of this treaty signed March 12, 1940, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 298-317; for translation of text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 27, 1940, p. 453.

<sup>38</sup> In response to an inquiry by Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr., regarding the "objective" of this telegram, Mr. L. Randolph Higgs of the Division of European Affairs, who drafted it, explained in an attached memorandum dated January 30, 1942:

"With possibility in mind we or British may find it necessary at some future time to make a landing at Petsamo or move through Northern Finland from Murmansk area against Germans in Northern Norway and Finland, Eu [Division of European Affairs] thinks it desirable to emphasize at this time for the record the use which German troops are making of Finnish territory.

"Another aim of the attached telegram is to reinforce the thought to the Finnish Government that by prolonging its close association with Germany it risks running into unavoidable complications which neither it nor we desire."

When the Acting Chief of the Division, Ray Atherton, initialled this memorandum, he added: "I cite also spirit of attached" telegram.

<sup>39</sup> Declaration of January 1, 1942, vol. I, p. 25.



making of Finnish territory as bases of military operation, so far as we are aware, with the full consent of the Finnish Government.

We are unaware of any evidence that the Finnish Government has taken any action since Germany's declaration of war on us or even before that date, to clarify or justify its position with regard to the continued presence in Finland of German armed forces and use of Finnish territory as a base of operations by German forces. It must be recognized that the continued presence and activities of German armed forces on Finnish territory unopposed by the Finnish Government has a direct bearing on the status of Finland in the present war situation.

You are requested to bring this matter orally to the attention of the Finnish Government, leaving with it a memorandum of your oral presentation of our views.

HULL

---

740.0011 European War 1939/19204 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, February 3, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received 11:27 p. m.]

91. Finance Minister Pekkala called on me this afternoon as he said to inquire as to present state of relations between Finland and the United States which is matter of concern to many here. He said frankly he was not kept informed about foreign policy but whenever he had inquired recently either of Prime Minister Rangell or Minister Tanner,<sup>41</sup> with special reference to United States, he had been told there were no new developments. I told the Minister that it was difficult for me to discuss these matters with him in present circumstances but that I felt Finland's position could not be considered stationary and was necessarily affected by rapid developments of the war, this being particularly true since attack on United States by Japan. Hence, I said Finland's position seemed to require clarification and time was of the essence.

Pekkala said he could assure me of two things: First, that great majority of Finnish people were sympathetic to cause of the democracies and, second, that conviction was steadily growing that Finland must make separate peace with Soviet Union. He did not know how long it would take for these facts to find expression in official action but he appreciated importance of time element. He expressed opinion that even Field Marshal Mannerheim and many in the Finnish Army shared these views and assured me they were also shared not only by

---

<sup>41</sup> Väinö A. Tanner, Minister of Commerce and Industry until May 1942; then Minister of Finance.

Social Democratic Party leaders including Tanner and rank and file of that party but by numerically smaller political groups including Swedish Party and Progressives. When I inquired as to attitude of Agrarian Party his answer was they were still convinced that Russians must and could be crushed and in any case took little interest in foreign policy.

Pekkala said he never discussed anything with Foreign Minister Witting and intimated some lack of confidence in President Ryti but he asserted categorically that the two propositions above stated were absolutely in accordance with facts and that movement based on them was growing steadily.

I expect to see Foreign Minister Witting tomorrow to make representation directed in your 31, February 2. Meanwhile it is apparent from Pekkala's visit and from other indications which Department will have noted in my recent telegrams that there is increasing uneasiness here both about relations with us <sup>42</sup> and possibility of Finland withdrawing from the war.

SCHOENFELD

---

740.0011 European War 1939/19219 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, February 4, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 8 : 55 p. m.]

94. Department's telegram No. 31, February 2. I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs as directed today and left with him memorandum in confirmation of oral statements. He said he could not make considered comment at the Foreign Office and would have to examine memorandum most carefully.<sup>43</sup>

He pointed out at once that Finland is now dependent for 93% of its imports on German good will, a remark which was doubtless prompted by the fact that German delegation for renewal of trade agreement negotiations has just arrived here and called on him immediately preceding my visit. He also said that Finland's position with regard to German troops and use of Finnish facilities by Germans was similar to that of Iceland with regard to Allied troops and asked

---

<sup>42</sup> The Minister in Finland again pointed out in his telegram No. 98 of February 5, 1942, that public opinion toward the United States was largely uninformed owing to the suppression of American news coming from non-Axis sources. To overcome this deficiency, the Legation had recently commenced the distribution of a news bulletin to some 375 persons, who had accorded it an enthusiastic reception, while it also speedily ran afoul of the German Legation. The Minister further declared that German officials at this same time were making determined efforts to prevent the showing of American motion picture films in Finland. (740.0011 European War 1939/19245)

<sup>43</sup> Foreign Minister Witting's *aide-mémoire* in reply is contained in telegram No. 127, February 16, from the Minister in Finland, p. 39.

what Icelandic Government could do in event of German demand for evacuation of Allied troops from that Island. I said I saw little similarity between the two situations inasmuch as Finland was actively and voluntarily engaged in war.

Witting went on to say that even in the time of Russian domination of Finland "there had often been periods when no "constructive" action could be taken by Finnish patriots and that Finland at the present time was "like a mouse in a trap" and similarly in a period when there was little to do but keep quiet.

It was evident that so far as Witting is concerned there was little disposition to try to shake off the German grip on this country if only on the theory that Finland could not risk starvation which he believes will ensue for Finns if Germans have any pretext for interrupting imports to this country.

SCHOENFELD

---

740.0011 European War 1939/19350 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, February 9, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received February 10—12:56 a. m.]

239. My 229, February 7, 1 p. m.; 211, February 5, 5 p. m.; 103, January 19, 7 p. m.; 38, January 9, 2 p. m.;<sup>45</sup> and Department's 31, February 2, 5 p. m. to Helsinki. From all information available here it seems clear that Finnish military situation is rapidly deteriorating. Should spring and summer arrive without a cessation of Russian-Finnish fighting and a Russian offensive take place ending in the complete military collapse of Finland there would arise possibilities of reaction in Sweden which in my view cannot be ignored. The further Russian forces penetrate into Finnish territory during such an offensive the harder would become the terms on which Finland might make peace and as the Russian forces got nearer the Swedish and Norwegian frontiers there would arise in this country a cry for assistance to Finland. Such assistance in those circumstances would suggest Swedish collaboration with the Germans and would play strongly into the hands of the small but potentially influential pro-German group in Sweden as well as appealing to those circles, including officers of the high command, who though not pro-German doubt possibility of an Allied victory. An appeal for Swedish assistance for Finland in this eventuality would also command popular support from among classes who have no sympathy for Germany. As a result this country might be faced with an internal political

---

<sup>45</sup> Finland was a Duchy and Grand Duchy in the Russian Empire between 1809 and 1917.

<sup>46</sup> None printed.

crisis of the first order, which could endanger present coalition government and might place in power a group whose policies would be dangerous to democratic cause.

Madam Kollontay, Soviet Minister, has expressed herself privately as being exceedingly concerned about possible effects on Sweden of a Russian victory and advance into Finnish territory. She believes that only hope for Russo-Finnish peace is for a simple cessation of fighting. My understanding is that she has brought her view to attention of her Government and is exploring possible ways in which it may be made effective.

JOHNSON

---

711.60D/55

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 12, 1942.

The Minister of Finland called to see me this morning at his request. The Minister began the conversation by asking what opinion I had with regard to relations between Finland and the United States at this moment.

I replied that, as he knew, I had been away for the better part of a month and since my return I had been so occupied with urgent problems that I had not had any opportunity to acquaint myself with recent developments regarding Finland.

The Minister went into a very long and exceedingly rambling conversation which always came back to the expression of his hope that relations between Finland and the United States would not deteriorate and that there would be nothing like a severance of relations between the two countries.

I again and again reiterated the same basic principle, namely, that in as much as the United States was now engaged in war it was impossible for it to consider maintaining normal or understanding relations with any country which was actively assisting the Axis powers.

The Minister insisted that his Government had officially stated to the United States that it would not participate in any way in the war between the United States and Germany.

I repeated that if Finland was actively engaged in assisting Germany in fighting Russia that obviously constituted active assistance on the part of Finland to the enemy of the United States.

I made it clear that because of our traditional friendship for the Finnish people we had so far undertaken a very patient and forbearing policy towards Finland, but that if Finland were now to embark upon major offensive operations against the Soviet Union, it would

inevitably give rise to a situation which I was sure the Minister and I would regard as regrettable.

The Minister endeavored, as usual, to get me to give him a detailed statement as to how far Finland could undertake military operations against the Soviet Union without being regarded as going beyond the bounds of what this country would stand. To this I consistently replied that the statements I had already made on this and previous occasions and the statements made to the Minister by the Secretary of State made perfectly clear beyond the shadow of any misapprehension the position of this Government in that regard.

The Minister likewise endeavored to get me to give him some information with regard to the conversations between Stalin<sup>46</sup> and Mr. Eden. I said that I regretted that I was not in a position to give him any information on that point.

The Minister handed me a copy of the address made by the President of Finland at the opening of the present session of the Finnish Parliament which is attached herewith.<sup>47</sup>

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

740.0011 European War 1939/19350 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, February 13, 1942—7 p. m.

85. As a means possibly of sounding out Swedish Government on matters mentioned in your 239, February 9 and of influencing it to urge Finnish Government not to participate in further offensives against the Soviet Union we suggest you press on such Swedish officials as you deem appropriate the following thoughts:

Ryti's recent speech and other information now available to us strongly suggest Finnish Government has decided to gamble everything on a final German victory and may now be considering collaboration with German forces in further offensives in Soviet territory. We take such a serious view of these developments we hope that in the interest of Finland and the rest of Scandinavia the Finnish Government might be persuaded not to take any action which would further complicate Finland's position with anti-Axis forces but to make every effort to come to a peaceful understanding with the Soviet Union at the earliest possible moment—or at least to arrange for the cessation of fighting.

Repeat to Helsinki.

HULL

---

<sup>46</sup> Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union, People's Commissar for Defence, etc.

<sup>47</sup> Not printed.

660D.6231/138 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, February 14, 1942.

[Received February 15—3:45 a. m.]

122. New trade agreement between Germany and Finland was signed here yesterday following negotiations since February 3. Official statement published press today to effect that "negotiations conducted in spirit of brotherly and hearty cooperation inspired by common task offered opportunity for far reaching consideration all economic questions and resulted in complete agreement". Statement adds "Within framework agreements reached we received assurance that on German side everything in their power being done in field both of public supply and industrial and financial economy so that Finland's economic striking power in common struggle may be kept unbroken and strengthened and so that Finland on its side notwithstanding difficulties caused by war and demands created thereby shall deliver to Germany in highest possible quantity important products from its forestry resources and industry." Also announced that special agreement simultaneously concluded regarding exchange goods between Finland and Norway.

German negotiator Schnurre<sup>48</sup> quoted in press having said negotiations not only involved extension previous agreements regarding exchange goods and regulation of payments but intensification thereof. Said negotiations would be undertaken middle this year within framework agreement reached yesterday regarding details exchange of goods and that discussions covered all economic questions including raw materials and foreign trade. Finland would be provided with coal, iron, artificial wool, etc., in sufficient quantity. Added that as clearing procedure cannot be maintained to full extent further regulation of payments will be made later and that "Finland despite great difficulties has delivered great quantities forest products and other things to Germany" also that "agreement reached is specially advantageous to Finland and shows that talk of weakness of Finnish economy is without foundation".

SCHOENFELD

740.0011 European War 1939/19505 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, February 16, 1942.

[Received February 17—2:44 a. m.]

127. Minister Foreign Affairs this afternoon handed me following *aide-mémoire* in English language under today's date.

<sup>48</sup> Karl Schnurre, head of the Eastern European and Baltic Section of the Commercial Policy Division of the German Foreign Office.

*"Aide-Mémoire.* The arrival of German troops in Finland was originally based on a transit arrangement made in September 1940<sup>49</sup> and referring to transportation of German military personnel and matériel through Finland from Germany to northern Norway and back. Having received from the German Government an enquiry suggesting such an arrangement the Finnish Government gave their consent. The main reason why the Finnish Government took this attitude was the policy of the U. S. S. R. towards Finland after the conclusion of the peace in Moscow. The numerous demands on Finland put forward by the U. S. S. R. clearly indicated that the Soviet Government was not disposed to treat Finland as a sovereign state with which, in conformity with the peace treaty, it ought to have entertained friendly and normal relations. Immediately before the conclusion of the above mentioned arrangement with Germany, the Finnish Government had been forced to grant to the Soviet Government free passage of military transports on the railway between the frontier and the Hanko<sup>50</sup> territory.<sup>51</sup> It became obvious from the continued pressure and policy of extortion carried out by the Soviet Government that they were preparing for Finland the fate of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania,<sup>52</sup> a fate to which the Finnish nation will never submit without fighting. During the months following the conclusion of the arrangement with Germany it became evident that the Finnish Government had correctly appreciated the consequences of the German troop transports as a check on Soviet efforts to interfere in Finnish affairs as for the time being the crisis was postponed.

This is the background against which the presence of German troops in Finland ought to be seen and considered.

However, the developments in the world situation on which Finland had no influence, led before long to new tension and to open war. In June, 1941, the U. S. S. R. attacked Finland. Finland was thus involved in hostilities with the U. S. S. R. already at war with Germany. The presence of German troops in Finland now took on a new aspect. Their activities from Finnish territory against Soviet forces are a consequence of the struggle against the common enemy. These relations of co-belligerency were created by the military situation and without any political commitments.

Finland wages war against the U. S. S. R. for the purpose of safeguarding her existence and permanent security and does not want to become involved in the events referred to in the first paragraph of the American Minister's memorandum dated February 4, 1942.<sup>53</sup>

Attaching the greatest importance to the continued maintenance of the friendly relations between Finland and the United States of

---

<sup>49</sup> The Minister in Finland summarized the provisions of this transit agreement of September 22, 1940, in his telegram No. 416, September 26, 1940, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, p. 347.

<sup>50</sup> Hangö, Khanko.

<sup>51</sup> This convention of September 6, 1940, was reported by the Chargé in the Soviet Union in his telegram No. 1173 of September 15, 1940, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, p. 343.

<sup>52</sup> For correspondence on the forcible occupation of the Baltic States and their incorporation into the Soviet Union, see *ibid.*, pp. 357 ff.

<sup>53</sup> This memorandum was given to the Foreign Minister of Finland by the American Minister at the time of carrying out the instructions sent by the Department in telegram No. 31 of February 2, p. 33, about which he had reported in telegram No. 94 of February 4, p. 35.

America the Finnish Government believes that to achieve their aim mentioned above cannot be against the aspirations of the American Government. Helsinki February 16, 1942."

Repeated to Stockholm.

SCHOENFELD

---

740.0011 European War 1939/19512 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, February 16, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received February 17—4: 18 a. m.]

128. My 94, February 4, and 127 today. When Foreign Minister Witting this afternoon handed me his memorandum I [read] it in his presence and after doing so I had two inquiries to make. First, with reference to statement in third paragraph from end of memorandum to effect that U. S. S. R. attacked Finland last June, inquired whether Finnish Government considered there was no connection between presence of Germans in Finland at that time and alleged Soviet attack. His answer was that Finland considered attack in June 1941 part of same aggression which had begun in November 1939 and had continued even following Moscow peace. Secondly, I asked whether penultimate paragraph of his memorandum in light of official statements including President Ryti's latest speech that Finland was fighting for destruction of Bolshevism and would continue until common victory with Germany defined purpose of safeguarding Finnish existence and permanent security. Witting said destruction of Bolshevism was certainly Finnish war aim.

Witting then alluded to effort made by Finnish Government in summer of 1940 to secure agreement with Sweden for common defense and failure of that effort through Swedish timidity and later formal Soviet objection.<sup>54</sup> He expressed view already expressed by Wasastjerna<sup>55</sup> as previously reported that Soviet objection was very short-sighted for Finnish-Swedish agreement at that time would have made it possible for this country as well as Sweden to remain neutral.

Accumulation of Russian strength in Finnish area in summer of 1940 especially in tense crisis of August of that year had led directly to situation in which Finnish-German transit agreement in September was accepted here as great relief.

---

<sup>54</sup> Information about the consideration of plans for the formation of a northern defensive alliance, and the note of March 27, 1940, from the Soviet Union to the interested Scandinavian countries warning against the creation of any such combination, is contained in telegrams No. 315 of March 20, 1940, and No. 330 of March 26, 1940, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, and in telegrams No. 152 of March 28, 1940, and No. 164 of April 4, 1940, from the Minister in Sweden. *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 318, 320, 323, and 325, respectively.

<sup>55</sup> Jarl Axel Wasastjerna, the Finnish Minister in Sweden.



As early as November 1940 Witting again said Germans were aware of far-reaching Russian preparations including accumulation of men and matériel for attack not only on Germany, but incidentally on Finland which was confirmation of Finnish apprehensions in summer of 1940 when Finland knew Russians had every intention of attacking this country again.

I then turned to statement in penultimate paragraph of Witting's memorandum to effect that Finland does not want to become involved in greater war and asked whether this signified that Finland had already attained her strategic aims and that continuance of hostilities against Russians was result only of Russian offensive tactics at the front. Witting said that in a democratic country like Finland where military and civil direction was in different hands it was not possible as in authoritarian states precisely to define strategic aims of military leadership. It was true, however, that for long time past activity on Finnish front was due to Soviet offensive tactics which incidentally had recently been very costly to Russians in Povenets area where only some 60 prisoners had been taken in an operation which had cost Russians approximately 3,700 killed.

I intimated that what seemed to us to be of primary importance at this time was relation of Finnish military action to necessary passage of overseas supplies for Russia in our struggle against Germans. He asked how in practical terms Finland could control German action in this respect at a time when Finland was almost wholly dependent upon German good-will for imported supplies necessary to sustain life of Finnish people.

I asked whether this was not somewhat humiliating position for Finns to be in and whether they had given up all pretension of exercising their own free will. He countered by saying that free will of Finland was determined by its geographical position in precisely the same way as that of Sweden or of the United States which latter was protected by two oceans.

It seems perfectly clear that while Finns may still hope not to be forced to take aggressive action which will interfere with passage of our supplies for Russia they have very little confidence that this hope can be realized and are prepared if necessary to face consequences of enforced cooperation with Germany. I believe therefore it would be true to say Finns will not voluntarily take any action further to complicate their position with anti-Axis forces as suggested in your 85, February 13, to Stockholm, but that they rather expect that military necessity or events over which they have no control preclude possibility of their coming to peaceful understanding with U. S. S. R. at this time or even to arrange for cessation of fighting on Finnish front. I do not think it likely that Sweden can exert their influ-

ence successfully as desired by Department. The Finnish mind is made up.

Repeated to Stockholm.

SCHOENFELD

---

740.0011 European War 1939/19538 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, February 17, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 7:29 p. m.]

129. Your 85, February 13, to Stockholm. I asked my Swedish colleague <sup>56</sup> today whether he thought it possible at present for Finns [to reach understanding?] with Russians for cessation of hostilities. He answered in negative pointing out that though there was considerable body of opinion among Social Democratic and Swedish parties in favor of some action to that end this body had no effective leadership and would go along with Government on ground of national unity. I also asked Westman whether he felt it was possible for him to exercise any influence in that direction and he likewise answered in negative saying he would not wish even to try to do so since if he should talk along those lines with Witting it was not unlikely latter would report it to Germans and thereby further increase German displeasure with Sweden. He said he believed Finns for present neither can nor desire to come to understanding with U. S. S. R., mentioning that during recent visit here of Swedish newspaper editors Witting had emphasized dependence of Finland on Germany for essential supplies and that at same time Finns had sought to impress Swedes with merits of their annexation policy by circulating to the editors copies of Professor Jaakkola's <sup>57</sup> book entitled *Finland's Eastern Problem* to which I referred in my telegram No. 718, December 29, last, <sup>58</sup> and which purports to make out case for extensive acquisitions of Soviet territory.

Westman said that while there had been some wavering and uncertainty here a few weeks ago, recent reverses of Allies had again strengthened Finnish confidence in German success against Russians, although there was still anxiety as to possible effect on Finland of German exhaustion next fall, when Russians might be in position to concentrate their strength against Finland. Field Marshal Mannerheim was, therefore, giving very anxious thought to military situation and was finding it hard to reach any decision.

Westman added that Finns had begun their war thinking it would be short, victorious and ignored by Britain but that in all three respects

---

<sup>56</sup> Karl Ivan Westman.

<sup>57</sup> Jalmari Jaakkola, professor of history at the university in Helsinki.

<sup>58</sup> Not printed.

they had miscalculated. They had "gone into the air without a parachute." He was not able to express opinion as to whether Finns will themselves undertake further offensive operations against Russians in immediate future and seemed to feel, as I do, that this is still an open question.

Repeated to Stockholm.

SCHOENFELD

---

701.60D11/2234

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 18, 1942.

The Finnish Minister came in to see me at his request.

We first cleared up the question of permission for him to travel to New York and Providence, which had been granted yesterday. The Minister told me he had planned to go to Providence to spend a week-end with Mrs. Merriman but as there was not adequate time, he was limiting his trip to New York where he had to investigate an expenditure by the Finnish Consul General there.

He took advantage of the opportunity, as usual, to discuss the problem of Finnish-American relations. I told him that these had been made entirely clear to him by Mr. Welles and that there was not much now to say.

The Minister said that certain columnists had accused him of misleading his Government as to the friendship of the United States and Finland. Actually, he had not done that but had always leaned to the dark side of the picture.

He referred to a conversation he had with me at my house some months ago, in which I had told him that the ineluctable forces of military operation could produce only one result. Finland was fighting on the side of the Germans—and the rest of the world were lining up against the Germans.

I observed that I had nothing to add to the statement I had then made, namely, that the cardinal fact was that Germany was the enemy of the United States and of most of the civilized world, and that Germany's allies were necessarily lumped with Germany in the general jackpot.

I pointed out that I had told him then that the theory that there was a separate Finnish-Russian war, apart from the general war, was an impossible position to take. The Minister said he knew this was so and he had consistently so reported to his Government. He added that he saw no solution.

I said that I could again refer him to his conversation with Mr. Welles. The Minister observed that Mr. Welles had not proposed a

solution but had merely stated that if Finland's policy continued as it was, relations with the United States would become more critical. The Minister had reported to his Government that would probably mean a breach of relations between the United States and Finland. I made no comment.

The Minister then said that he found it difficult to see how the Finns, even though they did not take part in the spring offensive, could follow the situation resulting from the existence of German troops on the ground. They were not in a position to fight both Russia and Germany.

I said that as to that, I was not well enough informed to discuss the matter.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

740.0011 European War 1939/19690 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, February 24, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received 4:46 p. m.]

144. There has been no reference in Finnish press thus far to Stalin's declaration yesterday<sup>59</sup> on anniversary of Red Army including his statement that recovery of Baltic States and Karelia is Soviet war aim.

SCHOENFELD

740.0011 European War 1939/19741 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, February 25, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received 3:03 p. m.]

149. My telegram no. 147, today.<sup>60</sup> It is now quite obvious that the Finnish Government is following a deliberate policy of suppressing or at least distorting all statements by President Roosevelt bearing on the war situation. This contrasts even with policy toward Great Britain as Churchill's pronouncements are reported in the Finnish press in some detail. I am somewhat at a loss to know what we can do about this in view of manifest control over Finnish press exercised by Germans and should welcome the opinion of the Department as to any action that might be taken.

SCHOENFELD

<sup>59</sup> The Department received a report of Stalin's speech in telegram No. 163 of February 24, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, vol. III, p. 416.

<sup>60</sup> Not printed.

860D.5018/23 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, February 28, 1942—noon.

[Received 12:40 p. m.]

162. My telegram 64, January 22.<sup>61</sup> Jubilation over increase in bread ration of approximately 20 percent for February owing to German promises of grain has been short lived. Ice conditions in the Baltic have caused suspension of maritime traffic with result that food ships for Finland are icebound at Stettin and other North German ports. Ministry of Supply has been forced to requisition one-half of wheat and all rye seed reserved for next autumn sowing in Southern and Central Finland as well as cereals reserved for consumption by farmers in August which are to be returned later. This is an emergency measure designed to tide over the country until grain ships arrive from Germany but it emphasizes the force of Witting's repeated assertions to me that Finland is now dependent on Germany for essential food supplies.<sup>62</sup>

It is equally rejuvenating however that apart from effects upon Finnish policy of an eventual change in the military aspect of the general war, the United Nations have it in their power to influence Finnish policy whenever they can assure Finland of adequate food supplies.

SCHOENFELD

711.60D/58

---

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] March 3, 1942.

The Minister of Finland called to see me this morning at his request.

The Minister said he wished to read to me the telegram he had sent to his Foreign Minister after his previous conversation with me. The Minister read to me what purported to be a copy of his telegram and what he read to me seemed to be an accurate account of the conversation held. In the text which he read to me, the Minister had emphasized the statement I had made to him that if the Finnish Government now undertook openly and actively to assist the German Government in an offensive attack upon the Soviet Union, the relations between our two countries would reach a very serious crisis.

---

<sup>61</sup> Not printed.

<sup>62</sup> The Germans were, of course, quite aware of this hold over Finland. In telegram No. 171 of March 4, 1942, Minister Schoenfeld repeated the remark made by a German official: "If Finns do not do as we wish, *was machen sie!*" (860D.9111/66)

I said that what the Minister had read to me seemed to be an accurate presentation of the views I had expressed to the Minister and that I could only reiterate today the same views and with even greater emphasis, if possible. I stated that as I had said before, the Government of the United States had learned to have a very high regard for the people of Finland since shortly after the termination of the last world war and that this Government had always believed that the democracy of Finland was a very useful and desirable element in the concert of nations. I said, however, that to speak very bluntly, I believed the Minister would agree that no matter what the termination of the present war might bring about, the existence of friendly and cordial and intimate relations between our two countries was of far greater value to Finland than to the United States. I said, therefore, it seemed to me from the long range standpoint that the Finnish Government would certainly desire to think very carefully before embarking upon any adventure or policies which would result in the elimination of that relationship with the United States.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

860D 85/161

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] March 3, 1942.

The Finnish Minister called upon me at his own request. He stated that he had handed Mr. Welles a note on the subject of Finnish ships and he handed me a copy thereof which is attached.<sup>63</sup> He stated that the Finnish ships had an engagement with the United States Maritime Commission through the Finnish Shipping Mission<sup>64</sup> in New York to operate these ships on the Inter-American routes and that the British Government had given its permission for these vessels to return to United States ports. When Britain declared war on Finland, five of these ships were taken over by the British. The Minister claimed that we were responsible to Finland for the vessels because we had not forced the British to live up to their agreement to permit those vessels to return to American ports but had themselves appropriated them.

I told the Minister that his statement was correct except that it omitted to take note of the fact that the agreement with the United States and the undertaking of Great Britain was during a period when Great Britain and Finland were on a friendly basis. There was no war existing between the two. They had broken relations and

---

<sup>63</sup> Not printed.

<sup>64</sup> Finnish Shipowners Commission.

that was the occasion for the undertaking on the part of Great Britain to permit the ships to return to United States ports. However, the agreement did not contemplate that upon the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Finland that those ships would continue in the same relationship and receive the same treatment by Great Britain. The outbreak between England and Finland had changed the situation and had caused England to change its attitude toward ships of a power which had suddenly become an enemy power. I told the Minister that his claim, if any, would be against England and not against the United States and that the proper way for him to present his claim or to make any observations his Government might care to make on the subject of these vessels was through the intermediation of the Swedish Government as their protecting power with the British Government; that their protest or their claim should be made to Great Britain and not to the United States.

The Minister said that he was making this "for the record"; and that he did not expect any immediate action on the part of the United States.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

---

701.60D11/243j

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] March 4, 1942.

The Finnish Minister came in to see me at his request.

He brought up again the question of restrictions on Finnish consuls who are by law required not to leave the city in which they work. He said he believed that some of the honorary consuls who were American citizens were not observing this; specifically, there was an honorary consul who worked in New York but lived in Long Island. He likewise asked about restrictions on his own movements, saying that he had to go to New York quite frequently in connection with the liquidation of the Finnish purchasing mission.

I said the matter was still under consideration and I would try to expedite a solution.<sup>65</sup>

He then, as usual, tried to draw me into a discussion of the general Finnish position. I avoided this, saying that I thought that the discussions had between himself and Mr. Welles had made the matter perfectly clear.

He renewed his insistence that they considered it a "Finnish War", not to be connected with a World War. I confined myself to saying

---

<sup>65</sup> A notation dated March 12, 1942, to this portion of the memorandum reads: "Mr. Berle says to let Eu [Division of European Affairs] handle this: the Minister should not be able to shop around."

that unhappily Finland had got herself into the position of fighting on the side of the Germans, with all that implied.

He asked whether he might personally go over the various possibilities in the situation. I inquired whether he was doing this by instruction of his Government and he said he was not. I said that I likewise had no authority to discuss those matters and that I feared that under all the circumstances, merely personal discussion could be of no useful result.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

---

702.60D11/165

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Finnish Minister (Procopé)*<sup>66</sup>

WASHINGTON, March 7, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. MINISTER: In view of the statement in your note of March 4, 1942<sup>67</sup> that Finnish citizens in American service in Finland are not subjected to other restrictions than other Finnish citizens, I am prepared to agree to withdraw the limitations imposed upon American citizens in Finnish employ in this country set forth in the Department's note of January 27, 1942.

I hope this will ease your situation.

I am [etc.]

SUMNER WELLES

---

740.0011 European War 1939/1999 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, March 8, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 3:55 p. m.]

181. Jarnefelt,<sup>68</sup> former Finnish Minister at Washington, visited me yesterday. He said he had opposed his Government's policy at time of outbreak of war with U. S. S. R. last summer and had thought it would be wise to await developments before committing Finland. He had disagreed also with view then held by President Ryti and other leaders here that Soviet regime would collapse in matter of weeks under German attack. Now, however, things had gone so far that it would be most difficult to turn back especially since Germans constantly betray concern about Finnish policy by repeated inquiry whether Finns intend to make separate peace.

Jarnefelt intimated Finnish policy might indeed change if German military position deteriorates seriously but in that event change in

---

<sup>66</sup> This note was acknowledged with "very sincere gratitude" by the Minister on March 9, 1942.

<sup>67</sup> Not printed; this was a personal letter from the Minister to Mr. Welles.

<sup>68</sup> Eero Jarnefelt was the Finnish Minister in Washington, 1935-39.



policy might also involve revolution in this country which would sweep away many present leaders.

When in answer to his inquiry, I stated with conviction that Germany would be defeated by American action and that our war effort against Germany would not be deflected by necessity of waging war in Far East, Jarnefelt said it was realized both here and in Germany that this was American strategy. Result thereof he said would be to make northern theater, particularly Murmansk area, very important and might easily bring Finland into conflict with United States. I expressed agreement with this view.

Jarnefelt strongly deprecated local talk of so-called new strategic frontier saying that air power had made any such frontier meaningless for Finland. He spoke similarly of war slogan that Bolshevism must be destroyed saying Bolshevism was Russian internal affair resulting from conditions caused by First World War and that it had manifestly been succeeded by strong national resurgence on [in] Russia quite apart from fact that Finnish peasant and worker were not easily persuaded to accept alien political ideas.

He said, however, it is still quite impossible to obtain rational hearing for such views which are received with scorn and indignation. People here, he said, are divided as they were in 1918 between those on German side and those who look to West and new leadership of Finland; above mentioned would emerge from latter category. . . .

When I suggested that recent Finnish policy had appearance of gamble on German victory without alternative line of retreat Jarnefelt did not deny it. He seemed to accept my further suggestion that it appeared to be necessary for Finland to get back to strong moral position it held in eyes of world during war of 1939-40 and that to do so more would be required than official claim which was already wearing thin and almost abandoned that Finland is following independent line. To do this, however, Jarnefelt pointed out it was now extremely difficult considering position into which Finland's relations with Germany had drifted.

. . . Though he wondered whether present war may not have produced vindictive spirit previously lacking among Russians towards Finns, he said his experience in Russia indicated that Russians felt no such hatred for Finns as latter feel for Russians. I gathered he feels there must be an accommodation with Russians on reasonable terms.

Whether our warnings and intimations official and unofficial in recent months have had effect on Finnish policy should appear more clearly in next few weeks. If Finns refrain from trying to interfere with northern supply route via Murmansk railroad by cutting line at Sorokka, for instance, this will be seen by time that [thaw?] sets in since otherwise such operation must be postponed till summer.

Should they so refrain it will be due in great part to acceptance by Finnish Government and High Command of views like those expressed by Jarnefelt and to him yesterday. Meanwhile Brazilian Chargé d'Affaires <sup>70</sup> tells me he has it on good authority that Finnish military have always concluded Sorokka is now too strong to be taken even by Finns. Latest Finnish communiqués continue to mention bombing of railroad south of that place.

SCHOENFELD

---

711.60D/59 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, March 11, 1942.

[Received March 12—4: 18 a. m.]

199. Finnish Government's annual report for 1941 submitted to Diet includes usual section behalf Ministry Foreign Affairs from following extract refers United States: "As appears from foregoing fact that Finland was drawn into war also had political effects on relations between Finland and United States. Number of measures very regrettable from Finland's standpoint also took place on part United States Government in economic matters. However, friendly relations between the two countries continue in normal diplomatic forms although actual connections chiefly economic were interrupted in consequence of general war."

SCHOENFELD

---

740.0011 European War 1939/20356 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, March 16, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received March 16—2: 52 p. m.]

218. Former Estonian Minister Varma <sup>71</sup> informed me today that Germans about a month ago brought pressure to bear on Finns to secure withdrawal of American Legation from Finland. Representations were made both to Finnish Minister at Berlin <sup>72</sup> and to Foreign Office here. Representations were oral and informal and Finns answered that severance of relations with United States would cause unfortunate reaction among masses of Finnish people and hence was not considered for present.

Varma adds that Foreign Office officials now express regret Finnish Government did not take stronger line in opposing German pressure

---

<sup>70</sup> P. C. de Souza Dantas.

<sup>71</sup> Aleksander Varma.

<sup>72</sup> Toivo Mikael Kivimäki.

for breaking off relations with Britain last summer. Gripenberg <sup>73</sup> lately Finnish Minister at London has made his views on subject known here and both he and former Counselor of Finnish Legation at London <sup>74</sup> have been frank in deprecating wisdom of Finnish policy in relation to Britain. This Varma says has had influence on Finnish Government's attitude toward German pressure with reference to United States apart from accepted fact that public opinion here is definitely opposed to rupture with United States.

SCHOENFELD

740.0011 European War 1939/20731 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, April 1, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received April 1—8:20 a. m.]

251. French Minister <sup>75</sup> told me yesterday he has good reason to think Finns have decided to take no further offensive action against Russians at least for present and are resolved to resist continued German pressure to participate in spring offensive. He says Finns explain visit to [of] Marshal Von List to far north as German affair in which they are not concerned.

Now that Finns have recovered Suursaari Island in Gulf of Finland, as just announced, I believe French Minister's impression may be quite correct.

He adds that feeling Finnish Government as among public is definitely that anything should be avoided which might further jeopardize maintenance of relations with United States. When he said Finnish Government is firmly following its "middle course" my comment was that policy of Government hardly leaves Finns much choice.

SCHOENFELD

740 0011 European War 1939/21166 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, April 22, 1942—5 p. m.

296. We have been informed <sup>76</sup> that early in March Soviet Minister in Stockholm raised with British Minister there question of effecting Finnish withdrawal from the war pointing out danger to Finland of cooperation with Germany after war turns against Axis and reper-

<sup>73</sup> G. A. Gripenberg, Finnish Minister in the United Kingdom until the break in relations, August 1, 1941.

<sup>74</sup> R. Seppälä.

<sup>75</sup> Hubert Guérin.

<sup>76</sup> The Department had received its information through an *aide-mémoire* of April 13, 1942, from the British Embassy (not printed).

cussions in Sweden from Finnish military collapse. British Government instructed Mallet and Ambassador at Kuibyshev to take no action on this matter which would give rise to Soviet suspicions that British Government is flirting with Finland at Soviet expense and that generally Finns and Russians should be left to find their own way to initiate a settlement. British appear to feel Finns would not be amenable to settlement until they can see probable outcome spring offensives.

We have been much interested in foregoing information which is passed on to you to put you in a better position to interpret any developments pertinent thereto coming to your attention. We feel British Foreign Office instructions mentioned are soundly conceived.

Department has repeated this telegram to Kuibyshev. Please repeat to Helsinki as no. 61.

HULL

---

740.0011 European War 1939/21094 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld)*

WASHINGTON, April 23, 1942—7 p. m.

63. Your 291, April 20," and related telegrams. We suggest you endeavor to see Ryti and say to him orally we are much concerned with persistent reports from many sources that Finnish troops may resume the offensive against Soviet territory; and that since we have already made our position in that general connection clear we can only re-emphasize at this time our more than ever confident belief that Germany will be completely defeated by the United Nations.

HULL

---

740.0011 European War 1939/21256 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, April 27, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received April 28—5:02 a. m.]

309. Upon his return to Helsinki from an absence President Ryti received me today and I spoke to him in sense of your 63, April 23. President expressed confidence that Russian resistance to Germans would be broken this year and countered any intimation of possible further Finnish offensive in Soviet territory by asserting that it was Russians who continued to attack Finnish positions. These attacks in recent past and still going on in some sectors at no time represented serious threat to Finnish positions and in general he gave impression that Finnish military situation remained satisfactory.

He said he could not know outcome of war against Germany but he remained sure that if Germany were defeated and Russia victorious Bolshevism would sweep Europe, including Britain and even threaten internal stability in United States. President while disclaiming sympathy with Nazism considers Hitler pivot of balance between Nazi Party and German Army which balance might be destroyed by his elimination and deliver Germany to Bolshevism while in Britain and United States the lowering of standard of life, the casualties and other losses incident to war on its present scale would similarly prepare ground for proletarian upheavals at least akin to Bolshevism if in form different from its expression in Russia.

Ryti expressed doubt that we would be able to restore European position in Far East and said he expected the present would not be the last war between United States and Japan. Ryti said that if Finland and the other northern countries survived present war it would be necessary with Sweden and Norway to form the northern coalition which Finland sought to create in 1940 and which was accepted in principle by Swedes but failed for various reasons.<sup>78</sup>

In response to inquiry as to effect of continuance of war on Finland's internal economy President was vague but expressed view that in Finland as well as in other belligerent countries including Britain and United States public debt being piled up would never be repaid.

So far as Finland's relation with Russia and Germany was concerned the President said frankly that as a Finn he would prefer the danger attendant upon German domination of the continent to decapitation of the Finnish people which would follow Russian control of this country because the first danger could be met by passive resistance in which Finns were experienced whereas the second danger would mean destruction of nation. He said that during the peace negotiations at Moscow in March 1940 Molotov had frankly admitted to him that purpose of Soviet policy was creation of a new Soviet nationality and elimination of all traditional national groups in the Soviet Union.

My conversation with President which lasted more than 2 hours and covered pretty well entire range of world affairs was first I have had with him since November and I do not think he has changed in slightest his view of what Finnish policy should be. I would describe that policy as designed to make maximum use of Finland's relation with Germany to prevent Russia from controlling this country but with no inclination specially to facilitate possible German plans for propagation of Nazi ideology here. Policy mentioned undoubtedly includes also hope that territorial gains already achieved can at least be held pending result of European War and perhaps extended if Rus-

---

<sup>78</sup> See footnote 54, p. 41.

sian power is forced back to line of Volga River which the President mentioned. He clings tenaciously to the claim that hostilities last June were initiated by Russians against Finland and said in response to my inquiry as to reason for such action on part of Russians that it was undoubtedly due to Soviet Government's knowledge of its own military power, which was unknown outside Russia, and to belief that relatively small number (about 30,000) of German troops then in this country could be destroyed and Finland taken over because of its supposed exhaustion as a result of Winter War.

So far as our relations with Finland are concerned, my view is that nothing we can do short of direct military action or a free offer to feed Finland will change Finnish policy. The President said as much when he pointed out that if Russia were on victorious side at end of war she would dispose of this country as she saw fit and we could do nothing about it. Britain, he said, was already committed to Russian domination of this country and President asserted that he knew this to be fact although he admitted that we were still governed in our view of status of Finland and of the small nations in Russian orbit by our interpretation of Atlantic Charter.<sup>79</sup>

Summing up—there has been no essential change in Ryti's view of general European situation. He still expects European War to end in relatively short time, say within a year with defeat of Russia or her withdrawal to Volga and a compromise peace between Germany and the Western powers. He seems still to count on German victory for salvation of Finland but said that he would make peace with Russia the moment he could get "security." I did not press for any definition of that term in view of your no. 61, April 22.<sup>80</sup>

SCHOENFELD

---

740.0011 European War 1939/21251 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the  
Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 27, 1942—midnight.

[Received April 27—11 : 20 p. m.]

2202. The competent official of the Foreign Office mentioned that the various reports which circulate occasionally regarding the possibil-

---

<sup>79</sup> For text of the Atlantic Charter, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367. The Minister in Finland commented in a later telegram, No. 320, April 29, 5 p. m., that the Finns still believed that "despite our displeasure at their collaboration with Germany," at the end of the general war our sympathy "will at least preserve their independence and lead us to contribute to reconstruction of the country. They are strengthened in this view by fact that, notwithstanding our warnings since last fall, they have been able to keep to their course and at the same time maintain official relations with us." (740.0011 European War 1939/21300)

<sup>80</sup> See last paragraph of telegram No. 296, April 22, 5 p. m., to the Minister in Sweden, p. 52.

ity of Finland withdrawing from the Russian war apparently originate in the hopes of certain Social Democrats in Finland and gain currency abroad through Social Democratic circles in Sweden. In this official's view such reports were exaggerated and premature to say the least and he still believed that Finland would in any event await an indication of the outcome of this summer's eastern campaigns. According to this official, one of the chief holds which the Germans possess over Finland is the food supply. The Foreign Office had consequently considered suggesting to the Russians that, despite their present food stringency, they might explore the practicability of making food available to the Finns as a possible basis of discussion at some later stage. This suggestion had been telegraphed to the British Embassy at Kuibyshev which was left discretion whether it should be placed before the Russians at this time, particularly from the standpoint of whether the suggestion under the present circumstances might be interpreted by the Russians as part of an independent British initiative to make peace with the Finns, an impression which the Foreign Office wished to avoid. As yet no answer has been received from Kuibyshev.

The Foreign Office official referred with appreciation to the co-operation which the Department has extended to the British Embassy in Washington in the consideration and formulation of policy toward Finland.

MATTHEWS

---

701.0090/114

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. L. Randolph Higgs of the  
Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] May 4, 1942.

Mr. Solanko came in to see me this afternoon. He inquired as to the reasons for an announcement he said had been made by the American Legation in Helsinki advising American citizens that the last opportunity for them to return to the United States would be provided when the Swedish steamship *Gripsholm* leaves Göteborg at the end of this month.<sup>82</sup> The manner in which Mr. Solanko phrased his inquiry indicated clearly that he suspected some political implication in the announcement.

I told Mr. Solanko that I had not previously heard of any such announcement and could not therefore make any specific comments regarding the matter. It was my opinion, however, that the announcement was another in the series, and probably the last of such

---

<sup>82</sup> The *Gripsholm* and *Drottningholm* were exchange ships used for repatriation of American officials and other American citizens from Europe in accordance with agreements with the German and Italian Governments. For correspondence on this subject, see vol. I, pp. 285-377.

announcements, issued by American Consulates and Missions in Europe since August 1939. I went on to say that as difficulties in Europe for American citizens had increased and as facilities for their return to the United States became available, it was our policy to advise all American citizens who could do so to return to the United States.

Mr. Solanko inquired why no such announcement had been issued before the recent sailing of the *Drottningholm*. I replied that I presumed it was because of the shortness of time between the receipt of information that German authorities would permit Americans to sail on the ship and its departure.

In order not to ease his mind too much, I cautioned Mr. Solanko on his departure that what I had said in the foregoing connection was based upon supposition, and that other factors unknown to me might possibly be involved.

---

740.0011 European War 1939/21467a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)*

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1942—6 p. m.

196. According to a UP despatch dated Stockholm, May 2,<sup>83</sup> Soviet radio stations broadcasting on that date to the Finnish people promised Finland territorial gains if they would lay down their arms and conclude a separate peace.

In case an opportunity should present itself and unless you should perceive some objection to so doing, please inquire of the appropriate Soviet authorities (a) whether such Soviet broadcasts have been made to the Finnish people; (b) whether such broadcasts indicate that the Soviet Government has decided upon a definite policy with regard to Finland in case Finland should make a separate peace and (c) what this policy might be.

You may in your discretion point out that your inquiries are made with the purpose of ascertaining whether your Government might possibly be of some assistance in any efforts to induce Finland to make a separate peace.

The text of some of these broadcasts would be helpful.<sup>84</sup>

HULL

---

<sup>83</sup> The United Press despatch was carried in the *Washington Post* for May 3, 1942.

<sup>84</sup> Confirmation of such broadcasts from Moscow as were mentioned in the Finnish press was reported by the Minister in Finland in telegram No. 341, May 6, 1942. Here they were described as "offering Finland certain territorial compensations but stating that this country will have to pay war indemnity at very high figure." (740.011 European War 1939/21446) The Finnish reception of these broadcasts was not encouraging.



701.60D11/2781

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 6, 1942.

The Minister of Finland came in to request information as to the reason for which he had been denied the right to go to New York on the 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th of this month. I treated the matter lightly and told the Minister that it was not necessary to go into explanations as to why the application had been denied; that he of course recognized the right of any government to deny such an application under the circumstances at present existing; that there was no personal reflection upon him and no intention to prevent him from attending to the business of his mission but that the Government had exercised its right to say that for these particular dates and at that particular place it was inconvenient for the Minister to proceed.

He asked if restrictions had been placed upon Minister Schoenfeld and whether he was allowed to proceed to his country home, about forty miles from Helsinki. I told the Finnish Minister I did not know whether he could proceed to his country home but for the last six months he certainly would not be making it a habit to proceed to his country home. I then stated that whereas our action has nothing to do with the theory of retaliation and should be entirely divorced from that thought, yet the fact remained that several officers of the United States in Finland had been denied the right to proceed to certain destinations and that one officer had been denied the right to visit with his family outside Helsinki. I stated I realized the conditions were different because Finland was actually the scene of warfare, but under the conditions existing here, the United States must insist that it had the right at any time to approve or deny such an application.

The Minister mentioned his summer plans and wanted to know if there would be any objection to his having his family, which would include a young child and a baby, take a place outside of Washington. He asked particularly if he might go to the seacoast. I said there would probably be no prohibition upon it but it might be difficult and embarrassing for him from time to time because there were regulations owing to the war in force along the seaboard. It would be more difficult for a foreigner, even if he were a Minister, than it would be for an American, and there would be plenty of difficulties for Americans. He seemed to agree that it would border upon the impractical.

There is no doubt in my mind that the Minister associated this denial with the possible immediate probability of his demission. I obtained from him the unmistakable impression—not from his words, however—that he felt this might be a part of a breach of relations.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

740 0011 European War 1939/21500 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State*

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), May 10, 1942—4 p. m.  
[Received 5 p. m.]

379. Department's 196, May 5, 6 p. m. In response to my inquiry concerning the reported Soviet broadcast, Vyshinski emphatically stated last evening that the Soviet Government had not broadcast any peace appeals to Finland and would not take the initiative in making peace overtures to the Finnish Government since Finland started the war.

STANDLEY

740.00119 European War 1939/1007 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State*<sup>85</sup>

ANKARA, May 20, 1942—9 p. m.  
[Received May 21—4: 53 p. m.]

456. For President, Secretary and Under Secretary. Finnish Minister<sup>86</sup> called on me this morning and told me present Axis-Soviet front in Finland substantially follows Finnish-Soviet frontier of October 1939 on the Karelian Isthmus and along Svir River from Lake Ladoga to Lake Onega thence along west shore of Lake Onega to head of Lake thence along railroad to Nadvoitsk<sup>87</sup> thence north from 50 to 100 miles west of Murmansk railroad. He said total number German troops in all Finland at present time numbered about six divisions nearly all of which are operating or stationed north of Lake Onega. Line on Karelian Isthmus and along Svir River and Lake Onega is held by Finnish troops.

Minister said his Government desired a permanent frontier with Soviets which would be strategically defensible and line now held south of Nadvoitsk would constitute such a frontier. He expressed doubt a definite frontier could be established other than at a general peace conference but remarked present line was substantially frontier Finland would seek. He clearly indicated exact frontier was subject to negotiation provided lines agreed upon was strategically defensible.

After Minister had informed me of foregoing and had emphasized his desire for absolute secrecy particularly in respect of his disclosure of number of German troops now in Finland and their position I inquired of him as to whether his Government was prepared

<sup>85</sup> This telegram was repeated to the Minister in Finland in Department's telegram No. 109, May 23, 7 p. m., with a request for comment.

<sup>86</sup> Baron Aarno Armas Sakari Yrjö-Koskinen.

<sup>87</sup> Nadvoitsy.

to make a separate peace with Soviet to which he replied that in his personal opinion it was but only on basis of a strategically defensible frontier.

I then inquired as to whether he had received specific instructions from his Government or from Ryti, Tanner, Erkkö or perhaps Paasikivi<sup>88</sup> to impart foregoing to me. Although he denied having received any suggestions from anyone I am inclined to view that he would not have approached me on this subject without instructions from his Government.

As Minister apparently expected a reply to his approach I assured him that I would report what he said to my Government.

From nature of Minister's remarks I am reasonably satisfied that Finnish Government would welcome any steps Department might see fit to take with object of ascertaining terms on which Soviet Union would be prepared to make a separate peace with Finland.

STEINHARDT

740 00119 European War 1939/1015 . Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, May 26, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received May 26—2:16 p. m.]

434. Definition of Finnish front given by Finnish Minister at Ankara as set forth in your 109, May 23,<sup>89</sup> seems approximately correct but as indicated in my 359, May 8,<sup>90</sup> there are probably nine or more German divisions in this country. As suggested in my 417, May 22,<sup>90</sup> Finns now are alone on Svir front and it seems probable that Finns alone hold Karelian Isthmus notwithstanding report in my 426, May 23.<sup>90</sup>

"Strategically defensible frontier" mentioned by Finnish Minister at Ankara remains declared war aim of Finland. What such frontier might be when Finland finally stands alone against U. S. S. R. and in view of modern methods of war particularly air power is not easily defined. I think Finnish Minister was repeating sentiment expressed in my 309, April 27 when President Ryti said to me he would make peace any time he could be sure Finland could get "security". It may be that Ryti directed his Minister at Ankara to sound Steinhardt because of latter's participation in conversations preceding Moscow peace of March 1940 but I have no reason to think Finnish Government is prepared to make separate peace with U. S. S. R. at present.

<sup>88</sup> Juho Kusti Paasikivi, Finnish Minister in the Soviet Union, April 1940 to May 1941

<sup>89</sup> See footnote 85, p. 59.

<sup>90</sup> Not printed

Finnish Minister at Ankara apparently ignored important question what Germans might think of Finnish attempt to conclude separate peace. Finns are bound by their relation of cobelligerency with Germans and are not likely to abandon it without obtaining compensatory protection. This suggests that until tide of war definitely turns there is little to convince Finns they should give up German support. Two conditions seem necessary to such change in Finnish policy as heretofore repeatedly reported namely change in military situation favorable to us and capacity to feed these starving people. On both points perhaps as good a statement as any was made by Erkkö some months ago when he said to me in facetious manner that best solution might be landing of overwhelming American force in north Finland to protect this country not only against Russians but Germans as well. At present I do not think Finns can disengage themselves even if they would.

In view of your 61, April 22,<sup>1</sup> I shall not approach Foreign Minister or President pending further instructions with regard to possible peace feeler mentioned in your 109. It happens that on June 2 I expect to have important members of Government and some former Cabinet Ministers for a stag dinner and if Department has any suggestions on this occasion I may be able to sound Witting or Tanner.

SCHOENFELD

---

740 00119 European War 1939/1007 Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld)*

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1942—8 p. m.

114. Following telegram has been sent to Steinhardt in connection with subject matter of your 434, May 26.

"We are inclined to believe approach mentioned in your 456 was unauthorized. Schoenfeld holds similar opinion. However, in order that no real opportunity be lost to effect Finland's withdrawal from the war, we think it desirable that you inform your Finnish colleague in effect as follows:

"We are ready to be of assistance to his or the Soviet Government in reaching a peaceful settlement of their differences, if requested to do so. However, it is our understanding that the Soviet Government now feels that any initiative for such a settlement must come from the Finnish Government. Hence, before giving further consideration to approaching the Soviet Government to ascertain its reaction to the Minister's intimations, we feel it desirable to be informed categorically whether his approach to you was under specific instructions from his

---

<sup>1</sup> See last paragraph of telegram No. 206, April 22, 5 p. m., to the Minister in Sweden, p. 52.

Government, and if so, to be given a clearer definition of the terms on which his Government would be willing to make a settlement.<sup>92</sup>  
 "Repeated to Helsinki."

It is not suggested that you initiate any discussion of foregoing matter at time mentioned last paragraph your telegram under reference.

HULL

---

740.0011 European War 1939/21944 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, June 3, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received June 3—11:41 a. m.]

459. In conversation last night with Paasikivi, formerly Finnish Minister at Moscow, who was always well regarded by Russians and is probably most moderate among Finnish leaders in his views on relations between Finland and the U.S.S.R., he indicated that he saw no solution for that problem except on basis of maintenance of German power as counterbalance to U.S.S.R. He insisted that Russian mentality was wholly alien to that of western Europe and that Stalin's policy represented combination of outright expansionist aims with internal development. He agreed with Witting and Tanner who were also present that only force could prevent Russian encroachment in northern Europe though at same time he admitted Russia was potentially self-sufficient and consequently irresistible in long run by purely military methods. He expected that exhaustion resulting from present war would keep Russians quiet for a time thereafter, but he was skeptical of Russian sincerity in accepting principles of Atlantic Charter and expressed grave doubt that Britain and United States could exercise any controlling influence over U.S.S.R. if war concludes favorably for United Nations.

It was evident from my talk with Paasikivi as well as with other Finnish leaders last night that they continue to count on German power as their only available resource against U.S.S.R. and that if this fails them they see no alternative to destruction of their national existence and Russian domination of entire European continent. Their panacea is reconciliation of western powers and Germany to form united front against Russians and they make no secret of their belief that this united front will also have to face the Japanese. In short, these Finns consider Russians incorrigible and our political idealism impracticable.

SCHOENFELD

---

<sup>92</sup> Some discussion of the possibility of peace between Finland and the Soviet Union took place between President Roosevelt and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, during the latter's visit in Washington. See the third paragraph of the memorandum by Mr. Samuel H. Cross of the morning conversations on Monday, June 1, 1942, vol. III, p. 578.

740 0011 European War 1939/22126

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)* <sup>93</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] June 5, 1942.

The Minister of Finland called this afternoon to see me at his request.

The Minister was obviously perturbed by the declaration of war, unanimously approved by the Congress, upon Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria.<sup>94</sup> He referred to this and inquired whether any change of policy on the part of the United States towards Finland was contemplated. I told the Minister that the policy of this Government towards his country had been made very clear in conversations which he had had with Secretary Hull and myself. He said that he had learned of the visit to Washington recently of a "distinguished visitor",<sup>95</sup> and asked whether there was any evidence that the Soviet Government was pressing the United States to change its policy towards Finland. I answered that the policy of the United States was determined by this Government, and was not formulated as a result of pressure from any other government. He said that, of course, recent Soviet negotiations with Great Britain<sup>96</sup> had created profound disquiet in Finland, where the fact that these negotiations had taken place was generally known, and that if it were known that the United States had held similar conversations with Soviet officials of the highest rank, that would create far greater disquiet in his country.

I said that I had just learned of the visit of Hitler to Field Marshal Mannerheim in Finland,<sup>97</sup> and that this visit could only be interpreted as meaning that Germany was demanding that Finland cooperate with Germany in some new offensive action against the Soviet Army, presumably towards Murmansk and Archangel in order to cut off the flow

<sup>93</sup> The substance of this conversation was sent to the Minister in Finland in telegram No. 122, June 8, 8 p. m.

<sup>94</sup> On June 5, 1942. For correspondence regarding recognition of a state of war with these countries, see pp. 833 ff.

<sup>95</sup> Negotiations on the occasion of the visit of V. M. Molotov in Washington (May 29-June 4, 1942) are described in vol. III, pp. 566-583, 585-587.

<sup>96</sup> Treaty of Alliance in the War against Hitlerite Germany and Her Associates in Europe, and Collaboration and Mutual Assistance Thereafter, signed at London on May 26, 1942; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CCIV, p. 353; for draft of treaty and subsequent changes, see telegrams No. 2897, May 24, and No. 2922, May 26, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 558 and 564, respectively. For correspondence regarding the conversations leading to the conclusion of this treaty, see *ibid.*, pp. 490-566, *passim*.

<sup>97</sup> Adolf Hitler and party had been in Finland from soon after noon until about 6:30 p. m., on June 4, 1942, on the occasion of the 75th birthday of Field Marshal Mannerheim. Conversations between Government leaders were also reported to have taken place.

of British and American war materials to the Soviet Union through those ports. I said that, as Secretary Hull and I had both informed the Minister, if the Government of Finland were now to undertake to give open and direct assistance to Germany against the Soviet Union, such action would necessarily and immediately result in a complete change of policy on the part of the United States. I said: "It seems to me that your Government must, therefore, realize that whether or not the policy of the United States towards Finland changes depends on Finland herself."

The Minister spoke at some length of the desirability, from the standpoint of the United States, of having an intact and independent Finland as an island of order and of democracy in the chaos which would exist in Europe if Germany were defeated and the Soviet Union were to be the victor. I said that our feelings with regard to the Finnish people had been demonstrated in many practical ways upon repeated occasions, and that the United States most certainly desired to see a world of the future in which small countries could live at peace and in security. I said that the apparently increasing willingness of Finland to permit herself to be used by Germany, and apparently to be occupied more and more as the weeks passed by German troops, could only bring about a revulsion on the part of the American people towards the Finnish people, with consequences which I felt would be disastrous to the people of Finland. I said that the victory of Germany could only mean utter annihilation and ruin for every ideal for which the Finnish people have striven since 1918, and that I trusted no decision would now be made by the Government of Finland which would result in a change of policy by the Government of the United States toward the people of Finland.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

740.0011 European War 1939/22163a · Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld)*

WASHINGTON, June 6, 1942—5 p. m

121. In reply to inquiries today from the press concerning Hitler's visit to Finland, I said:

"It is evident that the visit is a deliberate ruse on the part of the Germans to compromise Finland further in the eyes of the anti-Axis world and a cover for the desperate attempts of Hitler to induce Finland to make further contributions to Axis military campaigns. A reported statement yesterday of a Finnish spokesman in Helsinki may be interpreted to mean that Finland is balking at the German pressure.

"We are watching the situation most closely to see whether this visit of Hitler results in any greater degree of cooperation with Hitler against the United Nations."<sup>98</sup>

Repeat to Stockholm as Dept's No. 492.

HULL

701 60D11/363

---

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 9, 1942.

The Minister of Finland requests for himself and for members of his staff permission for repeated and frequently contemporaneous visits out of Washington. If the engagements are carried out which are indicated by the requests for permission to visit New York, there are frequently a number of them together in New York.

In view of the present situation vis-à-vis Finland and Germany, it is my opinion that the Department should exercise a more strict control over the movements of the Minister of Finland. Through other sources we know that he has several contacts in New York which are not related to Finnish business. He may have other activities that we know not of. I think it would be entirely proper to limit the Minister to a maximum of four consecutive days in New York within each calendar month—in case he applies for permission to go.

The individual members of his staff should be more strictly limited and should be confined to Washington unless it appears that there is some unusual urgency or official importance to Finland connected with their visits. They should not be in New York at the same time with the Minister or with one another. Nor should it be arranged that one or the other of them would be there most of the time.

None of this has any relation to the Minister's visits to and from his summer home or to the visits of his designated secretariat to his summer home.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

---

<sup>98</sup> The Minister in Finland reported in his telegram No. 485, June 10, 1942, that no reference whatever had been made to this statement in the Finnish press (740.0011 European War 1939/22164).



740.00119 European War 1939/1028 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld)*

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1942—1 p. m.

123. Our 114, May 27. Following secret telegram from Ankara has been received : <sup>99</sup>

"Finnish Minister called to see me this morning and read me substance of a telegram which he received yesterday from his Government. Minister explained that in his last telegram to his Government he had suggested if it desired to pursue the matter any further appropriate instructions be sent to Procopé.

"Finnish Government agreed with Minister's suggestion and instructed him to inform me to this effect. His Government then informed Minister in strict confidence on May 22 Procopé had telegraphed an unidentified person in Washington had suggested to him the conclusion of a separate peace with Soviet Union saying Soviet was disposed to make peace with Finland and he had reason to believe that State Department would lend its good offices if formally requested to do so by either Finland or Soviet Union but without such a request State Department would not be disposed to take any action. Telegram closes with following:

" 'For this reason we have informed Procopé that according to our information Soviet Union is not disposed to discuss peace with Finland.'

"In response to my inquiry as to his opinion concerning source of Finnish Government's information that Soviet was not disposed to discuss peace with Finland at this time Minister replied he had little doubt it came from the Swedes."

We have not been approached by Procopé in the foregoing connection.

HULL

862 24/695 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, June 10, 1942.

[Received June 10—11:25 p. m.]

482. Reference my 121 [122], February 14. According to communiqué in morning papers Finnish-German trade negotiations carried out in Berlin from May 29 to June 9 with purpose of complementing agreements concluded at Helsinki February last have "led to agreements intended to maintain and strengthen production capacity of Finnish war economy and to promote within fixed framework mutual goods exchange". Berlin correspondent *Uusi Suomi* reports consid-

<sup>99</sup> Telegram No. 547 was sent by Ambassador Laurence A. Steinhardt from Ankara at 2 p. m., June 6, and was received at 6:43 p. m.

erable significance attached there to conclusion of new Finnish-German agreement details of which kept secret involving strengthening of Finland's military power and war economy.

SCHOENFELD

---

740.0011 European War 1939/22568 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, June 30, 1942—noon.

[Received June 30—10 a. m.]

533. Prime Minister Rangell who in absence of Witting is acting as Foreign Minister informed me in reply to inquiry this morning that Marshal Mannerheim's visit to Germany reported in my 529<sup>1</sup> yesterday was one of courtesy only. He said emphatically that Hitler's visit here June 4 and Mannerheim's return visit had no military significance.

My conversation today with Prime Minister gave me impression that there has been no change in general attitude of Finnish Government which remains essentially defensive for the present but as indicated in my 320, April 29<sup>1</sup> possible collapse of Russian resistance to German attacks may well induce Finns to continue their advance eastward to the White Sea. As to possible German intentions in the North I elicited no information from Rangell.

SCHOENFELD

---

740.0011 European War 1939/22878 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, July 14, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 3: 15 p. m.]

567. In conversation this morning with Minister for Foreign Affairs he reiterated intention of Finnish Government to keep its military forces substantially in their present positions and seemed increasingly confident that success now attending German arms against Russians would make this possible without excessive further sacrifice on part of Finns. He repeated his statement of last year that Finns might have to stand on their present lines "with possible minor modifications" as they did in the period between 1918 and 1921. He appeared hopeful that at least as between Germans and Russians "war

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

would be over soon".<sup>3</sup> He admitted strain on Finnish domestic economy by reason of large scale mobilization of manpower but was optimistic as to crop prospects for this year.

Again as in my conversation June 30 with Prime Minister Rangell, Foreign Minister Witting volunteered no reference to possible German offensive action against Russians in northern area and confined himself to giving me impression of substantial stabilization of Finnish front.

SCHOENFELD

123 Gleeck, Lewis E./76. Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld)*

WASHINGTON, July 15, 1942—6 p. m.

142. Please address a first person note to the Foreign Ministry,<sup>4</sup> as under instructions from your Government, in the following sense:

The request for provisional recognition of Gleeck is withdrawn.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, in view of the action taken by the Finnish Government with respect to your request for provisional recognition of Gleeck and in denying since July 17, 1941 to our consular officers in Finland the right of access to local officials, actions which are contrary to the entire spirit of our Treaty of Commerce and Consular Rights of February 13, 1934 with Finland,<sup>6</sup> we feel that it is impossible to continue further American consular representation in Finland in the face of the attitude adopted by the Finnish Government. We have, accordingly, cancelled the consular commissions of McClintock<sup>7</sup> and Von Hellens<sup>8</sup> and are closing immediately the consular section of the Legation. We

<sup>3</sup> The Minister in Finland in telegram No. 578, July 17, 1942, summarized Finnish public opinion as "hoping that Russia would speedily be defeated, preferring not to face fact that such defeat would be triumph for totalitarian system and defeat for free peoples of world. Devout believers in miracles, they dreamed of qualified victory sufficient to eliminate Russia followed by compromise peace after which Finland would again be friend of all nations except Russia." (740 0011 European War 1939/22944)

<sup>4</sup> The Legation's note was delivered on July 16, 1942

<sup>5</sup> The Minister in Finland had recounted in his telegram No. 564, July 13, noon, that provisional recognition of Lewis E. Gleeck, Jr., Third Secretary of Legation, also as a Vice Consul had been requested on June 22. In reply the Finnish Foreign Ministry stated on July 9 that it was preferable to postpone this request to some subsequent time, and referred to its circular note of July 17, 1941, regarding consular procedure in Finland. The Minister summarized that this circular note "merely refers to necessity in view of war time conditions that consular matters be handled entirely through Finnish Foreign Office rather than directly with local authorities and seems to have no reference to question of issuance of exequatur for accredited consular officers." (123 Gleeck, Lewis E./72)

<sup>6</sup> For text, signed at Washington, see Department of State Treaty Series No. 868, or 49 Stat. (pt. 2) 2659. For the negotiations concerning this treaty, see *Foreign Relations*, 1934, vol. II, pp. 134 ff.

<sup>7</sup> Robert M. McClintock, Second Secretary of Legation in Finland

<sup>8</sup> Lawrence W. von Hellens, Vice Consul at Helsinki.

request that the Finnish Government close all Finnish consular offices in the United States not later than August 1, 1942.<sup>9</sup>

(Separate instructions will be sent you with regard to closing the consular section of the Legation and to Von Hellens.)

After you have assured yourself that the Foreign Ministry has received your note, inform us thereof by triple priority cablegram upon receipt of which we shall authorize you to issue to the Finnish press the following statement which we shall release to the press here upon receipt of your cable:

Under the terms of Article XXIII of the Treaty of Commerce and Consular Rights of February 13, 1934 between Finland and the United States of America, American consular officers "may within their respective consular districts, address the authorities, national, state, provincial or municipal, for the purpose of protecting their countrymen in the enjoyment of their rights accruing by treaty or otherwise."

However, in a note dated July 17, 1941,<sup>10</sup> the Finnish Foreign Ministry informed the American Legation in Helsinki that "in view of wartime conditions" consular matters should be handled entirely through the Finnish Foreign Ministry rather than directly with local authorities. This action of the Finnish Foreign Ministry had the direct effect of denying to American consular officers in Finland the specific treaty rights mentioned above.

Furthermore, the Finnish Foreign Ministry in a note dated July 9, 1942 informed the American Legation that with reference to the Foreign Ministry's note of July 17, 1941, it was preferable to postpone to a subsequent date the question of an exequatur for a career officer of the American Foreign Service whom the American Government had recently commissioned as a Vice Consul in Helsinki and for whom the American Legation had requested provisional recognition in accordance with established custom in such cases.

The American Legation, acting on instructions from its Government, informed the Finnish Foreign Ministry in a note dated . . . .<sup>11</sup> that the request which the American Legation had made for the provisional recognition of the consular officer referred to above was withdrawn. The Legation further informed the Finnish Foreign Ministry that by the latter's action in regard to the withholding of recognition of the consular officer referred to and in denying American consular officers presently in Finland their treaty rights in connection with the representation of American interests in Finland the Finnish Government had undermined the basis upon which American consular representation was maintained in Finland. Accordingly, the Foreign Ministry was informed that the consular commissions of the American consular officers at present in Finland had been cancelled and the consular section of the American Legation in Helsinki was being closed immediately; and that this action had been taken by the American Government to put an end to the present untenable situation involved in

---

<sup>9</sup> A note of July 31, 1942, from the Finnish Legation in Washington declared that all Finnish Consulates in the United States had been closed (702 60D11/197).

<sup>10</sup> See footnote 5, p. 68.

<sup>11</sup> The date here inserted was July 16, 1942, in the text printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, July 18, 1942, p. 632.

maintaining American consular representation in Finland in the face of the attitude adopted by the Finnish Government in the matter. The Finnish Government was requested by the American Legation to close all Finnish consular offices in the United States not later than August 1, 1942.

HULL

711.60D21/13

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 16, 1942.

The Minister of Finland called to see me this afternoon at his request.

The Minister asked if I had any views to express to him with regard to the present situation. I said that I wished to let the Minister know that today the American Legation in Helsinki had officially notified the Finnish Government that, in view of the terms of the Finnish Government's decree of July 17, 1941, and in view of the recent indication given by the Finnish Government that they did not wish to issue an exequatur to Mr. Gleeck, a Foreign Service officer whom this Government had desired to appoint as a consular officer in the consular section of the American Legation in Helsinki, it appeared to be clear that the Finnish Government is not willing to carry out the provisions of the Treaty of Commerce and Friendship between the two countries as it relates to consular officers, and wishes to make it, in practice, impossible for American Consuls to operate in Finland; that in view of these circumstances this Government withdrew its request for the issuance of an exequatur for Mr. Gleeck and would close the consular establishment of the United States in Finland, and reciprocally requested that the Finnish Government close its consular establishments in the United States prior to August 1, next.

The Minister inquired what the reasons for this step might be. I explained to him that one of the basic reasons for this step is the violation by the Finnish Government of the treaty above-mentioned. The Minister inquired whether the action taken by his Government with regard to our consular officers had not also been taken with regard to the consular officers of other Governments, and that consequently the most-favored-nation treatment accorded to the United States by the treaty could not legitimately be regarded as having been violated. I stated that that was not the point at issue, but the violation of the stipulation whereunder the American Consuls stationed in Finland were entitled to do business directly with the local and municipal officials where they were stationed, and that the decree of June [July] 17, 1941, clearly violated this treaty provision.

The Minister thereupon drew out of his portfolio a copy of the pertinent Article and commenced discussing the language of that

Article. It is very clear in my mind that the Minister must have had advance notice of the action taken by this Government, since it is highly unlikely otherwise that he would have had this particular Article at hand ready to discuss.

The Minister inquired whether this step on the part of the Government of the United States implied an imminent severance of diplomatic relations, and whether it was intended as a means of bringing pressure to bear upon Finland to make a separate peace. I replied that the question of pressure did not involve the Government of the United States but rather the Government of Germany. I said that if the Government of Finland desired, as I assumed, to maintain relations with the Government of the United States, it would hardly have taken this action with regard to American consular officers except as a result of direct pressure from Germany, and that I deeply regretted that evidence that Finland was operating under German pressure tactics.

I said that insofar as this Government was concerned the step taken represented exactly what I had stated to him—nothing more, nothing less.

I added, however, that it must be apparent to him, as it was to me, that the relations between our two countries were unfortunately degenerating. The Minister insisted that since his last conversation with me in early June the Finns had undertaken no offensive action and had limited themselves strictly to defense. He stated very emphatically that this made it clear that his Government wished at every cost to maintain relations with the United States and to do nothing to jeopardize the friendship between the two countries. I said that I was glad to have this statement from him, but that he himself must realize that as the war progressed it became more and more evident every day to the people of the United States that the Germans were only enabled to make their attacks on Murmansk and the railway and the lines of supply from the Allied powers to Russia by way of Murmansk because they were enabled to operate upon Finnish territory, with the assistance and support of the Finnish military authorities, and consequently American public opinion would feel consistently more clearly that the people of Finland were giving vitally important aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States and were seriously threatening the Soviet Union, a nation joined with the United States in the common determination to defeat Hitlerism. It was perfectly clear, I stated, that a situation of this kind could not continue for very long without very serious results to the relations between Finland and the United States.

I went on to say that the Minister and I had discussed these issues many times before, and that I consequently deeply regretted the course which events seemed to be taking.

The Minister stated that he regretted very much the action which his Government had taken and that he could only assure me again that he had tried consistently to prevent his Government from taking one step more than was strictly necessary to defend Finnish territory against the Russians. He had strongly urged his Government to prevent any press attacks against the United States and to refrain from undertaking any action which could be construed as "pin pricks". He now regretted the fact that he had sent his Government word with regard to the restrictions placed by this Government upon the movements of himself and of his Legation personnel.

The Minister then cited certain instances where he thought inconsistent treatment had been accorded his Legation personnel, and I said that I was very glad to look into these cases with a view to rectification where I thought rectification was demanded.

The Minister read to me various editorials from Finnish newspapers, all to the effect that Finland was not undertaking any offensive warfare. He said these editorials represented his own point of view.

Before he left, the Minister inquired what the situation would be of those Finnish consular officials in the Consulate General in New York when the Consulate General was closed. He wanted to know whether any of them could be assigned to his Legation as members of his staff, since otherwise he could not, with his present staff, cope with the amount of work that had to be done in connection with the representation of Finnish interests in this country. I said that any request which the Minister might make in this regard would be given very careful consideration.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

701 0060D/7 Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, July 18, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received July 19—7:49 a. m.]

585. Considerable comment has been rendered in the Diplomatic Corps on the pointed omission of the Finnish Government to extend invitations to members of this Legation and to the Brazilian Chargé d'Affaires to a reception for the Diplomatic Corps given on June 29 last on the occasion of the 60th birthday of the Speaker of the Diet Mr. Hakkila. Speaker ranks next to the President of the Republic in precedence here. He did however make cordial acknowledgement of the receipt of cards from me and officers of the Legation.

I have refrained from reporting this incident earlier as it was suggested in diplomatic circles that possibly Finns intended to give a later reception to which the Brazilian and American Legations might be invited together with neutral diplomats as was the case last year when

President and Mrs. Ryti received the Diplomatic Corps in two separate functions. Under the circumstances since this possibility has not materialized it would appear that the Hakkila reception and pointed omission of this and the Brazilian Legations from list of guests was another pinprick of possible political significance.

SCHOENFELD

124 60D/69 Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, July 18, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received July 19—8: 55 a. m.]

589. Swiss Minister<sup>12</sup> informed me this morning that Finnish official circles are obsessed by thought that American Legation is center of extensive espionage activity in Finland.<sup>13</sup> He said that during conversation recently with German Minister Von Blucher latter told him quite openly that this was the case and that departure of American Legation might be expected shortly would be correspondingly welcome from Germans point of view. Egger said this feeling of German Minister had undoubtedly been constantly imparted to Witting with whom Von Blucher is on terms of intimate friendship and must thus have spread through higher ranges of Finnish Government. Egger added that particular anxiety was felt here as to possible espionage activities of Mrs. McClintock who he said is described as "the beautiful Creole" and whose visits to Stockholm from time to time have been subject of anxious comment in this relation. Mrs. McClintock's trips to Stockholm have of course been innocuous and have been undertaken either with her child during periods of our activity here or with her husband on courier trips. Finnish credulity in this matter is measure of characteristic provincialism.

SCHOENFELD

125 0060D/54 Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, July 21, 1942.

[Received July 22—4: 45 a. m.]

596. Following is text of note in English language dated July 20 received from Minister for Foreign Affairs.

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note No. 798 of 16th instant<sup>14</sup> in which Your Excellency has brought

<sup>12</sup> Karl Egger.

<sup>13</sup> Further such reports came in telegrams No. 827, September 21, 3 p. m., and No. 1007, October 21, 7 p. m., from the Minister in Finland (124 60D/82, 86)

<sup>14</sup> Not printed; but see Department's instruction in telegram No. 142, July 15, 6 p. m., p. 68.



to my knowledge the decision of the American Government to break off consular relations between the United States and Finland.

This decision has been received with surprise by the Finnish Government, as they could not assume that the regulations communicated in the circular note, July 17, 1941, and which consequently have been in force for a year, would, without the usual exchange of views through the diplomatic channels lead to such an abrupt action on the part of the American Government.

Regretting the above decision, which does not correspond with the aspirations of the Finnish Government in the various spheres of the relations between the United States and Finland, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency, that the Finnish Minister in Washington has received the necessary instructions regarding the closing of the Finnish Consulates in the United States and the taking over of their affairs, from the first of August next.

The Finnish interests in USA are, as is known to Your Excellency, in view of the existing circumstances, considerably wider than those of which the American consular officers in Finland have been in charge. The disadvantage caused by the rupture to the United States, having no separate Consulates in Finland, is much less than to Finland, the numerous Consulates of which have been in charge of the multiple affairs of a large settlement spread over a wide area in the United States. The closing of the Consulate General in New York causes special disadvantage to Finland, since it is the main center of the economic life of the United States and in the center of a large Finnish colony. Thus, from the point of view of Finland and her economic interests, the Consulate General was of first rate importance.

The Finnish Government hope that the American Government will show a benevolent attitude towards the arrangements which will be necessary when the Legation in Washington takes over all the Finnish interests in the United States."

SCHOENFELD

---

711.60D/82

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)* <sup>15</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] July 22, 1942.

The Minister of Sweden <sup>16</sup> called to see me this afternoon at his request.

The Minister said that his Government was deeply disturbed by the action of the Government of the United States in withdrawing its consuls from Finnish territory and in requesting the withdrawal of Finnish consuls from United States territory, not because of the intrinsic action taken, but because of the belief of the Swedish Govern-

---

<sup>15</sup> The substance of this conversation was telegraphed on July 25 to the Minister in Sweden as No. 618 and to the Minister in Finland as No. 148.

<sup>16</sup> W. Boström.

ment that this step was merely a forerunner of the severance of diplomatic relations and a possible declaration of war against Finland.

I explained to the Minister the situation as it had developed during the past year and the technical grounds upon which our recent action had been based. I made it plain that this Government had informed the Finnish Government that the continued and increasing use of Finnish territory by German forces was inevitably creating an increasingly critical situation in the relations between our two countries and that this Government had repeatedly informed the Finnish Government that should the Finnish Government itself undertake anything in the nature of offensive action against the Soviet Union, the present relationship between Finland and the United States could not possibly be maintained. I said that this Government had further made it clear that the continuation of relations between the two countries depended very largely upon Finland herself and that it was with deep regret that this Government had seen recent evidences which led it to believe that the Government of Finland was operating increasingly under German pressure and upon German instigation.

I said that the Minister knew very well the importance to the United States of insuring the safe arrival in Soviet ports of matériel which the United States was making available to the Soviet Government and that the use of Finnish territory by the Germans in order to attempt to prevent the safe arrival of such supplies was creating more and more opposition on the part of American public opinion towards a continuation of apparently normal relations between Finland and the United States. I said that while it was the desire of this Government to maintain its traditional and close friendship with the people of Finland, the attitude and policy of the present Finnish Government was unquestionably making this more and more difficult.

The Minister specifically asked whether the closing of the consulates was to be interpreted as a forerunner of the severance of diplomatic relations. I replied that no decision on that question had been reached by this Government and that consequently the Swedish Government need not draw that conclusion from the recent action taken by the United States. I added, however, that I would not be frank with him if I did not emphasize the fact that I believed the situation was deteriorating and that it might not be possible, if Finland continued to permit the exercise by Germany of increasing influence both military and political within Finland, to continue the relationship which had existed up to now.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

124.60D/71 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, July 22, 1942.

[Received July 23—1:20 a. m.]

598. Following memorandum has been received from Foreign Office with card of Foreign Minister:

"The Minister of the United States of America, having communicated that the members of his Legation have met with difficulties from the side of the Finnish authorities when they wished to go outside Helsinki, it seems appropriate to state as follows:

The settling of some requests of the Legation for its members to proceed to forbidden localities has lately been influenced by an information from Minister Procopé that all of his and his collaborator's corresponding demands have been declined [by the American authorities. Even his demand for a permission to go with his wife to a dinner party in the vicinity of Washington had been declined.]<sup>17</sup>

Before, e.g., during the last 2 months, only one of the requests from the Legation has not been agreed. It was question of a sailing trip within an area which ought to be considered war zone. During these 2 months the members of the Legation have received 31 permissions. The requests from the American Legation constituted, indeed 45 per cent on all the demands addressed to the Ministry by the Diplomatic Corps during this period.

However, even after the Ministry having received Minister Procopé's communication and after Minister Schoenfeld's discussion with the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the matter, several permits have been granted to members of the American Legation under the presumption, of course, that the treatment of similar questions in Washington be only temporary.

It may be added that several members of the Legation have been seen without permits in places where, according to the *note circulaire* of August 28, 1940, it is allowed to go only with a special permission. Helsinki July 18, 1942."

SCHOENFELD

125.0060D/57 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, July 28, 1942—noon.

[Received 5:10 p. m.]

624. I am prompted by your 148, July 25,<sup>18</sup> to point out again that Finnish Government has been for sometime aware of imminence of crisis in relations with us. Arrival here July 24 of Finnish Minister at Stockholm presumably for consultation suggests that your latest intimation through Swedish Minister at Washington is now known here. Following as it does long and consistent series of similar appeals,

<sup>17</sup> Wording in brackets added on basis of certified copy of memorandum supplied by the Finnish Foreign Office, transmitted to the Department by the Embassy in Finland in despatch No. 775 of May 26, 1959 (023.1/5-2659).

<sup>18</sup> See footnote 15, p. 74.

warnings and intimations this latest expression is doubtless well understood.

It is evident that Finnish Government has braced itself to meet final deterioration in relations with us though it may still come as shock to public here. This fact was shown by uniformity of controlled press comment attending recent break in consular relations and its political significance. Comment was based on premise that present hostilities are due solely to Soviet aggression against Finland which premise underlies same order of ideas as prevailed during Winter War and rationalizes policy adopted in June last year or earlier.

Men who managed Finnish policy at time of transit agreement with Germans in September 1940 are still in control and have followed with characteristic tenacity line then entered upon.

Regardless of its original motivation, or wisdom of Soviet contribution to its adoption prior to June 1941, Finnish policy has clearly taken little or no account of changed circumstances since then. In past year Finnish leaders have said openly that issues of general war do not concern them and even that the war involves no moral issues. Nevertheless, I know that many of these leaders understand issues quite well. They merely choose to ignore them in shrewd hope that Finland may profit by German success against USSR while avoiding consequences of attendant subordination of this country to Reich for the latter's purposes in the general war. In doing this they choose also, to ignore effects upon American interests of their subordination to Germany. On other hand, I have no doubt they have measured with complete deliberation the risks attendant on our disapproval of their course and even on our hostility. If and when crisis comes, these leaders, like many of the Finnish public, may sincerely regret it but they have persuaded themselves that they have no alternative to course they are following and are prepared to accept the consequences.

Meanwhile they hope devoutly for cessation of German-Russian hostilities, if not for formal peace, and present development of military situation in Russia has gone far to confirm this hope. In these circumstances it seems improbable that further warnings or appeals to Finland on our part will be more effective than hitherto.

SCHOENFELD

---

800.20260D/3 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, August 3, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received August 3—1:15 p. m.]

639. My 638, today.<sup>19</sup> Upon receipt of Finnish circular note August 1, we suspended distribution of our daily news bulletin pending

---

<sup>19</sup> Not printed; it transmitted a translation of Finnish circular note of July 30, received by the Legation August 1 regarding prior authorization of Finnish authorities for circulation of foreign political propaganda (800.20260D/2).

opportunity for informal discussion with Foreign Office. We also suspended distribution of Finnish edition of Flying Fortress pamphlet which had been mailed at daily rate of 200.

Gleeck today called on Chief of Press Section of Foreign Office<sup>21</sup> to discuss circular note and was told orally that notwithstanding terms of note order was intended to apply only to books, pamphlets and other more substantial pieces of propaganda. Numelin said specifically that our news bulletin was not affected and that he like other members of Foreign Office was anxious to see its continued distribution. Gleeck handed Numelin copy of Flying Fortress pamphlet which he promised to submit to censor.

Numelin repeated usual expressions of solicitude that diplomatic relations with us be continued and alluded to severe German pressure on Finland citing as example forthcoming visit of German press delegation including Dr. Schmidt of German Foreign Office<sup>22</sup> arranged at instigation of local German Press Attaché.<sup>23</sup> Numelin mentioned also that Germans were not pleased by his membership on editorial board of periodical *Le Nord* devoted to non-political subjects concerning Scandinavian countries.

SCHOENFELD

---

125.0060D/61 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, August 5, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received 3:55 p. m.]

645. Secretary General of Foreign Office<sup>24</sup> said yesterday to member of Legation staff who is old friend of his that our recent action in breaking consular relations with Finland was strongly reminiscent of methods used by Soviet diplomacy in dealing with this country and he seemed to be correspondingly resentful. Matter is of interest in that Pakaslahti probably reflected his chief's feeling on the subject.

On other hand Turkish Minister<sup>25</sup> told me today that Witting had recently said to him emphatically that Finnish Government is most anxious to avoid any difficulties with United States. I gathered, however, that Witting may also have intimated to my Turkish colleague that our action was thought to be due to Soviet pressure upon us.

SCHOENFELD

---

<sup>21</sup> R. Numellin.

<sup>22</sup> Paul Schmidt, Director of the Press Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1939-45.

<sup>23</sup> H. Metzger.

<sup>24</sup> Aaro Pakaslahti.

<sup>25</sup> Agah Aksel, Turkish Minister to Sweden and Finland.

740.00112 European War 1939/6418 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, August 20, 1942—noon.

[Received 2:49 p. m.]

692. Source <sup>26</sup> mentioned in my 691 today <sup>27</sup> confirmed our impressions that Finnish-German trade negotiations just concluded extended German-Finnish grain agreement for another year from September 1 on same terms, namely, 230,000 tons of grain during 12 months' period. This source added that concurrently with commercial negotiations a General of German Army supply service had been in Helsinki and had signed an agreement with Finnish Army supply corps calling for unspecified amount of foodstuffs to be sent for use of Finnish Army. Similar agreements this source said had recently been reached with Hungary and Denmark undoubtedly under German inspiration.

SCHOENFELD

124 60D/78 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, August 31, 1942—noon.

[Received August 31—8:17 a. m.]

734. Former Estonian Minister Varma told me last night in confidence that this Legation and especially our Military Attaché are now kept under regular surveillance by Finnish authorities including stationing of official photographer in nearby houses to record all visitors.

SCHOENFELD

740.0011 European War 1939/23901 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, August 31, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received 5:23 p. m.]

735. A Finn who in peace time is largest importer of steel and who is now in special military service and in close touch with leading military opinion last night told me Finns earnestly hope there will be no break with us but that if there should be such break direct results would be that Finnish forces will undoubtedly extend their operations eastward and will lend Germans support necessary for latter to move eastward on northern front. Thus far, he said, Finns have refrained from moving beyond strategic line required to protect their old fron-

<sup>26</sup> A Finnish Army supply officer.<sup>27</sup> Not printed.

tiers largely out of consideration for us and Germans have been unable to extend their lines only because of Finnish unwillingness to cooperate in such operations. This Finnish attitude, however, would change promptly in event of rupture with us.

My informant displayed characteristic self-confidence of Finns and their amazingly egocentric outlook when he said they have absolutely no sense of obligation for any German assistance which they realized had been given only for German purposes and was as nothing compared to assistance they had given Germans. Finns would never forget German betrayal of Finland to Russians in 1939 but now held long Finnish front to German advantage as well as their own. Finns would not permit German interference here either in political or economic matters and in case of German victory in Europe they were confident Finland would continue to command German respect and to enjoy special position recognized by Germans. Finns had no fears on this score the more so as Germans who had been inclined to patronize them in early stages of present war now "talked very small" and know that Finnish "sisu" <sup>28</sup> is irreducible.

My informant's statements though quite unofficial are worthy of note because they undoubtedly reflect views in highest Finnish circles.

SCHOENFELD

740.0011 European War 1939/24015 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

[Extracts]

HELSINKI, September 3, 1942—noon.

[Received 9 : 50 p. m.]

750. Following summarizes our report on public opinion August 16–September 1.

1. Finnish opinion toward United States. Despite fact that so far as Finnish press and radio were concerned, battle for Solomon Islands <sup>29</sup> was seen through spectacles fitted in Japan and using German lenses, most people in Finland sensed that all was not going Japan's way. Entry of Brazil into war <sup>30</sup> on side of United Nations was interpreted here as result of American pressure and was not connected in any way in Finnish minds with possible good reasons Brazil itself might have had. As for continuance of normal Finnish-American relations, Finns welcomed views expressed in article of

<sup>28</sup> A word expressing the quality of stubborn determination of character which made possible the accomplishment of great deeds in time of stress.

<sup>29</sup> Attacks by United States Marines began on August 12, 1942, to consolidate positions, and the Navy Department announced on August 25, 1942, considerable Japanese losses in a naval engagement.

<sup>30</sup> August 22, 1942. For correspondence regarding the cooperation of the United States and Brazil on defense measures, see vol. v, pp. 632 ff.

Anne O'Hare McCormick in *New York Times* of June 8 which emphasized that American foreign policy toward Finland was not dictated from Moscow. Nevertheless Finns felt that we would be subject to continued Russian pressure to force break with Finland and that should Russia win war we could not intercede effectively on behalf of Finland. Obverse of usual thesis that Finns have refrained from further advances against Russians for fear of break with United States was expressed by Finn who said that if we should break relations there would be nothing to restrain such advance. You may be interested to know that on July 31 there were just over 400,000 licensed radio sets in Finland although this statistic to United States still seems largely of potential importance since Finnish and Swedish language broadcasts from United States are simply not picked up in Finland. We still have not changed our view that until American radio propaganda can find a base of operations nearer to Scandinavia than Boston, much of its wordage in Scandinavian and Finnish languages will be lost on empty air.

6. Anniversaries. Many disparate anniversaries were celebrated in Finland during past 10 days including that as [of] recapture of Enso and Viborg, third anniversary of Russo-German non-aggression pact<sup>31</sup> and third anniversary of outbreak of Great War. When Hitler himself in his exhortation to German people to hold through fourth war winter suggested that he also did not know when his war would end Finns began to wonder. Something seemed a little too neat in dream that Germans would knock out Russians and in turn be knocked out themselves leaving Finland to emerge unscathed, its trade debt cancelled, its markets in demand, its eastern boundary secure and its normal position—as always—unassailable.

SCHOENFELD

---

740.0011 European War 1939/24506a · Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld)*

WASHINGTON, September 24, 1942—7 p. m.

191. You should seek an interview if possible with President Ryti, otherwise with Witting, and state orally that under instructions you wish to point out that the American Government is gravely concerned at increasing indications of German pressure on Finland for participation of Finnish armed forces in fresh military operations. The tolerance which the American Government has shown heretofore in

---

<sup>31</sup> Signed at Moscow on August 23, 1939; for text, see Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 76-78, or *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. VII, pp. 245-247.



the numerous instances of provocation of it by the Finnish Government reflects the residue of the good-will for Finland which existed in the United States at the time Finland began its co-belligerence with our enemies. In the face, however, of a step by the Finnish Government which the United States could only consider as clearly affecting its own vital interests and in no wise promoting any legitimate Finnish interest for the future, our existing relations with Finland precarious as they already are would have to be reconsidered.

In the recent past there were indications from Finnish sources that the military objectives in view did not extend beyond those areas already encompassed. A public declaration to that effect or any other statement which would clarify Finland's intentions would necessarily do much to strengthen our present day-to-day relationships with the Finnish Government which hang by such a slender thread.

HULL

---

740.0011 European War 1939/24515 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, September 25, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received 8:25 p. m.]

866. President Ryti received me at 4 o'clock this afternoon when I spoke to him in sense your 191, September 24, and handed him memorandum closely paraphrasing your instruction. President at once said with vehemence that Finland's policy remained absolutely unchanged in its fight for its existence which United States was apparently willing to see destroyed by Russians.

He denied that any German pressure had been exercised or was now being used on Finland but refrained from saying that Finland would not participate in new military operations. He was struck most unfavorably by reference to provocation on part of Finnish Government and asserted that if any provocation or any pressure was being exerted it came from United States and not from Finland.

President repeated official theme of purely defensive character of present hostilities with USSR outlining again events preceding Finland's armed resistance in June last year. When I said that Hitler's announcement of attack on Soviet Union apparently preceded Russian acts of hostility on Finland and that at that time Hitler had referred to Finland as Germany's ally which implied prior understanding President said Finland could no more accept responsibility for Hitler's statement at that time than it accepted responsibility for equally mistaken statements made by other foreign statesmen including President Roosevelt regarding Finnish situation.

President calmed down after his first intense reaction and repeated what he had said before as to total disregard by great powers of justice

for small nations when latter stood in their path which had made him absolutely cynical regarding policy of great powers including United States.

President cited as example of such injustice on our part our action in taking over Finnish ships without compensation and he reverted to British blockade policy against Finland in June 1940 as illustration.

Finland was determined he said to follow its present policy at any cost and neither we nor anyone else could alter it because Finland knew Russians and we did not as our existence was not at stake and existence of Finnish people as physical entirety [*entity?*] is in jeopardy. Bolshevik power must be destroyed and President was thankful that German action against Russians was helping to preserve Finland. He was confident United States and Britain could not rely on Bolshevik leaders who deserved absolutely no faith. American people were being misled by propaganda regarding Finland as well as other matters and indeed people in big countries were more susceptible to propaganda than those in small countries like Finland where pace of life made it possible for people to think for themselves.

When I asked President whether he thought Finnish Government would make public statement as I had suggested under your instruction President expressed opinion that as there had been no change in situation no further statement seemed necessary at this time.

When I intimated regret at conclusion of conversation that my message may not have been pleasing President said facetiously that if any further messages I had to convey were no less pleasing he would be thankful. Saying that his personal esteem for me had not been lessened and would not be by any future events President gave me impression that further initiatives on our part would not surprise him.

Department will gather from foregoing that adamant Finnish conviction of rightness of its course is fully represented by President Ryti. When I asked him whether Marshal Mannerheim shared his views he answered in affirmative and said Finnish leaders were unanimous.

SCHOENFELD

---

740.0011 European War 1939/24528 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, September 28, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received September 28—5: 04 p. m.]

880. I have just received with Foreign Minister Witting's card the following memorandum in English dated today.

"In a conversation with the President of the Republic on the 25th instant the American Minister suggested that a statement should be

made from the Finnish side which would serve to clarify the intentions of Finland.

The same day, just before this conversation took place, the Prime Minister of Finland made in the Parliament a statement which, as far as it concerns foreign policy, seems to correspond with the desire thus expressed on behalf of the United States of America. This part of Prime Minister's statement is enclosed herewith.

The Finnish Government can, however, not at all understand the mentioning of the 'numerous instances of provocation of the American Government by the Finnish Government'. This, or that there should be any reason for the allegation, that Finland is being subjected to foreign pressure, must be definitely rejected. It should also be remembered that when the acts of aggression of the Soviet Union against Finland took place in 1941, the United States of America were not at war with any power, nor an ally of the USSR, but gave in many ways assistance to Finland."

Enclosed with foregoing memorandum also in English is an "extract from Mr. Rangell's speech September 25, 1942" reading as follows:

"The clearly defined line of our foreign policy is determined by our defensive struggle. A logical consequence of the nature of our struggle is the fact, that no changes have occurred in the attitude underlying our foreign policy since the day, 15 months ago, when the Soviet Union, by her acts of aggression, forced us to continue the war into which she had drawn us through her aggression in the autumn of 1939.<sup>32</sup> Finland is fighting her war against the Soviet Union side by side with Germany, to which we are linked by brotherhood in arms.

The unambiguous attitude, which we have adopted, with the purpose of securing the safety of our country, has been in so many different connections explained to the Governments of the foreign powers, that there should be no reason for various interpretations. I had on November 29, last year, the honor to define this attitude in a communication given by the Government to the Parliament. This was unanimously accepted by the Parliament and remains unaltered in force as a definition of our foreign policy. However, certain circles abroad have, for some reason, wished to draw arbitrary conclusions about the attitude of the Finnish Government. Quite recently one has wished to interpret a statement, which was made by one of our envoys to the press of the country where he is stationed,<sup>33</sup> in a manner quite different from the real attitude of the Finnish Government, although the statement was based on the Government's communication just mentioned.

<sup>32</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, pp. 952 ff.

<sup>33</sup> The Department had informed Minister Schoenfeld in telegram No. 192 of September 24, 8 p. m., that the Minister of Finland had given three hand-outs, issued without instruction from the Foreign Office, to press representatives in Washington on September 19, 1942. One of these, on the political and military situations in Finland, which had apparently been misinterpreted, had declared that Finland "wants to cease fighting as soon as the threat to her existence has been averted and guarantees have been obtained for her lasting security." The Department had considered that this statement consisted in general "of a rehash" of remarks already made in the past by Finnish spokesmen. (740.0011 European War 1939/24404) Procopé was himself much exercised by the misinterpretation of his press hand-outs and he made extended explanations and descriptions of the circumstances to Mr. L. Randolph Higgs, of the Division of European Affairs, on September 22, 1942, and to Under Secretary of State Welles on September 23 and again on September 28.

The changes in the attitude to Finland of certain foreign powers, which occurred after the first phase of our defensive war, apparent from the interpretations I have just referred to, and of which the declaration of war by Great Britain in December 1941<sup>34</sup> was the most conspicuous example, have not induced us to adopt a different line of foreign policy than the one which according to the unanimous conviction of our people, has been dictated by our country's vital interests."

SCHOENFELD

121 5460D/88

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. L. Randolph Higgs of the  
Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] September 29, 1942.

I was called into Mr. Atherton's office this afternoon to participate in a conversation already under way between him and the Finnish Minister. Mr. Atherton remarked that the Minister had raised the question of actions of the Finnish Government against the personnel of our Legation in Helsinki and that he had told the Minister about the refusal of Marshal Mannerheim to receive Colonel Huthsteiner, our Military Attaché in Helsinki, before the latter's departure from Finland for the United States,<sup>35</sup> and about the pressure being brought to bear on Finns to sever their association and other connections with our Legation personnel in Helsinki. Mr. Atherton asked me whether I had any other information along those lines to give the Minister.

I said that I could add a few details to the matter relating to the departure of our Military Attaché and recited the refusal of the Field Marshal to receive Colonel Huthsteiner after the latter had been given to understand before departing for his tour of the front that he would be so received. I said that it was our understanding that the Marshal was stated to have taken the position that he would no longer receive "neutral Attachés," but that we were unable to understand this report in view of another report that the Swedish Military Attaché<sup>36</sup> who was likewise being transferred from Finland had been received by the Marshal.

I then told to the Minister what I had previously stated to him: that is, that I saw little purpose in our trying to debate the pros and cons of various actions of this kind, since it would take up too much time and really do nothing to solve the basic difficulties which were the

<sup>34</sup> The British declaration of war on Finland came on December 7, 1941; see telegram No. 256, December 5, 1941, to the Minister in Finland, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 114.

<sup>35</sup> After the refusal of permission to make a farewell call, at the direction of the Minister in Finland the Military Attaché wrote a letter on September 29, 1942, to Baron Mannerheim calling attention to this refusal.

<sup>36</sup> G. Baron Stedingk.

cause of these incidents. The Minister objected that one of the purposes in his being here was to smooth out such difficulties.

At this point the Secretary called for Mr. Atherton to come to his office and I was left alone with the Minister.

The Minister then stated that he could not agree with me entirely as to the basic attitude of the Finnish Government toward the United States at this time. He described that attitude as friendly and as indicating a strong desire on the part of all Finns to maintain relations with the United States. I replied that I could agree with him to the extent that there probably was wide-spread desire in Finland to maintain relations with the United States. I said that it was my personal opinion, however, that the considerations involved in maintaining relations with the United States were secondary in the mind of the Finnish Government to those involved in its policy toward the Soviet Union and toward Germany. I went on to say I felt that if the Finnish Government thought it necessary to achieve the aims involved in its policy toward the Soviet Union and toward Germany, it would readily forego the considerations of advantage to it involved in maintaining relations with us. The Minister said that he could agree with this view with the modification that friendly feelings toward the United States were stronger than I seemed to feel.

The Minister said that he wanted to illustrate the latter point. He then opened his brief case and pulled out a document which he said was a draft of a Christmas message which he intended to send to Finnish language newspapers in the United States this year in accordance with his usual custom. He said that as a matter of courtesy he would like to give me a copy of that message. I interrupted him to say that I would want to make it clear in accepting the copy that such acceptance did not imply either approval or disapproval of his message. He said that of course he understood, and that he would never submit voluntarily to censorship of such statements and that he was only giving me a copy of the message as a courtesy.

He then reverted to his previous statement about Finnish friendship for the United States and said he wanted to read me a passage in his message. The passage which he read me was to the effect that outside of the Scandinavian countries Finland had a greater friendship for the United States than any other country. I asked him how he thought such a statement would be received in Helsinki at the present time. He was much taken aback by this question and said he hadn't thought of it. He folded his paper and dropped the subject.

The conversation lasted for a few minutes longer along lines previously taken and much discussed between him and the Department on a number of other occasions.

As he got up to leave, I reminded him that he had not left with me the copy of his message mentioned above which I said I thought he had forgotten about. He replied that he would not give me that copy, but would send me a "clean copy." (It was obvious that he intended to revise his "message" in the light of my remarks, an action which clearly demonstrates how "free" Finland is at this time of "foreign pressures".)

---

740.00119 European War 1939/1160 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, September 29, 1942—noon.  
[Received September 29—8:38 a. m.]

883. Local correspondent of *Berlingske Tidende* of Copenhagen has informed Colonel Woldike<sup>87</sup> that at press conference September 27 Foreign Office spokesman stated that Finland, having recovered its lost provinces and formally reincorporated them, its absolute minimum peace aim must be preservation of 1939 frontier.

This statement was banned by censors when foreign correspondents attempted to telegraph it abroad.

The second point made by Foreign Office spokesman was that there was no written agreement between Finland and Germany. He said that basis of Finnish-German relationships remained as set forth in two speeches (1) Hitler's proclamation to German people on the morning of June 22, 1941,<sup>88</sup> and (2) President Ryti's speech of June 25 [26] last year.<sup>89</sup> This statement was passed by censorship. This statement may also be noted in light of President Ryti's statement to me reported in my 866, September 25, regarding Hitler's reference to Finland as an ally in the war against Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Same source states that foreign correspondents here, and their wives, have been invited by Finnish press officials on conducted tour of Lapland this coming weekend. He suggested that Finnish Government is desirous of having foreign journalists absent from Helsinki should important news break at that time.

SCHOENFELD

---

<sup>87</sup> Lt. Col. Aage Woldike, Military Attaché in Finland.

<sup>88</sup> See telegram No. 2488 of June 22, 1941, from the Chargé in Germany, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 152. For text, see *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, July 1941, pp. 545-551.

<sup>89</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 43, footnote 1. Excerpts from this speech are in *Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents on Soviet Policy, March 1940-June 1941* (New York, 1941), pp. 99-105.

711.60D/108

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] October 2, 1942.

The Minister of Finland called to see me today. The Minister asked what my impressions might be of the interview which Mr. Schoenfeld had recently had with the President of Finland and with regard to the *aide-mémoire* which the President had sent him after the interview. I said that the most accurate answer I could give the Minister was that I had no reactions. I said that the conversation and the document in question seemed to me to leave the situation exactly as it had been before.

The Minister inquired whether Mr. Schoenfeld had been instructed to seek the interview because of information received by this Government that a new and intensified German offensive against the Soviet through Finland was probable. I said that this Government had no information in that regard and that the instructions sent to Mr. Schoenfeld had been sent in accordance with the policy which we had hitherto followed with regard to the Government of Finland, namely, of informing the Government of Finland with complete frankness of the attitude of this Government and of the course which this Government would be forced to follow in the event of any change for the worse in the situation which the Minister and I had often previously discussed.

At the conclusion of the interview, the Minister presented to me Baron Wrede, now attached to the Legation.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

711.60D/96 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, October 7, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 2:37 p. m.]

928. I had confidential conversation yesterday at his request with former Finance Minister Pekkala. He was desirous of learning what had passed recently between American and Finnish Governments and said Foreign Affairs Committee of Diet of which he is member has vouchsafed no information. Intimating resentment of this secretiveness he said Diet was entitled to be kept better informed. He asserted that he still disapproved Finnish Government's course in foreign policy as he had at time of his resignation from Cabinet. Mass of Finnish people were on side of democracies and convinced Germans would not win war. They were conscious of necessity for accommodation with Russians with whom Finland must continue to live. Such views however could not be openly voiced though he had made no

secret of his position and it was significant that Finnish masses were so little influenced by intense and pervasive Axis propaganda.

I sounded Pekkala as to popular attitude in event American armament should become more noticeable on Finnish front in hands of Russians as was to be expected. He said this would cause no significant increase in anti-American feeling among Finns and would be understood as inevitable.

Though Pekkala represents presently uninfluential body of opinion in Social Democratic Party his group at least shares in even greater degree manifest desire of Government and probable majority of Finns to preserve relations with United States notwithstanding fact that former has gambled on German victory.

SCHOENFELD

711 60D/95 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld)*

WASHINGTON, October 9, 1942—9 p. m.

201. Your 914, October 5, 10 a. m., and 929, Oct[ober] 7, noon.<sup>40</sup> Department knows of no basis for any impression that Finnish-American relations have eased, unless it is based on some unwarranted assumption telegraphed by Procopé. The situation remains as before: on a day to day basis.

WELLES

711.60D/107 . Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, October 21, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 12:31 p. m.]

999. We learn that Foreign Minister Witting in next [*last meeting of?*] Foreign Affairs Committee reprimanded Salmiala<sup>41</sup> of quasi-fascistic party when latter advocated break with us saying Finland does not know how long war will last and that as small country Finland must be careful not to lose contact with powerful nation which is of great importance to her interests.

It seems Witting is becoming more conscious that his own course has been too pro-German and that he has been warned by group of men including Erkko of need of following more closely President Ryti's personal policy which goes about as far as is considered safe.

SCHOENFELD

<sup>40</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>41</sup> Prof. B. A. Salmiala, a leader of the Patriotic National Movement.



711.60D/100j

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

[Extract]

[WASHINGTON,] October 21, 1942.

The Minister <sup>42</sup> asked me if I could make any statement to him with regard to the relations between Finland and the United States which would relieve his mind in view of his approaching confinement to the hospital. I said that there were no developments since I had previously talked with the Minister and that the situation still remained on a 24-hour basis.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/25143j

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Standley), Temporarily in the United States* <sup>43</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] October 28, 1942.

ADMIRAL STANDLEY: You are requested to discuss orally with the Soviet Government, upon your return to your post, this Government's Finnish policy with a view to placing before the Soviet Government the considerations upon which that policy is based and to obtaining, to such an extent as may be feasible, an expression of the Soviet Government's concurrence in the general practicability of such policy.

This Government's estimate of the situation in Finland, based upon reports over the past year from the Legation in Helsinki and upon conversations with other competent observers who have recently come from Finland after several years stay in the area, is as follows:

(1) German forces now in Finland seem unwilling to attempt fresh advances into Soviet territory north of Leningrad *unless they are aided by Finnish armed forces.*

(2) Neither the people nor the Government of Finland desire to mount fresh military offensives against the Soviet Union.

(3) There is reason to believe that German pressure on Finland to furnish further military aid is heavy and increasing. It is still open to question whether such pressure will be decisive.

(4) Given the foregoing situation it is the present policy of the American Government to exert counter pressure on the Finnish Government. Under present circumstances it is the opinion of all American observers in Finland that the Finnish people and certain officials of the Finnish Government place great value on maintaining diplomatic relations with the United States and that the maintenance of

<sup>42</sup> Hjalmar J. Procopé, Minister of Finland.

<sup>43</sup> William H. Standley, Ambassador to the Soviet Union, had arrived in Washington for consultations; he returned to the Soviet Union in January 1943.

such relations acts as a strong brake on successful German pressure for increased aid from Finland. These observers feel that, conversely, if we should break relations with Finland under existing conditions the last political weapon in the hands of the United Nations to counteract German pressure on Finland would be destroyed and increased Finnish military aid to Germany, perhaps of the decisive character referred to above, would soon result. It is also felt by these observers that instead of creating disunity among the Finnish people the immediate effect of a severance of relations with Finland on the part of the United States would be to increase the influence and power over the people on the part of the pro-German elements in Finland, a development almost certain to lead to more extended Finnish military collaboration with Germany against the Soviet Union. Accordingly it is the opinion of the American Government that there is a definite military advantage to the Soviet Union obtained in the maintenance of Finnish-American relations under present circumstances. (The maintenance of American relations with Finland in no way precludes, under present circumstances, military action by any member of the United Nations against Finnish territory.)

In presenting these considerations to the Soviet Government please endeavor to obtain to such an extent as may appear feasible, its views on the Finnish situation. If possible, it is desirable to obtain its specific approval of this Government's policy in this matter.

---

103.9166/1004 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, October 28, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 7:46 p. m.]

1039. The following may likewise be of interest to Office of War Information.

When I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning to inquire as to reasons why Finnish authorities had refused to approve for publication proofs of proposed weekly bulletin prepared by Press Section of our Legation at Stockholm in Finnish language with illustrations regarding American war effort Witting said it was policy of Finnish Government to keep such propaganda at minimum. When I pointed out that virulent Axis propaganda including entire book attacking United States was abundant here he said it was less abundant than it would be if Axis were allowed free hand and that though line of demarcation between what might be published and what might not could not be easily defined and we might differ as to where it should be drawn such line nevertheless existed. He confirmed refusal of authorities to permit us to publish proposed weekly on American war effort.

He called my attention to item in our news bulletin for October 24, as prepared by Legation at Stockholm quoting American commentator to effect that Finland had refused peace offer. He complained that

this statement appearing under masthead of this Legation which he said was not in accordance with facts should have been circulated here by us. I pointed out that statement was not made by Legation but he nevertheless objected.

Incidents herein reported illustrate practical impossibility of presenting in print either American war scene or American political standpoint in Finland as well as fact that discrimination in favor of Axis propaganda not only exists but cannot be eliminated under present conditions.<sup>48</sup>

Department and Office of War Information may wish to consider whether daily bulletin of Finnish Information Center, New York, should be suppressed although thus far our daily news bulletin in English continues to be distributed here to selected list of some 500 addressees with occasional suppression by the Finnish authorities.

SCHOENFELD

860D.4061 Motion Pictures/70: Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, via STOCKHOLM, November 5, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received November 6—8:20 a. m.]

1068. We have been trying since February 4 (see my 93 that date to Department, 15 to you <sup>49</sup>) to obtain raw film for Finland which as subsequent telegrams over these 9 months have indicated has become chief obstacle to continuing distribution of American motion pictures in this country. Our most recent appeal for prompt action (my 1004, October 21 to Department <sup>50</sup>) has so far gone unanswered. It is certain that our fight will now be lost and American films will be banned in this country after December 31 <sup>51</sup> unless immediate support is forthcoming in way of providing raw film for Finland. Please act.

SCHOENFELD

<sup>48</sup> Mr. Higgs of the Division of European Affairs discussed the substance of this telegram with Mr. Toivola, the Counselor of the Finnish Legation, on October 30, and remarked that "the position taken by the Foreign Minister in regard to this matter indicated rather clearly that the Finnish Government did not intend to permit us to make our position in the war clear to the Finnish people." The Counselor personally regretted that "his government had found it necessary to take that action." (103.9166/2071)

<sup>49</sup> Not printed; the telegram sent to Stockholm was numbered 15.

<sup>50</sup> Not printed.

<sup>51</sup> Efforts were being pushed by Germany to compel suppression of American films in Finland. Certain of the Finnish film agencies (Adams Filmi, Suomi Filmi) abetted these German attempts, and the decision had been reached that there would be no importation of American films after December 31, 1942, and no showings in theaters after March 31, 1943.

860D.4061 Motion Pictures/73 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI via STOCKHOLM, November 7, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received November 8—9: 50 a. m.]

1074. Many thanks for your prompt and timely cooperation in sending first shipment of 10,000 feet of positive raw film by pouch yesterday.<sup>52</sup> We understand from letter from Eastman Kodak people in Stockholm to their representative here that in all 40,000 feet of positive film will presently be shipped to Finland through you.

We learn this morning that Finnish Government through Commercial Section of Foreign Office is actively collaborating in our efforts to bring this film in quietly by pouch. Finnish Government instructed Krogius, its Commercial Attaché in Stockholm, to suggest to Swedish Government that this would be best means of handling shipment for reasons which are obvious to you. In this evidence of willing cooperation on part of Foreign Office we find great encouragement in our view that—provided we have raw film on which to print American pictures—it will be possible even after end of year to insure distribution of them in spite of German opposition. Raw film is duty free here, only charges payable are internal excise taxes, and hence use of our pouch creates no complication.

Department will be interested to know that at meeting early this week of Finnish Film Chamber majority of theater owners and film distributors in Finland passed vote of confidence in directorship of Chamber and resolution condemning boycotting of any foreign film on grounds of its country of origin. It is typical of Finnish censorship that publication of these resolutions in Finnish press was forbidden.

As matter of practical procedure Legation is keeping all raw film in its own custody and will release only to representatives of American film companies who can show that they have immediate need for raw film in order to distribute new American feature pictures. Eastman Kodak agent is thus relieved of possible opprobrium resulting from competition among various distributors here and will confine his activity to commercial aspects of question.

Although arrival of raw film at this moment has literally and in nick of time saved day for American film in this country we do not cease to urge need for shipment at earliest possible opportunity of complete requirements of raw film needed for Finland. We learn from Dr. Hiitonen, Secretary of Finnish Film Chamber, that Germans are

<sup>52</sup> As far back as on September 23, 1942, in telegram No. 848, the Minister had complained that the firm commitment of the American Government since the preceding May to supply limited amounts of raw film sufficient to meet legitimate needs of the Finnish film industry had remained only a promise on paper, as no supplies of film had yet been received (860D.4061 Motion Pictures/49).

considerably embarrassed by their own inability to send raw film to Finland and that in a large theater here which has two Hungarian features in stock is unable to show them because of lack of film on which to print copies. If we can bring in sufficient raw film to supply pro-American producers of motion pictures here we may very well be able to break back of pro-German Finnish film union.

SCHOENFELD

711.60D/112a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld)*

WASHINGTON, November 16, 1942—5 p. m.

225. We see no objection to your actively circulating among such persons as you think appropriate, the statements that we consider Witting and his Ministry so pro-German that we expect nothing but a continuous worsening of relations with Finland as long as he remains in office and that it is out of the question to expect any *rapprochement* with the United States until he is replaced by a person in whom we can have some confidence.

HULL

711.60D/113 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, November 18, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received November 18—3:28 p. m.]

1120. I am reminded by your 225, November 16, of pressure successfully exerted by Axis in fall of 1938 for withdrawal of Holsti<sup>53</sup> as Finnish Foreign Minister. Although conditions in Witting's case may not be the same, any activity on my part along lines indicated in your instruction seems expedient only if it proves successful. My intervention might have effect of checking growing weakness of Witting's position among influential elements here on grounds of resisting foreign pressure. In that case my relations with him would be impaired below their present point of usefulness if they are not already seriously so because of his probable knowledge that I have no confidence in him.

Reference in your telegram to possibility of *rapprochement* with us if Witting is removed seems to imply that he and his Ministry are considered main obstacle to such possibility. This supposition I am afraid exaggerates their real importance in present political picture here which continues to be overshadowed by President Ryti himself and in all essentials reflects his personal direction of affairs.

<sup>53</sup> Rudolf Holsti, who became permanent Finnish delegate at the League of Nations.

Consequently if and when I start circulating statements suggested in your 225, I can expect to be confronted with at least two questions, firstly, as to qualifications of possible successor to Witting and secondly, as to practical basis for possible *rapprochement* with us. To answer such queries it may seem advisable to you that I should have further instructions before acting on your 225.

SCHOENFELD

---

860D.00/979 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Sweden (Greene)*

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1942—9 p. m.

1015. We approve your discussing the matter in question with persons mentioned in your 3266, November 18,<sup>54</sup> as well as Erkko should you see him during visit mentioned in Helsinki's no. 1119 November 18.<sup>55</sup>

For your information in foregoing connection and for repetition to Helsinki as our no. 229 :

"Your 1120, November 18.

"We had intended that you should convey the impression of something less direct than 'foreign pressure' in carrying out our 225, November 16. Hence we desired merely to make known in an informal way to such Finns as might be concerned over the course of relations with us that, if the Finnish Government has any real desire to improve relations with us, the continuation of Witting in office is one of the effective bars thereto.

"Referring last sentence your first paragraph we suggest you keep your contacts with Witting to absolute minimum anyway.

"We have not overlooked points made in your second paragraph.

"Answers to questions suggested in your last paragraph are: (1) We do not wish to suggest what the successor's qualifications should be; but they should be obvious to any Finn desirous of improving relations with us; (2) We are open to Finnish suggestions as to the positive and practical basis for *rapprochement* but have no intention of making any move ourselves except possibly in the negative manner indicated in our 225."

HULL

---

<sup>54</sup> Not printed; the Chargé had suggested that he might discuss the Department's attitude toward the Foreign Minister of Finland with Jarl Axel Wasastjerna, the Minister of Finland in Sweden, and with S. J. Söderblom, the Chief of the Political Affairs Section of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (800D.00/979).

<sup>55</sup> Not printed. Elias Erkko had told Minister Schoenfeld of his intention to visit 4 or 5 days in Stockholm. He had not mentioned the purpose of his trip, but it was thought possible that he might get in touch with the Swedish General Staff, or perhaps with the Russians. (740.0011 European War 1939/25788)

860D.00/986 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, November 24, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received November 25—1 : 40 a. m.]

1146. Member of Finnish Diet yesterday confirmed to me that recent enactment of law providing for presidential election next February by electors of 1937 for term of only 2 years from March 1st was intended to record resentment felt by Diet against President Ryti's arbitrary methods of administration especially in matters of foreign policy regarding which Diet was kept uninformed. This lack of information about foreign policy however placed Diet in position of independence to make its influence felt in future and relieved it of direct responsibility for mistakes made.

My informant mentioned incidentally that according to information available understanding with Germans for joint action against USSR in 1941 contemplated Finnish offensive action 8 days after start of German offensive though this became unnecessary by reason of fact that Russian offensive against Finland started at once and enabled Finnish Government to claim with color of truth that it had taken no aggressive action.

Informant added that Foreign Minister Witting was most "hated" man in administration so far as Diet is concerned by reason not so much of his partiality for Germans as his secretiveness vis-à-vis Diet Foreign Affairs Committee. I gave my informant intimation along lines of your 225<sup>66</sup> and have no doubt intimation will go further. Informant said what was needed to precipitate decision of Finnish Diet to assist [*assert?*] itself for change in course of Finnish policy was unmistakable sign of our military strength and probable victory regarding which informant is personally convinced but bulk of Diet members are not as yet though recent military developments have already encouraged many sympathizers with democratic cause to express themselves more openly. It was chiefly because of Finnish dependence on German good will for essential supplies that continued restraint seemed necessary.

SCHOENFELD

860D.6359 International Nickel Co./45 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI via STOCKHOLM, November 24, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received 8 : 29 p. m.]

1150. We learn from excellent source that annual production capacity of refinery at Petsamo Nickel Mine is estimated at 5000 tons of

<sup>66</sup> November 16, 5 p. m., p. 94.

metal,<sup>57</sup> although as suggested in my 1106, November 16,<sup>58</sup> apparently plant is not yet in operation.<sup>59</sup>

SCHOENFELD

860D.00/987 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, November 25, 1942—noon.

[Received 4:44 p. m.]

1154. Well-informed former diplomat in close personal relations with leading Social Democrats as well as intellectuals here told me last night that Social Democratic elements are increasingly determined to bring about removal of Witting and Pakaslahti from Foreign Office and that principal difficulty seems to be to find suitable successor to Witting. Among possible candidates who are spoken of are Kekkonen, Minister of Education,<sup>60</sup> Procopé, Minister at Washington, Voionmaa,<sup>61</sup> Minister at Bern, and Erkko, former Foreign Minister. Of these only one who has political significance here is Kekkonen, member of Agrarian Party who is considered sound and steady man and who is not unfavorably regarded by Germans but is reported pro-Ally on larger issues of war. Erkko is considered lacking in political authority and is not personally popular. Voionmaa, though intelligent, exercises no political influence and is considered as lacking force. Procopé likewise has little standing here among political elements and his appointment might be regarded as too obvious a bid for American support.

Informant said there was increasing realization of necessity of *rapprochement* with Sweden upon which any favorable development of Finland's complicated political position is thought largely to depend. Hence consideration was also being given to possibility of finding Swedish party representative to take Foreign Office.

I carefully refrained from expressing any views on possible candidates mentioned but spoke emphatically along lines of your 225,

<sup>57</sup> The Minister had reported in telegram No. 611 of July 24, 1942, that the Petsamo Nickel Mine was working at full capacity; that Germany obtained practically all of the nickel concentrate, but that "strangely enough Germans through deficient refining process were not getting as much out of this concentrate as they might." (860D.24/211)

<sup>58</sup> Not printed.

<sup>59</sup> The British Commercial Counselor in Stockholm (Mitcheson) had told the Secretary of the American Legation in Finland (McClintock) that although the refinery was constructed it was not yet functioning. While much of the construction material was being shipped through Sweden, he had arranged for "certain of the bits and pieces" to be "lost" in transit. Although these had been replaced, "someone had contrived to provide wrong lining for electrolytic tanks and in consequence plant is still incapacitated." (860D.6359 International Nickel Co./43, 44)

<sup>60</sup> Urho Kekkonen was a former Minister of Interior. Antti Kukkonen was Minister of Education at this time.

<sup>61</sup> Tapio Voionmaa.



November 16, regarding Witting. As anticipated in my 1120, November 18, endeavor was made to sound me as to basis for *rapprochement* with us to which I answered that this was matter for future and not [*now*] immediate problem was to have a Foreign Minister here in whom we could have some degree of confidence.<sup>62</sup>

I expect substance of last night's conversation will not be long in reaching Social Democratic leaders.

SCHOENFELD

740.00119 European War 1939/1189 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, November 26, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received 7:46 p. m.]

1163. Informant referred to in my 1162, today<sup>63</sup> says that about month ago Molotov hinted to Swedish representatives that U. S. S. R. might be inclined to discuss cessation of hostilities with Finland and inquired whether Sweden would act as intermediary. Informant says these efforts were fruitless at that time owing to Finnish obstinacy. I have no confirmation of this report from any other source.

SCHOENFELD

711.60D/189

*Memorandum by the First Secretary of Legation in Finland  
(McClintock)<sup>64</sup>*

[Extracts]

HELSINKI, November 30, 1942.

This Legation, as most Legations the world over, is not informed as to the directives of American policy toward Finland. It infers from the record of the past year, however, that American policy toward Finland is much the same as stated by the Secretary of State toward Vichy France. The Legation is not aware whether the American Government has reached an understanding with the Soviet Government as to Finland. The Legation is not aware whether indeed the Soviet Government presently wishes peace with Finland or

<sup>62</sup> A day later the Minister told in telegram No. 1159 of a recent interview with President Ryti, who had spoken "in most friendly terms both of Britain and United States emphasizing determination of Finnish Government at all costs to preserve relations with the United States." (860D.00/988)

<sup>63</sup> Not printed.

<sup>64</sup> Transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Finland in his despatch No. 2484, November 30, 1942; received December 29.

whether the Kremlin now believes it is good policy to continue the war with Finland to crush this country before the final peace treaty is written and thus to claim that there is no Finnish problem for the conference.

As for the Atlantic Charter,<sup>65</sup> most Finns at present share the profound cynicism of President Ryti as to that document or any other declaration of principles by the Great Powers.

The Legation does feel, however, that with growing German military weakness the Finns indeed might reach a separate peace with Russia if they could be assured of economic support, largely in the form of food. Given first some sort of peace with Russia, which they would more quickly accept after assurance of guarantees by the western democracies, and given the promise of being fed by the United Nations, the Finns conceivably might turn against their German co-belligerents and lock them in a mighty *motti*<sup>66</sup> in the Far North, where their superior knowledge of forest warfare would stand them in deadly stead. The landing of British or American troops—but most definitely *not* Russian troops—in Northern Norway or Finland might be a signal for Finnish co-belligerency with the United Nations against their former co-belligerent.

What seems certain at this writing is that American diplomatic pressure has at least resulted in the negative success of staying a further Finnish advance against Russia and of impeding a German military thrust in the Far North. This was perhaps no mean success, and it was achieved because political relations between Finland and the United States were maintained. Should diplomatic relations be broken the door would be closed in the face of the Finns and their last hope would be the dwindling hope of German victory.

The answer is largely out of Finnish hands. The "separate war" would imply the possibility of a separate peace. Finland, even if Russia were willing to conclude a separate peace, is powerless to do so. Finland's partner is Germany, and Finland is not a free agent. A factor which has given the diplomatic correspondence of the last eleven months an unreal quality is Finnish insistence that Finland is a sovereign state with American willingness to accept this theoretical concept and thus to charge Finland with responsibility for its acts. Finland must indeed be held responsible for preparing and sharing in Hitler's plans for an attack on Russia. To this extent Finland was and is still responsible for the consequences of this cooperation. But to pretend that Finland can cease cooperating with Germany at the

<sup>65</sup> Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

<sup>66</sup> Elsewhere expressed as "pocket".

present time, or stop fighting, is to assume that Germany does not have Finland in a state of quasi-occupation. At the peace conference Finland would have been better off as a fully occupied country than to appear, as Mr. Churchill said, in the same dock with the guilty and defeated Nazis.

One thing is certain and that is that if the United Nations win this war Finnish policy must change if there is to be a Finland. Perception of this fact is growing in this country and people are awakening to the realization the [*that*] Finland will find security against Russia not in any particular chain of lakes and rivers but in a political basis whereby a small country can live beside a big one. Presumably such a basis would be found in the promises of the Atlantic Charter. If a way could be discovered to show the Finns that the Atlantic Charter means what it says, much progress could be made toward reaching that strategical frontier of the mind which the Finns have yet to win.

As for our own interest in getting Finland out of the fight, this country is a candidate with Italy and the Balkan satellites of the Axis for detachment from Germany. Already American diplomacy has succeeded in limiting the Finnish war effort. This has been a negative accomplishment. The positive deed is yet to come, to deprive Hitler of Finnish support entirely. To accomplish this objective positive means will have to be used, not merely the negative means of threats and re-statement of disapproval. The Finns under admonition merely dig in their heels and grit their teeth. However, like a mule, they will move toward a carrot held in front of their nose. In other words, we must be prepared to feed them. We must be able to offer them some framework for political security or else they will feel their present sacrifices have been in vain. The Finns would probably settle now for the return of their 1939 frontiers, if they had some guarantee from the United States and Great Britain that those frontiers would be respected by the Soviet Union. If we can offer food and guarantees there will be an earnest effort to end Finnish co-belligerency with Germany.

R[OBERT] Mc[CLINTOCK]

860D.00/993 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, December 1, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received 5:47 p. m.]

1181. Reliable information reaches me with reference to my 1173, November 28<sup>67</sup> that Social Democratic Party leadership has in fact

<sup>67</sup> Not printed.

decided for present not to agitate question of Cabinet reorganization or of positive change in foreign policy chiefly for fear of possible German reaction taking form of withholding supplies to Finland but possibly involving even more active measures.

I have no doubt fears of this kind are important factor in calculations not only of Social Democrats but of other political elements here who are seeking way out of impasse. Attendant sense of frustration seems for present to have led to determination merely to avoid any positive action in matters of foreign policy as well as on military front. It seems to be confirmed however that effort is being made unofficially to strengthen contact with Swedes as only possible firm bulwark in confusing cross currents now flowing. It seems also to be agreed that east Karelia annexation plans which were so prominent last year in Finnish Government's mind have been reluctantly but substantially abandoned.<sup>68</sup>

SCHOENFELD

---

740.00119 European War 1939/1194 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, December 3, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 6:13 p. m.]

1187. Helsinki is excited about two rumors of impending peace both involving the same protagonist but diametrically different. One story is that Paasikivi is in London seeking to arrange a separate peace. The other story is that he is in Berlin with Von Blücher, the German Minister here, on the same errand.

Paasikivi has accepted my invitation to dine with me tomorrow night and I doubt if he will send regrets at the last minute. The rumors are an indication of how anxiously people here speculate on the possibility of getting out of their "separate war".

SCHOENFELD

---

<sup>68</sup> In summarizing Finnish public opinion as it seemed to be at the end of November 1942, the Minister explained in telegram No. 1192, December 5, 10 a. m., that "As for effect of America's increasing might on outcome of war and where Finland would stand at its end Finns began to rationalize their increasing fear they had backed wrong horse, struck up argument of German invincibility and insisted Finland was not concerned in what was happening in more distant theaters of war." The Minister reported further that "At moment most people seem to have adopted defeatist argument that Finland has no choice and must grimly hold to its present policy. Believers in ultimate German victory by which Finland will profit are still majority but dwindling and those who are actively thinking how to get Finland on winning side are still minority. Leaven is there, however, and ferment is growing." (860D.00/999)

740.0011 European War 1939/26657

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. L. Randolph Higgs of the  
Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] December 4, 1942.

Mr. Boheman <sup>69</sup> dropped in late this afternoon to say goodbye before his departure for New York to-night. I was reading at the time Stockholm's telegram no. 3341 [3441] of December 3,<sup>70</sup> a white of which is attached,<sup>71</sup> reporting Swedish press comment on Finland.

I showed this telegram to Mr. Boheman and asked him whether he thought it represented the true Swedish opinion on this matter, particularly the statement,

"If Finland were again face Russia alone, it would be Sweden's duty interest aid Finland greater extent than hitherto."

Mr. Boheman after commenting that the *Svenska Dagbladet* had always taken a very strong stand in support of Finland, said that under no circumstances which he could now foresee would Sweden give armed assistance to Finland against Russia. I replied that that had been my understanding but that in all of our conversations with the Finns, they showed great confidence that if Germany should be defeated and Finland were faced with the threat of imminent invasion by the Soviet Union, Sweden would give Finland full military support against Russia. I went on to say that if the situation was indeed as he described it, I thought it unfortunate that the Finns were allowed by the Swedes to continue under this misapprehension; as they might, if clearly informed of the Swedish position find it necessary to pursue a different policy. Mr. Boheman agreed fully that this should be done and said that he would discuss the matter with the Swedish cabinet upon his return to Stockholm, especially as regards the Swedish press and their misleading statements.

Mr. Boheman . . . said that rudimentary caution should have prevented the Finns from making any claim to Soviet Karelia when they did. He thought Finland should have announced that it intended only to regain its 1939 frontiers and to stop there. He said that such an announcement would have maintained Finland's moral position in the eyes of world opinion and would not have prevented Finland from taking a "little Russian territory" later if indeed Russia were completely smashed by the Germans. I recalled to him that the Secre-

---

<sup>69</sup> Erik Boheman, Secretary General of the Swedish Foreign Ministry.

<sup>70</sup> Not printed.

<sup>71</sup> A circulation copy on white paper of a telegram received in the Department; not attached to file copy of this memorandum.

tary, as had been made public by the Department, had urged in the strongest terms upon Minister Procopé that Finland declare that it intended only to regain its lost territory and stop there, but without avail.

Mr. Boheman said that it had been practically impossible for the Swedish Government to give the Finnish Government any advice about keeping its collaboration with the Germans to a minimum and making peace with the Soviet Union. He said that any such intimations were immediately reported by Finnish Foreign Minister Witting to the Germans who "took the matter up with the Swedish Government." Mr. Boheman said that as long as Mr. Witting remained Foreign Minister, it was practically impossible for the Swedish Government to offer any suggestions along these lines to Finland.

I gave Mr. Boheman our views on Witting and told him that we had already authorized our Chargé d'Affaires in Sweden to pass them on to Mr. Soderbolen [*Söderblom*] in the Swedish Foreign Office.

Mr. Boheman gave me the impression of being completely in sympathy with our policy toward Finland. He said that he would be very glad to give Mr. Herschel Johnson,<sup>12</sup> from time to time, any views which the Swedish Government might have on Finland and he would be happy if we would transmit our views on the subject to him through Mr. Johnson whenever we thought appropriate. I thanked him for his offer of cooperation and said that we undoubtedly would avail ourselves of it whenever it seemed feasible to do so.

---

860D.00/998 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, December 5, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 7:07 p. m.]

1194. I had occasion last night to speak to Paasikivi, Erkkö and Swedish Minister<sup>13</sup> along lines of your 225, November 16. Latter two had, of course, been previously informed as indicated in Stockholm's telegram 3332, November 23.<sup>14</sup> Paasikivi, however, did not intimate he had previous advice. He immediately showed that supply question, in respect of which he said Finland was so dependent on Germany, was uppermost in his mind. Both Paasikivi and Erkkö

---

<sup>12</sup> The American Minister in Sweden.

<sup>13</sup> Hans Gustaf, Baron Beck-Friis, had been appointed Swedish Minister to Finland on September 14, 1942.

<sup>14</sup> Not printed.

made great point of fact that Finland had refrained and continued to refrain from move on Sorokka which they said could easily fall to Finnish arms and former said plainly that this restraint reflecting unwillingness of Finns to interfere with Murmansk railroad as well as their refusal to cooperate with Germans in operations against Leningrad were all to be interpreted as gesture vis-à-vis United States. I said supply question like many other problems could no doubt be advantageously discussed on Finnish initiative in due course but that immediate problem was to have in Finnish Foreign Office a point of contact meriting our confidence.

Paasikivi inquired as to standing of Procopé who is his protégé. I evaded discussion by returning to issue of Witting's position. He asked if I had discussed Witting with President Ryti. I answered that I am, of course, entirely at President's disposal should he wish to see me on this or any other topic. Paasikivi thanked me for frankly speaking about these matters. He gave me impression that he would lose no time in discussing them presumably with President and others intimating he would wish to talk with me again, later.

Erkko told me that on his return from Stockholm he had discussion at their request with Prime Minister Rangell, Finance Minister Tanner, and War Minister Walden and that unlike their attitude before these three men, especially Rangell, now saw necessity for reconsideration of Finland's entire position. Erkko felt matters were beginning to "move." He expected to have another talk with three mentioned and said he would wish to see me thereafter. While in Stockholm on his recent visit which was private and made on his own initiative Erkko said Swedish Foreign Minister<sup>77</sup> had indicated plainly that Witting was not considered in Sweden to be adequate.

Erkko told me Germans had recently indicated their concern here regarding change in tone of Finnish press on such matters as democratic institutions of Finland, nonacceptance of so-called new order, and Nordic solidarity on all of which more pronounced position was being taken by Finnish papers.

Swedish Minister seemed to be informed of our attitude towards Witting but was characteristically cautious in his comment. He gave me to understand incidentally that idea mentioned in my 1169, November 27,<sup>78</sup> regarding transfer of German and other refugees from Finland to Sweden was not looked upon with favor and would hardly have Swedish cooperation.

SCHOENFELD

---

<sup>77</sup> Christian Günther.

<sup>78</sup> Not printed.

860D.00/1000 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, December 7, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received 4: 55 p. m.]

1200. My 1199 today.<sup>79</sup> Ryti's speech<sup>80</sup> suggests that he has gone the whole way with Germans. His sole reference to Nordic solidarity is in historical review introducing his main argument and no reference is made as had been rumored to support of democracy except that he mentions Finland's Nordic institutions. He did not refer to *rapprochement* with United States or Britain.

He twice used word "geo-politics", almost said Japan would win its war for East Asia and hailed a strong Germany as principal bulwark of Europe against Soviet aggression. Except for veiled reference to Japanese victory he made no allusion to anything outside Europe and a reading of speech would not even suggest that United States was in the war. His reference to Finland as only state surviving among those created following First World War speciously pointed to Soviet absorption of Baltic States<sup>81</sup> and Bessarabia<sup>82</sup> completely ignoring German destruction of both old and new states in this war.

His address seems to indicate that Ryti has burned his bridges behind him and gambled everything on German victory. He maintains doctrine that his policy is "not only the sole way but the right way" to assured future for Finland and gives no hope of cessation of hostilities and much less peace.

Witting and Rangell were only persons to receive Grand Cross Order of White Rose in honors awarded yesterday.

SCHOENFELD

860D.00/1004 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, December 7, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received December 8—8: 35 a. m.]

1202. Source<sup>83</sup> mentioned in my 1201 today<sup>79</sup> said he thought Witting would be held in office as long as Finland's relationship of co-belligerency with Germany continued. He admitted that there would be slight chance of *rapprochement* with us so long as Foreign Office

<sup>79</sup> Not printed.<sup>80</sup> A radio address to the Finnish nation on December 6, 1942, commemorating the 25th anniversary of Finland's independence.<sup>81</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. 1, pp. 357 ff.<sup>82</sup> For correspondence regarding the activities of the Soviet Union in the Balkans and the seizure of Bessarabia, see *ibid.*, pp. 444 ff.<sup>83</sup> The source of information was described as a "well informed member of Social Democratic Party" of Finland.



remained under Witting and Pakaslahti. . . . He added that former prohibition on Foreign Office officials seeing members of this Legation had recently been lifted. We reminded him that it took two to make a party and that Foreign Office officials were not being invited by us except rarely. Our friend said "the Finns have had more good luck than good ideas in matters of foreign policy". He seemed to think there was now neither good luck nor good ideas.

SCHOENFELD

---

860D.00/1005 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, December 8, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received 10:11 p. m.]

1206. In light of Ryti's speech as summarized in my 1199, yesterday,<sup>85</sup> I desire to draw Department's attention to conclusions in latest of series of memoranda on Finnish war covering last year of Finnish-American relations which went forward by courier day before President spoke. This study was transmitted under cover of my despatch 2484, November 30.<sup>86</sup>

Our conclusions are as follows:

1. There has been no basic change in Finnish policy whatever.
2. The Finns are impressed by deeds not words. Breaking of consular relations by United States moved them more profoundly than any of our representations expressing menace and displeasure.
3. Major result of American policy during year was negative achievement of restraining further Finnish advances, particularly against Sorokka and possibly further Finnish military cooperation with Germany, at least so far as active operations were concerned.
4. The Legation is not informed as to directives of American policy toward Finland but infers that it is similar to that maintained toward Vichy. Legation is unaware if USSR wishes separate peace with Finland or if USSR plans to eliminate Finland before end of war.
5. The Finns uniformly share Ryti's cynical conviction that Atlantic Charter does not mean what it says.
6. With growing German weakness and signs that Germany will not win war, there is some possibility that if Finns can be assured of supplies and peace with Russia with guarantees from United States and Britain, they might conceivably turn against Germans in Finnish territory. Landing of British and American troops in far north after these conditions had been met might be signal for such action, but most definitely Russian troops should not cooperate.

---

<sup>85</sup> Not printed, but see the Minister's telegram No. 1200, p. 105.

<sup>86</sup> Despatch not printed; for extracts of the study referred to, see memorandum by the First Secretary of Legation in Finland, November 30, p. 98.

7. Finland's possibly fatal mistake has been to cling stubbornly to its static policy in a dynamic situation. Finnish dogma of the "separate war" is a purely artificial concept proved not by argument but by blind repetition to reconcile Finland's desire not to be in the World War with the fact that it is. The Finns have wished to enjoy all the advantages of co-belligerency with Germany and none of the liabilities. Finland will be held responsible for sharing in Hitler's plans for attack on Russia but in its state of quasi-occupation is not free by itself to get out of its "separate war" even if it wanted to.

8. It is certain that if United Nations win this war and integrity of Finland is to be maintained, Finnish policy will have to change. Signs of a desire for such a change are beginning to be evident.

9. American interest would be served by getting Finland out of the fight to deprive Hitler of Finnish support entirely. To do this, however, more than negative means are required. Positive means include first of all food, guarantees, peace.

It is now seen from Ryti's speech that there is still a long road to travel before the Finns can be got out of the "motti" in which they have been trapped by bullheadedness, bad policy and Nazi guile.

SCHOENFELD

---

123 Sch 62/466 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld)*

WASHINGTON, December 8, 1942—9 p. m.

235. In view of your 1200, December 7, you are instructed to return home for consultation at your earliest convenience under authorization already issued you.<sup>87</sup>

We suggest you do not seek interviews with Ryti or Witting before leaving, and that you answer any inquiry as to whether you will return to Finland by saying your instructions are that you return home for consultation and that your return home has no reference to the forthcoming holidays.

CORDELL HULL

---

740.0011 European War 1939/26449 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State*

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), December 11, 1942—9 p. m.

[Received December 12—1:15 p. m.]

1084. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. Reference my telegrams 1059, December 7, 5 p. m.<sup>88</sup> and 1082, December 11, 7 p. m.<sup>89</sup>

---

<sup>87</sup> By telegram No. 220, November 6, 1942, the Department had directed Schoenfeld to report for consultation, without specifying a date (123 Sch 62/458).

<sup>88</sup> Not printed.

<sup>89</sup> Vol. III, p. 483.

1. If the Department perceives no objection I should like, during my impending conversation with Molotov early next week,<sup>90</sup> and in case his attitude makes it possible for me to do so, to ask him whether in the opinion of the Soviet Government the time has come when something might be done in the direction of prevailing upon Finland to break away from Germany and to make peace with the Soviet Union. For some time the Swedish Minister here,<sup>91</sup> who, as has been reported, is considered since very friendly to the Allies, has been insisting that now is the time to exert every effort to extricate Finland from its present position.

2. The Czechoslovak Minister,<sup>92</sup> who it will be recalled is very close to the Soviet authorities, called on me today, and after discussing other matters also referred to the Finnish situation. He said that he had the feeling that the Russians might be more interested now than they have been in the past in effecting a settlement with Finland. His idea, which is similar to that of the Swedish Minister, is that the Russians might now feel themselves to be in a sufficiently strong position to permit overtures to be made to Finland without the impression being created that such overtures reflected weakness on their part.

3. The Swedish Minister is inclined to believe that if the Finns could receive assurances through the United States or some other channels that the Russians might be willing to negotiate on the basis of the Moscow agreement, altered to permit Hango and perhaps Viborg to remain in Finnish hands, accompanied by explanations that if Finland refuses to negotiate it might eventually expect Soviet occupation, they would be sorely tempted to reconsider their position. The Swedish Minister feels that success with regard to Finland could not fail to make a powerful impression on Sweden and would considerably strengthen the influence of those Swedish groups who desire Sweden to come out openly on the Allied side.

4. If I should mention the matter to Molotov I would, of course, confine my remarks to questions of an exploratory nature.

5. Please send reply direct to Moscow.

HENDERSON

---

123 Sch 62/470 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, December 14, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received December 15—4:10 a. m.]

1230. At request of President Ryti I called on him this afternoon and had 2 hours or more of conversation with him besides half an hour spent in his company and that [of] Madame Ryti for coffee.

---

<sup>90</sup> For the Chargé's report on his conversation with Molotov, see his telegram No. 537, December 15, 9 p. m., vol. III, p. 484.

<sup>91</sup> Per Vilhelm Gustaf Assarsson.

<sup>92</sup> Zdenek Fierlinger.

Ryti said he had learned of my forthcoming departure for consultation and desired me to say to you and to the President on his behalf that Finnish democracy which dates from fourteenth century in recorded history was analogous only to that of Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland in Europe and that none of these peoples had ever been serfs. Finland stood for same ideals of political and social freedom as United States and had no intention of deviating in slightest from them. He again made point that Finland had no political commitments to Germans and remained free to make its own decisions though he alluded to question of essential supplies.

President told me for first time from any authorized source that so far from taking negative and defeatist (my words) attitude toward problems of world war he fully intended as soon as in his judgment opportunity offered to take positive measures implying that these measures would be designed to terminate conflict with U. S. S. R. by saying that decision in March 1940 to go personally to Moscow for peace negotiations was taken by himself alone and against much opposition. I told President this was most important statement and that I had long felt something should be done to remove impression that Finnish policy was merely negative and static in presence of tremendous issues now at stake in world. His statement was made very cautiously and he made considerable point of fact that decision as to time for action though steadily kept in mind must be his own.

I had opportunity to tell President I had been greatly disappointed in his speech December 6 which struck me as having been made by scholarly and deeply thoughtful man such as I knew him to be as if in complete "vacuum" since it seemed entirely to ignore large moral issues involved in our past [*part?*] in world war except for allusion by implication to possible Japanese victory. His response was that careful examination of speech which he hoped would be made by us and particularly by you should make it plain that he had been principally concerned with security of small nations including Finland and their equal rights with great powers. Finnish spokesman, however, as representative of small nation could not undertake to discuss in specific language many other issues of war and in any case Russian danger for Finland and for Europe remained uppermost in his mind throughout that speech.

2. Also referred to attendance of Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and other Government representatives at Japanese Legation reception December 8 to celebrate anniversary of Pearl Harbor<sup>93</sup> saying this had made particularly bad impression on us. He gave no adequate explanation and obviously could not.

---

<sup>93</sup> A reception had been held at the Japanese Legation in celebration of the first anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Prime Minister Rangell, and other Finnish Governmental officials, had attended. Here they viewed with seeming approval a Japanese film of this attack, and there had been reports that some of these officials had publicly congratulated the Japanese on the attack.

President brought up question of my personal status and that of this Legation in recent months which afforded me opportunity to tell him, mentioning isolation and intimidation of our friends, that speaking to him as man to man and fully cognizant as I was of delicacy of subject, it was fact that impenetrable barrier had developed in intercourse with Foreign Office and that relations between ourselves and Finnish Government could not improve until confidence was re-established between Legation and Foreign Office. President said he was most grateful for opportunity to discuss this question frankly. He said condition was due to fact that in Finland's short independent history Foreign Office was probably weakest point in administrative organization. Thanks to Marshal Mannerheim, respectable army had been built up but it had not yet been possible to create diplomatic organization adequate to national needs. I gained impression President was fully inclined at the moment to take drastic action to change incumbency of Foreign Ministry but he may well have to reflect that this matter which must also be considered in light of effect of possible action on Nazi cobelligerent.

Ryti alluded to his vehemence and rather intemperate attitude during his conversation with me last September 25 and told me his reaction had been due to use of words "provocation" in memorandum I then handed him. He apologized in effect for his attitude at that time and intimated desire for some specification of use of that term. I did not follow his lead beyond saying that if my Government should undertake to set out facts on which use of term was based list would be impressive.

Ryti reiterated his expressions of confidence and esteem for me and said he hoped I would soon return.<sup>94</sup>

Clear impression left on my mind by today's conversation and especially by Ryti's reference to intention not to remain passive is that my forthcoming departure is well understood as political gesture on our part and that it will have effect on policy here.

SCHOENFELD

---

740.0011 European War 1939/26449 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson), at Moscow*

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1942—10 p. m.

411. The matter mentioned in your 1084, December 11 will be discussed with Admiral Standley who plans to leave for Moscow end of this week.

HULL

---

<sup>94</sup> The Chargé in Finland informed the Department by telegram No. 1267 on December 24, 1942, that "Rumor is now current here that Mr. Schoenfeld will not return until Witting has resigned." (123 Sch 62/474)

660D.6281/143 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, December 15, 1942.

[Received December 15—9:16 p. m.]

1234. Press today publishes following:

"Finland, Germany have decided prolong trade agreement between the two states till end 1943.<sup>95</sup> Similarly agreement has been reached as in earlier years regarding organization of Finnish-German trade during first quarter on temporary basis. Final negotiations regarding trade exchange 1943 will take place in Helsinki during February next."

SCHOENFELD

860D.00/1014 : Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, December 16, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 5:22 p. m.]

1238. At his request I called on Foreign Minister Witting this morning. His attitude was much unusual [*as usual?*] and not personally lacking in friendliness. He repeated standing theme so often previously reported regarding Finnish policy including statement that it remained unchanged and free of any political obligation to Germans though preponderantly influenced by dependence on Germany and German controlled Europe for 94 percent of essential imports. To my suggestion that such passive policy in fast movement of powerful forces now involved in war was highly dangerous to Finland his answer was that life itself is dangerous and that physical self-preservation was first requirement of small people who could not hope to influence events in larger field.

He asked me to explain when I reached Washington "facts" regarding Finland which he gave me credit for understanding. I intimated regret that he and I had found it difficult to understand each other to which his answer was that he understood our point of view very well. To my inquiry whether there would be any desire to take a more active line Witting said he could not speak for future saying this possibility would depend on events over which Finland had no control. Witting did not rise to my suggestion that if Finland had

<sup>95</sup> The treaty of commerce between Finland and Germany signed at Berlin on March 24, 1934 (League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CXLIX, p. 343, or Finland, Treaty Series, 1934, No. 13), was extended by a law issued at Helsinki on November 6, 1942, approving certain provisions of the protocol which had been signed at Berlin on December 31, 1941 (Finland, Treaty Series, 1942, No. 3), and by a decree, bringing into effect this protocol, issued at Helsinki on November 13, 1942. The protocol of extension became effective on November 27, 1942. For the text of the Finnish law and decree, see Finland, Treaty Series, 1942, Nos. 19-20.

any problems to discuss with us they might be sympathetically considered if brought to our attention and contented himself substantially with line above indicated.

Unlike President Ryti, Witting did not express any desire regarding my possible return to Helsinki. Nor did he suggest any interest in interpretation of fact that I have been ordered home for consultation.

SCHOENFELD

---

711.60D/187a

*Memorandum for Admiral Standley* \*\*

I. OUR POLICY TOWARD FINLAND

(a) *Immediate Considerations*

This Government's estimate of the present situation in Finland, which is based upon reports over the past year from the American Legation in Helsinki and upon conversations with other competent observers who have recently come from Finland after several years stay in the area, is as follows:

1. German forces now in Finland seem unwilling to attempt fresh advances into Soviet territory north of Leningrad *unless they are aided by Finnish armed forces.*

2. Neither the Government nor the people of Finland desire to mount fresh military offensives against the Soviet Union.

3. There is reason to believe that German pressure on Finland to furnish further military aid has been heavy in recent months.

4. Given the foregoing situation it has been the short term aim of the American Government to exert pressure on the Finnish Government as a counter to the German pressure.

It is the opinion of all American observers in Finland that the Finnish people and certain officials of the Finnish Government place great value on maintaining diplomatic relations with the United States, and that the maintenance of such relations acts as a strong deterrent to any Finnish inclination to increase substantially aid to Germany. These observers feel that, conversely if we should break relations with Finland under existing conditions, the last political weapon in the hands of the United Nations with which to counteract German pressure on Finland would be destroyed, and increased Finnish military aid to Germany, perhaps of a decisive character along the northern front, would probably result. It is also felt by these observers that, instead of creating disunity among the Finnish people,

---

\*\* Handed to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union, William H. Standley, while in Washington on December 18, 1942, by Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs,

the immediate effect of a severance of relations with Finland on the part of the United States would be to increase the influence and power over the Finnish people of the pro-German elements in Finland, a development almost certain to lead to more extensive Finnish military collaboration with Germany against the Soviet Union.

5. Accordingly, it is the opinion of the American Government that in the absence of any practical possibility of opening substantial military operations in the area, there has been and continues to be a definite military advantage to the Soviet Union in the maintenance of Finnish-American relations under present circumstances. (It should be pointed out in this connection that the maintenance of American relations with Finland in no way precludes, under present circumstances, military action against Finnish territory by any member state of the United Nations.)

*(b) General Considerations*

It is the view of the American Government that it is in the interest of the United Nations generally and of the Soviet Union in particular that Finland be gotten out of its "co-belligerency" with Germany.

Aside from the obvious military advantages to the Soviet Union, the psychological effect of a Finnish withdrawal from the hostilities would be very great on:

(1) Sweden, where present nervousness over the fate of its eastern neighbor distracts Sweden from complete opposition to German encroachments.

(2) Rumania, where, should it be demonstrated that Finland was able to withdraw from the war on equitable terms, the opposition to continuing military operations against the Soviet Union would, it is believed, substantially increase.

(3) The United States, where a substantial Scandinavian population remains skeptical of the sincerity of the Atlantic Charter because of fear that the Soviet Union intends to occupy and annex Finland.

(4) The Axis countries, where it is reasonable to assume the dissidence of Finland would have a strongly adverse effect on morale.

## II. PROCEDURE

(a) It is suggested that you explain to high Soviet officials as soon as practicable, the immediate considerations involved in American policy toward Finland. In doing so, it would be advantageous, for the record, to obtain the Soviet Government's specific approval of the policy which the American Government has followed so far in regard to Finland.

(b) If, on receiving the explanations of the immediate considerations involved in the American policy toward Finland, the Soviet



Government should show an inclination to discuss its own attitude toward Finland, you might find it feasible also to go into the question of general considerations in American policy toward Finland; but, if the Soviet Government should show no inclination to discuss Finnish matters further with you, it might be best not to pursue the matter for the time being.

The Department inclines to the opinion that the Finnish Government would not be receptive at this time to the character of peace terms which it is thought the Soviet Government might feel disposed to offer. \*Hence, it would seem undesirable in any event for this Government to press the matter of a peace offer from the Soviet Government until the situation in Finland appears more propitious, which may be expected when the results of the North African campaign and the Soviet winter offensive are apparent to the Finnish Government.

---

123 Sch 62/472: Telegram

*The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, December 19, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received 11:50 a. m.]

1249. Headlines in today's papers emphasize two aspects of Minister Schoenfeld's departure, first that he will return soon and second that his trip to United States is "without significance". First headline is based on his alleged statement to *Social Demokraten* in Stockholm on the 17th and second seems to have been a directive from censorship here. Since headlines in Finland today are not slogans of news but of what Government wishes people to think this slant on Minister's departure is significant.

Should Department wish to suggest any other interpretation of Mr. Schoenfeld's return to Washington we feel that possibly American Finnish language transcription via British Broadcasting Corporation next Thursday and daily news bulletin prepared by Press Section of our Legation at Stockholm might be used.

---

\*Note. In a conversation on December 14, President Ryti of Finland informed the American Minister that so far from taking a negative and defeatist attitude toward problems of the world war, he fully intended, as soon as in his judgment opportunity offered, to take positive measures, implying that these measures would be designed to terminate the conflict with U. S. S. R. The Department is inclined to believe that President Ryti expects the Soviet Union in due course to become much weaker militarily, and that he intends to wait for such a development before taking "positive measures". However, if the military situation of Germany in relation to the Soviet Union deteriorates as we expect, he may be moved to take "positive measures" for consideration contrary to those he now expects. [Footnote in the original. The conversation with President Ryti on December 14, 1942, was reported in the Minister's telegram No. 1230 of the same date, p. 108.]

Even in informed circles wishful thought is being expressed that Mr. Schoenfeld, who "understands Finland" will present Finnish case in Washington in best light and that following this "explanation" there will be an improvement in Finnish-American relations.

We shall continue to say that we do not know when the Minister will return and that significance of his trip must be inferred not from headlines but from facts of Finland's position in the war.

McCLINTOCK

---

811.20260D/6: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (McClintock)*

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1942—8 p. m.

240. In a note dated today<sup>97</sup> to the Finnish Chargé d'Affaires<sup>98</sup> reference is made to a conversation on October 28 between Foreign Minister Witting and Minister Schoenfeld. The note continues:

"The American Minister inquired as to reasons why Finnish authorities had refused to approve for publication in Finland proofs of a proposed weekly bulletin with illustrations regarding the American war effort prepared by the Press Section of the American Legation in Stockholm. Professor Witting stated that it was the policy of the Finnish Government to keep such propaganda at a minimum. The American Minister pointed out to him that virulent Axis propaganda including an entire book attacking the United States was abundant in Finland.

The attitude taken by Professor Witting illustrated the practical impossibility of presenting in print in Finland the American war scene or the American political standpoints. It also points to the fact that discrimination in favor of Axis propaganda not only exists but cannot be eliminated under present conditions.

It had been the hope of the Department that the attitude of the Finnish Government in regard to this matter would be reversed. This, however, has not proved to be the case. Accordingly instructions are being issued by Mr. Hull to the American Legation in Helsinki to cease immediately the distribution of information of all types to the Finnish public.

In view of the foregoing, the Chargé d'Affaires is requested to have stopped immediately upon receipt of this note any further activities of the Finnish Information Center in New York and of the Finnish Legation's personnel in the field of releases, pamphlets, public addresses, books, et cetera. Hereafter the Finnish Legation is requested to make or release no statements for public consumption in the United States except such oral statements as may be required to reply to specific inquiries from American press representatives. Instructions

<sup>97</sup> The note when finally despatched was dated December 26, 1942.

<sup>98</sup> Torsten Oskar Vahervuori.

being issued to the American Legation in Helsinki require that that Legation follow a similar practice in Finland."

Please repeat to Stockholm for its guidance.

HULL

---

860D.00/1025 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Sweden (Greene) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, December 24, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 12:04 p. m.]

3666. Foreign Minister Günther having expressed a desire to talk with Minister Schoenfeld I presented latter yesterday afternoon. Foreign Minister referred to a newspaper comment on attack in Finnish Diet against Finnish Foreign Minister Witting<sup>99</sup> and said that he really felt foreign policy of Finland did not rest with M. Witting. He mentioned fact that Russian Government had let it be known that it did not favor any members of present Finnish Government including President Ryti and Minister Tanner.

In discussing possibilities of a Finnish peace, Foreign Minister mentioned existing Finnish fear that peace at a time when Russia is in ascendancy would leave latter country in a stronger relative position in United Nations effort than at a later date when it might be expected that Britain and America would supply a more decisive blow against Germany. From that point of view it did not seem to be to Finns' advantage to seek peace at present. From another point of view, Günther thought there is an advantage to Finland which Finns recognize in an earlier peace in that at a later stage in war if United Nations desire aid of Russia against Japan there exists a fear that Russia might demand more of Finland than would be case if a peace had already been established. Günther said Finns are well aware that moment for peace effort must be very carefully chosen also because success of Finland in securing peace with Russia would be considered by Germans as breach in solidarity of states associated with them and might lead to general stampede out of Axis camp which Germans would use every effort to prevent including forceful measures against Finland.

Repeated to Helsinki.<sup>1</sup>

GREENE

---

<sup>99</sup> The Chargé in Finland reported also in telegram No. 1261, December 23, 1942, that two days previously some members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Finnish Diet had extensively criticized Witting for his conduct of foreign affairs, and particularly for keeping this committee uninformed of developments in violation of constitutional provisions (article 48). (860D.00/1023)

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was further repeated by the Department on December 31, 1942, to the Embassy in the Soviet Union at Kulbyshev.

860D.00/1024 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, December 24, 1942—noon.

[Received 4:34 p. m.]

1268. We have confirmation from reliable source <sup>2</sup> of report in my 1255, December 22,<sup>3</sup> that Kivimäki <sup>4</sup> has urged necessity of Finland maintaining an alternative line. It is alleged he has gone even farther and categorically informed his Government that Germany cannot win war. Kivimäki is supposed to have urged immediate consideration of ways and means to abandon sinking German ship before Finns go down with it. He seems to have laid particular stress on cultivating Sweden to this end.

McCLINTOCK

860D.00/1017 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (McClintock)*

WASHINGTON, December 24, 1942—6 p. m.

243. Your 1223, December 14; 1235, December 15; and 1239, December 17.<sup>5</sup> American press and radio featuring story that Prime Minister and other high Finnish officials attended reception December 8th at Japanese Legation in Helsinki celebrating the attack on Pearl Harbor. Reports cite fact pictures shown of burning American warships and that Rangell and others toasted Japan with shouts of "banzai".

Story broken unofficially by OWI <sup>6</sup> with material released virtually same as that broadcast shortwave in Finnish and Danish languages by Schenectady station on December 17th. Source of information not given.

Finnish Legation issued statement this morning to following effect: it had received official Finnish version that film of Pearl Harbor attack was shown at tea party at Japanese Legation; that guests knew nothing beforehand of planned program; denies knowledge of alleged congratulations addressed by Rangell and others to Japanese Minister;<sup>7</sup> and concludes that there is no reason, from Finnish point of view, why invitations to social events should be declined when arranged by foreign legations in Finnish capital. (Repeat to Stockholm).

<sup>1</sup> The Chargé described the informant as being an "exceptionally well informed" neutral Press Attaché.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Toivo Mikael Kivimäki, Finnish Minister in Germany.

<sup>4</sup> None printed.

<sup>5</sup> Office of War Information.

<sup>6</sup> Tadashi Sakaya.

Please report fully on extent of reproduction of story in Finnish press and radio and popular reaction to publication of story in United States.

HULL

---

860D.00/1029 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, December 28, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received 9:03 p. m.]

1275. Chief of Protocol<sup>8</sup> last night informed me that although annual New Year reception would not be held at President's Palace on January 1, it was expected that President's book would be signed by diplomatic representatives and that "pf"<sup>9</sup> cards would be sent to Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

In view of Japanese tea party on December 8, I am not disposed to send cards to Rangell or Witting unless instructed to do so by you.<sup>10</sup>

McCLINTOCK

---

711.60D/132

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. L. Randolph Higgs of the Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1942.

Being unable to arrange an appointment with Mr. Atherton this afternoon, Mr. Vahervuori, Finnish Chargé d'Affaires came in to see me.

Mr. Vahervuori read me the attached *aide-mémoire*.<sup>11</sup> After he had finished I inquired of him if his phrase in paragraph no. 2 of the *aide-mémoire* "member of the Finnish Government" was to be interpreted as it was in Finland, or in other words that the phrase referred only to members of the Finnish cabinet and did not include other Finnish officials. He replied in the affirmative and indicated on my pressing the point that he had information to the effect that a Finnish official had in fact congratulated the Japanese Minister on the occasion. He endeavored to pass the incident off, however, by saying that inexperienced minor officials occasionally phrased their remarks in such a way as to convey meanings which they had not meant to.

I then inquired of Mr. Vahervuori whether, in view of the point made in his *aide-mémoire* that the Finnish officials had not been aware

---

<sup>8</sup> R. Hakkarainen.

<sup>9</sup> *Pro forma*.

<sup>10</sup> No indication has been found in Department files of instructions sent in this matter.

<sup>11</sup> Not printed; this *aide-mémoire* was concerned with the happenings at the celebration at the Japanese Legation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

of the character of the celebration at the Japanese Embassy [*Legation*], any of them had left the Legation when they did become aware that the Japanese were celebrating the attack on Pearl Harbor. Mr. Vahervuori replied that he had no information to that effect, but that he assumed that no one had left under those circumstances since it was contrary to Finnish character to create "demonstrations". I commented that, for whatever reason, Finnish officials had gotten themselves into a position where they had created a demonstration against us by not leaving the party, I said that it seemed to me that under the circumstances that they were faced with the choice of "demonstrating" either against us or the Japanese and that they had chosen the former.

Mr. Vahervuori then stated that he had the impression that the Office of War Information "had it in for Finland". I replied that I was unaware of any such situation. Mr. Vahervuori referred to the handling of the story under discussion and to recent newspaper accounts of the renewal of the Finnish-German Trade Agreement, and the headlines carried by the American press indicating a definite Finnish subservience to Germany. I said that with respect to the "Pearl Harbor" story, I could not comment on the validity of Constantine Brown's information in his article breaking this story,<sup>12</sup> as I had not discussed the matter before or after the publication of the article with Mr. Brown. I said, however, that it seemed to me on the basis of the information that I had in regard to the event in question and on the basis of the information just conveyed to me by Mr. Vahervuori that the sense, at least, of Mr. Brown's article was more or less accurate in that it reported that a function had been held at the Japanese Legation in Helsinki on the occasion of the Anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor, that high Finnish officials had attended the function, and that the Japanese Minister had been congratulated by at least one of those officials.

---

Mr. Vahervuori then said that the Legation had received the previous night the Department's note regarding the closing of the Finnish Information Center in New York and in general regarding the dissemination of Finnish propaganda in the United States and American propaganda in Finland.<sup>13</sup> Since it was obviously in his mind, I told him that this move was in no way connected with the "Pearl Harbor" incident and that the move had been decided upon before that story

---

<sup>12</sup> The article by Constantine Brown entitled "Finn Premier Reported Toasting Japs at Dec. 7 'Victory Party'" appeared in the *Washington Evening Star* for December 23, 1942, p. 1, col. 5. An Office of War Information radio broadcast to Finland about this incident had been made on December 17, and the text of it was printed in the *Evening Star* on December 24, 1942, p. 2, col. 2.

<sup>13</sup> See telegram No. 240, December 23, 8 p. m., to the Chargé in Finland, and footnote 97, p. 115.

appeared in the press and that the move would have been put into effect earlier had not Mr. Berle been unexpectedly delayed in returning to Washington.

Mr. Vahervuori then brought up certain details of the execution of the Department's note in regard to this matter. (1) He inquired whether it was the Department's desire that the Finnish Information Center in New York be definitely closed and I replied in the affirmative. (2) He then inquired what action the Legation could take in replying to the number of letters it was receiving in regard to the "Pearl Harbor story"; to which I commented that the Legation seemed already to have issued a statement to the press on the subject. I said that the Legation might answer these letters by referring to the Legation's statement to the press and agreed with his suggestion that it might not be inappropriate also to refer the inquiries for further information to the Office of War Information. (3) Mr. Vahervuori then stated that the Legation received a rather large number of inquiries from schools, students, et cetera for basic information in regard to Finland and that it had been the habit of the Legation to reply to these inquiries by enclosing pertinent documents, booklets, et cetera. I said that it seemed to be the clear intention of the Department that the dissemination of pamphlets, booklets, et cetera would cease, hence I thought that in replying to inquiries of this type the Legation should confine itself to furnishing an appropriate bibliography on the subject in question. I assured him that the Department had no real desire to oppose adequate and pertinent replies to legitimate inquiries of this character but pointed out the difficulty in drawing a line between inquiries of this character and others; and hence that no printed documents of any kind should be disseminated by the Legation.

---

Mr. Vahervuori then jokingly inquired what new "blow" we had in store for Finland. I replied that I knew of none; but that we should be prepared for surprises so long as Professor Witting remained in office as Foreign Minister. Mr. Vahervuori interrupted to inquire whether the Department was opposed to Professor Witting on personal grounds and whether there had been any personal difficulties between Professor Witting and Minister Schoenfeld. I replied in the negative to both questions and continued by saying that any references to Professor Witting as Foreign Minister referred to his policies. I said that it was no concern of this Government whether Professor Witting remained in office or not, but that we did realize on the basis of past experience that Professor Witting's personal policy was so closely identified with collaboration with our enemies that he might promote other measures in the field of collaboration with our enemies

that would require action on our part. I said that as long as he remained in office, we had to anticipate under these circumstances a further deterioration in Finnish-American relations but that I could not forecast how this would come about since we had no idea, at this time, what new move Professor Witting would make.

---

860D.00/1088 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, December 29, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received 9 : 47 p. m.]

1287. Department's 243, December 24, and my 1274, December 28.<sup>14</sup> Chief of Political Section of Foreign Office asked me to call this afternoon. He said that he had just received our news bulletin 293, December 21, with paragraph entitled "Americans resent Finnish attitude toward Pearl Harbor attack." I am sending text of this paragraph in clear.

Ivalo said he had been instructed to raise this matter with me apparently with a view to protesting its appearance in our bulletin. I told him that in the words of President Roosevelt,<sup>15</sup> Pearl Harbor was a deed which would live in the annals of infamy and that no recent incident had more aroused American popular indignation so far as Finland was concerned. Ivalo then more or less summarized statement of Finnish Legation of December 24 making point that Finnish officials could not well decline invitations from foreign legations, that Finland had maintained equally friendly relations both with Washington and Tokyo and that Rangell had not congratulated Japanese Minister on Pearl Harbor although he and others had used the usual "phrases de courtoisie", as Ivalo put it. He said Witting did not stay to see film. His own impression on going to Japanese Legation had been that this was merely a Japanese national holiday.

I remarked that people in his own Protocol Section knew very well what the Japanese national holiday was and that it was even printed in Foreign Office's own diplomatic list. I said that certainly any American seeing an invitation from Japanese Legation dated December 8 which, in Tokyo time was date of Pearl Harbor attack, could not fail to connect such invitation with Pearl Harbor. Finns were indeed free to accept such invitations as they wished and to offer such congratulations as occurred to them but to an American "Pearl Harbor" was fighting words and Americans, in fact, were angry at this gaff. Ivalo remarked that perhaps the Japanese Minister had made a gaff.

---

<sup>14</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>15</sup> Message of the President to the Congress on December 8, 1941, Department of State *Bulletin*, December 13, 1941, p. 474.



I replied that I was glad to have his explanations and hoped that he would understand in light of my explanations how American people felt about this Japanese tea party.

Ivalo made point he has referred to in previous conversations of Finland's complete neutrality in Pacific war. He even went so far as to assert that 80 percent of news in Finnish papers concerning Pacific war was of American origin. I said I could not at all accept this statement as Legation had made very careful study of this point and on contrary, I had definite impression that any Japanese victory appeared on front page in big black type and any American victory on back page in very small type. This pointed indeed to Department's decision on whole problem of providing Finland with accurate information of American war effort.

I informed Ivalo that at all events he would no longer be troubled with news bulletins of American Legation as they had been stopped. He said he had received several telegrams from Finnish Legation in Washington on this subject but had not seen text of your note of December 23<sup>16</sup> and professed to be puzzled as to exact situation. I informed him in sense of your 240 and offered to send him text of your note which I am doing this afternoon. Ivalo also said he had not known that Finnish Legation had issued communiqué to press in terms of your 243 and I volunteered to give him paraphrase.

In closing interview, Ivalo said he hoped that we would show motion pictures and said without doubt Mr. Rangell would accept.

McCLINTOCK

---

740.0011 European War 1939/26833 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State*

HELSINKI, December 31, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received December 31—9:51 a. m.]

1301. Officer cited my 1300 today<sup>17</sup> expressed great indignation last night at what he termed stupidity of Witting which resulted in suppression of our and Finnish Legation's propaganda activities. He said he hoped there would soon be a new Foreign Minister in Helsinki and intimated he thought there would be.

McCLINTOCK

---

<sup>16</sup> See telegram No. 240, December 23, 8 p.m., to the Chargé in Finland, p. 115.

<sup>17</sup> Not printed.

## FRANCE

### CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES OVER VICHY COLLABORATION WITH AXIS POWERS,<sup>1</sup> ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO CAMPAIGN IN LIBYA; SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND VICHY

740.0011 European War 1939/19747

*The French Chief of State (Pétain) to President Roosevelt*

[Translation]

VICHY, January 16, 1942.

MY DEAR PRESIDENT: I was happy to receive your New Year's message<sup>2</sup> and at the same time to have confirmation of the interest which you had felt in our recent conversations<sup>3</sup> with Admiral Leahy.<sup>4</sup> During the course of these conversations, French policy was clearly defined both by me and by the Vice President of the Council<sup>5</sup> and I see with keen satisfaction that the Government of the United States understands the position of the French Government in the present conflict.

The sentiments which you were good enough to express to me on this occasion respond to those which the French people feel for the American nation and you may be assured of the fidelity of the French to the traditions which you invoke.

I was very much touched by the good wishes which your message brought me; I beg you to find here the expression of my thanks and the renewal of my best wishes.

Please accept [etc.]

PH. PÉTAİN

---

740.0011 European War 1939/18731a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy,*

WASHINGTON, January 20, 1942—11 p. m.

44. The President has asked me to send you the following message:

---

<sup>1</sup> Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, pp. 89-206.

<sup>2</sup> Letter dated December 27, 1941; see *ibid.*, p. 205.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 196 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Adm. William D. Leahy, American Ambassador in France.

<sup>5</sup> Jean François Darlan.

"Dear Bill:

Here are some thoughts which you could use if the occasion offered—either with Marshal Pétain or General Weygand.\*

(1). It is most important for the French Government and the French people to realize that the President of the United States is about the best friend they have; that one of his greatest wishes is to see France reconstituted in the post-war period in accordance with its splendid position in history.

(2). The word 'France' in the mind of the President includes the French Colonial Empire.

(3). The attack on the United States and the declaration of war must make the French Government and people realize that any act on their part either at home or in the Colonies which would give aid and comfort to the Germans or Italians must, of necessity, help the Germans and hurt the United States. The United States could not, of course, take such a hostile act lying down. That is just common sense which the French should realize.

(4). Now that the United States is in the war, it should be perfectly clear to the French Government and the French people that if Germany or Italy attacked unoccupied France or any of the French Colonies, in any way, the President could not regard acquiescence to such an attack as anything else than playing the German game.

(5). On the other hand, resistance by the French against Germany or Italian attack either in France itself or in any part of the Colonial Empire would be regarded by the President as a normal and natural reaction. Such resistance would have not only the moral support of the United States, but it would also have the physical support of the United States by every possible military and naval assistance we could bring to bear.

The above seems to me almost like a primer because it is wholly logical and wholly simple. F. D. R."

HULL

---

740.0011 European War 1939/18979 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, January 27, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received January 28—2:46 a. m.]

130. Attention of Mr. Atherton: I obtained an interview this morning with Marshal Pétain, Admiral Darlan and M. Rochat<sup>a</sup> being present, and delivered orally to the Marshal the President's message to me—Department's 44, January 20, 11 p. m.

While the Marshal made no direct reference thereto, I am convinced that he had previously received a communication from the

---

\* Gen. Maxime Weygand, French Delegate General in North Africa until his recall in November 1941.

<sup>a</sup> Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

<sup>b</sup> Charles Antoine Rochat, Secretary General of the French Foreign Office.

person referred to in my 107, January 22, noon,<sup>8a</sup> and my 108, January 22, 1 p. m.<sup>9</sup>

I reminded the Marshal that I have heretofore frequently expressed to him as my personal opinion the contents of the President's message to me except the prospect of naval and military assistance referred to in the last paragraph thereof but that these thoughts coming directly from the President to me should have much more weight.

The Marshal, who seemed unusually well prepared in advance replied, "This is very definite." Then reading from a pencil memorandum he said that he has made it very clear that his Government will resist invasion by British, Gaullists, Germans or Americans.

He continued with a statement that the following pertinent questions have been discussed:

1. "Unfriendly use of the French Fleet. This is no longer a question."
2. "The use by Germany of bases in North Africa. This also is not a question at the present time."
3. "The possibility of invasion of Africa through Spain or from some other direction. This question is certainly not pending at the moment."

I then asked the Marshal if, in the event of an invasion of French Africa by the Axis Powers, he would accept naval and military aid from America. He replied: "If we ask for it".

Admiral Darlan then expressed a hope that the President will at an early date settle the Saint Pierre-Miquelon affair<sup>10</sup> and that he has been informed of a prospective attack on Madagascar by South Africa, which "would make us very angry".

I referred to newspaper reports of an Allied attack on the Japanese occupied aerodrome at Hanoi and expressed an opinion that we in France must be prepared for military action by the Allies against Japanese occupied Indochina, particularly the bases and ports used by Japan. Darlan replied that there are no bases in Indochina and the ports are not useful.

My general impression as a result of this interview is that America cannot expect any cooperation whatever by Vichy in an effort to ex-

---

<sup>8a</sup> Telegram not found in Department files. The person referred to is General Weygand.

<sup>9</sup> Not printed; this telegram referred to telegram No. 107, January 22, noon, and stated: "The person referred to in reference, although specifically requested to keep message secret, stated his duty requires that he inform the Marshal and that he will do so." (123.AT 4/425) The message referred to was a letter from President Roosevelt to General Weygand and an oral message both of which were conveyed to General Weygand by Douglas MacArthur II, Secretary of Embassy in France. The texts of the letter and the secret oral message are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations* containing the records of the First Washington (ARCADIA) Conference of December 1941-January 1942. See also Maxime Weygand, *Recalled to Service* (London, 1952), pp. 390-392.

<sup>10</sup> For correspondence concerning St. Pierre-Miquelon, see pp. 654 ff.

clude the Axis from French Africa when and if Germany desires to move in that direction.

Repeated to Murphy.<sup>11</sup>

LEAHY

---

862.24/568 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, February 6, 1942—9 a. m.

[Received 9:19 a. m.]

193. We learned last night from a source which we consider thoroughly reliable that the French Government has entered into some form of accord with the Axis Powers whereby French ships are being used for the transport of munitions and supplies from France to Tunis, presumably destined for Rommel's<sup>12</sup> forces in Libya.

We expect to obtain further information on this matter today. The Department's attention is invited in this respect to telegram no. 192, February 6, 9 a. m.<sup>13</sup> from our Naval Attaché.<sup>14</sup>

Repeated to London and Casablanca for Murphy.

LEAHY

---

862.24/565 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, February 6, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received February 7—1:24 a. m.]

199. Reference Embassy's 193, February 6, 10 [9] a. m. We saw Rochat this afternoon and informed him that reports had reached us to the effect that the French Government had entered into some form of an agreement with the Axis Powers providing for the use of French ships for the transportation of war material and supplies from French ports (and possibly Sicilian and southern Italian ports) to Tunis destined for the Axis forces in Libya.

Rochat replied that a limited quantity of supplies, to the exclusion of all war material, had recently been shipped on French vessels from France to Tunis destined for the Axis forces in Libya. The supplies, he said, included a certain amount of wheat. In reply to the question as

---

<sup>11</sup> Robert D. Murphy, Counselor of Embassy in France on special mission to French North Africa. Substance of this telegram and telegram No. 44, *supra*, was sent to the Embassy in London in Department's telegram No. 339, January 29, 1 p. m., for Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

<sup>12</sup> Marshal Erwin Rommel, Commander of German Forces in Libya.

<sup>13</sup> Not printed.

<sup>14</sup> Comdr. Abel Sabatol.

to whether these shipments included trucks, he replied that he did not know. He assured us positively that no war material of any kind had gone to Rommel's forces since the shipment some time ago of aviation gasoline and gas oil. Rochat informed us that he had received this much information from Admiral Darlan on February 4 but that this [*his?*] knowledge of the question was at best limited. In reply to a specific question as to whether any "agreement" had been entered into between France and the Axis Powers in connection with these shipments, Rochat replied that he was unaware of any such accord. We were forced to the conclusion that Rochat, probably acting on instructions from Admiral Darlan, was withholding information from us.

Rochat's statement to the effect that no agreement has been reached does not correspond with information which we obtained from a member of the French Economic Delegation at Paris and from the person mentioned in our 1490, December 3, 2 p. m.<sup>15</sup> When we requested information from the former, he replied that he had not seen the text of any agreement. He later admitted, however, that certain economic questions, apparently involved in an agreement, had been referred to the French Economic Delegation. He also admitted that trucks as well as wheat were involved in the arrangement but said that the concessions which the French had made were of relatively such small importance as to constitute no real material aid to the Axis forces.

The latter informant above mentioned who on Wednesday<sup>16</sup> had assured us that to the best of his knowledge no such agreement had been made, informed us today that, while he was not at liberty to give us any details, he could no longer reaffirm the assurance which he had previously given.

Repeated to Murphy.

LEAHY

---

862.24/568 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, February 7, 1942—9 p. m.

[Received February 8—1 : 26 p. m.]

208. Person mentioned in our 1490, December 3, 2 p. m.,<sup>15</sup> informed us this afternoon that at the Turin meeting in December Darlan was requested by Ciano<sup>17</sup> to agree to the shipment of an average of 500

---

<sup>15</sup> Not printed; the informant was identified only as a career diplomat in Pétain's "entourage" (851.00/2529).

<sup>16</sup> February 4.

<sup>17</sup> Count Galeazzo Ciano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

tons of Axis material per day by French vessels from Marseille to Tunis and the transit of this material from Tunis for delivery to the Axis forces on the Libyan frontier. Our informant said that Darlan informed the Italians that transportation facilities in Tunis were not adequate to handle the transshipment of such a large quantity of material but he did agree to the handling of an average of 200 tons per day under such an arrangement.

In return for this concession, Ciano promised Darlan that the Italian Government would press Berlin to secure the release of French prisoners and also the moving of the line of demarcation northwards so that Paris would no longer be included in the occupied zone and the French Government could return there.

"Darlan" said our informant "gave a verbal commitment to the Italians agreeing to this arrangement but neither the Marshal nor responsible high officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were informed."

The details of this agreement had first come to the attention of our informant recently when he saw a telegram from Esteva<sup>18</sup> to Darlan in which the former complained that the details of the "Delta plan" had been announced over the British and American radios and stated that in compliance with instructions the strictest secrecy had been observed in Tunis concerning this matter. Our informant went on to say that it was only on Wednesday evening that he learned that the so-called "Delta plan" was the above arrangement for supplies from France to Tunis and then onto the Libyan frontier.

While our informant said that war material was specifically excluded under the terms of the agreement, he admitted that "present shipments include supplies of various kinds, trucks and sealed cases of which we do not know the contents".

Repeated to Murphy.

LEAHY

---

862.24/573 . Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, February 9, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received February 10—2:56 a. m.]

214. At 6 p. m. today I obtained an interview with Marshal Pétain and in the presence of Admiral Darlan and M. Rochat discussed current reports that an agreement has been entered into by the French Government to provide transportation in French ships to Tunis of material including trucks for the use of Axis forces in Libya. The

---

<sup>18</sup> Adm. Jean Pierre Esteva, French Resident General in Tunisia.

Marshal replied that Admiral Darlan would give me full information in the matter whereupon Darlan said that in an effort to avoid a forcible seizure of Bizerta he had agreed to permit the shipment of 200 tons of supplies each week and a total of 500 Italian motor trucks in French vessels to Tunis; that no war materials or munitions have been shipped or will be shipped to the Axis forces via Tunis.

He asked me whether my Government would prefer the shipment of small quantities of food via Tunis to the forcible seizure of Bizerta by the Axis.

I replied that it was impossible for me officially to state the preference of my Government but that in my personal opinion it would be a more friendly action by France and better in the end for France to lose Bizerta by armed attack than voluntarily to give assistance to our declared enemy. He said that as a member of the French Government he could not agree with my opinion.

I informed the Marshal that I would immediately and correctly convey to my Government his statement in this matter and suggested the practicability of avoiding misunderstandings in the future if his Government could give me advance information regarding any similar arrangements or agreements that may be made.

He expressed agreement in principle but I do not expect to get from his Government any such advance information.

[For remainder of this telegram, dealing with French ships in Indochina, see page 676.]

LEAHY

862.24/612

---

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 10, 1942.

The French Ambassador <sup>19</sup> called to see me at his request this afternoon.

The Ambassador said that he had read in the papers my press statement of several days ago saying that inquiry had been made of the Government of Vichy with regard to the reports that the French Government was sending shipments of supplies for the use of the Axis troops in North Africa. The Ambassador said that he had telegraphed his Government that he had requested this appointment with me and had asked full information before seeing me. This, he said, he had just received.

The Ambassador then proceeded to read me a telegram from Admiral Darlan which was a rosy-colored version of Ambassador

---

<sup>19</sup> Gaston Henry-Haye.



Leahy's report, concluding with the surprising statement that Admiral Leahy had expressed great gratification for the information given him and that Admiral Leahy had said that "this information would undoubtedly be satisfactory to the United States Government".

I said that my best answer to this was to give the Ambassador Admiral Leahy's report so that he might read it himself. The Ambassador did so. I then said that he could see for himself that Admiral Leahy had no cause to express gratification and no reason whatever to indicate that this Government would be satisfied with this report.

I said that I regarded the situation which had arisen as the most serious one which had developed in relations between the Vichy Government and the Government of the United States. I said that what had now taken place meant that the Government of France, which we had endeavored to assist in every possible way during the past year and a half, and notwithstanding the unbroken and traditional record of friendship of over 150 years between our two peoples, was now openly furnishing assistance to the enemies of the United States. I said that it was inconceivable that the Ambassador could assume for a moment, or that his Government could assume for a moment, that, if this was not immediately and completely checked, the present policy of the United States towards France could continue.

The Ambassador then engaged in a very long harangue. He said he admitted the unsavory character of the information received, but that this Government should not forget all that the Vichy Government had done during the past year and a half to resist German pressure and to refrain from making available the French Fleet and French bases to Germany. He said that the shipments which, it was admitted, had been made to the Axis powers were very small. He urged that this Government should not lose its sense of proportion. He reiterated the argument of Admiral Darlan that if this had not been done the Germans would have seized the port of Bizerta.

To all of this I replied that the argument with regard to Bizerta was so absurd as hardly to merit serious consideration. I said it was tantamount to the French Government telling us that they were sending three divisions to fight with the Germans in Russia in order to prevent the Germans from forcing them to send out all of their able-bodied men to fight with them. I said that, in so far as proportion is concerned, the issue is so serious as to overshadow any other issue that could be raised. I said that, in so far as the material actually shipped was concerned, this Government had many means of obtaining information other than from British sources or from our American observers in North Africa, and that I was sorry to have to say that I was

very definitely under the impression that munitions had been shipped to the Axis forces, in addition to food supplies and trucks.

I said that the Vichy Government had had two alternative courses to pursue. One was that of adhering strictly to the terms of the armistice<sup>20</sup> and making it clear to the Germans that it would agree to nothing beyond those terms. That, I said, would have been the honorable course to pursue and the course which would have merited and retained the confidence of the American people. The other was the policy of supine collaboration, which could inevitably end only in complete domination by Germany of France and everything in France. The second alternative, unfortunately, seemed to be the course upon which the French Government was now bound.

I said to the Ambassador that the views of this Government would be communicated to the French Government in writing and that we would await a reply to that communication.

The Ambassador brought up a good many other matters, such as the two French tankers chartered by the Portuguese Government in the Mediterranean, the sending of a Red Cross ship, and the negotiations with the Maritime Commission. I said that I regretted that it was impossible for me to discuss these matters, since everything was now contingent upon the reply which the French Government would make to the communication I had mentioned.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

862.24/575 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1942—7 p. m.

88. You are requested to convey the following message from the President to Marshal Pétain:

"Since sending you my message of January 20, it has been brought to my attention that the French Government may have entered into some arrangement with the Axis Powers providing for the use of French ships for the transportation of supplies and possibly war material to Tunis for the use of the enemy forces in Libya. I have been informed that supplies have gone forward by this route and that food, liquid fuels, trucks, munitions and other supplies have been shipped from Metropolitan France or sent in from French North African territories.

The position of France and the limitations placed upon it through the Armistice are fully recognized and understood by the Govern-

---

<sup>20</sup> Armistice Agreement between Germany and France signed June 22, 1940, and between Italy and France signed June 24, 1940. For text of the former, see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. ix, p. 671; for text of latter, see *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, vol. ii, p. 436, or the *New York Times*, June 26, 1940, p. 5.

ment and people of the United States who, as I previously have made clear, in the spirit of their traditional friendship were prepared to give certain assurances that the established relationship between the two countries would be preserved. If, however, France now proceeds to enter into agreements for the shipment of war materials or forwards supplies to the enemies of the United Nations, France, by its own action, will have turned its back upon the uninterrupted friendly relationship with the United States and will place itself in the category of nations which are directly assisting the Axis Powers who have opened warfare upon the United States. There can be no possible justification under the terms of the Armistice for shipment of war materials or other direct aid to Axis nations. I am confident that such action would be contrary to the wishes of the people of France and disastrous to their aspirations and their final destiny.

Unless I can receive official assurances that no military aid will go forward to Germany, Italy and Japan and that French ships will not be used in the furtherance of their acts of aggression in any theater of war, wherever it may be, I shall ask Admiral Leahy to return immediately to the United States in order that his advice and counsel may be obtained in the determination of the future course of policy to be pursued with regard to the Government of Vichy."

HULL

---

862.24/587 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, February 16, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received February 17—12: 10 a. m.]

245. There follows herewith a translation of a note signed by Admiral Darlan in reply to the message from the President of the United States to Marshal Pétain (Department's 88, February 10, 7 p. m.) and delivered by me to the Marshal on February 12:

"Mr. Ambassador:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a message which Marshal Pétain would be grateful if you would convey to the President of the United States in answer to his message of February 11.

'After having called attention to information relative to the use of French ships for the transport via Tunisia of supplies and "perhaps material of war" destined to enemy forces in Libya, you add that if France enters into agreements with such a purpose, she will have by this action alienated herself from the uninterrupted friendly relations with the United States and will have placed herself amongst those nations furnishing a direct aid to the Axis Powers. "Unless," you conclude, "formal assurance can be given that no military aid whatsoever will be furnished to Germany, Italy or Japan or that French ships will not be used to facilitate the acts of aggression of these countries in any theatre of war whatsoever," Admiral Leahy will be invited to return immediately to the United States in order to determine the lines of policy to be followed in regard to the "Vichy Government".

I can not refrain from expressing first the surprise which this communication caused me after the very complete information which Admiral Darlan and I had already given to Admiral Leahy on February 9th.

In the course of the interview that we had on that date we made it clear that there had been transported during the month of January by French ships, at the request of the Italian Government, only 1000 tons (1029 exactly) of food supplies and 50 trucks (56 exactly), this merchandise being of Italian origin and not having been taken in any way from French territory either metropolitan or North African. The assurance was furthermore formally given that no war material whatsoever (including munitions) nor any liquid fuel had been included in these shipment[s].

This detailed information appeared to the French Government sufficient to give all reassurances to the American Government, as the latter could not consider the shipment of such a small quantity of merchandise, the transit of which is, furthermore, perfectly legitimate according to international law, as constituting an appreciable aid to the German and Italian forces.

These assurances appeared also sufficient to put an end to the tenacious [*tendentious*] campaign which had been launched, especially in London, on the basis of definitely wrong information.

The French Government still hopes that the written confirmation of this information will enable the American Government to estimate more exactly the insignificance of such shipments from military point of view and will also serve to put an end to a campaign which can only have as its purpose an endeavor to place the responsibility for the reversal of the military situation in Libya on the shoulders of third persons.

The facts having thus been restored to their just proportions, I believe that I should call your attention to the following general considerations:

France, who was defeated because she was alone, had armistice terms imposed upon her, the severity of which is in correlation to the temporary nature applicable in general to stipulations of this kind. Events have prolonged and are prolonging this situation beyond any foreseeable period of time—obligations for France resulting therefrom are such that the primary duty of those in charge of the country's destiny is to work unceasingly to alleviate them—no one has the right to hold it against them since the very life of the nation is at stake—it is this effort towards adaptation which leads the French Government to seek and to accept certain adjustments in order to obtain equivalents which are essential to the existence and future of the country.

Convinced that it meets with the will of the French people [for?] which it is the only legitimate spokesman, the French Government takes this course fully conscious of its responsibilities and taking into account factual elements which do not always depend upon its will and the consideration of which must override certain of its decisions.

In doing this, it does not violate its other agreements, agreements which in spite of the difficulties of the situation it has always respected and will continue to respect.

It has maintained and will maintain, both on land and on sea, the position of neutrality in which, subject to the obligations of the Armistice Conventions, it has in fact been placed since June 1940.

The French Government would find its task facilitated if the Government of the United States would be good enough to display towards it a spirit of comprehension which would correspond with the feelings and interests of the two countries!['']

Darlan''

While I am personally convinced Marshal Pétain and French public opinion are anxious to maintain the present relations between the United States and the French Government, the absence is noted of any of the assurances requested in the President's message to the Marshal.

LEAHY

---

862.24/596 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, February 18, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received February 21—9 a. m.]

111. From Murphy. Vichy's 1558, December 17, noon, and my 62, January 28, noon.<sup>21</sup> I learn from a reliable source that up to the present a total of 1700 tons of aviation gasoline and 1600 tons of automotive gasoline have now been delivered to the Axis forces in Libya under the Turin accord of December 12. There remains 300 tons of aviation gasoline for delivery which is expected to be accomplished within a few days. The aviation gasoline has been taken from French military stocks in Algeria, most of the automotive gasoline in question was shipped from France as was the 1800 tons of aviation gasoline shipped by the tanker *Port Bouc* from Marseille to Dakar (Department's 44 [41], February 3, 7 p. m. to Casablanca<sup>22</sup>).

From reliable sources in the oil business I learn that the effort to incorporate French North African oil business in the Metropolitan Syndicate made by General Blanchard, President of the Petroleum Syndicate with headquarters at Paris, encountered strong resistance in French Africa. Blanchard's principal argument was that as far as petroleum products is concerned the North African economic accord with the United States had ceased to operate and that France is no longer bound, that it could make deliveries to Libya or Europe from North Africa and that French North Africa has nothing to expect in the way of assistance from the United States. This seemed to please Blanchard.

During the past weeks I have actively encouraged oil representatives in the three territories to believe the United States earnestly de-

---

<sup>21</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>22</sup> Not printed.

sires to provide for their needs if obvious conditions which to them are most acceptable can be met.

Representative oil men see in the present trend increasing French dependence on the Axis for oil supplies with a policy of Franco-German collaboration in this field. They view the forthcoming visit of Pucheu, Minister of the Interior, to this area with alarm as marking an important step toward the incorporation of French North Africa in the scheme of active collaboration with the Axis.

Repeated to Vichy for Tangier. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

862.24/587 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, February 19, 1942—3 p. m.

114. From the Under Secretary. Your 245, February 16, 4 p. m. Please call once more upon Marshal Pétain and communicate to him orally the following message in the name of the President:

"The President has given the most careful thought and the most attentive consideration to the contents of Marshal Pétain's reply to the President's message of February 10.

The President is not lacking in understanding of nor in sympathy for the position in which France finds herself. The President believes that he has made this apparent on many occasions during the past year and a half.

The President has taken careful note with due gratification of the statement contained in Marshal Pétain's reply that the French Government 'has maintained and will maintain, both on land and on sea, the position of neutrality in which, subject to the obligations of the Armistice Conventions, it has in fact been placed since June 1940.'

On the other hand, in his message of February 10, the President requested official assurances that no further military aid would go forward from France to Germany, Italy and Japan.

Unfortunately, the reply of Marshal Pétain now under acknowledgment does not contain any such assurances.

The United States is now engaged in a war which has swept over the entire world. Thirty-seven nations and governments, including that of the United States, have come out openly in one form or another in opposition to the Axis powers. Those nations represent three-quarters of the population of the world. The United States and the powers united with it will inevitably gain a final and complete victory over their adversaries.

It has been the hope and the desire of the President that this Government's present policy of comprehension towards France in its existing difficult and tragic situation might be maintained without modification, but the President is sure that Marshal Pétain will understand that the pursuit by the French Government of a policy of open assistance to the Axis powers, beyond the terms of the Armistice between France and Germany, would make it impossible for such a policy to be continued.

The President is consequently requesting Admiral Leahy to return to the United States for consultation, leaving Mr. Tuck as Chargé d'Affaires of the United States Embassy in Vichy.

It is the hope of the President that before Admiral Leahy returns to the United States, he may obtain the assurances sought by the President in his message of February 10."

In the event that in your conversation with Marshal Pétain there is no indication of any change with regard to the granting of the assurances requested by the President, you will be instructed to return promptly to Washington for consultation with the President, and the necessary priorities will be secured for you on the Clipper.

Please telegraph the result of your next conference with Marshal Pétain in order that the Department may instruct you accordingly. [Welles.]

HULL

---

862.24/575

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to President Roosevelt*<sup>23</sup>

VICHY, February 20, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On February 11th we received by cable from the State Department your message to Marshal Pétain<sup>24</sup> in which you informed him of information received in Washington to the effect that an agreement had been made to transport war material to the Axis forces in Libya by the use of French merchant ships between France and Tunis, and in which you told him that unless official assurance should be given by France that no military aid will go forward to Germany, Italy and Japan, and that French ships will not be used in the furtherance of their acts of aggression in any theater of war wherever it may be, I would be recalled for advice and counsel in a determination of American future policy with regard to the Government of Vichy.

In the forenoon of the next day, February 12th, I delivered to the Marshal a written French translation of your message which he read aloud to Admiral Darlan and M. Rochat who were as usual present at the conference. The Marshal made no other comment than to say that he would give me a written reply.

Admiral Darlan who had made an agreement with Italy, possibly without the knowledge of the Marshal, to send in French ships to Tunis for Rommel's army 200 tons of foodstuffs each week and a total of 500 Italian trucks seemed unusually disturbed by your very positive statement of your reaction thereto.

---

<sup>23</sup> Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

<sup>24</sup> See telegram No. 88, February 10, 7 p. m., to the Ambassador in France, p. 181.

The Marshal throughout our very brief tense interview was as friendly and considerate as always. Upon my departure he expressed a hope that it will not be necessary for me to depart from France.

On February 16th we received and forwarded by cable to the Department of State a note signed by Darlan in reply to your message to the Marshal.

None of the assurances demanded by you in regard to giving assistance to the Axis forces or in regard to the use of French ships in the furtherance of their acts of aggression appear in the Vichy reply to your message, and I am therefore expecting a "recall for consultation".

In view of an opinion previously expressed by Admiral Darlan and entertained by other officials of the Vichy Government that the United States can be depended upon to never take any positive action I consider it would be extremely detrimental to American prestige to fail in this instance to carry out your announced intention to recall the Ambassador for consultation in the determination of future policy with regard to the Government of Vichy.

If in the larger field of view from Washington it would appear advantageous to our war effort for me to continue in the office of Ambassador to France, it would appear from this point of view entirely practicable for me to return after a "consultation", but in my opinion Vichy should not be permitted to believe that your statement in regard to my recall for consultation in the event of failure to receive the requested assurances was a "bluff". Too large a number of the members of the Vichy Government now share a belief with Admiral Darlan that the United States may be always depended upon to take no positive action whatever.

Since receiving the Marshal's reply to your message I have seen a copy of a proposal made by Vichy in January to Japan in regard to the use by Japan of French merchant ships in the Orient. This proposal agrees to charter to Japan about 50,000 tons of the French shipping now in Chinese and Indochinese ports, the ships to be operated under the Japanese flag with Japanese officers and crews, but not to be used for "war purposes". Other French ships will be used under a time charter for commercial purposes between Japanese occupied ports but under the French flag and with French crews.

I was, in reply to a specific question, informed orally by Admiral Darlan on 12 February that arrangements for the chartering of French merchant shipping by Japan had not been completed.

I personally have no doubt that under a threat of Axis pressure Vichy will agree to any use of French shipping that may be demanded.



Since the retreat in Libya, the escape of German ships from Brest, and the fall of Singapore, British prestige has fallen to a new low level.

I am sure that French public opinion and I believe that the Marshal himself hopes that an Allied victory will save France from the fate toward which it is moving, but at the present time public opinion and the Marshal have difficulty in believing that the Axis can be defeated.

The local press yesterday reported a statement by General Smuts<sup>25</sup> that there is as yet no reason for taking any action in regard to Madagascar.<sup>26</sup>

This is reassuring to Vichy where there has very naturally been a fear for some time that the Allies might anticipate Japanese action by occupying Madagascar, Mauritius, and Réunion.

From this point of view and particularly in consideration of previous action of Vichy in Indochina it is difficult to understand why these islands, flanking as they do the supply route from anywhere to the Red Sea and now also from Good Hope to the Dutch East Indies, have not long ago been occupied by the Allies.

There must be a sufficient force in South Africa that could be spared for that purpose before it is made difficult by previous enemy action.

While one should have great sympathy for the Marshal in his almost impossible position, and a real affection for the unorganized, inarticulate, depressed people of France, it would appear that the time has already passed when this war for the preservation of our civilization permits of giving further consideration to the pride or sensibilities of defeated France in Madagascar, in Indochina, or elsewhere.

With one and a half million of its young men in German prison camps and with more than half of its continental area occupied by German troops there is not a chance that France can be of any assistance to the Allies or even be of any assistance to itself. It would therefore seem desirable, necessary and essential that French territory be utilized by the Allies wherever it promises advantage to us in the prosecution of our war effort.

Vichy would object of course but much of French public opinion would cheer us on.

I am taking advantage of courier departing today to send this hurriedly prepared letter.

Most respectfully,

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

---

<sup>25</sup> Jan Christian Smuts, South African Prime Minister.

<sup>26</sup> For correspondence regarding the British occupation of Madagascar, see pp. 687 ff.

*President Roosevelt to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)* <sup>27</sup>

WASHINGTON, [copy undated.]

DEAR BILL: I have given careful consideration to the thoughts expressed in your letter of February 20, particularly as regards your feeling that it would be detrimental to our policy to fail to carry out the expressed intention to recall you for consultation.

I am fully sympathetic and understand the position in which this has placed you. On the other hand, the timing of such a step has now become of paramount military importance. In fact, the joint staff missions have very definitely urged that we postpone as long as possible any evidence of change in our relations with France and they consider that to hold the fort as far as you are concerned is as important a military task as any other in these days. Consequently, we decided to go ahead and to obtain from the Marshal's Government the utmost assurances possible which would preserve our fundamental objectives. Not only is our presence in France and North Africa the last bridgehead to Europe but it likewise helps to hold the Iberian Peninsula in line.

The military developments of the next few weeks will be of such vital importance that, in the interests of the United Nations, we cannot afford to risk any possibility that an abrupt action on our part would lose ground anywhere. The impending Mediterranean drive will be one of the most important of the war and it must be checked by all means possible until the time when the full weight of our rapidly developing production can be felt in the war effort.

I have also taken note of your statements regarding Madagascar and shall refer them to the war council.

I want you to realize that I am fully aware of the problems with which you are confronted but must consider that you are in a vital strategic position. In these critical days we count not only on your presence there as Ambassador but upon your own military knowledge and experience to give us, in so far as possible, estimates of the French position from this point of view.

Should the time come, however, when the conditions of our relations with the Marshal's Government are more stable and your return for consultation would not be made an issue either here or in France, I shall telegraph you to proceed to Washington "for consultation."

With kindest regards to you both,

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

---

<sup>27</sup> Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y. Copy of the original letter was furnished the Library by Admiral Leahy.

862.24/595 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, February 21, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received 10:36 p. m.]

268. At 5 p. m. today I obtained an interview with Marshal Pétain with Admiral Darlan and Mr. Rochat present and delivered to him orally the President's message contained in your 114, February 19, 3 p. m. The Marshal stated that he would make a reply to me in writing.

Admiral Darlan then said that shipment of Italian trucks in French ships to Tunis for Rommel's forces had been stopped. I understand that the shipment of foodstuffs has not been stopped.

Darlan also said that Japan had requisitioned French merchant ships in Indochina but has consented not to use them for military purposes.

The Marshal thereupon stated that he has not signed any agreement with Japan in regard to the use by Japan of French shipping.

Upon my departure I specifically asked the Marshal if I may inform my Government that he would include in his promised written reply a statement as to whether he can or can not give the assurances requested by the President in his message of February 10. His reply, although not clear, appeared to be in the affirmative.

LEAHY

862.24/596 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, February 23, 1942—8 p. m.

127. Murphy's telegram 111, February 18, 3 p. m. relating to delivery of aviation and automotive gasoline to the Axis forces. You are requested to bring this report to the attention of the Foreign Office pointing out that these deliveries constitute the supply of important military matériel, and that they exceed the terms of the Armistice agreement. The French authorities in North Africa have repeatedly requested that supplies of petroleum products and in particular gasoline be made available to the civilian population of North Africa, alleging the urgency of this demand because of the scarcity of gasoline in that area. It is now learned that nearly 2000 tons of gasoline which might have been made available for these urgent civilian requirements are now being delivered to the Axis forces. It is obvious that if such deliveries continue no petroleum products can be delivered to North Africa and that if the North African agreement is

considered by French authorities as having ceased to operate the reasons therefor are based on unilateral action on the part of the French authorities.

In view of the great importance of gasoline as a military supply you should add in connection with the last sentence of your 268 February 21 that this Government attaches the utmost importance to the assurances to be received which should include such supplies of a military character.

WELLES

---

862.24/604 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, February 25, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received 7:21 p. m.]

292. Reference our 268, February 21, 6 p. m. We received yesterday evening from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a third person note in reply to the message of the President to Marshal Pétain contained in your 114, February 19, 3 p. m., which I delivered orally to the Marshal on February 21.

A translation of the note follows:

“Vichy, February 24.

Marshal Pétain and his Government fully share the desire and hope of President Roosevelt to maintain unchanged the present policy of comprehension which should in their opinion inspire the relations between France and the United States.

In spite of the difficulties of a situation the exigencies of which were set forth in the note of February 16 and the tragic character of which the President himself recognizes, they have always endeavored on their part to assure in an atmosphere of understanding the continuity of relations which correspond with traditional sentiments.

To this end the French Government affirms once again its will to abstain from any action, under reservation of the obligations resulting for it from the two armistice conventions, which would not be in conformity with the position of neutrality in which it has been placed since June 1940 and which it intends to maintain. It will not (*ne saurait*) therefore lend any military aid to one of the belligerents in any place in the theater of operations, particularly the use of French vessels for purposes of war (*à des fins de guerre*) nor all the more, ‘adopt a policy of open assistance to the Axis Powers beyond the terms of the armistice agreement’.

In reply to this assurance, Marshal Pétain has a right to expect from President Roosevelt and the American people a spirit of comprehension and a desire for agreement which are indispensable for the maintenance of a position the affirmation of which answers the preoccupations of President Roosevelt.

With such an attitude, the French Government hopes for the resumption of maritime traffic in particular and, under the conditions originally stipulated, the resumption of the supplying of North Africa, the satisfactory settlement of the Saint Pierre et Miquelon incident and of course the respect of the rights and interests of France in the various parts of the world. It hopes that the Federal Government will at once put a stop to a press and radio campaign the violence and clearly tendacious [*tendentious*] character of which are incompatible with the desire expressed by President Roosevelt himself to maintain 'the present policy of understanding of his Government with respect to France.'

Marshal Pétain is confident that President Roosevelt will find in the foregoing declarations on the reassurances which he hoped to obtain in order to assure between the two countries the maintenance of relations to which the French Government attaches for its part the highest value".

This note appears to reply to the assurances requested in the President's message (your 88, February 10, 7 p. m.) with an affirmation that France will abstain from any action incompatible with its position of neutrality and the Armistice conventions, and that it will not lend military aid to any one of the belligerents, particularly by the use of French vessels "*à des fins de guerre*".

In an endeavor to obtain an exact understanding of the meaning of "*fins de guerre*" as used, Rochat was interrogated. He stated that while he is unable to give us an official explanation of its meaning, it is his personal opinion that the shipment of munitions would not be permitted, that there is a question in his mind as to the shipment of trucks and that in his opinion the shipment of supplies and food-stuffs by a neutral to a belligerent is permitted by international law.

LEAHY

711.51/208

---

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 27, 1942.

The French Ambassador called to see me at his request.

The Ambassador first commented upon the statement I had given to the press earlier in the afternoon <sup>27a</sup> covering the present status of our relations with the Vichy Government. Somewhat to my surprise, he said he believed it would be most helpful and that he was glad I had issued it.

He inquired whether we had consulted the Government at Vichy before the issuance of this statement. I replied that we had not and

---

<sup>27a</sup> For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 28, 1942, p. 189.

that I saw no reason for so doing inasmuch as it was my desire to keep the public in the United States as fully informed as possible of every aspect of our foreign relations during these critical times. I stated that inasmuch as the communications received from the French Government were not quoted, there was no reason, technical or otherwise, for obtaining the agreement of the French Government to the issuance of this statement.

The Ambassador inquired what the other points at issue between this Government and his Government might be. I replied that they were—

First. The failure of the French Government to comply with its obligation to this Government to inform us prior to the removal of the *Dunkerque* from French North Africa to Toulon.

Second. The failure of the French Government as yet to give the assurances requested that no German submarines, surface vessels or aircraft would be permitted to enter the territorial waters or territory of the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere.

Third. The insistence of the United States that the military stocks of oil supplies, including gasoline, in North Africa should be utilized for civilian purposes and should not be transferred to the Axis powers in North Africa.

The Ambassador took note of these points and expressed no difference of views with regard to our insistence that assurances be given covering these points. With regard to point two, he said probably the most practicable arrangement would be for the United States to prevent by force the entrance into French colonies in the Western Hemisphere of Axis ships or planes. I said that this action certainly would be taken in any event whenever it was found possible and that this did not cover the issue involved.

The Ambassador complained with regard to the reference by the President in his address of the other night to the "Vichy French" and to the President's charge that the Vichy Government had ceded French Indochina to Japan.<sup>27b</sup> I made no comment other than that the President's statements spoke for themselves.

The Ambassador complained again about press attacks in this country on his Government, and I said I thought the best way of preventing a continuance of these attacks was for the French Government to give us the assurances we had requested, which could then be made public.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

<sup>27b</sup> Reference is to radio address of February 23, 1942; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 28, 1942, p. 183.

862.24/604 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, March 2, 1942—8 p. m.

139. Your 292, February 25, 10 a. m. In response to the memorandum received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs please address a communication to the Ministry along the following lines:

The Government of the United States has received and has taken note with satisfaction of the statement of the French Government that it will not lend any military aid to one of the belligerents in any place in the theatre of operations, particularly the use of French vessels for purposes of war, nor adopt a policy of open assistance to the Axis powers beyond the terms of the Armistice Agreement.

The Government of the United States, however, considers that shipments of food, fuel, trucks and other supplies to the Axis forces in North Africa and other theaters of operations constitute military aid and could not accept any other contention. In considering future questions to be discussed between the two governments this Government must request assurances from the French Government that its agreement not to supply "military aid" to the belligerents includes the delivery or transportation of such supplies from whatever source obtained.

It has been noted that the explanations given by the French Government concerning the delivery of certain supplies of fuel and food-stuffs did not in any way deplete the supply available to the inhabitants of France. Their delivery, however, constitutes valuable aid to the German and Italian forces and it cannot be justified on the ground merely that they do not deprive the civilian population of needed supplies.

WELLES

740.0011 European War 1939/20710

---

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

VICHY, March 4, 1942.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: During the month of February as you have noted in our cable reports business has been unusually brisk in this area with reports from day to day in which our different sources of information have frequently been in complete disagreement.

Early in February M. Bousquet<sup>28</sup> told us that a note had been received from some German authority requesting that France should interrupt commercial relations with the United States.

Day before yesterday we were told by M. de Chalvron<sup>29</sup> and M. Wapler that German authorities have asked that diplomatic re-

---

<sup>28</sup> Raymond Charles Bousquet of the French Foreign Office.

<sup>29</sup> Guillier de Chalvron of the French Foreign Office.

lations with the United States be not interrupted. We reported by cable that in M. Wapler's opinion (he is one of the bright young men in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and anti-Nazi) this new German attitude in the matter of our relations with Vichy is in preparation for the possible use of France as an intermediary in a presentation of peace proposals that will be made by Germany following the spring offensive against Russia.

M. de Chalvron has informed us that your protest in regard to the visit of a German submarine to Fort-de-France <sup>30</sup> was discussed with Krug von Nidda, the German representative in Vichy with the rank of Consul General, who gave his consent to the agreement that no belligerent vessels or aircraft will be permitted to enter French ports in the Western Hemisphere. Von Nidda is said to be not violently anti-American and is said to be under attack by Achenbach, Counselor of the German Embassy in Paris, who is an extremist.

M. de Chalvron admitted that Darlan has for some time followed an anti-American policy but that recent demands of Germany for horses, locomotives, rolling stock, food, etc., far beyond any possible requirements of the Armistice, have caused a change in Darlan's attitude. He did not mention the possible effect of Germany's present difficulties in Russia which almost certainly has injected some doubt into Darlan's previous assurance that the Allies will be defeated. Admiral Darlan may be expected to shift from side to side with the changing fortunes of the war, and we should not fail to consider that his Government when it loses German support will probably be thrown out of office by a combination of some of the other aspirants.

There is sufficient evidence to justify our accepting it as a fact that Darlan made with Italy a secret agreement to ship supplies, trucks, and possibly other war material, to Rommel's forces in French merchant ships via Tunis. He communicated this arrangement as a "Delta Plan" in secrecy to Admiral Esteva, Resident General of Tunisia, and it is more than possible that he did not inform the Marshal.

We believe that the Marshal himself abrogated the agreement and we believe also that the shipments can still be made as purely commercial transactions without formal Vichy approval. This should be facilitated by the use of French money which the Germans have in practically unlimited amounts and which costs them nothing.

We will of course endeavor to obtain information and report by cable in regard to all such shipments.

Court proceedings for the trial at Riom <sup>31a</sup> of ex-political officials Daladier, Blum, La Chambre, and Jacomet appear from all our information to be giving Vichy many unhappy moments.

---

<sup>30</sup> See pp. 611 ff.

<sup>31a</sup> Opened February 19, 1942. A special French Supreme Court was created to try certain French leaders for responsibility for defeat of France.



General Gamelin's refusal to make any defense by making the army and the Marshal less vulnerable to criticism will help the Government, which appears to very definitely have in Riom "a bear by the tail".

We are making arrangements to obtain all available information from Riom by getting a transcript of the record and by occasional attendance by one of the Embassy staff. Travel between Vichy and Riom is difficult with existing transportation facilities.

The President's message of February 10th and yours in regard to the Martinique submarine visit with their demands for categorical assurances, accepted by Vichy as practical ultimatums, created consternation among our contacts in the Foreign Office; and the assurances to date constitute a real effort by Vichy to satisfy the United States without committing France to a position in direct opposition to the Axis powers.

The admitted "requisitioning" of French merchant ships by Japan is in fact probably an oral agreement. I accept as true the Marshal's statement to me that he has not *signed* any agreement with Japan in regard to merchant shipping. The Marshal has of late appeared old and fatigued. He is always more than courteous in his relations with me.

Darlan's explanation of his movement of the *Dunkerque* to Toulon <sup>21</sup> is of course a weak effort to find an excuse for failing to keep his agreement with us. His statement to me, which doesn't make sense, is that the ship is so badly damaged as to be out of service for the duration of the war, and that if it had remained at Oran progressive deterioration would have permanently ruined the vessel.

Like many of Darlan's performances the movement was an accomplished fact when the news reached us.

We assume that the Department of State is giving adequate consideration to the question as to whether or not in the long view it is to the advantage of our war effort to continue to encourage and support the Marshal or to openly take sides with the dissidents.

From this limited point of view I am unable to satisfy myself as to which would be the better course, but it does seem clear that the United States should not through promises or agreements bind itself to a continued support of Vichy, but that it should on the contrary maintain its freedom to act in any direction at any time.

Vichy's first replies to your demands for official "assurances" brought to us a bright hope (since somewhat faded) that the near future might permit of my returning to America and finding some kind

---

<sup>21</sup> For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 204 ff.

of employment that is more directly concerned with our essential task of winning the war.

*Delenda est Japanico.*

With expressions of personal regard,

Most sincerely,

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

862.24/617 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, March 10, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received March 11—10:56 a. m.]

369. We saw Rochat this afternoon who informed us that owing to the Marshal's and Admiral Darlan's brief temporary absences from Vichy it would not be possible to give us the answers to the subjects specified in the Department's 156, March 9, 9 p. m.<sup>32</sup> before 2 or 3 days.

In connection with the subject of the Department's 139, March 2, 8 p. m., Rochat gave us to understand that his Government will express its willingness to put an end to the future shipment of all supplies of any kind to the Axis forces in North Africa. He added, however, that insofar as food supplies and trucks were concerned small shipments amounting to only a few tons of the former and possibly six or eight trucks were actually in the course of delivery. As regards fuel he said that of the original 3600 tons 1600 had been delivered. The question of the delivery of the remaining 2,000 tons had been taken up with the Italian Government in an endeavor to stop its shipment. The French Government had contended that Italian insistence on the delivery of the remaining 2,000 tons would imperil the future of the entire American North African economic program. From Rochat's remarks we gathered that the Italians had been given to understand that if the whole matter could be settled to the satisfaction of the American Government there was a possibility of the quick resumption of shipments from the United States to North Africa.

Repeated to Murphy.

LEAHY

740.0011 European War 1939/20299 : Telegram

*The Consul at Tunis (Doolittle) to the Secretary of State*

TUNIS, March 12, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received March 13—4:32 p. m.]

44. My 35, March 3.<sup>33</sup> Vice Consuls Woodruff and Utter report firsthand investigation during trips out: While Italian trucks are now

<sup>32</sup> *Post*, p. 620.

<sup>33</sup> Not printed.

shuttling between Tunis and Gabès, supplies by rail from Tunis for Libya have been stopped. Gasoline is still coming by train from Algeria via Kasserine to El Aouinet station about 8 miles north of Gabès where its transshipment to German and Italian tank trucks is centralized for Libya. About 300 used trucks of North African origin still going monthly by rail to Gabès to be repaired and forwarded.

From January 3 to 16 exactly 1507 tons of gasoline were shipped plus 37 tons fuel oil and 22 lubricating oil. Since then gasoline figure increased well over 200 tons.

No landing facilities at Skirra though building project considered on coast about 3 miles north of lighthouse where water is 20 feet deep and where special military road leads to battery of 155's on shore.

Two tugs have just been requisitioned by Germans to tow barges between Sousse and Zuara.

We understand that each French convoy leaving Sfax for France includes one special boat called "bateau comptoir" whose cargo is unloaded at Caronte near Marseille and entirely reshipped either to Genoa by sea or Germany by air. All fuel for these boats is furnished by Axis. PLM20 sunk March 1 was such a boat though peculiar position of funnel at stern gave appearance of tanker.

Our observations seem convincing that there are no Axis air bases in Tunisia though emergency landings entailing French servicing of planes are numerous and Axis commissions naturally use airfields freely.

Repeated to Vichy.

DOOLITTLE

---

862.24/621 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, March 14, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received March 15—12:55 p. m.]

390. The following is a translation of a note dated March 14 which has just been received from the Foreign Office signed by Darlan in reply to my note conveying the substance of the Department's 139, March 2, 8 p. m.:

"In its note of March 5 Your Excellency had the kindness to inform me that the American Government had taken note with satisfaction of the contents of the note which I addressed to him on February 24.

Your Excellency adds, however, that the United States Government considers that the shipment of food supplies, fuel, trucks and other supplies to the Axis forces in North Africa and in other theaters of operations constitutes military assistance. The United States Government desires consequently to receive the assurance from the French Government that the agreement on the part of the latter to

provide no 'military assistance' to the belligerent forces extends to the delivery and transportation of supplies of any origin whatsoever.

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the French Government is in a position to give (*est en mesure de donner*) this assurance (with the exception of the delivery of a remaining balance of food supplies and trucks the transportation of which is being effected at the present time and will be completed very shortly).

It is still to be understood, as indicated in my note of February 24, that the French Government expects as a counterpart to find with the American Government a spirit of comprehension and the willingness to come to agreement 'which are indispensable for the maintenance of a position the affirmation of which answers the preoccupations of President Roosevelt' " (this quotation is from French note of February 24 transmitted in our 292, February 25, 10 a. m.) "and which should more particularly find an expression in the resumption, under the conditions originally provided for, of the supplying of North Africa, the satisfactory settlement of the St. Pierre-Miquelon affair,<sup>33a</sup> the respect of the rights and interests of France in the various areas of the world and the cessation of a tendencious press and radio campaign."

The person mentioned in our 1527, December 12, 1 p. m.,<sup>34</sup> informs us that the German authorities were consulted and gave permission for these assurances.

Repeated to Murphy.

LEAHY

862.24/622 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, March 14, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received March 15—12:27 p. m.]

391. Embassy's 309, February 27 noon<sup>35</sup> and 369, March 10, 3 p. m. The following is a translation of a note signed by Darlan which has just been received from the Foreign Office in reply to my note bringing to its attention the substance of the Department's 127, February 23, 8 p. m. The official who delivered the note stated that, in view of the importance the United States Government attaches to the question of gasoline deliveries, a separate note has been made explaining fully the situation which will amplify in so far as gasoline is concerned the information contained in the note transmitted in Embassy's 390, March 14, 4 p. m., relating to the remaining balance to be delivered to the Axis forces in Libya. He expressed the hope that an early reply will be forthcoming.

"By note dated February 26, the Embassy of the United States called the attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the shipments

<sup>33a</sup> See pp. 654 ff.

<sup>34</sup> Not printed; the informant's name is not given.

<sup>35</sup> *Post*, p. 205.

of French petroleum supplies delivered up to the present time to the Axis forces in Libya. The Embassy added that 300 tons of aviation gasoline would be furnished in the near future to the Germano-Italian troops in North Africa. The Embassy considers that these deliveries are a diversion, in favor of the Axis Powers, of carburants necessary for the civilian needs of North Africa and that consequently the sending of any American petroleum products will not be able to be authorized to North Africa if the foregoing deliveries are continued.

Certain deliveries of French petroleum products have in fact been made to Libya following a request made by the Axis Governments and at a time when the American Government had taken the initiative of suspending the execution of the North African supply agreement.

The French Government could not at that time, as it did on March 25, 1941, at the time of an Italian request to deliver 5000 tons of automobile gasoline from Algeria, invoke, in order to justify its refusal, the supplying by the United States of petroleum products for North Africa.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs adds, as Admiral Darlan has already pointed out to Admiral Leahy, that the major portion of supplies of carburants delivered to Libya, has been the object merely of a transit in North Africa, inasmuch as they came from metropolitan stocks. Furthermore the total amount of the quantity delivered has been replaced.

Following the assurances concerning the resumption of the economic program for North Africa given by the Government of the United States the French Government has appealed to the Axis Governments in order to get them to forego the delivery of petroleum products of French origin beyond the exacted quantity of 3,600 tons. It has just obtained satisfaction.

Furthermore, the French Government would today be willing to make another *démarche* in order to obtain from the Armistice Commissions that they forego the balance of this quantity (about 1,580 tons) if it were in a position at the present time to use as an argument the resumption of the supplying of North Africa with American petroleum products.

It would be grateful if the Government of the United States would inform it as soon as possible of its reply to this suggestion."

Repeated to Murphy.

LEAHY

---

740.0011 European War 1939/3-1942

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

VICHY, March 15, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Yesterday evening we received from the Minister of Foreign Affairs a note in reply to our demand for assurances that military aid including supplies, fuel, et cetera will not

hereafter be provided by France for Axis forces in any area of military activity or from any source.

The note which is quoted in our cable 390, March 14, 4 p. m., appears to give the assurances requested, but it includes an escape clause that can be used when necessary if we fail to carry out our North African economic plan, fail to establish Vichy sovereignty in St. Pierre and Miquelon, or fail to suppress "tendencious" press and radio attacks on Vichy in America. This is very reminiscent of the *Dunkergue* incident and understanding.

If it should be decided to accept these assurances as given, if it is the desire of the United States Government to endeavor to maintain the *status quo* of our diplomatic relations, and if it is desired to cultivate and stimulate the friendly feeling of the vast majority of the people in unoccupied France who are now pro American and anti-Axis, it is my opinion that the economic relief of North Africa should be resumed without delay, that Red Cross relief supplies for infants should be despatched at once, and that any other practicable relief for the people of unoccupied France which cannot be of assistance to the Axis powers should be provided when practicable.

I am not certain that it will be advantageous to our war effort to maintain the *status quo* in France, or even that we can maintain the *status quo* when, and if, the Germans bring pressure on Vichy for military assistance.

If an Allied expeditionary force should land in France at the present time we are informed that it would have the immediate assistance of more than 100,000 ex-soldiers residing in the unoccupied zone who are waiting for an opportunity to fight the Germans, and who under competent leadership might be less inefficient than they were in 1940.

Any success by an Allied expeditionary force would probably cause the overthrow of this regime by a group friendly to the Allied cause which would place the French fleet on the Allied side. It is generally believed that the fleet and the army in Africa will carry out any orders issued by Vichy or by any subsequent government of France.

The present government cannot survive without German support and it must therefore be expected to grant demands made by the Axis.

While we believe that the Marshal and some others in the Government hope to be able to keep the promise made in Darlan's note (our 390, March 14, 4 p. m.), past performances do not indicate that Vichy will refuse Axis demands for assistance when pressure is applied.

Departure within an hour of one of our infrequent couriers seems to justify this hurriedly prepared note.

With expressions of personal regard,

Most sincerely,

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

862.24/682a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1942—4 p. m.

198. You should address a communication to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in response to his note of March 14 (see telegram 390, March 14, 4 p. m.) along the following lines:

"The Government of the United States takes note with satisfaction of the assurance received from the French Government that its agreement to provide no military assistance to the Axis forces includes the delivery and transportation of supplies of any origin whatsoever. It is further understood that no exceptions are contemplated to the agreement not to furnish military aid, either directly or indirectly, to the Axis Powers and that arrangements have been effected to put an end to any further deliveries of petroleum products as mentioned in Admiral Darlan's note of March 14 (Embassy's telegram 391, March 14, 5 p. m.).

Confident that the assurances thus given represent an affirmation of the true feelings of the people of France, this Government is prepared on its part to pursue the present arrangement with regard to the program of North Africa supply on the basis of the release of vessels which have been engaged in this traffic thus permitting the departure with agreed cargoes for North Africa of the two vessels now in United States ports under the same conditions that have governed the previous voyages of vessels in this service. The French Government will appreciate that the continued operation of this service will be governed by conditions existing at the time of possible further scheduled sailings which must involve an adjustment of the problem presented by the existence in North Africa of strategic materials such as supplies of cobalt and rubber.

In regard to other questions raised by the French Government in its communication, the position of this Government and its desire to maintain French sovereignty throughout the French Empire has been made clear on repeated occasions. The rights and interests of France in the various areas of the world are fully respected by this Government and its announced intention of respecting the sovereignty exercised by the French people over the various possessions of France should be clear evidence that this Government looks toward the eventual resumption of complete independence and sovereignty of France and its people. The people of France will fully appreciate that this declaration of the United States represents a recognition of their future rights and independence and is in entire conformity with the ancient traditions of friendship and solidarity of the free peoples of both Nations."

WELLES

862.24/681 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, March 23, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received 10:59 p. m.]

172. From Murphy. Vichy's 391, March 14, 5 p. m. The statement made in the French note of March 14 penultimate paragraph to the effect that the French Government would be willing to make an effort to obtain Axis concession permitting France to forego delivery of balance of 1580 tons remaining of 3600 tons gasolines promised for delivery to Libya under December accord is not understood.

I have now received confirmation from a completely reliable source that the total of 3600 tons was delivered to Libya by the end of February. Of this total 1140 tons automotive gasoline were received from France in transit via Algeria and 360 tons automotive and 2000 tons aviation gasoline were taken from Algeria's docks for shipment to Libya without compensation thus far.

Repeated to Vichy. [Murphy.]

COLE

862.24/632 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, March 24, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 9:20 p. m.]

181. From Murphy. My 172, March 23, 5 p. m. Late last evening source supplied written confirmation of exact quantities of gasoline delivered to Libya after further verification with army officers concerned. According to these corrected figures a total of 1450 tons aviation gasoline and 1518 tons automotive gasoline have been delivered to Libya. A further quantity of 350 tons aviation gasoline will be delivered in the near future from Algeria. He states no further shipments are contemplated.

Repeated to Vichy. [Murphy.]

COLE

862.24/631 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1942—8 p. m.

205. Algiers' no. 172, March 23, 5 p. m. supplemented by Cole's report that 10,000 liters of aviation gasoline were delivered to three Italian bombers after the Army borrowed that amount from Standard Oil stocks under order from Vichy.



The first of these reports is entirely at variance with the statement contained in the French Government's note of March 14 that it would be willing to make another *démarche* in order to obtain from the Armistice Commission that they forego the balance of 1580 tons. Furthermore this Government had no prior knowledge of the fact that the North African authorities under orders from the French Government were allowing Italian planes to fuel on French territory thus making use of French territory as a base of operations.

You are requested urgently to bring the substance of these reports to the attention of the French Government and to state that had this Government been aware of these deliveries it would have hesitated before agreeing in principle to the resumption of the North African program.<sup>35a</sup> We shall, however, await a reply to the above representations before reconsidering our position. Please telegraph as quickly as possibly reply made.

WELLES

---

851.00/2699 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, March 26, 1942—3 p. m.  
[Received March 26—2:25 p. m.]

451. For the Acting Secretary. The official mentioned in our 690, June 14, 10 a. m., 1941<sup>36</sup> in conversation with a member of this Embassy yesterday stated that since a previous conversation (see our 417, March 19, 5 p. m.<sup>36</sup>) German pressure on Vichy has become much more intense.

This pressure while not yet in ultimatum form is being applied through Benoist-Méchin,<sup>37</sup> Abetz<sup>38</sup> and de Brinon<sup>39</sup> and is directed toward the establishment of a definitely collaborationist government prior to the spring offensive in Russia.

He said that Germany is pressing for the return of Laval<sup>40</sup> which is extremely displeasing to the Marshal<sup>41</sup> who is, however, very friendly with René de Chambrun.<sup>42</sup>

Our informant fears that a definitely pro-collaborationist government will in the near future be forced upon the Marshal. He said also

---

<sup>35a</sup> For correspondence on the economic aid program for French North Africa, see pp. 224 ff.

<sup>36</sup> Not printed.

<sup>37</sup> Jacques Benoist-Méchin, French Secretary of State to the President of the Council of Ministers.

<sup>38</sup> Otto Abetz, German Ambassador on special mission in Paris.

<sup>39</sup> Fernand de Brinon, General Delegate of French Government for Occupied Territories.

<sup>40</sup> Pierre Laval, named Chief of French Government April 18, 1942.

<sup>41</sup> Marshal Pétain, French Chief of State.

<sup>42</sup> Son-in-law of Pierre Laval.

that Xavier Vallat, Commissioner for Jewish Affairs, and Xucheu [*Pucheu?*]<sup>48</sup> have now been refused permission to travel between the occupied and unoccupied zones and that a decree putting an early end to the Riom trial will shortly be issued following German pressure.

The individual mentioned in our 1490, December 3, 2 p. m., 1941<sup>49</sup> told us today that Germany will no longer negotiate with the present Government, that a change will be made at a time chosen by Germany and that Laval will be returned to the Cabinet, the matter having already been discussed with the Marshal by René de Chambrun.

We are told by a reliable informant who obtained his information from Laval that the Marshal and Laval had a secret meeting this morning in the country near Vichy in which the question of Laval's return to the Cabinet was discussed.

Arrangements have been made for Darlan to confer with Laval Saturday at Châteldon.

LEAHY

---

740.0011 European War 1939/20710

*The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Ambassador  
in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, March 27, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I have received your letter of March 4, 1942, and am grateful for the useful background of information which it contains.

I am fully in accord with your ideas concerning the importance of the question of determining whether, from the long point of view, it is to our advantage to continue to support the Marshal or openly to take sides with the dissident French elements. As you are aware, we have followed the policy of giving aid and support to the Free French movement in territories which it administers and of endeavoring to hold Vichy to its promises not to give away the French Fleet or make French territory available as bases for military operations. The time may come at an early date when these two are no longer compatible. Until such time, however, we have felt that by not abandoning Metropolitan France completely we would still be able to keep in touch and strengthen those elements which are locally resisting the extension of German influence. It is not our intention, however, in any agreements entered into with the Vichy Government

---

<sup>48</sup> Pierre Pucheu, French Minister of Interior.

<sup>49</sup> Not printed; the individual is identified only as a career diplomat and member of Marshal Pétain's "entourage" (851.00/2529).

to do more than recognize the continued existence of the French people as a nation and their sovereignty over various possessions of the French Empire regardless of through what French authority this sovereignty is exercised.

I should welcome receiving any further observations you may care to make regarding the future development of this policy.

With kindest regards,

Very sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES

---

851.00/2701 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, March 27, 1942—9 a. m.

[Received 12:30 p. m.]

453. For the Acting Secretary. The informant mentioned in the penultimate paragraph of our 451, March 26, 3 p. m. learned yesterday from Laval himself further details regarding the latter's meeting with the Marshal which took place in the forest of Randan near Vichy yesterday between 10 and 12 a. m.

It was the second meeting since Laval's overthrow and the first since his reconciliation with the Marshal at Varennes-sur-Allier in February 1941. The meeting was agreed upon following a conversation which the Marshal had 2 days earlier with René de Chambrun and was arranged at the Marshal's request. Dr. Menetrel, his personal physician, went on the previous day to select an isolated spot in the forest where, without heavy police protection and for the first time since the armistice, the Marshal proceeded. The four people who attended the meeting were the Marshal, Laval, René de Chambrun and Menetrel.

According to what Laval told our informant the conversation chiefly concerned the means of strengthening the Marshal's position domestically and abroad. While no decision was reached as to the actual date of Laval's return to the Government our informant considers that progress was made although Laval's terms appear to have been stiff. He allowed our informant to understand that he would not consider a return to the Government unless he were given full powers. On the conclusion of the conversation the Marshal and Laval returned to Vichy by separate ways and the latter after calling upon our informant returned immediately to his home in Châteldon.

It is significant that neither Darlan nor Pucheu nor any other member of the Cabinet was informed of the meeting until after it occurred. I have since obtained abundant proof to substantiate this.

In brief summary Laval's arguments in the forest of Randan were to the following effect: Laval reminded the Marshal that when they

reached Bordeaux he (the Marshal) had had 100 per cent of the country behind him. Subsequently facing a Parliament almost entirely hostile to himself Laval had, nevertheless, been able to obtain full powers for the Marshal.

He allowed the Marshal to understand, however, that through the weakness of his present Government he had now lost 90 percent of his popularity and that the moment had come for a "strong government." Otherwise he said the country would be flooded with Communism. Laval had said to the Marshal: "If you do not consent to establishing a strong government you risk the setting up by Germany of a separate government in Paris. I do not want to be your successor but the people around you must be eliminated. They are too weak."

The two remaining points of interests in connection with the Randan meeting are: (1) That Laval stated to our informant that in the event of the constitution of a new Cabinet he had allowed Darlan to understand that he would be made Minister of National Defense; (2), that on learning of the Marshal's conversation with René de Chambrun, Darlan did everything he possibly could to dissuade the Marshal from meeting Laval. Darlan was consequently kept in the dark once the secret arrangements were made for the Randan meeting.

LEAHY

---

862.24/640 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, March 27, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received 5 : 12 p. m.]

454. Department's 205, March 24, 8 p. m. and Algiers' 172, March 23, 5 p. m. and 181, March 24, 11 a. m. I considered it advisable first to make an informal inquiry from a competent official in the Foreign Office before bringing the substance of these reports to the attention of the French Government. The result of this inquiry is as follows:

1. We are informed that of the original 3,600 tons of gasoline to be delivered by France to Libya 2,000 tons of this amount is aviation gasoline of which 1,400 tons came from Marseille and 600 tons from stocks already in French North Africa. The 1,400 tons in question were transported from France to French North Africa by tanker whose total carrying capacity did not exceed that amount. The official stated that if the French Government had had at its disposal a tanker with a carrying capacity of 2,000 tons the entire amount of French aviation gasoline destined for Libya would have been sent to French North Africa from French metropolitan stocks.

2. The remaining 1600 tons is automotive gasoline to be delivered to Libya from French North African military stocks.

The official stated that the following is an exact record to date (March 26) of deliveries already made: Aviation gasoline 1148 tons; automotive gasoline 1395 tons, total 2543 tons. Remaining to be delivered is therefore 1057 tons.

The official offered the opinion that the discrepancy in the figures (received from Murphy) is due to the fact that the 1140 tons of aviation gasoline reported as having been supplied from France should not have been added to the 2,000 tons of aviation gasoline described as supplied by Algeria but should have been included. In fact our informant said French North Africa not having the local stocks available to furnish 2,000 tons of aviation gasoline to Libya had been forced to call on metropolitan France to supply the 1400 tons in question.

As regards Cole's report mentioned in the Department's 205, March 24, 8 p. m., the official said that he presumed that it referred to the recent landing of five (not three) Italian airplanes at Maison Blanche, Algeria, on March 7, 1942. The arrival of these planes, he claimed, had embarrassed the local authorities who felt themselves obliged to supply the necessary gasoline to insure their immediate departure. The amount of supplies furnished these planes was approximately 10,000 liters.

The delivery of this gasoline was made from French military stocks only (and not borrowed from Standard Oil stocks) which in some instances, due to a lack of army owned reservoir tanks, are stored in tanks of a number of private companies from which they are taken as needed to meet the requirements of French aviation.

As the Department is aware we have been informed by our Consul at Tunis (see last paragraph of Tunis telegram 44, March 12, 8 p. m., and Tunis 51 [52?], March 25, noon, to the Department <sup>46</sup>) that Italian military planes coming from Libya have landed in Tunisia allegedly to the embarrassment of the French authorities who claim to have protested to the Italian Government but so far without much success.

The official in question assures us that negotiations to forego the balance of tons to be delivered are still proceeding with the Armistice Commission but he appears to be uncertain of what the results will be.

From this point of view it appears advisable to me to recommend to the Department the acceptance of the present situation as outlined above and to take no adverse action in the matter unless some further violation of the assurances is made by the French Government.

I will, however, bring to the attention of the Foreign Office the question of the landing of Italian military planes in French North

---

<sup>46</sup> Latter not printed.

Africa in the sense indicated in the final paragraph of the Department's 205, March 24, 8 p. m.

Repeated to Murphy.

LEAHY

862.24/692

---

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

If the United States Government can obtain complete satisfaction on the question of supplies to Libya, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have no objection to the despatch of limited quantities of navicerted supplies to French North Africa, provided that United States observers can penetrate the country freely and provided that the United Nations get compensating advantage in obtaining control of strategic materials which are at present going to Germany. In this connexion His Majesty's Government wish to emphasize that they attach the greatest importance to establishing in the case of North Africa the principle on which, in agreement with the United States Government, they are working in Spain and Portugal, that deliveries from the United Nations will depend on counter deliveries of strategic materials to the United States or the United Kingdom.

His Majesty's Government desire to urge strongly that the United States Government should insist on the complete cessation of oil supplies to Libya before they agree to the sailing of two ships from New York, and that they should not recognise the alleged Vichy commitment to deliver a further 1580 tons to the Axis powers. In this connexion the United States Government will no doubt have noted the contradiction between the assurances contained in the principal French note to Admiral Leahy of March 14th that no further supplies would be transported or delivered to the Axis in Libya other than those already in transit and the offer in the supplementary note of the same date to endeavour to get the Axis powers to agree to the cancellation of the delivery of the balance (about 1580 tons) of the original 3600 tons which had been promised, provided that it could be stated that American supplies of petroleum products to North Africa were actually being resumed.

His Majesty's Government hold strongly that unless and until the Vichy Government agree to arrangements for the export of strategic raw materials from French North Africa to the United States of America and the United Kingdom, there should be no shipments of oil products to North Africa and permission should not be granted to use any additional vessels in the North African service.

WASHINGTON, March 27, 1942.

851.00/2699 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, March 27, 1942—4 p. m.

214. Your 451, March 26, 3 p. m. At any moment at which in your judgment it appears probable that Laval is to return to the French Government, you are requested to obtain immediately an audience with the Marshal and to make, by direction of the President, the following statement to him.

"The Government of the United States has made every effort during recent weeks to adjust, in a friendly spirit, various problems which have arisen in its relations with the French Government with due regard for the national interests of the United States and bearing in mind the interests of the French people and their aspirations for the restoration of the integrity and independence of France.

As the result of the recent interchange between the two Governments, these problems have been solved and the Government of the United States, as the French Government is aware, is willing to consider the immediate resumption of the trade arrangements previously agreed upon and which had temporarily been held in suspension.

The Government of the United States has no intention whatever of interfering in the purely domestic affairs of the French people.

However, the return to a position of power and authority in the French Government of M. Laval, or the appointment to such position of any other French citizen so notoriously and completely identified with a policy of supine subservience to Germany and so obviously intent upon a course of open 'collaboration' with the enemies of the United States, could only be regarded by public opinion in the United States and by the Government of the United States itself as a clear indication that the French people can no longer look to the French Government at Vichy to carry out their own desire to maintain relations of friendship and understanding with the United States and the American people.

Were M. Laval, or those identified with his policies, to obtain authority within the French Government, the Government of the United States would be unable to believe that the assurances recently given it by the French Government covering the legitimate requirements of the United States would be carried out in good faith either in their letter or in their spirit.

Consequently, were M. Laval or any individual identified with his policy to be called upon to enter the French Government in any controlling position, the United States Government would be obliged to discontinue its existing relations of confidence for our mutual welfare with the French Government at Vichy."

For your personal information, I am sure you will realize that the appointment of Laval or those associated with him, would be unanimously regarded by the American people as a clear sign that German

pressure on the Marshal had at last become conclusive. Under such conditions it would be impossible for this Government to maintain diplomatic relations with the French Government at Vichy. I have discussed these issues with the President, who has authorized me to state to you that that represents his own considered convictions.

WELLES

---

851.00/2702 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, March 30, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received March 30—11:14 a. m.]

466. At 11:30 today I delivered to Marshal Pétain in the presence of Admiral Darlan the statement contained in your 214, March 27, 4 p. m.

The Marshal replied that he does not enjoy having to make decisions that are personally disagreeable to him, that the French people do not like Laval, and that he is not hurrying toward a decision.

Darlan who did not join in the conversation remarked privately that a decision might probably be made within a week and that in his opinion there is only a 20% prospect of Laval's return to the Cabinet.

I expressed to the Marshal my personal opinion that an appointment of Laval to the Cabinet would probably cause a break in our diplomatic relations. Upon my departure he expressed a hope that I have not started to pack my trunks.

LEAHY

---

800.6363/618

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] March 31, 1942.

The French Ambassador called to see me today at his request.

The Ambassador read to me many telegrams and discussed at some length various questions relating to French shipping, including the case of the tanker *Merope*.<sup>48</sup>

I told the Ambassador after he had concluded that I should like very much to be helpful to him, but that it was impossible for me to keep in touch with all of the details involved in these questions, and

---

<sup>48</sup> The French tanker *Merope* was chartered by a Mexican shipping line that was a subsidiary of the Mexican Government for the period from December 10, 1941, to March 24, 1942. The charter was not renewed, and in August 1942 the ship was taken over by the Mexican Government with the understanding that France would be reimbursed for its value.



that I felt sure that Mr. Long <sup>49</sup> and Mr. Atherton <sup>50</sup> and other officials of the Department were giving these questions prompt consideration.

I explained to the Ambassador the recent message sent to Admiral Leahy for communication to Marshal Pétain with regard to the rumors of the possibility of the entrance into the French Government of Monsieur Laval and I informed the Ambassador of the nature of the reply received from Admiral Leahy. I stated that I felt sure the Ambassador would understand that, notwithstanding the fact that this Government desired to move rapidly to determine the various questions in which the French Government was interested, notably Red Cross assistance and commercial shipments to North Africa, because of the assurances recently given this Government by the French Government it was impossible for us to go ahead until we had categorical assurances that Monsieur Laval or other notorious collaborationists with Germany were not going to take charge of French policy. I said that until this issue had been settled almost all of the questions which the Ambassador had mentioned would have to be left in abeyance.

The Ambassador said that he understood fully the situation. He said he wished, of his own initiative, to cable his Government that if Laval or his associates came into control in Vichy, all profitable relations with the United States would be terminated. I said that was a matter which the Ambassador would have to decide for himself. I stated that the views of this Government had already been communicated to Marshal Pétain and we would have to await developments.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

862.24/647 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, April 3, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received April 4—3 p. m.]

497. Reference Department's 205, March 24, 8 p. m. and Embassy's 454, March 27, 10 a. m. We have received the following note dated April 2, 1942, from the Foreign Office regarding the landing and refueling of Italian planes in French North Africa:

"In a note dated March 28 the Embassy of the United States called the attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the fact that the French authorities were permitting Italian military planes to refuel in North Africa.

The Embassy added that if the Government of the United States had been aware of these deliveries at the time it was decided to resume the supplying of North Africa it would have hesitated to give its consent in principle to this measure. The Federal Government is

---

<sup>49</sup> Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State.

<sup>50</sup> Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

however willing to await information from the French Government concerning the facts above mentioned 'before reconsidering its position'.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to inform the Embassy that it is a fact that on March 7 five Italian planes landed on the aviation field at Algiers—Maison Blanche.

The local authorities, anxious to obtain the immediate departure of these planes, were obliged to furnish them with the necessary fuel. This, amounting to about 10,000 liters, represents the strictly indispensable quantity necessary for the return voyage of these planes to Italy.

This incident was the subject on March 11 of a formal protest by the French Government to the Italian Armistice Commission at Turin."

The Embassy learns confidentially from a competent official in the Foreign Office that the protest referred to in the final paragraph of the note quoted above was of a firm character. Admiral Duplat apparently informed the Italian General Vaccamaggiolini that in the event that further landings of this kind were to take place, the French authorities would be forced to take appropriate measures with regard to the Italian planes and their crews, "measures which might go as far as internment".

Rochat informed us a few days ago that he was under the impression that the five Italian planes in question had been forced to land in Algeria as they had encountered a violent storm off the north African coast.

Repeated to Murphy.

LEAHY

---

865.248/102 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1942—5 p. m.

234. Murphy's telegram 211, April 3, 5 p. m., from Algiers.<sup>51</sup> The continued use by Italian airplanes of French fields in North Africa and the utilization of French facilities for continued military operation seems to us at variance with French assurances regarding the use of bases in North Africa. Please make immediate inquiry of the French Government in this regard.

In this connection you may again refer to protest submitted in Department's 205, March 24, 8 p. m.

WELLES

---

<sup>51</sup> Not printed.

862.24/655 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, April 7, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 1:08 p. m.]

511. The following note, dated April 4, and signed by Darlan, has been received in reply to our note embodying the Department's telegram no. 199 [198], March 22, 4 p. m.

"In a note dated March 24 Your Excellency informed me that the American Government, in consideration of the assurances given by the French Government in its communication of March 14, is prepared to resume the operation of the program of supplying North Africa by authorizing the loading of two French vessels now in New York 'under the same conditions that have governed the previous voyages' of these vessels.

Your Excellency adds however that 'The French Government will appreciate that the continued operation of this service will be governed by conditions existing at the time of possible further scheduled sailings which must involve an adjustment of the problem presented by the existence in North Africa of strategic materials such as cobalt and rubber.'

Furthermore, and in response to a request made in the French Government's communication of March 14, Your Excellency again defined in the nature of the Federal Government the position of the United States and stated that the American Government fully respected the rights and the interests of France in different parts of the world.

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the French Government takes note of the assurances given by the American Government by virtue of which the *Ile de Noirmoutier* and the *Ile d'Ouessant* now in New York will be despatched with their cargoes at the same time as the *Aldebaran* and the *Ile de Ré* leave Casablanca for New York. With regard to the further operation of the supply agreement detailed instructions have been sent by the French Government to its Ambassador at Washington. I am communicating the substance of these instructions to Your Excellency by separate note and I should be obliged were he to intervene with his Government with a view to securing a favorable reception on the part of the American Government to the proposals made in this connection by the French Government." (Copy of this separate note which we understand to be merely a repetition of Henry-Haye's instructions is being sent to the Department by air mail despatch).

Lastly I take note of Your Excellency's statement defining the position of the United States with regard to French sovereignty and take occasion to call [*recall?*] that from both the political and juridical standpoints the French state is alone entitled to exercise the rights of French sovereignty in all the territories constituting its Empire."

LEAHY

740.00112 European War 1939/5299

*The French Embassy to the Department of State*

[Translation]

No. 524

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1942.

## NOTE

(1) In a note of February 26, 1942,<sup>52</sup> the Embassy of the United States at Vichy notified the French Government that the United States Government could no longer authorize the shipment of petroleum products to North Africa if the deliveries of French fuels to the Axis armies in Libya were to continue.

(2) In another communication, dated March 5,<sup>53</sup> Admiral Leahy stated that the deliveries of food, fuels, trucks, etc. to the Axis forces in North Africa and in other theatres of operations were considered by the United States Government as constituting military aid.

(3) The reply sent to Admiral Leahy on March 14<sup>54</sup> contained in particular the following considerations:

(a) It is true that certain deliveries of petroleum products consigned to Libya have been effected. The German and Italian Governments had requested them at a moment when the execution of the agreements on the supplying of North Africa had been suspended on the initiative of the United States Government. This circumstance made it impossible for the French Government to justify a refusal by invoking the American deliveries of fuels, as it had done in March 1941 on the occasion of an Italian request relative to the supplying of 5,000 tons of gasoline for automobiles to be taken from the Algerian stocks.

(b) As the United States Embassy had been informed before, it is to be remarked that the fuels delivered to Libya had, for the most part, merely passed in transit through North Africa, since they originated chiefly in the stocks of the home country. To the limited extent in which these shipments had had to be taken from the North African stocks, they have been entirely compensated for new shipments from France to North Africa.

(c) The quantity of fuels originally demanded by the Axis Governments was 3,600 tons. As the United States Government had given the assurance that the program of economic assistance to North Africa would be put into effect again in a short time, the French Government immediately seized the opportunity to intervene with the Axis Governments with a view to inducing them to renounce any new supplying of fuels over and above the 3,600 tons in question. It obtained satisfaction on this point.

<sup>52</sup> See telegram No. 127, February 23, 8 p. m., to the Ambassador in France, p. 140.

<sup>53</sup> See telegram No. 139, March 2, 8 p. m., to the Ambassador in France, p. 144.

<sup>54</sup> See telegram No. 390, March 14, 4 p. m., from the Ambassador in France, p. 148.

(d) The note transmitted to Admiral Leahy March 14 stated further that the French Government was disposed to attempt another effort with the Armistice Commissions with a view to being relieved of the delivery of the balance of those 3,600 tons. As a matter of fact there remained on March 14 about 1500 tons to be delivered, and the French Government considered that it would be possible to liberate itself from the engagements undertaken in this connection, if it could invoke the immediate resumption of the exports of American petroleum products to North Africa.

(4) At the same time the French Government gave the assurance that the engagement undertaken by it not to furnish any military aid to the belligerent forces of the Axis Powers extended to the delivery and transportation of goods, of any kind whatever.

(5) In giving these various assurances, the French Government clearly emphasized that it expected to obtain from the United States Government certain *quid pro quo* considered by it as indispensable to the maintenance of the political position resulting from these exchanges of notes. It emphasized in particular that it expected the resumption of the supplying of North Africa, under the conditions agreed upon by both sides originally.

(6) The decisions which the United States Government has made up to now on the subject of putting into effect again of the plan of supplying North Africa have been of extremely limited scope.

Assurances have been given relative to the departure of the *Ile de Noirmoutier* and of the *Ile d'Ouessant*, which are at present at New York. But as of April 7, the economic services of the French Embassy are not yet in possession of the payment license, without which no new purchase can be made. On the same date the said services have not yet received from the Board of Economic Warfare any indication concerning the nature and quantities of the goods the exportation of which to North Africa could be immediately authorized.

Moreover, the United States Government has not undertaken any formal engagement with respect to the subsequent movements of the four vessels assigned since July 1941 to the New York-Casablanca line, nor with respect to the use on this line of the other three vessels which the Maritime Commission has left at the disposal of the French Government for approved traffic.

A note transmitted to Vichy March 24 by Admiral Leahy<sup>55</sup> indicates that the functioning of the New York-Casablanca line will be governed by the conditions in force at the moment of possible proposed departures and that steps must be taken to bring favorable solution to the problem resulting from the existence in North Africa of strategic matériel, such as cobalt and rubber.

<sup>55</sup> See telegrams No. 198, March 22, 4 p. m., to the Ambassador in France, and No. 511, April 7, 11 a. m., from the Ambassador in France, pp. 152 and 164, respectively.

(7) On receiving this communication, the French Government indicated its surprise at the new conditions thus placed upon the continuation of the supplying of North Africa with American goods, when the said supplies had already been limited for several months past to products other than petroleum products. It urgently requests the United States Government to understand that regular and substantial imports of American goods into North Africa are indispensable for it to be able to maintain both the economic balance and the economic independence of those territories and thus meet the engagements it has assumed. North Africa cannot subsist without outside aid. If this aid does not come from the United States, the French Government will be deprived of any argument to resist the pressures it is under from the Axis Powers on the economic plane.

(8) For it is to be observed that the French Government was able to obtain the stoppage of the exports to Libya only by emphasizing the vital character of the supplying of North Africa with American products and by maintaining that the suspension of such supply had been provoked only by the deliveries allowed to the Axis forces.

(9) If such supply should be made subject in the future not only to the conditions agreed upon originally (non-exportation of the imported products or of like products; control of the distribution by American agents), but also to new conditions, such as the furnishings to which the American note of March 24 alludes, the French Government would lose every means of discussion with regard to the demands of Germany and Italy.

(10) Indeed, the cobalt and other ores of North Africa are normally considered as contraband of war. All transportations of this nature would certainly be intercepted by the maritime forces of the Axis, as they would be by the maritime forces of the Allied Powers if they were destined for a German or Italian port. Their delivery to the United States therefore encounters a manifest impossibility.

During the suspension of the supplying of North Africa the German Armistice Commission already made the claim of treating cork and tartar as contraband of war. The French Government is trying to have this interdiction removed, in order to permit the loading of the two cargo vessels which are at Casablanca. But there is no probability that it can obtain a similar decision with respect to cobalt and other ores.

(11) In order for the supplying of North Africa in American products to have the scope and stability which are desirable, it seems necessary that the conditions set forth below be met:

(a) use of all the vessels left at the disposal of the French Government, that is, the four cargo ships assigned to the New York-Casablanca line since July 1941 and the three vessels approved by the Maritime Commission: *Indiana*, *Mont Everest* and *Angoulême*;

(b) the fixing of quarterly programs, which would involve not only, as that has been the case hitherto, the approval in principle (*de principe*) of the Department of State, but also the assurance that we would obtain in useful time the corresponding payment and export licenses and that priorities of sufficiently high rank will be granted to permit the manufacture and delivery of orders which necessitate the use of controlled raw materials. Such a program should include, in a general way, the products necessary for the subsistence of the natives, (green tea and cotton cloth particularly) and for the maintenance of the economic balance of North Africa (sulphate of copper, binder twine, spare parts for agricultural machinery, etc.).

(12) Lastly, in view of the special structure of North Africa, the economic assistance which these territories expect of the United States cannot be considered as completely efficacious unless it involves a regular supplying of fuels. The latter are indispensable, indeed, not only for highway transportation (by reason of the insufficiency of the railway system), but also to agriculture (fuel for tractors, agriculture machinery, water lifts, and auxiliary engines), for coastal fishing and for certain industries, particularly the electric power industry in Algeria and Tunisia.

The French Government recently reminded Admiral Leahy that it remained disposed to stop execution of the deliveries of fuel promised to Libya (there remained still 1,057 tons to be furnished March 26), as soon as it should have obtained sufficient assurances with respect to the resumption of the supplying of North Africa with petroleum products.

So far as concerns the possible use of these products, the control which is exercised in North Africa by the American agents (and which, up to the present at least, has no equivalent in the Iberian peninsula, although the latter likewise is dependent on America for its supply of petroleum), should give all the guarantees that could be wished to the United States Government.

(13) In a new note which has just been transmitted to Admiral Leahy, the French Government has emphasized that the resumption of the supplying of North Africa with petroleum products would enable it to obtain, with respect to cobalt and the other strategic products of North Africa, solutions corresponding to the wishes of the United States.

It could be understood particularly that no exportation of cobalt would be effected to any destination whatever.

Moreover, regular deliveries of olive oil, in quantities to be determined, could be made to the profit of the United States, this question, however, continuing to be bound up, in a certain measure, as has been indicated in other communications, with the problem of the supplying of French West Africa.

The notes exchanged between the French Government and the United States Embassy at Vichy do not seem to have mentioned, at least up to now, of other North African products considered as strategic. But, if the case should arise, of course solutions inspired by the same spirit could be envisaged for these products, in particular, for molybdenum.

As to Indochinese rubber, there is at this time no stock in North Africa, and it is not to be foreseen that such stocks can be reconstituted in the future.

(14) The principal idea which appears from this ensemble of communications is that a regular and substantial supplying of North Africa with American products is considered by the French Government as indispensable, not only because it permits assuring the economic equilibrium of North Africa, as was the object of the agreement entered into at Algiers between General Weygand and Mr. Murphy February 21 [26], 1941,<sup>56</sup> but also because it is the only effective argument which the French Government has in order to resist the economic pressures of which it is the object on the part of the Axis Powers and to maintain thus the political position which it has of its own free will adopted with respect to the United States.

---

851.00/2718 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, April 13, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received April 13—4:01 p. m.]

537. The official referred to in our 1490, December 3, 2 p. m., 1941,<sup>57</sup> informs us today that Du Moulin de la Barthète and himself have resigned from the Marshal's civil Cabinet in response to German pressure for their removal and that General Latzl has also resigned because of local difficulties.

There is an unconfirmed report from a reliable source that Darlan repeated to Benoist-Méchin our statement to the Marshal of America's attitude toward the appointment of Laval to the Cabinet (your 214, March 27, 4 p. m.); that Benoist-Méchin repeated the statement to Abetz and that this has caused the German authorities to consider that the return of Laval is now a test of strength between Washington and Berlin.

Information available to us today indicates that a return of Laval to the Cabinet under German pressure is highly probable in the near future.

LEAHY

---

<sup>56</sup> See telegram No. 249, February 28, 1941, 10 a. m., from the Ambassador in France, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, p. 226.

<sup>57</sup> Not printed; the official is identified only as a career diplomat and member of Marshal Pétain's "entourage" (851.00/2529).



124.51/284a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1942—11 a. m.

254. With the return of Laval to the French Government the situation foreseen in the Department's telegraphic instruction No. 214, of March 27, 4 p. m. has arisen and you should be guided accordingly.

The State Department is informing the press immediately that the President has ordered you to return to the United States "for consultation" and it is hoped you may leave Vichy at an early convenient moment. You should inform the French Government that Mr. Tuck will assume the duties of *Chargé d'Affaires ad interim*.

You may inform your staff that while this present instruction only affects you the developing situation may well necessitate further withdrawals of personnel.

Please let me know if there is anything we can do from this end to facilitate Mrs. Leahy's and your journey to the United States.

WELLES

124.51/286a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1942—4 p. m.

255. Department's telegram no. 254, April 15, 11 a. m. Your telephone conversation this morning was most helpful. I am distressed to learn of Mrs. Leahy's illness but naturally delighted to learn at the same time that her progress is satisfactory.

Having full knowledge of your views this telegram supplements the Department's instruction under reference and leaves you certain discretionary possibilities as follows:

In American public opinion the issue is clear and there is no room for doubt but that because of German insistence Laval has re-entered the Cabinet on a policy of close collaboration with Germany before she begins a spring offensive. From the political angle here it is advisable that action by this Government should not be delayed pending complete disintegration of the Vichy situation. However, as I understand that in your estimation the announcement that the President has ordered you to return to the United States "for consultation" might be delayed for a day or so until at least the announcement of Laval's full powers and Cabinet appointments, we shall not inform the press

today of your recall. In the meantime please keep me fully advised at the earliest moment from the Vichy standpoint you think such an announcement might be effectively made. In any case we hope the delay will not be longer than 48 hours.

I fully realize that your departure cannot be immediate and in making such an announcement it will be said that you will leave at the earliest possible date which may, however, be delayed because of Mrs. Leahy's health.

I have reported your telephone conversation to the President and he asked me to convey his warm personal regards and best wishes for Mrs. Leahy's speedy recovery.

WELLES

---

851.00/2810a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, April 16, 1942—6 p. m.

259. Your 552, April 16, 10 a. m.,<sup>58</sup> has been given every consideration.

The Department is of the opinion that no room for doubt must exist in the American mind and, above all, in the French mind, that the focal point of the future of American-French relations is German control over any French Government dominated by Laval. Accordingly, failing contrary official instructions to you from Washington, the Department will tomorrow, April 17, issue a statement that in view of the reinstatement of Monsieur Laval into a dominant position in the Vichy Government, the American Ambassador at Vichy has been instructed to return to the United States "for consultation" as soon as Mrs. Leahy's health makes this possible. Concurrently with the issuance of this statement here the short-wave stations in this country will broadcast to France in order that the fullest realization may be established in the minds of the French people as to exactly what will be the effect on American-French relations of Monsieur Laval's return to office.

You are likewise authorized, in your discretion, to make use of the foregoing in such manner as you may deem expedient.

WELLES

---

<sup>58</sup> Not printed; the Ambassador suggested it would appear advantageous to Embassy's future relations with Vichy Government to delay announcement of his recall to the United States for consultation until beginning of the following week (124.51/235).

851.01/448

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] April 16, 1942.

The French Ambassador called to see me this evening at his request.

When the Ambassador entered the room he said that I knew of course that he had come in to present the official reply of his Government to the note which I had sent him on April 13.<sup>59</sup>

I answered that there was no use in the Ambassador's wasting my time and his own by reading me the text of this communication since I had already received the full text from Ambassador Leahy.<sup>60</sup> I said that this communication constituted probably the most amazing incident in the more than 150 years of unbroken friendship between the United States and France. I said it was impossible for me officially to accept any communication from the French Government which referred to an American note, in which the traditional friendship between our two countries had been emphasized, in which the earnest hope of the United States for the restoration of French independence had been underscored, and in which the United States had announced as its policy its conviction that the victory of the United Nations would restore to the French people their liberty and would preserve the integrity of French territorial possessions, as "injurious" to France. I said that of course it was notorious that this communication from the French Government had been submitted to and had received the prior approval of the German authorities. For all of these reasons, I said, the Ambassador would understand it was impossible for me officially to accept any such interpretation as that placed upon the note of April 13 by the French Government.

The Ambassador made no reply whatever and was very evidently extremely reluctant to transmit such a message from his Government.

During the rest of our interview which lasted for over an hour, the Ambassador attempted to prove that Laval, whom he knew well, might not be as bad as this Government believed.

In reply to these comments I merely said I was entirely familiar with the history of M. Laval, and particularly with his recent history, and that because of the fact that M. Laval had openly and publicly announced as his policy intimate cooperation between France and Germany, it would obviously be out of the question for the United States to maintain the same kind of relations with the government of M. Laval as with preceding French governments. I stated that our

---

<sup>59</sup> *Post*, p. 561.

<sup>60</sup> See telegram No. 547, April 15, 4 p. m., from the Ambassador in France, p. 563.

viewpoint on this score had been made known on March 27 to Marshal Pétain, as I myself had informed the Ambassador, and I said that the President had likewise informed me that he had made the same statement to M. Henry-Haye in the last interview the President had had with him.

I said that for all of these reasons I felt it necessary to let the Ambassador know that the end of the chapter had been reached.

The Ambassador inquired persistently whether this implied a rupture of diplomatic relations.

To this I answered that I was not prepared to give any specific or detailed reply to this question. I said that the policy of this Government would be announced in the near future.

The rest of the interview was taken up by very fervent appeals on the part of the Ambassador to the effect that this Government should not break diplomatic relations. He emphasized the value to the United States of our agents and observers, particularly in North Africa, and of the need of the French people to know that a friendly power like the United States was still represented in France.

I stated that the French people, in my judgment, would most certainly not understand a continuation of apparently normal diplomatic relations between the United States and the Laval government which was pledged to complete subserviency to Germany, and to a policy which could only result in an attempt permanently to enslave the French people.

The Ambassador attempted to make out that Marshal Pétain would remain the controlling factor in the new Government.

I said it was impossible for me to accept this thesis. I stated that in view of the well known distrust by Marshal Pétain of Laval and his personal objection to him and his recent statement to Admiral Leahy that Laval was the most hated man in France, it was inconceivable that Marshal Pétain would of his own free will have appointed Laval to power. It was evident that the Marshal had only taken such action under direct and overwhelming pressure from Germany. Under these conditions, I said, it was quite out of the question for this Government to believe that Marshal Pétain would remain a dominant factor in the new governmental framework.

When the Ambassador finally left, he said he hoped he would see me again before he left the United States.

I said that of course I expected to see him.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/21086: Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 16, 1942—9 p. m.

[Received April 16—7:14 p. m.]

1903. I called on Mr. Eden <sup>61</sup> this afternoon to inquire his impressions with respect to the situation in France. He said that in general his views differed somewhat from those of most in that he regarded the German insistence on the reinstatement of Laval as a definite sign of German weakness. It must, he said, be considered as some confirmation of reports that the Germans were not satisfied with the trend at Vichy and were anxious over growing American influence. One fact seemed clear, however, namely that the Germans wished to be sure of a government in France completely subservient to their wishes prior to any surprise moves they may contemplate for this spring. He went on to say that most of the British General Staff people are convinced from the absence of signs of military preparations that no German operation is contemplated for this spring other than the expected Ukraine offensive toward the Caucasus (and possibly toward Murmansk). He feels however that in the light of the importance of the surprise factor in German successes in this war they may well repeat their recent history with a sudden attack in some other direction.

He finds it difficult to understand why the Germans are devoting so much attention to Malta—with some 400 bombers all told utilized in attacks on that island when they must be urgently needed elsewhere—and is unwilling to accept the obvious answer that it is solely to “neutralize” the island. He wonders whether these heavy attacks do not fit in with plans for some major campaign in the Mediterranean. If so, what role they expect France to play, or in the negative sense refrain from playing, it would be interesting to know.

As for Laval’s immediate plans—on the hypothesis that he has in fact acquired rather full powers—Eden is inclined to believe that he will be “rather quiet” with the thought of placating opinion both in France and in the United States; further, he will need some time to consolidate his position. He believes that Laval has never abandoned his hope of playing the role of “mediator” between Germany and the United States and of playing a sufficiently important part in the establishment of the new order to obtain a relatively favorable position therein for himself and France. He added: “I have good reason to know Laval very well indeed and regard him as a typical

---

<sup>61</sup> Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

French deputy. He views the whole international political scene from the point of view of getting two politicians of opposite views into the same lobby." (I am inclined to agree with this estimate of Laval. Certainly up to the time of his dismissal in December 1940 and for a period thereafter he held the confident belief that he could somehow or other bring United States and Germany together and his ignorance of our country was such that nothing could shake this belief.) On the important question of the French Fleet he does not believe Laval will attempt to make any immediate move or that he will either wish or expect to "turn it over to the Germans." I advanced the thought that since one of Laval's last statements on "collaboration" prior to his fall from power, if my memory is not at fault, was to the effect that collaboration should extend not only to the economic field but to the "colonial field" as well, he would probably endeavor to facilitate greater German exploitation of French African economic resources and probably permit greater German infiltration into that area. He agreed and likewise conceded the likelihood that the French Fleet might be utilized for the protection of French (German) colonial trade and thus be brought into action against the Allies. Certainly, he felt, Laval would facilitate Germany's urgent efforts to increase her labor supply by encouraging in various ways migration of French labor to Germany. He said that de Gaulle <sup>62</sup> believes, particularly in the light of Laval's recent statement, that the latter may make some attempt to recapture Free French African territory, but he, Eden, seemed somewhat skeptical in view of the military and physical difficulties.

As to our policy in the light of new developments, he said he had no wish to inject his views and was quite content to let us handle the situation. He read me, however, a telegram he sent Lord Halifax <sup>63</sup> night before last in which the latter was authorized, should Mr. Welles consult him, to say that the Foreign Office feels that Ambassador Leahy should be called home for consultation. This, Mr. Eden told me, he thinks might have the effect of bringing home to the Marshal the dangers of completely alienating the United States and would have a similar effect on French public opinion, to which in turn the Marshal is relatively sensitive. The Foreign Secretary feels that these advantages outweigh the loss of Ambassador Leahy's great personal influence at Vichy. He hopes, however, that we will not sever relations with Vichy at this time and entertains the hope that if things improve, Leahy might sometime return. As to "further steps" which Mr. Eden thinks we might be considering, he mentioned (1) possible

---

<sup>62</sup> Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the National Committee of the Free French at London.

<sup>63</sup> British Ambassador in the United States.

direct action definitely to immobilize in some manner the French naval vessels now at Martinique, (2) making certain that the gold there does not slip away, (3) taking such measures with respect to Guadalupe and French Guiana as may seem advisable, and (4) the desirability of blocking French Government funds in the United States now utilized for the maintenance of French diplomatic and consular offices in the Western Hemisphere. He added that he had just learned from Lord Halifax that this last is being done.

He said it would be interesting to know the nature of the threats the Germans used in forcing the return of Laval and what they have demanded of him but recognizes the difficulty in getting the full story. (I have just heard that Czech sources here say that utilization of Ajaccio is one concession demanded).

MATTHEWS

123 Leahy, William D./90 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, April 22, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received April 22—3:21 p. m.]

597. From Tuck: "Department's 273, April 21, 8 p. m." According to present plans Ambassador Leahy will leave Vichy on May 1st by train for Lisbon traveling via Canfranc and Madrid. He will take Mrs. Leahy's remains with him and will be accompanied as far as Lisbon by Secretary Woodruff Wallner. Our missions at Madrid and Lisbon have been notified accordingly and requested to assist in all necessary arrangements. I will keep you fully informed in the event of any change in the Ambassador's present plans.

Repeated to London. [Tuck.]

LEAHY

851.00/2760 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 23, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received April 23—6:35 p. m.]

2102. In the course of an interview which I requested this morning with Mr. Eden we again discussed the French situation (my telegram number 1903, April 16, 9 p. m.) and I found that in general his estimate of the present atmosphere and probable future developments agrees largely with that reported in Ambassador Leahy's telegram number

<sup>a</sup> S. Pinkney Tuck, Counselor of Embassy in France.

<sup>b</sup> Not printed.

587, April 21, 5 p. m.<sup>66</sup> Mr. Eden too is of the impression that popular reaction in France to the return of Laval to power is one of increasing apathy; that Laval will proceed slowly and endeavor to avoid any action likely to cause a break with the United States; and that Germany wants the French to avoid such a break. In answer to my question, Mr. Eden said that the simple fact that the Germans wish to avoid a complete severance of United States-Vichy relations is not in his opinion a sound reason why the Allies should consider a break desirable; on the contrary he hoped we would continue diplomatic relations with Vichy. As to Martinique, he made no further suggestion for any additional action on our part. He told me that Halifax had reported that we are exerting increasing vigilance over that area and have stationed heavy bombers in appropriate nearby spots. Halifax added that we are loathe to take any measures of force in the absence of the need for a total break. Mr. Eden went on to say that he saw nothing in the way of a hopeful reaction in North Africa among either the public or the military and did not feel that we could under present circumstances expect any resistance to Laval in that area.

He told me that de Gaulle believes that Laval, while endeavoring to help the Germans in many minor ways, will try to keep the situation as quiet as possible for the time being with the thought of lulling the people into a sense of relative calm and security and with the hope of undermining such spirit of resistance as exists—and de Gaulle fears Laval may be all too successful in this. As for the French Fleet, Eden went on, de Gaulle does not think that Laval will try to use it for direct aid to Germany though he may endeavor to employ it indirectly against the British and possibly in some engagement against Syria.

Mr. Eden said there was one point which is causing him some anxiety, namely Laval's obvious endeavors to "drive a wedge," as far as the French public is concerned, between the United States and Great Britain. He referred to Laval's studied avoidance of any criticism of the United States in his attacks on the British as well as Laval's reputed desire to serve as mediator between the United States and Germany in the negotiated peace for which he is so eager. Mr. Eden told me that he sent a telegram to Lord Halifax last evening asking him to urge you to make some public statement unmasking this attempt to get the French people to differentiate between the United States and Great Britain. He suggested for instance that in view of Laval's unfriendly references to the return of English bombers over French territory after having "deserted" France in her hour of need it might be helpful if we could indicate that American bombers

---

<sup>66</sup> Not printed.



would soon be with them. (Mr. Eden of course realizes that American prestige in France is far higher than that of his own country and he probably feels that if Laval succeeds in convincing the French people that we are not wholeheartedly identified with various British moves with respect to France both British prestige and the cause of French resistance will suffer further. It is a subject on which the British are, not unnaturally, touchy.)

He mentioned with approval the leaflets bearing the text of Mr. Welles' note of April 13<sup>67</sup>—with an explanatory British foreword—which the Royal Air Force is now dropping over both occupied and unoccupied France. He likewise seemed quite encouraged at the success of last night's Commando raid in the Boulogne area; there were practically no British casualties. The object of the raid, he said, was to test the strength of German defenses in that area and while the British would not of course advertise the fact they were impressed by the lack of spirit in the German resistance. I asked him what he thought Rundstedt<sup>68</sup> is doing in France and he replied that he thought he was there solely to inspect defenses with a view to strengthening them where necessary. He attached no offensive significance to the presence there of this able German general.

MATTHEWS

---

711.51/237

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 23, 1942.

The Minister of Canada<sup>69</sup> called to see me this afternoon by instruction of Mr. Mackenzie King.<sup>70</sup>

During the course of the visit which the Canadian Prime Minister made to me last week, we discussed very fully the present situation in France and the policy which this Government would probably pursue with the new Laval government. Mr. Mackenzie King said that it was his hope, if possible, to pursue an identic policy with the United States. He said at that time, however, that although Mr. Churchill<sup>71</sup> had let it be known publicly that the continued relations between Vichy and the Canadian Government were useful to the Government of the United Kingdom, there was increasing pressure within Canada upon Mr. Mackenzie King to sever diplomatic rela-

---

<sup>67</sup> *Post*, p. 561.

<sup>68</sup> Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, appointed German Commander-in-Chief in the West, March 1942.

<sup>69</sup> Leighton McCarthy.

<sup>70</sup> Canadian Prime Minister.

<sup>71</sup> Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.

tions and to hand his passports to the French Minister in Ottawa. At the conclusion of our conversation it was agreed that each Government would keep the other informed as to what steps it might contemplate which would change the existing situation.

The instructions which the Minister communicated to me this afternoon stated that Mr. Churchill had now let Mr. Mackenzie King know that he could not again state publicly that he felt it would be useful for Canada to continue relations with Vichy and that, in view of the severance of relations by the Union of South Africa,<sup>72</sup> Canada was now the only dominion which still had diplomatic relations with Vichy. As a result of the constitution of the Laval government, criticism of this situation was becoming more and more emphatic on the part of Canadian public opinion and was even having a considerable effect in the election campaign for the plebiscite on conscription to be held next Monday.<sup>73</sup> Mr. Mackenzie King therefore wanted me to know that he felt it was necessary in the interest of the Canadian Government to sever diplomatic relations with Vichy unless the United States were most emphatically to urge that this step should not be taken.

I said that in view of the circumstances mentioned and inasmuch as Mr. Mackenzie King had made it very clear that his own Government urgently desired to take this step, I did not feel that the Government of the United States should interpose any objection.

Mr. McCarthy expressed great relief at my statement and said he knew from his telephone conversation with Mr. Mackenzie King that the Prime Minister himself would be greatly relieved and would consequently take action before the end of this week.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

711.51/227

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] April 25, 1942.

The British Ambassador called at his request.

I said that among other matters coming to my attention since my return was the information I had received yesterday to the effect that Foreign Minister Eden had notified Canada that it would be agreeable for her to cease diplomatic relations with the Vichy Government, and in effect he indicated there was no further occasion for diplomatic connections. I commented that it probably would have been very advis-

---

<sup>72</sup> The Union of South Africa severed diplomatic relations with France April 28, 1942.

<sup>73</sup> April 27.

able to have had a conference or an exchange of views between the British, the Canadian and the United States Governments on this whole question relating to the Vichy and the French situation with a view to salvaging whatever might be possible in this respect to the advantage of the governments associated in the war against the Axis. I said that, of course, this was a matter for the British and Canadian Governments to pass on and I was not undertaking to make suggestions with respect thereto, especially at this late date. I added that it would apparently not be possible for the United States Government long to keep up diplomatic contacts with the Vichy Government after Canada had rebuffed that Government, and especially since the British propaganda agencies continue their past policy of making it appear that the British Government is not only opposed to American diplomatic relations with Vichy but that in some respects those relations are of a sinister nature relating as they do to Hitler and Hitlerism and the Vichy Government conducted in whole or in part by pro-Hitler Frenchmen. The Ambassador immediately began to urge that we not dissolve relations with the Vichy Government for different reasons and I repeated that we, of course, could not be left out on a limb by ourselves very long in the circumstances I had described.

The Ambassador said he proposed to take this matter up with Eden at once. I replied that that was a matter for them to determine among themselves; that I was merely commenting on the situation as it was presented at this time.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

---

128 Leahy, William D./102: Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, April 27, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received April 28—4 a. m.]

621. I called on the Marshal this afternoon to take my leave. Our interview was of the most cordial nature. The Marshal professed his sincere devotion for the United States and expressed a hope that there will be no change in our friendly relations.

He said that while it might be necessary for France to continue to furnish economic aid to Germany, France would never provide Germany with armed assistance. He felt certain that Laval whom he described as being nearer to the Germans than himself would also refuse to give military aid to Germany.

During our conversation the Marshal remarked that at times such as these matters which affect Franco-American relationships can be spoken of freely but should not be made a matter of record.

LEAHY

740.0011 European War 1939/21262 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, April 27, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received April 28—1:51 p. m.]

623. Laval accompanied by Rochat, called by appointment this afternoon at 6 o'clock.

Laval, in the course of a conversation lasting some 20 minutes, spoke with the utmost frankness both with regard to the interior and foreign policy which his Government intends to pursue and of his reaction to Franco-American relations.

He said that he did not wish to dwell upon the insulting references to himself by the American press and public opinion since his advent to power; he preferred to limit himself to asking whether such an attitude was justifiable. He had been accused by the American people of being Fascist and pro-Nazi. He maintained that he was neither and that he was only interested in one thing and that was the welfare of France. He felt that the United States had committed a serious error in entering the war and that in the event of a victory over Germany by Soviet Russia and England Bolshevism in Europe would inevitably follow. Under such circumstances he would prefer to see Germany win the war.

As regards Franco-American relations he repeated on two occasions that neither by word nor act would his Government make any unfriendly gesture to the United States. His feelings towards our country he said could perhaps best be illustrated by a statement he had made at the time of his visit to America in 1931<sup>14</sup> when he said that if he were 20 years of age and wished to become an expatriate he would like to start his life as a young man in America. He felt that the present war was a "Civil War" in the sense that it was a conflict between democratic and totalitarian ideals and that in such a conflict he was only concerned with the ultimate salvation of France. He was prepared to defend France and her Empire against all comers and he stated specifically that if the British or the Americans were to attempt to effect a landing either on the soil of metropolitan France or on French North African territory he would resist them to the best of his ability. His Government he maintained would take no step to provide military assistance to the Germans.

When I reminded him that only a few months ago it had become known that the French Government then in power had agreed to transport on French vessels supplies, trucks and munitions through French North Africa to Rommel's forces in Libya he evaded a direct reply.

---

<sup>14</sup> For correspondence regarding this visit, see *Foreign Relations*, 1931, vol. II, pp. 237-258.

He was vehement in his attack on Great Britain, claiming that she is basically responsible for the plight in which France finds herself today and that it was Great Britain who had drawn France into the war. "You will never hear from my lips" he said "from now on a friendly reference to England."

As regards Germany, he felt that an understanding could be reached which would result in a lasting peace in Europe and he believed that a German victory (or possibly a negotiated peace) is preferable to a British and Soviet victory. He said that the statement of policy which he had issued in May 1941 (which took the form of an exclusive interview granted to the U. P. correspondent Heinzen) stood today as it did then and that it represents accurately at this time his attitude toward Franco-German relations.

As regards his desire to defend the French Empire he said that if he possessed the means to do so he would attempt to reconquer those parts of the French Empire which de Gaulle is now occupying with British assistance.

On taking leave he again repeated that neither by word nor act would his Government make any unfriendly gesture towards the United States.

As a result of this very frank interview it is my opinion that Laval is fully committed and may be expected to go as far as practicable in an effort to collaborate with Germany and assist in defeating what he calls Bolshevism.

Repeated to London and Murphy.

LEAHY

---

711.51/2351

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] May 4, 1942.

The British Ambassador called at his request and stated that when he and I discussed some days ago the question of the issuance of a joint statement of policy toward Vichy by Great Britain and the United States Government, clarifying the matter in various ways, it was understood that on that very day Canada was announcing the severance of diplomatic relations with Vichy. The Ambassador inquired whether, in the light of the abandonment of that step by Canada, this Government still desired to work out a joint statement.

I thanked him for bringing up this question and added that, in view of Canada's recall of her representative to the Vichy Government for consultation without severing relations, it might well be left to each of our two Governments to prepare and make public its respective statements dealing with the relations of each Government with Vichy.

I then said that the Free French and some of the British propagandists have devoted a great deal of time which could have been used with better results and with more propriety to the prosecution of the war against the common enemy in an endeavor to make it appear that the relations between this Government and Vichy were in some ways incompatible and inconsistent with the real interests of the British and American peoples and Governments. The impression, I added, that we have consistently sought to convey was that, in maintaining relations with or recognizing Vichy, or whatever one chooses to call it, this Government has been bitterly opposed to everything the Vichy Government stands for as it relates to a denial of the aspirations of the French people for the restoration of their freedom, their free institutions, and their way of life. While this Government has consistently upheld all of the rights, interests and freedom, et cetera, of France, it has most strongly and consistently opposed everything the Vichy Government stands for that is of a pro-German or pro-Hitler nature. Furthermore, this Government has uniformly asserted to the world that the Vichy Government does not represent the French people and the true interests of France. This Government, therefore, has continued relations with the Government at Vichy solely for the advantages derived from having representatives in Vichy, French Africa, et cetera, affording channels for our insistent demands that the Vichy Government observe the rules of neutrality and not go beyond the terms of the Armistice. This position is calculated to safeguard the French fleet and French bases in North and West Africa, et cetera, from being in any sense transferred to Hitler or Axis agencies. Likewise this course is based essentially and solely on a policy of promoting to the fullest extent the military progress of the twenty-six united nations, et cetera. I strongly pointed out the absurdity of attempting to misinterpret the entire policy and attitude of this Government as some of the Free French and other propagandists have endeavored to do.

I brought up the question of just what is the present policy of the British toward the French from a political standpoint, with special reference to the Free French situation. I first repeated what the Ambassador already knew, to wit, that this Government has consistently given the fullest possible cooperation to the Free French in a military way and that we are continuing to do this, but that this Government did not contemplate the recognition of de Gaulle and his organization from a political standpoint. The Ambassador said that his Government, in his opinion, which he would confirm, would, while supporting de Gaulle to an unlimited extent militarily, likewise support him in dealing with any local situation arising in connection with the prosecution of the war, but that this was entirely different

from political recognition in the broader sense, such as de Gaulle control of France as a political government both now and in the post-war period. Bearing in mind that the British dealings with the Free French are mainly confined to London, I inquired of the Ambassador whether this course was practicable, especially in cases where it might be necessary for a military force to move rapidly and to work with any local officials who might be in control and disposed to cooperate. I further inquired as to whether his Government would be disposed to urge the organization of a political committee to work coordinately with the de Gaulle military committee in order to compose all angles of this situation. The Ambassador agreed that he would query his Government on this point, as I had requested, but he expressed doubt about the practicability of any other course except recognition of the existing de Gaulle organization which dealt with local political questions arising in connection with the military problems. This would not, however, involve recognition of its authority as regards any general French political policy. I emphasized finally that military movements must be swift and far distant from de Gaulle headquarters, and that there would be no time for such detailed discussions as de Gaulle is reported to have been carrying on with respect to questions arising both of a military and political nature, and possibly some of a personal nature. I illustrated the present confused and complicated situation with the remark that de Gaulle is reported to be not on too good terms with most British officials with the exception of Prime Minister Churchill, the Governor of Central Africa and with the civil government in New Caledonia, and that this Government has found it most advantageous to deal quickly with the local governor in charge, especially when he is going in our direction.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

---

851.00/2792 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, May 7, 1942—3 p. m.  
[Received May 8—1:40 a. m.]

675. It is still too early to attempt to gauge with any degree of accuracy the concrete intentions of the Laval Government particularly insofar as its foreign policy is concerned. It is reasonably certain that, for the time being at least, Laval is anxious to avoid a rupture of relations with the United States. The conciliatory tone of his remarks to me at the close of our second interview on May 5 (substance of which was reported in my 665, May 5, 7 p. m.<sup>75</sup>) appeared in the

---

<sup>75</sup> *Post*, p. 700.

local press the following morning, producing both a favorable reaction and no little relief, particularly amongst those who are convinced of the necessity of continued friendly relations with the United States.

As regards Laval's interior policy, qualified observers consider it possible that it may take the form of a gradual shifting towards the left in the sense of a revalorization of certain republican institutions. It is rumored that it is his intention eventually to reinsert the name French Republic in the *Official Journal* and there are interesting indications that he is now endeavoring to resuscitate the functions and duties of the former Conseils Généraux.

We have it on the best of authority that at a recent Cabinet meeting, which met to consider the all important question of food supplies, Laval definitely opposed a reduction in the bread ration. This stand was quite evidently dictated by a desire to bolster his prestige in the country.

I feel it very necessary particularly at this time to stress the difficulty which we anticipate in our future endeavors to obtain even approximately reliable information. With the advent of Laval to the Government a fairly clean sweep took place in the Marshal's entourage as well as in many Government administrations and in the Foreign Office. The result has been that a number of our most useful contacts who had been built up over a period of time have now disappeared. With Laval's tendency to keep even the more important of his subordinates in ignorance of his intentions the prospect of obtaining reliable information is anything but bright. During Laval's past official life this tendency for official reticence was notorious and the man who today is perhaps in the best position to testify as to the extent to which Laval chose to ignore him is Alexis Léger.<sup>76</sup>

TUCK

---

711.51/248 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

VICHY, May 18, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received 9 : 26 p. m.]

727.

The fact that Laval's pro-American policy has struck a snag has resulted in throwing Doriot<sup>77</sup> and certain of his fellow collaborationists into sharp relief. These elements are becoming increasingly vocal

---

<sup>76</sup> Former Secretary General of the French Foreign Office; at this time an émigré in the United States.

<sup>77</sup> Jacques Doriot, French collaborationist.



in advocating a rupture of relations with the United States and for the moment are centering their efforts on a violent anti-British press campaign. Well informed political observers are in agreement that Doriot's hat is now in the ring as a successor to Laval and Doriot's party is believed to have received heavy subsidies from the Wehrmacht and Gestapo (reportedly 100,000,000 francs). Laval according to my informant is by no means unaware of this situation but that for the moment he has other fish to fry. He hopes in the next few months to solve the difficulty by means of Cabinet changes which would include Déat<sup>78</sup> and perhaps even Doriot in the Government. Laval who is known for his ability in engineering such political reshuffles considers that these unfriendly figures are safer in the Government than out of it. According to the opinion of a former deputy such a Cabinet regrouping might also be designed to include elements taken from the various political groups extending from the Socialists to the extreme right, some of whom might be willing to accept Laval's proposed economic program flavored with a mild dose of socialism.

Laval's professed desire to maintain friendly relations with the United States brings to the fore certain considerations which I feel should not be overlooked in determining the character of our future relationship with this Government. As previously stated there are unmistakable indications that Laval does not enjoy the full support of the German Government which up to the present appears to have done little to facilitate his task. Unless Laval proves himself able to overcome these difficulties it is doubtful whether he will be able to remain in office. Reliable observers are in agreement that if he were to go his Government would be succeeded by one composed of arch collaborationists and probably headed by Doriot. Under such circumstances I can only assume that the fiction of our present diplomatic relationship would come to an abrupt end. I am still of the belief—and heartily endorse Ambassador Leahy's opinion—that a continuance of diplomatic relations is for various reasons desirable provided of course this Government refrains from lending military assistance to our declared enemies.

I therefore respectfully suggest that if and when the present situation in the Martinique<sup>79</sup> is satisfactorily settled the Department may wish to consider the advisability of issuing a conciliatory statement which might possibly take the form of a declaration of friendship and solidarity with the French people. No matter how general or purposefully vague the terms of such an announcement might be it would unquestionably have the effect of producing a much needed *détente* in our present relations with this Government which I venture to point

---

<sup>78</sup> Marcel Déat, French collaborationist.

<sup>79</sup> For correspondence regarding the situation in Martinique, see pp. 611 ff.

out are now assuming so strained a character that it is difficult to understand how long they may continue to be maintained.

I sincerely hope that I have not created the impression that I am over-confident of Laval's honesty of purpose—far from it—but I honestly believe that it would be tactically advisable for our Government (and for our press) to moderate their present attitude towards Laval in the hope of forestalling the alternative of an even less favorable regime.

Repeated to London and Murphy.

TUCK

---

711.51/243 · Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Tuck)*

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1942—11 p. m.

336. Your 727, May 18, 4 p. m., section 5,<sup>79</sup> per first paragraph. In reply to a question at press conference today, the Secretary of State answered:

"We have had up fully and freely the question of our deep concern for the French people in their distress and in their conquered situation and our great desire to see restoration of all of her popular institutions, all of those rights and benefits and blessings that the great French Republic once enjoyed."

HULL

---

740.0011 European War 1939/22218 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, June 13, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received June 14—4:10 a. m.]

852. I spent hour with Laval this morning during which time he gave me an exposé of his views with regard to his Government's policy. Our interview had its origin yesterday when I met him at luncheon. He then suggested that it might be to our mutual advantage to have a frank conversation and asked me to come to see him this morning at 11 o'clock. On my arrival I found both Rochat and his son-in-law René de Chambrun present.

Laval was in good humor and the conversation opened with reference to the request contained in the Department's 359, June 6, 4 p. m.,<sup>80</sup> for transit visas to be accorded to certain members of our clerical personnel now in Lisbon who have been assigned to our Legation at Bern. This

---

<sup>79</sup> Last two paragraphs of telegram.

<sup>80</sup> Not printed.

matter which has now assumed a complicated phase will form the subject of a separate telegram.

Laval then referred to our conversations in Martinique and while he did not go into detail I gathered that he felt that these negotiations were progressing favorably. It was clear, however, from his remarks that he continues to resent our method of procedure in not having taken the matter up directly with his Government.

He expressed his satisfaction that the North African economic program was to be resumed<sup>81</sup> and referred to the German stand in connection with the activities of our control officers. He remarked humorously that he would be glad to give as many additional consuls as we wanted provided we sent North Africa what was needed; I suggested that it might be a good time to give the resumption of the program some much needed press publicity. He replied that until German agreement had been obtained for the departure of the two ships from Casablanca he felt that no such publicity could be given but that he would do his best to comply with my request once this agreement had been obtained.

Laval then embarked upon a general exposé of the problems of policy both exterior and interior which confront his Government at the moment. In reply to my direct question he refused to commit himself with regard to the present state of relations with Italy in connection with Italian territorial claims. He said, however, that he could give me a formal assurance that at no time had the Italian Government made any official *démarche* in connection therewith.

He then proceeded to an almost word for word reiteration of what he had said to Ambassador Leahy on the occasion of his visit to the Embassy (our 623, April 27, 8 p. m.) again laying stress on the dangers which he felt certain would accompany a Soviet victory in the form of the inevitable spread of Communism throughout Europe. He repeated that he would prefer (*je souhaiterais*) a German victory to a Soviet or British victory. Waxing eloquent—and in an outburst of savage Anglophobia—he declared that England was alone responsible for the plight in which France found herself today and cited Eden as the perfect example of futile British statesman whose presence in the Government could be explained but not justified by his membership in the hierarchy of the “old school tie” brigade (it was apparent to me that perhaps the basic reason for Laval’s intense dislike for the British Foreign Secretary can be attributed to the marked difference in their social origin). He declared that he would never place the United States in the same category with England but that for the life of him he could not understand what had induced President Roosevelt to throw our nation into the conflict. I replied somewhat sharply that

<sup>81</sup> See pp. 224 ff.

if he did not understand the reasons for which the United States was at war with the Axis Powers it was hardly worth while attempting to explain them to him.

As I listened to the development of his ideas I was forced to the conclusion that Laval is still convinced of the possibility either of a German victory or of a negotiated peace. I asked him if he had any real conception of the extent of our war effort and the part it was destined to play in the eventual outcome of the war. His reply seemed to indicate that we would have our hands full with Japan for a long time to come and that the best we could achieve with Germany would be a stalemate (part in UL [*sic*]). He therefore considered our participation in the war an unwise and futile effort.

As regards his interior policy Laval referred to several of the measures enumerated in the Embassy's telegram 841, June 11, 8 p. m.<sup>82</sup> as evidence of the immediate necessity for restoring order in France's interior economy adding that until full power was in his hands he could do nothing. The Germans he said were becoming increasingly exacting in their demands and his position as Chief of the Government was probably the most difficult one that any statesman faced in the world today. Only one thing was important however and that was the ultimate destiny of France and he was prepared to make almost any concessions to his country's enemies provided that in so doing this policy of sacrifice would in the long run benefit the nation. Many Frenchmen might not agree with such a policy but their opinions were a matter of complete indifference to him. He had but one desire—that France should emerge from this national catastrophe clothed again in that dignity and self-respect of which incompetent statesmen had despoiled her.

As I left he suggested that we might with advantage resume our conversations in the future.

Repeated to London and Murphy.

TUCK

---

711.51/265a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, July 21, 1942—6 p. m.

609. In your discretion will you designate a Foreign Service officer of your staff to proceed to Vichy and on the basis of this instruction orally discuss there with Tuck and other Foreign Service officers in the strictest confidence what their reactions might be should this Government be forced to break relations with Vichy. I am particularly interested in Tuck's estimate as to the effect it might have on (1) the

---

<sup>82</sup> Not printed.

future of the French fleet; (2) the effect on Laval's position; (3) whether it would be an incentive to the French people for closer collaboration with Germany; (4) whether the reaction in France would be influenced by a detailed public statement of this Government's reasons for such a course of action or merely a very general statement that we can no longer consider the Vichy Government a free agent; (5) any comment Tuck may wish to make as regards communications with our offices in Bern would be of interest as well as his general opinion in this matter as seen from the Vichy standpoint.

Your reply to this cable should not be drafted until the return of your secretary to Madrid in order that there may be the maximum of secrecy.

HULL

---

711.51/266j : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, August 6, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received August 7—noon.]

1040. Beaulac<sup>83</sup> has just returned from Vichy and reports the following opinions of Tuck and other Foreign Service officers there:

From the point of view of the situation in metropolitan France no advantage to us is perceived in breaking relations under present circumstances. (Your 609, July 21, 6 p. m.)

As fundamental background of a consideration of the problem it should be recalled that Pétain is immediately concerned with (1) preventing harm by the Germans to the more than a million French prisoners and (2) preventing the complete occupation of France and treatment similar to that being given Poland. The Germans assiduously exploit these two preoccupations, while Pétain in making concessions cleverly places responsibility for them on Darlan, Laval, et cetera.

The effect of a break on Laval's relations with the Germans is problematic. There are indications that while the Germans were interested in the maintenance of relations between France and the United States, their interest has declined principally because of their concern over the activities of Murphy and our other representatives in French North Africa and their desire to put a stop to them.

It must be recalled that Laval has been the candidate only of the so-called Embassy groups (Abetz, Ribbentrop,<sup>84</sup> De Brinon, et cetera), and has not been the candidate of the Wehrmacht or of the SS.<sup>85</sup> It is

---

<sup>83</sup> Willard L. Beaulac, Counselor of Embassy in Spain.

<sup>84</sup> Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>85</sup> Schutzstaffel, Nazi Elite Guard.

not possible in Vichy to predict the course of the internal bickerings and struggles among those German groups or the effect on them of a break with Vichy. To date, however, the SS candidate for Laval's job is Doriot.

In estimating Laval's position vis-à-vis the Germans it should be recalled that Laval has not yet been able to deliver to the Germans anything they consider substantial.

The latter have expressed dissatisfaction over the results so far of Laval's efforts to induce French workers to go to Germany and have asked for deeds instead of words. Furthermore, Laval has been unable so far to see anyone in the German Government higher than Abetz.

The effect on Laval's position vis-à-vis the French people would depend somewhat on the circumstances under which we broke. Assuming we broke under circumstances which appeared reasonable to the French people, his prestige would be further lowered.

In this connection it is recalled that when Laval entered office his prestige was very low. His prestige was increased when he (a) was able to maintain relations with us (b) maintained bread rations (c) failed to make prompt concessions to Germany (d) skillfully handled Madagascar incident<sup>85a</sup> and said at the time he would not take the initiative in breaking with us and (e) skillfully handled Martinique incident, his moderate attitude contrasting with our strong attitude.

On the other hand, his prestige was lowered by his speech of June 22 in which he expressed a wish for German victory and referred in offensive manner to General Giraud. His prestige has been lowered further by his efforts to recruit French labor for Germany.

It is not believed that in event of a break under present circumstances the French people would take any violent action against Laval although the possibility of his being assassinated would not be lessened.

Neither is it possible to predict what effect our breaking would have on Laval's position vis-à-vis Pétain and Darlan. There is no clear indication it would make any difference. If Laval should be forced out of office by either of those persons or otherwise the present probability is that Doriot would take his place. Doriot is much more of a Quisling<sup>86</sup> than Laval and even our French friends who now urge continued maintenance of relations say we could not maintain them with Doriot. Despite Doriot's apparent willingness to go along completely with the Germans, he probably would be unable to deliver the fleet to North African bases. Doriot's entry into office would still further increase the resentment of the French people against Vichy.

<sup>85a</sup> See pp. 687 ff.

<sup>86</sup> Vidkun Quisling, Minister-President of the puppet government set up by the Germans in Norway.

It is not believed that the French Navy would be turned over to the Germans under any circumstances. This does not preclude its possible use against the democracies in the event of aggression in North Africa, for example, or against the Axis under similar circumstances. However, this has no apparent relation to the maintenance of diplomatic relations.

If there should be a chance the Navy would be turned over to the Axis that chance would not be lessened by our breaking. The Germans in that event would have a clear field to endeavor to lure or push France into the German camp. The personal contacts between our Embassy staff and French Naval officers are of some value and might become increasingly so.

Our breaking relations would not lessen the [apparent omission] French people for us nor their readiness to cooperate with us. However, the initial reaction would be one of further despair and possible disappointment, although the incentive to collaborate with Germany would probably not be increased. Intelligent informed friendly Frenchmen fail to see any possible gain to us from breaking under existing conditions.

Our failure to break up to now has not lowered the affection of the French people for us or the hope they have in us.

With reference to explaining a break under present circumstances there were two occasions when the French people genuinely feared we would break. They were when Laval took office and after his speech of June 22. We failed to break on those occasions. To explain a break at this time on the basis of those two incidents would not be entirely convincing particularly since Laval on his part has been careful not to break over Madagascar and Martinique and has indicated he would not take the initiative in breaking.

A detailed though not too lengthy explanation would be desirable if convincing details could be presented.

Under existing conditions the most plausible explanation probably would be a statement that it has become evident that Laval is totally subservient to our enemies and has endeavored to grant them concessions of military value.

However, any explanation at this time would be less convincing than the explanation we should be in a position to make if we should delay breaking until after Laval makes a further concession to Germany (which it is believed he will be forced to do eventually in order to maintain himself in power) sufficiently important that our severance immediately thereafter would appear more timely and, therefore, more reasonable than at present. The large scale requisitioning of French workers for Germany would be such a concession.

It is unlikely that in the event of a break American diplomatic couriers would be permitted to go in transit through France unless

some means of pressure such as making it difficult for the French Government to communicate with its representatives in South America could successfully be used as a basis to establish a *modus vivendi*. There is at least a very good possibility we would be entirely cut off from mail communication with Bern.

HAYES

---

711.51/265

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 11, 1942.

The French Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at his request.

The Ambassador spent the better part of an hour in giving me a detailed account of his life, along lines which I had heard previously, as an indication of why he should not be regarded as anti-American and pro-cooperationist and why he should be recognized as having contributed greatly towards maintaining relations of friendship between the French and American peoples. In this connection he emphasized particularly the fact that he had never permitted his military, naval or air attachés to report to the French Government anything regarding the war effort of the United States that had not been published in some American newspaper or periodical. He stated that his whole record for twenty-five years had been one of devotion to the cause of friendship between France and the United States and that it was incredible to him that such an incident as the Musa incident<sup>87</sup> could now make people in this country believe that he could possibly be guilty of undertaking activities which were inimical to the welfare of the United States. He stressed also recent messages he had sent to Laval urging him to desist from any measures which might be regarded as persecution of the Jewish people in France.

At the end of this monologue I merely stated that I felt sure the Ambassador would realize that he was confronting what I believed was an insuperable obstacle. I said I did not see how he could expect the people of the United States for a moment to forget that the Ambassador was representing in Washington a Government in Vichy which was openly assisting Germany in detriment to the vital war interests of the United States and whose head, Monsieur Laval, had publicly proclaimed that he hoped for a German victory. I said

---

<sup>87</sup> Jean Leonard Musa, a naturalized citizen of Swiss birth, was arrested on July 14, 1942, and accused of giving the Vichy Government information and propaganda service without registering with the State Department as agent of a foreign power.



that under these conditions I thought it was only human and reasonable for the people of this country to be suspicious of the activities of the embassy in the United States which represented that Government and that, of course, the Ambassador, whatever his private beliefs might be, would necessarily have to figure as the chief figure in that embassy.

The Ambassador expostulated again at some length and endeavored to make out that Laval did not really mean what he had said nor did he actually intend to assist Germany against the United States. I said I regretted to have to state that there were no arguments which the Ambassador could offer me which would change my already formed opinion in that regard.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

740.0011 European War 1939/23904 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, August 31, 1942—8 p. m.  
[Received 11:18 p. m.]

1284. Our 1272, August 30, 1 p. m.<sup>88</sup> The person mentioned in our 1259, August 27, 2 p. m.<sup>88</sup> (who gave us the first information about the Dakar negotiation) confirms the fact that Laval accompanied by Rochat, Guérard<sup>89</sup> and Auphan<sup>90</sup> met "high German officials" at Nevers on August 27 to discuss "the question of the defense of French West Africa and merchant tonnage".

In strictest confidence our informant tells us that as the counterpart for permitting the French to reinforce Dakar in munitions and guns the Germans are insisting on the right to send "a military observer or German commission of some kind to Dakar to satisfy themselves as to the measures the French are taking". He went on to say that at the meeting the Germans offered to conclude a Franco-German defense agreement for the defense of French North and West Africa. While Laval was favorably disposed, Admiral Auphan who attended the meeting took the stand that such a pact exposed France to the danger of inviting an Anglo-Saxon action against Africa (Auphan is reported to have threatened to resign should such an agreement be made). Therefore, Laval, according to our informant, has for the moment put aside the idea of such a joint defensive pact but our contact "believes that he has agreed to the sending of some sort of a German observer or German Control Commission to Dakar".

---

<sup>88</sup> Not printed.

<sup>89</sup> Jacques Guérard, French Secretary General attached to the Chief of Government.

<sup>90</sup> Adm. Paul Auphan, French Secretary of State for Navy.

The second question discussed at the meeting was the question of merchant tonnage. In this connection the Germans demanded that the French turn over a total of 200,000 tons of shipping.

This was to consist of ships of countries of [at] war with Germany interned in French ports (i. e. Yugoslavian, Danish, Dutch, et cetera,) and the balance to be made up of French shipping particularly tankers. Our informant stated that there are only about 70,000 tons of shipping belonging to countries at war interned in French ports so that to meet the demand the French would have to turn over 130,000 tons. In this case also Admiral Auphan took a strong stand against the delivery of French tonnage and while our informant believes that Laval will agree to turn over the 70,000 tons of shipping which belongs to countries at war with Germany if the Germans are not too insistent, he thinks that—for the time being at least—French vessels may not be delivered to Germany.

Our informant also confirms the fact that "Boisson"<sup>91</sup> sent his resignation to the Marshal by the intermediary of a general but that the Marshal refused to accept it and requested Boisson to remain at Dakar".

TUCK

---

740.0011 European War 1939/23904 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Tuck)*

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1942—3 p. m.

540. Your 1284, August 31, 8 p. m. In whatever manner you think best please make it clear to the French authorities that we would take the strongest exception to the transfer of either French or foreign merchant tonnage to the Axis powers. Such action would obviously be of the utmost assistance to them and would constitute a concession far beyond France's obligations under the Armistice Convention.

In this connection you will recall the French note of August 21 (your telegram 1231, August 23, 9 p. m.<sup>92</sup>) in reply to our request that the French Government renew its assurances that no assistance would be granted to one of the belligerents and no policy of open aid to the Axis powers beyond the scope of the Armistice Convention would be adopted. We are fully conscious of the fact that the French reply avoided a clear-cut compliance with our request, but it did state that "the French Government has always respected its engagements and no change in the constitution of the new government can cause it to modify its attitude" and concluded that "the French Government has never questioned" the assurances previously given.

HULL

---

<sup>91</sup> Pierre Boisson, Vichy Governor General of French West Africa.

<sup>92</sup> *Post*, p. 262.

740.0011 European War 1939/24068 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, September 7, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received 8:43 p. m.]

1314. Laval sent for me this afternoon to acquaint me with the text of a Havas-OFI<sup>22a</sup> version of a London communiqué relating to the recent bombardment by elements of the American Air Force on the docks at Le Havre and the railway yards at Rouen. He said that as a result of these operations 80 persons had been killed and 112 wounded. He therefore wished to formulate an official protest against this attack by our Armed Forces.

I informed him that while I would acquaint my Government of his protest it was obvious from the text of the communiqué that these attacks had been made on military objectives and were therefore fully justified. Our Armed Forces I added had no desire to inflict additional suffering on the people of France—they had suffered enough already—but as long as the Germans remained in France these attacks on military objectives would certainly continue.

Laval informed me that he had held up the publication of this Havas-OFI despatch until he had made his protest to me. The text of the communiqué and the fact that his Government had protested would appear in tomorrow's press.

TUCK

740.0011 European War 1939/24086 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, September 7, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received September 8—9:25 a. m.]

1315. During the course of my conversation with Laval this afternoon I informed him of our attitude towards the transfer of either French or foreign merchant tonnage to Axis Powers as indicated in the first paragraph of the Department's telegram 540 of September 4, 3 p. m.

Laval said that for some time past the Germans had been endeavoring to lay their hands on foreign merchant tonnage in French ports. The total amount of such tonnage amounts approximately to 70,000 tons of which he said about half is now being used by the French Government for its own needs. Laval added that this foreign merchant tonnage was legally the property of shipowners in countries which are now controlled and occupied by the Germans (Holland, Belgium, Norway, and Denmark) and that these shipowners had

---

<sup>22a</sup> Office Français d'Information.

under pressure agreed to charter these vessels to the German Government. Under such circumstances there was little that the French Government could do or say.

While no final decision had as yet been reached he believed that the proportion of this foreign merchant tonnage lying idle in French ports and amounting approximately to 40,000 tons would be taken over by the Germans. These ships, however, would not be operated under the French flag or by French crews.

He gave me his formal assurance that there was no question of the transfer of *French* merchant tonnage to Axis Powers.

In a subsequent conversation with Rochat he confirmed this information.

TUCK

---

740.0011 European War 1939/24063 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Tuck)*

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1942—7 p. m.

553. Your 1314, Sept. 7, 7 p. m. Report of your conversation with M. Laval as given to the press here <sup>93</sup> was published in Radio Bulletin no. 212 of September 8.

You will make occasion to state that the American Government approves your statement as the official reply to M. Laval's protest.

HULL

---

740.0011 European War 1939/24281 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, September 16, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 3 : 20 p. m.]

1376. Our 1315, September 7. A reliable official informs us that the Germans are continuing to exert pressure on Vichy with a view to obtaining merchant tonnage immediately. Under the German plan the ships are to be delivered to an Italian port (probably Genoa) where they will be manned by an Italian crew and put in service as soon as possible transporting supplies to Libya.

While our informant still believes that the French if only for the present may be resisting the German demand for French tonnage he expressed the opinion that the neutral tonnage interned in French ports will soon be turned over.

As a result of the shortage of fuel oil the Germans are particularly interested in coal burning vessels and at the present time a large per-

---

<sup>93</sup> For text of press release, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 12, 1942, p. 750.

centage of the coal burning ships of countries occupied by Germany, which are in French hands, are being used in the traffic between North Africa and metropolitan France. The delivery of these vessels to the Germans will further cripple French economy.

Repeated to London and Algiers.

TUCK

---

740.0011 European War 1939/24086: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Tuck)*

WASHINGTON, September 19, 1942—8 p. m.

579. Your 1315, September 7, and 1376, September 16. You should see Laval at the earliest opportunity and present the following views of your Government.

As Laval has stated to you, owners of the foreign merchant tonnage in French ports have been pressed into an agreement to charter their vessels to the German Government. Since it cannot be regarded as having been entered into voluntarily, any such agreement amounts to a requisition of the ships. Moreover, those vessels flying the Dutch, Belgian and Norwegian flags have previously been requisitioned by their respective Governments. Consequently, the former owners of these vessels were not in a position to charter or otherwise dispose of the vessels and any such agreement entered into with the German Government remains without legal effect.

The taking of foreign owned merchant vessels from French ports under these circumstances would constitute the carrying out in neutral territory of belligerent activities begun outside such territory. Furthermore, there would appear to be no justification for allowing Germany to be substituted for France with respect to foreign owned tonnage which France has been operating. France has a prior right to these ships and by foregoing her right in favor of Germany she would be giving direct aid to an enemy of the United States.

This Government cannot accept M. Laval's attitude that there is "little that the French Government could do or say." It is of the opinion that the French Government should refuse to allow France to be used for the continuation of belligerent acts by Germany and refuse to forego her rights in favor of Germany to the operation of foreign owned tonnage in her ports. Any other course of action would be entirely incompatible with France's oft-declared position as a neutral state and could only be considered by this Government as an unneutral act and in direct violation of the principles she has enunciated to the United States.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/24427 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, September 22, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received 9:50 p. m.]

1404. I saw Laval yesterday afternoon and left with him a memorandum conveying the purport of the Department's 579, September 19, 8 p. m.

Laval stated that in our conversation, as reported in my 1315, September 7, 8 p. m., he had not stated that the ship owners in question had agreed to charter these vessels to the German Government *under pressure*. Had he been so informed it would have been easier to refute German demands. In fairness to Laval I believe that I was in error in attributing to him the statement that the chartering of these vessels had been made under pressure. The confusion may have been due to the fact that a reliable informant in the Foreign Office assured me confidentially at that time that this was the case.

Our Government's views have now been referred by Laval to Rochat who informed me this morning that he was taking the matter up with Admiral Auphan, Minister of Marine, and that we could expect an answer shortly.

TUCK

740.0011 European War 1939/24606 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, September 30, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received October 1—5:50 p. m.]

1451. Reference Department's 579, September 19, 8 p. m. and Embassy's 1404 September 22, 5 p. m. When I saw Laval this afternoon he handed me a note dated September 30 which he informed me constitutes his Government's reply to the *aide-mémoire* which I left with him on September 22 with regard to foreign ships held in French ports. The following is a close translation of the note in question.

"In reply to the *aide-mémoire* of September 22 from the Embassy of the United States of America with regard to foreign ships held in French ports after the Armistice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to state as follows:

1. The French Government has always considered that the temporary requisition (angary) of foreign ships held in its ports in no way affected the ownership of these vessels and has declared that it will return them in due course to their legitimate owners.

By allowing them to be chartered at this time at the request of their owners, with crews of their own choosing, under their national flags,

the French Government is only abiding by its original intention and the rules of private international maritime law.

It is not for the French Government to know or control the chartering contracts which may have been concluded between the owners and the German Government, any more than the relations established or the possible differences between these owners and their respective governments.

2. The French Government is astonished that the Government of the United States should be desirous of emphasizing the priority right which the French Government may have on foreign ships whose return is envisaged. If such a priority right exists, it is for France alone to estimate its value and to decide upon its relinquishment. It would be desirable that the principle which it is adopting in the premises should be applied in favor of legitimate French owners, both by the American and British Governments who hold between them, in addition to the vessels which sought refuge with confidence in England at the time of the Armistice, more than 350,000 tons of French shipping. Proposals with a view to an exchange have furthermore already been made in this respect to the Government of the United States.<sup>94</sup> No response has ever been received to them.

3. By allowing their owners to resume possession of Greek, Norwegian and Danish ships which it holds the French Government therefore acts within the fullness of its rights."

TUCK

---

740.0011 European War 1939/24606: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Tuck)*

WASHINGTON, October 10, 1942—9 p. m.

627. Your 1451, September 30, 8 p. m. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the French Government has always considered that the temporary requisition of foreign ships held in its ports in no way affected the ownership of the vessels; that it has declared that it will return them in due course to their legitimate owners; and that by allowing them to be chartered at this time by their owners the French Government is only abiding by its original intention. It makes the strange statement that it is "not for the French Government to know or control the chartering contracts which may have been concluded", thus indicating that it does not know that such contracts exist. But aside from this the French Government must know:

(1) That by turning the vessels over to the German Government it would not be turning them over to the original owners.

(2) That the vessels for the most part have been requisitioned by the governments of the former owners and that those governments, and not the former owners, have legal title to the vessels.

---

<sup>94</sup> Apparently reference is to French proposals to British Government through the intermediary of the United States relating to the exchange of British and Allied ships held in French ports for an equivalent amount of French merchant tonnage held in British ports.

(3) That the turning over to Germany of ships the title to which is in her enemies is an act wholly inconsistent with France's professed neutrality.

(4) That whatever may be said regarding the right of France to turn back to their owners foreign ships whether requisitioned by France or not, the bold facts cannot be disputed that France would thus be giving material and direct aid to the enemies of the United States and the other United Nations; and that this Government cannot regard such action as other than distinctly unneutral and detrimental to its interests and to the interests of its associates in the war.

(5) That the statement in the last paragraph of the note that "by allowing their owners to resume possession of . . . ships which it holds the French Government . . . acts within the fullness of its rights" is self-contradictory since the French Government knows that the ships are not to be restored to their owners but are to be delivered to a dictator whose heel of oppression is felt not only by the countries whose ships they are but by France herself; and that under no conceivable circumstance could the United States admit that France acts within the fullness of her rights in a situation wherein the French Government commits a highly unneutral act.

You may reply to the note of September 30 in the sense of the foregoing and say that your Government hopes and expects that the French Government will reconsider the whole matter in a more realistic manner.

WELLES

---

[On the night of November 7-8, American Armed Forces landed in French North Africa. For correspondence regarding this occupation, see pages 429 ff.]

---

124 51/239 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, November 8, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received November 9—2: 05 a. m.]

1651. Laval sent for me this evening at 7 o'clock. Rochat was present at our meeting. He desired to inform me that at a Cabinet meeting this afternoon it had been decided that the United States in carrying the war into French territory of North Africa had by that fact severed diplomatic relations with France.

He said that in conveying to me this momentous decision he wished at the same time to assure me of his sincere regret. The fact that our troops had landed on the soil of French North Africa could not be viewed in any other way but as an act of aggression and for this reason it was no longer possible to maintain diplomatic relations between our respective Governments.



As regards the technical details in connection with the eventual departure of the Embassy personnel, the staffs of our Consulates and certain other Americans including journalists he said that he wished to approach the problem in a spirit of sympathy and comprehension. He presumed that an exchange of diplomatic and consular personnel between the American and French Governments could be effected in the same manner as the exchange recently carried out between the German and Italian officials and our representatives in those two countries<sup>94a</sup> and that eventually our people in France could proceed through Spain to Lisbon.

He left all technical details in connection with our eventual departure in the hands of Rochat and instructed him to take up the matter with me. He said that we would be free to use our codes for the time being and it would be decided when this privilege would terminate.

Repeated to London.

TUCK

711.51/308

---

*Press Release Issued by the White House on November 9, 1942*

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

The representative of this Government at Vichy has reported that last evening M. Laval, Chief of the Government at Vichy, notified him that diplomatic relations between Vichy and this Government had been severed. I regret this action on the part of M. Laval.

He is evidently still speaking the language prescribed by Hitler.

The Government of the United States can do nothing about this severance of relations on the part of the Vichy Government.

Nevertheless, no act of Hitler, or of any of his puppets, can sever relations between the American people and the people of France. We have not broken relations with the French. We never will.

This Government will continue as heretofore to devote its thought, its sympathy and its aid to the rescue of the forty-five million people of France from enslavement and from a permanent loss of their liberties and free institutions.

---

124.51/247 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, November 12, 1942.

[Received November 12—9:20 a. m.]

5123. Swiss Foreign Office telephones following telegram received late yesterday from Swiss Legation Vichy.

“Arrangements for departure and provisional lodging of American diplomatic and consular personnel from Vichy have been settled to

---

<sup>94a</sup> See vol. I, pp. 285 ff.

Tuck's entire satisfaction. Entire group including journalists leaves today (November 11) by special train for Lourdes where they will provisionally remain."

HARRISON

701.5111/1033

---

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] November 18, 1942.

The Mexican Ambassador <sup>95</sup> called at his request and inquired about the plan this Government might have to exchange diplomatic and consular officers with the Vichy Government, and especially how the plan was being worked out. I replied that since the German occupation of unoccupied France we have treated the former Vichy Government as extinct. I then said that we are going through the rather tenuous process of communicating with the French Embassy here by the entirely unofficial and informal action of a liaison person, namely, the Swiss Minister, for the purpose of working out the exchange and its details. The Ambassador seemed very much interested in this phase. He said his Government had the same problem but that the Swedes were representing his Government.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

---

740 0011 European War 1939/26000a : Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Diplomatic Missions Abroad*

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1942—3 p. m.

It is appreciated that recent events in North Africa and the action of the former French Government at Vichy in severing diplomatic relations with the United States have created a problem for American diplomatic and consular representatives abroad from whom advice and guidance has been sought by former French officials desiring to disassociate themselves from the actions of their former Government. Some of these officials have completely severed their connections with Vichy. Some wish to offer their services to General Giraud or Admiral Darlan; others merely state that they are anxious to be of assistance in any way which may be suggested to them.

In the light of the rapidly changing situation the difficulty of laying down a clear-cut policy for the guidance of American representatives will be recognized. Nevertheless, certain general observations are possible and may prove helpful.

(1) As some offices have already been informed, this Government has taken the position that in view of the full occupation of metro-

---

<sup>95</sup> Francisco Castillo Nájera.

politan France by Germany, it cannot regard as a sovereign independent government any regime which Hitler may permit to function in that area.

(2) Careful attention is invited to the President's statement, quoted in full in Radio Bulletin No. 272 of November 17,<sup>98</sup> which clearly points out that the political arrangements arrived at in northern and western Africa are of a temporary nature and are based on military expediency. It should be noted in particular that the arrangements made with Admiral Darlan "apply without exception to the current local situation only".

(3) The requests of any individuals who wish to offer their services in a military capacity to elements cooperating with the U. S. may be forwarded to the Department which will see that they reach the appropriate authorities in North Africa when possible and will transmit any reply which may be received.

(4) The Department should be informed of any offers of service in a civilian capacity, but the inquirer should be advised of the military nature of the present arrangements and informed that non-military questions will of necessity have to wait until the situation becomes stabilized.

Repeat to consular officers under your jurisdiction.

HULL

---

REPRESENTATIONS TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WITH REGARD  
TO THE MOVEMENT OF THE BATTLESHIP "DUNKERQUE" FROM  
ORAN TO TOULON

851.33/1294 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, February 23, 1942—6 p. m.

125. Your 413, April 8, [1941,] 1 p. m.<sup>97</sup> It will be recalled that the French Government in its note of April 8, 1941,<sup>98</sup> informed the American Embassy that it agreed to delay the preparation of the *Dunkerque* for departure from North Africa "until the conclusion of an agreement on this subject". It was further promised that the vessel in question would not be moved without prior information.

This Government was not informed of the recent intention to transfer the *Dunkerque* from Oran to Toulon. The action taken would appear clearly to be a violation of this agreement. Please discuss this matter urgently with the Foreign Minister, and telegraph his reply.

WELLES

---

<sup>98</sup> See Department of State *Bulletin*, November 21, 1942, p. 935.

<sup>97</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, p. 146.

<sup>96</sup> Quoted in telegram No. 413.

851.83/285 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, February 27, 1942—noon.

[Received 11:03 p. m.]

309. I delivered orally to Admiral Darlan<sup>99</sup> your message (your 125, February 23, 6 p. m.) in regard to the movement of the *Dunkerque* to Toulon in violation of the understanding of April 8, 1941.

Darlan replied with a statement that the agreement of April 8 was conditional upon the United States shipping necessary food-stuffs to unoccupied France and to North Africa and making arrangements with the British Navy not to interfere with legitimate French commercial shipping. The United States having failed to carry out its part of the agreement, he considered that it was not binding upon France.

He continued with a statement that the original Armistice proposal was to send the French Navy to occupied ports where it would have been available for seizure by Germany, that he succeeded by his personal efforts in getting permission to send the Navy to unoccupied ports where it would be available for the defense of the Empire and that British appreciation of his assistance was shown at Mers-el-Kebir.<sup>1</sup>

He stated that the *Dunkerque* is so badly damaged that its repairs at Toulon will require approximately 2 years, that it will therefore be unavailable for the duration of the war and that progressive deterioration if it had remained at Oran would have permanently destroyed the vessel.

I discussed also with Admiral Darlan the matter of the delivery of petroleum products from Tunisia to Libya and its effect on our North African economic accord (your 127, February 23, 8 p. m.<sup>2</sup>).

He replied that he has previously informed us that these petroleum products were taken from the French supply stored in Africa which were replaced by shipments from continental France which were replaced in France by shipments from Germany.

He said that a refusal by him to comply with this proposal by the Axis would have created serious difficulties for France and that its accomplishment did not have any effect on the local civilian need for shipments from America. He also said that further demands for the shipment of petroleum from Tunis will not be made by the Axis.

---

<sup>99</sup> Adm. Jean François Darlan, Vice President of the French Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Navy, and Defense.

<sup>1</sup> On July 8, 1940, a British fleet fired on French warships at Mers-el-Kebir near Oran, causing severe damage and casualties. See message from the President of the French Council of Ministers to President Roosevelt, July 4, 1940, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. II, p. 469, and following documents.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 140.

He stated that recent shipments of foodstuffs to the Axis forces in Libya originated in Italy and did not in any way deplete the supply available to the inhabitants of France.

He said in closing that even if the President may be desirous of becoming displeased with the Government of France he has no desire to have any misunderstanding with the United States. I replied that I am certain the President has made every practical effort to be of assistance to France.

LEAHY

---

851.33/285 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, March 2, 1942—midnight.

143. Your 309, February 27, noon. Please transmit the following note to the Foreign Office.

"The Government of the United States has taken note of the statements of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France relating to the agreement of April 8 restricting the movement of the *Dunkerque*. The records of the Department of State fail to show that the agreement of April 8 was made conditional upon sending necessary foodstuffs from the United States to unoccupied France and to North Africa and arrangements with the British not to interfere with legitimate French commercial shipping. The note to which the Minister of Foreign Affairs referred stated that the agreement to give prior notification of any movement of the *Dunkerque* should facilitate the foregoing but in no sense was acceptance of the latter conditions ever made a condition to the agreement."

The Department would appreciate receiving confirmation from you that the *Dunkerque's* repairs will require approximately 2 years and that it will be unavailable for service for this period.

WELLES

---

851.33/305

*The French Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy in France*<sup>3</sup>

[Translation]

No. 2813 Pol

VICHY, March 2, 1942.

On the 26th of February, and referring to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' note, No. D. 543/8 of April 8, 1941, concerning the *Dunkerque*, the Embassy of the United States called to the attention of the

---

<sup>3</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department by the Chargé in France in his despatch No. 810, March 5; received March 20.

French Government the fact that the Federal Government had not been informed of the recent moving of this battleship and pointed out that for this reason the transfer of the *Dunkerque* seemed to be in direct violation of the assurance given in the aforementioned note.

In the memorandum handed to the Chief of State on April 4, 1941,<sup>4</sup> the Embassy of the United States indicated that if the French Government decided on an action such as the transfer to Toulon of the battleship *Dunkerque*, the Federal Government could no longer contemplate the continuation of indispensable relief shipments to unoccupied France, "not to mention the other acts of cooperation envisaged".

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied on April 8, 1941, that the French Government, wishing thus to indicate to the Federal Government its willingness to pursue loyally, for its part, the policy undertaken with a view to ensuring the supply of French Africa and the unoccupied zone, agreed to delay the departure of the ship until the conclusion of an agreement on this subject. At the same time it requested the Department of State to intervene with the British Government for the purpose of prevailing upon it to seize no further ships commissioned to ensure our legitimate commercial traffic between the French colonies, French Africa and the unoccupied zone.

The maintenance of the *Dunkerque* at Oran was thus contingent on the one hand on the supplying of French Africa and the unoccupied zone and, on the other, on the discontinuance of the seizures of French merchant ships by the British naval forces.

However, the supplying of North Africa, interrupted on various occasions, has functioned in reality only five months and a half since April 1941 and, because of this fact, involved a tonnage considerably inferior to the amounts agreed upon by common consent at Washington. At the present time the American Treasury refuses to grant the necessary licenses for new purchases. Moreover, the supplying of the unoccupied zone as a matter of fact has never been organized and only four ships have brought products sent by the American Red Cross. Finally, as concerns the treatment applied to the French merchant fleet by the British naval forces, it suffices to recall that the latter have seized a total of 26 ships, representing 122,318 tons, since April 8, 1941.

This simple reminder of events makes it possible to establish that since the conditions on which, in actual fact, the maintenance of the *Dunkerque* at Oran depended have not been realized, no complaint should be formulated against the French Government on the occasion of the moving of this battleship.

---

<sup>4</sup> See telegram No. 200, April 3, 1941, 2 p. m., to the Ambassador in France, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, p. 140.

851.33/395

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] March 5, 1942.

The French Ambassador<sup>5</sup> called to see me this morning at his request.

The Ambassador brought up the subject of the *Dunkерque*.

I told him that I had already made it clear to the French Government by referring to the French communication of April 8, 1941 that the French Government had in no sense by direction or indirect action at that time made the assurances given to the United States that this Government would be notified previously in the event that the *Dunkерque* was moved conditional upon the carrying out by this Government of the requests which the French Government [made?] of us at the same time. I said the language of the French communication of April 8, 1941 spoke for itself and that there was no record of any kind in the State Department which showed that at any time subsequently had the French Government indicated that these assurances concerning the *Dunkерque* had been conditional. I said the only basis for satisfactory relations between the Vichy Government and ourselves must necessarily be the carrying out of commitments given.

The Ambassador attempted to explain the failure of his Government to live up to its official assurances by saying that these assurances had been given when this country was not a belligerent and that he assumed that our entrance into the war made the French Government feel that the situation with regard to the assurances given had changed.

I stated that I obviously could not accept this contention for one moment. The Ambassador did not press the matter and very evidently felt that he had an indefensible case to argue.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

851.33/296 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, March 9, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received March 10—3:44 a. m.]

361. Department's 143, March 2, midnight. Following is the text in translation of note dated March 9 signed by Admiral Darlan relative to the transfer of the *Dunkерque* from Oran to Toulon:

<sup>5</sup> Gaston Henry-Haye.

"By letter dated the fifth of this month, Your Excellency kindly transmitted to me a new note\* from the Government of the United States regarding the recent transfer of the *Dunkerque*. In this note the Federal Government expressed the opinion that in its communication of April 8, 1941, the French Government had simply meant that its consent as regards advising the movements of the *Dunkerque* would facilitate agreement concerning the other questions mentioned 'but in no sense was acceptance of the latter conditions ever made a condition of the agreement'.

I have the honor to recall to Your Excellency that in so far as the sending of supplies to the unoccupied zone is concerned, it was the Government of the United States itself which, in its memorandum of April 4, 1941, took the initiative of linking this question to that of the *Dunkerque*. On the other hand, the French Government unequivocally associated, in its note of April 8, 1941, the maintaining of the *Dunkerque* at Oran with putting a stop to the seizures of French merchant vessels by the British naval forces. As its note of April 8 remained unanswered, the French Government had the right to consider that the position thus taken by it met with no objection on the part of the American Government. In any event, it was at that time, and not at present, that the American Government might have usefully put forward its observations."

LEAHY

---

851.33/296 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, March 11, 1942—4 p. m.

161. You may inform Admiral Darlan, in response to his note of March 9 relative to the transfer of the *Dunkerque* to Toulon, that:

There was no question of leaving the note of April 8 unanswered since without establishing conditions it gave the assurances in regard to the *Dunkerque* which had been requested. It was at the same time itself a reply to a communication from this Government. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is fully aware of the reasons why it has not been possible to comply with the French Government's request for sending supplies to the unoccupied zone. The United States Government had considered that the good faith of the French Government would have maintained the binding character of these assurances.

WELLES

---

\* See telegram No. 143, March 2, midnight, to the Ambassador in France, p. 206.



REPRESENTATIONS TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WITH REGARD  
TO THE FRENCH WARSHIPS AT ALEXANDRIA, EGYPT

851.80/147

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] March 5, 1942.

The French Ambassador<sup>7</sup> called to see me this morning at his request.

The Ambassador told me that he had received again formal assurances from his Government that under no conditions would the French fleet in any sense be made available to Germany. Admiral Darlan<sup>8</sup> had authorized him to make this statement public and he was considering doing so. He added that in a message which he had received from Admiral Darlan reiterating these assurances, the latter had stated that when Darlan had recently seen Admiral Raeder<sup>9</sup> in Paris, Admiral Raeder on behalf of the German Government had made no request concerning the French fleet.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

851.30/178 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, July 1, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received 11:30 p. m.]

956. Acting on my own initiative I called on Admiral Auphan,<sup>10</sup> Minister of Marine, this morning. I said what [*that?*] the news regarding Rommel's<sup>11</sup> advance in Egypt appeared to be increasingly serious and that the latest reports indicated that the spearhead of the Afrika Korps had reached El Daba which is very near to Alexandria. I said that were Rommel to succeed in occupying the Nile Valley and Alexandria the situation with regard to the French Naval squadron in that port would become an extremely delicate one. I asked him whether he would give me the benefit of his reaction to the situation.

Admiral Auphan replied that the position of the French Fleet in Alexandria was indeed so critical that it was giving his Government the most serious preoccupation. He had only one hope and that was

<sup>7</sup> Gaston Henry-Haye.

<sup>8</sup> Adm. Jean François Darlan, Vice President of the French Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Navy, and Defense.

<sup>9</sup> Adm. Erich H. A. Raeder, Commander in Chief of the German Navy.

<sup>10</sup> Adm. Paul Auphan became French Secretary of State for Navy, April 18, 1942.

<sup>11</sup> Marshal Erwin Rommel, Commander of the German Afrika Korps.

to save these vessels for the French Fleet and he greatly feared that the British might resort "to another Mers-el-Kebir".<sup>12</sup> I asked him whether thought had been given to the possibility of sending these vessels through the Suez Canal into the Indian Ocean. He replied that this would be impossible as it would convey to the Germans "an appearance of dissidence." He reminded me that there had been great difficulty with the Germans in the past in connection with the presence of these ships in Alexandria as the terms of the Armistice acquired [required] that French naval vessels should remain in French ports. Any attempt to send them to safety through the Red Sea would certainly be interpreted by the Germans as a move towards dissidence and would create serious difficulties for the French Government. I said that I hoped he would understand that my visit was of an unofficial character and that I had not come on behalf of my Government. I thought, however, that it would be of interest to the Department of State to be informed of his views. He said that before he could authorize me to acquaint my Government of his reaction he felt it necessary to mention the matter to Laval.<sup>13</sup> He would then let me know whether I was at liberty to inform my Government.

Laval sent for me this afternoon at 4 o'clock. I found Admiral Auphan and Rochat<sup>14</sup> present. Laval said that Admiral Auphan had acquainted him of my visit and that while he understood perfectly that I had not been sent by my Government he was nevertheless glad of the opportunity to acquaint me of his Government's official position in connection with the French Fleet at Alexandria. He then dictated to Rochat in my presence a statement of which the following is a careful translation:

"The French Government desires by all means possible to save the French squadron which is now at Alexandria.

If the British forces should have to evacuate Alexandria the French Government will not permit that our ships should be molested by these forces before their departure. In such an eventuality they would defend themselves by all the means at their disposal. Admiral Godefroy, commander of the squadron, has received order to refuse to follow the British in their retreat.

If a new attempt such as that of Mers-el-Kebir were to occur the consequences would be serious.

The French Government again reaffirms that all French warships can only remain French which is furthermore in conformity with

---

<sup>12</sup> On July 3, 1940, a British fleet fired on French warships at Mers-el-Kebir near Oran, causing severe damage and casualties. See message from the President of the French Council of Ministers to President Roosevelt, July 4, 1940, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. II, p. 469, and following documents.

<sup>13</sup> Pierre Laval, French Chief of Government.

<sup>14</sup> Charles Antoine Rochat, Secretary General of the French Foreign Office.

the Armistice conventions. In present circumstances the French Government would like to see (*envisagerait volontiers*) its ships in a position to proceed freely to the nearest French port.["]]

Laval then told me the Germans had brought up this matter some time ago and that precisely the same answer had been given to them. He said that he preferred that no publicity should be given to my visit or to the above statement. He nevertheless welcomed the opportunity to acquaint the United States [with his?] Government's stand with regard to the fleet in Alexandria and he hoped that it might be possible in the near future to receive an expression of our reaction.

TUCK

---

851.30/177: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 1, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received July 1—7 p. m.]

3667. With the fate of Alexandria hanging in the balance the question of what to do with the eight Vichy warships now at that port has naturally come to the fore. As the Department is aware, under a gentleman's agreement of July 1940 between Admiral Cunningham<sup>15</sup> and Admiral Godefroy<sup>16</sup> the ships were rendered unfit for combat through removal of breech blocks, et cetera, and the British undertook not to utilize them in the war. Now Admiral Godefroy is suggesting that it would be well to let them sail either to Toulon or Bizerte on the grounds that they would thus become "neutral" and would not be used against the United Nations. The British naturally feel, we are told by the Foreign Office, that Admiral Godefroy is somewhat optimistic in this assumption and that his proposal is clearly unsatisfactory. They are contemplating two other alternatives: (1) To remove the ships through the Suez Canal to Aden or other British territory (we understand they are able to proceed slowly under their own power) or (2) to request Godefroy to scuttle them. In case Godefroy refuses the latter suggestion, the British might be compelled to undertake the scuttling of the vessels themselves.

WINANT

---

<sup>15</sup> Adm. Andrew Brown Cunningham, Commander in Chief of the British Fleet in the Mediterranean.

<sup>16</sup> Adm. René-Émile Godefroy, Commander of the squadron of French ships demilitarized at Alexandria.

851.80/180 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Truck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, July 2, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received July 3—2:37 a. m.]

962. Laval sent for me this afternoon at 4 o'clock. On my arrival I found Admiral Auphan, Minister of Marine, and Rochat present. Laval presented me with what he described as an *aide-mémoire*, the contents of which he requested me to bring urgently to the attention of my Government. The following is a careful translation of this communication:

"The evolution of the military situation created by the rapid advance of Rommel's army had naturally drawn the attention of the French Government to the fate of our squadron which lies at Alexandria.

On June 26 Admiral Auphan addressed to Admiral Godefroy a telegram of instructions. In case the British were to evacuate Alexandria the latter (Godefroy) should attempt to reach a French port. If that were to prove impossible, he was to remain on at Alexandria under the French flag and refuse to follow the British in their retreat. He was reminded that our ships were not to fall into foreign hands.

This telegram of instructions was on the following day—June 27—communicated to the Armistice Commissions at Wiesbaden and at Turin.

The French Government received today July 2 the two following communications from Wiesbaden and from Turin:

(1) 'The Supreme German Command recognizes that the instructions given to the French Maritime forces at Alexandria are in conformity with the Armistice Convention.<sup>17</sup> The Supreme German Command gives at the same time the assurance that it intends to act in conformity with article 8 of this Convention with regard to all French naval vessels which might be found in Alexandria as a result of having explicitly carried out the instructions given by the French Admiralty.

(2) The Italian Government has decided to adhere purely and simply to the Armistice Convention<sup>17a</sup> and advances no pretension as regards the French Naval vessels no matter under what conditions they may be found in Alexandria.'

The Chief of the French Government considers it his duty to call these facts to the attention of the Federal Government. He requests [it?] to take cognizance of this communication which is a sequel to the communication which the Federal Government received yesterday from the French Government.

Any act of violence on the part of the British in view of these above indications might result in consequences the extreme gravity of which could not be overlooked by the Federal Government."

In handing me this communication Laval said that he considered it his duty to keep our Government informed frankly and openly

<sup>17</sup> For text, see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. ix (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 671.

<sup>17a</sup> For text in English translation, see *New York Times*, June 26, 1940, p. 5, or *Documents on American Foreign Relations, July 1939-June 1940*, vol. ii, p. 436.

as regards the stand which the French Government intended to adopt in connection with its naval squadron at Alexandria. He assumed that the Department of State would communicate this information to the British Government.

TUCK

---

851.80/178 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Tuck)*

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1942—1 a. m.

411. Your 956, July 1, 7 p. m. You should immediately transmit the following message to Laval:

The President is, of course, deeply concerned that the French men of war now at Alexandria should under no circumstances fall into the hands of the German or Italian military or naval forces. The President is equally deeply interested in the restoration of these ships to France at the end of the war. He has, therefore, so informed the British Government and now makes the following suggestion and offer to the French Government.

The President proposes that the French ships at Alexandria be placed in the protective custody of the United States which is to include passage of the French ships through the Suez Canal and thence to a secure and remote port of asylum for the duration of the war in a port of the United States or other American republic to be mutually agreed upon with the guarantee of the return of the French ships to France at the end of the war.

The President feels that this proposal is in the interest of France. However, if this offer on behalf of the United States is not accepted by the French Government, the British, knowing of this offer, would of course be properly and wholly justified in ordering the French ships through the Suez Canal, and if the order were not obeyed would be wholly justified in destroying the ships to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy.

The President trusts that this reasonable proposal can be accepted for the honor of France.

HULL

---

851.80/181 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, July 3, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received July 3—5 p. m.]

967. I saw Laval this afternoon at 4 o'clock and delivered the message contained in your 411 July 3, 1 a. m. Rochat was present and Admiral Auphan was hurriedly summoned.

Laval's immediate reaction was one of extreme annoyance. He characterized our suggestion as "injurious and insulting" and remarked that the President must have a very curious conception of French honor. He then asked me whether this message constituted a reply to his two communications to me of July 1 (Embassy's 956 July 1, 7 p. m.) and of July 2 (Embassy's 962 July 2, 7 p. m.). I replied that the message from my Government made a reference only to the communication which he had made to me on July 1. He requested me to forward a reply to my Government of which the following is a close translation.

"Mr. Tuck delivered today at 4 o'clock to the Chief of the Government an American note. This note is drawn up in terms so unacceptable that the French Government is forced to believe that it does not constitute an answer to the *aide-mémoire* which was delivered yesterday—July 2—to the American Chargé d'Affaires.

Before delivery [of] a suitable reply to this note the Chief of the French Government has asked Mr. Tuck to question his Government on this point."

Laval considered that our suggestion and offer to the French Government was beyond all reason. Why he asked was our Government averse to the French Fleet in Alexandria proceeding to a French port? France had originally with difficulty obtained German agreement to retain these ships in Alexandria and we were now suggesting that the French Government should take action contrary to the Armistice Convention, while at the same time we continuously insisted upon the strict observance of the terms of that Convention.

I said that if I had understood him and Admiral Auphan correctly, their main preoccupation was to preserve these ships for the French Navy and that the proposal made by our President did in effect guarantee their return to France at the end of the war. Laval stated that the French Government could under no circumstance accept our suggestion and that he hoped that when our Government had had time to review the message which he had delivered to me on July 2 and which embodied the communications received from the Armistice Commissions at Wiesbaden and Turin, it would be prepared to reconsider its position. It was for this reason that he would limit himself for the time being to the reply above quoted.

TUCK

---

851.80/182 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, July 4, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 12:30 p. m.]

971. My 967 July 3, 6 p. m. I happened to meet Rochat late yesterday evening. He informed me that according to a telegram received

yesterday afternoon from Admiral Godefroy at Alexandria, the British had made no demands of any kind in connection with the French squadron there. Rochat wished me to know this chiefly because of unsubstantiated reports which were afloat in Vichy yesterday to the effect that the British intended to scuttle the French Fleet in Alexandria.

Rochat added that after our conversation with Laval yesterday afternoon Admiral Auphan had expressed to him his conviction that if the French Government were to comply with the suggestion and offer of the United States Government he was certain that the German Government would demand the cession of an equal amount of tonnage of French war vessels now lying in French ports.

TUCK

---

851.80/181 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Tuck)*

WASHINGTON, July 4, 1942—3 p. m.

413. Your 967, July 3, 6 p. m. It is true that our 411, July 3, 1 a. m. was sent before receiving your 962 of July 2, 7 p. m.

Department's 411 of July 3, 1 a. m. transmits the President's proposal as he wishes it to be laid before the French Government.

HULL

---

851.80/185 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, July 7, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received 8:48 p. m.]

986. Laval sent for me this afternoon at 5 o'clock and in the presence of Rochat delivered to me a note which he requested that I transmit to my Government.

The following is a close translation of this communication :

"The French Government had been apprised of the American *aide-mémoire* of July 3 concerning the French naval squadron at Alexandria.

The proposals submitted were so unacceptable that it was justified in thinking as was stated to the Chargé d'Affaires of the United States on July 3 that the Federal Government must have drawn up this document before learning of the decision taken by the German and Italian Governments to abide by the provisions of the Armistice Convention and not to put forward any claim with regard to the

French Fleet at Alexandria. This decision has been made known to the Federal Government of [on] July 2.

In an oral declaration the Chargé d'Affaires of the United States informed the French Government on July 5 that the Federal Government maintained its note in the terms in which it had been presented.

After this confirmation the French Government is in a position to appreciate the full extent of the claims of the Federal Government. It rejects them formally as being contrary to the honor and interests of France. The Federal Government is aware that the French Government has the legitimate preoccupation not only of maintaining the French flag on the vessels of its squadron at Alexandria, all vessels of its navy, but also of insuring itself its safety. The Federal Government also knows that contrary to the allegations so often spread in America the French Government has never delivered nor attempted to deliver any one of its warships to foreign powers.

The Federal Government which was informed of the decision taken by the German and Italian Governments in application of the Armistice Conventions cannot contend that our ships at Alexandria are in danger of 'falling into the hands of German or Italian military or naval forces'. The correction [*correctness?*] as well as the precision of the German and Italian replies should not permit the Federal Government to adopt such an attitude which is in your estimate vis-à-vis the French Government.

If the Federal Government is as it claims desirous of safeguarding the interests of the French Navy it would not have refused but on the contrary would have facilitated the departure of our vessels from Alexandria towards a French port. The Federal Government in asking that our warships be directed toward a 'secure' American port of asylum advances a claim that is clearly incompatible with French obligations under the Armistice Conventions.

The Federal Government on the other hand in formulating such a demand casts a slur on the dignity of France. The French Government cannot allow its word to be doubted at a time when it renews its resolution to maintain all its war vessels under the French flag. The Federal Government fails to appreciate the traditions of honor of the French Navy which alone intends to ensure the safeguard of the vessels which the nation has entrusted to its care.

The French Government takes note that the American Government declares as justifiable the destruction of French vessels at Alexandria, [if?] we refuse to obey the orders of the British forces.

The French Government wishes once again to stress the extreme gravity of the consequence which might result from any act of violence occurring at Alexandria against the French naval forces.

The French Government notes with regret that President Roosevelt does not hesitate to associate himself in advance with the heavy responsibilities of those who in contempt of military honor contemplate a criminal action against a disarmed squadron.

Another outrage, following that of Mers-el-Kebir, should on the contrary weigh heavily on the conscience of the American people.

France has a right to be respected."



For the sake of accuracy I wish to point out that when I delivered the gist of the Department's 413 of July 4, 3 p. m., to Lagarde (Embassy's 973, July 5, 4 p. m.<sup>18</sup>) I gave him an exact verbal translation of its second paragraph. I did not say that "the Federal Government maintained its note in the terms in which it had been presented".

TUCK

---

851.80/188a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Tuck)*

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1942—midnight.

430. You should transmit to Laval as soon as possible a message in the following sense:

The President proposes that if the French Government agrees that the French naval units now at Alexandria be withdrawn by way of the Suez Canal, the Government of the United States, by agreement with the British Government, will grant safe passage to Martinique where they will not be used by the United States or British Governments but where they will be immobilized on the same basis as the French warships now at Fort de France,<sup>19</sup> for the duration of the war, with the assurance that at the termination of the war they will be restored to the French people.

The United States and British Governments agree to periodical relief and repatriation of the crews after they have reached Martinique on the same basis which would have obtained had the ships remained at Alexandria.

The President proposes that this arrangement be entered into irrespective of whether the fall of Alexandria becomes imminent, since these ships would in any case be in danger of enemy attack there.

Inasmuch as these ships have, from the beginning, occupied a special and are now in a precarious situation, they are not within the operative provisions of the armistice agreement and hence the proposed arrangement could not be said to be violative of that agreement.

HULL

---

<sup>18</sup> Not printed.

<sup>19</sup> For correspondence regarding the French warships at Martinique, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. II, pp. 505 ff.

851.80/190 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, July 13, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received 9:40 p. m.]

1024. Embassy's 1010, July 11, 1 p. m.<sup>20</sup> Laval sent for me this afternoon and delivered me a note of which the following is a careful translation:

"1. The new proposal formulated by President Roosevelt in his note of July 11<sup>21</sup> cannot be accepted. It is incompatible with the obligations of the Armistice Conventions which stipulate that 'all warships outside of French territorial waters should be recalled to France' (Franco-German Convention, article 8) 'to metropolitan ports' (Franco-Italian Convention, article 12). If the presence of the French squadron at Alexandria at the time of the Armistice did not permit the immediate execution of this provision the obligation nevertheless exists for France to recall to metropolitan ports all ships which are not in French territorial waters.

The German Government and the Italian Government in allowing the return to a French port of our ships in Alexandria and in not putting forward any claim to these vessels affirm their respect for the Armistice Conventions whereas the French Government by accepting the American proposal would violate these same Conventions.

2. The new proposal formulated by President Roosevelt must like the one which preceded it be rejected as being contrary to the honor and interests of France.

Indeed President Roosevelt cannot without offending the French nation doubt the will of the French Government to maintain the French flag on all warships. The French Government alone has the right to insure by its own means and in particular by the choice of their station (*base de stationnement*) the safety of these ships.

3. The French Government in renewing its request to permit the departure of these vessels from Alexandria to the nearest French port affirms a right which cannot validly be contested by President Roosevelt. By refusing us this right and by exposing these disarmed warships to an attack by British force President Roosevelt would assume a responsibility the extreme gravity of which the French Government wishes once again to stress."

In a conversation with a qualified political observer who maintains a close contact with the Foreign Office, it was intimated to us that the French Government might be disposed to view with favor the suggestion that these ships be permitted to proceed from Alexandria to Casablanca and would not be unwilling to approach the German and Italian Governments in this sense.

TUCK

<sup>20</sup> Not printed.<sup>21</sup> See *supra*.

851.80/192a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)*

WASHINGTON, July 14, 1942—6 p. m.

735. We wish to draw your special attention to today's Radio Bulletin which contains the full statement of our proposals to the French Government regarding the disposition of the French ships at Alexandria.<sup>22</sup> Please bring this to the immediate attention of the appropriate British propaganda officials with the request that they use every available means to bring this exchange to the attention of the crews of the French ships. As you know our radio stations, which will put on special programs, reach that area hardly if at all. The propagandizing effort must accordingly be made from Cairo.

WELLES

851.80/191 : Telegram

*The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, July 15, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received July 15—2:32 p. m.]

1241. Personal for the Acting Secretary. Your 735, July 14, 6 p. m. I have brought the complete statement in question to the attention of the British propaganda officials through the Minister of State who I learn has been kept advised of the progress of these negotiations and I have stated to him the exact terms of your request. A certain reserve was expressed as to the advisability of communicating to the personnel of the Fleet that portion of the statement relating to the right of the British in the event of certain eventualities to order the French vessels to pass through the Canal and in case of refusal to destroy them rather than allow them to pass to the enemy. I made it clear that my instructions related to the "full statement" and that my request was based thereon and I pointed out that the statement as it appeared in the Radio Bulletin would doubtless receive full publicity elsewhere irrespective of the form in which it was communicated to the personnel of the French Fleet by the British propaganda officials. I shall inform you of the final action taken by these officials in this regard.

KIRK

---

<sup>22</sup> See Department of State *Bulletin*, July 18, 1942, p. 631.

740.0011 European War 1939/26147: Telegram

*The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, November 30, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received December 1—12:10 p. m.]

2110. My 2071, November 24, 10 a.m.<sup>23</sup> According British Naval Liaison Head in Cairo it seemed possible French Fleet in Alexandria might come over following Toulon affair<sup>24</sup> but when Godefroy consulted his captains he found opinions divided and nothing materialized. There was also idea of making for Dakar but that abandoned owing rallying West Africa to Darlan and letter recently addressed to Godefroy by Darlan asking fleet to join him said to have made Godefroy even more obdurate since he professes to regard Darlan "arch traitor".

Same source states situation now is that Godefroy still pondering matter with little prospect of doing anything, but British increasingly dissatisfied with his vacillation and considering forcing issue, possibly by threatening abrogate Cunningham-Godefroy agreement and discontinue financing.

KIRK

740.0011 European War 1939/26614a: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)*

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1942—5 p. m.

1604. Please inform Admiral Godefroy orally by any available means that the President will be very pleased to have his squadron come to America for repairs and refit to join with us against the common enemy under same arrangements as have been made with the other patriotic Frenchmen in Africa who are now fighting against the German and Italian aggressors.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/26615: Telegram

*The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, December 18, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received December 19—7 p. m.]

2218. Department's 1604, December 14, 5 p. m. Naval Attaché of Legation<sup>25</sup> called on Admiral Godefroy in Alexandria at my re-

<sup>23</sup> Not printed.

<sup>24</sup> French commanders scuttled the French Fleet at Toulon on November 27, 1942, to prevent seizure by the Germans.

<sup>25</sup> Comdr. Thomas V. Cooper.

quest yesterday to transmit message. Admiral received Attaché on shore and following oral delivery of President's message handed Attaché copy of speech delivered by Admiral to his officers on December 7, which he said fully expressed his sentiments and constituted reply to President's communicated [*communication*].

Full text of message being sent by airmail tomorrow but following summary main points:

Natural that after 30 months of inaction, recent events should have caused desire to act but matter not one for personal decision, but for collective action by whole squadron. Necessary therefore to analyze situation objectively and in so doing to take cognizance of following considerations:

1. From standpoint of principle, necessary to understand that French people can only constitute a nation by obeying a government, whether such government pleases them or not and this obligation more stringent for persons in military service. France has such a legitimate government, the consent of which is necessary in respect of disposition of fleet. It could possibly be maintained that Marshal Pétain is acting under duress against his will but such difficult to prove and even if admitted it would not give reason for rash and ill-timed action by fleet in Alexandria which might only serve to burden France with new troubles.

2. From standpoint of logic, what has in fact happened to change situation in respect of previous and continued refusal to yield to British pressure? Simply that the Americans have landed with British aid in North Africa contrary to international and all law. It would be absurd to argue that such an action should motivate the desire to rush to the aid of the aggressors and it would be overly facile reasoning to argue after the fact that the Armistice terms have been broken by the Germans and that Frenchmen therefore obligated to resume struggle even if claim were admitted that it is only final liberation of France that counts. It should be observed that occupation of North Africa, even if completed, will only serve to improve Anglo-American communications with the Orient without relieving France or constituting a definite step toward the defeat of Germany.

3. From standpoint of sentiment is it possible to accept cooperation with the British with memories still fresh of insults heaped on France by head of British Government, of tragedy of Mers-el-Kebir and vexatious and humiliating treatment suffered locally by fleet in Alexandria at hands of British during past 30 months, due allowance being made for efforts at courtesy by certain British officers? This is not a question of grudge but necessary that British should understand wrongs inflicted and the effects thereof. Furthermore as regards the Americans it would be impossible to accept incorporation in the American naval forces without feeling misgivings because of fact that it was owing to the occupation of North Africa at American instigation that France was subjected to a new catastrophe. What honorable avenue of action then remained? Not surely joining the de Gaullists <sup>26</sup> who are directly or indirectly responsible for troubles

---

<sup>26</sup> Supporters of Gen. Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French Forces and President of the National Committee of the Free French at London.

heaped on France since Armistice and as for rallying to French in North Africa such would merely constitute recognition of another dissident element by whose acts motive was given for occupation of Toulon and disbanding of French Army. Furthermore how could a person be recognized as legitimate chief there who has been destituted of civil authority, his military command and even his nationality and whom Americans treat openly and cynically as a political instrument?

4. From practical standpoint would participation of squadron constitute an effective contribution? In long war which is in prospect the intervention or non-intervention of squadron would have no effect on final result and would only give Germans another reason for crushing unhappy France. Surely it is not by killing France that one can begin to save it. Rallying of fleet would only be symbolic and propaganda value for the British and Americans whose guilty consciences it would serve to absolve. Furthermore Americans and British have not kept promises in past as evidenced by American pledge to support French institutions and sovereignty in North Africa, only to be followed by President Roosevelt's "ordering["] the release of certain detained persons, the abrogation of laws affecting Jews and further proof afforded by issuance of occupation currency and fixing artificial exchange rate to permit invaders to live on country. If North Africa is being treated thus as conquered country would not same be fate of France? Necessary to beware of those merely desiring to profit by France and make light of her. If struggle in fact is to be taken up again, necessary to do so in certainty that such action is in real interests of France and not merely "pulling chestnuts out of fire" for others. At time when whole world is acting criminally against France necessary to avoid becoming accomplices "of so many executioners, hypocrites and traitors".

In supplementation of foregoing, Admiral criticized British press for having 2 months ago published stories regarding Darlan which subsequently proved false and with direct reference to President's message he emphasized that, unlike the Army, naval vessels continue property of the State which he could not honorably appropriate and that even though he desired to do so the majority of his officers and men would oppose. Should "poor old Marshal Pétain" die or be forced from office and a new government be put in by Germans then he would be free to take the fleet over but as matters stood he was bound by duty and oath to Pétain, contrary to his own personal desires, to maintain the fleet in its present status.

In ensuing conversation and in reply to inquiries Naval Attaché, Admiral expressed view that it would be desirable to set up coalition government in North Africa under recognized leader of French State (not necessarily Darlan) but such would take some time and he would not use fleet in support of formation of such a government at least for the time being. Admiral also acquiesced in suggestion of Attaché regarding desirability of cooperation of all Frenchmen in North

Africa against common foe and lessening breach between followers of Darlan and de Gaulle.

Regarding difference of tone between Admiral's speech to officers and remarks to Attaché, latter suggest possible that speech designed to prevent defection [*defection?*] of crews and that his informal remarks to Attaché probably more truly reflected his personal feelings. Second reason for difference might also be effect of recent conversations with Admirals of north [*North Africa?*] as reported in my 2214, December 17, 6 p. m.<sup>27</sup>

Admiral told Attaché that text of speech had not been given British and he requested that if [*it*] not be communicated to them. Should it eventually reach them he would regret the fact but would be prepared to admit if necessary that he had made it available as expression of his sentiments.

Naval Attaché asks Navy Department be informed.

KIRK

---

[In May 1943, Admiral Godefroy joined his squadron to the naval forces of France in North Africa.]

---

#### INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN FRENCH NORTH AFRICA <sup>28</sup>

##### I. Continued Suspension of Economic Aid Program Except for Two Shipments; Negotiations and Policies Regarding Possible United States Assistance to Resistance Movement; Resumption of Economic Aid Program (January-April)

740.0011 European War 1939/18100: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, January 1, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received 10:15 p. m.]

2. From Murphy.<sup>29</sup> A reliable official just returned from Paris and Vichy tells me that the French Government has agreed to the reopening of the Japanese Consulate at Casablanca. An Attaché of the Japanese Embassy in Vichy is now in Casablanca for this purpose.

The officials add that in addition to Casablanca the Japanese had requested permission to open a Consulate at Dakar. When this permission was refused the Japanese protested that the United States is permitted to maintain a Consulate at that place. According to the official the French Government sustained its refusal.

---

<sup>27</sup> Not printed.

<sup>28</sup> Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, pp. 208-503.

<sup>29</sup> Robert D. Murphy, Counselor of Embassy in France on special assignment in French North Africa to control and supervise the economic aid program.

My informant said that there is great apprehension on the part of members of the French Government regarding Axis intentions in the western Mediterranean. He said that there is evidence of the presence of German effectives in southern Spain. He shares the opinion of his friends in Vichy that an Axis move directed against Gibraltar and Morocco is a distinct possibility during the next few weeks. He declared that most members of the French Government discount the notion of an Axis move against Turkey on the theory that action in the eastern Mediterranean is too vast and complicated. According to him Vichy believes that the German Government faced with the necessity of presenting its people with a quick victory to improve morale will choose action in the western Mediterranean possibly accompanied by a move over Sicily and Tunisia.

This official is not alone in the opinion that some form of provisional government must be set up in French North Africa (see my 602, November 25, 7 p. m.<sup>30</sup>). He believes, as do others, that at the appropriate moment Marshal Pétain<sup>31</sup> must be faced with a demand from the Allies that he permit the establishment in French Africa of an autonomous government or incur the risk of Allied action to cut off metropolitan France from the Empire. According to my contact the choice of the person to head such an organization should of course be left to the Marshal to whom it will be obvious that only General Weygand<sup>32</sup> would be qualified.

My informant said that there is no doubt that the Marshal fears incurring American displeasure but that he will vacillate under the influence of his associates until confronted with a substantial show of force. The official states that the spirit of resistance in France is growing as a result of the heartening news from Russia and elsewhere but that the danger continues that the small clique of French collaborationists who are well known to the Department will not only not offer resistance to German plans but will cooperate fully in their operation.

This official and another reliable source scoff at Admiral Darlan's<sup>33</sup> statement (see Vichy's 1630, December 30, 3 [5] p. m.<sup>34</sup>) that he agreed to deliver gasoline to Libya from Algeria only because the Germans threatened to occupy Morocco.

They place no credence in the statement but suggest that Darlan is sufficiently [apparent omission] to believe that if he prevails on the Germans to replace the gasoline taken from Algerian stocks we

---

<sup>30</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, p. 479.

<sup>31</sup> Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, French Chief of State.

<sup>32</sup> Gen. Maxime Weygand, former Delegate General of the French Government in North Africa.

<sup>33</sup> Adm. Jean François Darlan, Vice President of the French Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Navy, and Defense.

<sup>34</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, p. 502.



should be satisfied that no violation of the North African Agreement<sup>35</sup> has occurred.

The official in question was in touch in Paris with members of the French delegation to the Armistice Commission who informed him that in connection with the North African supply program that Hemmen, German Chairman of the Economic Committee, had informally agreed to the operation of the four French ships, two of which are now in Casablanca and two in New York. This followed Boisanger's<sup>36</sup> vigorous presentation of the North African situation for the economic collapse of which Germany would be responsible, he said, if authorization for this shipping movement was refused. No official confirmation has as yet been received at Algiers from the French Government.

Repeated to Vichy. Copy to Tangier by courier. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.0011 European War 1939/18266: Telegram

*The Consul at Tunis (Doolittle) to the Secretary of State*

TUNIS, January 7, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received January 8—9:13 a. m.]

4. For Secretary and Under Secretary. I have again been approached by Arab leaders who profess anxiety over present situation. This group which controls local Arab opinion has been working lately to create pro-American and pro-British sentiment in which it has noticeably succeeded.

Frankly, they want to get rid of French and set up autonomous Arab state under Anglo-Saxon protection. Their organization is allied with similar movements in Morocco and Algeria and has connections with other Arab states in Near East.

In case their services are of interest they are ready to intensify pro-Ally campaign and under guidance of outside technicians prepare for active work and if given arms even military resistance in Tunisia against Axis move or assist an Allied occupation. Arrangements can be made for landing agents.

This would naturally be in exchange for joint guarantee of future independence on lines of Egypt. No de Gaullist<sup>37</sup> generals are wanted.

---

<sup>35</sup> Murphy-Weygand Agreement initialed at Algiers, February 26, 1941; for text, see telegram No. 249, February 28, 1941, 10 a. m., from the Ambassador in France, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, p. 226. For confirmation of the agreement, see note from the French Ambassador, June 3, 1941, *ibid.*, p. 239.

<sup>36</sup> Yves Bréart de Boisanger, Governor of the Bank of France and President of the Control Commission for Banks.

<sup>37</sup> Gen. Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French Forces and President of the National Committee of the Free French at London.

French policy here is a complete mystery. While sentiments expressed privately are pro-Ally every act is positively pro-Axis and I am regretfully coming to conclusion that no help may be expected from French.

Although adoption of Arab cause here would mean break with France the sympathy it would kindle in the Islamic world would be of enormous benefits.

Even if the French should again take up arms which seems doubtful the Arabs would be reluctant to see French rule thus perpetuated and would follow only if assured of home rule after war. (See my dispatches on this.)

DOOLITTLE

---

740.0011 European War 1939/19265

*The Counselor of Embassy in France (Murphy) to the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn)*

ALGIERS, January 9, 1941 [1942].

[Received February 2.]

DEAR JIMMIE: I have avoided writing you personal letters because I didn't want to be a nuisance, realizing the pressure you are under.

There is one point, however, on which I do need your advice, and I should be grateful for a telegram if you find it practicable to send me one:

Ever since the dismissal of General Weygand there has been effervescence on the part of individuals and groups in French North Africa who are eager to undertake action to resume hostilities against Germany and Italy. Their ideas usually contemplate the temporary separation of French North Africa from metropolitan France, the setting up of a provisional form of government here and, principally, military and economic aid from the United States. Thus, for example, there is a group of officers in Morocco who feel this way, another group in the Oran district of Algeria, still a third group in the Chantiers de Jeunesse (comprising about 20,000 trained young men) and a further element headed by a prominent French business man<sup>38</sup> who is the subject of my confidential letter to the Undersecretary dated December 7, 1941,<sup>39</sup> a copy of which I enclose for your information. The latter offers interesting possibilities, and is submitting further data relating to the character and volume of military aid which would be necessary.

---

<sup>38</sup> J. Lemaigre-Dubreuil.

<sup>39</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, p. 494.

What I think I should know is whether you feel that encouragement should be given to such ideas. For example, the last mentioned group insist that they have from us some indication whether our Government would approve such a plan of independent French North African action, in principle. They feel that if they have our agreement *in principle* it will be comparatively easy to build up a powerful organization throughout French Africa, including French West Africa. They say that little progress can be made without such an agreement.

I might add that even during General Weygand's regime I received a number of similar suggestions which I was careful to ignore on the theory that our traditional friendly policy toward France was working for the support in French Africa of a friendly French administration, and that our role was to encourage the latter in resisting the Axis.

Now, frankly, I am at sea, but I have the feeling that under the changed conditions we should not ignore and discourage responsible elements who are actuated by a desire to resume hostilities. That desire, of course, always revolves around the question of American military support, that is, matériel, munitions and technicians. As matters now stand, I simply tell these people what the President has said in his public declarations of our desire to aid all those who offer resistance to Axis aggression. I should be very grateful if you would tell me that is as far as I can go or whether our policy now may contemplate more specific intervention.

I hope you will appreciate the spirit in which this letter is written. I do feel that I should have some clarification of the direction in which we are going in this area.

With warm regards and apologies for tossing this on your doorstep, I am,

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT D. MURPHY

---

740.0011 European War 1939/19350 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, January 10, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received 6:30 p. m.]

25. From Murphy. Under the changed circumstances resulting from our entry into the war as a belligerent I wonder whether the Department is in position to give some indication of its desires regarding the policy to be followed by our officers in French Africa who are frequently approached by French military personnel and officials who desire to transfer their activity to the Allied forces.

Generally it has been our policy to inform such persons that there was nothing which could be done to assist them.

Might I suggest that this matter be left to the discretion of the respective officers for discreet treatment in cooperation with British authorities? It would be helpful to have the Department's comment. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.0011 European War 1939/20096

*The Counselor of Embassy in France (Murphy) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

ALGIERS, January 12, 1942.

DEAR MR. UNDER-SECRETARY: I take the liberty to refer to my letter of December 7, 1941,<sup>40</sup> enclosing a memorandum of a conversation with M. J. Lemaigre-Dubreuil who, in the interim, has been active in the development of an organization for the defense of French Africa against Axis aggression. His plan is based on the seven points mentioned in that memorandum. The plan, you may recall, contemplates the temporary separation of French Africa from metropolitan France and the establishment of a provisional government in this area. I enclose the following:

A self-explanatory letter, in original and translation, from Mr. Jean Rigaud, a collaborator of M. Lemaigre-Dubreuil, covering:

a) Supplemental note, in original and translation, to the conversation of December 6, 1941. (This has reference to the seven points outlined in the memorandum transmitted by the above mentioned letter of December 7, 1941.)

b) Note 1, in original and translation. An interesting analysis of the current French African situation.

c) Note 2,<sup>41</sup> in original and translation. Means necessary for French North Africa in order to resist German aggression. (This interesting estimate of military needs has been prepared by competent French staff officers).

I shall be grateful if early study could be given to the enclosures which suggest that our Government agree to support the plan described herein for the defense of French Africa against the Axis. The persons who are involved urge that time is short; there is much preliminary work to be done in building up and perfecting such an organization; much time would be necessary for the arrival of matériel and other necessary supplies and that desirable progress in the development of the contemplated organization cannot be accomplished

---

<sup>40</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, p. 494.

<sup>41</sup> Not printed.

unless the United States Government agrees *in principle* to lend its active support.

It would be most helpful if you could give me the benefit of your telegraphic comment in regard to the enclosures.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT D. MURPHY

[Enclosure—Translation]

*Mr. Jean Rigaud to the Counselor of Embassy in France (Murphy)*<sup>42</sup>

ALGIERS, January 2, 1942.

SIR: I have dictated to Mrs. Hardy the text of memoranda 1 & 2 revised, as well as the general memorandum contemplated by our yesterday's conversation.

As I said yesterday, I believe it would be well to consider:

1) That the conditions contemplated by the conversation of December 6 would be completed by a clause regarding the future of French naval units in Africa, of the officers and crews in the sense indicated, that is, the possibility of their return to metropolitan France.

2) Request, if the question of principle is decided, the designation of one or more experts who would be able to analyze and make suggestions regarding the several memoranda annexed.

3) To have conversations with representatives of the British Government, requesting them to segregate from this affair any conversations with so-called Free French elements.

4) In the case of an agreement, the constitution of military stocks and, if possible, their preliminary delivery to points accessible to French Africa, even if it would never be necessary to execute the agreement.

Respectfully yours,

JEAN RIGAUD

[Subenclosure 1—Translation]

#### SUPPLEMENTAL NOTE TO THE CONVERSATION OF DECEMBER 6, 1941

In the course of the conversation of December 6 the general conditions favorable to a common effort were discussed—these have not been modified in their essential parts. However, since then, the general situation has evolved and it has become necessary to prepare the attached notes 1 & 2.

In transmitting these notes, and should the situation continue to evolve as suggested below, it has appeared useful to indicate in which

<sup>42</sup> Filed separately under 740.0011 European War 1939/20098.

way American reaction would receive most favorable welcome by French public opinion, and thus facilitate the work of those desiring to resist the Axis:—

a) In the near future and upon German pressure, France's failure to honor the guarantees given the United States will no doubt become apparent.

b) The United States will note this failure and no doubt will make appropriate protests, meanwhile continuing to express its desire to guarantee the integrity of the French Empire.

c) Upon further failures of a particularly important nature on the part of the French Government, the United States should decide to apply the program of French African resistance which would permit it to assure its own defense along the lines suggested in the conversation held on December 6, 1941, and in notes 1 & 2.

d) At the same time, the Anglo-Saxons should decide to interrupt communications between France and French Africa; the American Government should notify the French Government of this decision "x" hours before its entering into effect, indicating that thereafter only planes and specially authorized vessels will be permitted to cross the Mediterranean.

e) It is believed that French opinion will welcome such a notification, based on the decision of the Anglo-Saxons not to tolerate any longer the inability of the French Government to oppose itself to the desires of the Axis, provided the above notification were accompanied by declarations more or less as follows:

The American Government would declare itself ready to:

—Assure to French Africa sufficient matériel for its own defense;

—Recognize officially and by radio the integrity of the French Empire, and its faithfulness to the Vichy Government or its representatives;

—Guarantee the reestablishment of normal relations between Africa and France, as soon as the French Government would commit itself to maintain strict neutrality, this neutrality thereafter being guaranteed by armed forces capable of resisting the pressure of the Axis;

—Insure the supply of foodstuffs to French Africa.

f) After presentation of this notification, either of the following may happen:

—Either the French Government would sign an agreement with the American Government, and the situation immediately would return to normal without the program mentioned having been executed further than preliminary preparations. It would be in accord with the French Government and through its mediation that the furnishing of matériel to French Africa would be made.

—Or, this agreement would not be made, and the relations between France and Africa would be broken, and various dispositions taken

on the spot, these automatically provoking the installation of an independent Government in French Africa, decided to insure its defense in every possible way.

[Subenclosure 2—Translation]

NOTE No. 1

*French African Situation:*

Since the Armistice the resources and military means of French Africa have never been sufficient to insure its defense.

Present effectives are relatively important and recruiting among the native population would permit of a substantial increase of effectives if necessary. On the other hand industrial equipment is mediocre; inventories are extremely low, military armament is old-fashioned and notoriously insufficient: the means for defense, therefore, must come from abroad.

To these material difficulties are added others caused by the departure of General Weygand. The latter has not been replaced. His civil and military functions, the coordination and control which he exercised on the ensemble of French Africa disappeared with him. The direction of civilian and military affairs are at present divided among civilian and military officials, in other words, among six different people, to say nothing of the officials in charge of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia (a Governor, two Residents and a General commanding the armed forces in North Africa; a Governor and a General commanding the armed forces in French West Africa).

To resume, at the present moment, there does not exist in French Africa a civilian official or an army officer who has the prestige or the authority necessary to undertake the initiative to place the country in a state of defense and to obtain from abroad the necessary deliveries of matériel: these decisions must be provoked. Furthermore, if the large majority of the population and civilian and military authorities is either favorable to the Anglo-Saxon cause or more precisely hostile to the axis, this large majority is apathetic: favorable in principle to a reaction of defense, the mass of people will undertake no initiative, but on the contrary will submit if other decisions are taken.

*Normal Measures:*

To remedy this situation it would appear normal first of all to count on the French Government. There is no doubt that Marshal Pétain wishes sincerely that French Africa, strictly neutral, would remain outside the conflict. It remains to be seen whether he will or whether he will [not] be able to cause this neutrality to be respected in every circumstance.

1) That he wishes to do so in every circumstance is problematical. It is certain that it can be expected that he has given or that he will give such assurances to the American Government. At present, German demands are relatively moderate, with the reserve, however, that the transit be permitted of military supplies and other articles to Libya. Tomorrow these demands may be increased (accord regarding bases or occupation) and there is reason to fear that then the French Government will not resist. Circumstances today lend themselves to every possibility of denunciation of any engagement.

2) That he will be able to do so is also problematical. Problems of supply and direction regarding the defense of Africa cannot be resolved without diplomatic conversations and without substantial delays. As far as we know, nothing has been done in this respect. Furthermore, nothing can be done regularly without the agreement of the Armistice Commission. There is little likelihood that the French Government will give the necessary orders in time in order that a decision to resist, if it had a desire to take such a decision, would be susceptible of execution effectively: indecision regarding policy reacts on the preparation for defense, and at a given moment the lack of preparation for defense will react in its turn on the political decision.

To summarize—there is reason to fear that the future of French Africa is dependent in the last analysis on the decision of Germany.

#### *Exceptional Measures:*

Certain Frenchmen who are worried regarding this situation are making an effort with the cooperation of civilian and military experts:

1) To study the political conditions of an agreement which would permit Africa to remain French and to receive outside support.\*

2) To study the material conditions of such an agreement (intervention, supplies, cooperation of specialists, etc.)†

3) To obtain the necessary cooperation from the ranks of the civilian officials, the police authorities and the army.

4) To find a solution of the problem of the High Command which this project raised.

#### *Attitude of the United States:*

This project cannot be developed normally if the American Government does not approve in principle.

The defense of Africa cannot be assured except by supplies from abroad, and it is impossible to contemplate that any initiative may be

---

\*A memorandum has been furnished on this subject. [Footnote in the original.]

† Memorandum 2 and 3. [Footnote in the original.]



undertaken in an important manner without preliminary satisfaction in this regard.

It is certain that the preliminary work can be undertaken, especially that relating to the study of the technical problems regarding defense and the enlistment of civilian and military collaborators. But this work, which as a matter of fact is now in course, cannot usefully be pushed beyond a certain point which will soon be reached without information on the question of the attitude of the United States and the importance of the foreign cooperation which may be expected and the delays which may occur.

Refusal to take a favorable attitude will lead undoubtedly to the interruption of the only substantial work which at present is being done to place French Africa in a state of defense. The decision to proceed to the execution of the program may on the other hand remain in a state of suspense until circumstances require it.

### *Objections:*

Several objections may be made to an American reply which would approve the matter in principle.

1) Such a reply might be considered incompatible with steps already undertaken or which might be undertaken or with engagements taken or given in respect of the French Government.

We mentioned above for what reason it is to be feared that such engagements may not be executed or may not be possible of execution. In any event, the approval in principle which we suggest would not in any sense be contradictory of such engagements; it would be supplementary. It would not contemplate breaking engagements, but it would simply supplement them in the event that circumstances would prevent their execution. In effect, the execution of the program contemplated is dependent in any case on these two factors.

2) It may be considered preferable to postpone such an approval in principle until a solution has been found to the problem of the high command.

We have indicated above that this question cannot at present be solved as a result of the dispersion of powers and of the absence of a man who possesses sufficient personal authority. This problem does not appear insoluble when the time comes, and already the cooperation obtained is important. It would be, of course, always possible to suspend the execution of the program if the problem has not been satisfactorily solved. It should be added that an approval in principle would not contemplate any operation on French territory, but only preparation abroad and the establishment of liaisons.

It would seem, therefore, that the temporary impossibility regarding the high command should not call for a refusal to agree strictly

confidentially in principle to a project, the execution of which would remain subordinated to a subsequent accord.

To these considerations there should be added two propositions which are, it seems, advisable:

1) The development of a program of defense of French Africa is a time taking matter. It requires political consultations, conversations with the British Government, the assembly of stocks and the routing of deliveries and the accomplishment of liaisons which is very delicate in its execution. In addition, the difference in the types of military matériel would require a period of instruction. *This program cannot be improvised.*

2) The realization of the program necessitates considerable co-operation in the civilian administration, with the police and with the Army. This cooperation is at present assured. It can disappear tomorrow as a result of shifting of personnel (by Vichy) and such changes depend for a large part on the collaborators of Marshal Pétain who are particularly favorable to Franco-German *rapprochement*. If such changes occur, the difficulties which will result will be of a nature to seriously diminish the chances of success of such an undertaking if not to suppress it entirely.

To summarize, it seems that the reply in principle should not be long deferred at a time when external incidents may at any moment intervene in a way which would make desirable the application of the program described, and when a delay of several weeks is necessary to prepare completely such a program from the moment that the reply in principle has been given.

#### *Conclusion:*

To résumé, the operation in question, which is exclusively of French origin, will retain, in case of its execution, its initial character (matériel delivered against payment, defense of the country assured by French effectives except for specialists necessary during a period of instruction, and of course subject to any new accord which might be necessitated in case of a German aggression after the establishment of the new regime).

The program contemplated does not tend to a rupture with the French Government. On the contrary, it would only be applied in case it is revealed that a satisfactory accord, accompanied by appropriate guarantees, is impossible with the French Government. By the same token the preparations which it requires may be accomplished without incurring the risk of a legitimate objection on the part of the French Government.

Note 2 contemplates that French Africa, in accord with the American Government, would take the initiative in the operation. It

should be specified further, to avoid all misunderstanding, that there is no question of taking such initiative in any event, but only in the case that the internal and external political situation would require. In other words, there is question only of anticipating an adverse initiative at a moment when such initiative appears immediate and certain.

It is hardly necessary to add that the French people in Africa would have the greatest interest in what, in the light of experience, might be the possibility that the execution of this prepared program would be unnecessary. However that may be, it appears opportune now to take the necessary precautions and in any event, the American Government has the assurance that the execution of the program is impossible without its agreement because it is subordinate to the deliveries which are requested.

---

8518.50/9 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, January 12, 1942—4 p. m.  
[Received January 13—1:22 a. m.]

27. From Murphy. Vice Admiral Fénard, Secretary General for French Africa, has just concluded visits to Tunisia and Morocco and is leaving this morning for Vichy for discussions regarding the critical economic situation in North Africa. During the course of a long conversation with him yesterday he made the gloomiest predictions regarding the economic future of this area. He asserted that the economic structure is on the verge of going to pieces like the proverbial one horse shay.

Industrial agricultural and transport equipment in his opinion due to lack of replacement over a long period of time, lack of lubricating oil and heavy usage has dangerously deteriorated. The lack of liquid fuel is having a paralyzing effect on every branch of life. Food cannot be distributed, doctors cannot reach their patients, et cetera. The lack of solid fuels for the operation of the railways, coastwise traffic, gas and electric light plants to say nothing of household requirements presents the gravest kind of problem. At Algiers he states there is only a 3 days' coal supply. Yesterday many bakeries were without flour due to lack of transport in this important wheat-producing area. Two ships engaged in the Algiers-Marseille traffic have foundered within the last 48 hours with the loss of about 300 lives. The cargo of one from Marseille included 7,000 tons of coal for Algiers. If this had been received Algiers would have had a week's supply of coal on hand. The loads of these ships, the Admiral states,

is merely another example of the general deterioration of North African transport and industrial equipment.

The Admiral as is his wont repeatedly urged American action to supply liquid fuel to this area. He declared that this area is wide open to American influence and that we are failing to take advantage of it. I replied again that it is difficult for us to have confidence in the ability of the French authorities to resist German demands for the export of liquid fuels to Libya in the light of Admiral Darlan's agreement of December 12 with the Axis authorities. Fénard states that he contemplates bluntly stating to Admiral Darlan, his close friend, the gravity of the prevailing condition and the necessity of American aid. He agreed that Admiral Darlan when faced with the necessity of making concessions to the Axis should take our Ambassador<sup>43</sup> into his confidence before the fact rather than require us to depend on unofficial information concerning secret concessions made to the Axis. Fénard of course stoutly maintains that Darlan has no intention of making major concessions regarding the fleet and naval bases and spoke with pride of the manner in which France has procrastinated in the execution of innumerable German and Italian requirements.

For this he said France is given but little credit.

We should understand, he declared, the necessity of an occasional minor concession at least until such time "as the United States may be able to extend substantial military assistance to France". I asked Admiral Fénard if he believed that Admiral Darlan would be willing to avail himself of such military assistance looking to the resumption of hostilities against the Axis. He said he did not know but he referred to Darlan's statement to Admiral Leahy of August 1 (see Vichy's No. 970, August 1, 4 p. m.<sup>44</sup>) to the effect that when the United States had 3,000 tanks, 6,000 planes and 500,000 men to send to Marseille that he would welcome them.

Repeated to Vichy. Copies to North African offices. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.0011 European War 1939/18350 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, January 13, 1942—7 p. m.

6. For Murphy. Your 25, January 10, 4 p. m. Department believes strongly that the action of individuals in separating themselves and going elsewhere, while valuable as evidence of their feel-

---

<sup>43</sup> Adm. William D. Leahy.

<sup>44</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, p. 189.

ing, adds only individuals in the points of their destination. But if they are able to keep together and develop their attitude within the places and groups to which they are now attached they may render a service far greater than in any other manner.

Naturally each situation must be dealt with in the light of circumstances, but it is suggested you make this quietly known to the officers in question and ask them to stimulate this line of approach. Your telegram and this reply should be repeated to Tangier for the information of the Naval Attaché<sup>45</sup> on his forthcoming arrival.

HULL

---

740.00112 European War 1939/4606

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs  
(Murray) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 23, 1942.

MR. ACHESON: Arrangements have now been completed for the departure from this country of two French vessels under the revived plan of economic assistance for French North Africa. One is expected to sail on January 26 and another on January 31, with simultaneous departures from Casablanca of two other vessels carrying cork and other commodities for the United States. The Treasury Department has acted in this matter to permit the loading of cargoes only for the two vessels about to leave for North Africa, no steps being taken with regard to future supplies.

The French Embassy has now approached us with reference to further shipments under the economic plan, particularly in regard to cargoes for the two ships about to come to this country from North Africa and which will be ready to return to Casablanca within a comparatively short time. After detailed discussion of the matter, officials of the British Embassy and this Division have reached the conclusion that future purchases for French North Africa should be made within the framework of the quotas previously approved for the last quarter of 1941, which were suspended but never revoked during the temporary stoppage of the economic plan. As a practical matter, it would of course be impossible for the French either to purchase or to ship more than a fraction of the authorized commodities, owing to the existing situation with respect to priorities for defense materials. It is felt, however, that the list of goods so carefully set up over a period of many months' discussion should form the basis of all future shipments as a matter of practical convenience.

---

<sup>45</sup> Lt. Col. William A. Eddy, U.S. Marine Corps.

The easiest way to permit the French to resume purchases would apparently be to reinstate the Treasury license for the entire list of commodities previously authorized by the British and ourselves. This would afford much needed latitude to the French in their choice of supplies and would enable them to place orders without delay for forthcoming shipments. It is essential that sufficient time be afforded to place these orders, as the delays which would otherwise ensue in filling the ships would be construed as bad faith by the French authorities and in turn exploited by the Germans as a demonstration of the failure of the American program of supply for North Africa.

If the Treasury license were reinstated in its entirety, there would still be ample check on the commodities actually to be exported on the two small French vessels available at any one time for this trade. Export licenses would have to be obtained for each commodity and the British would have to grant navicerts not only for each item but for the ships as well. The French have, moreover, agreed to present us with a detailed list in advance of each cargo, in accordance with an outline of their new purchasing program dated January 17, 1942, a copy of a translation of which is attached.<sup>46</sup>

I may add that the French authorities are counting on the fact that the program of supply for North Africa is to be continued after the departure of the two vessels about to sail, and they have made full use of this assumption not only in their relations with the German Armistice Commission, but with respect to the serious economic situation in North Africa. The economy of that region, which is of vital importance to the United States, is steadily deteriorating according to all our recent reports. The French have built their policy with respect to the future of North Africa on a message from the President to Marshal Pétain, which was transmitted in the Department's telegram no. 928 of December 13 to the Embassy at Vichy,<sup>47</sup> and which stated that every possible step would be taken in order to enable this Government to assist in the alleviation of conditions in French West Africa and in North Africa.

I hope, therefore, that the Treasury Department may be authorized at the earliest possible moment to reinstate the French North African license in order that the French officials in this country may place their orders and make plans with respect to future shipments.

WALLACE MURRAY

---

<sup>46</sup> Not attached to file copy.

<sup>47</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, p. 499.

740.00112 European War 1939/4017a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, January 31, 1942—4 p. m.

29. For Murphy. The French have requested urgent consideration of a quota for tractors, agricultural machinery and automobile spare parts. Before examining this question further, the Department would like to have an estimate of the situation from you, with particular reference to the possibility of any such supplies or their equivalents reaching the Axis forces in Libya.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/5222

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles W. Lewis, Jr. of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] February 4, 1942.

Participants: Mr. Guérin<sup>48</sup> and Mr. Marchal,<sup>49</sup> French Embassy  
Mr. Lewis

Mr. Guérin stated that because of the suspension of the Treasury licenses in November, when trade with French North Africa under the economic program was suspended, much concern and inconvenience had been caused to American firms holding contracts for goods for shipment to North Africa, and he added that because of the uncertainty which then arose many of the firms have now expressed their disinterest in further transactions with that area. This, Mr. Guérin stated, had increased very considerably the difficulties of the French North African authorities in obtaining supplies in this country.

With a view to overcoming this problem and making it certain to American suppliers that in the event of a further suspension of trade under the economic program they would receive payment for goods contracted for, Mr. Guérin suggested that it seemed desirable that the Treasury licenses be not subject to revocation, or at least not subject to revocation without adequate notice. He pointed out that trade with French North Africa could be effectively suspended through the revocation of export licenses, the revocation of navicerts, or by the refusal by the American authorities to permit the sailing from this country of the French ships engaged in the trade, and that therefore there seemed to be no need, in the protection of

<sup>48</sup> Paul Guérin, Special Economic Representative of the North African authorities attached to the French Embassy.

<sup>49</sup> Léon Marchal, Counselor of the French Embassy.

American interests should a change in the North African situation warrant a suspension of the trade, to suspend the Treasury licenses. If there could be some assurance, he said, that the latter would not occur he felt that their purchasing plans could be more effectively executed, while no injury could be done to this country by the continuance in force of the Treasury licenses in view of the means outlined above available to this Government to control the flow of goods to French North Africa.

Both Mr. Guérin and Mr. Marchal expressed the earnest hope that the Department would give sympathetic consideration to this suggestion.

---

740.0011 European War 1939/19265: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Casablanca (Russell)*

WASHINGTON, February 4, 1942—7 p. m.

44. For Murphy from Dunn. Find great interest in subject of your letter of January 9 to me. When you see Hibbard<sup>50</sup> give him as much specific and detailed information on subject as possible and I will endeavor to inform you of our policy. [Dunn.]

HULL

---

740.0011 European War 1939/19291: Telegram

*The Consul General at Casablanca (Russell) to the Secretary of State*

CASABLANCA, February 5, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received February 7—3:40 a. m.]

70. From Murphy. During the past few days I have discussed the political and economic situation in French Morocco with a number of French officials including Generals Noguès<sup>51</sup> and Béthouart,<sup>52</sup> Director of Supply Bataille, Director of Public Works Normandin, Director of Public Security Herviot and others. There is an undercurrent of tension regarding pending American intervention. I find no anxiety over the rumors of an imminent Axis intrusion. My contacts state that the German Armistice Commission personnel has never been less active. Civilian delegate Theodore Auer who is now duly accredited as Consul General at Casablanca and his assistant Counselor of Legation Sonnenhol assigned as Consul continue to

---

<sup>50</sup> Frederick P. Hibbard, en route to his post as Counselor of Legation in Liberia.

<sup>51</sup> Gen. Albert Noguès, Resident General in the French Zone of Morocco.

<sup>52</sup> Gen. Emile-Marie Béthouart, Commander of the Casablanca Division.



evinced an active interest in American activities. Auer just returned from Southern Morocco, yesterday registered with the diplomatic officer at Rabat a complaint against the activity of American consular agents who he charges are distributing tracts and conducting unauthorized propaganda activity in this area. Noguès said that he was obliged also to complain about a recent unauthorized visit made to the new naval aviation field now under construction at Port Lyautey by our Military Attaché in Tangier<sup>53</sup> who was accompanied by Vice Consul Culbert.

Noguès said that he has constantly refused permission to the Germans to visit the field which he said is regularly photographed from the air by British planes. I took pains to assure Noguès that Bentley believed he was welcome as he had gone there to pay his respects to the commanding officer; that we make every effort to comply scrupulously with the rules as we feel we can count on French officials in this area for friendly cooperation. Noguès plans to visit the Spanish High Commissioner Orgaz<sup>54</sup> in Spanish Morocco today. He said he had no worries regarding Spanish intentions and that his present visit is simply a return courtesy call. Noguès professed to be easier in his mind than he has been for months regarding the Germans.

General Béthouart (now commanding the Division of Casablanca) on whom Weygand depended for the execution of restrictions against the German Armistice Commission discussed generally the weakness of the French military position and the need for immediate supplies in the event of German intrusion. I was disappointed however in his refusal to discuss more detailed plans in this respect as several of his aides have intimated that he wished to do so. I believe however that we can count on his support in the event of a crisis and he wishes to continue in contact with us.

Béthouart said he believed we could boost our stock enormously if we would have the courage to send a modest quantity of gasoline to the French Military in this zone which would enable the French to exercise their pilots and tank units. I find this suggestion worthy of study; it would give our control of fliers [*control officers*] added entry to French military circles and generally improve our status.

The economic picture is decidedly unfavorable. Criticism of the French administration is mounting in the European business community and among the Arabs.

It is the consensus of opinion of the friendly elements with whom we are in contact that Libya remains the key to the future in French North Africa. With each day of British reverses in Libya, confi-

---

<sup>53</sup> Lt. Col. William C. Bentley, Jr.

<sup>54</sup> Gen. Luis Orgaz.

dence in British ability to win on the land decreases. Several prominent officials including Ambassador Corbin<sup>55</sup> say that until there is an Allied success in Libya our efforts to further resistance to the Axis and build up sentiment for resumption of hostilities are hopelessly handicapped. The question arises, referring to Prime Minister Churchill's<sup>56</sup> recent statement in the House of Commons, why after 2½ years of war the Allies are able only to put into action 45,000 men in such a major theatre as Libya. British success there coupled with the encouraging news from the Russian front would provide an impetus to right-minded elements here; without it sentiment grows that England is saving her manpower and that we are maneuvering the French into fighting the battle for the British.

These contacts state also that German propaganda among the Arabs and particularly the Berbers in this area is fortified by above factor and is making definite progress to a point where considerable native element may now be considered Germanophile. This development I am told is in part due to the unfavorable economic situation as well as to the discouragement of and loss of confidence in Vichy's policies by a great many local French administrators of native affairs.

Repeated to Vichy. Text to Tangier by courier. [Murphy.]

RUSSELL

---

740.00112 European War 1939/4621½

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

MEMORANDUM

1. His Majesty's Government have recently reviewed their policy regarding supplies for North Africa and their considered views are set out in various telegrams which are paraphrased below:—

2. First, they do not regard the stability and prosperity of North Africa as an end to be pursued for its own sake. If it is impossible to divert supplies from the enemy, then it is in the American and British interest that the territories should be poor. His Majesty's Government believe that the lack of supplies; e.g., oil, binder twine, sacks and piece goods for the natives has kept exports to France low during the last year. On the other hand, French resistance to German invasion of North Africa will depend on the development of the war and on what military assistance the United States and Great Britain can give them and not on whether they are poor or prosperous.

---

<sup>55</sup> Charles Corbin, French Ambassador in the United Kingdom 1933-40; he had resigned from the French Foreign Service on June 30, 1940.

<sup>56</sup> Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.

3. His Majesty's Government feel, therefore, that any unconditional shipments into North Africa should be limited to the bare minimum required to maintain United States influence in North Africa and that it should be constantly impressed on the French in North Africa that the amount of Anglo-United States assistance they receive will depend on the degree to which they are willing to help the United Nations so that any extension of supplies which the French desire beyond this bare minimum will be conditional upon their willingness to sell to the United Nations supplies which they need and which they desire to deny to the enemy.

4. The goal to which His Majesty's Government would like to work would be a barter of the exportable surplus of North Africa against supplies from the United States. This proposal is based upon their desire to detach French Africa from France and close by other means than force the leak in the blockade made by shipments from North Africa which it is not possible to control. In this connection reference is made to the British Embassy's informal memorandum of December 19th to the State Department.<sup>58</sup>

5. If the United States Government feel that this is not an opportune moment to proceed with so ambitious a program, His Majesty's Government suggest that American supplies should be used as a lever to prevent shipment to the enemy from North Africa of vital war materials, in particular, wool and skins, cobalt, manganese, molybdenum, and if possible, the balance of the rubber shipped in the *François L.D.* In this connection reference is made to the attached memorandum<sup>59</sup> summarising the importance of these supplies for the German war effort.

6. As regards oil, His Majesty's Government have no wish to see supplies made available in North Africa, but would be prepared if the United States Government think it desirable, to revert to the offer made in October 1941 of a provisional quarterly quota of some 30,000 tons of petroleum products, (The details of this offer are set out in Mr. Wyndham White's<sup>60</sup> letter of October 20th, W.T.834/155/41,<sup>61</sup> to Mr. Villard<sup>62</sup>) in return for solid advantages, that is to say, agreement to sell to the United States the materials referred to above and to stop the transit of oil and other materials from France through North Africa to the enemy in Libya. This latter is in the view of His Majesty's Government a cardinal point on which they think the United Nations should make a firm stand. Transit trade, no less

---

<sup>58</sup> Not printed.

<sup>59</sup> First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States.

<sup>60</sup> Henry S. Villard, Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

than the re-export of American oil, is previous aid to the common enemies and a direct blow at British troops in Libya. His Majesty's Government assume that the United States Government would insist that the reports of re-export of oil should be cleared up before further supplies are shipped.

7. If the North African programme were developed on the lines set out above, the French would clearly wish to add to the North African service two of the three vessels which have been reserved for their use under the agreement recently concluded between the French Embassy and the United States Maritime Commission. His Majesty's Government would be prepared to agree to this allocation of tonnage and to waive their insistence on the withdrawal of equivalent tonnage from the Mediterranean provided that the French agree to charter to Portugal two tankers from the Mediterranean.

8. Finally, we must expect continued pressure to be exercised by the enemy upon the French North African authorities and His Majesty's Government would therefore have liked the French of all classes in North Africa to have heard of an offer (on the lines of the barter suggestion referred to in paragraph 4 above) which could be presented as a bold effort to preserve a part of the French Empire from economic ruin. The offer might well be turned down by the North African authorities but His Majesty's Government think that there would be great propaganda value in making it. As matters now stand, the French in Africa have never received an offer sufficiently concrete, extensive or dramatic to attract them away from the Axis. Sooner or later they will have to choose between the United Nations and the Germans. It would be well if Frenchmen in Africa at least could know what the United States and Great Britain have to offer them.

9. As regards the other French colonial territories, His Majesty's Government adhere to the position they have taken hitherto that they would be prepared to extend the plan of economic aid to West Africa on condition that the whole of the groundnut and peanut oil crop were sold to the United States and Great Britain. They see no particular reason to agree to shipments to West Africa from other French colonies unless the United States and Great Britain get some *quid pro quo*. As regards Madagascar, there would be an advantage on balance in an agreement for the purchase of the whole output of mica, graphite and hides in Madagascar by the United States in return for supplies of harmless consumption goods. Moreover, if the United States Government wished to acquire the Réunion sugar crop as well, there would be no objection on the part of His Majesty's Government. If the French Government were to insist

on permission to run ships between Madagascar, Dakar and Casablanca, His Majesty's Government would in the last resort agree provided:

(a) The purchase proposal of the United States and British Governments were accepted in full;

(b) Goods to be shipped were to be subject to approval and navicerted;

(c) Ships were to call at Cape Town for control.

Great importance is attached to (c) in view of the possibility of smuggling graphite, etc.

[WASHINGTON,] 7 February, 1942.

---

740.00112 European War 1939/4613: Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, February 7, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received February 7—3:13 p. m.]

206. We are informed by a reliable official of the Foreign Office that a note was received today from the German authorities asking France to sever commercial relations with the United States unless German officials in North Africa are permitted to inspect shipments to and from America and that a German Control Commission be permitted to take passage on the ships plying between North African and United States ports.

Repeated to Murphy.

LEAHY

---

740.0011 European War 1939/19458: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, February 14, 1942—1 a. m.

[Received 6:50 p. m.]

91. From Murphy. Admiral Esteva, Resident General in Tunisia, asked to call on me last evening on my arrival from Casablanca. He leaves today for Vichy where he says as far as he knows he is ordered for a discussion of administrative problems. He stated his confidence that he would be returned to Tunisia. Esteva left me mystified regarding the purpose of his call which was unusual unless it were to manifest friendly sentiment and to underscore as he repeatedly did that the quantity of supplies going forward to Libya via Tunisia is not important. He insisted that no war material or munitions are being delivered and that it was preferable from our point of view for the French to make small

deliveries of foodstuffs and incidentals rather than precipitate an occupation of Tunisia by Axis forces. He said, "You Americans understand that we are defenseless in Tunisia, the Axis forces can occupy the territory whenever they please as we do not have the means to resist them."

Esteva said that the Tunisian situation is far less tense since the retreat of the British forces in Cyrenaica and he looks for several weeks of comparative calm. He confirms that the Axis effectives in Libya had received important reinforcements (begging that he be not quoted in that connection) stating that for a number of weeks his observers counted at least 40 transport planes a day proceeding from Sicily and estimated to carry an average of 25 persons with kit.

He said also that the Axis is able to transport important quantities of matériel and ammunition by boat from Italy at night but he insisted that Tunisian territorial waters are not used for this purpose. He attributed this facility to the weakness of the British Navy which he said had suffered heavy losses.

Esteva expressed active interest in the recent Tangier bomb incident, stating his private opinion that the whole affair was organized by the Axis.

He also urged the importance of friendly cooperation between the United States and France and the continuance of our economic support of North Africa.

He declared that during the course of his visit to Vichy as much as he would like to call on Ambassador Leahy he did not dare to do so because any contact he would have with our Embassy would be misinterpreted in hostile quarters.

Esteva said that he is pleased with the cordial relations existing between the French authorities in Tunisia and American consular representatives. He expressed appreciation of Doolittle's intelligent cooperation.

Repeated to Vichy for repetition to Tangier. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.00112 European War 1939/4698: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, February 15, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 8:12 p. m.]

94. From Murphy. Your 29, January 31, 4 p. m. Reply to your telegram has been deferred due to my absence in Morocco and Tangier. I discussed last evening with Admiral Fénard, Secretary General for French Africa, the French request for a quota for tractors, agricultural machinery and automobile spare parts with particular

reference to the possibility of any such supplies or their equivalent reaching the Axis forces in Libya.

I might suggest that I have always believed that we would be well advised to make at least small shipments of these products for the following reasons:

(1) We are [sure that?] well-disposed French authorities could then invoke the restrictive clause in the North African accord against exportation of those and similar products; if we do not ship them the clause does not apply.

(2) There is no evidence of the shipment to Libya of any agricultural machinery nor automotive equipment except the trucks and cars about which frequent reports have been made.

(3) The only possibility of such supplies or their equivalent reaching the Axis forces in Libya would result from occupation of this territory by Axis forces or a complete change of policy on the part of French North African officials; the latter certainly do not now have any intention of making such shipments.

(4) We know that German manufacturers are copying American agricultural machinery parts and will supply this market as soon as they are able to do so.

There is not the slightest doubt regarding the need for these supplies. The use of substitute liquid fuels in tractors, automobiles, et cetera, has resulted in the deterioration of much equipment. On the other hand, unless new supplies of liquid fuels are forthcoming, it will be impossible to use much of the present equipment.

I respectfully recommend for these reasons which my recent conversations confirm that we make at least some token shipments of these products if our general policy permits the operation of the North African economic plan. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.0011 European War 1939/19464: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, February 15, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received 11 p. m.]

97. From Murphy. Vice Admiral Fénard, Secretary General of French Africa, asked me to call last evening prior to his departure for forthcoming conference at Vichy of the High French African authorities. General Noguès from French Morocco and Esteva from Tunisia are already in Vichy. Governor General Chatel of Algeria will leave tomorrow. Governor General Boisson, High Commissioner for French West Africa, declined to attend alleging indisposition.

Fénard, who, as the Department knows, is an intimate friend of Darlan, expressed the gravest concern that the United States would

rupture relations with France which he considers quite unfounded. He asserts that we are making a mountain out of a molehill in unduly emphasizing the importance of the small shipments of supplies via Tunisia to the Axis forces in Libya. He denies emphatically that war matériel is being shipped, insisting over and over again that it is to our advantage to overlook inconsequential shipments of food-stuffs, miscellaneous supplies and even gasoline if thereby we postpone the day of Axis occupation of Tunisia. He deplores Darlan's failure before the fact to take our Ambassador into his confidence in this and related matters but claimed in Darlan's behalf that the risk of communicating such information to us is too great: First, because of the detailed German surveillance exercised over Vichy's activities; and second, because so much confidential information seems to leak out of Washington over the radio and through the press.

He said: "Please tell your Government that I know that Admiral Darlan is persuaded that Germany will lose this war and that the Marshal <sup>65</sup> and he are striving by every means known to them to gain time until the Allied forces are equipped to destroy the Axis". He said that we should have no doubts where French sympathies lie and that when the time is ripe but not before we could count on French support. Concluding 2 hours of pleading and harangue Fénard urged that we should give French Africa, where our cause he said is popular, economic support to enable it to live as well as to enable us to extend our influence. He urges that the total amount of goods necessary for this purpose is so insignificant and so far from being a decisive factor that we run absolutely no risk.

After months of association with Fénard I am convinced of his sincerity and I know that his sympathies are definitely on our side.

Repeated to Tangier, Vichy, and London. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.00112 European War 1939/4798

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Villard)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 16, 1942.

Mr. Marchal and Mr. Guérin called to inquire as to the present state of the economic plan for North Africa. They said that they were unable to make any move whatever because the Treasury had not reinstated the North African license, and it was therefore impossible to proceed with the purchase of supplies for the next trip of the vessels to Casablanca. No explanation had been furnished, and with-

---

<sup>65</sup> Marshal Pétain, French Chief of State.



out some definition of our attitude it was very difficult to explain the situation to the North African authorities.

I said that the machinery of the economic accord had been temporarily stopped pending further clarification and consideration of our relations with Vichy.<sup>66</sup> This involved a number of questions, not all of which were related to North Africa, and until these matters had been cleared up it was not possible to proceed with the economic plan.

Mr. Guérin urged that the North African plan should once and for all be treated separately from political questions. He said that as long as the war lasts there will always be incidents which could be used as a reason to stop shipments to North Africa, such as the reports of supplies being sent to the Axis through Tunisia. While he deplored the action of the Vichy Government in permitting supplies thus to reach the Axis in Libya, Mr. Guérin maintained that it should not affect our general plan of sending urgently needed economic supplies to the French and native populations in the French North African territories. Other reasons of a political nature could always be found, if we so desired, to suspend or drop the economic plan, but in doing so we would be deliberately fulfilling the wishes of the Germans.

Mr. Marchal strongly supported the statements made by Mr. Guérin. He urged that once and for all this Government should make a clear-cut decision on the subject of the North African plan, rather than retarding it or holding it up pending clarification of political questions at frequent intervals. He said that the slowing down of purchases and the long drawn-out periods of inaction were having a most harmful effect on the purpose of the plan, if he understood it correctly.

Mr. Marchal said that he had always been under the impression that we were sending supplies to North Africa primarily to win the sympathy and attention of that area, and to hold out the hope of continued American interest. If this objective were to be attained there should be no hesitation in maintaining a steady flow of supplies which would reach the inhabitants and ameliorate their serious economic condition. Full advantage should be taken of the circumstances to publicize these American efforts, which would have the best possible effect in our favor.

Both Mr. Marchal and Mr. Guérin agreed that it would be better to drop the economic plan entirely than to maintain it on the present indefinite and hesitant basis. Under the present circumstances, French North Africa could only distrust our motives and doubt our sincerity, which, of course, played directly into the hands of the

---

<sup>66</sup> For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 123 ff.

Germans. Mr. Marchal emphasized that even if one or more entire shiploads of cotton cloth, sugar or tea fell into the hands of the Axis it would make no difference in the prosecution of the war and the resultant publicity could only have a favorable effect for the American cause.

In conclusion they asked again that a clear-cut decision be made on the continuation of the plan, regardless of such incidents as would inevitably occur in our relations with the Vichy Government. They expressed themselves as in favor of sending American supplies to North Africa just as long as possible, as any curtailment or withdrawal of the program would be exactly what the Axis would desire.

---

740.00112 European War 1939/4798

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs  
(Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 18, 1942.

MR. WELLES: The attached memorandum<sup>67</sup> brings forcibly to our attention the desire of the French Embassy to obtain, if possible, a clearcut expression of our policy with respect to the shipment of economic supplies to North Africa. At present, the plan of economic assistance is again suspended pending clarification of our relations with Vichy, with the result that no orders can be placed, the ships remain idle, and the impression is created throughout North Africa that we are not sincerely interested in holding up our end of the economic accord.

The French officials concerned with North Africa are making a strong plea that we pursue our plan of economic action independently of the inevitable political vicissitudes with Vichy. They believe it would be better to drop the plan entirely than carry it out in a half-hearted, desultory manner. Moreover, we are acting against our own interest in these frequent interruptions, since no ships can move from Casablanca with the cork we vitally need until the vessels are ready to sail from here.

I feel that there is a good deal in what the French say. There seems little to be lost and a great deal to be gained by sending innocuous supplies to North Africa on a regular schedule as long as it is possible to do so, regardless of what takes place in our relations with Vichy. By stopping such shipments and thereby making the position of our control officers more and more insecure, we are

---

<sup>67</sup> *Supra.*

obviously playing the German game. Would it not be possible to examine the position anew along the lines mentioned above?<sup>68</sup>

WALLACE MURRAY

---

740.0011 European War 1939/201701

*The Counselor of Embassy in France (Murphy) to the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn)*

ALGIERS, February 18, 1942.

[Received March 10.]

DEAR JIMMIE: Remembering previous items of interest in our French African policy, I enclose a memorandum prepared by one of our valued contacts in Morocco as a result of a conversation with him, Lt. Colonel Eddy, Vice Consul Mayer and myself on February 8 at Casablanca. This conversation took place right after the receipt of your telegram No. 44 of February 4, but before I had seen Hibbard at Tangier.

A copy of this memorandum, which is a preliminary outline of our contact's ideas on this subject, has been given to Colonel Eddy.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT D. MURPHY

[Enclosure]

#### MEMORANDUM

##### *Objective.*

The principal vital centers of Morocco—the nerve centers of the Protectorate—can be occupied and held for about 15 hours following a “coup de force” effected by surprise and at night by very small groups.

Advantage must be taken of this period of a few hours to land an important air force and light air-borne reinforcements, the first to repel any reaction which may be made by air, the second to consolidate the objectives attained.

Within the 48 hours following the “coup d'état”, the allied naval forces must land in the ports which will have been opened to them the landing forces necessary to assure that the entire country will fall into line and the protection of the frontiers.

All critical posts will be occupied at the beginning of the movement by trusted Frenchmen who will take such measures as will insure the support of the French population and of the native chiefs.

---

<sup>68</sup> In a memorandum dated February 19, 1942, Mr. Welles replied: “In view of the present discussion with the Vichy Government, I have informed the Ambassador that I am not in a position to take up any of these questions until an understanding has been reached on the main issue involved. I do not think we can deviate from that position.”

Morocco will then be able to reinforce the ranks of the Frenchmen who are fighting with the United Nations against the Axis and will thus be able to contribute effectively, thanks to the key position which it occupies, to the delivery of France and to the establishment of its independence and territorial integrity.

### *Execution.*

On the appointed day, at about 1 o'clock in the morning, three small ships will disembark, the first ship, about 150 men in the neighborhood of Safi, the second ship, about 500 men in the neighborhood of Casablanca, the third ship, about 450 men in the neighborhood of Rabat. These detachments should be composed exclusively of Frenchmen wearing French uniforms, equipped with light motorcycles. Guided by trusted men, they would operate as follows:

*Casablanca group.* Should be in the immediate neighborhood of Casablanca at about 2:30 a. m. so that it may take up positions and do as follows at exactly 3 a. m.

- 70 men to occupy the Admiralty;
- 160 men to occupy the port and the naval ships in it, (a few French naval reserve officers replacing immediately the Admiral's staff and the commanders and seconds in command of the ships in port).
- 50 men to occupy the airfield;
- 100 to immobilize the Armistice Commissions;
- 20 to occupy the Police station;
- 15 to occupy the military headquarters;
- 10 to occupy the Post Office and the military telephone switchboard;
- 10 to occupy the Région Civile;
- 10 to occupy the telephone central;
- 5 to occupy the office of the newspaper *Le Petit Marocain*;
- 40 to constitute a mobile reserve at the disposition of Colette, to enable him to take care of any incident which may occur.

By 4 a. m., all groups should report to headquarters on the success of their missions.

*Northern Group.* A sub-group of about 185 men assigned to Rabat should be in the neighborhood of that city at 2:30 a. m. so as to be able to take up positions as follows at exactly 3 a. m:

- 30 men to occupy the aviation field;
- 15 men to immobilize the Resident General;
- 5 to immobilize the Delegate General;
- 5 to immobilize the Secretary General;
- 15 to immobilize the Commanding General;
- 20 to occupy the Région Militaire;
- 15 to occupy the Bureau de la Place;
- 30 to occupy the offices of the Direction de la Sécurité Publique;
- 10 to occupy the Post Office and the Military telephone switchboard;
- 10 to occupy the Services Municipaux;

5 to occupy the office of the newspaper *L'Echo du Maroc*;  
25 to constitute a mobile reserve at the disposition of Roger, to enable him to take care of any incident which may occur.

By 3:30 a. m. all groups should report to headquarters on the success of their missions.

Raoul would then call upon the Sultan, accompanied by a "guard of honor" and notify him, with due deference, of the organization of a provisional French Government in Morocco, having the support of the United States.

Meanwhile, a sub-group of 100 men would occupy the vital centers of Port Lyautey and another sub-group of 165 men would occupy the vital centers of Meknes (office of the Région Militaire and staff, aviation field, post office, telephone central, etc.).

*Southern Group.* Would occupy the vital centers of Safi at the same time and in the same way as the other groups occupied their objectives.

At 3:45 a. m. the northern sub-groups and the southern group would report by radio to Casablanca.

At 4 a. m. Morocco would report and ask immediate help from the allied forces and such help, in the shape of fighting aircraft and air-borne troops, arriving at daybreak would complete the total occupation of western Morocco.

The allied fleet, which until then would have remained far from the Moroccan coast in order not to arouse suspicion, would then proceed at full speed toward the occupied ports and disembark as soon as possible the troops needed to protect the frontiers.

Other points to be considered: orders to be given to the military and civilian authorities in the French Zone; the possibility of a reaction from the Spanish Zone.

---

121.5481/88

*The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State*

No. 629

TANGIER, February 18, 1942.

[Received March 11.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the occasion of my last visit to Rabat on February 6, M. du Gardier, Chief of the Diplomatic Cabinet, informed me that Herr Auer, German Consul General in Casablanca, had spoken to him of the frequent visits of Colonel Bentley, American Military Attaché of the Legation in Tangier, to the French Protectorate.

Herr Auer was reported to have observed, as justifying his comments, that Colonel Bentley's frequent visits to the French Protectorate concerned French security. He stated that he could cite the number and date if necessary of Colonel Bentley's visits.

M. du Gardier informed me that he had made light of Herr Auer's remarks and had explained our special treaty position in Morocco according to which the Legation in Tangier had jurisdiction over all Morocco. The Chief of the Diplomatic Cabinet stated that he had been at first loath to point out to the German Consul General our special treaty position in this respect for fear that the Germans might be given thereby a lead to demand the same position. However, Herr Auer had shown himself so thoroughly familiar with the treaty situation in Morocco that he had concluded that there was no reason to omit mention of it in his conversation for fear that he might be supplying Herr Auer with information he did not already possess.

In response to my inquiry M. du Gardier stated that the German Consul General had not as yet received his *exequatur* and that he has a French liaison officer with him to control his contacts with the French and native population.

M. du Gardier suggested that it would relieve the pressure on the French Protectorate authorities if Colonel Bentley would space out his visits to the French Protectorate to a somewhat greater extent and if he might find it possible to delay visiting the French Protectorate again for a little while.

The Department will recall from the Legation's despatch no. 589, January 28, 1942,<sup>70</sup> particularly the Spanish Consul's<sup>71</sup> remarks at the bottom of page 5 and top of page 6 of that despatch concerning the movements in Morocco of the military officers of the Legation, that the authorities of the Spanish Zone have also evidenced some concern about Colonel Bentley's recent frequent journeys. In my despatch, it will be recalled, I mentioned the fact that I believed my Spanish colleague had been influenced to make the suggestion which he had regarding economy of travel on the part of our military officers both out of concern for possible pressure by the Spanish military authorities as well as owing to possible pressure on the part of the Germans. From the fact that the subject was mentioned to me by both the Spanish Consul in Tangier and the Chief of the Diplomatic Cabinet in Rabat within a brief period of time, I am inclined to conclude that German pressure on both the French and the Spanish has been more responsible than any other factor for mention of the subject by the Spanish and French.

In order to avoid pressure on both the Spanish and French from the Germans, I have suggested to Colonel Bentley and Colonel Eddy that they endeavor to confine their movements in Morocco to strict necessity and to those dictated by the exigencies of their work.

Respectfully yours,

J. RIVES CHILDS

---

<sup>70</sup> Not printed.

<sup>71</sup> Rafael Soriano.

740.0011 European War 1939/19586: Telegram

*The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State*

TANGIER, February 19, 1942—noon.

[Received 3:25 p. m.]

84. For Shaw.<sup>72</sup> In accordance with urgent request of War Department to Bentley and Donovan to Eddy, Consul General Russell<sup>73</sup> was requested several weeks ago to accord his cooperation in assisting in obtaining information desired concerning airports French Morocco and information concerning Moroccan coast line.

The airport work has been completed with one exception. The only specific complaint so far made against these activities which were bound sooner or later to attract some notice, however discreetly made, has been that of Admiral d'Harcourt against Bentley and Culbert (see Legation's 57, February 9<sup>74</sup>).

In reply to an oral inquiry transmitted to me from Russell by Vice Consul Reid<sup>75</sup> this week concerning the attitude of the Consulate in the case of renewed complaints I stated that in my opinion this work was of great urgency, that we had to foresee the raising of possible further questions with regard to it by the French if not protests which should be dealt with as they arose with the greatest possible diplomacy.

Russell now telegraphs that "While I am not obstructing in any way I most emphatically protest against such arrangements and point out that they are certain to lead to expulsion of control officers from this zone, thus making obtaining of further information here impossible. I strongly urge reference of this whole matter to the Department as it transcends the authorization received [apparent omission] officers here to abstain from carrying out recent order temporarily until I receive reply from you. Information received from friendly members of Deuxième Bureau indicates previous work of control officers on airfields is completely tabulated and there is strong indication of rising opposition to their conduct which may well result in their arrest and expulsion. All this work may well be interpreted as espionage and in any case will circumscribe the usefulness of this office in the future."

When the protest of d'Harcourt was made Bentley was informed by a high ranking French officer that no attention need be paid to it and when I was recently in Rabat I was assured that General Noguès while being under no illusions concerning Bentley's excuses and his professed ignorance of the naval character of the airport at Port

<sup>72</sup> G. Howland Shaw, Assistant Secretary of State.

<sup>73</sup> H. Earle Russell, Consul General at Casablanca.

<sup>74</sup> Not printed.

<sup>75</sup> W. Stafford Reid, Vice Consul at Casablanca.

Lyautey had nevertheless made a report to Vichy counteracting d'Harcourt's report of the incident.

The impression given both Bentley and me at Rabat from different official sources was that the French concern centered on our investigations escaping the notice of the Germans whose own control work is circumscribed by the presence with the nonofficial missions of French liaison officers.

There are of course risks to be run in this work but as I have stated to Russell when discussing your letter of December 31<sup>76</sup> we are in a war of life and death and we cannot regard these questions in the light of the lessons we learned in the consular school of the Department. Moreover it has been impressed on Russell that his officers must naturally use the utmost discretion but it is my view that the anticipation of possible displeasure of the French should not deter us from obtaining information vital to our Government.

Repeated to Algiers, Casablanca.

CHILDS

---

862 24/602 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, February 25, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received 7:07 p. m.]

122. For the Under Secretary from Murphy. Vice Admiral Fénard<sup>77</sup> returning from the French African conference at Vichy asked me to call stating that he wished to assure me that no questions other than economic and administrative had been discussed at the conference.

He stated in strictest confidence that all shipments of supplies to Libya and the use of French vessels for that purpose have terminated.

Fénard delivered a long discourse on the political and eventual military advantages which would flow to the United States from our continued prosecution of the economic program for North Africa.

He declared with strict injunction that he be not quoted that until the United States is really prepared for military support of this area that we have little to lose and much to gain by maintaining a tangible bond between the United States and French Africa. His argument included a long exposition with which I shall not burden the Department of the effect on public and official French opinion which he said would accompany the arrival of one tanker loaded with petroleum products.

---

<sup>76</sup> Not printed.

<sup>77</sup> Vice Adm. Jacques Fénard, Secretary General for French Africa.



I urged that military stocks of gasoline in Algeria be used for civilian purposes suggesting that if eventually the French wished to defend the area we would be able undoubtedly to provide for their needs promptly.

Fénard, who said he had six private interviews with Darlan, referred to current conversations at Vichy with Ambassador Leahy (about which the Embassy has kept me informed) stating that while the note of February 16<sup>th</sup> did not include the assurances desired by the President, prior to his departure from Vichy the draft of a new note had been prepared which contained "every assurance" desired by the President. He said he had reason to believe the note would be delivered to Ambassador Leahy immediately. [Murphy.]

COLL

---

740.0011 European War 1939/20098

*Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department  
(Eisenhower)*

WASHINGTON, February 25, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ORME WILSON, LIAISON OFFICER, STATE  
DEPARTMENT

A study has been made by the War Plans Division of the plan for the defense of North Africa as set forth in the attached papers.<sup>79</sup> The prevention of further extension of Axis control in North Africa is of great interest to the United States from a military point of view, and we should take such steps as may become practicable to check such extension.

Assuming that the agents concerned are responsible and sincere parties, and capable of developing an adequate following among civil and military authorities (neither of which is proved in the attached papers), they should be encouraged in their efforts.

The requirements for matériel and ammunition to equip the French North African forces as set forth in the plan are quite large and could not be made available in the near future in view of our present commitments. Moreover, any attempt to equip the French forces just prior to and during active operations as envisaged in this plan could not result in efficient use of the strange matériel. For this reason, it would be necessary to equip them prior to the opening of

---

<sup>79</sup> For text of Admiral Darlan's note, see telegram No. 245, February 16, 4 p. m., from the Ambassador in France, p. 182.

<sup>80</sup> Letter of January 12 from the Counselor of Embassy in France to the Under Secretary of State and enclosures, p. 229.

hostilities. What, if anything, could be accomplished along this line would of course depend upon the attitude of the Vichy and North African Governments, as well as upon availability of the matériel at the proper time, and the shipping to transport it.

The present critical situation with respect to shipping likewise prevents its use, at this time, in transporting French effectives from other areas.

In an unstable situation as this one would be, to entrust command of participating American forces to French authorities, as indicated in the plan, would be fraught with great danger.

From the foregoing it is clear that definite action, involving commitments on the part of the American government at this time, is not warranted. However, it is equally clear that if the authors of the proposal are in a position to develop potential assistance to the U. S., their collaboration may later be of the highest importance. Consequently this Division believes that, if possible, discussion should be continued, particularly with a view of determining the capacity and ability of these men to collaborate with us effectively.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
*Brigadier General*

---

740.00112 European War 1939/4884

*The French Embassy to the Department of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, March 3, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

The enclosed tables show the size of the shipments made from the United States to Africa in execution of the Murphy-Weygand agreements.

It is enough to consider these tables to see how incomplete and intermittent the supplying of North Africa has been. Even as it is, it has nevertheless offered France and the United States real advantages the importance and interest of which cannot be missed.

From the French point of view, it has made it possible to provide the native populations of North Africa—in, it is true, a very low proportion—with the clothing and foodstuffs which they most lacked. More generally, this plan of supply has constituted a material bond between France and the United States the symbolic importance of which can escape no one. If it had been possible for this plan of supply to reach such proportions that it would have effected the economic independence of North Africa, its influence on French

policy would doubtless have been considerable. As it has hitherto existed, nevertheless, limited by the available tonnage and by the very vicissitudes of its own history, it represents a real utility of which the North African authorities and populations are perfectly aware.

From the American point of view, the supplying of North Africa has been the sole possibility offered to the Government of the United States to manifest in a concrete fashion the interest which it takes in the lot of the French and native populations during the trials which they continue to undergo. Furthermore, the very mechanism of the supply plan for North Africa has made it possible for the Government of the United States to multiply and extend its means of contact with the populations of North Africa through the presence of numerous observers intended to guarantee the regular application of this plan.

Finally, it seems that to date in the supplying of North Africa the Government of the United States has seen, quite aside from the temporary political circumstances, a means of giving constant evidence of the concern and friendship of the American people for the French people. There should not, it seems, be any reason for this essential objective to be lost from view. The French people are, in fact, living today in such conditions of distress and isolation that any pledge of material assistance and sympathy given them cannot fail to impress them deeply.

The general political considerations of the European blockade which may appear so demanding seen from the territory of the United States cannot actually be felt by a people whose essential and daily preoccupation is to obtain and to hold on to the articles necessary for a minimum existence which becomes more precarious daily.

Now, if the supplying of unoccupied France is always clashing with these imperious necessities, the same is not true for North Africa. The disillusion of the French and native population would then be great if these supplies should come to be definitively suspended, the more so since it is possible to continue it without going contrary to the purposes of a blockade policy to which the Government of the United States had adhered.

It would doubtless be still more useful if a certain number of shipments intended for the children of France could be made from the United States.

If, indeed, the United States wishes one day to have again the support and friendship of a nation whose qualities and geo-political situation remain important, it is essential that its children at least do not perish, when its youth is imprisoned and its aged population becomes more feeble every day.

The American Government, by alleviating the sufferings of the children, would gain the immediate gratitude of hundreds of thousands of French families.

To come back to the more special problem of the supplying of North Africa, it will be recognized that it is politically useful and that in the form in which it has been conceived it does not present any danger for the United States.

On the one hand, none of the goods imported into North Africa has to date been the object of a delivery to the Axis powers. On the other, the very nature of the goods imported—tea, condensed milk, pharmaceutical products, cotton goods, tobacco, sugar, coal, rosin, clothing—is such that these goods are distributed to the civilian population and used or consumed immediately. Their use by powers hostile to the United States is not possible even on a most pessimistic hypothesis.

One is thus led to ask himself whether the Government of the United States has not come to the time when it would be well to establish an extremely clear distinction between relations of a political and diplomatic order, which are subject to various vicissitudes, and problems of supply which enter into a really democratic policy of support from people to people, which should be by that fact protected from ephemeral contingencies and crises in order to realize their actual purpose: that of giving evidence of the permanent interest of the United States in a nation for which it has never ceased to have sentiments of esteem and great sympathy.

[Enclosure—Translation]

*Memorandum by the French Embassy*

WASHINGTON, January 31, 1942.

EXECUTION OF SUPPLY-PROGRAMS FOR NORTH AFRICA

I. PETROLEUM PRODUCTS

<i>Name</i>	<i>Minimum needs of North Africa for nine months</i>	<i>Exportations actually made in nine months (March–December 1941)</i>
Gasoline for auto- mobiles	84, 000 metric tons	10, 535 metric tons
Oil	39, 000   “   “	11, 235   “   “
Gas oil	69, 000   “   “	12, 427   “   “
Fuel oil	45, 000   “   “	8, 491   “   “
Lubricating oils	12, 000   “   “	813   “   “
<b>Total</b>	<b>249, 000   “   “</b>	<b>43, 501   “   “</b>

## II. OTHER GOODS

<i>Name</i>	<i>Minimum needs of North Africa for six months, as shown by quotas accepted by the Department of State</i>	<i>Exportations actually made in six months (July-December 1941)</i>
Tea	3, 150 metric tons	1, 415 metric tons
Condensed milk	2, 550 " "	1, 360 " "
Pharmaceutical products	1, 000 " "	1 " "
Cotton goods	13, 000 " "	2, 445 " "
Bags	5, 500 " "	178 " "
Tobacco	2, 000 " "	984 " "
Iron wire	7, 250 " "	382 " "
Copper sulphate	6, 400 " "	200 " "
Sugar	91, 000 " "	14, 095 " "
Agricultural machines and spare parts	2, 800 " "	5.5 " "
Coal	220, 000 " "	11, 179 " "
Coke	1, 800 " "	896 " "
Rosin	4, 000 " "	1, 117 " "
Binder-twine	2, 700 " "	1, 133 " "
Paraffin	4, 000 " "	702 " "
Nails	4, 200 " "	103 " "
Ready-made garments	2, 270 " "	1 " "
Machines other than agricultural and spare parts	2, 000 " "	Nil " "
Cotton thread	830 " "	"
Rayon thread	70 " "	"
Woolen thread	300 " "	"
Woolen cloth	900 " "	"
Rayon cloth	900 " "	"
Used clothing	870 " "	"
Potassic manure	5, 000 " "	"
Nitrogenized manure	3, 400 " "	"
Insecticides	2, 600 " "	"
Sulphur	3, 367 " "	"
Pyrites	3, 000 " "	"
Other chemical products	4, 000 " "	"
Papers and cartons	13, 000 " "	"
Matches	420 " "	"
Threaded cotton for matches	16 " "	"
Bicycles	1, 955 units	"
Rubber articles	300 metric tons	"
Tin	50 " "	"
Anti-friction metal	10 " "	"
Electric bulbs	500, 000 units	"
Electric apparatus	1, 000 metric tons	"

## II. OTHER GOODS—continued

Name	<i>Minimum needs of North Africa for six months, as shown by quotas accepted by the Department of State</i>	<i>Exportations actually made in six months (July–December 1941)</i>
Tools	650 metric tons	Nil
Crude copra	700	“
Tar	4,000	“
Asphalts and bitumens	2,400	“
Glassware	1,000	“
Calcium carbide	4,240	“

740.0011 European War 1939/19586: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé at Tangier (Childs)*

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1942—9 p. m.

45. From Shaw. Your 84, February 19, noon. The scope of the work to be performed by the control officers has been carefully considered in consultation with the Coordinator of Information. While we are fully alive to the urgency of some of the requests for information which have been made or which may be made in the future, it has been definitely agreed that the vice consuls should engage in no activities which might endanger their position or result ultimately in their expulsion.

It is of course difficult to define the exact nature of the acts which might involve these risks, and to a considerable extent therefore we must rely on the judgment and discretion of the officers concerned. While every effort should be made to comply with requests for information, there should be no attempt to obtain information which might in any way jeopardize the continued functioning of the control officers or of our own career service in North Africa.

Repeat to Casablanca. [Shaw.]

WELLES

740.0011 European War 1939/21085a

*The Counselor of Embassy in France (Murphy) to the Under  
Secretary of State (Welles)*

ALGIERS, March 14, 1942.

DEAR MR. UNDER-SECRETARY: I take the liberty of referring to my strictly confidential letter of December 7, 1941,<sup>82</sup> and my urgent and secret letters to you of January 12 and January 13, 1942,<sup>83</sup>

<sup>82</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, p. 494.

<sup>83</sup> Letter of January 13 not printed.

regarding the developing organization in French North Africa of groups desirous of resuming hostilities against the Axis. I wish to refer particularly to my letter of January 12 which transmitted a plan (Memorandum No. 1 [*Note No. 1.*]) for American intervention in French North Africa in cooperation with French elements.

Colonel Van Hecke (Commissaire Général for French Africa of the Chantiers de Jeunesse, a French national organization comparable to the American CCC camps) is evolving as the potential military chief of the several groups. I enclose biographic data<sup>44</sup> regarding him. He is able, fearless, young, experienced, and enjoys the essential elements of prestige which could be rapidly developed. He is the leader in North Africa to whom youth looks for guidance and inspiration. He is aggressive and as are his associates, disdainful of many of the old-line military officers who, in his mind, are far more interested in their daily comfort and regular promotions than they are in the welfare of their country. He maintains that many of them must be eliminated. He is ably assisted by Lt. Colonel Fredaigue and Lieutenant d'Astier de la Vigerie, both of whom are Assistant Commissioners for French Africa of the Chantiers de Jeunesse organization.

At the present moment, Colonel Van Hecke heads a group of approximately 26,000 disciplined, trained and hardened young men of the average age of 21 who would form an admirable nucleus for action.

Colonel Van Hecke is in close liaison with a number of right-minded regular army officers, including the Chief of Staff of General Juin, the Major-General commanding all French forces in all French Africa. That officer, Colonel Jousse, and his associates, have now prepared the enclosed program dated March 13, 1942, for American intervention in French North Africa. This replaces and supplements the program enclosed with my letter of January 12.

I urgently call your attention to certain features of this revised program as follows:

1—The Allied reverses exploited by enemy propaganda have discouraged many leaders and disturbed opinion which, at the moment, regards resumption of hostilities as exceedingly risky. This state of mind makes it necessary to contemplate an important increase of initial foreign support.

2—The revised estimate of the strength of an American expeditionary force necessary for this area is:

7 motorized divisions (20,000 effectives each)

5 armored divisions (7 to 700 tanks [*sic*] each—10,000 effectives each)

---

<sup>44</sup> Not printed.

3—The ultimate French strength available, as soon as equipped, would be:

12 motorized divisions  
4 armored divisions.

May I respectfully urge that you give me a directive in this connection. Do you wish me to continue these conversations, or do you wish them dropped? Do you wish the conversations conducted by someone else?

I approved in this connection a meeting between Colonel Van Hecke and his two assistants, and Lt. Colonel Eddy, our Naval Attaché at Tangier, and control officer Vice Consul King.<sup>85</sup> Colonel Van Hecke supplied Colonel Eddy with a copy of the enclosed program. If you are interested in these propositions, it is suggested that you arrange as soon as may be practicable to send at least one qualified regular army officer who would be able to discuss the technical features of the military operation with these French officers. Lt. Colonel Eddy, as you may know, is an able person, a reserve officer in the Marine Corps. I do not believe that he is equipped to discuss technical questions of modern warfare, and he should have the assistance of at least one trained regular army officer if these negotiations are to progress effectively.

The political phase is naturally of great importance. You will probably advise me when practicable of your ideas regarding the political possibilities and what form, in your opinion, the future political set-up in this area should assume to facilitate the accomplishment of whatever policy you may determine.

Our Economic Accord with North Africa has proved, and is continuing to prove its value in preparing the ground for more serious operations. It seems to me essential that it be continued and that we enlarge our publicity efforts by radio and other means to ensure knowledge of our efforts to supply this area with its essential needs on as large a part of the mass of the North African population as possible. I think that our radio broadcasts, which frequently underscore violent criticism of Vichy policy, would be fortified if they also demonstrated some affirmative facts such as the material benefits which flow to the North African population from cooperation with the United States. They should emphasize that only the United States is able to provide for their needs as contrasted with enemy action which is depriving the French people of its property, its food and its opportunity to earn a livelihood.

The time has arrived, I believe, for you to give me a directive, if circumstances permit, by whatever means you may deem appropriate.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT D. MURPHY

---

<sup>85</sup> David W. King, Vice Consul at Casablanca.



[Enclosure—Translation<sup>87</sup>]*Memorandum Regarding American Intervention in French North Africa*

ALGIERS, March 13, 1942.

## NOTE No. 2

In a preceding memorandum<sup>88</sup> we indicated, in the order of urgency and time necessary for delivery, the needs of the land army for matériel, supplies and specialists during the first month in the event that French North Africa would resume its liberty of action and fight on the side of the Allies.

We have already shown that this hypothesis could not be contemplated if the following conditions did not obtain:

(a) The destruction or at least immobilization of the Axis armored forces in Libya.

(b) The initiative or at least the consent of a high ranking chief with indisputable authority (General Weygand) taking advantage of favorable political circumstances.

(c) The action to be launched at an appropriate moment taking the initiative in advance of the enemy and blocking his reactions.

(d) The existence of allied aero-naval supremacy in the Mediterranean. (This was not specified because admitted implicitly.)

With the fulfillment of these conditions, it was admitted that the liberating operation in North Africa could be executed with a weak military support from abroad evaluated at:

One to two armored divisions in Morocco, pending [*depending?*] upon the reinforcements which the Spaniards or the Germans could develop in their Moroccan zone at the moment of the operation.

100 anti-aircraft batteries.

Aviation support as then described.

The unfavorable evolution of the situation makes it necessary to revise that estimate. In Libya the Axis forces considerably strengthened have the initiative; they retain an important liberty of action as well as their communications with Italy.

In the Mediterranean the Allies have lost aero-naval supremacy. They have suffered reverses in Cyrenaica and important reverses in the Far East.

These reverses, exploited by propaganda, disturb the population and the army and inspire prudence on the part of leaders who would have the courage to assume the risks of independent action in North Africa. The least that one can say is that opinion is not favorable

<sup>87</sup> File translation revised by the editors.

<sup>88</sup> Not printed.

at present time to an action of this nature which would be regarded as a risky adventure.

This state of mind and the political situation which it develops makes it necessary to contemplate an important increase in the initial foreign support—this support must in effect permit:

For one thing, the guarantee of a favorable command and the reassurance of public opinion by the manifestation of massive force.

For another, blocking the reactions of the Axis and the temporary replacement of French forces whose modernization may be retarded by the housecleaning necessary in the high command.

Considering the present situation we will examine the following points:

Preliminary conditions which must be fulfilled.

The expeditionary force to be contemplated for French North Africa.

General conditions of intervention.

The employment of the intervening forces and initial French possibilities.

*A.—Preliminary Conditions for Fulfillment by the Allies Outlined as Follows:*

(a) To immobilize definitely by action starting from Egypt the Axis forces in Libya in order that they may not be able even temporarily to detach armored forces in French North Africa. This fixation is a minimum which must end in the destruction of those forces at the earliest possible moment.

(b) To recover aero-naval supremacy in the western Mediterranean even in the hypothesis of a hostile intervention by the French Navy.

(c) To dispose of reserve forces in tonnage in addition to the actual expeditionary forces in order to provide for the unforeseen and to enable certainty of action.

(d) To be able to furnish to French North Africa in the time requested technicians, matériel and supplies listed in memorandum No. 1.<sup>89</sup>

*B.—Expeditionary Forces Necessary for French North Africa:*

The land forces necessary may be estimated as follows:

- 7 motorized divisions
- 5 armored brigades (700-800 tanks)\*
- 120 anti-aircraft batteries (one half of small caliber) for the defense of the debarkation zones.

<sup>89</sup> Not printed.

\*It should be noted that the French "division" contemplates 20,000 effectives, and the French "brigade" about 10,000 effectives. [Footnote in the original.]

### Corresponding services.

These forces must be provided with supplies of the following sufficient for one month:

- Munitions
- Liquid fuel
- Foodstuffs (flour, canned goods, sugar, tea, coffee)
- Spare parts
- Tent equipment
- Sanitary equipment and medicine (vaccines and anesthetics, bandages, surgical equipment)
- Coal (see memorandum No. 1)

The aviation forces necessary will be outlined subsequently.

To assure the protection of the debarkation, however, the needs can be evaluated at about 500 pursuit planes, or approximately 100 per debarkation zone.

The aviation forces must also have on the ground means of supply and maintenance (personnel and matériel) delivered at the aviation bases by transport planes arriving at the same time as the combat planes.

The anti-aircraft defense of the bases must also be insured at the rate of from 5 to 10 batteries per base, or about 100 batteries.

### C.—*General Conditions of Intervention:*

The following general ideas should guide the enterprise:

(a) The preliminary conditions having been fulfilled, the initiative must be taken deliberately in liaison with favorable French elements. It is absolutely essential to avoid a set-back at the beginning. Intervention conceived as a counter attack would lead inevitably to a set-back. If the Axis take the initiative it will have the advantage of being first in action on a strategic chess board favorable to it.

(b) To operate simultaneously, on a large scale and by surprise; to avoid all adverse reaction susceptible of compromising the initial debarkations which are the most difficult.

(c) To assure the immediate possession without combat to the American forces of the vital centers of the country, the naval bases and the indispensable aviation installations, as well as the best ports with the most adequate equipment.

(d) To follow as soon as possible the landing of the forces with the shipment of means, both personnel and matériel, necessary for the *ravitaillement* of the French troops as well as the supplies designed to influence public opinion (textiles, liquid fuel, tea, sugar, coffee, coal).

The vital centers, naval bases and indispensable ports include essentially:

- The Zone of Casablanca–Fedala–Rabat;
- The City of Oran, including Mers-el-Kébir;

The City of Algiers;  
The group Tunis-La Goulette-Bizerta.

One could add as secondary urgency:

The Atlantic Moroccan ports of Mogador, Safi, and Mazagan.  
In Algeria; Mostaganem and Bône.

It would be well also to control as a minimum the following aviation bases:

Morocco: Rabat, Casablanca, Meknes, Fez, Kasbah Tadla, Marrakech;

Algeria: La Senia, Lartigue, Maison-Blanche, Blida and eventually Satif and Bône.

Tunisia: El Aouina, Souk el Arba.

The initial division of the forces and their zones of debarkation could be outlined as follows:

Morocco: 3 motorized divisions  
2 armored brigades  
40 anti-aircraft batteries

Debarkation region: Casablanca-Fedala and, depending on enemy reaction, in the southern ports: Mazagan, Safi and Mogador.

Algeria: 3 motorized divisions  
2 armored brigades  
40 anti-aircraft batteries

Debarkation region:

(a) Oran, Mers-el-Kebir, Beach at Arzew, 2 divisions, 1 armored brigade, 20 anti-aircraft batteries.

(b) Algiers (port and bay) 1 division, 1 armored brigade and 20 anti-aircraft batteries.

Tunisia: 1 motorized division  
1 armored brigade  
40 anti-aircraft batteries.

Debarkation region: Bizerta-La Goulette-Tunis. Eventually these might be transferred partially to Bône and Philippeville in case of too active enemy reaction.

The general mechanism of debarkation must be the following:

(a) Debarkations executed at dawn simultaneously in all the ports;

(b) With a view to avoiding all unfortunate reaction on the part of the police forces and the forces guarding the ports, patriots would take the control of the zones in question during the course of the night preceding the debarkation. This preliminary action is of capital importance, but it is necessary to underscore the difficulty of its preparation and its execution because of the lowered morale resulting from the recent allied setbacks and incessant Vichy propaganda.

As accessory, several special points of execution should be noted:

(a) The transports used for the first debarkation must carry a mixed load (infantry, armored units, anti-aircraft units). As soon as the infantry and armored units debarked are sufficient to support the patriots, and to avoid all possibility of an immediate internal threat, the anti-aircraft equipment must be debarked and put in place;

(b) It would be well to assure a strict liaison between the patriots and the expeditionary troops:

Before debarkation, by radio, the radio units not entering into existing networks;

After debarkation, by liaison personnel.

(c) The debarkation corps must include personnel necessary to assure port service in order to prevent all momentary defection of French personnel and to constitute in each debarkation zone a maritime base.

#### D.—*Employment of the Expeditionary Forces and Initial French Possibilities:*

The expeditionary forces will be used to oppose all diverse reactions until the French forces of French North Africa are at least partially transformed and reconstituted.

The expeditionary forces would be engaged:

For one part, in Tripoli, to combine their action with British forces operating in Cyrenaica;

For the other part, in Spanish Morocco, to insure a preventive occupation of this territory. The Moroccan operation will be assisted from the beginning, without transformation or preliminary reconstitution of regular French troops acting in the mountain zone.

As concerns French troops, their immediate possibilities are limited except for action in the mountainous region of French Morocco indicated above. It would be committing a great error to throw into the battle the Armistice (French) Army troops in their present state, that is to say, deprived of all modern matériel. One would thus destroy without appreciable result personnel of a quality difficult to replace under present circumstances.

An initial *échelon* of forces could comprise:

2 armored divisions	} 12 to 1500 tanks
6 motorized divisions	

The preparation of this *échelon* would be achieved toward the fifth or sixth week, if the technicians and the matériel indicated in Memorandum No. 1 are furnished under the conditions requested.

The second *échelon* of forces of the same importance as the first could be organized toward the third month (certain elements much earlier—starting with the second month) with the reserve that the

corresponding supplies of matériel would be assured in the time desired (these needs do not figure in Memorandum No. 1).

It appears from the foregoing indications that within a short delay there could be made available four armored divisions and twelve motorized divisions for action abroad—either in France or in another theatre of operations.

An effort of mobilization in North Africa would be pursued further, but it does not seem possible to increase the battle corps thus constituted.

The European personnel resources are limited, and it should be noted:

On the one hand, the necessity of conserving the resources necessary to supply fresh personnel to the troops in operation;

On the other hand, the obligation of allowing to remain in North Africa a French minimum to carry on economic activity and to guarantee order in the country.

---

740.0011 European War 1939/20488 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, March 18, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received March 19—7:41 p. m.]

167. For the Under Secretary from Murphy. My letters of January 12 and 13.<sup>90</sup> The military group in North Africa, headed by a French officer in whom I have confidence (described in my airmail report to you of March 14<sup>91</sup>) who heads an organization comprising 26,000 young, trained fighting men, acting in liaison with officers of the regular military establishment, has now given me a revised program suggested for American intervention in French North Africa. This is going forward by first clipper courier and a copy has also been given Naval Attaché Eddy. . . .

The French officer in question is emerging from the several elements in this area as possibly the young, fearless, experienced and capable military leader on whom we may rely. He possesses a reasonable degree of prestige. He proposes the liquidation of some of the old-line French military who by reason of age and timidity have lost their punch.

He states the opinion that hostilities will be resumed in this area as early as the month of May 1942.

The present revised program is the work of the same persons who are responsible for the program transmitted on January 12 (high-ranking French army officers).

---

<sup>90</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>91</sup> Letter of March 14, p. 283.

The program increases original estimates of American personnel and equipment which would be required should the United States determine on military intervention in this area during the near future. It also estimates that the French forces in French North Africa available within a short delay necessary to equip them would comprise 12 motorized divisions and 4 armored divisions (a French division is rated at 2,000 [20,000] effectives or approximately a total of 30,000 [300,000] men). A considerable portion of these eventually would be available for service in other theatres of operation.

Colonel Eddy urges that I suggest the necessity of an immediate answer to this plan. I recommend that it be accorded as prompt consideration as may be possible in the light of current conversations at Vichy and also that I be given whatever directives may be practicable. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.00112 European War 1939/5001

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Samuel Reber of the Division  
of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] March 19, 1942.

Participants: Sir Ronald Campbell, Mr. Noel Hall, Mr. Helm, Mr. Barclay and Mr. Wyndham White, of the British Embassy.

Mr. Dunn, PA/D

Mr. Murray, PA/M <sup>92</sup>

Mr. Atherton, Eu <sup>93</sup>

Mr. Villard, NE <sup>94</sup>

Mr. Reber, Eu

Subject: North African Supply Program.

In opening the discussion Mr. Dunn explained that the assurances which the American Government had requested of Vichy regarding the supply of goods to the Axis, the use of French territories or harbors by the Axis Powers, the situation in Madagascar, and the French Fleet, have now been received for what they are worth. This would appear to indicate that Vichy finds it advisable to give up the practices which brought about tension in Franco-American relations and the suspension of the North African program.

In the light of these assurances the question now arose whether the North African traffic should be resumed and, if so, in what form.

---

<sup>92</sup> Wallace Murray, appointed Adviser on Political Relations, March 13.

<sup>93</sup> Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

<sup>94</sup> Henry S. Villard, Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

Mr. Noel Hall explained that in the opinion of the British Government, there were three approaches to the problem. The first involved a substantial offer for a considerable quantity of goods for North Africa which might be used both as a lever to obtain vital war materials from North Africa, or at least prevent them from reaching the enemy, and to have a political effect among the French people when it became known that the British and American Governments were embarking on an ambitious program to supply North Africa. A refusal on the part of the French Government to put this in effect would be regarded by the people as evidence of Germany's unwillingness to allow them to receive supplies. The second method would be to work out a minimum program which would enable the United States to keep its present position. The third would be to establish a program sufficient to maintain the economic life of North Africa on the basis of agreed quotas of regular limited shipments in return for which such products as cork, could be secured.

It was agreed that the success of the larger program would depend, in the first instance, upon the availability of means of transportation. In view of the British Government's expressed preference for this program, however, it was felt that further study should be given to it in order to determine the commodities which might be needed by the United Nations, the commodities which they did not wish to have the Germans get through shipments to Metropolitan France, and the commodities which might be offered. An adequate supply of the latter would be determined on a barter basis in return for the strategic materials desperately needed. It was appreciated, however, that there might be certain difficulties in obtaining authorization for export in view of increasing shortages of goods in the United States.

After discussing whether a resumption of the regular program, without going into the larger possibilities, might weaken the political value of the latter, full agreement was reached upon one sailing of the two vessels now in American ports and that the Department should communicate this to the French Government.

The British representatives at the meeting recognized and so stated the importance of maintaining, for political and military reasons, relations with the French Government which would permit American observers and control officers to remain not only in France, but which was more important, in North Africa as well.

The British Embassy undertook to continue studies for a larger program and the American representatives on their part were to communicate the decision regarding the release of vessels with cargoes to the French.



740.00112 European War 1939/4996 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, March 23, 1942—6 p. m.  
[Received March 24—12:15 a. m.]

176. From Murphy. I received today the visit of Massenet, special Vichy representative for edible oils, here to participate in conference of North African and Vichy officials including Leroy Beaulieu. Conference designed to develop policy in connection with the shipment of edible oils from French West Africa.

According to Massenet, High Commissioner Boisson at Dakar informs Vichy that it is impossible to ship 130,000 tons of peanuts and palm kernels from the interior district unless 2,000 tons of gasoline or alcohol are provided for the operation of trucks. Vichy insists therefore that Algeria ship 2,000 tons of alcohol for this purpose. Massenet inquires whether we would regard such shipment as violation of North African accord. He also inquires whether Department has taken a decision on Vichy's notes of March 14<sup>98</sup> regarding resumption of operation of North African economic accord about which he understands there was a Departmental conference last Tuesday.

I told him that I had no information from the Department but that I would inquire whether it considers shipment of Algerian alcohol to French West Africa as permissible under the accord.

Massenet also said that the French obligation to deliver to Germany under an accord of August 14, [1941?], edible oil at the rate of 2500 tons a month is not being observed and that Barnaud<sup>99</sup> has been authorized to negotiate with the Germans looking to a cancellation of the accord stating French inability to live up to it.

My visitor said that France's policy on colonial deliveries to Germany hinges on the American North African accord. If the United States performs under it France has the protection of its restriction provisions against exportation to Germany and Italy. Without that protection the French have nothing on which to cushion their resistance to Axis demands.

I pointed out that the stumbling block to the supply of French West Africa to which we were sympathetic is the deliveries of edible oil products to France of which a considerable percentage is going to the Axis. I suggested the opinion that until a formula is found to prevent this supplying the Axis our shipment to French West

<sup>98</sup> See telegrams No. 390, March 14, 4 p. m., and No. 391, March 14, 5 p. m., from the Ambassador in France, pp. 148 and 149, respectively.

<sup>99</sup> Jacques Barnaud, French delegate general for Franco-German economic negotiations.

Africa of vital items such as petroleum products would appear to be out of the question.

May I request the Department's advice regarding the transfer of Algerian alcohol to French West Africa?

Repeated to Vichy. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.00112 European War 1939/4996: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers  
(Cole)*

WASHINGTON, March 30, 1942—8 p. m.

87. For Murphy. Your 176, March 23, 6 p. m. In view of the ultimate Axis destination of a large proportion of the edible oils exported from French West Africa, the Department is unable to agree to the shipment of alcohol from Algeria to move these products from the interior. Such an operation would constitute indirect aid to the enemy, and would be contrary to the spirit of the recent assurances given by the French Government regarding supplies for Libya.

As you have pointed out, the question of these edible oils remains the principal obstacle to discussion of economic aid for French West Africa. If a formula can be offered which would prevent supplying of the Axis with these products, the subject would receive prompt consideration.

Repeat to Vichy.

WELLES

---

740.00112 European War 1939/5247: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Ambassador in France  
(Leahy)*<sup>1</sup>

ALGIERS, April 1, 1942—3 p. m.

From Murphy. Your March 28, noon. On my return from a trip to Southern Algeria, Admiral Fénard, Secretary General for French Africa, asked me to call for a discussion of questions relating to the resumption of shipments under the North African economic accord urging that we recommend the immediate shipment of petroleum products, copper sulphate, cotton textiles, et cetera. Fénard of course was informed by Vichy of the contents of Department's last note (Department's 198 of March 22, 4 p. m., to you<sup>2</sup>).

---

<sup>1</sup> Repeated to the Department by the Embassy in France; received April 4, 3:57 p. m.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 152.

Under injunction that he be not quoted as he is timid about discussing politics without Darlan's permission he referred to the current deterioration of Franco-German relations mentioning the increasing pressure which the Germans are bringing to bear with especial relation to this area. He said, however, that the pressure was rather in the form of bribes than threats saying that "he feared that the Germans would offer to supply this area with gasoline and gas oil in a manner that would be difficult to refuse"; that the German aim is to manipulate us out of this area. He urged that it is definitely our interest to resume shipments promptly as a play to defeat German and Italian intentions.

Fénard and others also refer to the possibility of Laval<sup>3</sup> resuming power as remote. According to Fénard, Admiral Darlan "has reason to believe" that Laval would not accept power now at any price, and the Marshal has no intention of inviting him. According to Fénard and another well-informed source who said he lunched with Laval recently the latter is too intelligent to undertake an all-out collaborationist program at the present time, he knows the country would not tolerate it, and he is said furthermore to have evolved away from the beliefs he expressed so often after the Armistice in the certainty of a German victory.

A week's trip in the Algerian Sahara where conditions are comparable to other North African districts leaves no doubt in my mind regarding the adverse economic situation in this area. The rail head is approximately 300 kilometers to the south of Algiers. Beyond that stage motor transport was the rule prior to the Armistice. Automotive traffic is now practically non-existent (I saw less than a dozen cars in 1400 kilometers traveled) and the camel and burro now provide the only means of transport. The reorganized camel caravans which operated to and from the far south as in ancient times provide many local cities with only a thin margin of subsistence. There is need of practically every type of essential commodity, and that of clothing and textiles by both Europeans and natives is of course urgent.

On the other side of the medal there is the story of possibly over a million sheep smuggled during the past months by the Arabs with Italian connivance to Libya as well as the smuggling of large quantities of cereals, olive oil, wine and other foodstuffs. That there is a considerable clandestine traffic via the wide open spaces of the Sahara is undoubtedly true.

It is also unfortunate that on the part of some civilian and military officials in that district as in others, there is noticeable Anglophobia and distrust of British military ability as well as of British long-term

---

<sup>3</sup> Pierre Laval; named Chief of French Government, April 18, 1942.

intentions regarding this area. On the other hand anti-Axis and pro-American sentiment is the rule. I have the growing conviction that if by some stretch of the imagination it could be supposed that the United States should decide to send a large scale expeditionary force to French North Africa that it would be welcomed with open arms by the general population and the bulk of officials. But so many who bring up that subject in informal discussion volunteer the suggestion that it must be an American force with no British participation "at least for the beginning".

I should like to make the following suggestions regarding the North African economic accord of which I believe it may be said that it has proven a useful instrument in supporting those French elements who have desired to resist Axis demands for concessions in this area. The suspension of the accord's operator [*operation*] subsequent to the departure of General Weygand was fully justified by the dubious situation then existing. If the accord is to be useful in the future I believe we have arrived at a point where we should breathe some life into it. It should be stressed that our performance under the accord in the past year of its existence has never been of really important volume. I estimate that thus far we have not shipped under the accord more than about 60,000 tons of American products. The essential needs of French North Africa for imported goods, however, are measured in hundreds of thousands of tons. Unquestionably there is an urgent present need of over 300,000 tons of merchandise. But the four available French ships in the New York-Casablanca traffic cannot possibly deliver more than a maximum of 25,000 tons of goods monthly. I believe that of the quotas approved for North Africa by our Government and the British less than 15% were actually delivered during the past year. No petroleum products have been delivered for the past 6 months. Since the departure of Weygand only two small cargo ships have sailed from New York for French North Africa together with some small lots of merchandise from Martinique. It is obvious that the material basis on which we rely [*rely*] to influence the French aside from the question of principle is exceedingly flimsy.

It is also fairly obvious that we can count on basic sympathy for our cause in this area. If that did not exist I believe the accord would have been denounced long ago. It is increasingly difficult to persuade North African officials and the business community of the value of our economic cooperation in the light of our skimpy performance during the past 6 months. Some officials and businessmen say quite openly that we seem to enjoy talking in a grand manner of the economic aid we give North Africa but that our actual deliveries are ridiculously insignificant; that we are only bluffing.

I believe also that if we undertake really substantial performance under the accord we should also insist on some control of the North African food deliveries to France where according to the stories reaching us here a large share falls to German and Italian hands.

I recommend that in view of the fact that this area still remains free of Axis occupation 5 months after the departure of General Weygand; that the status of our control personnel and consular establishments is unchanged; that the disposition of French officials continues friendly and cooperative; that the accord enables the United States to obtain some strategic materials such as cork from North Africa; and that an opportunity to use this area for our future war purposes seems to exist, that we make a substantial effort to cooperate economically with French North Africa. If we are to hope for the possibility of independent North African action it would be well to prove that this area which is dependent on France for the bulk of its supplies can look to us (naturally on a pay as you go French shipping basis) for that support. I think it is very important to bear in mind that if we are to hope for independent action from this territory which industrially is dependent on France it would be well to prove that we are able to provide for its needs.

I should be grateful if you would have any part of this telegram which you might consider of interest repeated to the Department with whatever comment if any you may feel disposed to make. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.0011 European War 1939/20761: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, April 2, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received 1:33 p. m.]

203. From Murphy. My 167, March 18, 3 p. m. I recommend that a qualified regular Army officer be detailed now to make contact with the persons involved in my telegram under reference. It is necessary that someone with the language, technical qualifications and experience in France possessed by Major Louis Fortier formerly Assistant Military Attaché in Paris now with MID<sup>4</sup> in Washington be sent for this purpose.

[Here follows comment on personnel matters.]

The enclosure to the Department's strictly confidential letter of March 5, 1942<sup>5</sup> (secret memorandum of February 25<sup>6</sup>) manifests a serious interest in the military possibilities of French North Africa

---

<sup>4</sup> Military Intelligence Division (G-2).

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

<sup>6</sup> Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of Staff, p. 258.

and requests that conversations be continued with a view to determining the capacity and ability of the persons in question to collaborate. It would appear obvious that at least one qualified regular Army officer be available on the spot to study the problem and remain in practical contact with these French military elements. The persons mentioned in my 167, March 18, 3 p. m., insist that a qualified officer arrive here for conversations with them this month.

It is of great importance for them to gain an idea of approximately when we may be able and ready to extend our cooperation. Timing in the development of their organization is naturally of the essence. They state that if we should be ready for example in 2 months their program would necessarily be greatly different than would be the case if we were prepared only in 4 months. Delay, of course, represents for them greater risk and difficulty in maintaining the morale of their people. That is why they are eager to talk with a qualified military representative who would be able to outline our position.

I urgently recommend that an arrangement be made at once to send Major Fortier to Tangier in one capacity or another preferably as Military Attaché. Please give me the benefit of your telegraphic comment. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.00112 European War 1939/5195 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, April 6, 1942—11 p. m.  
[Received April 6—6:33 p. m.]

212. From Murphy. The Secretary General for French Africa, Admiral Fénard, again asked me to call today. He said all the news he receives from France confirmed what he previously stated (see my April 1, 3 p. m.) that Laval will not be returned to power in the near future.

He eagerly inquired for news regarding the resumption of shipments under the North African accord urging that we manifest a vigorously sympathetic interest in this area. He said that personally he has gone far out on a limb advocating to Vichy that French Africa should cooperate with and rely on the United States for supplies, that he detests the Germans and knows that when the time is ripe France and the United States must pull together. He expressed apprehension that if we hesitate too long the Germans will have their way adding that he knows conversations between Barnaud, Leroy Beaulieu and German representatives are now in course regarding supplies for this area.

He said that there has been a sharp decline of North African exports to France and that North Africa can do but little to supply the French wheat deficit which he estimates at 130,000 tons.

Fénard repeatedly urged that we could afford to take a broad view of the question of economic aid for North Africa.

I inquired whether he could suggest a formula under which edible oil shipments for [*from*] French West Africa to Germany might at least temporarily be suspended. He said that it should not be forgotten that the operation of the French Merchant Marine was permitted by the Germans after the Armistice only on the basis that France would deliver certain colonial products; that the Germans are exceedingly dissatisfied with what they are getting and that they are fully capable of sinking the French ships engaged in the North African traffic unless the French make some pretense of deliveries. He thought that if we wished to make a point of such deliveries that it should be done in a friendly informal way at Vichy, not facing the French with a threat, but merely suggesting that the French might wish to inform the Germans that we were threatening discontinuance of all economic assistance to French Africa unless a reduction of the deliveries of colonial products to Germany was effected.

Fénard concluded by saying that the resignation of Admiral Muselier<sup>7</sup> has had a most favorable effect in French Naval circles increasing their confidence in our Government.

Repeated to Vichy. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.00112 European War 1939/5830

*Press Release Issued by the Department of State, April 7, 1942*

As a result of conversations with the French Government<sup>8</sup> relating to a resumption of the program of economic assistance under the North African agreement, satisfactory assurances with regard to the issues involved have been received from the French Government which will permit the agreed departure of two French vessels now in New York with cargo of limited supplies for North Africa.

Conditions governing previous shipments with the undertaking that the supplies thus received or their equivalent shall not in any way serve to further Axis ends, will likewise regulate these shipments and their distribution to the local populations under the direct super-

<sup>7</sup> Vice Adm. Emile Muselier, Commander in Chief of the Free French naval forces.

<sup>8</sup> For correspondence regarding these conversations, see pp. 123 ff.

vision of American control officers. No military supplies of any character are to be included in the shipments.

It is also agreed that a simultaneous departure of two ships carrying materials from North Africa to the United States will take place.

---

8518.00/208

*The Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling) to the  
Consul at Tunis (Doolittle)*

WASHINGTON, April 14, 1942.

DEAR HOOKER: We have read with a good deal of interest a copy of your letter of February 25, 1942, to Colonel Eddy,<sup>9</sup> and have noted your comments on the possibility of Arab cooperation in North Africa. There is one point, however, on which I think we should make ourselves clear before misunderstandings arise, and that is on the subject of a so-called "palace revolution."

Let me say at once that the Department would consider any attempt to turn the Arab population against the French as dangerous in the highest degree. Our policy in French North Africa is directed to building up the confidence of the French authorities and the French population in general, and to induce them to support the democratic cause in one way or another. It is obvious of course that what counts in this connection is the friendly attitude of French military officials, and if anything were done to destroy such favorable sentiment as we may have aroused, our entire objective would be defeated.

While the feelings of the Arab population are of some concern to us, the French position is of much greater importance. If we were implicated in a political overturn such as you suggest, it might arouse such bitter resentment on the part of the French that we might presently find ourselves ejected from North Africa altogether.

We therefore feel that you should exercise the utmost caution in any contacts you may have with Arab elements who have anti-French views. While an Arab organization would undoubtedly be useful to us if it were principally concerned in opposing the Axis, the Department would look with strong disfavor on any move which would in effect sponsor any kind of a revolution against the present administration in Tunisia.

Sincerely yours,

PAUL H. ALLING

---

<sup>9</sup> Not printed.



740.00112 European War 1939/5258: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, April 14, 1942—noon.

[Received 10:52 p. m.]

235. From Murphy. I interviewed Governor General Chatel of Algeria yesterday. Chatel, who is well disposed, maintains that German activity in this area is at a low ebb. He talked at length regarding Algeria's unfavorable economic situation, particularly the need for fuel. He maintains that Algerian normal pre-war coal consumption averaged 100,000 tons monthly. Kenadza he said is now producing 18,000 tons monthly with about 8,000 tons from Djerda. About 20,000 tons monthly are received from France. Algerian alcohol production, he estimates, will approximate 65,000 tons this year. Due to the lack of liquid fuels he considers that Algerian agricultural production will be 30 percent below last year's notwithstanding that greater areas have been sown. He asserted that American economic cooperation during the coming months is essential in this area but said that we should not insist on too much publicity to avoid exciting Axis representatives. He does not doubt that Algerian public opinion wholeheartedly favors the American cause but entertains reservations regarding British intentions.

He brought up the subject of the activity of American control officers in Algeria suggesting that they avoid the appearance of propaganda work among the natives.

A story had come to him from an undisclosed source to the effect that Vice Consul Knox, for example, had spread the word among certain natives that the French were on the toboggan and that it was useless for the natives to continue loyal to the French, they must look to the United States. He said this was in line with German propaganda efforts and if we are engaging in such propaganda we are wasting our time as our effort and that of the Germans simply cancel each other. The story is so patently absurd that I denied it promptly, insisting that the Governor General ascertain the source which I believe to be the Parti Populaire Français (Jacques Doriot) group about whose pro-Nazi sympathies and activity there is no doubt.

An official just arrived from Vichy who formerly was attached to the Vice President of the Council of Ministers tell me as have others that the policy of France-German collaboration is finished. He also said that a Gauleiter form of Government in the French-occupied zone is an imminent possibility; that approximately 150,000 French workmen have been recruited for work in Germany; that

the Germans want to eliminate American influence from French North Africa; that food shipments from French North Africa are approximately 30 to 40 percent less than they were last year. He heard in Vichy the subject of American military intervention in this area discussed by French officials who are expecting it and whose sole question seems to be whether such action will be well timed and adequately done. He asserted that we have every political reason to execute an economic program in this area on a substantial basis.

Repeated to Vichy. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.0011 European War 1939/20994 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, April 14, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received April 15—12:48 a. m.]

236. From Murphy. During his stay in North Africa I have had several conversations with Alain Darlan, the son of Admiral Darlan, who seems to enjoy his father's confidence. Saturday evening I dined with him and Admiral Fénard. They devoted themselves to the following propositions: Marshal Pétain and Admiral Darlan are convinced of an American victory. They want to be on our side and believe that we stand for the restoration of the French Empire. They hate the Germans and loathe the Italians. They are unable to do more now than attempt to keep the French nation together and enable the population to subsist. The French Fleet will never fall into Axis hands and obviously the French naval personnel would never fight with or for the Axis. Marshal Pétain and Admiral Darlan are determined to keep North Africa free of Axis domination. We, they reiterated, should be comprehensive and not too hard when concessions to the Axis are made as long as the more important objectives are attained.

I told the contacts that we may have felt on occasion that the French Government which professes friendship had lacked in frankness. I suggested that when minor concessions are exacted our Ambassador should be taken into confidence before the fact and not obliged to depend on outside sources for information. Darlan replied that his father knows we feel that way but that Admiral Darlan had no faith in our ability to keep a secret. He said, for example, that when Admiral Darlan talked with a German representative the latter clicked his heels after the conversations and departed. The French could be sure that nothing would leak out of Berlin subsequently. Washington, however, is different he said

and the press and radio seem to be informed of everything. Admiral Darlan understands he asserted that under the parliamentary system secrecy is almost impossible. He suggested, however, that if some system could be devised whereby only the President, a few top State Department officials and Admiral Leahy would be informed of confidential matters of importance he was certain that the Marshal and his father would be much more inclined to take us into their confidence.

They urged a friendly gesture on our part respecting Saint Pierre et Miquelon<sup>10</sup> and also suggested that we propose an amicable adjustment of the French Somaliland predicament by the establishment of a temporary neutral commission at Djibouti to enable the population to survive.

The eagerness and apparent friendly sincerity with which young Darlan and Fénard spoke and their unconcealed desire to see France cooperate with the United States are very encouraging.

Repeated to Vichy. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.0011 European War 1939/21085a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers*  
(Cole)

WASHINGTON, April 16, 1942—4 p. m.

104. For Murphy. I am giving consideration to your air mail letter of March 14 which I have just received, and will telegraph you again as soon as possible.

WELLES

---

740.0011 European War 1939/20761 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers*  
(Cole)

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1942—4 p. m.

111. For Murphy. I am informed that should the present *status quo* even approximately be maintained consideration will be given in due course to the recommendation contained in your 203 of April 2, 10 a. m.

WELLES

---

<sup>10</sup> For correspondence regarding the seizure of these islands by the Free French forces, see pp. 654 ff.

II. Suspension of the Economic Aid Program Following Laval's Return to Power in France; Considerations for Revival of Program (April-June)

740.0011 European War 1939/21086 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, April 18, 1942—midnight.

[Received April 19—11:26 p. m.]

248. Personal for the Acting Secretary from Murphy.<sup>11</sup> Your 104, April 16, 4 p. m.<sup>12</sup> After conversations with the leaders involved in my March 14,<sup>13</sup> it was decided 4 days ago to send one of them who knows Laval<sup>14</sup> well to Vichy to ascertain the lay of the land. He saw Laval on yesterday for an hour returning today by plane to Algiers. We dined together this evening and the following is a brief account of his conversation with Laval:

In reply to a direct question Laval stated he still believes in a German victory. Our friend suggested that he had put the question unofficially as a friend and as they were alone he wanted the low-down and not what Laval had to say officially to the Germans adding that 4 months ago in a conversation with our friends at Paris Laval had not expressed the same conviction. Laval reiterated in a less positive tone that he believed in a German victory but that he hoped for a negotiated peace. Laval talked at length about his qualifications as the eventual mediator between the United States and Germany repeating the old clichés we heard in 1940 even mentioning his American son-in-law. Laval said that his name was being dragged in the mud by the American press and radio during the past week but that with time they would become persuaded of their error and his merits.

Our friend said Laval is worried and apprehensive having heavy police protection. He is disappointed over his inability to include certain personalities in his Cabinet mentioning chiefly de Monzie, Bonnet, and Bergery.

The conversation then came to the matter which I hope justifies this telegram. Laval disclaimed knowledge that the two North African ships had been held up by our decision. Our friend said that while Laval professed the greatest interest in French Africa everyone knows that Laval's imagination stops at the continental frontier and that he really cares little and knows less about French

<sup>11</sup> Robert D. Murphy, Counselor of Embassy in France, on special assignment in French North Africa to control and supervise the economic aid program.

<sup>12</sup> *Ante*, p. 284.

<sup>13</sup> Letter of March 14, p. 263.

<sup>14</sup> Pierre Laval was appointed French Chief of Government on April 18, 1942; for correspondence on this subject, see pp. 154 ff. After Laval's return to power, Acting Secretary of State Welles had stated to the press that plans for resumption of economic assistance to French North Africa would be held in abeyance (Department of State *Bulletin*, April 18, 1942, p. 337).

Africa. He professed to our friend an intention to work for continued cooperation between the United States and French Africa. Our friend told him that he intended to stay in contact with me and Laval inquired why I remained in Africa saying he wanted me to come to Vichy to talk about this and other questions.

Our friend parted with the conviction that we have several weeks time before the Laval organization gets into action in French Africa as he has much to do in metropolitan France. Jacques Guérard appointed in the new Government as Secretary General to the Chef du Gouvernement it is understood will "coordinate" French African Affairs. He is definitely bad news. As former Chef de Cabinet of Paul Baudouin<sup>15</sup> he was responsible for much Franco-German collaboration. It is also rumored that a German with the rank of Consul General named Rahn who accompanied Guérard to Syria in January 1941 will undertake similar activity in this area. It is also rumored that the present Secretariat General for French Africa now under the sympathetic direction of Admiral Fénard will be suppressed.

Our contact emphasized in the strongest terms that we have nothing to gain by any sincere effort to cooperate with the present French Government, and for French Africa we should urgently contemplate action along the lines of the plan outlined in my March 14. Our friend said Darlan<sup>16</sup> officially now represents exactly zero. Darlan has accepted a gift of a Rothschild (presumably Edouard)<sup>17</sup> yacht for his lifetime use as Admiral of the Fleet and also a gift from the state of a property of 1,000 acres. This story is causing a profound impression in Navy circles here.

Our friend and the group in whom we are interested signal a tense atmosphere growing in volume on the part of the French military.

In France he said for the first time since the Armistice a group of officers protested against the execution of Frenchmen in the occupied zone requesting permission to take leave and proceed there as civilians to engage in guerilla warfare against the Germans.

In North Africa there has been an important meeting of general officers about which I shall report. There are signs of tension in other quarters. You know that the C. O. I.<sup>18</sup> has authorized the delivery of certain war matériel to this area as well as payment of funds to the group the subject of my March 14. The regular Army is interested in the matériel. You will appreciate my impatience when it is considered that there is a possibility of throwing several hundred thousand trained men especially French officers and non-commissioned officers into the fight on our side.

<sup>15</sup> Paul Baudouin, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, June-October 1940.

<sup>16</sup> Adm. Jean François Darlan, Commander in Chief of all French Armed Forces.

<sup>17</sup> French banker.

<sup>18</sup> Coordinator of Information, Col. William J. Donovan.

I cannot urge you too strongly to enable me to give these people some immediate encouragement if this is at all possible. I think this an opportunity we should take at the time. I know it may be unfair to mention it but practically a year has elapsed without to my knowledge the offer to our friends in this area of as much as a cap pistol as practical encouragement. May I renew the recommendation made in my 203, April 2, 10 a. m.,<sup>19</sup> referred to in Department's 111, April 18, 4 a. m. [*p. m.*],<sup>20</sup> for the assignment of Louis Fortier<sup>21</sup> as special representative to discuss technical military questions.

Our friend proceeds tomorrow to Dakar where he will obtain the reaction of High Commissioner Boisson<sup>22</sup> who left Vichy this week thoroughly disgusted. There are rumors of Weygand's<sup>23</sup> return but I am unable to confirm them. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

851.00/2757 : Telegram

*The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State*

TANGIER, April 20, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received April 22—2:43 p. m.]

169. Following repeated to Algiers, Vichy, and Madrid are observations of one of Noguès'<sup>24</sup> personal advisors who is a friend of mine of longstanding.

Laval's entry into the Government is not expected to result in granting to Germany of bases in Morocco or any advantages they do not now possess.

No changes in either personnel or policy are anticipated in French Protectorate as the withdrawal of economic aid to Morocco and French North Africa by United States can only play into the hands of the Germans. The rupture of the economic accord will make it all the easier for Germany to press for the withdrawal of our control officer whose *raison d'être* is the continued existence of the accord.

My informant sees a close parallel between the role which Laval essays to play in present history of France and that of Talleyrand. He commented "I do not admire Talleyrand the man but one cannot gainsay his political genius". This is a parallel which has been

---

<sup>19</sup> *Ante*, p. 278.

<sup>20</sup> *Ante*, p. 284.

<sup>21</sup> Former Assistant Military Attaché in Paris.

<sup>22</sup> Pierre Boisson, High Commissioner in French West Africa.

<sup>23</sup> Gen. Maxime Weygand, former Delegate General of the French Government in North Africa; for correspondence concerning his removal, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, pp. 455 ff.

<sup>24</sup> Gen. Albert Noguès, Resident General in the French Zone of Morocco.

made to me recently by other Frenchmen whose detestation of Laval and friendship for United States is beyond question.

My interlocutor said there was no doubt that Pétain's<sup>25</sup> action had been taken in the interest of France as Pétain saw it under the inexorable pressure of circumstances and events. However one might dislike Laval it was a lack of realism to consider him as a traitor or one who would not consider first of all France's interests and who would not seek to achieve them by all the passionate devotion to France of the French peasant.

Laval was consumed by hatred for England because that power had in his opinion destroyed his plan for European peace. Then too there was the deep-seated French peasant's distrust as personified by Laval of Bolshevism.

"I for my part," it was said, "do not have this fear which animates so many Frenchmen. In any case the world faces the greatest social revolution in its history. It will come willy nilly Russia. It is more likely to be a social revolution dominated by the Anglo-Saxon world. But this Bolshevist bogey must be taken into account in estimating and seeking to understand French politics."

I said so far as my information went of American public opinion the Marshal's acceptance of Laval was interpreted as complete submission to Germany.

He thought this a mistaken interpretation.

The turn of events would mean a closer economic collaboration dictated by France's imperative need to survive but would not involve a military collaboration or concessions of the fleet or North Africa. Even in 1940 Laval had opposed the granting of facilities in North Africa to the Germans and it was unreasonable to suppose he would grant them more now than he had been disposed to give them.

My informant hoped we would not by breaking relations deprive France of its only support against Germany.

I referred to the great activity of the Germans in Tangier (see my 162 of April 17 [18] and 166, [April 19] and 167 of April 18<sup>26</sup> and asked his interpretation. He said he thought the increase in the staff of the German official establishment was due to two factors. First, Germany had a great surplus of diplomatic officers with little outlet for them. Tangier offered a field for their activity. Second, the Germans were obviously disturbed by the increase in our staff and were determined to match it. They had shown themselves singularly inattentive to North Africa and were now repairing this omission.

---

<sup>25</sup> Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, French Chief of State.

<sup>26</sup> None printed.

He saw no sign whatsoever of an imminent German military move in French North Africa. The French military in Morocco saw no sign of such a move. They believe the Germans would concentrate everything on the eastern offensive with any additional activity directed toward Egypt. A military move in Morocco would represent a diversion entirely foreign to German strategic conception and would serve no apparent German interests.

The pressure exercised by Germany to obtain a new government in France had been undertaken owing to German desire to protect its rear at this critical movement [*moment?*]. To initiate a military move in French North Africa now would be to undertake what Germany was precisely seeking to avoid, the opening of another front and the assumption of new liabilities.

(CHILDS

851 00/2750 . Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, April 21, 1942—noon.

[Received 8:22 p. m.]

249. From Murphy. Chatel, Governor General of Algeria, tells me this morning that in his opinion the Laval Government could be far worse from our point of view since it does not include members of the pro-Nazi Jacques Doriot group<sup>27</sup> or extremists like Déat or Luchaire.<sup>28</sup> He is convinced that Laval notwithstanding everything will make an effort to work with the United States and also that the Germans want Laval in power because they would like to use him in an effort eventually to negotiate peace. Temporarily he said the Germans believe that Laval can hold the country in an inert state. If a radical of the Doriot stamp were put in power an uncontrollable situation could easily develop.

The Governor General states that there is a great deal of nervousness and tension in North Africa, that he is taking special police measures but that he believes there will be a period of several weeks of calm. In his opinion Laval is incapable of taking immediate unfavorable action in French Africa and has no such intention. He is convinced that the Laval Government is purely a transition affair. Marshal Pétain he said has definitely lost prestige in this area and he considers Darlan without current political importance.

Repeated to Vichy. [Murphy.]

COLE

<sup>27</sup> Parti Populaire Français.

<sup>28</sup> Marcel Déat and Jean Luchaire, editors of the French newspapers *L'Oeuvre* and *Les Nouveaux Temps*, respectively; both newspapers under German control



740.00112 European War 1939/5315: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, April 21, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received April 21—4: 42 p. m.]

253. From Murphy. My 248 to the Under Secretary. Our friends suggest that we should allay Laval's suspicions regarding whatever may be our eventual intentions concerning French North Africa. They suggest that if possible the two ships which are understood to be ready to sail be allowed to depart from New York for Casablanca as their importance is negligible. Their departure would encourage Laval to believe that we intend to cooperate. It is also suggested that I send to the Department in a code which we know the French censors will decipher several recommendations to the effect that we cooperate with the Laval Government in respect of North Africa. This would be designed to gain time and enable us to maintain our position in French North Africa until we may be able to take a decision on other questions.

The foregoing appears to deserve sympathetic consideration and I shall send two or three messages in gray, marked for the Under Secretary, urging economic support for this area.

Repeated to Vichy. [Murphy.]

COLE

851.01B11/134½

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser on Political Relations  
(Murray)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 21, 1942.

Mr. Paul Guérin, Special Economic Representative of the North African Authorities, came to see me this afternoon at his request to discuss his situation in the light of the recent political developments at Vichy.

M. Guérin informed me that certain of the younger members of the French Embassy staff, who are greatly shocked and discouraged over the resumption of power by Laval at Vichy, held a conference among themselves last night to discuss their future. As a result of this meeting the following have tendered their resignations to the Ambassador:

Mr. Léon Marchal, Counselor of Embassy  
Baron James Baeyens, First Secretary of Embassy  
Mr. Charles Lucet, Second Secretary of Embassy  
Mr. Etienne Burin des Roziers, Second Secretary

since they are unwilling to function under the instructions of Laval, who has assumed the portfolio of Foreign Minister.

What M. Guérin wanted particularly to discuss was his own peculiar and separate status as Special Economic Representative of the North African Authorities. It will be recalled that he is in this country on a special mission and that he was actually here before the inauguration of the North African economic program to make certain modest purchases of coal for the Moroccan Railways, of which his father is Director. After the Murphy-Weygand Agreement<sup>29</sup> went into effect we intimated to General Weygand that it would be quite agreeable to us if M. Guérin were selected to conduct the negotiations incidental to the operation of the economic program. We had already become well acquainted with M. Guérin and all in the Department who knew him had, we believe, respect for his patriotism and integrity. While M. Guérin has necessarily had to communicate with his Government through the Embassy in Washington, he has nevertheless maintained a separate and independent status in many respects.

In view of the above circumstances and because of his great reluctance to see all American connection with North Africa severed, M. Guérin has not yet decided to sever his connection with the North African Authorities, and is anxious to know how the Department would view his continuance here particularly in the event of a rupture of relations between this Government and that at Vichy. What, in other words, would his status in that eventuality be and would he be assimilated to the Embassy and obliged to leave the country with the Embassy staff?

I told M. Guérin that I would take note of the information he had conveyed to me and the questions raised with regard to himself and that due consideration would be given to his inquiry.

In reply to my inquiry of M. Guérin as to whether he believed the Laval Government would recall M. Henry-Haye<sup>30</sup> for consultation in view of the imminent departure of Admiral Leahy, M. Guérin said that while he had no knowledge of the intentions of M. Laval he would nevertheless venture the guess that M. Laval had no intention of withdrawing Henry-Haye from Washington. On the contrary, he felt sure that within a few days M. Laval would make a statement regarding the future of Franco-American relations that would in all likelihood be ingratiating and even complimentary to the United States. He would probably take the line that France had no quarrel with the United States and therefore saw no reason why this Government should pick a quarrel with France; that France

---

<sup>29</sup> See footnote 35, p. 226.

<sup>30</sup> Gaston Henry-Haye, French Ambassador in the United States.

had found it necessary to restore friendly relations with Germany and to collaborate with her in order to safeguard the vital interests of France but that in following such a policy France saw no reason why perfectly normal relations with the United States could not be continued.

With regard to the situation in North Africa itself, M. Guérin takes a different view. He feels certain that the Germans will bring strong pressure upon M. Laval to oust Murphy and the American Vice Consuls unless we give early evidence of our intention to resume the North African economic program. When I suggested that such a drastic attitude with regard to North Africa would appear to be inconsistent with the ingratiating attitude which M. Guérin feels M. Laval will assume with regard to the relations between Vichy and Washington, M. Guérin expressed the view that even though the Germans might eventually wish to force the severance of relations between France and the United States they would be unlikely to try to force the issue pending the outcome of the Russian campaign.

---

740.00112 European War 1939/5352 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, April 27, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received April 28—1 a. m.]

265. From Murphy. Admiral Fénard, Secretary General for French Africa, asked me to call for a discussion of several economic questions including the shipments of alcohol from Algeria to French West Africa (see Department's 87, March 30, 8 p. m.<sup>31</sup>). It appears that it has been found impracticable to send Diesel motor trucks to French West Africa. Fénard pleads that we interpose no objection to shipment of Algerian alcohol to French West Africa at this time because such opposition fortifies the position of those elements who would like to see the North African accord entirely eliminated. Under the accord these opponents assert that France receives no benefits having obtained no merchandise for months whereas its hands are tied by the restrictive provisions of the accord. The clause against reexport, Fénard points out, was designed to restrict exports to Europe rather than the exchange of commodities among the four territories of French Africa.

Does the Department wish to review this question which has some importance in respect of the situation of our control organization in French North Africa? It is not impossible that Vichy may decide

---

<sup>31</sup> *Ante*, p. 275.

that as we have taken the initiative suspending the accord its restrictive provisions become *ipso facto* inoperative.

Fénard is proceeding to Vichy April 28 for a discussion of the foregoing and other economic questions relating to French Africa.

He also expects to obtain Darlan's private view on current developments. The Admiral indulged in a long exposé of the situation of the French naval units at Toulon (he formerly commanded the *Dunkerque*) stating that based on information from the "best sources" he could assure me positively that these ships were in no danger of being turned over to the Axis. He asserted that Allied countries in causing so much effervescence over Laval (whom personally he detests) and moving towards a rupture of relations with France are playing directly into the hands of the Axis.

Admiral Fénard has become vehemently pro-American and quite openly states that France's whole problem revolves around the question when the United States is going to be able to supply France adequate military equipment to enable it to fight its way out of its present predicament.

Repeated to Vichy and Tangier. [Murphy.]

COLE

740.00112 European War 1939/5362: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, April 29, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received 5:02 p. m.]

275. Personal for the Under Secretary from Murphy. My 253, April 21, 6 p. m. Pierre Laval's expressed desire to cooperate with the United States is of course most encouraging and undoubtedly will open the door to friendly economic relations between French North Africa and the United States. I believe that we should continue our efforts along these lines in an endeavor to solve some of the acute economic problems prevailing in this area.

Repeated to Vichy. [Murphy.]

COLE

740.0011 European War 1939/21373: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, May 3, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 11:38 a. m.]

283. For the Under Secretary from Murphy. Your 104, April 16, 4 p.m.<sup>32</sup> The group described in my March 14<sup>33</sup> now inform me that

<sup>32</sup> *Ante*, p. 284.

<sup>33</sup> Letter of March 14, p. 263.

unless we are prepared to give them some indication of our intentions now they may be obliged to abandon the matter. They have returned to me the funds advanced by Coordinator of Information and state further that our long continued reticence is arousing suspicion regarding our motives on the part of the friendliest elements. We have done our best to encourage and hearten these people but I fear we cannot indefinitely hold them in a state of suspense. [Murphy.]

COLE

740.00112 European War 1939/5352 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, May 4, 1942.

128. For Murphy. Your 265, April 27, 2 p.m. While the Department is unwilling to approve of any action which might tend to facilitate the export of edible oils from French West Africa to metropolitan France, it does not intend to insist at this time on the restriction of Algerian alcohol shipments destined for West Africa.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/5629

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)* <sup>34</sup>

WASHINGTON, May 4, 1942.

As suggested, I took up today at the meeting of the J.I.C.<sup>35</sup> the question as to what value they attached to the continuance of our consular representation and the maintenance of our control officers in North Africa and West Africa.

The J.I.C. will answer this in writing; but the view is unanimous that the presence of these men in North and West Africa was of "very substantial value". Particular importance was attached to the representation at Casablanca and at Dakar; to which they assimilated the representation at Tangier, though this stands, of course, on a different basis.

The view was expressed that it would be desirable to go to considerable lengths to create a situation in which this representation could be maintained. Appreciation was expressed of the value of the information which had come heretofore; less military information had been received in the past few weeks than otherwise, principally because there had been no great developments in North

<sup>34</sup> Addressed to the Under Secretary of State (Welles) and the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray).

<sup>35</sup> Joint Intelligence Committee.

Africa; and it was pointed out that once this representation and the control officers were withdrawn there would be, virtually, a blackout of an entire and crucial region.

A representative of the Board of Economic Warfare, Mr. Stone,<sup>36</sup> specifically stated that the Board of Economic Warfare had convinced itself of the desirability of continuing this representation, and considered that the trickle of supplies proceeding to North Africa was in no way detrimental, under the circumstances, to the program of economic warfare.

I state this because I believe it of importance in determining whether the ship destined for French Africa and now held, by our direction, should be allowed to proceed.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

---

740.00112 European War 1939/5629

*Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray)  
to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 4, 1942.

MR. BERLE: While it is realized that the assumption of power by Mr. Laval makes it difficult to announce publicly the resumption of shipments to French North Africa, there are a number of important reasons why it seems desirable to continue our trade with that area. Aside from the main objective of our program, which has been to maintain the *status quo* in the strategic French North African territories, the chief advantage derived from our agreement with the French is the presence of control officers in the principal North African sea ports. Their continued functioning is perhaps the most important single advantage to be derived by the United States from resuming shipments to North Africa.

The twelve Vice Consuls who are serving as control officers have supplied us in the past with the most valuable kind of information, including military, naval, and economic data of great interest not only to this Department but to the War Department and the British Government. Their presence in North Africa is justified only by the shipment of supplies in accordance with the provisions of the so-called Weygand-Murphy Agreement. There are many indications that the suspension of all shipments and the absence of any indication that they will be resumed may lead to a request on the part of the French Government for the recall of these officers. Unless the officers are given some active work in supervising the distribution of supplies, there is little doubt that their activities will not be tolerated much longer, and we shall lose a highly important source of information.

---

<sup>36</sup> William Stone, Assistant Director in Charge of Exports.

Officers in the military intelligence division of the War Department have expressed themselves informally in favor of continuing the economic plan and thereby obtaining the information supplied regularly by the control Vice Consuls. We understand that the War Department is desirous also of maintaining, if possible, the *status quo* in North Africa and keeping both the French and native population friendly to the United States. This view is shared by the Coordinator of Information, who has a number of representatives in North Africa and whose organization benefits by the data sent in by our control officers. Officials of the British Embassy are also deriving much benefit from the reports of the control officers, and certainly would be loath to see their work interrupted.

Under the new plan of marking all articles sent to North Africa with American flags and appropriate indication of their source, the Board of Economic Warfare has displayed a lively interest in having the shipments resumed. Economic Warfare officials, in cooperation with the Coordinator of Information, have worked out this scheme which would doubtless add greatly to the effectiveness of the shipments to North Africa. The supplies of sugar, tea, matches, et cetera, would be sent in small packages, numbering several millions, which would reach the greatest possible number of inhabitants and carry the message of American interest and friendship. It is felt that this form of propaganda alone would make the continued flow of shipments worthwhile.

The materials to be obtained by us from North Africa in return must also be taken into account. The French have tentatively offered us cargoes of cork, tartar, red squill, and olive oil, all of which are vitally needed in the United States. It is possible that other commodities, such as wool, may also be obtained. None of these products would be forthcoming, of course, unless we resume our shipments to North Africa.

The amounts involved in sending supplies to North Africa are relatively small. The two vessels now waiting to load at New York have a combined carrying capacity of between 13,000 and 15,000 tons. The goods which could be thus transported represent only a very small fraction of the needs in North Africa, and, even if they fell into unauthorized hands (which would automatically terminate the agreement), the loss would be negligible. On the other hand, the propaganda value of impressing ourselves upon the local population and thus detracting from the influence of collaborationist elements would be very great. There is naturally some hesitancy in resuming shipments to North Africa because of the public reaction against Laval and the Vichy Government. However, in sending the next two vessels to Casablanca, there would seem to be no reason for making a public announcement. The ships could be permitted to sail without

notification, and our censorship facilities could be utilized to keep the sailings confidential.

The shipments to North Africa may best be regarded, at this juncture, in the light of a weapon in economic warfare. Their propaganda and psychological value are closely related to this economic phase. From a military and strategic point of view, the shipments offer great importance as a means of continuing the work of the control officers. Lastly, the purely humanitarian aspect may be considered in the case of such commodities as cotton cloth for the Arab population, many of whom, through no fault of their own, are going about naked and a prey to disease because of lack of clothing.

WALLACE MURRAY

---

851.00/2793 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, May 6, 1942—3 p. m.  
[Received May 7—4: 14 a. m.]

294. From Murphy. Chatel, Governor General of Algeria, received me on his return from Vichy, where he had conversations with practically all members of the Government except Darlan who was in Paris. According to Chatel there is no fundamental change of policy as far as Marshal Pétain is concerned. Chatel said that Pétain, called by the Germans "the old fox" and "Marshal Nein" told him that he hoped to gain 3 months' time by the maneuver. He said that the Marshal had acquired no affection for Laval. However, he said "the Marshal is a very old man".

Chatel as well as Charles Roux <sup>37</sup> who has just arrived from France both were in touch with General Weygand who has now taken a house at Cannes. They, as do other well-informed sources, tell me that there is no truth in the stories reported by Casablanca and Tangier to the effect that Weygand recently visited North Africa (see Department's 133, April 22, 10 p. m., to Casablanca <sup>38</sup>).

Chatel lunched at Vichy with Marshal Pétain and General Giraud recently escaped from the fortress of Königstein. I am told there is no intention of surrendering Giraud to the Germans and Chatel also says that Giraud is as ardently anti-German as ever. He also said that Giraud would be glad to work with the Americans. Giraud plans to remain in seclusion temporarily and voices the hope that the radio broadcasters will forget about him.

---

<sup>37</sup> François Charles-Roux, Secretary General of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, July–October 1940.

<sup>38</sup> Not printed.



I tried in vain to pin Chatel down regarding the possibility of Giraud coming this way but could only evoke a bland smile. Chatel did not deny that the possibility existed.

The local reaction to Madagascar<sup>40</sup> is mild and understanding. Several French officials including Chatel do not believe it will result in the rupture of Franco-American relations. Chatel on the contrary voices the urgent hope that we will prosecute our policy of economic aid to North Africa in the face of everything and maintain our influence. He said, "For heavens sake persuade them to let those two small ships sail from New York. It does not pay to wave the carrot in front of the donkey too long."

I have also had a long talk with Admiral Fénard just returned from Vichy. After conversations with Darlan he is convinced that the Laval Government is a temporary affair and said that the power still lies with Pétain and Darlan. He declared that he and many high ranking French naval officers dislike and distrust Laval. Fénard reiterated all the well-known arguments that we should manifest a practical interest in this area by removing the suspension of the operation of the economic accord. Our policy should regard this area as a separate entity he believes and he is confident that a courageous friendly policy on our part is a safe investment. Fénard frankly tells me that he hopes for a resumption of hostilities against the Axis but only when we are able to provide the material which will make such action effective. There is no doubt that Fénard's sympathies are with us as France's only hope. I am convinced that he would seize any reasonable chance to come over to our side.

Repeated to Vichy. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.0011 European War 1939/21452: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, May 6, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received May 7—4:23 a. m.]

296. For the Under Secretary from Murphy. May I again urgently invite your attention to the lapse of time which has occurred in the despatch of a qualified American Army officer to contact the group mentioned in my March 14<sup>41</sup> (your 104, April 16, 4 p. m., and 111, April 18, 4 p.m.<sup>42</sup>). The leaders of the group now inform me that an Allied intelligence agent has been in contact with them and accord-

---

<sup>40</sup> For correspondence regarding the British occupation of Madagascar, see pp. 687 ff.

<sup>41</sup> Letter of March 14, p. 263.

<sup>42</sup> *Ante*, p. 284.

ing to him, London is sending a military expert to meet a representative of the group on May 20.

The group is in a state of effervescence over the Madagascar operation as an example of what should not happen in French North Africa. They continue to plead for our cooperation in organizing an effective *coup d'état* well in advance of any military intervention urging that the technique of ultimata and debarkation without prior accord with someone inside the country who controls an effective organization is costly and may in this area prove disastrous. They point out that the French Army and Naval authorities in North Africa have orders to resist military intervention attempted by anyone except the Axis. They confirm that Vichy's orders are to that effect and that in case of Axis intervention, the North African authorities must await Vichy's specific instructions. They fear that Axis rejoinder to the Madagascar intervention will be some form of action against Tunisia which may happen before we have perfected our liaison and preparatory to organization with our friends here.

If Allied forces debark here without prior accord with an effective organization inside the country, the rank and file military undoubtedly will obey orders (see my 276 April 29, 4 p. m.<sup>43</sup>). Once the shooting has started it would be impossible to stop it before much blood has been shed unnecessarily. They refer in that connection to Darlan's message to the Governor General of Madagascar<sup>44</sup> urging maximum resistance, hurling invectives against the British. They say that they fully understand that the American authorities cannot disclose to them their plans in advance but they do not understand our apparent dilatoriness in sending a qualified Army officer (see my 167, March 18, 3 p. m., and my 203, April 2, 10 a. m.<sup>45</sup>) to discuss organization with them and at least work out many preliminary details. They feel that the time available may be shorter than we imagine.

The group is sending this morning the person mentioned in my 248, April 18, midnight, to Vichy in order to keep them fully informed of the trend as it concerns this area. They will convey to us any data of interest they may obtain. They find a ray of hope in the reasonable tone of the Laval note and commentary on Madagascar.

In cooperation with Eddy<sup>46</sup> at Tangier the group is establishing an independent radio contact with us as part of the American chain in this area.

---

<sup>43</sup> Not printed.

<sup>44</sup> Armand-Prosper Annet.

<sup>45</sup> *Ante*, pp. 271 and 278, respectively.

<sup>46</sup> Lt. Col. William A. Eddy, Naval Attaché at Tangier.

They feel that there is a possibility that American official representatives can be obliged to leave this area or that they may be deprived of cipher privileges.

I am very much impressed with the group's earnestness of purpose and their potential usefulness (please refer to the last paragraph of the enclosure of your letter of March 5<sup>4</sup>). I feel that we should provide the military contact now. May I not have the benefit of your advice? Please acknowledge the receipt of this telegram. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.0011 European War 1939/21452 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1942—10 p. m.

132. For Murphy from the Under Secretary. Your 296 of May 5 [6], 8 p. m., has been duly received and is having close study. When this is completed and after a final consultation I shall endeavor to reply as definitely as possible. [Welles.]

HULL

---

851R.20/23 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, May 15, 1942—midnight.

[Received May 16—5:08 p. m.]

320. From Murphy. General Juin, commanding French forces in Africa, is departing on a tour of inspection of coastal defenses in Morocco. This tour of inspection is responsive to a recent German demand that the French take action to strengthen their coastal defense system in Africa which after a recent investigation made by General Boem, a special representative of the German Armistice Commission, is described as weak and ineffective. Boem's report also reported that the French Army officers in charge of coast defense are not animated by the "desirable aggressive spirit" and demand that changes of personnel be effected.

General Juin continues to manifest friendly sentiment towards the United States. In a recent conversation with me he described the weakness of the French military situation in French North Africa saying in conclusion "you Americans must come to our assistance". Contacts who know him well state that there is no doubt regarding

---

<sup>4</sup>Letter of March 5 not printed; for enclosure, see memorandum by the Assistant Chief of Staff, February 25, p. 258.

his anti-Axis sentiment but that he cannot be depended on for independent initiative.

Admiral Fénard, Secretary General for French Africa, asked me to call yesterday, plying me with questions regarding Martinique,<sup>48</sup> about which I told him I was without information. He repeatedly expressed the hope that after a friendly settlement of the Martinique question, that the Department would turn its attention to French North Africa, and authorize resumption of shipments under the economic plan. He said that it now appeared that North Africa would shortly receive shipments of German synthetic gasoline via France. He also said that shipments of gasoline received from Europe are continuing via Algeria and Tunisia to Libya. He also stated that there is a regular flow of military equipment from France to North Africa with German consent to strengthen French capacity to resist Anglo-American aggression. He concluded with another suggestion that French North Africa is ready and eager to cooperate with the United States but that apparently we do not see it that way or are simply not interested.

Repeated to Vichy. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.00112 European War 1939/5571 : Telegram

*The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State*

TANGIER, May 21, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 12:22 p. m.]

230. It may be perhaps useful to the Department to know that it is the unanimous opinion of us here in Tangier including the Military and Naval Attachés as well as my British colleague that at least token shipments should be resumed to Morocco under the American-French economic accord.

One obvious advantage of token shipments is that they offer a *raison d'être* for the continued activity of the control officers whose reports have contributed so much to the work of Anglo-American joint intelligence center here which is cooperating most effectively with Gibraltar and Malta.

By courier to Casablanca, Algiers.

CHILDS

---

<sup>48</sup> For correspondence concerning the French possessions in the Caribbean, see pp. 611 ff.

740.00112 European War 1939/5629

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson.)*<sup>49</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] May 25, 1942.

We have been informed by the British Embassy that negotiations have been concluded for the chartering to Portugal of two French tankers, the proceeds of this transaction to be used by the French for purchases in Portugal of goods for French North Africa. The British have promoted this deal as part of their policy of assistance to Portugal and they have asked us whether we would consent to the deduction from our own established quotas for French North Africa of several thousand tons of goods to be sent in from Portugal. The Portuguese Government is likewise pressing us for a decision as to whether these shipments would meet with our approval.

The above proposal immediately raises the question of our own shipments under the terms of the North African economic accord, which has been suspended since the return to power of Mr. Laval. Such shipments are recommended by the Board of Economic Warfare as a psychological warfare measure, in order to prepare the ground for the possible future entry of American troops into French North Africa. The Board points out that, labeled with the American flag, these supplies would have great propaganda value and would assist the local authorities in preventing unrest among the native population. In return for these shipments we would be able to obtain certain critically needed materials, particularly cork, olive oil, red and white squill, essential oils, and possibly wool, hides and skins.

The Office of the Coordinator of Information is supporting the plan for propaganda and psychological reasons and is prepared to handle the packaging and marking of the goods. The Coordinator's Office has stressed in this connection the difficulty of combating German statements in North Africa that Germany supplies the needs of the people with actual deliveries while we merely give them promises. Moreover, the Coordinator is deeply interested in the maintenance of the twelve control officers stationed in North Africa under the economic accord, whose sources of information with regard to events in that area are regarded as of the greatest importance.

We have received strong indications that unless token shipments are resumed, the activities of these control officers will be terminated by the French Government. Their presence in North Africa is justified only by the shipment of supplies and it is now more than four months since the last vessel reached Casablanca from the United States. In view of the valuable military and naval information received from these officers, the Joint Intelligence Committee has expressed the unanimous opinion that the presence of the vice consuls

<sup>49</sup> Addressed to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State.

was of "very substantial value" and that it would be desirable to go to considerable lengths to maintain this representation.

In view of the fact that the recall of the control officers would create a virtual blackout of information in a critical region, it may be desirable at this point to make direct inquiry of the War and Navy Departments as to the value they attach to the resumption of shipments to Casablanca. It may be mentioned that in addition to our Embassy in Vichy, the entire American staff in French North Africa, including the military and naval attachés at Tangier, has expressed the emphatic opinion that shipments should be resumed as a means of strengthening the anti-collaborationist elements and in order that the reports of the control officers may be continued. Officials of the British Government in London, Washington and Tangier have also stressed the importance they attach to this reporting as part of the Anglo-American Joint Intelligence Center in Tangier, which is cooperating effectively with Gibraltar and Malta.

If you concur, the entire question might now be put up for decision by the appropriate officials of the War and Navy Departments as a measure which should be considered in relation to their treatment of the North African area (and on their initiative).

DEAN G. ACHESON

---

740.0011 European War 1939/21916 : Telegram

*The Consul at Tunis (Doolittle) to the Secretary of State*

TUNIS, June 1, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received June 2—10:57 p. m.]

74. Admiral Esteva<sup>50</sup> returned from Vichy evening May 30. He saw Pétain several times Laval only once. Substance of talks was (1) no negotiations concerning Tunisia outside armistice conditions (2) Italian landing would be resisted by force (3) Germans are apparently not backing Italian claims (4) Laval particularly asked Esteva to prevent any local incidents which might serve as intervention pretext for Italians (5) Darlan is reported to have influenced Esteva against Anglo-Saxons on grounds that by "war of nerves" we are trying to make France take up arms without being ready ourselves to back such movement in force.

Despite this comforting news the *Gardes Mobiles* were held in barracks over weekend and maneuvers by northern army units at Bou-Ficha south of Tunis cancelled. Troops are to remain in Tunis Cap Bon region.

Repeated Vichy and Casablanca.

DOOLITTLE

---

<sup>50</sup> Adm. Jean Pierre Esteva, French Resident General in Tunisia.

740.00112 European War 1939/5625

*The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference your request made at the termination of the conference in your office on Saturday, May 30, dealing with the matter of control officers in Northwest Africa, the following statement of the War Department attitude in the premises is furnished for your information.

The War Department finds the information received from the control officers of considerable value in checking reports received from other sources. The maintenance of a favorable public opinion in Northwest Africa due to the activities of control officers in distributing foodstuffs and other articles for local consumption, while of no particular moment at this time, may be of no inconsiderable importance in event that the military situation in Northwest Africa or in Equatorial Africa changes materially. The continued presence of these officers is dependent upon the maintenance of a relatively steady flow of supplies to North Africa, even though the volume of such shipments is extremely small.

The War Department realizes, of course, that the political situation may change at any time, due to factors over which we have no control, but until such a change takes place, it is believed advisable for military reasons to continue the small shipments contemplated, and to maintain control officers in connection therewith in Northwest Africa.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

851.01/473 . Telegram

*The Consul at Tunis (Doolittle) to the Secretary of State*

TUNIS, June 3, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received June 4—9:32 a. m.]

75. In interview with Admiral Esteva this morning he informed me that while he had not obtained all he wished at Vichy he was not discouraged. There had never been any question of surrendering all or any part of Tunisia to Italians. He further stated that even friendly French circles had been hurt by tone of American note about Martinique<sup>51</sup> although that question seemed on way to settlement. His talks at Vichy had convinced him that Laval was not so much in hands of Germans as we tried to make out but it was true for Doriot, Déat and others of that stripe. The whole matter was one of gaining

<sup>51</sup> See telegram No. 124, February 21, 6 p. m., to the Ambassador in France, p. 612.

time and we should note no marked changes had been effected by Laval.

On general situation he observed that best informed Germans in France openly expressed doubt they could cope with Russia this year which, he implied, might mean never. He again warned me Italians were demanding expulsion of this Consulate on ground of alleged intrigues against them.

Repeated Vichy.

DOOLITTLE

---

740.00112 European War 1939/5642: Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, June 4, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received 10:29 p. m.]

806. An influential and well disposed Foreign Office official in charge of the Division of Economic Affairs sought a private interview with us yesterday.

The object of his visit was to express his personal and deep concern at the failure of our Government to resume the operation of the North African economic program. He told me bluntly that in the course of his last two meetings with the members of the Armistice Commission in Paris the Germans had brought up this question and that with the best will in the world he had found it extremely difficult in view of their present inactivity to justify the continued presence of our control officers in North Africa. He recalled that with the exception of the sailings of two vessels from New York to Casablanca in January last the program had been in suspense since November, 1941, but he pointed out that the Weygand-Murphy accord is nevertheless still effective insofar as France is concerned and that it provides for: (a) The non-reexportation of imported products and of similar products; (b) the control of this non-reexportation by our officers.

He felt that the unilateral maintenance by the French Government of the above provisions might result in serious difficulties. To illustrate the point he said that while on the one hand, under the terms of the agreement, no alcohol for fuel purposes of French North African origin could be shipped to metropolitan France or to French West Africa on the other hand for 6 months no supply of American petroleum products had been received. The situation he felt could not be indefinitely prolonged without creating difficulties especially from the Germans.

He reminded me that the time the French Government had agreed to cease delivery of supplies through French North Africa to the Axis forces in Libya the American Government had been urgently re-



quested to resume the program. So far and despite an apparently favorable reaction on our part nothing had been done.

As concrete proposals for a step towards the resumption of the program as a whole he suggested that our Government should give its approval without delay to the immediate departure from New York of the two French vessels *Ile de Noirmoutier* and *Ile d'Ouessant* and that the French Embassy in Washington should be authorized by means of the renewal of a Treasury license to make purchases in the American market. Even if an approximate date for the departure of these two vessels could not be announced he considered the granting of such facilities would be highly desirable as they would serve to shorten the delay which must inevitably elapse between the adoption of a favorable decision and the resumption of the traffic and loading of cargoes.

Rochat<sup>52</sup> asked me to come to see him this morning. He said that he felt obliged to tell me that the Germans were placing such insistence on the matter that he feared that unless our Government was prepared to resume the program in the near future, and could give some indication to that effect, the Embassy might at any time be faced with an official request from the French Government for a reduction in the number of our consular representatives in French North Africa to that which existed on January 1, 1939; it being understood, however, that with the resumption of the program, this number would be restored to its present strength. Rochat explained that German pressure was alone responsible for this attitude and that it was well nigh impossible for the French Government to attempt to justify—in view of their continued inactivity—the further presence of these control officers in North Africa. I said that as far as I was aware it was not the intention of our Government to abandon the North African economic program and that if delays had occurred in its resumption these were due to political factors which he would understand.

I fully realize the importance of recent political developments which may have decided the Department to defer action—not the least of these being the return to power of Laval and our negotiations in Martinique. I venture, however, to submit certain considerations in support of the resumption of the program which I hope will be given consideration.

I am confident that Laval believes it in his best interest to maintain friendly relations with the United States and there is not the slightest doubt that this firm and conciliatory attitude at the time of the Martinique affair has served greatly to enhance his prestige locally. This opinion incidentally is shared by those who dislike him most. On the other hand anti-Laval German pressure shows no signs of subsiding

---

<sup>52</sup> Charles Antoine Rochat, Secretary General of the French Foreign Office.

and Doriot's candidacy with German backing as Laval's successor is now a matter of open discussion. I believe therefore that if we were to declare our intention of resuming the operation of the North African program at an early date (and should we only make a "token" shipment in one vessel) such a step would be received with genuine appreciation and would be interpreted as concrete evidence of a desire on our part to bring that assistance to France and her possessions which they stand so critically in need of.

I need not emphasize the pressing economic needs of North Africa. These have been repeatedly and clearly set forth in Murphy's telegrams. It may, however, be significant to report in this connection that I have learned on the best of authority that Admiral Esteva who recently completed a brief visit to Vichy has informed the Government that unless he could be supplied with 600 tons of fuel oil by June 15 he did not expect to be able to harvest the Tunisian wheat crop.

If the Department is in a position to inform me that it contemplates an announcement as to the resumption of the North African economic program at an early date I request authority to convey the information officially to Rochat. The Armistice Commission is to meet in [apparent omission] time and if the French representatives could be fortified with such an assurance I am convinced that it would do much to forestall the virtual ultimatum which the Germans will almost certainly deliver with regard to the necessity for the continued presence of our control officers in [North Africa?].

I respectfully request that the contents of this telegram be brought to the attention of Ambassador Leahy<sup>53</sup> whose views as to the advisability of the resumption of the program are already a matter of record in the Department.

For the reasons stated in the Embassy's 790, June 1, 5 p. m.<sup>54</sup> this message has not been repeated to Murphy. Should the Department consider it advisable to do so I suggest that it be repeated to him direct.

TUCK

---

740.00112 European War 1939/5682: Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, June 8, 1942—5 p. m.  
[Received June 9—5:34 a. m.]

823. The Foreign Office official referred to in the first paragraph of our 806 June 4, 5 p.m., showed me in strictest confidence the text

---

<sup>53</sup> Adm. William D. Leahy, Ambassador to France, in Washington for consultation.

<sup>54</sup> Not printed; the reasons referred to were those of code security.

of a note dated Paris June 1 from the German representative on the Armistice Commission complaining of the activities of our control officers in North Africa and demanding that in view of our continued failure to resume the North Africa economic program their number be reduced to that of the officers assigned to American consular establishments in French North Africa as of January 1, 1939. The number could be restored to its present strength if and when the program is resumed. The note was strong in its denunciation of the activities of our control officers who according to the German representatives were in reality nothing but the paid agents of the United States Government employed to spread anti-German propaganda among the natives of North Africa.

Alleged subversive activities by Americans in North Africa and their hope to achieve a separation between France and Morocco is the subject of an article which appeared in the Berlin *Das Reich* of May 31 and its North African correspondent, Heinz Barth, is the author. In this article Barth refers to the "five Military Attachés of the American Consulate in Tangier and other military personnel who disguised as Consuls travel back and forth between the international and free zones". He denounces in scathing terms the activities of "12 Consuls and 50 underlings" inhabiting the Consulate in Casablanca and the "splendid banquets offered by the American Vice Consul to the Glaoui of Marrakech". The sinister figure who hovers over and directs these activities is according to Barth "Counselor Murphy" the "organizer of this systematic work of destruction". The author concludes by saying that America has sent no textile nor gasoline to French North Africa since last autumn because of its fear of seeing that region increase its defense and that "there is no doubt that the United States will tear up the Murphy accord as soon as it becomes apparent that there is no hope of forcing a split between Morocco and France".

Repeated to Murphy.

TUCK

---

740.0011 European War 1939/22096 : Telegram

*The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State*

TANGIER, June 8, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received June 9—10:37 a. m.]

257. In a conversation with Noguès on June 5 he remarked "Morocco is very favorably disposed to the United States but we shall resist any effort which may be made to attack us and I hope you will emphasize this to your Government". Noguès said nothing in his opinion would draw the Germans quicker to North Africa than the belief that there is a serious chance of an Anglo-American landing.

He added that the Germans are already much disturbed on this score owing to the great number of reports that the British have been pressed to create a diversion in French North Africa, on the Continent or in Norway.

I pointed out that we had not taken any aggressive action against any French possessions during this war and that I thought it extremely unlikely that we should take action to land in Morocco contrary to French wishes. Noguès answered that he had a great deal of confidence in us and he did not think we would but he was afraid that the British might.

I replied that we were acting today in such concert that it was not possible to foresee one of the partners taking independent action.

I asked Noguès if he had any reason to believe that the Germans had become particularly anxious recently or had begun to make any special plans in anticipation of an invasion of French ports Africa. He observed the Germans are a very methodical people and since the arrival of the German Armistice Commission they have made plan for taking action in presumably every possible circumstance.

I asked him about the Spanish press campaign and agitation concerning Spain's aspirations in French North Africa. He said this was inspired by Suñer<sup>55</sup> and the Falange but did not reflect the attitude of the Spanish generals. He felt confident of Orgaz<sup>56</sup> and did not anticipate any military action.

He spoke with great assurance and confidence and seemed more sure of himself than I have found him for a long while.

He went on to say that the advent of Laval to power had changed nothing. He added that Pétain previously had distrusted Laval and believed the latter was working behind his back.

I asked the Resident General if Laval had not been brought back under German pressure. He said "indirectly if you like" but that "the Germans are already dissatisfied with him". Noguès added that Laval now has the full confidence of the Marshal in a way in which he did not have it before and he confers every day with him. He emphasized that it is Pétain who continues to exercise chief power in the Government.

Noguès stated he did not anticipate any changes in French North Africa. He stressed that Laval is above all a good Frenchman. He added that when he was in Vichy he, Noguès, was told that his directives remained the same as they had been before.

I asked him for his views concerning the international situation.

He said the Germans had a formidable task on the Russian front.

I remarked that the fact that they had not launched their offensive seemed to be itself a check.

---

<sup>55</sup> Ramón Serrano Suñer, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>56</sup> Gen. Luis Orgaz, High Commissioner, Spanish Zone of Morocco.

He agreed and said the Russian counter-offensive appeared to have seriously upset German plans. He thought the Germans greatly over-extended in their communications and that they were beginning to suffer the consequences. They had been obliged, he said, to double the number of their divisions in occupied France after the St. Nazaire affair<sup>67</sup> and they were beset with the problem of not knowing where the enemy would strike next. He left the impression that he felt the Germans had lost the initiative.

Repeated to Vichy and Algiers, true reading to Madrid and Casablanca.

CHILDS

---

740.0011 European War 1939/22131 : Telegram

*The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State*

TANGIER, June 9, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 10:20 p. m.]

258. Sentiment in French Morocco for United States and the Allies was never so widespread or so openly expressed by the French themselves as today. An official at the Residency estimates fully 80 percent of the people of Morocco are now wholeheartedly for United States with 10 percent indifferent and 10 percent still perhaps for one reason or another hostile.

The marked upswing in our favor and a widespread and greater confidence in our ultimate victory which has developed particularly the past 6 weeks is attributed to the following:

- (1) Laval's advent to power.
- (2) Germany's check in Russia at Kharkov.
- (3) Strength of British bombings of Cologne and Essen which have made a tremendous impression.
- (4) Recognition of the growing strength we are showing and confidence given by the initiative being taken by the United Nations.

(A military officer who reports periodically to Vichy concerning public reaction informed me the British occupation of Madagascar had been reported by him as having evoked no appreciable reaction [apparent omission] response was favorable to us other than the contrary.[.])

At the same time Residency officials who exceeded the [apparent omission] friendliness emphasize the necessity for the greatest prudence. As one high official has put it "Laval has determined to give way to the Germans only in small things but not in matters of importance (thus he refused to give up General Giraud at the German demand) but he will not hesitate, and understandably, to sacri-

---

<sup>67</sup> British air, naval, and commando raid on harbor of St. Nazaire, March 28, 1942.

fice us as individuals upon complaints that our actions indicate too friendly a disposition to the United States and Great Britain." For this reason Noguès is more and more disinclined to take any action on his own responsibility with respect to requests made by us, such as those on behalf of foreign interests, which would indicate the least partiality, but is referring such matters more and more to Vichy and is executing instructions given him on the subject as objectively but with as much understanding as possible under the circumstances.

The greatest service we can render our many friends in the Protectorate and our own cause is to take into account these considerations and do nothing by any over-zealousness which would prejudice the position of our friends causing them to be replaced by others most probably less sympathetic and certainly not more accommodating.

The paradoxical situation has to be borne in mind that while general sentiment was never more favorable to us there was never greater need for our officers in Morocco to display the utmost prudence and understanding of the extreme delicacy of the situation of all officials.

Repeated to Casablanca.

CHILDS

---

740.00112 European War 1939/5625

*The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau)*

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As you will recall, this Government's program of economic assistance to French North Africa was suspended last November; and in January two ships were permitted to leave this country upon the recommendation of this Department and the War Department, and their places were taken here by two other ships from French North Africa. No further shipments were recommended or permitted.

By the agreement covering this accord certain American control officers have been maintained in French North Africa to supervise the distribution of products and the measures taken by the French authorities under their guarantee that neither these products nor similar products should be exported.

For some time the Department has been informed by its officers in French North Africa and in France that it would not long be possible to continue maintaining the control officers in North Africa without some resumption of shipments. A paraphrase of the most recent telegram on this subject is enclosed.<sup>58</sup>

This Department, believing that the decision as to the continuance of the officers and shipments is primarily a matter of concern to the military authorities, has sought the advice of the War Department on

---

<sup>58</sup> Telegram No. 806, June 4, 5 p. m., from the Chargé in France, p. 305.

the subject. A copy of a letter from the Secretary of War,<sup>59</sup> advising that the continued presence of the officers and the resumption of shipments is in the interest of this Government, is enclosed. The Department has been advised by the Coordinator of Information that he regards it as of importance that the officers remain. At a meeting recently held at this Department and attended by representatives of the Treasury and of the Board of Economic Warfare, the representatives of the latter expressed themselves strongly as in favor of the resumption of the shipments upon the basis of not more than two ships per month. It was stated that the Board has certain plans for the packaging of the shipments to indicate their American origin for the purpose of its propaganda effect. The representatives of the Treasury Department wish to refer the matter to you for consideration.

This Department recommends, in accordance with the views expressed by the War Department and endorsed by the Coordinator of Information and the Board of Economic Warfare, that the necessary licenses be granted by the Treasury to permit resumption of the shipments. It is recommended that the licenses cover the shipments of commodities which have hitherto been purchased by the French authorities under Treasury license and also permit the purchase of additional goods for possible future shipment. All shipments are, of course, subject to export licenses to be issued by the Board of Economic Warfare, and the program is subject to suspension at any time should there be a change in the conditions which have led to the War Department's recommendation.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

---

740.00112 European War 1939/5642: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Tuck)*

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1942.

364. Your 806, June 4, 5 p. m. The Department has been giving urgent consideration to resumption of the North African economic program and a decision is expected shortly. You may convey this information informally to the appropriate French authorities.

HULL

---

<sup>59</sup> Dated June 1, p. 304.

## III. Resumption of Economic Aid Program (June-July)

740.00112 European War 1939/5726c : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, June 11, 1942.

172. For Murphy.<sup>60</sup> After full consideration of the factors involved, the Department has decided to authorize the immediate resumption of shipments to North Africa. The first vessel should be ready to sail from New York in about 8 days with goods which have already been purchased, while the second vessel would depart as soon as a full cargo has been obtained.

It is understood of course that simultaneous departures will take place from Casablanca of ships carrying cork, olive oil, tartar, and other commodities needed in the United States.

Repeated to Vichy.<sup>61</sup>

HULL

125.0081/43b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Tangier (Childs)*

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1942—10 p. m.

117. The Department has received the impression from recent correspondence emanating from your office that some doubt may exist as to the responsible authority in North Africa for the work of the vice consuls under the economic accord.

In order to remove any possible misunderstanding on this subject, it is believed desirable to point out that the activities of these vice consuls are under the control and supervision of Mr. Robert D. Murphy at Algiers. For administrative purposes the vice consuls are of course assigned to consulates nearest their respective bases of operations and, solely in an administrative sense, they are under the jurisdiction of the consular officers in charge of those posts. However, the Department regards Mr. Murphy as the supervising officer for all of the control officers, consequently all matters such as their disposition and movements, the nature of their activities, and their relations with French officials or the native population, should be handled entirely by him.

Please repeat to Algiers for Murphy.

HULL

<sup>60</sup> Robert D. Murphy, Counselor of Embassy in France, on special assignment in French North Africa to control and supervise the economic aid program.

<sup>61</sup> As telegram No. 368, June 11.



811.20 Defense (M)/7538

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles W. Lewis, Jr.,  
of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] June 16, 1942.

Participants: Mr. Guérin, French Embassy.<sup>62</sup>

Mr. Wilson,<sup>63</sup> Board of Economic Warfare.

Mr. Finletter, DM.<sup>64</sup>

Mr. DeGolia, AP.<sup>65</sup>

Mr. Villard.<sup>66</sup>

Mr. Lewis.

It was explained to Mr. Guérin that this Government was concerned about the stocks of cobalt in French North Africa and was desirous of seeing shipments of this commodity stopped. Mr. Guérin said that he was in a position to say that all shipments of cobalt might be suspended if the United States would agree to supply a substantial quantity of petroleum products to French North Africa.

After some discussion, the suggestion was made that this Government might agree to permit the shipment of several thousand tons of kerosene (the amount suggested by Mr. Guérin was 13,000 tons to meet the requirements of French North Africa for a period of three months) if the French would immediately embargo all shipments of cobalt and molybdenum from French North Africa, and would halt or bring back to that area any shipments which might recently have been sent forward to France. It was added that if these conditions were agreed to this Government would be willing to enter immediately into discussions with the French with regard to the shipment of other classes of petroleum products.

Mr. Guérin said he would telegraph a proposal along the above lines to his Government.

In response to an earlier suggestion that the French suspend shipments from North Africa of all minerals, he stated that he was positive that his Government would not agree to this, since such action would produce many economic and social problems as a result of the closing of the mines which the French could not undertake to meet under existing conditions. It was thought that there was a reasonable amount of justification for this point of view, and the point was therefore not pressed at this time, since it was agreed that the vital minerals for consideration were cobalt and molybdenum, all the others produced in North Africa being regarded

<sup>62</sup> Paul Guérin, Special Economic Representative of the North African authorities attached to the French Embassy.

<sup>63</sup> Duane Wilson.

<sup>64</sup> Thomas K. Finletter, Acting Chief of the Division of Defense Materials.

<sup>65</sup> Darwin J. DeGolia, Office of the Petroleum Adviser.

<sup>66</sup> Henry S. Villard, Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

as of secondary importance. These two minerals, moreover, were the subject of earlier discussion at the start of the trade program, when the French had agreed orally to suspend shipments but had never followed this up in writing. It was felt, therefore, that the freezing of such stocks could now properly form the subject of further discussion.

---

740 00112 European War 1939/5794 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, June 20, 1942—1 p. m.  
[Received 2:43 p. m.]

897. The Director of the Commercial Section of the Foreign Office<sup>67</sup> asked me to call urgently this morning. He said that he wished to convey to me unofficially and strictly confidentially the following information:

For a period of almost a year the Germans had been pressing the French Government to supply them with certain minerals of North African origin including cobalt. Until recently it had been possible to stave off these demands on one pretext or another. When, however, it appeared likely that the United States Government was disinclined to renew the North African economic program the French Government as a result of renewed pressure sold to the Germans 500 tons of cobalt. The French had nevertheless insisted that under no circumstances would this cobalt be shipped in French bottoms and the Germans were informed that they could make their own arrangements as to transport.

My informant said that the Germans had recently informed the French Government that arrangements had now been completed with the Spanish Government whereby a Spanish sailing vessel would call at the port of Nemours in Algeria to load the 500 tons of cobalt and transport it to Spanish Morocco. It was believed that this sailing vessel is now at the port of Nemours. He felt that this information would be particularly interesting to our Government and he was anxious to assure me that the agreement to sell the cobalt had only been given at a time when the French Government honestly believed that there was no prospect of the resumption of the North African program.

He said that since then there had been a further demand from the Germans for 1,000 tons of cobalt which he assured me would be refused by the French Government.

Turning to the question of the resumption of the North African program and conditions as to the restriction of exportation of cer-

---

<sup>67</sup> Pierre Albert Arnal.

tain minerals which our Government wished to impose he said that he felt that it would be most difficult to give any *official undertaking* to that effect which if given would almost certainly be turned down by the Germans. His Government was nevertheless willing and anxious to give us such an undertaking *unofficially* and as a "spontaneous" gesture. He hoped that I would stress to the Department the difficulties that would result from our insistence on an official undertaking which might jeopardize the whole question of the renewal of the program.

As regards the present status of the resumption of the program he said that the agreement of the Germans had been obtained in principle to the departure of the vessels. The French Government has asked authorization from the Germans to make shipments of cork and tartar but so far had received no answer.

Repeated to Murphy.

TUCK

---

740 00112 European War 1939/5798 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, June 21, 1942—9 a. m.

[Received 3:01 p. m.]

401. From Murphy. In connection with the Department's decision announced in its June 11 to resume shipments to North Africa competent officials whom I have contacted during my recent visits to Tunisia and Morocco as well as in Algeria express gratification and appreciation. There is no doubt that the decision has done much already to increase their sympathy for the Allied cause. It has definitely augmented American prestige and strengthened French confidence in the United States. It serves as a counterweight to the military news from Libya which exerts a depressing effect. Many officials said, quite sincerely, I believe, that the decision gave them fresh inspiration to oppose anything savoring of concession to the Axis.

Secretary General Admiral Fénard<sup>68</sup> on my return to Algiers discussed a telegram from the French Embassy, Washington, indicating that the Department had offered to give favorable consideration to the shipment of petroleum products if the French authorities would promise to prevent shipments of minerals from North Africa, especially cobalt and molybdenum. He told me confidentially that Vichy has just agreed to the shipment of 2300 tons of gasoline from France to North Africa for use exclusively in harvesting the current cereal crops in the three territories. He

---

<sup>68</sup> Vice Adm. Jacques Fénard, Secretary General for French Africa.

said that this is gasoline delivered to France by Germany. He considers it unfortunate that France has to depend on Germany for gasoline for the use of French North Africa.

Fénard is recommending urgently to Vichy that the restriction against the shipment of Moroccan minerals be accepted but he points out that the fly in the ointment is the fact that if the operation of our accord is too unfavorable to the Germans they through the Armistice Commission will probably refuse authorization for French ships to move in the Casablanca-New York traffic. His argument and that of others is that a bold supply program on our part without hedging it by conditions arousing immediate German opposition will pay us ample political dividends over the long term. The Department has been furnished complete data regarding the prevailing adverse situation throughout French North Africa in respect of liquid fuels.

Repeated to Vichy, copies to North African offices. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.00112 European War 1939/5874 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, June 21, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received June 29—10:17 a. m.]

402. From Murphy. Your June 11. Steamer *Aldebaran* in Casablanca preparing for departure for New York under resumption of North African economic plan has on board 460 tons fuel oil. Secretary General Admiral Fénard states vessel will require 250 tons for trip to New York and suggests that the difference of 210 tons be unloaded and placed in depot at Casablanca for use in coastwise shipping of cork and other products destined for the United States as well as for American products arriving here. This would permit the resumption of coastwise traffic under the economic accord which has been paralyzed since the end of March.

In that connection Admiral Fénard showed me a telegram of June 13 from the French Embassy in Washington stating that the Department suggested as a condition for the shipment of 400 tons of fuel oil for the above-mentioned coastwise shipping that products received from the United States such as sugar, condensed milk, green tea, pharmaceuticals, et cetera, would bear an inscription on the packaging "De la Part de Vos Amis le Peuple Américain". I should be grateful if the Department would comment on this statement. Admiral Fénard points out that the language is misleading. In the French language the statement would mean that the articles in question were donated by the American people. This is not true as the transaction is a commercial sale. He suggests that prominent

inscriptions "Importé des États Unis d'Amérique" (by French customs law) in French and Arabic would be ample and would leave no doubt in the minds of the public as to the origin of the merchandise. On package goods such as condensed milk and other items which in normal commercial practice bear labels there would be no objection he said to American flags and other descriptive matter showing American origin. He urgently suggests that at least for the beginning we avoid unusual publicity effort which would arouse the opposition of the German Armistice Commission. The latter, as the Department is aware, controls the movement of ships in the Casablanca-New York traffic. He and other French officials emphasize that when American goods are received here that fact becomes known in a dozen subtle ways to the official and business communities and the general public.

Fénard states that there would be no difficulty regarding the shipment of a small quantity of wool from French North Africa as a counterpart for the shipment of agricultural machinery even though the French authorities are mystified as they do not believe there is need for additional wool supplies in the United States.

Fénard also said that he had arranged the matter of shipping 200 tons of olive oil for the second sailing from Casablanca. This will be taken from Algerian stocks as the Moroccan authorities at Rabat declined to release any Moroccan oil.

May I also have the Department's advice regarding statements made in the French Embassy's telegrams to the effect that no binding twine will be shipped from the United States but that Department agreed that a certain tonnage might be imported from Portugal.

Fénard also referred to an exchange of telegrams with Vichy regarding the shipment of 6000 tons of coal on the steamer *Ile d'Ouessant* destined for Tangier for the benefit of the Tangier-Fez Railway due to the lack of Spanish shipping. He said that the French authorities were glad to cooperate of course but that with the urgent need in French Africa it seemed unfortunate that the very first shipment should include a large portion of the small tonnage available for Spanish interests. He said that the suggestion was being made that this coal shipment be reduced to 3000 tons.

Repeated to Vichy, copies to North African offices. [Murphy.]

COLE

881.00/2178 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, June 22, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received June 23—8:50 a. m.]

407. From Murphy. I have just concluded visits to French Morocco and Tunisia. The Department may be interested in the following observations:

In French Morocco I found on the part of officials and businessmen apprehension regarding Anglo-American military intentions in respect to that area. Resident General Noguès<sup>69</sup> for example twice referred to what he described as the folly of an Allied military intervention in French Morocco. I inquired whether he had any reason to believe that the United States contemplated military intervention in French Morocco. He said that he did not but that he was positive the British contemplated military intervention and in fact that they so stated on their radio. He went on at considerable length to state that such action would be disastrous as it would not only ruin the French position in Morocco but it would provide no material advantage to the Allies. Only chaos and ruin would result. The native population, he said, could not be trusted and they would take advantage of the chaotic situation thus created to attack not only the French but the expeditionary forces as well. He volunteered several suggestions to the effect that it was to the interest of the United Nations to assist in maintaining the *status quo* in French Morocco. This provided a stable element he said which would be of great utility in the postwar period. Resident General Noguès failed to elucidate exactly how this negative condition of affairs would assist the United States in winning the war although I undertook tactfully to hint that at the moment this is our major objective.

Resident General Noguès also expressed his satisfaction over Laval's appointment as Chief of Government<sup>70</sup> stating that Laval is far better qualified and intelligent than Admiral Darlan<sup>71</sup> and that he, Noguès, intends to give Laval his wholehearted and active cooperation. He said that Laval had promised him that there would be no changes in the administrative set up in French Morocco and I learned from Noguès entourage that Laval promised Noguès that the latter would remain undisturbed as Resident General of French Morocco. According to these informants the latter fact weighs heavily with the Resident General whose tenacious affection for

<sup>69</sup> Gen. Albert Noguès, Resident General in the French Zone of Morocco.

<sup>70</sup> Pierre Laval was appointed French Chief of Government on April 18, 1942.

<sup>71</sup> Adm. Jean François Darlan, former Vice President of the French Council of Ministers, presently Commander in Chief of all French Armed Forces.

his place as Resident General they state covers every phase of his conduct of Moroccan affairs. Noguès evinced no interest in the operation of the North African economic plan.

These same informants declare that they have noted during past months the growth of anti-British sentiment on the part of General Noguès. They said that there is a psychological reason for this state of mind which has its origin in the decision Noguès took in June 1940 as the General commanding French forces in North Africa to abide by the Armistice although he was greatly tempted to continue resistance. One of his assistants remarked that Noguès gambled then that the British would collapse and unconsciously he cannot forgive them for proving that he erred. Noguès' military aide spent 20 minutes telling me why Great Britain would probably lose the war, that British air raids over Germany are ineffective and condemned the British for their "treachery and lies".

This is the first time during my visit to Morocco that I have noted such distinct evidence of Anglophobia in Rabat. I attribute it to an effort on the part of General Noguès to please Laval plus the adverse news from Libya but of course it may represent the true sentiment of himself and some of his associates.

There was also evidence that our representatives are suspected of adverse propaganda among the Arab population. A member of Noguès entourage told me that the Resident General was furious over stories brought to him by several French Army officers of a growing anti-French sentiment manifest among the native troops. He said there were instances where the Arab soldiery did not hesitate to say to their commanding officers that they did not care what the French thought about it; that they knew that the Americans were coming to French Morocco and that they would be glad to serve the Americans who would bring with them everything that the Army needed. One official who mentioned this to me in Rabat agreed that there is no evidence that American representatives in French Morocco are carrying on any form of subversive propaganda among the Arabs and he attributed inspiration for such stories to German, Italian, Spanish and Japanese representatives who are waging an insidious campaign against us. (He mentioned especially the activity of the Spanish Consulate in Rabat which maintains a large organization.) He said that there is no doubt that these combined efforts succeeded in instilling doubts in the minds of French officials and especially the military regarding Allied plans and intentions for French Morocco.

I assured those French officials with whom I talked that the policy which our representatives have followed under instructions of my Government up to the present has been one of friendly cooperation with the French whom we have tried to support in every way pos-

sible and that we had conducted no active propaganda effort among the Arabs and particularly not among Arab troops.

In that connection Resident General Noguès stated to me apprehension regarding possible repercussions on the part of the Germans if we continued the use of the former British Consulate at Fez by our control officers. I told General Noguès that Childs had explained to the Department the French apprehensions in this regard and that of course we would not insist upon the use of these premises if the French authorities really objected. The premises have now been closed and sealed. In practically the same breath Noguès stated that he had been successful in excluding German and Italian influence in the Fez area but he asserted that German and Italian surveillance in Fez is very effective and that our slightest activity is immediately known to the Germans and Italians. It did not seem necessary to point out to General Noguès the inconsistency of this statement. From what our control officers have been able to learn of conditions Axis representatives aided by the Spanish have certainly conducted an active propaganda effort among the natives in the Fez area.

I also talked with a number of French Army officers including a top general sympathetic to our cause. I find also with them a new note of uneasiness regarding an eventual American "attack" against French Morocco. The General in question suggested that we should refrain from military intervention unless there is Axis provocation or a French invitation. I told these contacts that they were obviously laboring under the effects of Axis propaganda. The General paradoxically concluded our conversation by urging that we establish a program of military aid for French Morocco. I mention this because it illustrates the struggle going on in the minds of many French Army officers who are tormented by doubts as to where their duty lies.

In addition to contacting French officials in Morocco I also met a few of the Arab leaders in southern Morocco. I was amazed at their vigorous criticism of the French administration and their spontaneous insistence that the United States intervene in French Morocco where they state the United States would enjoy the effective support of the vast majority of the eight millions of persons included in the native population.

I was careful to explain that I had no reason to believe that my Government contemplated any such action; that we are engaged in this war in the defense of certain principles of conduct and have always condemned aggression. The Arab contacts expressed the opinion that we are engaged in a war with a ruthless and unscrupulous enemy and stated that they are convinced from what they have been able to learn from German and Italian representa-



tives in Morocco that the Axis will seize the first opportunity to invade Morocco.

They said that they knew that the Germans and the Italians have studied every inch of the territory in southern Morocco of which German topographers have made careful surveys; that large sums of money had been offered to various Arab elements by Axis representatives and that they are convinced that if and when the Germans are able to free effectives from the Russian front they would not hesitate to seize French Morocco. They also expressed the opinion that we would be foolish if we did not anticipate such an Axis move while we have the time.

In Tunisia I interviewed a number of officials including Resident General Esteva, General Barré commanding all military forces in Tunisia, General Péquin in charge of aviation and a number of officials dealing with economic and financial matters. The news of the resumption of shipments from the United States evoked enthusiasm on the part of these French officials whose pro-Allied sympathies seem more pronounced than is the case in any part of French North Africa.

One explanation for this situation is that the daily irritation of close contact with Italian representatives brings home to the French in Tunisia a keener realization of French humiliation. Admiral Esteva who with the two Generals in question came to lunch with Doolittle<sup>72</sup> and myself was particularly vigorous in his denunciation of the Germans and Italians whom he characterized as vermin. All of these officials stated that tension in Tunisia has declined, that only insignificant dribbles of foodstuffs are going to Libya, and that pro-Allied sympathy is on the upswing.

I found active interest in American armament production, the need for more information on this subject. Adverse events in Libya, however, register a most depressing effect throughout this area, particularly on the part of French Army officers.

Repeated to Vichy and Tangier.

Vichy please repeat to London and Tangier. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.0011 European War 1939/22793

*The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State*

No. 857

TANGIER, June 24, 1942.

[Received July 8.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 841 of June 18, 1942<sup>73</sup> and in particular to the reported nervousness locally

---

<sup>72</sup> Hooker Doolittle, Consul at Tunis.

<sup>73</sup> Not printed.

concerning a possible Allied invasion of Morocco, and to report that this nervousness would appear to extend also to German sources.

According to secret sources of information Colonel Hans Jacob Recke, Chief Gestapo Agent in Tetuán, had an interview with a Spanish official during the first week in June, at which time they discussed the possibility of an Anglo-American landing in Morocco.

Recke is said to have expressed the opinion that an invasion of Europe is doomed to failure and that consequently the possibility of an invasion in this part of the world cannot be ignored, especially as it is more likely to be successful.

The departure of Lieutenant Colonel Bentley, former Military Attaché to the American Legation in Tangier was interpreted as an indication that operations in this area will commence shortly. It is believed by the Germans that he will be in an excellent position to serve on the Headquarters staff of any such operation.

Respectfully yours,

J. RIVES CHILDS

740.0011 European War 1939/22424 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, June 24, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 4:41 p. m.]

907. The Director of Commercial Accords at the Foreign Office informed me confidentially that his Government has received a note in the last few days from the Germans demanding that the same rights of control in connection with shipping which they now exercise in Algiers be granted them at Casablanca.

My informant said that the French Government would be obliged to accede to the Germans as it was felt that with American control officers in Morocco exercising such prerogatives, it would be difficult to refuse them to the Germans. What really worried his Government, he said, was that by acceding to this demand, it would permit the Germans to control shipments from Casablanca to Dakar.

Repeated to London, Casablanca and Murphy.

TUCK

740.00112 European War 1939/6818

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief  
of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Villard)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 24, 1942.

Mr. Guérin said that he had received a reply from his Government to our proposal to send a tanker loaded with kerosene to North Africa on condition that the movement of cobalt be stopped.

He said that the French Government could not give an official undertaking to prohibit the exportation of cobalt from North Africa because it would immediately attract the attention of the German Armistice Commission which had the power to cancel the sailings of all vessels engaged in the North African supply program if it so desired. However, the French authorities were prepared to give unofficial and confidential assurances that no further shipments of cobalt would be made.

Mr. Guérin explained that a few months ago when the North African supply program was suspended and when there was no indication that it would ever be renewed the French had agreed to sell 500 tons of cobalt to the Germans. No French vessels were to be used in this transaction and the Germans were required to make their own arrangements for transportation. It was assumed that those arrangements were now being carried out. A few days ago the Germans had made a strong demand on the French for an additional 1,000 tons of cobalt, and it was this amount as well as all further amounts of cobalt which the French have now agreed unofficially to stop.

I said that we would consider whether we would accept these unofficial and confidential assurances, but that I felt we should be able to exercise some check on the carrying out of the promise. I suggested that some arrangement might be made whereby our Control Officers in North Africa could be informed of the location of the cobalt and exercise a degree of supervision in order to make sure that it was not exported. Mr. Guérin felt that it would be possible to come to an agreement on this and suggested that the matter be taken up through our Embassy in Vichy, which would be in a better position to discuss such confidential or off-the-record matters with officials of the Foreign Office.

Mr. Guérin then proposed that instead of a full cargo of kerosene the French should be allowed to purchase a cargo one-half of which would consist of kerosene and the remainder of gas oil, fuel oil and lubricants. I said that negotiations for such a cargo might take a good deal longer than the full tanker load of kerosene which we had proposed and that it would be advisable to postpone discussion of the other petroleum products to a subsequent date.

I said that if we undertook to make further shipments to North Africa we would wish to obtain substantial quantities of olive oil in addition to the 200 tons promised for the vessels now loading at Casablanca. Mr. Guérin replied that he was prepared to offer us substantial quantities of olive oil provided petroleum products could be sent to French West Africa. I observed that in as much as we had previously allowed a French tanker loaded with kerosene to discharge 2,000 tons at Dakar while en route to Casablanca, it

might be possible to repeat this arrangement in the present instance. Mr. Guérin said that in such an event more olive oil could be shipped on the next vessels to leave North Africa after the two now loading.

Mr. Guérin said that he wished to stress the urgent need in French North Africa of spare parts for agricultural machinery and petroleum products for agricultural purposes. He said that if we really meant to provide economic assistance to North Africa it was essential that the French be allowed to obtain priority for 2,000 tons of agricultural spare parts on order with American manufacturers. These spare parts together with a supply of petroleum products for the tractors and other agricultural machinery were vitally needed if the economy of North Africa was to be preserved. He said that the Germans were already endeavoring to discuss the question of supplying North Africa with machinery and gasoline which the French would have to accept if no American aid was forthcoming.

---

740.0011 European War 1939/22487 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, June 26, 1942—noon.

[Received 2:34 p. m.]

418. From Murphy. Vichy's 907, June 24, 1 p. m. I urge that we do what we can to inspire more resistance by the French Government to the German demands for the extension to Casablanca of the privileges which they now exercise regarding port control in Algiers. It is noted that according to Arnal the French Government would be obliged to accede to the German demand as it was felt with American control officers in Morocco exercising such prerogatives it would be difficult to refuse them to the Germans. I doubt that Arnal understands the exact situation. In agreement with General Weygand<sup>75</sup> months ago we for example did not insist on the production of copies of all manifests of ships leaving Casablanca because Weygand felt that if we did the Germans and the Italians would immediately demand the same privilege. He also agreed informally to refrain from unnecessary port visits to avoid attracting attention to themselves making discreet arrangements to obtain data we required. The Germans therefore have no proper

---

<sup>75</sup> Gen. Maxime Weygand, former Delegate General of the French Government in North Africa; for correspondence on the Murphy-Weygand Agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, pp. 206 ff.

ground for their request is [and?] to say that they should be permitted these prerogatives because we exercise them is misleading.

Repeated to Vichy and London. Copies to North African offices. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.00112 European War 1939/5852 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, June 26, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 6 p. m.]

419. From Murphy. Reference your June 11 regarding resumption of shipments to North Africa. Admiral Fénard invites attention to request made by French Embassy to obtain authorization for the shipment on steamers *Ile de Noirmoutier* and *Ile d'Ouessant* of sufficient fuel oil to enable those vessels to proceed from Casablanca to Algiers for the delivery of American products as well as for shipment from Algeria and Tunisia of cork and other products destined for the United States.

I recommend that sympathetic consideration be given to this request. There is a distinct propaganda value attaching to the arrival of these ships in Algiers from the United States which in our opinion would be worth far more than any formal propaganda we might undertake. This arrangement also would facilitate the shipment of products desired by the United States from this area. Please comment. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.00112 European War 1939/5856 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, June 27, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 6:39 p. m.]

928. A competent and thoroughly reliable Foreign Office contact has given me the following information which he requests should be regarded as strictly confidential.

1. As a condition to the resumption of the North African program, the German representative on the Armistice Commission recently insisted upon German control of French ships and cargoes between Casablanca and United States ports; Casablanca and the Antilles; Casablanca and Lisbon and Casablanca and Dakar. Such control would be limited to war materials only.

2. The French Government, being anxious to obtain the rapid resumption of the program and aware that under the terms of the

Armistice Convention the Germans have the right to exert control over all French ships and cargoes, has agreed to accept the German control as above indicated, but on the strict understanding that under no circumstances would this permit any control at Dakar or the presence of German and Italian officials there. My informant added that the Germans have since unofficially agreed and will shortly notify the French Government officially that there is no intention of demanding German control at Dakar.

3. The Italian Government recently made the suggestion to the French Government that an Italian Vice Consul be attached to the Spanish Consulate at Dakar. Governor Boisson,<sup>76</sup> who is now in Vichy, threatened to resign rather than to permit the presence of any German or Italian officials at Dakar.

The French Government has received an official assurance from the Germans that they will not increase the number of the members of their military inspection commission at Casablanca.

My informant added that by giving in to the Germans on the question of control, the French Government was thus able to obtain the assurance that German officials would not be stationed in Dakar and that there would be no increase in the number of the inspection commission at Casablanca.

Repeated to Murphy.

TUCK

---

740 00112 European War 1939/5794 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Tuck)*

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1942—5 p. m.

397. Your 897, June 20, 1 p. m. The Department appreciates the information concerning the cobalt transaction. It is prepared to accept the unofficial undertaking of the French Government that no further shipments will be made, but in view of the importance thereof considers that this undertaking should include also the projected shipment from Nemours. While we realize the difficulty of an outright repudiation of the German contract, it should be possible to find the means to delay in one way or another the loading and sailing of the vessel until we are prepared to deal with the attempted passage of this contraband of war. If the French authorities are as anxious and willing to help us as they profess to be, they should at the very least be willing to keep us closely informed of the status of this shipment, its proposed date of departure, and the course it would follow.

---

<sup>76</sup> Pierre Boisson, High Commissioner in French West Africa.

We should furthermore require some form of assurance that facilities will be provided in the future whereby we may satisfy ourselves from time to time that no movement has occurred in the stocks of cobalt and molybdenum and that these minerals remain in North Africa. If all of the above assurances are forthcoming, even though they are placed on an unofficial basis, the Department is willing to permit a French tanker to furnish a cargo of kerosene to North Africa.

In view of their confidential nature the Department prefers to obtain these assurances through the Embassy in Vichy without reference to the French representatives in Washington. On all technical matters connected with the operation of the economic accord we shall continue to deal with the French here as in the past, but we shall look to you hereafter to handle any negotiations respecting North Africa which may call for similar informal or unofficial undertakings on the part of the French Government.

Repeat to Algiers for Murphy as no. 194.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/5852 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1942—midnight.

202. For Murphy. Your 419, June 26, 3 p. m. The two French vessels now loading in this country are scheduled to proceed to Aruba for fueling because of the lack of bunker fuel on the East Coast. When they have arrived in the Dutch West Indies, final consideration will be given to the proposal that they be authorized to call at Algiers as well as Casablanca.

Owing to the German refusal to grant safe conduct for these vessels hereafter on the Eastern seaboard, it is proposed to transfer all subsequent operations of the economic accord to a Gulf port, where bunker supplies will also be more readily available.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/5922 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, July 2, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received July 3—1:22 a. m.]

959. The purport of the first two paragraphs of the Department's 397, June 27, 5 p. m. was communicated confidentially to the official referred to in my 897, June 20, 1 p. m.

Today he requested me to convey to the Department his regret that the unofficial undertaking of the French Government that no

further shipments of cobalt would be made could not include the projected shipment from Nemours. He explained that this cobalt had been sold to the Germans and that it was consequently impossible to repudiate the contract. He agreed however to keep us closely informed as to the status of the shipment, its proposed date of departure and the course it would follow. He felt that Murphy's control officers could play a useful role in this connection and he promised at the same time immediately to convey to me whatever information he received with regard to the vessel's movements. He added that the ship in question had not as yet reached Nemours.

As regards the assurance requested in the second paragraph of the Department's telegram under acknowledgment he requested our Government to address an official note in this sense to the French Government stating specifically that if this assurance were given we would in return be willing to permit a French tanker to furnish a cargo of kerosene to North Africa.

I confidently believe that this official is anxious and willing to keep us informed with regard to the attempted passage of this cobalt and that while it may not be possible for the authorities to arrange to delay the loading and sailing of the vessel he will do his best to keep us posted as to the status of the shipment.

The same official informed me that the Germans are now insisting on the continuance of their control at Casablanca for the duration of the armistice period even if United States shipments to North Africa were to be suspended in the future.

Repeated to Murphy.

TUCK

---

740 00112 European War 1939/5874 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1942—10 p. m.

207. Your 402, June 21, 10 a. m. For Murphy.

1. Consideration is still being given to Admiral Fénard's proposal regarding fuel for coastwise shipping, which however would appear to conflict with the suggestion in your 419, June 26, 3 p. m. that the economic accord vessels be authorized to proceed to Algiers after calling at Casablanca.

2. The question of markings on products imported from the United States has been settled in accordance with your observations.

3. The reference to binding twine is explained by the British-sponsored negotiations between Portugal and French North Africa, under which the Department agreed to permit this commodity to proceed immediately from Portugal rather than to await inclusion



in our own resumed shipments. Full details of the Portuguese deal have been sent to you by air mail.

4. One of the vessels now preparing to sail is expected to carry several thousand steel drums of kerosene. It is distinctly understood that these drums are to be returned to the United States on a return voyage from Casablanca and the control officers are asked to assume responsibility for their collection and loading. The exact number of drums involved will be telegraphed later.

5. At the request of the Board of Economic Warfare the control officers at Casablanca should check the loading of cork and other products and submit a complete list of the cargoes by telegraph.

HULL

---

740.00112 European War 1939/6022

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of  
Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1942.

Acting under Mr. Berle's<sup>77</sup> instructions, I asked Mr. Guérin to call at the Department with reference to his telephone communication of yesterday requesting a decision whether the French ships now in New York could obtain fuel oil there or whether they would have to fuel at Aruba. I told him that a decision had been taken that it would be necessary to fuel at the latter port. Mr. Guérin indicated that he understood the reasons for the decision.

I told him that I had also been instructed to inform him that the Department would now be willing to enter into negotiations regarding economic assistance for French West Africa. I said that in effect I believed that this would mean the extension to French West Africa of the present agreement covering North Africa. I added that this would of course involve the stationing of control officers in West African territory. Mr. Guérin expressed the view that there would be no difficulty on this score. He said that he supposed that we should want to obtain goods from West Africa, and I told him I believed that to be the case and asked what goods they could offer in addition to peanut oil. He said he thought there was little else except perhaps a few skins, since in ordinary times at least ninety-five percent of the exports from West Africa consisted of peanut oil. Mr. Guérin indicated that he would inform his Government of the foregoing and seek instructions with a view to entering into negotiations for the proposed West African agreement.

---

<sup>77</sup> Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.

740.0011 European War 1939/22717½

*The Counselor of Embassy in France (Murphy) to the Acting Chief  
of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton)*

ALGIERS, July 6, 1942.

DEAR RAY: During the interval since the despatch of my No. 167 of March 18, 1942,<sup>78</sup> which had reference to my confidential letters of December 7, 1941,<sup>79</sup> January 12 and March 14, 1942,<sup>80</sup> to the Under Secretary, I have been active in pursuit of the hope that the resumption of hostilities against the Germans and Italians might be developed in French North Africa. As you will have noted from a number of reports from this area, there are interesting trends in that direction.

I gathered from the Department's secret letter of March 5, 1942,<sup>81</sup> enclosing the War Department's comment of February 25, 1942,<sup>82</sup> relating to this movement, that it was desired that efforts along these lines be continued. It was obvious that the weakness of the North African movement consisted principally in the lack of a leader with the prestige of Weygand to insure its success from the beginning. I am reasonably confident that that deficiency may now be considered as rectified.

Since his escape from Koenigstein in May, the leaders of the North African group have been in touch personally with General André [*Henri*] Giraud. He has given them his authorization to continue their effort, and has designated certain military officers in French North Africa for this purpose. One of these officers, General Charles Mast, is stationed in Algiers as Chief of Staff of the 19th Army Corps. I have had several conversations with Mast. He tells me that, operating with the consent of the French Second Bureau, he organized General Giraud's escape from Germany. Mast himself had been a prisoner in that same fortress.

According to Mast, General Giraud is heart and soul for the resumption of hostilities against the Axis and will take command of the French forces either in France or North Africa. He believes that the action will start in North Africa. This statement is confirmed by two other members of this particular group who have recently visited General Giraud in France.

General Mast said that it is still too soon for the commencement of staff talks in this connection. He anticipates that these might be held in the autumn subject, of course, to other developments,

<sup>78</sup> *Ante*, p. 271.

<sup>79</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, p. 494.

<sup>80</sup> *Ante*, pp. 229 and 263, respectively.

<sup>81</sup> Not printed.

<sup>82</sup> Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of Staff, p. 258.

such as Axis provocation, which might precipitate earlier action. He stated the opinion which he said is shared by General Giraud and other important French officers, that German defeat is certain, and that the only hope France has to emerge from her humiliating position is the resumption of hostilities at a time when she can expect from the United States adequate and timely military aid.

Referring to North Africa, Mast states the opinion that we could count on the cooperation in French North Africa of at least 14 divisions composed of French officers and French and native troops. I refer in this connection to my telegram No. 167 of March 18, 3 p. m.

It is refreshing to have the point of view expressed by General Mast who, with other officers, insists that it matters little what politicians in Vichy may say or do during the coming few months. He insists that they will disappear, and that France's destinies will be taken in hand by the military. I asked in that connection, as a matter of detail, whether he considered Resident General Noguès of French Morocco as a politician or a soldier. He promptly replied that he considered Noguès as neither. The representative of General Giraud in French Morocco is General Béthouard,<sup>83</sup> a divisional commander now stationed at Casablanca.

There are many phases of this tricky situation on which I would like to have the benefit of your advice and counsel, in addition to the strictly military angle, if we are to support a movement in this area. There are important financial, economic and political considerations which naturally arise. For example, the group have presented me with a questionnaire on financial and economic matters, a copy of which I attach in translation.<sup>84</sup>

As you may know, Lt. Colonel Robert Solborg, Assistant Military Attaché in Lisbon, telegraphed me at Casablanca, suggesting that he come over for consultation. On his arrival in Casablanca I placed him in contact with certain individuals involved in this movement, and arranged for his visit to Algiers. He at that time provided me with a copy of the recent SOE<sup>85</sup> directive for French North Africa. Colonel Solborg stated that he had a most favorable impression of the persons with whom he conversed in Algiers. He will report to the Office of Strategic Services and to the War Department these conversations in detail. Colonel Solborg is now in Lisbon enroute to the United States.

I cannot help but feel that the recent unfortunate developments in Egypt may serve to focus more of our attention on the Mediterranean area. If that is true, I hope that the Department may

---

<sup>83</sup> Gen. Emile-Marie Béthouart.

<sup>84</sup> Not printed.

<sup>85</sup> British Special Operations Executive.

be able to devote some added attention to French North Africa. The more I study this area, the greater becomes my conviction that North Africa affords, by virtue of its climate, terrain and geographical situation, an ideal platform from which the French with our aid could launch military action against the Axis which would shorten the present conflict by many months and facilitate our victory.

The Department's decision to resume operations under the North African Economic Accord is a splendid step which I hope will lead in that direction. Might I have your comment, if practicable, on the attached questionnaire.

With warm regards to you and Sam, I am,

Yours sincerely,

ROBERT D. MURPHY

740.00112 European War 1939/6023a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1942—7 p. m.

209. For Murphy. The French Embassy was informed today [July 3] that the Department would now be willing to enter into negotiations regarding economic assistance for French West Africa. Any agreement reached will probably have to be along the lines of the present agreement covering French North Africa. The French Embassy is communicating the above to the French Government and is seeking instructions. Please repeat to Vichy. The Department will keep you informed of developments.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/22804 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, July 8, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received July 9—3:57 a. m.]

449. For Atherton from Murphy. If you approve please communicate following to Colonel Solborg, Assistant Military Attaché Lisbon who is now en route to Washington.

"Your June 26, 7 p. m. Our friend back from Paris and Vichy informed of your plans. Following is a résumé of his impressions:

Saw Laval June 30 and he confirms previous impression. In our friend's opinion the current policy of obedience and concessions is only limited by the desire of certain Germans to avoid a rupture between France and the United States. There is a belief in a German victory. Laval insists on it possibly to persuade himself that it is true. Laval's fear of replacement by Doriot<sup>88</sup> incites him

<sup>88</sup> Jacques Doriot, French politician, leader of the Parti Populaire Français.

to concessions and facilitates the Marshal's<sup>87</sup> agreement to those concessions.

2. It seems that in an effort to rally public opinion which since the last speech has been especially reticent there was some thought in Vichy of a *rapprochement* with Weygand. Our friend believes that Weygand's sense of discipline would be exploited by Vichy if the General, inspired by apprehension that another chief would be willing to assume the responsibilities which he declined, would now agree to serve the Marshal's Government.

3. Our friend saw again the principal who is the subject of previous conversations. He believes that the principal hopes to become the pivot of resistance in Europe and Africa and is stated to be in contact through an intermediary with American representatives in Vichy to whom he has presented requests for matériel for finance about which our friend has been informed. Group do not know whether circumstances will permit the realization of a combined operation in Africa, France and certain other occupied territories. Our friend believes it certain that political, military events may make necessary at any moment an African operation. That is why the interested principal is stated to desire arrangements to insure his arrival here and has requested *état-major* which he has established in North Africa to do the necessary in order that this area may be as well prepared as possible.

It is necessary also to anticipate that the Government might take measures against the principal or against his assistants. Under those circumstances also immediate action would be necessary.

4. Our friend underscores that if Allied resistance should collapse in the Eastern Mediterranean all plans would be subject to modification. It is also understood that if for political, military reasons the American position is changed that the group would be notified. The group hopes for frankness in this regard.

5. Group will also be pleased if you would confirm the execution of the *procès-verbal* with which you were in accord. Group hopes also for early reply to economic and financial questionnaires which I have forwarded by pouch to Atherton.

6. Our friend plans to spend month of August in France and will remain in contact with me.["]

Repeated to Vichy. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.00112 European War 1939/5998a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, July 8, 1942—11 p. m.

212. For Murphy. The French Embassy has advised the Department that the Germans are attempting to make it a condition for the release of the two accord vessels at Casablanca that the *Ile d'Ouessant* and the *Ile de Noirmoutier* must take on fuel oil at an

---

<sup>87</sup> Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, French Chief of State.

Atlantic coast port for the voyage to Casablanca rather than at Aruba. The Department has rejected this condition.

Any efforts made by the Germans to propagandize the failure of the ships to depart as being due to difficulties raised by this Government should be rebutted by you with all means at your disposal. Independently of any such efforts, it is hoped that you will be able to make the true facts known.

HULL

---

740.00112 European War 1939/6072

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)*<sup>88</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] July 8, 1942.

Conversations have taken place this afternoon with French officials concerning the North African Accord, as a result of which the following points have been brought out regarding the steel drums for kerosene and the shipment of cotton textiles objected to, respectively, by Mr. Canfield<sup>89</sup> of the Board of Economic Warfare, and Mr. Wyndham White of the British Embassy.

1. 8,000 steel drums have been loaded on the S.S. *Ile d'Ouessant* at New York on the authority of Mr. Duane Wilson of the Board of Economic Warfare. Mr. Wilson, who was appointed by the Board of Economic Warfare to handle matters connected with the North African supply program, arranged for the delivery of the drums and their passage through the New York customs to be loaded on the steamer.

2. The French Commercial Attaché in New York has made an exhaustive search for containers other than steel drums which could be used to transport the 1,500 tons of kerosene authorized, with negative results. It has been shown that wooden containers are both unsuitable and unavailable for the kerosene shipment.

3. The S.S. *Ile d'Ouessant* has just received permission from the German Armistice Commission to sail for Norfolk on July 15 in order to load coal for Casablanca. It is obviously necessary that the vessel should comply with this authorization if the whole North African program is not to be prejudiced, since the Germans are not likely to issue instructions to their submarines a second time to permit free passage of the vessel.

4. Mr. Guérin, the French official in charge of the negotiations, stated that he would not answer for the consequences if the 1,500 tons of kerosene did not go forward as agreed. He said that he would be extremely reluctant to transmit word to the effect that the kerosene could not leave in accordance with the authorization received from the Board of Economic Warfare; and would only do so on receipt of a written communication from the Department of State retracting the permission granted through Mr. Duane Wilson of the Board of Economic Warfare. Mr. Guérin felt that the

---

<sup>88</sup> Addressed to Assistant Secretaries of State Berle and Acheson.

<sup>89</sup> Cass Canfield, European-African Division, Board of Economic Warfare.

slightest deviation in the makeup of the cargo previously agreed upon and transmitted to the German Armistice Commission would inevitably result in delays of so serious a nature as to threaten the entire future of the North African Program.

5. With respect to the 1,240 tons of cotton textiles already loaded on the S.S. *Ile de Noirmoutier*, the French representatives stated emphatically that these goods were identical in type to those which had previously gone to North Africa under our supply program. Mr. Guérin stated that he was at a complete loss to understand the objections which had been raised to this shipment, as it included no woollen goods of any character and was limited strictly to material used by the native population. He said that he could not run the risk of unloading these goods without giving the Germans an opportunity to retaliate by withholding permission for the vessels now at Casablanca to leave for the United States or otherwise to threaten the continuance of the economic accord.

In view of the above circumstances, it is recommended that permission be granted immediately for the shipment of both the steel drums and the cotton textiles. Full assurances have been received from the French authorities that the drums will be returned to the United States and Mr. Murphy, in a telegram received today from Algiers, states that the Department's instructions on this subject will be carefully followed.

PAUL H. ALLING

---

740.00112 European War 1939/6357

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 9, 1942.

Mr. Hall<sup>90</sup> came in to see me July 8 at my request.

I said I wished to take up two matters which were connected. One was the North African agreement; the other was the agreement which we were making with Orgaz<sup>91</sup> in Spanish Morocco. I considered that the two, though separate, were actually connected in policy.

As to the North African agreement, I said that though both the British Government and ourselves had fully agreed that this should now go forward, the detailed negotiations of the commodities to be sent had resulted in a great number of objections and delays proceeding, apparently, from the Ministry of Economic Warfare in London. I referred specifically to a recent letter from Wyndham

---

<sup>90</sup> Noel Hall, British Minister in the United States.

<sup>91</sup> Gen. Luis Orgaz, High Commissioner in the Spanish Zone of Morocco; for correspondence regarding these negotiations, see vol. iv, section under Morocco entitled "Negotiations between the American Chargé at Tangier and the Spanish High Commissioner regarding American economic aid to Spanish Zone of Morocco and Tangier."

White taking objection to the sending of 2500 tons of cotton piece goods (the real figure being 1240) and to the sending of woollen broadcloths (I was advised that no such cloth was going). This action was merely typical of a number of objections which were delaying the program. I wondered whether this was merely economic, or whether there was some political objection—perhaps a divergence in political objection [*objectives?*] between the two departments of the British Government such as occasionally occurred in the United States Government.

I said I did not wish to enter into the details of the complaints since that was being handled by the War Trade people, but that I wanted to make an arrangement by which this could be cleared up, cleaned up, and got forward as rapidly as possible. I said our view was that military developments in Africa enhance the need for speed.

Mr. Hall said that he had observed various objections which he characterized as "sniping". He said that before Halifax<sup>92</sup> had left for England, he and Halifax had worked up a personal telegram to Eden<sup>93</sup> calling attention to the delays and asking Eden to intervene with the Ministry of Economic Warfare in the sense that they should shut up and leave the details to be worked out in the negotiation on the basis of the best bargain possible. They had not, as yet, got the reaction from the cable. He agreed, however, to take another shot at this and see if he could extract a reaction from Halifax and Eden in London. He hoped this would solve the problem. I thanked him.

I then said that we had decided in principle to extend the North African agreement to Dakar largely to serve as an excuse for increasing our control officers there.

Mr. Hall said that they had anticipated that also and were in accord.

I then turned to the allied problem of the proposed agreement with General Orgaz. I said that here it looked as though we were running into complications. The principle had been fully agreed upon in London, but there had been vivid objection in Madrid chiefly proceeding from Sir Samuel Hoare.<sup>94</sup>

Mr. Hall observed that similar cables had reached them from Madrid.

I wondered whether possibly a somewhat similar situation might not exist in regard to this trade arrangement. We had acquired the feeling that the British Embassy in Madrid had a theory of Iberian-African matters not altogether on all fours with the London theory.

---

<sup>92</sup> Viscount Halifax, British Ambassador in the United States.

<sup>93</sup> Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>94</sup> British Ambassador in Spain.



Mr. Hall said he was not clear about that but felt that it had better go through in the same way as the North African agreement.

I added that any one of us was likely to be attacked for both the North African and the Spanish Moroccan agreements since these were not well understood and were unpopular publicly, being construed as attempts to "appease" Laval and Franco.<sup>95</sup> However, we considered, as did the Joint Intelligence Committee, that there were some distinct military advantages and we were in the business of winning the war rather than getting praise. I thought that if we could assume the burden of a thing like that, we were entitled to all the help we could get from the British side. Mr. Hall seemed to agree with this also and I gathered that he would do what he could to clear up the difficulties.

Mr. Hall did not state clearly whether the so-called "sniping" reflected a concealed political objection or merely a view of the Ministry of Economic Warfare. He seems to think that in either case it ought to stop.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

740.00112 European War 1939/6000 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, July 11, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 7:47 p. m.]

456. From Murphy. Your 212, July 8, 11 p. m. I have discussed with the competent officials here the question of overcoming the new German condition to the departure of the accord vessels. They propose that a hint be conveyed to the Germans through proper channels in Vichy that if the latter insist on this unreasonable condition, widespread publicity will be sent throughout North Africa which would leave no doubt in the minds of the population regarding the German responsibility for the failure of these much-needed supplies to reach this area. Vichy informed. [Murphy.]

COLE

740.0011 European War 1939/22896 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Casablanca (Russell) to the Secretary of State*

CASABLANCA, July 15, 1942—noon.

[Received 12:15 p. m.]

543. German Commission has started control of commercial vessels arriving in port. On Dakar convoy all soldiers disembarked immediately on ships coming alongside quays paraded and were in-

<sup>95</sup> Gen. Francisco Franco, Spanish Chief of State.

spected by Commission. Ships' officers much annoyed by arbitrary manner in which this complete control exercised.

Repeated to Algiers, by courier to Tangier.

RUSSELL

---

740.00112 European War 1939/6028

*Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray)  
to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 16, 1942.

MR. BERLE: It is rather difficult to see how this Government is in a position at this date to express an opinion in regard to the conditions imposed by Germany on the French Government regarding the control of the cargoes and passengers of French vessels. As explained in Vichy's telegram of July 13,<sup>66</sup> the Armistice between France and Germany subordinated the resumption of French commercial navigation to German and Italian authorization. When the question of resumption of commercial navigation had come up, the French Government had been forced to accept certain conditions under a threat that commercial navigation could not otherwise be resumed. The conditions which were imposed at this time, as pointed out by Mr. Arnal to our Chargé d'Affaires,<sup>67</sup> flowed out of the extremely vague but wide scope of Article 11 of the Armistice Convention.

In view of the fact that the Armistice Convention, as well as the conditions respecting commercial navigation, have now been in effect for two years, it does not seem feasible for us to express an opinion as to whether we would accept or reject the terms under which French commercial navigation was resumed. As a matter of fact, we have always been aware of the German control of French vessels engaged in the North African trade. The German Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden has always been approached by the French Admiralty for permission to carry out each sailing of the vessels engaged in the North African traffic, whether the ships departed from French North Africa or from a United States port. Moreover, we have been under the impression that a measure of control has always been exercised by the Germans in respect to the cargoes of these vessels, and in as much as a member of the German Armistice Commission has long been resident in Casablanca in the capacity of Port Control Officer, the German interest in these ships appears to us neither new nor surprising.

---

<sup>66</sup> Not printed.

<sup>67</sup> S. Pinkney Tuck, Chargé in France.

As long as our control officers are permitted to exercise their prerogatives in accordance with our agreement with the French, and as long as the German Control Commission is not granted rights in excess of those given to our control officers, there seems to be little ground on which to base a formal objection or to do more than what has already been done in the matter by the Embassy at Vichy.

WALLACE MURRAY

---

740.00112 European War 1939/6410

*The Counselor of Embassy in France (Murphy) to the Chief  
of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)*

ALGIERS, July 19, 1942.

DEAR PAUL: I very much appreciate the Department's air mail instruction of June 30, 1942,<sup>88</sup> with which you and Harry Villard enclosed the documentation regarding the Luso-Moroccan trade agreement.<sup>89</sup> My attention, of course, was particularly attracted to the memorandum of May 16, 1942,<sup>90</sup> which impresses me as being very much to the point. You, of course, know how I feel about this phase of our relations with French Africa, and I have tried in my despatch No. 1550 of today's date<sup>91</sup> to support your efforts as best I can. The more study I give to this French African problem, the more I am convinced that our policy during the past 18 months bears a certain similarity to French policy toward Spain during the Spanish Civil War. The French then were torn by opposing factions in their own country and were never able to make up their minds as a nation whether they would support the Franco or the Republican cause. The present war undoubtedly results in part from that failure to take and maintain a decisive line of policy.

Naturally, our relations with French Africa do not have the same importance. Yet this area, I am convinced, has had enormous possibilities of interest to the prosecution of the war and I have the uneasy notion that we have not taken advantage of them. I feel that we have permitted ourselves throughout to be victimized by all sorts of vague suspicions and doubts leading to indecision. These arose from a number of causes, including sensational reports about this area, sent in by irresponsible agents, some of them in the employment of various intelligence services.

---

<sup>88</sup> Not printed.

<sup>89</sup> A British-sponsored arrangement for barter trade between Portugal and Morocco.

We have enjoyed nevertheless a negative success in that French Africa has not gone over to the Axis, but we fall certainly far short of having developed this area into a unit fighting on our side. It seems to me that the reason for our failure to so develop this area has been our desire to avoid all risks. We would have liked large profits and advantages, but we were unwilling to risk anything. When we consider that we are faced by enemies for whom audacity has become a by-word, it is easy to understand that we are simply outpaced.

Take, for instance, French West Africa. You may vaguely remember that in January, 1941, I reported after conversations with General Weygand and High Commissioner Boisson at Dakar how eager they and other representative people were for us to come in and establish ourselves in that market. Boisson even urged that we have our Clipper Service use Dakar, offering, with Weygand's approval, to sign an agreement covering it. What happened? We declined to extend the North African agreement to French West Africa—which then really was wide-open to us—for the reason, as I understand it, that peanut and palm oil shipments were going from there to Germany.

This I believe was the view of the Ministry of Economic Warfare in London and from a strictly economic viewpoint it is a good reason. But it overlooks what I believe are solid political and eventually military considerations. I think it was a narrow-minded decision.

The other day I saw High Commissioner Boisson in Algiers returning to Dakar from Vichy. Since January, 1941, much has happened to destroy the friendly confidence he had in us at that time, and he has completely abandoned hope that we intend co-operating with French West Africa. In fact, after suffering continual personal attacks by British and De Gaulle radio broadcasters, listening to threats made by irresponsible persons that the United States would attack Dakar, seeing the economy of French West Africa go to hell in a big way, realizing that in the interval the Germans and Italians whom Boisson and Weygand had succeeded in keeping out of French West Africa were gunning for him with the aid of some fellow travelers in Vichy and Paris, Boisson is bitter and disillusioned. I am told that many others in Dakar feel as does he that having tried to demonstrate friendship for us, we have disdained them and are actually hostile. That being so, it is probably normal that resentment should manifest itself one way or the other.

I am all for British participation in the Luso-Moroccan trade and I would like to see them participate in trade with French Africa. The latter, I presume, is out of the question as long as

their blockade policy, as I understand it, regards French territory as enemy territory. However, this crazy situation calls for some flexibility and if a formula could be found to enable the British to participate in shipments to French Africa, I feel that such action would greatly facilitate our task.

I know you are busy and I apologize for this long and probably incoherent screed, but you gave me an opening.

With all the best, believe me

Yours sincerely,

ROBERT D. MURPHY

---

740 00112 European War 1939/5852 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1942—8 p. m.

219. Your 419, June 26, 3 p. m. For Murphy. Representatives of the Board of Economic Warfare and the British Embassy question the advisability of permitting the *Ile de Noirmoutier* and the *Ile d'Ouessant* to proceed to Algiers in view of the uncertain political situation in the Mediterranean. Will you please telegraph whether or not in your opinion governing conditions have altered since you made your recommendations in this regard and amplify your statements regarding the beneficial effect which the arrival of these vessels at Algiers would have.

The Board of Economic Warfare has objected to the sending of fuel oil for the Coastwise Service. It feels that cork and possibly other commodities from North Africa, if needed in this country, will be forthcoming without this service. In this connection the French Embassy has informed us that as much as 10,000 tons of cork might be available in Morocco. The Department would therefore like your comments on the possible value of the Coastwise Service in relation to the distribution in French North Africa of goods from the United States, particularly if the accord vessels are not permitted to proceed to Algiers.

Board of Economic Warfare also contends that if Coastwise Service is not used goods will have to be transported by rail thus using railroad facilities which otherwise would benefit the Axis. Please comment.

Since final decision must be made before accord vessels take on fuel oil at Curaçao we shall appreciate prompt reply.

HULL

123M956/885 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1942—9 p. m.

220. For Murphy. If you were ordered home for a brief period of consultation do you believe that you would have any difficulty in returning to North Africa?

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/5874 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, July 25, 1942—4 p. m.

224. For Murphy. The *Ile d'Ouessant* sailed July 21 from Newport News for Curaçao where it will bunker and load kerosene in 8,000 steel drums. It has a cargo of 5,000 tons of coal. As the matter now stands 2,000 tons of this coal and all the kerosene should be discharged at Casablanca and the remaining 3,000 tons of coal at Tangier. The empty kerosene drums should be controlled and returned to the United States in the manner described in the Department's telegram no. 207 of July 3, 10 p. m.

The *Ile de Noirmoutier* sailed July 24 from New York for Curaçao where it will take on bunkers. Its cargo consists of approximately 4,600 tons of brown sugar, 1,270 tons of cotton goods, 500 tons of copper sulphate, 300 tons of leaf tobacco, 73 tons of cotton thread, 150 drums of consular gasoline, 2 drums of lubricating oil, and several miscellaneous articles.

You will be instructed in the near future regarding the return to the United States of certain twills and denims forming part of the cargo of the *Ile de Noirmoutier*. After the loading of these cotton goods questions were raised as to the desirability of sending the goods to French North Africa. However, in order not to delay further the departure of the vessel, the Anglo-American Blockade Committee agreed to permit the ship to sail on condition that the twills and denims be sent back to this country.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/6161 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, July 26, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received July 27—10:35 a. m.]

1089. With reference to the Embassy's 897, June 20, 1 p. m. (repeated to Murphy). It will be recalled that the official in question stated that while it would be difficult to give us any *official*

undertaking regarding the restriction of exportation of certain North African minerals the French Government was nevertheless prepared to give us such an undertaking unofficially and as a "spontaneous gesture".

Yesterday evening a responsible Foreign Office official requested me to endeavor to obtain the Department's consent to the following proposal.

There was a strong indication that if the consent of the German Armistice Commission were to be obtained to the restriction of exports of North African cobalt such agreement would almost certainly be made contingent on counterdemands (possibly important sales of peanut oil to Germany). He recalled that the transport of North African cobalt destined for Germany is not authorized in ships flying French flag. The German Government therefore must have recourse to neutral vessels for such transport and shipments by neutral vessels entail certain very definite risks. He added that for the last 11 months no North African cobalt destined for Germany had left North Africa. His Government was therefore prepared to give us the following official undertaking in return for the resumption of petroleum shipments to French North Africa.

1. To maintain the undertaking that shipments of North African cobalt destined for Germany would not be made in French bottoms.

2. That instructions would be given to the competent French North African Government services to forbid the export or transport of cobalt to other countries as well as to the French metropolitan market (the latter concession was in his opinion an important one since the French market alone annually consumed 1200 tons of North African cobalt).

This official expressed the earnest hope that the Department would consent to this proposal which if agreed to by us might at the same time exact the promise of the French Government to restrict the export of certain other minerals including antimony.

If our Government could not agree to this proposal the French Government was prepared to adhere to its unofficial undertaking but it was greatly feared that the inevitable German counterdemands would prove as embarrassing to the French Government as they would be to us.

I would appreciate instructions.

Repeated to Murphv.

TUCK

123M956/386 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, July 26, 1942—midnight.

[Received July 27—10:41 a. m.]

490. From Murphy. Your 220, July 24, 9 a. m. [p. m.] I do not foresee any difficulty returning to North Africa. I hold visas for the three French North African territories good until February 1943 and no visa is required for the Tangier Zone. [Murphy.]

COLE

862.24/733 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Tuck)*

WASHINGTON, July 27, 1942—9 p. m.

464. Reference is made to the assurances contained in the French Government's note of February 24, 1942, and confirmed in its note of March 14,<sup>3</sup> that no military assistance would be given to any of the belligerents in any theatre of operations and that no policy of open assistance to the Axis powers beyond the terms of the Armistice Conventions would be adopted. It was on the basis of these assurances that this Government agreed to resume the shipment of supplies to French North Africa.

The North African Accord voyages are now being resumed. You should therefore draw this fact to the attention of the French Government and state that we would appreciate having the assurances previously given renewed.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/6190 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, July 29, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 11:06 p. m.]

495. From Murphy. Your 219, July 24, 9 [8] p. m. It is difficult to comprehend the doubts entertained by the Board of Economic Warfare and the British Embassy regarding the advisability of the *Ile de Noirmoutier* and the *Ile d'Ouessant*, vessels of French registry, proceeding to Algiers. It is obvious that there must be elements in the political situation known to them of which we here are ignorant. Replying to the Department's question, as far as I am

<sup>3</sup> See telegrams No. 292, February 25, 10 a. m., and No. 390, March 14, 4 p. m., from the Ambassador in France, pp. 141 and 148, respectively.



aware there is no change in governing conditions since the recommendations made in my 419, June 26, 3 p. m.

Viewed from here, authorization for these French vessels to proceed to Casablanca is difficult to distinguish from permission to proceed to Algiers. These ships make no movement without the prior authorization of the Axis Armistice Commissions. Upon arrival at Casablanca, they are subject to the control of the German Armistice Commission; upon arrival in Algiers to the control of the Italian Armistice Commission. In fact, they do not leave an American port without the prior consent of the German Armistice Commission and they must follow a given course which receives the prior approval of that Commission.

The general political situation in the western Mediterranean seems to have eased since my telegram under reference. The Axis advance into Egypt has, if anything, relieved the tension in this area. The situation in Algeria and Tunisia and, in fact, the western Mediterranean has not been more calm to the best of my recollection in the past 20 months.

The officials and other competent observers in this area seem to contemplate no change during the immediate weeks.

I believe the Department will appreciate without much comment from me the propaganda value of the arrival of these ships in Algiers from New York loaded with American goods for the benefit of this area. As the Department is aware, we are deprived by French censorship under German restraint from the benefit of press and local radio publicity. The public has heard talk of economic cooperation but during the past 8 months there has been no visible evidence of it. News travels fast by informal channels in North Africa and the arrival of these ships and goods from the United States will be no exception to the rule. The ships' arrival here will also afford our control officers in Algeria justification for port visits and more contact with French naval authorities. In the absence of military successes on this side of the water, I know of no more effective manner at present of bolstering our prestige and spreading our influence than the way suggested. I do not see that we encounter the slightest risk in adopting such a line. The total amount of goods is small and without direct military value and will be quickly absorbed by the local population. The goods have been paid for and the vessel, in any event, would be on this side of the water subject to Armistice Commission authorization.

I have noted most carefully the objections of the Board of Economic Warfare to sending fuel oil for the Coastwise Service and the possibility of obtaining sufficient cork in Morocco. That of course is a matter of policy which the Department will know best to determine. I respectfully suggest that it has always seemed to

me that we should regard French Africa as a unit in the matter of our current economic policy. In North Africa, Algeria is the most important unit politically, economically and militarily with the largest population of the three territories. It enjoys the closest ties with metropolitan France. Algiers is the seat of the High Command for French Africa.

Therefore it might be appropriate to inquire what objective the Department has in mind. Is it restricted to an exchange of merchandise to function with the minimum risk and inconvenience or does the Department contemplate other objectives of a political and eventually military nature? I am convinced that it is the latter. If that is true our influence should extend and it does extend to include Tunisia. In fact some of the strongest sentiment in our favor exists in Tunisia where resentment against Italy is a distinct element in our favor. In addition to those considerations there is the economic factor. In the present west bound shipments the bulk of the cargoes has been provided by Algiers, [for?] the reason that Morocco would release no olive oil or wool and Armstrong shipped most of the cork from Algeria.

I gain the belief from the contention of the Board of Economic Warfare that it may be believed that the North African railroad facilities are absorbed in servicing the Axis. This of course is not true. The present limited service which is far below normal due to lack of coal and lubricants is of small assistance to the Axis at present and barely answers transport for the needs of the 20 million of French North Africans. Most shipments in which the Axis are interested have gone forward by coal burning vessels from the ports of Dakar, Casablanca, Nemours and Oran. The Armstrong Cork Company is the owner of most of the cork in Tunisia and Algeria and it is principally this commodity for which fuel oil is desired in addition to the delivery of American products. The cork must be shipped from ports in Tunisia and Algeria assembled in Algiers and shipped to Casablanca. I believe we should if practicable have regard also for the American interest involved. I repeat my previous recommendations (my 402, June 21, 11 [10] a. m., and 419, June 26, 3 p. m.) with the amendment that only 100 tons of fuel oil be retained in Casablanca from the tank of the steamer *Aldebaran* due to the fact that vessel and the *Ile de Ré* are proceeding to Gulf ports and will require more fuel for the west bound trip. Four hundred tons should be granted in addition for coastwise shipping. [Murphy.]

COLE

IV. Acceleration of Economic Aid Program by Direction of the President;  
Inter-Departmental Difficulties Regarding Implementation of the Program  
(August-September)

740.00112 European War 1939/6211a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*<sup>4</sup>

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1942—11 p. m.

3537. For your information and guidance. Two cargo vessels operating under the North African Accord have recently left this country for the Dutch West Indies where they will fuel and depart for Casablanca.

With the resumption of this service, the President has directed (and the British Chargé d'Affaires is being so advised today) that the service be continued without interruption. Emphasis is laid on the political nature of the President's decision and if the spirit of his instructions are followed there will not be the same opportunity for extended consultation as to the cargo of the vessels leaving here in the future in the North African service. The Department of State, however, will continue to keep in close touch with the British Embassy on all phases of this matter.

For your information the American Red Cross was informed today that it might proceed at as early a date as possible with its plan for the shipment on the French vessel *Mont Everest* of a cargo of medicine, canned milk, and layettes intended for distribution to children through Red Cross channels in unoccupied France.

HULL

---

740.00112 European War 1939/63814

*Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of  
Near Eastern Affairs (Villard)*<sup>5</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] July 30, 1942.

Captain Strubel of the Navy called me on the telephone this morning regarding the amount of fuel oil to be given at Aruba to the two French vessels about to sail for North Africa under the economic accord. He said that he had been greatly confused by conversations with the Treasury and the Board of Economic Warfare as to the amount of fuel to be permitted and that he felt the various objections which had been raised by members of those organizations were delaying and hampering the prompt sailing of the vessels. Captain Strubel expressed a desire to deal directly

<sup>4</sup> Repeated to the Chargé in France as telegram No. 477, July 31, 11 p. m.

<sup>5</sup> Addressed to the Under Secretary of State (Welles) and the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle), both of whom indicated their agreement.

with one authority on this matter, preferably someone in the State Department.

I told Captain Strubel of the President's instructions that the economic program should be carried out without further interruption or delay. He replied that the Navy would be only too glad to go along in the matter to eliminate the interminable discussions as to details and quantities of fuel required for the round trip. He pointed out, however, that the Treasury Department controlled funds which the French Embassy was using to purchase the fuel oil and that it could withhold its consent to the purchase of fuel beyond an amount which it might consider desirable.

I believe that in view of the control thus exercised by the Treasury it will be necessary to inform some high official of that department regarding the President's directive if we are to avoid last minute hold ups and discussions. Captain Strubel cited the example of the *Ile de Noirmoutier* which desires to take on enough fuel to call at Algiers as well as Casablanca. This has been the subject of protracted discussion with the Board of Economic Warfare and the British Embassy. I told Captain Strubel that in view of the President's instructions and telegram no. 495 of July 29 from Mr. Robert Murphy, copy of which is attached,<sup>6</sup> the *Ile de Noirmoutier* should be permitted to load sufficient fuel to make the call at Algiers and to return to a port in this hemisphere. Before this loading can take place, however, the appropriate officials in the Treasury Department would undoubtedly have to receive instructions in the light of the directive we have received from the President.

HENRY S. VILLARD

---

123M956/887 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General  
at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, August 1, 1942—3 p. m.

229. For Robert D. Murphy. You are directed proceed Department for consultation as soon as possible. [Here follow travel orders.]

WELLES

---

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, p. 345.

740.00112 European War 1939/6406

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser on  
Political Relations (Dunn)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 4, 1942.

Mr. Hoyer Millar, Counselor of the British Embassy, came in this afternoon and among other matters took up the question of the shipments now being contemplated in connection with the economic assistance program for North Africa. He said that the British Government realized the importance of the decision already made by this Government to resume the assistance program to North Africa and to endeavor to send forward the ships on their regular runs without delay. But, he said, the British Government ventured the suggestion that if any question arose as to the advisability of sending certain commodities, or as to the volume in which certain commodities might be sent on these ships, that the decision be left to the military authorities, perhaps under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I told Mr. Hoyer Millar that it was fully realized here that the shipments were, under the President's direction, to go forward without delay and that there was a great possibility that, in order to insure the expeditious movement of the ships in connection with this program, the decisions in many matters affecting the military situation would be left to the military authorities.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

740.00112 European War 1939/6499

*The Counselor of Embassy in France (Murphy)  
to the Secretary of State*

No. 1586

ALGIERS, August 5, 1942.

[Received August 26.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the last paragraph of the Department's telegraphic instruction No. 224 of July 25/4 PM<sup>1</sup> regarding the decision of the Board of Economic Warfare to permit 125 tons of twills and denims to go forward on the S.S. *Ile de Noirmoutier*. Apparently an understanding was had with the French Embassy in Washington that this shipment when discharged at Casablanca would be held under the control of our consular officers and returned to the United States, at the earliest possible moment, for the reason that the Board of Economic Warfare considered that this material possessed a certain military value.

In that connection I have the honor to enclose a copy, in translation, of a self-explanatory note of August 6, 1942,<sup>2</sup> received from

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 343.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

the Secrétariat Général Permanent of French Africa urging that reconsideration be given this decision for the reasons stated in the enclosure.

In the event that it would be possible for the Board of Economic Warfare to reconsider its decision in this instance, I suggest that an arrangement could be made for the verification of the consumption of these goods by the civilian population of French North Africa. In other words, an assurance could be given that the goods would not be reexported from this area and would be used for civilian, as distinguished from military, purposes.

I shall be grateful for the Department's telegraphic comment on the foregoing reviewed in the light of the Department's 477 of July 31/11 PM to Vichy.<sup>9</sup>

Respectfully yours,

ROBERT D. MURPHY

---

740.00112 European War 1939/8313 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Thompson) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, August 10, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received August 11—8:52 a. m.]

1170. The Foreign Office official<sup>10</sup> referred to in our 1089, July 26, 5 p. m.,<sup>11</sup> has asked us for the Department's reaction to the proposal (which he says was not conveyed to Henry-Haye<sup>12</sup>) contained in above reference telegram. He understands that the question of North African cobalt is scheduled for discussion very soon between the French and German economic delegations and he expressed the hope that some indication of the Department's views will be forthcoming before Barnaud<sup>13</sup> arrives in Vichy next Friday.

He repeated his statement that there are strong indications that if the German Armistice Commission consents to the restriction of exports of North African cobalt the Germans will almost certainly insist on a "countrepart" probably in the form of considerable quantities of peanut oil and for this reason the French are anxious to avoid raising the question.

He repeated his assurance that under the French proposal North W[est] African cobalt would not be shipped in French bottoms and that under these circumstances he felt that we could bring sufficient pressure on Spain and Portugal (he suggested warnings that any

<sup>9</sup> See footnote 4, p. 348.

<sup>10</sup> Pierre Albert Arnal, Director of Commercial Relations, French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>11</sup> *Ante*, p. 343.

<sup>12</sup> Gaston Henry-Haye, French Ambassador in the United States.

<sup>13</sup> Jacques Barnaud, French delegate general for Franco-German economic negotiations.

neutral ships carrying such cargoes would be torpedoed) to prevent their vessels from transporting such cargoes.

Repeated to London.

THOMPSON

---

740.00112 European War 1939/6581

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 11, 1942.

The French Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at his request.

The Ambassador asked that in order to avoid further difficulties, delays and confusion, the officials of the French Embassy dealing with questions involving the North African trade agreement be permitted to deal solely with officials of the State Department. He said he realized that officials of the B.E.W.,<sup>14</sup> the Treasury Department, et cetera would necessarily have to come into the picture, but he urged that when this was necessary such meetings between the officials of his Embassy and these officials be held in the State Department in the presence of State Department officials. In other words, the Ambassador said he was asking that these negotiations be centered in the Department of State. He made the same request with regard to matters affecting supplies for the French West Indies.<sup>15</sup>

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

851R.24/9-1

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Thomas C. Wasson  
of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] August 11, 1942.

Participants: Monsieur de Panafieu, Counselor of French Embassy;  
Captain de Bourgoing, French Naval Attaché;  
Monsieur Paul Guérin, French Embassy;  
Mr. Wasson.

After introducing Captain de Bourgoing, M. de Panafieu inquired whether the French Mission could start purchasing the articles

---

<sup>14</sup> Board of Economic Warfare.

<sup>15</sup> As a result of this request it was decided that all future communications to and from the French Embassy dealing with supplies for French North Africa should be channeled through the Division of Near Eastern Affairs. In addition, Mr. Thomas K. Finletter, Acting Chief of the Division of Defense Materials, was designated as Chairman of an inter-departmental committee to discuss and iron out all questions arising from the North African Accord. Interested Divisions of the Department of State and other agencies of the Government were represented on this committee. Meetings were held weekly beginning on September 3, 1942. The memoranda regarding these meetings are not printed.

listed in the French Embassy's letters of July 23 and 24, 1942,<sup>16</sup> because it would not be long before the *Ile de Ré* and the *Aldebaran* would arrive at New Orleans. M. de Panafieu was informed that the lists of goods which they wished to purchase for export to French North Africa had been referred to the Board of Economic Warfare for clearance and that a reply had just been received from that organization, approving certain commodities and disapproving others. A list of the articles which had been approved was handed to M. de Panafieu.

After scanning the list M. Guérin stated that Mr. Fertig (OWI<sup>17</sup>) had informed him that the French would have to pay not only for packaging a certain quantity of the sugar and tea but also for having propaganda matter printed on the containers. He said that they had already purchased a considerable quantity of sugar and tea and that it seemed unreasonable to demand that they now pay \$25,000 additional to have a portion of this packaged and the containers printed with American propaganda. M. Guérin went on to say that there was no way to include such an item in his accounts, since the sugar in question was already bought. The three officials stated that they would be willing in the future to pay for packaging a part of the sugar and tea but that they thought that the OWI ought to pay for its own propaganda.

I read the list of commodities which had been disapproved. In connection with the 1,500 tons of binder cord, which had been turned down because of supply shortage and because French North Africa esparto grass and palm fiber could be used as a substitute, M. de Panafieu inquired whether we would be willing to sell them the machinery to make binder twine out of the grass and the fiber.

M. Guérin stated that the BEW could not refuse the export of the agricultural machine parts because it was clearly understood that these would be sent to French North Africa on condition that the French shipped at least 200 tons of olive oil to the United States. The *Ile de Ré* is bringing 218 tons of this commodity and he could not understand why the BEW now declined to permit the export of the agricultural machine parts.

M. de Panafieu expressed the hope that the delays which had been encountered previously in the sailings of the vessels engaged in trade between French North Africa and the United States would be reduced and that the turn-around of these ships would be expedited. I inquired whether it would be possible for a French tanker to bring a cargo of fuel oil from Aruba or Curaçao to an east coast port, in order to avoid having the vessels bunker in the West Indies. The

<sup>16</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>17</sup> Office of War Information.



Naval Attaché replied that he could not recommend this to Vichy in as much as there was no assurance of regular sailings.

M. de Panafieu requested the Department to use its good offices in order that the vessels might continue to call at North Atlantic ports, to avoid the delays incident to refueling in the West Indies. He said that the present destination, i.e. New Orleans, of the vessels was unsatisfactory because of the long inland freight hauls for both incoming and outgoing cargoes. He was informed that the Department was endeavoring to arrange for the vessels to call at Atlantic ports but that no assurance could be given him in this connection.

---

740.00112 European War 1939/6868 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)*

WASHINGTON, August 13, 1942—8 p. m.

1102. For Robert Murphy, expected to arrive Lisbon August 14:

1. The Board of Economic Warfare is working with the Department on a program for the shipment to French North Africa of the commodities described below. These shipments will be made without requiring any concessions on the part of the French Government and without any conditions except that the observers will supervise the distribution of these products under the Economic Accord. This program would consist of the following commodities, all in moderate quantities but to be shipped with regularity: sugar, cotton goods, yarns and thread, tea, matches, tobacco, cigarettes, and small amounts of kerosene for the heating and lighting of native homes.

2. The Board of Economic Warfare is prepared to approve a substantially larger program than that described in paragraph 1. The enlarged program would provide increased quantities of all the commodities listed in paragraph 1 above, and in addition coffee. The quantities of kerosene would be substantially increased. In the case of the other commodities, the quantities would approximate the present import requirements necessary to maintain the current rationed level of consumption. In company with these commodities would be an extensive Red Cross program including ambulances, medical supplies, soap, and powdered milk. The enlarged program referred to in this paragraph would, however, be approved by the Board of Economic Warfare only on the condition that approximately 30 buying agents should be granted visas for French North Africa and should be allowed to travel freely for the purpose of purchasing strategic materials in that area.

3. If the enlarged program referred to in paragraph 2 were to prove to be satisfactory in interfering with the flow of French North African strategic and other materials to the Axis, the Board of

Economic Warfare would be prepared to approve increasing even the so-called enlarged program.

4. The Department realizes that you will be in the United States in the near future and that therefore you will be available for full consultation on this subject. Nevertheless, the matter is believed to be of sufficient immediate importance to request your interim opinion as to whether it would be possible to obtain the approval of the French Government to the entry and proposed operations of these buying agents in return for the enlarged program described in paragraph 2 above. Please telegraph triple priority your personal and confidential views on this subject based on your knowledge and experience in French North Africa. Please also telegraph the approximate date of your departure from Lisbon for the United States.

HULL

---

740.00112 European War 1939/6368

*Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray)* <sup>18</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] August 13, 1942.

The attached telegram <sup>19</sup> to Mr. Robert Murphy at Lisbon appears to be essentially the same as that which was held up by Mr. Welles in the light of the President's new directive regarding the North African supply program, as explained by Admiral Leahy.<sup>20</sup> Mr. Murphy is now on his way to the United States and is expected to remain in Lisbon only long enough to make the connections with the Clipper, so that we may look forward to his arrival in the immediate future when he will be in a position to answer all of the questions put up by the Board of Economic Warfare.

In any case, the so-called enlarged program of economic supplies proposed by the BEW appears to be deceptive. The French have never been able to move more than one-tenth of the commodities which they have been authorized to purchase in the past and there is little likelihood that they will be able to do better in the future with the four vessels employed in the North African service. It was only with the greatest difficulty that even these four ships were obtained for the Casablanca-New York run. There is no indication as to where additional vessels could be obtained to transport the additional goods which would be approved by the BEW on condition that thirty buying agents should enter North Africa. Under the circumstances, permission to purchase increased quantities of approved products would have little or no validity.

---

<sup>18</sup> Addressed to the Under Secretary of State (Welles) and the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson).

<sup>19</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>20</sup> Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Moreover, with New Orleans as the newly selected center for operations under the economic accord, the greatest difficulties are foreseen in obtaining freight cars and port facilities to ship goods to North Africa. Rail congestion because of military requirements is already acute and considerable delays will undoubtedly ensue in sending to New Orleans even the normal supplies for shipment to North Africa. Finally it would be unjust to offer "an extensive Red Cross program including ambulances" without having prior assurances that this would be feasible. There has been no indication that the Red Cross has been consulted on the subject or that ambulances and medical supplies would be available for forwarding to French North Africa.

In view of the above reasons, both NE<sup>21</sup> and PA/M<sup>22</sup> feel unable to initial the proposed telegram to Mr. Murphy.

WALLACE MURRAY

---

740.00112 European War 1939/63814

*Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray)  
to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 14, 1942.

MR. BERLE: Although the two accord vessels have already sailed, the accompanying memoranda of conversations,<sup>23</sup> which were prepared as a matter of record, may be of interest to you in that they bring out the fact that the departure of the ships from this side of the Atlantic was delayed for two days by Mr. Fagan, an official of the Board of Economic Warfare.

On August 5, the Naval Attaché of the French Embassy informed the Department that the Treasury declined to issue the necessary licenses to permit the fueling of the two accord vessels, the *Ile de Noirmoutier* and the *Ile d'Ouessant*, which had proceeded, in accordance with instructions issued by the Office of the Petroleum Adviser of the Department of State, to Curaçao, to take on bunkers for the round trip to Morocco. The salient feature in the conversations between the French Embassy, the Department, and the Treasury was that Mr. Fagan, an official in the Board of Economic Warfare, was solely responsible for the delay which resulted in the failure of the two accord vessels to leave Curaçao on the date set by this Government and by the French Admiralty for the simultaneous departure of these two ships and two vessels from Morocco. Consequently, the French Admiralty radioed to the *Ile de Ré*, which

---

<sup>21</sup> Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

<sup>22</sup> Office of the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray).

<sup>23</sup> Not printed.

had already cleared for New Orleans, to return to Casablanca and the sailing of the *Aldebaran* was canceled.

Mr. A. U. Fox of the Treasury Department stated that Mr. Fagan had requested him not to take action on the French Line's applications for licenses because it appeared to Mr. Fagan that the company had applied for more fuel oil than was necessary for the ships to make the round trip to Casablanca. It was Mr. Barry of the Office of the Petroleum Adviser of the Department of State, the competent authority on questions involving the fueling of vessels outside of the United States, who had determined, after consulting the Navy, the amount of bunkers which these vessels would require.

WALLACE MURRAY

---

740.00112 European War 1939/6612

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 15, 1942.

This <sup>24</sup> is a telegram from the Foreign Office saying they want to get full publicity for their share in the United States-North African supply scheme, and asking us to give them materials so that they can publicize journeys of ships and cargoes, and so forth, through Arabic broadcasts in North Africa.

If anything can be accomplished for the common war effort by British broadcasts advertising themselves in the matter, I not only have no objection but am for it. But as a matter of fact:

(1) The British have no share in the North African scheme. These are French ships and American goods.

(2) The British began by opposing the North African scheme, tooth and nail. Later, they came to support it; but one branch of their Government has done its best to sink it, at all times.

(3) Examination of the papers fails to disclose a scintilla of "British share", unless it may be that, after finally examining many extraneous considerations they at length waived their objection—an objection, incidentally, which they were unable to enforce, except as we were prepared (as we were) to consider their views.

The British now, for reasons not wholly specified, would like to have it appear as partly a British matter, since the BBC <sup>25</sup> has coverage in North Africa, and up to the present, we do not.

I think we should instruct the British Government that we have no objection, provided, after consultation by cable with Murphy, he is of opinion that publicizing the British effort here would be of help. On this score I am frankly dubious. Both the Arabs and

---

<sup>24</sup> The annex to this memorandum.

<sup>25</sup> British Broadcasting Co.

the French in North Africa are lukewarm, tending to be more or less favorable to the United States; their two active and direct hatreds appear to be General de Gaulle and the British. In respect of this it should be remembered that the goods which are going to North Africa under the North African Agreement are elaborately and conspicuously labeled as "American", and there is a fair chance that the BBC would look rather foolish if they proclaimed this as a British *démarche*. In any case, the Office of War Information should be consulted and should agree with the Political Warfare and BBC people before any broadcasts go out, so that something stupid is not done.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

[Annex]

*Extract From a Telegram From the British Foreign Office,  
Dated August 12, 1942*

We are anxious to obtain all possible publicity for our share in operation of United States-North African supply scheme. To this end we wish to publicise rather intensively journeys of ships, cargoes etc. through our Arabic broadcasts to North Africa.

2. We are given to understand by United States propaganda authorities here that State Department has no objection but would like this confirmed by you.

---

862.24/733 Suppl. : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Tuck)*

WASHINGTON, August 17, 1942—2 p. m.

507. Please press for reply to representations made in accordance with Department's 464, July 27, 9 p. m.,<sup>26</sup> pointing out that North African Accord vessels are on the high seas.

British Embassy has information that shipments of lorries to North Africa continue to be made from Marseille and Toulon and that they are frequently transported by land to Libya after being unloaded in Algeria. You may mention this specifically in your representations.

HULL

---

<sup>26</sup> *Ante*, p. 345.

740.0011 European War 1939/23601 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, August 18, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 3:57 p. m.]

1205. Our 1182, August 12, 5 p. m.<sup>27</sup> We asked a reliable friendly official if he could give us any information on the reported agreement between the Vichy Government and the Germans looking to the joint defense of North Africa. Our informant replied in strictest confidence that for some time Rahn, Special Counselor of the German Embassy in Paris, has been working actively with Guérard <sup>28</sup> (the Department will recall that Guérard accompanied Rahn to Syria in 1941 when arrangements were made to permit the landing of German planes there) with a view to concluding an agreement for the joint Franco-German defense of "French Africa particularly Dakar and French West Africa". Our informant believes that Laval may be prepared to or perhaps may have even already accepted "the principle of such an agreement". A snag has been struck, however, in the form of Governor General Boisson <sup>29</sup> who is said to be strongly opposed to such an arrangement. While admitting that his information might not be complete our informant said that to the best of his knowledge and belief that matter is still under discussion and that no accord has as yet been signed.

TUCK

740.00112 European War 1939/6412a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Casablanca (Russell)*

WASHINGTON, August 19, 1942—9 p. m.

256. For Murphy. The British Government desires to publicize extensively, particularly by means of broadcasts in Arabic, the "British share" in the operation of the North African supply program. This share would, of course, appear to consist merely of British approval of the shipment of products of American origin in French vessels.

We should appreciate your views as to the advisability of spreading publicity of this nature among the French and native inhabitants of North Africa.

HULL

<sup>27</sup> Not printed.<sup>28</sup> Jacques Guérard, Secretary General to Pierre Laval, French Chief of Government.<sup>29</sup> Pierre Boisson, High Commissioner in French West Africa.

740.00112 European War 1939/6818 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Tuck)*

WASHINGTON, August 21, 1942—11 p. m.

521. Your 1170, August 10, 5 p. m., Algiers' telegram of July 28, 8 p. m. to Tangier repeated to Vichy and the Department,<sup>30</sup> and your 1089, July 26, 5 p. m.<sup>31</sup>

1. The Department is continuing its study of the Vichy proposals with the Board of Economic Warfare and is unable as yet to express any agreed views. In connection with this study it would be most helpful if you could throw additional light on the various changes which have occurred in the form of assurances which Vichy has from time to time suggested.

2. In your 897 of June 20, 1 p. m.<sup>32</sup> your informant discussed the possibilities of restricting the export of certain minerals from French North Africa and asserted his Government's willingness to give unofficial undertakings in this matter. From the context it appears that these assurances were offered in connection with the resumption of the North African program.

3. Following talks here with representatives of the French Embassy, the Department replied in its 397 of June 27, 5 p. m.,<sup>33</sup> in substance, that it would be prepared to furnish a tanker load of kerosene to North Africa upon receipt of an unofficial undertaking of the French Government that (a) no further exports of cobalt would be made other than a specific shipment awaiting loading at Nemours, if cancellation of the latter proved impossible, (b) complete information as to shipping arrangements would be furnished us regarding the aforesaid specific shipment, and (c) facilities would be provided whereby we could satisfy ourselves in future that no movement occurred in the stocks of cobalt and molybdenum in French North Africa.

4. Your 959 of July 2, 3 p. m.<sup>34</sup> reported a reiteration by your informant of his regret that the above-mentioned Nemours shipment could not be cancelled. Your informant promised, however, that we would be kept informed regarding plans for its departure and the course it would follow. Finally, it was requested by your informant that we address an official note to his Government stating that, if facilities were provided whereby we might satisfy ourselves that no movement occurred in the stocks of cobalt and molybdenum and that these minerals remained in North Africa,

<sup>30</sup> Telegram of July 28 not printed.

<sup>31</sup> *Ante*, p. 343.

<sup>32</sup> *Ante*, p. 315.

<sup>33</sup> *Ante*, p. 327.

<sup>34</sup> *Ante*, p. 328.

we would in return permit a French tanker to furnish a cargo of kerosene to North Africa. This suggestion was still under study by the Department and the Board of Economic Warfare when your 1089 of July 26, 5 p. m. was received. This telegram reported a proposal made by your informant that the French Government give us an official undertaking that (a) no shipments of cobalt for Germany would move in French ships, and (b) the French North African authorities would be instructed to forbid the export of cobalt (but presumably not molybdenum) to France or any other country in return for the resumption of petroleum (not kerosene) shipments to French North Africa.

5. Your 1170 of August 10, 5 p. m. appears to report a still further shift in the terms of proposals in that the only assurances mentioned in this telegram relate to the proposed prohibition on the movement of cobalt in French ships. In the light of these apparent modifications of the original proposal, the Department would appreciate it if through discreet inquiry you would ascertain (a) the precise character of the assurances which Vichy is prepared to offer this Government at the present time, (b) whether they would be official or unofficial, and if unofficial on whose responsibility and under whose control would they be carried out, and (c) what would be expected from us in return.

6. The review given above of the various proposals by Vichy has been primarily confined to those relating to the future movement of cobalt and molybdenum and not to the specific single shipment of cobalt from Nemours which was under contemporaneous discussion. As you are aware from the Tangier telegram under reference, Admiral Fénard<sup>25</sup> disclaimed knowledge of any cobalt on the *Matidja*, which statement is contrary to the report to the Department in cable no. 477 of July 21 from Oran via Algiers.<sup>26</sup> The Department would appreciate any information you can furnish bearing on the presence or absence of cobalt in the cargo of the *Matidja*. If cobalt not shipped on this voyage, do you know whether it has been shipped at all?

HULL

---

862.24/739 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, August 22, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received 2:20 p. m.]

1223. Department's 507, August 17, 2 p. m. I have pressed Rochat<sup>27</sup> on three separate occasions for a reply to our note re-

---

<sup>25</sup> Vice Adm. Jacques Fénard, Secretary General for French Africa.

<sup>26</sup> Not printed.

<sup>27</sup> Charles Antoine Rochat, Secretary General of the French Foreign Office.



questing the renewal by the French Government of the assurance previously given and on the basis of which our Government agreed to resume the shipment of supplies to French North Africa.

Today Rochat informed me that I might expect his Government's reply at an early date probably tomorrow August 23.

TUCK

740.0011 European War 1939/23713 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, August 23, 1942—noon.

[Received August 24—5:20 a. m.]

1229. For Atherton.<sup>38</sup> Our 1182, August 12, 5 p. m.<sup>39</sup> Following message for Murphy was delivered by person mentioned in reference message above.

"Your friend from Algiers after another interview yesterday with the chief of resistance and with your common friend 'the bather of suffren' has nothing to add to his last message.

It appears possible to be ready in metropolitan France by next March or April. Africa, however, should receive equipment and material by October. It is more urgent than ever that you furnish us with the arms and equipment for North Africa and that conversations be held in Africa between French staff officers and an American staff officer."

TUCK

862.24/742 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, August 23, 1942—9 p. m.

[Received August 24—9:34 a. m.]

1231. Embassy's 1223, August 22, 10 a. m. Following is a close translation of the text of a note dated August 21 which was received at the Embassy late this afternoon:

"Mr. Chargé d'Affaires. On June 12, 1942, the Embassy of the United States at Vichy communicated to the Minister of Foreign Affairs a telegram from Mr. Cordell Hull<sup>40</sup> stating that the Department of State 'after full consideration of the factors involved had decided to authorize the immediate resumption of shipments to North Africa'. In fact in execution of this decision the *Ouessant* and *Noirmoutier* left New York for Casablanca via Curaçao and Aruba on the 15th and 24th of July.

The question of the resumption of supplies to French North Africa appeared therefore definitely settled since by the very terms

<sup>38</sup> Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

<sup>39</sup> Not printed.

<sup>40</sup> See telegram No. 172, June 11, to the Consul General at Algiers, and footnote 61, p. 313.

of aforementioned communication from the Department of State it was 'after full consideration of the factors involved' that the American Government had taken its decision and despatched the first two supply ships.

Therefore, it is with surprise that the French Government has read your letter of July 29<sup>41</sup> asking it to renew once again the assurances which it had given in its note of February 24 and confirmed in its note of March 14<sup>42</sup>—assurances according to whose terms 'no military aid would be given to one of the belligerents in any part of the theater of operations and no policy of open assistance outside the framework of the armistice conventions would be adopted.'

As it has already stated to the Federal Government in its note of May 13, 1942,<sup>43</sup> concerning the status of French possessions in America 'the French Government has always respected its engagements and no change in the constitution of the new government can cause it to modify its attitude.'

Moreover I had myself previously informed Admiral Leahy in a conversation on general subjects which I had with him on April 27<sup>44</sup> that I had never contemplated repudiating the engagements taken vis-à-vis the United States.

However, since the Federal Government again raises the question of these engagements I must in my turn recall that in subscribing to them the French Government had expressly stated that as a counterpart to the assurances given it expected from the American Government 'a spirit of comprehension and desire for agreement' which should manifest itself notably not only in the resumption of the supplying of North Africa but also in a satisfactory settlement of the St. Pierre-Miquelon affair and in respecting the rights of interests of France in various parts of the world.

At a time when the Federal Government asks for the renewal of the assurances which the French Government has never questioned, the latter is justified in recalling the conditions under which these assurances were given.

Please accept, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, the assurances of my most distinguished consideration. Pierre Laval."

TUCK

---

740.00112 European War 1939/6486 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, August 25, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 5:14 p. m.]

1242. Department's 521, August 21, 11 p. m. I called on the Director of Commercial Accords at the Foreign Office today and

---

<sup>41</sup> Not printed; it was sent in accordance with Department's telegraphic instruction No. 464, July 27, 9 p. m., to the Chargé in France, p. 345.

<sup>42</sup> See telegrams No. 292, February 25, 10 a.m., and No. 390, March 14, 4 p. m., from the Ambassador in France, pp. 141 and 148, respectively.

<sup>43</sup> *Post*, p. 631.

<sup>44</sup> See telegram No. 623, April 27, 8 p. m., from the Ambassador in France, p. 181.

obtained from him confirmation of the following understanding which he authorized me to state was the official position of the French Government in answer to points *a*, *b*, and *c* mentioned in paragraph 5 of Department's reference telegram:

*a.* The French Government is prepared to give an official assurance as to the maintenance of the prohibition of shipments in French bottoms of North African cobalt and molybdenum destined to Germany. The French Government is also prepared to give an official assurance not to authorize the export of North African cobalt to metropolitan France or to any other country except Germany (this official stated that in his opinion if the United States Government were to insist it could probably also obtain from the French Government an assurance regarding the prohibition of export from North Africa of molybdenum).

*b.* The above would constitute the official assurances by the French Government.

*c.* The French Government would expect in return from the United States a shipment of a tanker load of kerosene to North Africa (it would greatly prefer instead a load of gas oil).

The official in question begged me to stress to the Department the urgent necessity for a quick decision. He said that the Foreign Office was under very heavy pressure from the industrial production Department of the French Government to send cobalt to metropolitan France in important quantities and he pointed out that the French market actually consumed 1200 tons of North African cobalt per annum. Cobalt was being used in the manufacture of materials which would eventually find their way to Germany and consequently an official assurance that North African cobalt would not be imported to metropolitan France should be considered as of very special interest to our Government.

TUCK

---

740.00112 European War 1939/6497 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, August 26, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received August 26—3:58 p. m.]

1101. From Murphy. I received last evening Department's 256, August 19, 9 p. m. to Casablanca regarding British desire to enjoy publicity in French North Africa concerning British participation in the American supply program for that area.

Much would depend, it seems to me, on the nature of the publicity campaign undertaken. It is suggested that the British be requested to submit for the Department's consideration an outline of whatever program they wish to undertake in order that study might be given the matter to insure that the British program does not con-

flict with whatever American publicity the Department may contemplate. I should be grateful for an opportunity to discuss this question after arrival in Washington which should be approximately August 29. [Murphy.]

FISH

851R.6368/8-2742

*The Counselor of the French Embassy (Panafieu) to the Chief  
of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)*

[Translation]

No. 823

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1942.

DEAR MR. ALLING: Following a conversation which Mr. Villard had about the middle of June with Mr. Guérin,<sup>45</sup> this Embassy was led to advise the French Government that the Department of State would authorize the shipment, in the shortest possible time, of a cargo of 13,000 tons of kerosene which corresponds, approximately, to the quarterly needs of North Africa, if the French Government were to undertake now, for the same space of time, not to export to any destination whatsoever the stocks of cobalt and molybdenum ores existing in North Africa at the beginning of June, as well as any other quantity of the ores in question which might be extracted during the period under consideration.

As Mr. Guérin stated that it would be very difficult for the French Government to make the commitment requested in the case of the two most important ores in North Africa if the French Government could not, at the same time, count on a concomitant commitment of the American Government for the supplying in full of petroleum products including, in addition to kerosene, gasoline for automobiles, gas-oil and fuel oil, he was told that the Department of State would greatly appreciate the initiative which the French Government might take in quickly accepting the proposal in question and in stopping any shipment of cobalt or molybdenum should any such be planned.

To meet the wishes of the American Government, the French Government made and respected the commitment requested. Now it is no longer a question of the shipment of a first cargo of 13,000 tons of kerosene nor, a fortiori of the establishment of a complete program for the supplying of North Africa with petroleum products.

Under these circumstances, I have the honor to advise you that, if a decision should not be arrived at in regard to this matter within a rather short period, the French Government would be led to

<sup>45</sup> See memorandum of June 16, p. 314.

reconsider its position with respect to the exporting of cobalt and molybdenum ores.

Please accept [etc.]

F. DE PANAFIEU

---

740.00112 European War 1939/6791

*The British Minister (Hall) to the Assistant Secretary  
of State (Berle)*

W.T.142/9/42

WASHINGTON, 31 August, 1942.

DEAR MR. BERLE: You mentioned to me sometime ago the possibility of the United States Government extending its skeleton supply programme now being carried on with North Africa to West Africa. It was, I think, your thought that by extending this programme the United States Government might be able to succeed, not only in getting observers into this important area, but also in obtaining useful commodities from it.

London has commented in reply to the report of my conversation with you that, as the United States Government attaches great importance to this plan on strategic grounds, they raise no objection. They hope, however, that the objective of establishing United States observers in French West Africa will be reached at the smallest practical cost in terms of Economic Warfare.

In this connection they call attention to the reduction in the production of, for example, ground nuts in the year 1941-1942. They think that this reduction is partly due to a shortage of supplies of other commodities necessary to maintain output and they hope in considering supplies which can be safely sent into West Africa, that care will be taken to see that production of goods likely to be valuable to the enemy, either directly or indirectly, is not once again stimulated. This view appears to rest on the assumption that in view of the control over French trade exercised by the Armistice Commission, it is likely to be found very difficult to get approval for the export from West Africa of substantial quantities of goods for the benefit of the United Nations.

I am happy to be able to record this general agreement on policy and if my staff can be of help in discussing detail when the time is ripe, we shall always be at your disposal.

Yours very sincerely,

NOEL HALL

740.0011 European War 1939/24142b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Dakar (Flexer)*

WASHINGTON, September 2, 1942—10 p. m.

86. For your strictly confidential information the Embassy at Vichy reports that it has been informed that Laval and Abetz<sup>46</sup> held a conference at Nevers on August 27 to discuss Dakar. It appears that previously the Germans had sought permission to send a squadron of Stukas to Dakar, which threatened to provoke the resignation of Boisson, who is thought to have been willing to accept the Stukas but not German pilots. The Embassy has been informed that Boisson recently forwarded his resignation to the Marshal<sup>47</sup> through Barrau but that the Marshal would not accept it on the grounds that the proposed German mission was only of a temporary character.

HULL

---

740.00112 European War 1939/6486 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Tuck)*

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1942—1 p. m.

541. Your 1242, August 25, 3 p. m. You state in paragraph A that "The French Government is also prepared to give an official assurance not to authorize the export of North African cobalt to metropolitan France or to any other country except Germany".

Please confirm that an exception is made in the case of Germany.

HULL

---

740.00112 European War 1939/6755

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Villard)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 7, 1942.

At Admiral Leahy's request I called on him today, together with Mr. Canfield of the Board of Economic Warfare, to discuss a conflict of views which had arisen with respect to the sending of fifteen tons of agricultural spare parts to French North Africa and which had been referred to Admiral Leahy with a request for decision. The French Embassy was pressing us for permission to ship these spare parts, which had been purchased some time ago, and in the meanwhile was holding up the disposition of 212 tons of olive oil

---

<sup>46</sup> Otto Abetz, German Ambassador in Paris.

<sup>47</sup> Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, French Chief of State.

which had come over from North Africa on one of the accord vessels.

I outlined to Admiral Leahy the circumstances of the case, pointing out that the question of these fifteen tons of agricultural spare parts was being made into an issue by the French, who had been led to understand that the purchase and export of a total of twenty-five tons of spare parts would be authorized under the economic program. I said that there seemed to be a mistaken idea that the olive oil was to be furnished in return for the spare parts, but that regardless of this error, agricultural spare parts was on the original quota lists and, in small amounts, met with no objection on the part of the British. Mr. Canfield then explained that the Board of Economic Warfare did not wish to grant export licenses for this item because agricultural machinery in French North Africa was producing food which eventually reached Germany and because agricultural spare parts were in short supply in this country. He added that the inclusion of any item on the authorized quota list did not imply in any way that export licenses would be granted.

After fully reviewing the facts in the case, Admiral Leahy said that in his opinion it would be desirable to send the fifteen tons of agricultural spare parts and to send them at once. He said that the objective of sending supplies to North Africa at this time was to please the French in every possible way and to remove any sources of irritation. In two or three months, Admiral Leahy said, we may want to send everything we have to French North Africa, or, on the other hand, we may wish to send nothing at all. At this moment, however, it is our objective to help the population of French North Africa and induce the people to think that we are their friends. Such a small item as fifteen tons of spare parts could make no difference whatever in our war economy and would provide a measure of satisfaction to the French. Mr. Canfield thereupon agreed to the sending of the spare parts, but said that this should not constitute a precedent.

Mr. Canfield then said he would like to take advantage of the opportunity to lay before Admiral Leahy a letter to the State Department outlining the Board of Economic Warfare's understanding of the type of commodities which should be sent in the future to French North Africa under the President's directive. Admiral Leahy perused the letter until he came to a portion which referred to a possibly enlarged program of supplies provided that the French should agree to certain conditions, such as the sale and export of various strategic products desired by the BEW. Admiral Leahy stopped at this point and said that to demand a *quid pro quo* for the sending of American supplies was exactly what we did not wish to do. He said that the shipment of goods from America was

not to be subject to negotiation as this would defeat the purpose of the plan and fail to produce the good feeling which we desired. Admiral Leahy was confident that the French would give us what they could, of their own will, in any case.

I next took up the question of kerosene shipments to North Africa and described the stalemate in the negotiations for freezing cobalt stocks against a cargo of kerosene from this country. Admiral Leahy said that if the kerosene was needed for local consumption and was not destined for export, it should be sent without delay. If it were possible to obtain assurances that no cobalt would be moved, so much the better; but that need make no difference in our sending of kerosene supplies. I asked Admiral Leahy if he meant that we should send a cargo of kerosene even if we failed to obtain the assurances on cobalt, to which he replied in the affirmative.

Admiral Leahy explained again that right now our policy was to send to the French what they urgently needed in North Africa, even if that policy should be changed later. He reiterated that the object of the economic program at this juncture was to do everything possible to placate the French and that Mr. Murphy was in an excellent position to determine the amounts and types of commodities needed. If the policy should change while the tanker of kerosene was at sea it would always be possible to intercept . . . the vessel, but the present desire and intention is to give the French the products they need for local consumption in North Africa. If a good feeling could be induced in French North Africa at this time, it might save thousands of American lives, which might otherwise be lost through delays and quibbling over small amounts of economic supplies that could not change the course of the war. Even at the risk of dribbles of these supplies reaching the enemy, Admiral Leahy believed that we should proceed as rapidly as possible with getting supplies to the French which they needed.

I mentioned to Admiral Leahy the action of the Board of Economic Warfare in reducing to 150 tons of skimmed milk the 1,100 tons of powdered whole milk which had been previously authorized. Admiral Leahy said that if it were impossible to make the shipment in tin containers, that would be understood by the French, but he could see no reason whatever for substituting skimmed for whole milk. Mr. Canfield indicated that this matter would be taken care of.

Admiral Leahy repeated again the urgent necessity of pleasing and placating the French in every way possible at this time. In two or three months, he reiterated, we would know whether we would vastly increase shipments to North Africa or stop them altogether. He said that he did not know how to make this any



clearer, but that if any question remained, he would be glad to ask the President for more explicit directions. Details regarding the various goods to be shipped as well as the amounts needed in French North Africa should, if required, be left to the judgment of Mr. Murphy, in whom the Admiral had the fullest confidence.

---

740.00112 European War 1939/6575 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, September 7, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 5:45 p. m.]

1310. Department's 541, September 5, 1 p. m. Responsible foreign official confirms that an exception is made in the case of Germany.

He adds, however, that French Government will under no circumstances authorize any shipment of North African cobalt and molybdenum in French bottoms destined to Germany.

He again confirms as reported in my 1299, September 4, 1 p. m.<sup>48</sup> that the 500 tons of cobalt at Nemours is still there, quite evidently due to German inability to secure means of transportation.

TUCK

---

740.00112 European War 1939/6743

*Memorandum by Mr. James C. H. Bonbright of the Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] September 12, 1942.

On instructions from Mr. Atherton, following his conversation with Mr. Berle, I spoke to Mr. Barclay<sup>49</sup> concerning his repeated requests for an expression of our attitude on the desire of the BBC to make a statement regarding the resumption of the North African Accord Voyages. I told Mr. Barclay that this matter has been given very careful consideration and that while there might not appear to be very great advantages or disadvantages to a BBC statement, Mr. Robert Murphy feared that there might be some bad effect. In the circumstances it seemed important to know exactly what the BBC would say and it would probably be desirable to have the statement brought to the attention of the J.I.C.<sup>50</sup>

Mr. Barclay thought that this was a good suggestion and said that he would take it up at once with Mr. Noel Hall.

---

<sup>48</sup> Not printed.

<sup>49</sup> R. E. Barclay of the British Embassy.

<sup>50</sup> Joint Intelligence Committee.

740.00112 European War 1939/6728

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State*

## MEMORANDUM

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to refer to recent verbal communications from the U. S. Department of State to the Embassy on the subject of supplies for French North Africa. Lord Halifax understands that it is the desire of the United States Government to intimate to the French Government:—

(a) That the United States Government is prepared to approve the despatch of a full tanker load of kerosene to French North Africa.

(b) That the United States Government is prepared to give renewed consideration to a restricted programme of oil supplies to French North Africa.

(c) That the United States Government is prepared to send as soon as possible to French North Africa shipments of foodstuffs and medical supplies.

(d) That the United States Government will not require the French North African authorities to return to this country certain textiles of a military type which were recently shipped from the United States to French North Africa against an undertaking by the French Government that they would be returned on the next available ship.

As regards (b), Lord Halifax understands that the intention of the United States Government is in practice to exclude from consideration lubricants and aviation gasoline and that the programme contemplated would consist largely of automotive gasoline (and possibly small quantities of gasoil) for medical and other essential public services.

Lord Halifax is instructed to state that His Majesty's Government is in full agreement as regards (a), (c) and (d) of the above proposals. As regards (b), His Majesty's Government would also be prepared to agree provided that the United States Government would consult with His Majesty's Government before any agreement is reached as to quantities and dates of arrival.

Lord Halifax would be grateful if the Secretary of State would confirm that this memorandum in Mr. Hull's view accurately sets out the position of the United States Government in this matter.

WASHINGTON, September 12, 1942.

740.0011 European War 1939/24255a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Dakar (Flewer)*

WASHINGTON, September 12, 1942—4 p. m.

90. Department's 86, September 2, 10 p. m. The Department has been reliably informed from a secret source that the Germans are sending one observer to Dakar and that Boisson was only induced to withdraw his resignation by the assurance that the German observer would be permitted to remain in Dakar for a temporary period, in principle for not more than 3 weeks. We have heard from other reliable sources that pressure is being applied to have Boisson withdrawn from Dakar.

If Boisson has returned from Vichy you may express to him our appreciation that he has succeeded for such a long period in keeping Germans out of French West Africa and that we realize the tremendous pressure which has been brought to bear on him, particularly of late. He should be given encouragement in his efforts to prevent a German commission from being established at Dakar. You may add in confidence that we are exploring as rapidly as possible the question of obtaining shipping for the inauguration of an economic supply program for French West Africa.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/24248 : Telegram

*The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State*

TANGIER, September 14, 1942—9 p. m.

[Received September 15—9:37 a. m.]

399. In contrast with my visit to Rabat in June when General Noguès<sup>51</sup> and other officials expressed great concern over an Allied landing in French Morocco the subject was not raised by anyone there on my present visit from which I have just returned. A high French military officer who was unable to see me for fear of compromising himself sent me a note in which he referred to "next year" in a manner leading me to conclude that the French military do not anticipate any Allied landing in Morocco before '43.

I was informed by another source that the German Armistice Commission which was also very nervous over such a landing in June has become again extremely concerned over such a possibility. A very high official informed me that despite disquietude on the part of the Commission it had not supported Rabat's requests for strengthening of French defenses in Morocco. He specifically men-

<sup>51</sup> Gen. Albert Noguès, Resident General in the French Zone of Morocco.

tioned a refusal to grant 200 additional tanks for which permission had been sought. My informant concluded that the Germans were not disposed to rely on French support in the event of an Allied landing and were counting on themselves taking such measures as might be available in such an event. When I asked from where he thought they would obtain their forces he suggested "across Spain" adding that the Germans would endeavor to tempt Spanish co-operation by the promise of French Morocco. He was inclined to think that the Spanish would not yield to the temptation, but did not believe they would offer any resistance to the passage of German troops.

Repeated to Madrid.

CHILDS

---

740.00112 European War 1939/6756

*Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Referring to your telephone conversation of September Twelfth in which you expressed a desire for further advice in regard to a requested shipment of a cargo of kerosene to the French African Colonies, I have the honor to reply as follows:

It is my definite understanding that with the purpose of furthering America's war effort, it is at the present time advantageous to America, and therefore desirable, to release for shipment limited quantities of material that is urgently needed by the inhabitants of the French Colonies in Africa, provided only that such shipments are not delivered to enemy powers.

The purpose of such shipments should be to retain or acquire the friendship of the inhabitants of French Africa.

I am not informed as to the quantity of kerosene that is urgently needed for the civil population, but I believe that Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Counselor of Embassy, who is now in Washington,<sup>52</sup> has full information as to the quantity that is needed and that will be used under his supervision by the civil population.

In view of the above, it is my opinion, with which the President concurs, that a release should be granted without delay for the shipment to Casablanca of one tanker load of kerosene that is

---

<sup>52</sup> Mr. Murphy had returned to the Department on August 30 for consultation.

urgently needed by the civilian population of the French Colonies in Africa.

Respectfully yours,

WILLIAM D. LEAHY  
*Admiral, U. S. Navy*

---

740.00112 European War 1939/6569 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Tuck)*

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1942—6 p. m.

567. Your 1310, September 7, 1 p. m., and 1242, August 25, 3 p. m. We are now prepared to accept the official assurances of the French Government that it will maintain its prohibition of the shipment in French bottoms of North African cobalt and molybdenum destined to Germany, and that under no circumstances will any such shipment be made. We accept likewise the French official undertaking not to authorize the export of North African cobalt to metropolitan France. It is felt that this undertaking should also include molybdenum shipments.

We assume that in accordance with previous discussions facilities will be granted to our control officers to ascertain from time to time whether any movement has occurred in the stocks of these minerals, and you should obtain either an official or an unofficial promise from the French on this score. At the same time you could express the hope that means may be found to let us know in some informal or unofficial manner of any shipments which might be contemplated in other than French vessels.

In return for the above, the French Government is authorized to make a shipment of a cargo of kerosene in one of its tankers from the United States to North Africa. It is understood of course that such a shipment will be utilized solely for consumption within North Africa by the civilian population and that its distribution will be supervised as in the past by our control officers.

HULL

---

740.0011 European War 1939/24307 : Telegram

*The Consul at Dakar (Flexer) to the Secretary of State*

DAKAR, September 16, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received 11:31 p. m.]

372. Referring to Department's 90, September 12, 4 p. m. It is obvious that Boisson's position can only be undermined and reported pressure for replacement encouraged by publicizing, as latterly by

broadcasts, his past achievements in keeping Nermals [*Germans?*] out of A.O.F.<sup>53</sup>

Aside from deep personal loathing for Germans his belief is that A.O.F. can contribute most to restoring France by resisting all non-French influences from whatever quarter. This policy recognizes that presence of Nazis might invite United Nations action and thus cut off France from A.O.F. aid.

FLEXER

740.0011 European War 1939/24314 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, September 17, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 2:37 p. m.]

610. I learn from a well-informed military source here that high military circles are very apprehensive that following the occupation of Madagascar<sup>54</sup> the Germans may bring pressure on Vichy to admit them to a share at least of the defense of the French Empire particularly North Africa and Dakar because, the Germans are expected to say, you have proved yourself incapable of defending it.

Repeated to Vichy and Casablanca, true reading to Tunis.

COLE

740.00112 European War 1939/6728

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Villard)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 18, 1942.

Participants: Admiral Leahy  
Commander Friesman<sup>55</sup>  
Mr. Canfield, BEW  
Mr. Villard

Mr. Canfield arranged the appointment with Commander Friesman in order to lay before him the objections of the Board of Economic Warfare to allowing certain cotton textiles to remain in French North Africa as a gesture of good-will at this time. After the matter had been explained to Commander Friesman, Admiral Leahy invited the persons concerned to discuss the matter with him.

Mr. Canfield asked the Admiral to read the objections of the Board of Economic Warfare. Admiral Leahy then reiterated the points which he had made at the conference with Mr. Canfield and

<sup>53</sup> Afrique Occidentale Française.

<sup>54</sup> Occupied by British forces beginning May 4, 1942; for correspondence, see pp. 687 ff.

<sup>55</sup> Cmdr. W. L. Freseman, Aide to Admiral Leahy.

Mr. Villard on September 7, namely, that the President had directed us to make every effort to placate the French at this time in North Africa, and to induce a feeling of good-will. Admiral Leahy expressed the opinion that in view of these facts it would be desirable to permit the textiles to remain in North Africa for local consumption under the supervision of the American control officers.

Mr. Canfield suggested that a provision be inserted in the telegram requiring the control officers to supervise the processing and tailoring of the goods, which would then be returned in finished form to the control officers and individually issued by them to the inhabitants of North Africa. Admiral Leahy said that he could not subscribe to a proposal of this kind in view of the absence of any knowledge as to the facilities which would be available for carrying out such a plan. Admiral Leahy asked Mr. Canfield whether he had ever heard of any failure on the part of the control officers to exercise their functions properly. Mr. Canfield replied in the negative.

Admiral Leahy once more explained that we should do everything possible to accommodate the French at this time, even though it involved some slight risk of a few dribblets of goods reaching the enemy. He said that he had the fullest confidence in Mr. Murphy's judgment and that we should be guided by Mr. Murphy's recommendations in reaching decisions on difficult technical problems. Admiral Leahy said once again that we should expedite shipments to North Africa right now, and that we will know within two or three months whether we shall continue them or not.

---

740.0011 European War 1939/24340 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, September 18, 1942—1 p. m.  
[Received September 18—11:01 a. m.]

613. For Murphy. Our saintly friend<sup>56</sup> here reports that the other friends, the flagpole sitter,<sup>56</sup> are anxious to know what has become of the projected secret meeting of their and our "general staffs" which they state was tentatively planned for September 15 somewhere in North Africa.

COLE

---

740.00112 European War 1939/6728

*The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the British Ambassador and refers to Lord Halifax' memorandum of Septem-

---

<sup>56</sup> Code name for French contact.

ber 12, 1942 regarding the shipment of supplies to French North Africa.

The Secretary of State takes pleasure in confirming that the contents of the memorandum accurately set forth the position of the United States Government in this matter.

WASHINGTON, September 19, 1942.

740.0011 European War 1939/24855 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, September 19, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 3:20 p. m.]

616. For Murphy. I report the following from our (saintly?) informant for what you may think it is worth:

The latest secret "information bulletin" received here by the naval authorities from Vichy, where it was probably printed 5 or 6 days ago and sent by airplane, contains the following:

1. Secret warnings issued to the Navy at Algiers regard American landing in the region of Algiers which is "less defended than Moroccan coasts" as imminent.

2. General Noguès now in Vichy and military representatives of other jurisdictions but not Juin.<sup>57</sup>

3. Italian Consul General at Algiers claims he has information of an early American attempt against North Africa and that he is in agreement with Germans for the immediate reinforcement of Algerian defenses mentioning 150,000 French troops to be sent here at once.

4. German Armistice Commission, Algiers, has complained to Vichy that "certain" French services have planted microphones on it.

5. Laval is "said to have stated" that the transfer of workmen to Germany having failed the only procedure left him to assure "the fruits of collaboration" is to assist Germany in North Africa.

Repeated to Vichy, true reading to Casablanca.

COLE

740.00112 European War 1939/6605 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, September 19, 1942—3 p. m.

279. Department's 270, September 12, 3 p. m.<sup>58</sup> It has been decided, with the approval of the various agencies involved and the British, not to require the return of the cotton twills and denims

<sup>57</sup> Gen. Alphonse Juin, Commander in Chief of the French forces in North Africa.

<sup>58</sup> Not printed.



which formed part of the cargo of the *Ile de Noirmoutier*. It is understood of course that these goods will be utilized solely for immediate local consumption within North Africa by the civilian population and that this distribution will be supervised as in the past by our control officers.

Repeat to Casablanca.

HULL

---

740.0011 European War 1939/24464 : Telegram

*The Consul at Dakar (Flexer) to the Secretary of State*

DAKAR, September 20, 1942—midnight.

[Received September 24—8:30 p. m.]

382. Message instructed by Department's 90, September 12, 4 p. m., conveyed in conversation Boisson yesterday. He was not pleasurably affected. His reply that "These matters are exclusively between my Government and me" is quoted with his permission.

My 372, September 16, 2 p. m., is applicable. We profit that his strong stand on a question of AOF policy incidentally falls in with our purposes but with which it has no deliberate connection. Our "appreciation" or expropriation of his achievements might also be reminder of indirect benefits to England and de Gaulle<sup>59</sup> for whom his animosity is less only than loathing for Germans. This situation invites encouragement of Nazi exclusion by political official silence by incidental beneficiaries.

Boisson would not be diverted from British action against Madagascar whereof he was bitter and cynical. He had been "surprised" by United States Government endorsement.

With regard to the economic accord which he said was engaging Murphy at Algiers the present problem in regard to vegetable oils since France looked to AOF for vitally needed oleaginous material beyond AOF productive capacity.

Department's 86, September 2, 10 p. m. and 90, September 12, 4 p. m. Boisson dismissed Stuka planes, German Consul and token observer reports as unfounded.

FLEXER

---

851T.00/48a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Dakar (Flexer)*

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1942—8 p. m.

94. For your information it is reported from a reliable source that within the next 10 days the Germans will take full but not

---

<sup>59</sup> Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the National Committee of the Free French at London.

public control of commercial port activities at Dakar, including customs, maritime and civilian police, transportation, passengers, cargoes and manifests. On the other hand, it is reported from another source that the Germans have, if only temporarily, postponed sending a military observer to Dakar. The opposition of Boisson was said to have been partially responsible for German decision to postpone the mission.

It is stated that there are indications that the Germans may now demand the right to establish a consulate at Dakar on the grounds that they are entitled to equal representation with us.

HULL

**V. Plans for Securing French Assistance for the Landing in North Africa of American Military Forces (September–November)**

123M956/4771

*Directive by President Roosevelt to Mr. Robert D. Murphy*<sup>60</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] September 22, 1942.

1. Upon the occupation of French North Africa by American Military Forces you will act as the Operating Executive head of the Civil Affairs Section and Advisor for Civil Affairs under General Eisenhower. Prior to the arrival of Military Forces in the Area, you will have the status of the Personal Representative of the President.

2. You will work in close cooperation with General Eisenhower, United States Army, Allied Commander in Chief, European Theatre, in the preparation and execution of plans of a civil and political nature for the occupation of French North Africa by American Military Forces. In the performance of this task you will retain your present status of Foreign Service Officer, Class I, assigned as Counselor of Embassy, Vichy. All communication between the President and you and between General Eisenhower and you will be carried out through such channels as General Eisenhower and you may arrange.

3. You will at an early date contact personally and through your Psychological Warfare and other assistants those French nationals whom you consider reliable, and give them the following information:

Information having been received from a reliable source that the Germans and Italians are planning an intervention in French North Africa, the United States contemplates sending at an early date

<sup>60</sup> Copy of this directive was sent to the Department by the White House on June 16, 1948. William L. Langer in his book *Our Vichy Gamble* states that President Roosevelt enjoined Murphy not to discuss plans for the North African campaign with the Department of State or with any but authorized Army or Navy officers. (*Our Vichy Gamble*, New York, 1947, p. 311.)

a sufficient number of American troops to land in that area with the purpose of preventing occupation by the Axis and of preserving French sovereignty in Algeria, and the French administrations in Morocco and Tunisia.

No change in the existing French Civil Administrations is contemplated by the United States.

Any resistance to an American landing will of course have to be put down by force of arms.

The American forces will hope for and will welcome French assistance.

The American forces will provide equipment as rapidly as possible for those French troops who join in denying access to French North Africa to our common enemies.

Money, in addition to that provided by French sources, will be made available for additional expense incurred through cooperation with American forces.

The American Government will guarantee salaries and allowances, death benefits and pensions of those French and other military, naval and civilian officials who join with the American expeditionary forces.

The proposed expedition will be American, under American command, and it will not include any of the forces of General de Gaulle.

After the necessary preparation is made by French patriots in French North Africa, which should be accomplished with the utmost expedition, at least twenty-four hours' notice will be given to our friends of the time of landings, and in your discretion of the approximate places.

4. Upon the receipt of the following message in code which will be despatched through at least two channels to insure delivery "Allotments approved effective (date)" you may in your discretion inform our friendly officials that landings by American troops will be made on that date as planned at approximate localities which are known to you. The date should be repeated in the message to avoid error.

5. As Political Advisor to General Eisenhower you will prepare and submit to the President for approval:

(a) Recommendations regarding policies to be followed by the American Government in the area, including economic supply and financial support, and such additional matters as you may deem appropriate.

(b) Drafts of proclamations to be issued to the inhabitants of the areas to be entered by Allied forces and recommendations regarding the means of transmitting them.

(c) Drafts of proclamations or messages to be addressed by the President to the French State and to officials in French North

Africa to which in your opinion they should be despatched, together with recommendations regarding the method of transmission.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

---

740.0011 European War 1939/24340 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, September 23, 1942—6 p. m.

284. From Murphy. Your 613, September 18, 1 p. m. There has been a delay in this matter which I shall explain on return. Arrangement should be possible early in October. [Murphy.]

HULL

---

740.0011 European War 1939/24355 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, September 23, 1942—10 p. m.

287. From Murphy. Your 616, September 19, 11 a. m. Please advise Saint that this information is useful and that we would like any additional data he may obtain regarding Noguès' present visit to Vichy.

Any effort which can be made tactfully to ridicule the rumors of an American landing would be appreciated. [Murphy.]

HULL

---

740 00112 European War 1939/6778 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, September 27, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received September 28—11:13 a. m.]

1432. Department's 594, September 26, 6 p. m.<sup>61</sup> The Embassy has just received note dated September 26, signed by Laval, a translation of which follows:

"By note dated September 22 you were good enough to inform me that the Government of the United States is willing to authorize the exportation and free passage from the United States to Casablanca for the sole consumption of the North Africa civilian population and under the supervision of American control officers in North Africa of a shipment of kerosene [apparent omission] the French Government transported in a French tanker. This shipment constitutes the counterpart of the assurances given by the French Government to the Government of the United States accord-

---

<sup>61</sup> This telegram read: "Please expedite reply to Department's 567, September 15, 6 p. m." (740.00112 European War 1939/6569 suppl.)

ing to which (1) the prohibition to ship cobalt and molybdenum in French bottoms to Germany will be maintained; (2) no shipment of North African cobalt will be authorized to metropolitan France.

The Federal Government asks, however, that the prohibition to export North African cobalt to metropolitan France should also include molybdenum and that American central [*control?*] officers should be authorized to 'ascertain from time to time whether any change has occurred' in the amount of stocks of North African cobalt and molybdenum.

I have the honor to inform you that the French Government is willing to reply favorably to the American requests mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

Inasmuch as the assurances given by the French Government concerning North African cobalt and molybdenum will only be maintained in effect as long as the regular supplying of French North Africa in American petroleum products is assured, I have the honor to ask you to be good enough to confirm to me the indications given on September 14, by the Department of State to M. Henry-Haye<sup>62</sup> according to which the loading on French tanker of a first shipment of kerosene will be followed by shipments of automotive gasoline and gas oil and subsequently by regular ships of each of these three categories of petroleum products taking into account the loading capacities and the rotation of the tankers used for their transportation."

The responsible friendly official who delivered the note told us unofficially that he would endeavor to keep us informed of any shipments which might be contemplated in other than French vessels.

TUCK

---

881.00/2340 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Casablanca (Russell) to the Secretary of State*

CASABLANCA, September 29, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received 11:54 p. m.]

771. For Murphy from King.<sup>63</sup> Reference your telegram 293, September 23, 6 p. m.<sup>64</sup> The reason for General Noguès' visit to Vichy was to confer with Pétain and Laval regarding suppression of all activities of the Parti Populaire Français in France and Morocco. Agreement is reported to have reached the point where Pétain and Laval decided to oppose any more German plots for a *coup d'état* through the Parti Populaire Français even if the Marshal and Laval have to come to North Africa.

---

<sup>62</sup> Gaston Henry-Haye, French Ambassador in the United States.

<sup>63</sup> David W. King, Vice Consul at Casablanca.

<sup>64</sup> Not printed.

Admiral Darlan <sup>65</sup> is expected to arrive here on October 10, ostensibly for the purpose of inspecting troops.

Noguès was due to arrive in Rabat September 27 by airplane from Algiers. At the last minute he accepted a seat in General Bergeret's <sup>66</sup> private plane instead of in the regular Air France plane which crashed shortly after its departure, causing deaths of all 25 persons on board, causes of crash attributed to sabotage, official report not published yet, but following secret information has been given me: one Dives of the Parti Populaire Français recently arrived in Morocco with a special travel order signed by Benoist-Méchin.<sup>67</sup>

On the morning of the accident Dives told some friends in his hotel room in Casablanca that, since it had not been possible to get rid of Noguès, an airplane accident had been arranged and was taking place that hour. A microphone record of this speech was made by police agents in an adjoining room and handed to General Noguès who arrived in Rabat about 2 hours later. Noguès telephoned Laval who told him to return Dives to France as soon as possible to be dealt with along with Benoist-Méchin's group. It appears that the discovery by Laval of Benoist-Méchin's and the Parti Populaire Français' plot to overthrow him coincided with the discovery by the French Moroccan police of a plot by Dives and the Parti Populaire Français to seize on October 10 all public administrations, post offices and wireless transmission stations, and to overthrow the Noguès-Herviot regime in Morocco at the same time as a similar *coup d'état* was taking place in France.

These recent events have increased General Noguès anti-German feeling.

Repeated to Vichy and Tangier as our 212 with special reference to the Naval Attaché.

RUSSELL.

---

740.0011 European War 1939/24558 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, September 29, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received 10:12 p. m.]

637. For Murphy if still in the United States, if not kindly repeat to him immediately. The group here which you knew including military connections are becoming very anxious. They state

---

<sup>65</sup> Adm. Jean François Darlan, Commander in Chief of all French Armed Forces.

<sup>66</sup> Gen. Jean Marie Bergeret, former French Secretary of State for Aviation; in December 1942 he became a member of the Imperial Council for North Africa.

<sup>67</sup> Jacques Benoist-Méchin, Secretary of State to Pierre Laval, French Chief of Government.

that all essential preparations here including retail deliveries, staff agreements, arrangements for the Chief on the White Horse,<sup>68</sup> and so on, require both a certain amount of time and extremely accurate timing. Nevertheless, they continue, everything is standing still here while, first, they hear constantly of imminent action which, they state, is sure to meet strong resistance unless the ground is properly prepared. Second, the situation is rapidly deteriorating as evidenced by the reported forthcoming visit of Admiral Darlan brought about, it is said, by the success of five unheralded night landing maneuvers from destroyers which reached all objectives easily from Castiglione to Ain-Taya including Algiers gas and light plants some even without being observed (see my 636 today<sup>69</sup>). Third, Robin Hood's<sup>68</sup> men disbanded early in October and the new class untrained and unknown joins only at the end of that month.

I tranquillize them using your two telegrams of the 23rd<sup>70</sup> (staff meetings and ridiculing rumors) but they are still jumpy. Definite news of date of your arrival would reassure them.

COLE

---

740.00112 European War 1939/6931

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Thomas C. Wasson of the  
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] September 29, 1942.

Mr. Panafieu<sup>71</sup> stated that the Embassy had received a further communication from Vichy in regard to the possible extension of the North African trade program to French West Africa. The French Government welcomed the suggestion and trusted that the Department would give immediate consideration to the shipment of much needed supplies to that area. At present French West Africa is in urgent need of petroleum products and coal to maintain internal transportation in order to prevent a breakdown in the economy of the Dependency. Mr. de Panafieu stated that it would not be possible at the time to send French ships from the United States to Dakar because it would involve sending German observers or a German commission there. It was suggested that commodities approved for shipment to French West Africa be sent to Casablanca for transshipment to Dakar. There would be no objection to American packaging or American propaganda of the type now used in the North African trade. The French were not prepared to permit American control officers to proceed to Dakar at this time

---

<sup>68</sup> Code name for French contact.

<sup>69</sup> Not printed.

<sup>70</sup> Telegrams No. 284 and No. 287, p. 381.

<sup>71</sup> François de Panafieu, Counselor of the French Embassy.

because the Germans would demand the right to station observers there, but it was suggested that we might send another American clerk to the Consulate at Dakar, whose duties would include the supervision and control of the distribution of economic supplies moving to French West Africa.

---

123M956/412½ : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1942—noon.

293. For Cole from Murphy. I am scheduled to depart October 4 and hope to arrive Tangier October 6. Delay due to clipper trouble. Would like 2 days in Morocco and plan to proceed then to Algiers.

There is substantial reason for them to be reassured. Please endeavor to convey my feeling that there is cause for the greatest optimism and that the group's careful plans and hard work will achieve the hoped for result. [Murphy.]

---

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/7058

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Villard)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 1, 1942.

Participants: Mr. Paul Guérin, French Embassy

{ Mr. Fleming

{ Mr. Fagan, Board of Economic Warfare

Mr. Wasson

Mr. Villard

Mr. Guérin explained that the French commercial services had been unable to purchase enough of the authorized goods to fill up the two accord vessels now preparing to load at New Orleans. He, therefore, requested authorization from this Government to load an additional 200 tons of leaf tobacco, 200 tons of used clothing, and 2,000 tons of coal.

Mr. Fagan said that while the BEW would raise no objection to the additional 200 tons of tobacco, he could not agree either to the coal or the used clothing. He said that enough used clothing had already been authorized to furnish several thousand suits, overcoats, etc., and that the additional request could not be justified. Mr. Fagan said that with respect to coal a sufficient supply already existed in North Africa to maintain the railroads and industrial establishments at their present levels of operation.



Mr. Villard read an extract from a report submitted on September 29th by Mr. Murphy estimating that the coal resources of Algeria were able to furnish seventeen per cent of the minimum normal needs of that area even when the mines were working with government encouragement. Mr. Fagan remarked that other mines in Morocco could supplement the output. Mr. Guérin replied that the Moroccan mines were of poor quality and that the product could not be considered suitable for current needs. Mr. Fagan said that it was not desired to encourage the operation of the railroads in North Africa because they were transporting supplies destined eventually for Germany. He inquired of Mr. Guérin why it was necessary in any case to fill up the vessels now in New Orleans, in reply to which Mr. Guérin stated that the inhabitants of North Africa were so desperately in need of supplies that he would like to fill the vessels "to the top of the masts" if that were possible.

Mr. Fleming stated that the BEW would not approve the request for coal or used clothing, but that the French might take 400 tons of tobacco instead. Mr. Villard suggested that the matter might be referred to higher sources, to which Mr. Fagan replied that the BEW took its instructions from the Vice-President.<sup>72</sup>

It was finally agreed to bring up the matter at the regular weekly meeting of the Inter-departmental Committee on North African Shipments, when the BEW representatives would explain the reasons for the refusal of the application for coal and used clothing.

---

125.9276/126

*The Adviser on Political Relations (Murray) to the Chargé at  
Tangier (Childs)*

WASHINGTON, October 2, 1942.

DEAR RIVES: We have been informed by the War Department that certain directions have been given the military personnel at the Legation in Tangier by the Commanding General in the European theater, without consulting either you or the Military Attaché. It has been explained to us that, in view of military requirements for secrecy in the present situation, information on certain matters must be strictly limited to the personnel having an immediate responsibility in the premises.

I hope that, in the event such matters are presented to you through the Military Attaché, you will cooperate fully without question or speculation, even though for the time being it may not be possible to keep you fully informed of the purport of certain actions.

Sincerely yours,

WALLACE MURRAY

---

<sup>72</sup> Henry A. Wallace, Vice President of the United States. Mr. Wallace was also Chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare.

740.0011 European War 1939/24609 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, October 2, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received 12:56 p. m.]

1459. There is increasing nervousness in official circles that an Anglo-American military operation against French Africa particularly Dakar is imminent. Friendly officials base their belief that something is in the wind on stories they hear of concentrations of troops and material in Gibraltar, Gambia and African territory in the hands of the United Nations. The free zone press this morning even carries an article on the front page stating that European women and children are being evacuated from Dakar as a precautionary measure.

The Paris press frequently used as a sounding board by the Germans has for the past several days been publishing a series of articles dealing with Anglo-Saxon intentions concerning French African possessions. Under such headlines as: "Freetown is the base of departure for an Anglo-Saxon attack against French West Africa", "Let us save the Empire", "Defense of our Empire" et cetera. These articles state that an Anglo-Saxon aggression against Dakar has been planned and is imminent. The articles conclude that since the measures which France took for the defense of Syria and Madagascar were completely insufficient, only by enlisting German assistance and military cooperation may French North and West Africa be saved.

Repeated to London.

TUCK

740.0011 European War 1939/24626 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, October 2, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received October 3—11 a. m.]

644. For Murphy. Boyd<sup>73</sup> has been informed by the Christian soldier<sup>74</sup> who may be seeking both profit and pleasure that a cable from Rome to the Italian Armistice Commission here has been decoded by his bureau stating that an Anglo-American attack is expected during October against North Africa and for the Italian Commission to arrange for all to leave by the best means possible, Italian Consul General only to remain.

<sup>73</sup> John H. Boyd, Vice Consul at Algiers.

<sup>74</sup> Code name for French contact.

The Saint reports his friends have learned Admiral Darlan is coming here only about October 14 instead of between October 5th and 10th.

COLE

---

740.0011 European War 1939/24678 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, October 5, 1942—midnight.

[Received October 6—11:37 a. m.]

651. I have been informed by the Saint from a person who was present at a secret meeting for the Chiefs of the Legion and Youth Movement that George Ognijkauf charged with a permanent propaganda mission in North Africa by the Secretary of State for Information said that the Vichy Government knows that an American aggression against North Africa is imminent and that the Germans had notified Vichy that while they had not intervened to protect outlying French possessions they would do so for North Africa.

Repeated to North African offices and Vichy.

COLE

---

711.819 Establishment/14 : Telegram

*The Chargé at Tangier (Schott) to the Secretary of State*

TANGIER, October 8, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received October 9—7:43 a. m.]

492. An official of French Consulate General showed me copy of note dated September 14 signed Laval which he said was reply to note of German Embassy at Paris dated this June 1st regarding restriction circulation American officials between Tangier and French Zone and control of communications. In punctilious but firm phrasing note emphasizes French Zone remains under state of siege and France itself has instituted strict control circulation persons and censorship communications but since United States recognizes only treaty with Shereefian State its nationals enjoy thereby free access to Empire which right remains the more incontestable as Tangier diplomatic mission accredited to Sultan is maintained. Final statement that recognizing obligations restricting French action American visits nevertheless will be limited strictest possible to avoid "all harmful indiscretions."

Repeated to Vichy and Casablanca.

SCHOTT

740.0011 European War 1939/24764 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, October 11, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 6:20 p. m.]

1513. A reliable friendly official informs us that he has reason to believe that in the course of Laval's conversations with the German authorities in Paris "the Germans brought up the question of Morocco and indicated their desire to come to some arrangement which would insure the fact that Morocco can and will be militarily defended against a possible Anglo-Saxon aggression". While our informant stated that he had no detailed information concerning what the Germans have in mind he expressed the personal opinion that they may envisage the conclusion of some sort of a defensive pact perhaps similar to that between the Japanese and French in Indo-China<sup>75</sup> which would give Germany certain military possibilities in French Africa.

(The Paris press—often a German sounding board—quotes Déat<sup>76</sup> in an address to the youth of his party as stating that the idea of only a token resistance in the French Empire is ridiculous and that France should at once make a pact covering her African Empire similar to the pact she made concerning Indo-China. The Paris newspapers also continue daily to publish articles indicating that the Anglo-Saxons are about to commit an aggression against French Africa. The article speaks of large concentrations of American and British troops at Gibraltar, Bathurst, Freetown, Liberia, et cetera, and large naval concentrations off the Brazilian coast.) Our informant believes that General Noguès like Boisson in the case of Dakar has let it be known that he is violently opposed to any agreement permitting German entry into Morocco.

Repeated to London.

TUCK

---

<sup>75</sup> Concerning Tokyo agreement of August 30, 1940, see telegrams No. 801, September 5, 1940, from the Ambassador in Japan, and No. 496, September 5, 1940, from the Chargé in France, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. iv, p. 100. Regarding agreement signed on September 22 in French Indochina, see telegram of September 22, 1940, from the Consul at Hanoi, *ibid.*, p. 141. For a report of the Franco-Japanese mutual defense agreement of July 29, 1941, see despatch No. 358, August 5, 1941, from the Consul at Saigon, *ibid.*, 1941, vol. v, p. 259.

<sup>76</sup> Marcel Déat, collaboratorist and editor of the French newspaper *L'Oeuvre* under German control.

123M956/418 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, October 12, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 5:14 p. m.]

666. From Murphy. Arrived in Algiers October 11.<sup>77</sup> [Murphy.]  
 COLE

740.0011 European War 1939/24800 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, October 12, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received October 13—2:49 a. m.]

1517. Our 1513, October 11, 1 p. m. Another straw indicating that something may be in the wind insofar as French Africa is concerned is a statement made yesterday at Paris by Marion<sup>78</sup> to representatives of the North African press (which all Free Zone papers are obliged to carry on the front page today). While Marion opened his conference by extolling the virtues of the French press and radio as compared with the lying insinuations and false information disseminated by "Anglo-Saxon agents and foreign radios" he concluded with the following significant words, which while not pressing openly like the Paris press for a defensive pact with Germany covering French Africa, imply much the same thing:

"You should tell them that our defeat had at least one advantage, that of leaving us our Empire, and that today, making use of these psychological factors of which I was talking a moment ago, others are going to use their power not against those nations which are too strong to yield before their attacks, but against ourselves.

We can defend our Empire only if we get Europe's support; and refusal on our part to integrate ourselves into Europe, if continued, would result for our people in the worst of disasters because in the long run this refusal to collaborate with Europe would simply become a refusal to live.

This is the truth for tomorrow, which is that already proclaimed today, and which you should proclaim unceasingly with growing energy. This is our duty as it is that of the Government."

<sup>77</sup> Mr. Murphy had conferred with President Roosevelt, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and officials of the Department of State. En route back to Algiers as Personal Representative of the President he stopped in England and conferred with General Eisenhower and his staff. See George F. Howe, *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West*, in the series *United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 54-57.

<sup>78</sup> Paul Marion, French Secretary of State for information.

Laval, in a statement to leaders of the French youth movement yesterday in the following words also stressed the necessity of saving the French Empire—

“The goal I set myself is to save our territory and our Empire. Trust in me. I shall go through with my duty to the very end. As long as the Marshal gives me his confidence I shall never desert my post no matter what happens.”

While we have as yet been unable to obtain reliable information as to exactly what may be in the wind, reliable friendly officials believe the Germans are urging the French to come to an agreement calling for joint cooperation which will prohibit the possibility of a successful Anglo-Saxon disembarkation and they express the belief that the opening wedge in endeavoring to obtain some measure of control in Morocco may be a further attempt to liquidate Noguès of whom the Germans are not sure and who in their eyes is now the successor to Weygand<sup>79</sup> as French public enemy No. 1 in North Africa.

Repeated to London and Casablanca.

TUCK

---

800.20251T/1a Suppl. : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Dakar (Flewer)*

WASHINGTON, October 13, 1942—10 p. m.

107. Department's 72, July 31, 6 p. m.<sup>80</sup> Department wishes to be kept informed on (1) feeling among the Services, civilian officials and French native population (2) influence of economic conditions on morale, including a summary of economic conditions from time to time (3) effect of United Nations broadcasts and propaganda generally, including an estimate of number of medium and short wave radio sets in use and quality and reception of British and French transmissions (4) evidence of enemy infiltration (5) names of potentially friendly contacts.

Please telegraph at very frequent intervals and as fully as possible such information as may be available covering Senegal and if possible French Guinea and Sudan.

WELLES

---

<sup>79</sup> Gen. Maxime Weygand, former Delegate General of the French Government in North Africa.

<sup>80</sup> Not printed.

740.0011 (E. W.)/11-742: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the War Department*<sup>81</sup>

[ALGIERS, undated.]

[Unnumbered.] From Murphy. On arrival in Algiers I received urgent request for secret interview from Colonel Chrétien who is head of G-2 in French Africa. I met him at an isolated place some miles from Algiers this evening in the presence of two members of Robin Hood Group with whom I have been in contact for several months.

Officer informed me in strictest secrecy that during recent visit to Vichy he had received instructions from Admiral Darlan's immediate entourage to contact me on my return for following stated reason:

French Government has been informed by both German and Japanese sources that United States is planning early military operations against Dakar and/or Casablanca and has been urged to take every precaution. Contact agreed at my suggestion that this may constitute pretext for Axis occupation of French North Africa. The Germans have made some small concessions to strengthen French military establishments in French Africa particularly Dakar but these are really insignificant.

French General Staff are convinced of impending German aggression against French Africa. Darlan believes in German determination and plan to settle western Mediterranean issue during coming weeks and that Germans will have use of bases on Spanish mainland and Spanish Morocco. Vigilant surveillance of Gibraltar is maintained. In French opinion Germans will have at least 8 days warning of an American or Anglo-American action. They believe information leaks through from England as in the case of Dieppe.

Contact to my surprise made no effort to question me regarding American intentions. He stated that the political situation in France is extremely fragile and that it may collapse in as little as 10 days; that Darlan's entourage are convinced that the German move will occur in any event before November 1. He said it is not in French opinion a question of weeks but of days. Under these circumstances Darlan, he said, is faced with a decision. If Darlan, he continued, could be informed that should he as Commander-in-Chief of French armed forces decide to come to Africa entraining with him the French Fleet that the U. S. would be willing [and] able to supply immediate large scale aid—effective [apparent omission] material and economic

<sup>81</sup> From his return to Algiers until the Allied occupation of North Africa, Mr. Murphy communicated through the Consul General at Algiers and the Department of State with the War Department and received instructions in similar manner. The telegrams were not in a Department of State code and no deciphered copies were supplied to that Department at the time. Copies of these messages were transmitted to the Department of State under cover of a letter of September 7, 1960, from the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

supply—there is strong possibility that Darlan would undertake such cooperation.<sup>82</sup> If he did the military and naval forces in French Africa would undoubtedly obey his command.

This is obviously of the greatest importance and my French friends and I are convinced of reliability and sincerity of contact who stated that negotiations with us would be carried on in Algiers as German Gestapo in Vichy rendered conversations impossible there.

Officer went into long exposé of French military weakness in North Africa due to lack of equipment and supply but said they could raise as much as a half million men.

The French Military [apparent omission] he stated that due to lack of sufficient equipment and supplies they will be unable to make serious resistance to an Axis attack without our immediate aid and that Laval is capable of an accord with the Germans along the lines of accord with Japan regarding Indochina<sup>83</sup> if this not already the fact.

It should be noted also that subsequent to my conversations with General Noguès in Morocco last week Noguès sent to me head of the French G-2 in Morocco for the sole purpose of informing me that I would possibly receive a message from Darlan in Algiers.

There is no doubt that the situation in French North Africa is moving fast. I learn that Axis have massed about one hundred thousand troops along the Tunisian frontier and French G-2 have information they say that extensive German plans for aviation attack have been perfected. They say there is no doubt of an important German inside organization in French North Africa equipped with arms and means of communication including a network of 30 clandestine radio transmitters with a plan to seize key points working with Parti Populaire groups and natives. German intervention in French Moroccan administration is indubitable according to information gathered during my conversations with several officials in French Morocco. German customs officers and Armistice Commission maintain vigilant surveillance of port of Casablanca where not a ship nor a pound of merchandise may move without German authorization. At that place French recently intercepted two messages from Consul General Auer to Berlin warning latter of imminent American attack. Please inform me at once how far I may go in replying to Darlan's representative who in effect asks: (1) would we be willing to cooperate with Darlan and (2) if so, are we able to do so quickly on a large scale here and/or Europe. I urge that we encourage Darlan and believe

---

<sup>82</sup> This sentence is garbled.

<sup>83</sup> See footnote 75, p. 388.



this would be reconcilable with eventual cooperation with Giraud <sup>84</sup> about whom I shall telegraph encouraging news tomorrow. Darlan is expected here next week. Inform Leahy and Eisenhower. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.0011 (E. W.)/11-742: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the War Department* <sup>85</sup>

[ALGIERS, October 15 (14?), 1942.]

[No. 670?] From Murphy. For Leahy. In accordance with the President's directive of September 22 I conveyed the message to General Mast.<sup>86</sup> I inquired whether he would be willing to transmit at once the information to General Giraud and also whether he would comment personally. His reaction was more favorable than I dared hope for the reasons that (1) he expressed genuine alarm over imminent Axis intentions to invade this area and (2) regarding the fragile political situation in France. Mast also told me bluntly that Giraud contemplates that we deal with him and not with Darlan. Mast has learned that Darlan is seeking to climb on the band wagon but in his opinion Darlan could not be trusted. I replied that we hoped that the French would demonstrate some unity, that Darlan is Commander-in-Chief of French armed forces, that French Fleet has its importance and that the Admiralty commands the ports and coastal batteries in French North Africa. Mast retorted that Giraud will command the Army which is loyal to him and not to Darlan and that the Navy in French North Africa would fall in line with the Army. I urged that success of the operation is the cardinal point and that we want the French to consolidate with us.

Mast's principal concern is whether we are able to undertake a large scale operation now. I assured him that we are. He then inquired if the Axis attacks in advance of our plans whether we would react immediately and I said I felt confident we would by air but the rest is a technical problem for which I am not competent.

Mast then insisted that we despatch immediately, because time presses, 5 American officers from Eisenhower's staff including a general officer to meet equivalent French officers at a point on the Algerian coast 150 kilometers west of Algiers on October 21. Full details regarding reception, hour and facilities will be telegraphed but he urges

---

<sup>84</sup> Gen. Henri Honoré Giraud, following his escape from Germany in April 1942, had established residence in southern France and was at this time in communication with French patriots in Algiers.

<sup>85</sup> Copy supplied by the Office of the Secretary of Defense under cover of letter of September 7, 1960.

<sup>86</sup> Maj. Gen. Charles E. Mast, Commander of French Algiers Division and representative of General Giraud in French Northwest Africa.

that men be selected immediately and be sent to Gibraltar. Officers should include following: one officer competent for operations, one for material, one for debarkation, and one Naval officer. They should arrive by submarine at night and will be received and housed in a private property. A stay of 48 hours is contemplated.

Mast also stated that urgent need of small arms especially sub-machine guns and grenades. This has been also subject of discussion with his subordinate group leaders. I informed them with emphasis that we have been waiting for days for their indication of places and time and that time is limited because of moon. They explained that they were awaiting my return from the United States. They promised to supply data for first deliveries by tonight late.

Mast stated gravest concern over Algiers situation which is menaced by early Axis action. He said there is evidence of arrival of German SS operatives bearing French passports and according to one reliable report Germans were recently given 500 blank French passports intended for use in this area. Mast warned me that American representatives in this area should be prepared to protect themselves against physical attack by Axis agents. I am also requested by Mast, whose representatives returned yesterday from visit to Giraud, to suggest to you the possibility that in the TORCH<sup>87</sup> operation some part of unoccupied France might be held by French Army if latter could be supplied by U. S. Mast said this idea is dear to Giraud's heart and that latter has worked hard during past 4 months on a plan for combined action next spring in Europe and Africa. He appreciates the compelling reasons for earlier action but urges that you consider the possibility of including in TORCH a plan of establishing a bridgehead in southern France before the Axis has the chance of organizing that area.

Then question which Mast raised is that of the command of TORCH. This is question I have dreaded because of French susceptibilities. After long discussion he proposed the formula of a unified command under which Eisenhower would retain complete command of American forces. In this connection Mast emphasized that French command knowing all details of terrain would be necessary to enable our forces quickly to move through French North Africa to contact the enemy. Mast also referred to the massing of Axis forces on the Tunisian frontier and added that 250,000 Italian troops are lined up on the Italo-French frontier. I suggested this was a technical rather than a political matter but Mast stoutly insisted that it is a political point which must be settled in advance. Are you able to suggest a happy formula for this delicate point which would leave the command effectively with Eisenhower but permit the French to regard the operation as theirs and require them to lend us their maximum aid? Mast

---

<sup>87</sup> Code name for Allied invasion of Northwest Africa.

asserts that Giraud's command will give us entry practically without firing a shot.

Also Mast states Giraud insists that Embassy at Vichy, Legation in Bern and other possible contacts be instructed that negotiations with Giraud are being channelized elsewhere. Giraud wishes to continue contact with U. S. via Mast in Algiers for reasons of safety.

Giraud's departure from France was also discussed. Mast and his advisers believe that we should provide an American submarine to pick up Giraud and his party at night at a point on the French Mediterranean coast. Detailed information on this point will be supplied. They prefer to regard departure by plane only as a last resort. May I say that this is possible. Please inform Eisenhower. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.0011 (E. W.)/11-742: Telegram

*The Chief of Staff, War Department (Marshall), to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*<sup>88</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] October 17, 1942.

No. M-1. From Handy<sup>89</sup> for Murphy. Five staff officers leaving London for Gibraltar by air for conference with Mast representatives as proposed in your number 670 October 14. Details regarding place of meeting given in your 682 October 16,<sup>90</sup> have been relayed to Eisenhower. For security reasons any additional details should be relayed through here and Eisenhower to Gibraltar. Only alternative would appear to be by trusted courier direct from you to Gibraltar with verbal message only. Eisenhower extremely desirous that conference be limited if possible to 24 hours. Clark<sup>91</sup> heads group of staff officers. [Handy.]

MARSHALL

---

740.0011 (E. W.)/11-742: Telegram

*Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*<sup>88</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] October 17, 1942.

No. M-2. From Handy for Murphy. Copies for Murphy and Eisenhower. This is reply to Murphy's message of 15 October.

---

<sup>88</sup> Copy supplied by the Office of the Secretary of Defense under cover of letter of September 7, 1960.

<sup>89</sup> Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy, Chief of Operations Division, War Department.

<sup>90</sup> Not printed.

<sup>91</sup> Maj. Gen. Mark W. Clark.

Inform your contact we also have information that Germany contemplates occupation of African Colonies and it is our opinion that Darlan should resist aggression by Axis with Army and Navy in which event America will provide at once large scale military, material, and economic aid in the colonies.

Inform Giraud's contact that question of command of French Army and Navy should be settled by Frenchmen and that America will undertake a large scale operation immediately upon resistance by French to Axis invasion of the Colonies.

Proposal that officers of American Staff visit Algeria has already been approved by Eisenhower, details will be cabled by Marshall.

In regard to the General's departure via submarine it is considered that airplane passage is preferable, less subject to interruption, and more easily arranged. [Handy.]

LEAHY

---

740.0011 European War 1939/25114 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Tuck)*

WASHINGTON, October 17, 1942.

It is desired that you have no contacts or negotiations with General Giraud.

[WELLES]

---

851R 24/9<sup>13</sup>/<sub>6</sub>

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Villard)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 17, 1942.

I asked Mr. de Panafieu the status of the two French accord vessels now supposed to be loading at New Orleans for North Africa. He replied that the ships were idle because no movement of supplies had taken place from New York to New Orleans, owing to the failure of the Board of Economic Warfare to authorize the railroads to make the shipments. I said that we had been working on the matter very hard and hoped to have it straightened out shortly.

Mr. de Panafieu observed that the French Commercial Service in New York had been notified by the BEW that they would not permit sugar, which is now loaded on freight cars in 100-pound bags, to be exported in this form. The BEW had ruled that no jute bags could be used for the exportation of the sugar, and that it would be necessary to use cotton bags. Before the sugar could be moved, therefore, it would have to be unpacked from the jute bags and transferred to cotton bags. For this reason Mr. de Panafieu felt that it might be just as well to relinquish the sugar in New York and

purchase a new supply at New Orleans whenever that became available.

Meanwhile, Mr. de Panafieu said, all progress on the supply program had ceased. I said that according to the BEW the shipments of cotton textiles, old clothing and powdered milk from New York had not been approved because export licenses had not been submitted. Mr. de Panafieu stated that two weeks ago all the export licenses had been delivered by his secretary in two bundles, one to Mr. Fagan personally and the other to Mr. Fagan's secretary.

---

012.3/7849 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, undated.

[Received October 18, 1942—8:30 p.m.]

691. For Admiral Leahy from Murphy. You might be interested in knowing that Darlan's son, Alain, has just entered an Algiers hospital and according to present diagnosis he is suffering from infantile paralysis.

Repeated to Tuck. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.0011 (E. W.)/11-742: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the War Department*<sup>94</sup>

ALGIERS, October 19, 1942.

No. 694. From Murphy. Vice Consul Reid learns from good source at Casablanca of the interception of a message from German Armistice Commission recommending the immediate occupation of French Morocco and estimating that four armored divisions would be required for the task. This is along the lines of other messages said to have been sent by the German Consul General at Casablanca urging German military intervention in French Morocco. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740.0011 (E. W.)/11-742: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the War Department*<sup>94</sup>

ALGIERS, October 20, 1942.

[Unnumbered.] From Murphy. I have had two confidential visits from Major Dorange the personal aide of General Juin Com-

---

<sup>94</sup> Copy supplied by the Office of the Secretary of Defense under cover of letter of September 7, 1960.

manding in French Africa. He called at his request to inform me that Juin is exercised over the grave possibility of an Axis provocation in Tunisia. In brief he wished to know what our attitude would be in event French authorities should request American aid to meet eventual Axis aggression. The officer said among other things that with the consolidation of the German position on the Volga it would soon be possible for the Germans to release aviation and other material and effectives for operations in the Mediterranean; that Kesselring<sup>65</sup> disposes at present of approximately twelve hundred planes in the Mediterranean area; that Rommel<sup>66</sup> would not be able to undertake an offensive before December 1st because he is encountering not only great transport difficulties but also because of the limitations of port facilities in Libya where Tripoli, Tobruk, and Benghazi offer but meagre possibilities; that the temptation of the Tunisia ports of Bizerta, Sousse and Sfax assumes ever greater proportions, there is evidence that the Axis is pushing the Arab element in Tunisia to a point where disorders may occur which would provide Axis necessary pretext to intervene and occupy Tunisian ports.

Officer said that Juin's orders are to resist and that he intended to do so, but that he doubted whether some elements in Vichy would back him. He believed that Darlan would. Juin will discuss these matters in Algiers next week with Darlan.

Juin's purpose according to his aide was discreetly to inquire what the American attitude would be in such an eventuality, would be willing and able to support the French authorities in North Africa if they undertook resistance and particularly whether we should be able to send aviation rapidly. He inquired also whether I had the necessary authorization to conduct preliminary conversations.

I replied that I had such authority and I referred to the President's announced policy regarding France.<sup>66a</sup> I also referred to Darlan's suggestion made to Admiral Leahy to the effect that when the United States would be able to send 500,000 men and several thousand tanks and planes to Marseille, to talk to him.<sup>67</sup> I said that while I did not pretend to be in the secret of our General Staff I felt reasonably sure that we now are able to do such without specifying any limitation of time necessary for such an operation. The officer said that General Juin felt that an accord in principle should be reached with us, but that everyone dreaded the danger of a leak and immediate reaction

<sup>65</sup> Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, German Commander in Chief, South.

<sup>66</sup> Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, German Commander in North Africa.

<sup>66a</sup> For passage regarding France in President Roosevelt's fireside chat of April 28, 1942, see Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.), *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 1942 volume, *Humanity on the Defensive* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1950), pp. 228-229.

<sup>67</sup> See telegram No. 970, August 1, 1941, 4 p. m., from the Ambassador in France, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, p. 189.

by the Axis before we would be ready to move. According to the officer General Juin will suggest to Darlan that either Juin or Noguès be authorized to negotiate with me and also authorized to act immediately and without qualifications in case of an Axis provocation. In the officer's opinion Darlan would in latter come to North Africa.

In this same connection I believe we should not overlook the memorandum which Darlan is supposed to have initialed in [on] 1 June 41 approving the use of Tunisian bases which was opposed by Weygand and not approved by Pétain. That memorandum is supposed to be in German hands. I took pains to make it clear that Darlan should be informed that Juin and not I took the initiative because I feel that with Darlan we should be cautious and avoid appearance that we wish to precipitate matters here. I have refrained from personal discussion with Juin, but his aide suggested it might be necessary during the next few days and I shall probably talk with him after he has seen Darlan if the latter's visit takes place. Darlan's son has just fallen ill of infantile paralysis and is in an Algiers hospital. Inform Leahy, Clebedor[?]. [Murphy.]

[COLE]

---

740.0011 European War 1939/24969 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, October 20, 1942—4 p. m.  
[Received October 20—2:32 p. m.]

701. From Murphy for Atherton. For Leahy. Admiral Darlan arrived at Oran this morning en route to Dakar for an inspection trip said to be pending for the last 2 months. He is expected in Algiers on his return in about 1 week stopping over for about 2 days as the guest of General Juin commanding in North Africa.

I promised to inquire discreetly whether American specialists might have helpful suggestions to offer regarding treatment of poliomyelitis. Could possibly Admiral McIntire<sup>98</sup> cable me confidentially anything that might be useful. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

012.3/7904a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, October 20, 1942—midnight.

343. For Murphy. Your 691.<sup>99</sup> You are requested to forward the following message to Admiral Darlan from Admiral Leahy:

---

<sup>98</sup> Vice Adm. Ross T. McIntire, White House physician.

<sup>99</sup> *Ante*, p. 398.

"I hope you will accept my sympathy in your son's illness, as well as our hopes for his complete and early recovery."

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/7582

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the  
Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Villard)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 21, 1942.

I told Mr. de Panafieu that the appropriate authorities of this Government had now approved a restricted program of petroleum shipments to French North Africa on the following quarterly basis:

A. Kerosene	15,000 Tons
B. Low grade gaso- line	10,000 Tons
C. Gas oil and diesel oil	10,000 Tons
D. Heavy Fuels	5,000 Tons
Total	<u>40,000 Tons</u>

I said it was stipulated that items C. and D. must definitely be of the lower grades, and that any given quota would be subject to change. I added that fuel oil for the Coastwise Service between Casablanca and Algiers would have to come out of the amounts mentioned above.

Mr. de Panafieu expressed himself as very greatly pleased with this development. He said that news of the proposed petroleum program would have a most favorable effect in French North Africa and that it would assist materially in producing a friendly attitude on the part of the officials of that territory towards the objectives of the American supply program.

I also told Mr. de Panafieu that in connection with this petroleum program we would desire to station at the Consulate General at Casablanca an officer who would be charged with the supervision and control of the supplies. We had selected for this position Mr. Arthur G. Reed, former representative of the Socony-Vacuum Company at Casablanca, who was thoroughly familiar with the French North African territory and well known to the officials in that area. It would be desirable to have Mr. Reed leave at an early date in order to make preliminary arrangements for the arrival of the supplies. I asked Mr. de Panafieu if a visa could be obtained for him. Mr. de Panafieu stated that he would be very pleased to telegraph immediately for Mr. Reed's visa and that he anticipated no difficulty in this matter. I said that we would like to give him some such



title as Special Assistant or Petroleum Adviser to the Consulate General, and that he would thus operate separately from the Vice Consuls who were serving as control officers. Mr. de Panafieu said he thought there would be no objection whatever to this arrangement.

Before talking with Mr. de Panafieu I read to Commander Freseman, aide to Admiral Leahy, the contents of the letter of October 20, 1942 from the Secretary of the Navy<sup>1</sup> setting forth the joint views of the War and Navy Departments in the matter of petroleum. Commander Freseman stated that the proposed program was "perfectly satisfactory" to Admiral Leahy. I then informed Mr. Cass Canfield of the Board of Economic Warfare, who expressed his concurrence.

---

740.0011 European War 1939/25013 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, October 22, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 10:42 p. m.]

1571. For Admiral Leahy. Admiral Auphan, Minister of Marine, sent me a verbal message yesterday by Captain Sanson, head of the Deuxième Bureau of that Ministry.

Auphan is apparently worried by the recent intensive British press campaign regarding Dakar which he likens to the British press attitude which immediately preceded military intervention in Madagascar. He hopes that our Government would be willing to bring influence to bear on the British to avoid an attack on Dakar which according to Auphan is now strongly defended by mechanized troops and by fairly adequate aviation. Auphan considers that the Madagascan affair and our attitude in the Antilles did not really strike deeply home in France but that an attack on Dakar would provoke a "national reaction" and would arouse deep-rooted animosity against us throughout the whole of France. If Dakar were attacked, he wished me to know that it would be defended to the last ditch and that the garrison would fight to the end rather than surrender. Auphan particularly desired that you should be acquainted with his opinions as he feels certain that you will view them objectively.

Quite apart from any legitimate preoccupations as regards the preservation of the French Empire which he may have, I believe that we have a useful friend in Auphan whose influence on Laval has so far been in the right direction.

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

To my knowledge, Auphan has on two occasions taken a strong stand against the Germans which was illustrated by his attitude towards a proposed joint defense agreement for French Africa and his opposition to turning over French merchant shipping to Germany. (Our telegrams 1284, August 31, 8 p. m.,<sup>2</sup> and 1416, September 24, 5 p. m.<sup>3</sup>)

Certain of our reliable contacts have expressed the opinion that an isolated occupation of Dakar without a successful landing in North Africa would serve no useful purpose and would only arouse the French population against us including many of our well wishers.

TUCK

---

740.00112 European War 1939/7529%

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 22, 1942.

I went to see the Vice President this morning regarding the difficulties which the Department has been having with the Board of Economic Warfare in connection with the North African Agreement for supplying N. Africa. Mr. Wallace said he understood the situation perfectly. There was certain information available to him and probably available to the Department which had not been, and could not be, divulged either to Milo Perkins<sup>4</sup> or to the men lower down. He had already spoken to Milo Perkins and suggested I follow up with him. He concluded by saying he thought there would be no further difficulty.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

---

851T.00/49a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Dakar (Flewer)*

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1942—1 p. m.

113. Department's 107, October 13, 10 p. m. A telegram has been received from Monrovia<sup>5</sup> to the effect that there is great unrest and some street rioting at Dakar in protest over the compulsory evacu-

---

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 194.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Executive Director, Board of Economic Warfare.

<sup>5</sup> No. 356, October 20, 11 a. m., not printed.

ation of French women and children. It is for the purpose of evaluating this and other alarming reports which are being received about your district that the Department has requested you to keep it currently informed on what is taking place and the state of public feeling.

HULL

---

740.0011 European War 1939/25189

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division  
of Near Eastern Affairs (Villard)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 26, 1942.

Mr. Guérin referred to press reports regarding possible Anglo-American action in French North Africa and expressed the opinion that this would be a favorable time for United States forces to land in Morocco and Algeria. He said that he wished to emphasize one point in particular, and that was the present position of Admiral Darlan.

Mr. Guérin said that Admiral Darlan was bitterly hostile to Laval and that he could be expected to interest himself in any movement which might react against his enemy. Admiral Darlan was also an opportunist and a very ambitious man, in Mr. Guérin's opinion. It was well known, moreover, that while he was very anti-British, he was at heart anti-Nazi as well and would do anything he could to thwart Germany, provided it did not endanger his own position. The chief argument in any movement to influence Admiral Darlan, according to Mr. Guérin, was the argument of military and naval strength, and if the United Nations could produce proof of adequate strength Admiral Darlan might be prepared to render assistance.

Mr. Guérin urged that, in view of these facts, an attempt should be made to win over Admiral Darlan to the cause of the Democracies. In any situation which might develop in French North Africa the French Fleet would be the key factor and Admiral Darlan still had supreme authority over the fleet. Mr. Guérin insisted that it would not be far-fetched to assume that if Admiral Darlan could be convinced of adequate strength on the part of the United Nations for any enterprise in North Africa he and the fleet could be persuaded to break from Vichy and join the Democratic side. Mr. Guérin felt that at a critical time such as this, no harm could be done in approaching Admiral Darlan and the attempt might succeed with highly gratifying results.

740.0011 (E. W.)/11-742: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the War Department*<sup>a</sup>

[ALGIERS, undated.]

[Received October 26, 1942—3 p. m.]

No. 725. From Murphy. For Eisenhower. Messenger sent to France after Flagpole's meeting with Clark<sup>7</sup> reports that Kingpin<sup>8</sup> agrees in principle to our proposition. He asks that we continue study of his idea of establishing a bridgehead in southern France. I am also informed under promise that it is for my personal information only and not as yet for communication to you that Kingpin will be willing to come to Africa for the operation. The reason for the stricture on communication to you of this information is that messenger left here last Friday morning by plane before I was able to give him the text of the letter of proposal approved by Clark and myself in agreement with Flagpole. Therefore Kingpin did not have before him this text but merely an oral account of the morning meeting between Clark and Flagpole. On that preliminary basis he agrees subject to consideration of the text which should be delivered to him this morning by a second messenger.<sup>9</sup> [Murphy.]

COLE

740 00112 European War 1939/6778: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Tuck)*

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1942—8 p. m.

656. Your 1432, September 27, 7 p. m. With reference to the last paragraph of Laval's note dated September 26, the Embassy is now authorized to confirm that a petroleum program has been approved for French North Africa, consisting of a quarterly quota of 40,000 tons, broken down as follows: kerosene, 15,000 tons; low grade gasoline, 10,000 tons; low grade gas oil and diesel oil, 10,000 tons; low grade heavy fuels, 5,000 tons. Any quota assigned is subject to change.

<sup>a</sup> Copy supplied by the Office of the Secretary of Defense under cover of letter of September 7, 1960.

<sup>7</sup> The Cherchel Conference, October 22, 1942, between United States representatives Gen. Mark W. Clark and Robert D. Murphy and French representatives Gen. Charles E. Mast (Flagpole) and Col. Louis G. M. Jousse. For details relating to this conference, see the following volumes: George F. Howe, *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West*, in the series *United States Army in World War II: Mediterranean Theater of Operations* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 81-83; Marcel Vignerat, *Rearming the French*, in the series *United States Army in World War II: Special Studies* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 12-16; Comité français de la libération nationale, *Les Cahiers Français*, No. 47, August 1943, "La part de la résistance française dans les événements de l'Afrique du Nord", pp. 3-45; Gen. Mark W. Clark, *Calculated Risk* (New York, Harpers, 1950), pp. 5, 69-89.

<sup>8</sup> Code name for Gen. Henri Giraud.

<sup>9</sup> For correspondence between Mr. Murphy and General Giraud, see pp. 412-422.

It is understood that the French Government will use the tankers *Limousin* and *Lorraine* in this service, the departure of a tanker from waters of the Western Hemisphere taking place at the same time as the entry into the same waters of the tanker from Casablanca.

Please repeat to Algiers, Casablanca and Tunis.

HULL

---

740.0011 (E. W.)/11-742: Telegram

*The Chief of Staff, War Department (Marshall), to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*<sup>10</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] October 27, 1942—10:30 a. m.

No. M-20. This message for Murphy. Herewith is relay of message from Eisenhower. Message begins:

1. Commander-in-Chief has approved your draft letter to Kingpin subject to change in last paragraph. Second sentence which starts with "However, during the initial phases" and ends with "while the operation is in progress" has been deleted and the following substituted therefor: "However, during those phases of the operation that involve the landing, establishing the security of French North Africa, and providing the necessary bases, it is considered essential that the American Command and organization which has been set up with so much effort and difficulty for this special operation, should remain unchanged. By the time this has been accomplished it is to be assumed that the French Forces, reinforced by the matériel support provided by the Allied Nations will be sufficiently strong to insure the complete security of French territory. Thereafter the primary interest of the American Commander lies in the use of the area as a base of further operations against the Axis, and the defense of French North Africa will be turned over to French Command." The rest of the letter remains unchanged.

2. I request urgently that you expedite news of Kingpin's decision. If favorable, furnish complete details for his evacuation. This evacuation must occur very soon. It is impossible for American submarine to arrive in time. I have therefore arranged for British submarine, under American command, to stand by at Gibraltar and proceed on short notice when orders are received from me.

3. Assuming that agreements reached at our conference are confirmed and that you remain convinced of integrity of individuals, you are authorized to notify Kingpin or Flagpole on November 4 of the assault date and of the name of the Commander-in-Chief. Flagpole is acceptable as a Deputy to Commander-in-Chief, whether or not Kingpin accepts invitation.

4. In event of postponement of assault date, plans are being prepared to insure that you will be notified.

Message ends here.

MARSHALL

---

<sup>10</sup> Copy supplied by the Office of the Secretary of Defense under cover of letter of September 7, 1960.

851T.00/50 : Telegram

*The Consul at Dakar (Flexer) to the Secretary of State*

DAKAR, October 28, 1942—8 a. m.

[Received October 29—10:01 a. m.]

458. Report mentioned Department's 113, October 24, may be thrown out. During Wasson's incumbency<sup>11</sup> and since my arrival Consulate has been required repeatedly to debunk such perversions which apparently reach Department from British West Africa or Free French. Latter's agents in particular are over enthusiastic and precipitant in reporting to principals and have own personal and political ends to serve which may or may not be ours. Consulate has same reports and loses valuable time in finding them usually admittedly unsubstantiated. Such naturally are not passed on. But no intelligence agent anywhere has habit of correcting his errors or deliberately mischievous reports.

When there is "great unrest and street rioting" here a true account will be sent from Dakar. There has been neither. Evacuation has caused justifiable grouching and unconcealed resentment particularly among true colonials and functionaries whose residence in AOF<sup>12</sup> are not for personal convenience, but majority affected are families on Government payrolls who cannot be expected to "riot" or protest against themselves and their meal tickets. Civilian element is cowed, divided and numerically a minority although their cause against repatriation has outstanding merit.

In the first heat possibly a move against Dakar, if with American participation or domination, might have found approval by local citizenry or even by military below field officer grade who were faced with family separation. Bear in mind that Circumscription of Dakar alone is affected and that parasitic Dakar is far from being AOF either economically or militarily. "When will the Americans come" or "Why don't they come" were briefly common questions with eye to the evacuation deadline and on family rather than political loyalties.

That attitude has passed. Without the benefit of propaganda blame for the separation of families is being thrown at the United States and Britain. They say that the attack on Madagascar gave good cause for expectancy of move against AOF and excuse for these defense preparations; that our official pronouncements and publicity media confirmed such offensive designs; that the hodge-podge of military and civilian establishments made Dakar undefensible without sacrificing women and children whereas our permitting their removal

<sup>11</sup> Thomas C. Wasson, former Consul at Dakar, at this time assigned to the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

<sup>12</sup> Afrique Occidentale Française.

makes it defensible; that they were deceived into accepting as pledges our pronouncements which now turn out to be radio vapors; that with their families in Laval or Nazi-occupied France there can be no thought of espousing the United Nations; that already their past sympathies have endangered them in respect to the purge expected under military authority after families' departures. These are the unpleasant facts.

There is a tenable view that evacuation policy is intended not only or primarily to remove encumbrances to Dakar defense but to free all mobilizables from immediate family influence and thus assure their reserve by anticipation in military effort here or elsewhere on AOF.

First repatriation convoy with *Lipari*, *Porthoi* and *Savoie* leaves October 28 for Marseilles via Casablanca with 1300 women and children, or half number originally planned. Estimated total over 7,000 if plan fully executed but widespread suspended when larger immobile families are moved.<sup>13</sup>

See my telegrams 399, September 28 and 406, October.<sup>14</sup>

FLEXER

---

740.0011 European War 1939/25267

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary  
of State (Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 29, 1942.

The French Ambassador called to see me this morning at his request.

The Ambassador, apparently very casually, said that he had been reporting to his Government that all of the reports which had recently reached him to the effect that the United States was planning some attempted invasion of North Africa were false, and that, in view of the seriousness of the question, he hoped for his own sake that he would not be found to have misled his Government. I said that reports and rumors of this kind had been current for many months past and that, of course, it was obviously impossible for me or for any official of this Government to pay attention to every rumor that was circulating in times like these. The Ambassador did not seem to lay any particular stress upon his remark to me nor upon my reply.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

<sup>13</sup> This sentence obviously garbled.

<sup>14</sup> Neither printed.

740.0011 (E. W.)/11-742: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the War Department*<sup>15</sup>

ALGIERS, October 31, 1942.  
[Received October 31—midnight.]

No. 749. From Murphy. Personal for Leahy to be communicated immediately. I must appeal urgently to President and yourself on following because of grave political factors involved and time element: On Oct. 22 a secret conference was held between American and French officers in Algeria regarding Franco-American cooperation for TORCH. This conference was requested by French months ago, ways and means of debarkation of American Forces in French North Africa in cooperation with French Army were discussed as also question whether General André [*Henri*] Giraud would accept command French and eventually Allied Forces in area. Question of authoritative French military leader is of essence. At conference no indication of our intentions regarding date of operation was supplied and French officers were left with impression that at least several weeks would intervene.

Confidential messenger was immediately despatched to France to inform Giraud who agreed in principle but Giraud is still ignorant of imminence of our intentions.

Messenger returned from France this evening bringing letter addressed to me by Giraud stating that American and French Armies in close liaison will assure final victory; also technical memorandum regarding TORCH operation and his participation therein.

Messenger states positively that Giraud cannot depart from France by November 4 and Mast now fully supports this view. Latter points out after reflection that our proposition verges on the hostile because on October 22 Clark gave no intimation of date of TORCH but did suggest that approximately 3 weeks would be required between departure of first convoys and landing. Therefore he concludes that our notification to him on Oct. 29 as instructed to effect that action is imminent and *submarine already on way for Giraud* although French are as yet only allowed to guess date of operation amounts virtually to ultimatum.

Mast proposes that we demonstrate some confidence in Giraud if we wish him as a partner and at least be willing to give him a reasonable number of days to organize what he considers the more important part of the operation that is France.

<sup>15</sup> Copy supplied by the Office of the Secretary of Defense under cover of letter of September 7, 1960.



Mast and returned messenger who is a civilian with important contacts in French political and business world both insist that Giraud's departure later in November will be a natural outgrowth of a rapidly disintegrating political situation evolving in our favor and thus Giraud will not be considered dissident. Giraud has taken residence in Marseille.

I am convinced that without French Army cooperation and the danger of its active opposition if we do not have French command with us that TORCH may fail. I urgently recommend that it is not unreasonable that Giraud be given 3 weeks interval to perfect his metropolitan organization and arrange his departure with maximum advantage to us. Giraud is stated not to believe that Axis intervention is imminent and Mast asserts now that there is no indication of immediate Axis move. No one here doubts that TORCH will lead to separation of Europe from Africa and total occupation of France. Therefore Giraud's decision is a grave one and we should go as far as we can to cooperate with him. Please reply by radio urgently. [Murphy.]

COLE

740.0011 (E. W.)/11-742: Telegram

*Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*<sup>18</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] October 31, 1942.

No. M-26. For Murphy. Please advise Flagpole that we consider it highly desirable that French commanders be given instructions on D day that incidents on the part of the Spanish, however provocative, should not be permitted to lead to retaliatory action on the part of the French until after the consolidation of the American forces on shore.

Eisenhower is requesting British to make similar representations to France on D day.

[LEAHY]

851T.00/51 : Telegram

*The Consul at Dakar (Flewer) to the Secretary of State*

DAKAR, November 1, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received November 2—7:11 p. m.]

468. Following is a summary of significant address by High Commissioner Boisson at St. Louis, Senegal, October 28.

<sup>18</sup> Copy supplied by the Office of the Secretary of Defense under cover of letter of September 7, 1960.

Working up from the evacuation of women and children from Dakar (my telegram 458, October 28, 8 a. m.) begun that day he placed responsibility for this defense measure on British policy of "gages" rather than on specific information of imminent attack. Madagascar was cited and French West Africa might be next victim of aggression under this Anglo-Saxon policy of "gages."

The latest reports may be by negotiation and "the English are occupied with replacing their lost cards by putting cards taken from the French into play". The value of the Dakar-French West Africa card in Anglo-Saxon hands will not be misappreciated. France holds that card and Boisson says "loudly" that he will not allow it to be taken. He wants it understood that the defense will not be a demonstration for honor. French West Africa will be defended to the end.

French West Africa he stated is absolutely essential to destiny of France. With it lost what would be the figure at the peace table with naught but the metropolitan territory.

He said that history will not permit credence of the British announcements following each snatching of a French possession that it will be returned after the war. "To the traditional egoism of English policy there are added momentary necessities: The British Empire as we have known it is a thing of the past and nothing or no one can stay its frittering." In view of the inadequacy of British assistance Australia has turned to the United States; tomorrow's position of Canada and South Africa he says conjectural. England cannot live without Empire and if the present one disappears her objective is to build up one of substantiation.

Surest way of keeping something is by holding it oneself; therefore French West Africa will not be abandoned.

Boisson concludes with call for unity. Destiny has given French West Africa privileged role of saving France by defending itself. The spirit must be that of Verdun. "It is as necessary for France to hold Dakar today as it was essential to hold Verdun in 1916."

Text and translation by air mail. Please see my telegram No. 462, October 29, 9 a. m.<sup>17</sup>

FLEXER

---

<sup>17</sup> Not printed.

740.0011 European War 1939/29461

*The American Political Adviser at Algiers (Murphy) to the  
Secretary of State*

No. 76

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS, March 22, 1943.<sup>18</sup>

[Received April 7.]

Subject: Transmitting Copies of Correspondence Exchanged between General Henri Giraud and Robert D. Murphy in October and November, 1942.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Department's telegraphic instruction no. 426 of March 10<sup>19</sup> requesting that the Department be supplied with copies of three letters dated November 2 exchanged between General Henri Giraud and myself.

As the Department was informed by my telegram no. 385 of March 14, 7 p. m.,<sup>19</sup> Mr. John McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, had already departed from North Africa prior to the receipt of the Department's telegram under reference.

I enclose in original and translation copies of three informal letters,<sup>20</sup> the originals of which were initialled by me and addressed to General Giraud.

I also enclose copies in original and translation of a letter of October 27,<sup>21</sup> and two letters dated October 28, 1942,<sup>22</sup> addressed to me and initialled by General Giraud. It will be noted that the letter of October 27 incorporated part of the text of one of the letters of November 2, and one of General Giraud's letters of October 28 incorporates all of the text of another of my letters of November 2. The reason for this disparity of dates is that the rough draft, undated, of these two communications was transmitted secretly to General Giraud by messenger while he was still in France. His letters of October 27 and 28 constituted his approval of the drafts and at his request these were confirmed by clean copies which I initialled.

I also enclose a copy in original and translation of General Giraud's letter to me of November 1, 1942,<sup>23</sup> and of my acknowledgment of November 2.<sup>24</sup>

There is also enclosed a copy of a draft of an "Accord de Principe"<sup>25</sup> and its enclosures<sup>26</sup> initialled by General Giraud on October 27, 1942.

<sup>18</sup> This despatch, although dated in 1943, is printed here because of its enclosures dated from October 27 to November 2, 1942.

<sup>19</sup> Not printed.

<sup>20</sup> Enclosures 1, 2, and 3.

<sup>21</sup> Enclosure 4.

<sup>22</sup> Enclosures 5 and 6.

<sup>23</sup> Enclosure 7.

<sup>24</sup> Enclosure 8.

<sup>25</sup> Enclosure 9.

<sup>26</sup> Enclosures 10, 11, and 12.

Copies of my letters of November 2, as well as General Giraud's suggested "Accord de Principe" of October 27 (which I did not initial) were forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief, European Theater,<sup>27</sup> via our Naval Attaché at Tangier.<sup>28</sup> Copies were also supplied to General Mark W. Clark at the time of his visit to Algeria on October 22, 1942.<sup>29</sup>

The Department is informed that these negotiations were conducted under the authorization contained in the President's Directive of September 22, 1942.<sup>30</sup>

Respectfully yours,

ROBERT D. MURPHY  
Chief Civil Administrator

Enclosures: <sup>31</sup>

- 1—Letter to General Giraud, dated November 2, 1942.
- 2—Letter to General Giraud dated November 2, 1942.
- 3—Letter to General Giraud dated November 2, 1942.
- 4—Letter to Robert D. Murphy dated October 27, 1942.
- 5—Letter to Robert D. Murphy dated October 28, 1942.
- 6—Letter to Robert D. Murphy dated October 28, 1942.
- 7—Letter to Robert D. Murphy dated November 1, 1942.
- 8—Letter to General Giraud dated November 2, 1942.
- 9—Copy of "Accord de Principe"
- 10—Annexe I to "Accord de Principe"
- 11—Annexe II to "Accord de Principe"
- 12—Annexe III to "Accord de Principe"

Translations attached to each enclosure.<sup>32</sup>

[Enclosure 1—Translation]

*The Personal Representative of President Roosevelt (Murphy) to  
General Henri Giraud*

NOVEMBER 2, 1942.

THE GENERAL: To reply to various questions which have been put to me in your name, I have the honor to advise you that:

<sup>27</sup> Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower.

<sup>28</sup> Lt. Col. William A. Eddy.

<sup>29</sup> On October 22, 1942, General Clark made a secret visit to Algeria, landing near Cherchel where he had conferences with members of the North African resistance. As a result of this meeting, a letter written by Mr. Murphy to General Giraud (see enclosure 4) was modified (see enclosure 3). Further information may be found in the following volumes: "Crusoe" [Jacques Lemaigre-Dubreuil], *Vicissitudes d'une victoire* (Paris, Les éditions de l'âme française, 1946), and Albert Kammerer, *Du débarquement africain au meurtre de Darlan* (Paris, Flammarion, 1949).

<sup>30</sup> In an unnumbered instruction, April 17, 1943, not printed, the Secretary of State requested a copy of the President's directive. This directive is printed on p. 379.

<sup>31</sup> The enclosures are printed in same order as listed here. General Henri Giraud, in his memoirs, *Un seul but, la victoire: Alger, 1942-1944* (Paris, Julliard, 1949), prints enclosure 3 as the first letter, enclosure 1 as the second letter, and enclosure 2 as the third letter, which order is followed in French volumes.

<sup>32</sup> All translations printed from this despatch were translated by Ridgeway Knight, Vice Consul at Algiers.

(1) The American Government will extend the benefits of the Lend-Lease Act <sup>33</sup> to the orders which will be transmitted to the United States in order to give the French Army the means of participating in the common struggle.

(2) The American Government will facilitate the negotiation and execution of these orders.

(3) The American Government will likewise expedite orders in the United States for, and the rapid delivery of, the necessary food-stuffs for the civilian population in those French territories which will be free themselves, or will be freed from the domination of the Axis.

(4) Adequate measures are already being taken to lay by, in anticipation of these deliveries, a quantity of commodities of which there is an especially urgent need, not only to relieve the populations, but also to assure a better functioning of the means of transportation, and to aid in the resumption of local production.

(5) Insofar as French North Africa is concerned, the list of these first "needs" which the Government of the United States agrees to satisfy as soon as possible, as soon as the break is made between these territories and the Armistice Commissions, appear on the attached enclosure which is in no wise all-inclusive.

(6) To hasten the arrival of these commodities the Government of the United States expects, however, that the French merchant ships in French North African ports will, at the proper time aid in such transporting.

(7) These deliveries of merchandise will be considered as official French purchases and invoiced at world-wide rates. For the acceptance and invoicing of these commodities, reference will be made in principle to the rules now followed in the application of the Franco-American Agreement of 1941 for the provisioning of North Africa.

(8) Payment will be made in kind. Credits corresponding to the amount of the deliveries will be opened in North Africa for the account of the American Government. These credits will be utilized either for the needs of the Treasury of the United States for its eventual military expenditures and its quartermaster purchases in French Africa, or for the payment of exports from North Africa to the United States.

(9) In case it becomes evident that American expenditures and purchases in Africa will not cover these deliveries for civilian needs, the question of the means of payment to be employed will be re-examined by mutual agreement.

(10) The American Government undertakes to facilitate insofar as it is possible to do so, the disposal of North African products which,

<sup>33</sup> Lend-Lease Act approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 81.

as a result of circumstances, are deprived of their normal outlets. As soon as military collaboration is accomplished, conversations will ensue to study the conditions under which these goods could be distributed, the list of which will be supplied by the French authorities.

(11) Being firmly resolved to do everything compatible with the conduct of the war, to avoid aggravating the suffering of the population of Metropolitan France, already so sorely tried, the Government of the United States will not raise any objections to measures of assistance which the French people, freed from the domination of the Axis, may desire to take to aid other populations of the French nation. The practice of sending "family" packages, for relief of Metropolitan cities adopted by African cities, Red Cross gifts, etc., should be in its opinion, continued between North Africa and Metropolitan France, subject to the restriction that the necessary safeguards be taken to insure that these parcels may not be diverted from their destination.

R[OBERT] D. M[URPHY]

[Enclosure 2—Translation]

*The Personal Representative of President Roosevelt (Murphy) to  
General Henri Giraud*

NOVEMBER 2, 1942.

THE GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of October 28, as follows:

"I consider it of the greatest importance that in case of combined military operations in French territories (either in Metropolitan France or overseas) which are not occupied under the terms of the Armistice Conventions by the Axis Powers, that the Expeditionary Corps of the United Nations which would come to collaborate with the local French troops should be an essentially American expedition placed under American command.

There should be no participation of dissident French elements.

It is only later, and after an understanding between the local French and American authorities that, in case of need, non-American Allied, or dissident French formations may be sent into these French territories."

[Here follows last paragraph of French text omitted from the enclosed translation:

I am glad to assure you that your point of view is perfectly in harmony with the point of view of my government.]

R[OBERT] D. M[URPHY]

[Enclosure 3—Translation]

*The Personal Representative of President Roosevelt (Murphy) to  
General Henri Giraud*

NOVEMBER 2, 1942.

THE GENERAL: Referring to the declaration made on several occasions by President Roosevelt, and the obligations already undertaken by the American Government as well as by the British Government, I am able to assure you that the restoration of France to full independence, in all the greatness and vastness which it possessed before the war in Europe as well as overseas, is one of the war aims of the United Nations.

It is thoroughly understood that French sovereignty will be re-established as soon as possible throughout all the territory, metropolitan and colonial, over which flew the French flag in 1939.

The Government of the United States considers the French nation as an ally and will treat it as such.

May I add further that in case of military operations in French territory (whether in Metropolitan France or in the Colonies) in all instances where French collaboration may be found, the American authorities will not intervene in any way in those affairs which are solely within the province of the national administration or which have to do with the exercise of French sovereignty.

Insofar as the command is concerned, the Government of the United States has no other thought or desire than to place the military command of this area in the hands of the French as soon as possible. However, during those phases of the operation comprising the debarkation, establishing the security of French North Africa, and supplying the necessary base, it is considered essential that the American command and the organization which has been set up with such effort and difficulty, especially for this operation, remain unchanged. (The above clause is a result of the recent conference between the American and French representatives. It was drawn up before the receipt of your note of October 27<sup>84</sup> reading as follows:

"It is altogether normal, and it is understood, that all the operations of debarkation will be controlled by the General Staff of the American Army.

"The Inter-allied Command will begin to function after the debarkation, that is to say, for each point of debarkation, forty-eight hours after the hour set for the beginning of the initial landing operations of the first convoy. With respect to subsequent operations, the American troops will come under the Inter-allied Command as soon as they are landed."

---

<sup>84</sup> For full text of the note of October 27 (the "Agreement in Principle"), see enclosure 9, p. 419.

I am communicating your suggestion to the General Staff of the American Army and I am certain that an agreeable solution will be found.) During this period, the Government of the United States will make every effort to supply the French forces with modern arms and equipment. While the equipping and organizing of the French Army will thus be accomplished, the details concerning the command can be completed so that the French will be in a position to take over the Supreme Command at the proper time.<sup>55</sup> It would be desirable, in order to facilitate the direction of the operations, to have a General of the French Army attached as Deputy to the Commander-in-Chief immediately after the debarkation.

R[OBERT] D. M[URPHY]

[Enclosure 4—Translation]

*General Henri Giraud to the Personal Representative of President Roosevelt (Murphy)*

OCTOBER 27, 1942.

MR. COUNSELOR OF EMBASSY: You have been good enough to write me as of today's date, the following letter:

"Referring to the declarations made on several occasions by President Roosevelt, and the obligations already undertaken by the American Government as well as by the British Government, I am able to assure you that the restoration of France to full independence, in all the greatness and vastness which it possessed before the war in Europe as well as overseas, is one of the war aims of the United Nations.

"It is thoroughly understood that French sovereignty will be re-established as soon as possible throughout all the territory, metropolitan and colonial, over which flew the French flag in 1939.

"The Government of the United States considers the French nation as an ally and will treat it as such.

"May I add further that in case of military operations in French territory (whether in Metropolitan France or in the Colonies) in all instances where French collaboration may be found, the American authorities will not intervene in any way in those affairs which are solely within the province of the national administration or which have to do with the exercise of French sovereignty.

"The Government of the United States is ready to aid, with abundant supplies of all the necessary materials, the rapid rebirth of a French army under French command."

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of this communication of which I have taken due note.

H[ENRI] G[IRAUD]

---

<sup>55</sup> See George F. Howe, *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West*, p. 82, footnote 61).



[Enclosure 5—Translation]

*General Henri Giraud to the Personal Representative of President Roosevelt (Murphy)*

OCTOBER 28, 1942.

MR. COUNSELOR:

[Here follows the quoted text of Enclosure 2, page 415.]

H[ENRI] G[IRAUD]

[Enclosure 6—Translation]

*General Henri Giraud to the Personal Representative of President Roosevelt (Murphy)*

OCTOBER 28, 1942.

MR. COUNSELOR OF EMBASSY: You have been good enough to write me, as of today's date, the following letter.

[Here follows the text of Enclosure 1, page 413.]

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of this communication, of which I take due note.

H[ENRI] G[IRAUD]

[Enclosure 7—Translation]

*General Henri Giraud to the Personal Representative of President Roosevelt (Murphy)*

NOVEMBER 1, 1942.

MR. COUNSELOR: I thank you for your confidence. You will not be disappointed.

I am certain that the armies of America and France, acting in close conjunction, will insure ultimate victory. You will have been one of the good artisans.

Please accept [etc.]

H[ENRI] GIRAUD

[Enclosure 8—Translation]

*The Personal Representative of President Roosevelt (Murphy) to General Henri Giraud*

NOVEMBER 2, 1942.

THE GENERAL: I am very grateful for your letter of November 1 and I am in entire accord, as is President Roosevelt, with your feeling that the French and American Armies, operating in close conjunction, will assure final victory.

The thoroughly unsatisfactory means of communication at our disposition have unfortunately hindered a more satisfactory correspondence between us. I hope that they will soon be remedied. We could accomplish so many things more quickly with a better liaison.

I may add that upon my departure from Washington, the President of the United States instructed me to convey his regards and good wishes for the success of our collaboration.

I beg you to accept [etc.]

R[OBERT] D. M[URPHY]

[Enclosure 9—Translation]

*General Henri Giraud to the Personal Representative of President Roosevelt (Murphy)*<sup>\*\*</sup>

#### AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE

The projected operation presents the greatest chances for success from the strategical point of view.

It calls for considerable effort which will not be easily renewed. It is, therefore, necessary to insure every chance of success and to eliminate as much risk as possible.

The more rapid the progress of the operation, the more complete will be its success.

A landing is always a difficult operation. It is of utmost importance to make sure that throughout the duration of the operation there will be no resistance either on sea, land, or in the air. Only the people on the spot can indicate the moment of maximum security.

It would be extremely desirable for the French fleet in particular not only to refrain from hindering the operation, but to regard it favorably. A similar hypothesis would have been impossible to envisage a few months ago. An evolution of opinion is now going on which can make it possible within a period of time difficult to specify, but perhaps not too far distant.

On land, bloodshed must be avoided at all costs between troops destined later to labor for the common cause. There also a favorable spirit is developing. *It would be heartbreaking to jeopardize it by an untimely haste.*

The reasons given for an immediate attack have much value. However, they are not all equal. It is necessary, above all, to forestall any enemy initiative. Intelligence work well done and completely objective in France, in Italy, in Tripolitania and in Spain, will keep the Allied General Staff fully advised of the possibilities

---

<sup>\*\*</sup> The French text is published in General Giraud's memoirs, *Un seul but, la victoire*, pp. 342-345.

of the adversary. The strategic stake is so important that political motives must remain secondary.

The means have been fully calculated and should suffice. It will necessitate an enormous tonnage which is supposed to exist, but which will inevitably suffer a certain percentage of loss. If one concedes the normal ratio of five tons as the minimum required to transport one man, it means that for the force envisaged, the General Staff must be assured of a minimum total of twenty-five million tons before launching the operations.

The protective cover, naval and aerial, appears to be sufficient. It can not, however, pretend to prevent all submarine or aerial torpedo attack. The less time the transports lie abreast of the coast of French North Africa, the better.

It is quite normal and it is understood, that all the landing operations will be regulated by the General Staff of the American Army.

The Inter-allied Command will begin to function after the landing, that is to say, for each point of debarkation, forty-eight hours after the hour set for the beginning of the initial landing operations of the first convoy. With respect to subsequent operations, the American troops will come under the Inter-allied Command as soon as they are landed.<sup>37</sup>

Fundamentally, the operation must aim at the total occupation of French North Africa, first to forestall any German-Italian reaction, then to prepare the march toward the East and liquidate the question of Tripolitania.

But the importance of this tremendous effort does not end there. It must afford the American army a chance to get a footing on the European Continent. It is therein that, in the final analysis, lies the real strategic stake of the operation. It is *vital* for the American Army.

That part of the European Continent not yet subjected to Axis occupation, that is to say, the Iberian Peninsula and the French Mediterranean Coast, must engage our attention. The French seacoast between Port-Vendres and Toulon, if one assumes that Nice will fall immediately into the hands of the Italians, seems at present to offer the maximum chances of success. On the other hand, the security of the operations envisaged in French North Africa requires that Axis troops be prevented, as long as possible, from using the ports and the flying fields of the French Coast. The maintenance of a bridge-head on the Mediterranean Coast could be achieved by the Metropolitan French forces, on condition that they be assured of American support both of matériel and personnel.

---

<sup>37</sup> Both this paragraph and the one preceding, with minor changes of translation, were incorporated in the letter of November 2, 1942, from Mr. Murphy to General Giraud, enclosure 3, p. 416.

It is quite logical that the American General Staff should not wish to divert a part of the forces coming from America for this operation, but it should be relatively easy to accomplish this with units stationed in Ireland and transported by plane to the Coast, while the matériel previously stored at Gibraltar would be brought at the first signal into the designated ports. This means, besides the armament proper of the American forces, anti-tank and anti-aircraft matériel, pursuit planes, fuel and munitions, totalling some 40,000 tons not counting the fuel. If one admits that it requires 100,000 tons of supplies of all kinds for the American troops arriving by air, it is evident that the maritime tonnage to be reserved at Gibraltar is insignificant compared with the total.

This question is closely related to that of the landing in Africa, for it is certain that this debarkation will immediately bring about the occupation by the Germans of that part of France still free. She may resist, and will, if she is sure of immediate American support. This support is possible if it is foreseen and preparations made therefor. It is necessary in order that the Franco-American union may be complete and fruitful.

Regarding aviation, the total contribution of 2,000 planes seems insufficient. There should be an ample supply of pursuit planes in particular. It is necessary to earmark at least 250 planes for the defense of the Metropolitan bridge-head. As to transport planes, first based in Ireland, it is understood that they will be available for the African operation as soon as they have disembarked their passengers on the Mediterranean Coast.

Two other points still remain to be clarified, both from the diplomatic as well as the military point of view, that is the attitude of Spain on the one hand, and of Italy on the other.

It would be of the greatest importance to have Spain on our side. In any case it is hazardous to plunge into an operation in winter in Spanish Morocco. There is the risk of losing men, matériel, and above all, time. It is expedient in this connection to remain on the defensive, strongly fortifying the border with mines and anti-tank cannons so as to bring to bear the full force of the effort as soon as possible against Tunisia, particularly on Bizerte and Cape Bon. On the other hand, the entrance of the Germans into Spain (in a race to the free continent) might justify an operation into Spanish Morocco.

As to Italy, it will be necessary to persuade her that her best interest lies in remaining quiet, lacking a subsequent adhesion not to be eliminated, in the face of a specifically German-American struggle.

The evolution of the situation in Egypt and the losses sustained in Russia are sufficient reasons for Italy to be unwilling to play Germany's game in this adventure.

To sum up, the Inter-allied Commander-in-Chief in North Africa accepts the propositions of the American General Staff for the debarkation in Algeria and Morocco, provided that he himself set the date for the landing, following American advices that preparations are completed.

He desires that this African operation coincide with the landing on the French Coasts of the Mediterranean of American personnel coming from Ireland—50,000 men in principle—and of matériel coming from Gibraltar,—140,000 tons in principle—upon radioed request from the French command.

At the same time British attacks on the Atlantic Coast, in the English Channel and the North Sea, Russian attacks on the Eastern Front and an attack on Rommel's Army should bring about the dispersal of the enemy's reserves, and prevent in particular concentrations of planes and Panzer Divisions both in the Mediterranean and in Unoccupied France.

All these efforts taking place simultaneously will guarantee success.

OCTOBER 27, 1942.

H[ENRI] G[IRAUD]

[Enclosure 10]

#### ANNEX I

[Here follows an Intelligence Plan to detect efforts of the enemy in French North Africa and in the Free Zone. The preface statement, "Plan d'opérations du Général Giraud pour une tête de pont française sur la côte méditerranéenne (27 octobre 1942)," was not included in this despatch. It is published in General Giraud's memoirs, *Un seul but, la victoire: Alger, 1942-1944*, with Annex I, on pages 336-339.]

[Enclosure 11]

#### ANNEX II

[Here follows the text of "Material Required—1st Urgency to be stocked at Gibraltar and to be transported upon request." This annex is published in General Giraud's memoirs, *Un seul but, la victoire: Alger, 1942-1944*, p. 340.]

[Enclosure 12]

#### ANNEX III

[Here follows the text of "Material—2nd Urgency to be transported between D-2 and D-10." This annex is published in General Giraud's memoirs, *Un seul but, la victoire: Alger, 1942-1944*, p. 341.]

740.0011 (E. W.)/11-742: Telegram

*Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*<sup>39</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] November 2, 1942.

No. M-28. This message for Murphy. Reference your 749 Personal for Leahy.<sup>40</sup> It is utterly impossible to arrange for delay of operation to which we are already committed. Therefore the decision of the President is that the operation will be carried out as now planned and that you will do your utmost to secure the understanding and cooperation of the French officials with whom you are now in contact. You should explain to Flagpole that the extreme hazards involved in any leakage of our plans makes it impossible to give notice far in advance of the movement, even though we were assured of full French cooperation. Point out to Flagpole that a premature disclosure, which is an inevitable possibility where so many people are involved, would jeopardize not only our plans but their hopes. Furthermore, TORCH represents the only hope in the predictable future for the redemption of France and it involves a tremendous naval, shipping, air, and troop concentration. It cannot be delayed. It must be executed. Therefore there can be no change in the plan as recommended by you.

You will not divulge the date or location of landings to anybody until Eisenhower authorizes you to do so.

[LEAHY]

---

740.0011 (E. W.)/11-742: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the War Department*<sup>39</sup>

[ALGIERS, undated.]

[Received November 3, 1942—5 p. m.]

No. 752. [From Murphy.] Your Mike 26, 1st [31st] Flagpole and Kingpin advised. Kingpin has already sent word that in event of TORCH we should do everything to placate Spaniards in order to avoid winter campaign in Riff thus losing time in march to Tunisia. Kingpin would even favor offering territorial concession up to River Ouergha but not as far as Sebââ. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

<sup>39</sup> Copy supplied by the Office of the Secretary of Defense under cover of letter of September 7, 1960.

<sup>40</sup> October 31, p. 409.

740.0011 (E. W.)/11-742: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the War Department*<sup>41</sup>

ALGIERS, November 4, 1942.

[Received November 4.]

No. 35. [From Murphy.] Your M-28 message conveyed to Flagpole who states that he will cooperate. Flagpole states that he is prepared to operate in one of two ways. 1. He will seize command in Algiers—his superiors are Juin and Koeltz—. In that case he would require 4 days notice before TORCH to make preparations. 2. If we are unwilling to give 4 days notice he will be unable to seize command. In that case we must be willing to risk combat resulting from orders given by General Juin but Flagpole will facilitate our entry to the best of his ability. In any case he asks that our forces debark at as many points in the Algiers and Oran Districts simultaneously as may be possible for [*sic*] particularly in the region of Sidi-Ferruch. Flagpole suggests that he prefers number 2 because of element of surprise. Thus far no alarm here.

We hope that our messenger will return from Marseille today with decision of Kingpin. Flagpole believes Kingpin will decide to come on November 5 and inquired whether submarine would be at place described in my 577 Nov 2, 5 p. m.<sup>42</sup> [Murphy.]

COLE

740.0011 (E.W.)/11-742 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the War Department*<sup>41</sup>

[ALGIERS, November 4, 1942.]

[Received November 5—4 p. m.]

No. 757. [From Murphy.] Your M-20, 27th, paragraph 3. In view of message received this morning from Kingpin regarding his decision to proceed North Africa I am informing Flagpole this afternoon on assault date and name of commander-in-chief. To avoid error please confirm assault date. [Murphy.]

COLE

<sup>41</sup> Copy supplied by the Office of the Secretary of Defense under cover of letter of September 7, 1960.

<sup>42</sup> Not printed.

740.0011 (E.W.)/11-742 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the War Department*<sup>43</sup>

[ALGIERS, undated.]

[Received November 5, 1942—noon.]

No. 755. From Murphy. General Juin Commander in French Africa asked me to call last evening. He said that he felt we should remain in closer liaison and has designated two officers of his staff for that purpose. The gist of his conversation was that he has orders to defend French Africa against all comers but that he hopes the provocation will come from the Germans. In that case he would ask our aid. But we should not make the mistake of attacking because he would be obliged to give orders to oppose our forces. I pointed out that this did not seem logical since Germany occupies most of France but that in any event if we ever came here in force we would naturally expect a French invitation. Juin said he had talked with Admiral Darlan regarding eventual American assistance. Darlan admitted his statement to Admiral Leahy in 1941 regarding his desire that the United States talk to him when able to provide large scale assistance but he would not commit himself further at this time.

This morning Colonel Chrétien, Chief of Juin's G-2, called on me to confirm his superior's conversation and to state that they would be glad to receive a competent high ranking army officer for technical discussions regarding eventual Franco-American military cooperation. I told him that I would be glad to convey the message.

Both General Juin and Colonel Chrétien expressed misgivings regarding Axis plans for this area but said that they did not look for immediate intervention. They also indicated no immediate anxiety regarding our plans. [Murphy.]

COLE

740.0011 (E. W.)/11-742 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the War Department*<sup>43</sup>

[ALGIERS, undated.]

[Received November 5, 1942—8 p. m.]

No. 768. From Murphy. For Leahy. Admiral Darlan arrived Algiers in greatest secrecy by plane today. His son is in dying condition with no hope of recovery. Darlan's presence here on D-day might be embarrassing but it is believed he will depart before then. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

<sup>43</sup> Copy supplied by the Office of the Secretary of Defense under cover of letter of September 7, 1960.



740.0011 (E. W.)/11-742: Telegram

*Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)* \*\*

[WASHINGTON,] November 5, 1942.

No. M-36. For Murphy from Handy. Inform Flagpole that his decision as to which of two methods to use outlined in your No. 35 November 4 must be governed by his judgement. He must advise us at once so that we can inform Eisenhower as to what to expect. Eisenhower is prepared for any eventuality, but desires earnestly to avoid combat with French forces or any part thereof.

Inform Flagpole that arrangements are made to meet Kingpin night of 5/6 November at 11 p. m. Kingpin is being notified by Eisenhower. [Handy.]

[LEAHY]

---

851R.20/48

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1813

ALGIERS, November 6, 1942.

[Received December 10.]

SIR: I have the honor to report as follows on the visit of the Minister of National Defense Admiral Darlan to Algeria.

The Admiral had been unofficially at Algiers for some days even before leaving for Dakar. He came in advance of his schedule to be with his son who is inspector here for an insurance company and fell seriously ill with infantile paralysis. He arrived at Dakar on October 21, 1942, and on October 27 returned to Oran where he reviewed the troops in the morning and in the afternoon paid the customary visit to Mers-el-Kebir. On landing at the airport of Oran he was met by the Governor General of Algeria, M. Yves C. Chatel. General Juin, Commander in Chief of the Army in North Africa accompanied him throughout his tour. After the ceremony at Mers-el-Kebir the Admiral gave an address to the Officers of the armed forces, almost certainly in the same terms as the addresses which he gave at Algiers later.

At 10.00 A. M. on October 28, 1942, Admiral Darlan landed at Algiers airport from his private plane, a Glenn Martin, and after the usual official greetings went at once to the residence of General Juin, his headquarters during his official stay. He lunched at the Summer Palace with the Governor General and afterwards went to

---

\*\* Copy supplied by the Office of the Secretary of Defense under cover of letter of September 7, 1960.

the Winter Palace where he received first the Commanding Officers of the armed forces in Tunisia and the Department of Constantine and afterwards the officers of the armed forces who happened to be at Algiers. According to the Press Report Admiral Darlan said:

"The Army of Africa has the task of defending this Empire and must be ready to fulfil it at any moment."

Then the Admiral asked the officers to help him to restore the Army to the place it should have within the Nation and continued:

"You must always bear in mind that your action serves as an example and that it consists in discipline and a devotion of body and soul. Thus you will be the unflinching supporters of the Marshal <sup>45</sup> in his desire to reconstruct the nation."

On October 29 the Admiral held a review of the troops in the morning and in the afternoon inspected the coastal defenses. After the review it was noticed that he left as soon as possible for the military hospital where his son was undergoing treatment. Early on the morning of October 30 he left by airplane for Vichy where he arrived at 8.30 A. M. His early departure was the cause of much speculation but so far as can be learned here had no other motive than to arrange the transfer of his son to Paris for special treatment at the Pasteur Institute.

According to the press his reception was very enthusiastic. The *Dépêche Algérienne* says: "All along the streets a great crowd gave a warm reception to the Admiral and the inhabitants displayed their enthusiasm by repeated and sustained cheers."

Such is, apart from the necessary interpolations, the official account of the visits, but for the information of the Department there are certain omissions and corrections to be added.

The first unofficial arrival of the Admiral at Algiers was made on the airplane which brought the German General Van Vogt <sup>46</sup> President of the Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden on an inspection trip of his own and was surrounded by the greatest secrecy. The various officials in the secret assembled at the airport at 4 P. M. and only after two false alarms did the high officials finally arrive at 10 P. M. The German General is said to have arrived to compose serious differences between the German and the Italian members of the Armistice Commission.

Lately the Italians have become much more aggressive in their demands because Algiers itself is recognised as a sphere of Italian domination and because they claim overriding privileges with regard to requisitioning based on the fact that their troops in North Africa outnumber the Germans many times. Among the claims

---

<sup>45</sup> Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, French Chief of State.

<sup>46</sup> Gen. Oskar Vogt.

put in are those for several large ships now anchored for refuge in Algiers harbor, French coastal vessels which have already been taken over, 30,000 tons of wheat, and last but not least, the whole of the crop of oats estimated at 160,000 tons, excepting the needs for next years' sowing. At this point the Germans intervened with the result that the whole of the crop of oats has been blocked pending a decision. It may be imagined therefore that the Wiesbaden President and the Admiral had need of a conversation, but the revelation that they had traveled in company had a disastrous effect on that section of the population which learnt of it and which was precisely that which might have been amenable to the Admiral's oratory.

It was a disastrous beginning and added to the cold reception which was given to the Admiral on his public appearances. Even the Press which on this occasion and in these times habitually prates of the huge crowds delirious with enthusiasm, had to tune down its description. In reality, as the result of actual observation it was far worse. The review ground was well filled by persons who had come to see the troops and applauded them, but for the Admiral himself there was no applause apart from that of school children carefully massed in front and the scattered *vivats* of a few men clearly stationed there for the purpose but who failed to elicit any response.

The address to the officers based on the theme: "It was the Nation, not the Army which was beaten in 1940" was obviously meant to raise the self-respect of the Army and to give it confidence and the will to resist any aggression. It was particularly remarked that there was no direct mention or even an insinuation against either Great Britain or the United States. Those present got the idea that the Admiral had evolved [*evolved?*] considerably from his former standpoint. Some even drew the conclusion that the Admiral was now anti-German.

The address to certain Algerian notables and magnates of local industry was different. They were convened by special and individual invitation. Addressing them, the Admiral said that he came as the messenger of Marshal Pétain that he had adjured them to resist to the last any attempt at Anglo-American aggression which would be an attempt at conquest and not liberation, as they might suppose. The notables, not being bound by military discipline, inquired as to the means of resistance and how the defense of Algeria could be made with the help of a single division, admittedly highly trained, but possessing only 30 machine guns. France should provide the equipment. The Admiral stuck to and labored his point, but was forced to admit that the means were deficient, that France could give nothing, and that the Germans although warned to the

consequences, had flatly refused to supply anything. Their answer was that it was not their business, it was up to France to solve the difficulty.

A similar response was made by General Juin who was taken to task concerning the inadequacy of the coastal defences. The General declared that he had a long coastline to defend and that apart from a shortage of arms and ammunition he could not expend in advance the few rolls of barbed wire which were all he had in stock.

The visit of the Admiral has stimulated the zeal of the militarist section of the Legion of Combattants or rather of the P.S.F. section (La Rocque)<sup>47</sup> which is opposed to the P.P.F. or Doriot<sup>48</sup> factions. But 70 percent of the membership is compulsory and the compulsory adherents are its most bitter enemies. Otherwise the visit must be written down a failure for the sufficient reason that the Admiral despite a carefully maintained photogenic smile, utterly fails to influence the masses. Weygand had prestige, the Admiral none at all.

Respectfully yours,

FELIX COLE

#### VI. Invasion and Occupation of French North Africa (November–December)

[See also George F. Howe, *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West*, in the series *United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1957).

Upon the opening of American military operations in French North Africa, President Roosevelt sent messages to officials of France, Portugal, Spain, Algeria, and Tunisia. For White House press releases of November 8, 1942, giving texts of these messages and replies, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 14, 1942, pages 904–908. For White House releases of November 23 and 25 giving text of message to the Sultan of Morocco and reply, see *ibid.*, page 961.]

---

740.0011 European War 1939/25297a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Tuck)*

WASHINGTON, November 7, 1942—11 p. m.

685. Personal for the Chargé d'Affaires. Report to the Department immediately upon delivery to Marshal Pétain<sup>49</sup> of the un-

---

<sup>47</sup> François La Rocque, French politician, leader of the Parti Social Français.

<sup>48</sup> Jacques Doriot, French politician, leader of the Parti Populaire Français.

<sup>49</sup> Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, French Chief of State.

enciphered message<sup>50</sup> which you have received for him from the President.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/25296 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, November 8, 1942.

[Received November 8—6:35 a. m.]

1646. Your 685, November 7, 11 p. m. The unenciphered message, received 7:20 a. m. from the President was delivered by me to Marshal Pétain at 9:10 a. m. this morning.

I am cabling a translation of M. Pétain's reply immediately.

TUCK

740 0011 European War 1939/25312 : Telegram

*The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State*

TANGIER, November 8, 1942—6 a. m.

[Received 6:45 a. m.]

559. News of American landings in French North Africa was received in Tangier in the early hours of the morning. Up until this hour the situation is entirely normal with no more than normal circulation on the streets.

Telegraph communications continue uninterruptedly, a telegram having been received from the Legation in Lisbon at 4:33 a. m.

Repeated to Madrid.

CHILDS

740 0011 European War 1939/25319 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, November 8, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received November 8—8:04 a. m.]

1648. Reference your [our] *en clair* message 1647, 8th.<sup>51</sup> The Marshal received me at 9:10 this morning. Jardel and Dr. Menetrel both members of his entourage were present. I handed the Marshal the text of the President's unenciphered message which he already had in translation before him on his desk. He read the French translation of the message which I had prepared and then signed

<sup>50</sup> Department of State *Bulletin*, November 14, 1942, p. 904.

<sup>51</sup> Not printed.

and handed me his already prepared reply to the President of the United States of which the following is a close translation:

"Vichy, November 8, 1942.

Message from Marshal Pétain to President Roosevelt.

It is with stupor and grief that I learned during the night of the aggression of your troops against North Africa.

I have read your message. You invoke pretexts which nothing justifies. You attribute to your enemies intentions which have never been manifested in acts. I have always declared that we would defend our Empire if it were attacked; you knew that we would defend it against any aggressor whoever he might be. You knew that I would keep my word.

In our misfortune I had when requesting the Armistice protected our Empire and it is you who acting in the name of a country to which so many memories and ties bind us have taken such a cruel initiative.

France and her honor are at stake.

We are attacked.

We shall defend ourselves. This is the order I am giving.

Philippe Pétain."

The Marshal said that he had told Admiral Leahy<sup>52</sup> that France would resist any attack on her Empire by whomsoever and that there was no other course of action left open to him than to order measures of defense. He then showed me the text of the order which he had sent early this morning to the chief military authorities in Morocco, Algeria, Tunis and Dakar. The text of the messages to the first three places mentioned reads in translation as follows:

"Am sending you under the following number the telegram from the Marshal, Chief of State, to President Roosevelt.

Your duty is clear. The Government counts on you. You should quell any tentatives of dissidence which have taken place or which may take place."

A translation of the text of the message to Governor Boisson<sup>53</sup> at Dakar is as follows:

"Am sending you under the following number the telegram from the Marshal, Chief of State, to President Roosevelt.

The attack on North Africa has taken place. Be ready for all emergencies. The Marshal and the Government count on you."

I informed the Marshal that I would immediately transmit the text of his reply to my Government.

---

<sup>52</sup> Adm. William D. Leahy, former Ambassador in France; at this time Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

<sup>53</sup> Pierre Boisson, High Commissioner in French West Africa.

As I rose to take my leave he took both my hands in his looking at me steadfastly and smiling. He accompanied me to the ante-chamber and turned briskly back to his office humming a little tune.

TUCK

740.0011 European War 1939/25308 : Telegram

*The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State*

TANGIER, November 9, 1942.

[Received November 9—8:17 a. m.]

566. Following are texts of messages exchanged between Laval<sup>54</sup> and Noguès<sup>55</sup> according to press.

Laval to Noguès:

"I send you herewith a telegram that the Marshal has just sent President Roosevelt. Your duty is clear and the Government counts on you. You should repress energetically all dissident tendencies which have appeared or may appear."

Noguès is quoted as having replied:

"I reply to your telegram.

Thanks to the loyalism of most of the troops the dissidents have been reduced without bloodshed after several difficult hours.

I ask you to tell the Marshal that he may count on us. The struggle may be expected to be severe but all French as well as Moroccans will make without distinction the necessary sacrifices for the future unity of the Government."

*Espana* announces Sultan of Morocco<sup>56</sup> has addressed a proclamation to the Moroccan public inviting them to cooperate with the French authorities in the operations to repel the American aggression against certain of the Imperial ports.

CHILDS

125.1333/326 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, November 9, 1942.

[Received December 5—7:41 a. m.]

3. Entire staff of Consulate General at Algiers safe and well. Individual inquiries indicate all American residents of whom Consulate General has record also safe and well.

COLE

<sup>54</sup> Pierre Laval, French Chief of Government.

<sup>55</sup> Albert Noguès, Resident General in the French Zone of Morocco.

<sup>56</sup> Mohammed Ben Youssef.

851R.50/27

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the  
Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Villard)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 10, 1942.

Participants: General Hull,<sup>57</sup> Operations Division, War Department  
Mr. Murray, PA/M<sup>58</sup>  
Mr. Villard  
Mr. Jernegan<sup>59</sup>

Mr. Murray raised the question of the future of the program of economic assistance to North Africa, now that military operations had developed in that area. He suggested that the problem was now largely of a military nature and that the War Department would probably find itself faced with the task of supplying the needs of the civilian population in the North African territories as soon as military operations ceased. Mr. Murray said that the State Department had a wealth of background, accumulated over the past two years, regarding the economic requirements of the North African area, which could be made available to the War Department if desired.

General Hull agreed that the matter was one which required the most careful attention of the War Department. He indicated that the problem would involve a study of the civilian needs in relation to the military supplies which must be transported to our forces in North Africa. General Hull said that all of these supplies, of whatever nature, would have to be convoyed to North Africa and that in view of the great demands placed upon the Navy, the type of supplies which would be sent to the area would have to be subjected to the closest scrutiny. General Hull said that he would be glad to make the necessary arrangements for the proper officers in the War Department to consult the State Department on this matter.

General Hull was fully familiar with the program of economic assistance which had been carried on in the past and with the status of the two French vessels which have been in New Orleans since August attempting to load supplies for North Africa. He was aware of the difficulties and delays which had been encountered in obtaining export licenses and which had resulted in the failure of the vessels to clear for North Africa before the commencement of military operations. General Hull stated that it was a great pity these ships could not have reached Casablanca a week or two ago, since their arrival with goods and propaganda material from America would

---

<sup>57</sup> Lt. Gen. John Edwin Hull.

<sup>58</sup> Wallace Murray, Adviser on Political Relations.

<sup>59</sup> John D. Jernegan, Division of Near Eastern Affairs.



undoubtedly have had a very favorable effect. He said that if the ships had reached Casablanca in time, it was possible that they would have been an important factor in lessening the resistance encountered in Morocco to our forces and consequently in reducing the unfortunate loss of life.

---

851R.50/28

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] November 12, 1942.

MR. SECRETARY: There was a meeting this afternoon of the committee which has been working on the economic agreement with North Africa. Prior to it, Mr. Murray showed me the memorandum of conversation he had yesterday with General Hull.<sup>60</sup> General Hull had criticized the failure of the Department to get off the two French ships which were designed to be sent to Casablanca, and had said that in his view the failure of those ships to get to Casablanca might have added to the loss of life in that operation.

Murray asked me whether I would state this to the meeting today.

I thereupon at the Committee read the apposite parts of the memorandum of conversation with General Hull.

I said that in reviewing the entire operation, in the main it had been successful, at least to the extent of seventy-five per cent, but that it had failed to some extent of maximum efficiency, by reason of this delay. For that reason, I thought that it might be good for all of us to review the entire proceedings with a view to seeing whether in future the speed of operations could not be increased.

I said that unhappily the argument which would have been convincing, namely, a disclosure of the North African military plans, could not be made. The military directive for secrecy had been very stringent. Further, I was advised that in future operations the War Department proposed to limit still further the number of men to whom information of a plan might be given. Under these circumstances we all of us had to realize that in a good many cases we might be asked to do things all of whose implications we did not understand, because of the military necessities of the situation.

I then suggested that it might be well to review the procedure, and expressed the hope that in view of the criticism made we might derive some benefit from reviewing the operation to date.

---

<sup>60</sup> *Supra.*

There was some discussion afterwards, and a tendency by a Mr. Fagan, of the BEW,<sup>61</sup> to regard this as a direct criticism of BEW. I answered that so far as I could see the delays had resulted not from any one agency, but from a combination of a great many; and that since the criticism was general, I thought we all of us had to take it to heart equally, and go at it on that basis.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

---

125.0051/249a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Tangier (Childs)*

WASHINGTON, November 12, 1942—5 p. m.

222. For Murphy.<sup>62</sup> Unless you perceive some objection, in which case you should so inform the Department with your recommendations, you should instruct in my name all consular officers in North Africa to maintain contact with local officials as heretofore so far as possible under existing circumstances.

Full cooperation should, of course, be maintained with our military authorities.

HULL

---

851R 24/7

*The Lend-Lease Administrator (Stettinius) to the  
Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)*

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1942.

DEAR DEAN: Attached hereto is a proposed draft of a letter on the extension of Lend-Lease aid to the French in North Africa. I would greatly appreciate your comments on it.

After getting your comments, I would like to transmit it to the President through Mr. Hopkins.<sup>63</sup>

As you will recall, the President, in a letter to me dated November 11, 1941, stated that, "in order to enable you to arrange for Lend-Lease aid to the French Volunteer forces (Free French), by way of retransfer from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom or their allies, I hereby find that the defense of any French territory under the control of the French Volunteer forces (Free French) is vital to the defense of the United States."

---

<sup>61</sup> Board of Economic Warfare.

<sup>62</sup> Robert D. Murphy, Adviser for Civil Affairs to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Allied Supreme Commander.

<sup>63</sup> Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt.

Subsequently, under date of October 6, 1942, the President sent the following letter to me:

"In order that Lend-Lease aid to the French National Committee (now Fighting France) may be more effectively rendered, my letter to you of November 11, 1941, is hereby amended to remove the provision that such aid be arranged for 'by way of retransfer from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom or their allies', and you are hereby authorized to arrange for Lend-Lease aid directly to the authorities of the French National Committee (Fighting France)."

The proposed directive authorizing the extension of Lend-Lease aid to "any French province, colony, protectorate, mandated area or other territory" is intended to leave the whole situation fluid and flexible, so that General Eisenhower, for example, can make the distribution directly to the persons who are going to use the Lend-Lease goods, whether they be representatives of the Fighting French or not. It is, of course, conceivable that the Fighting French may have no part in the Government of some of the newly occupied North African territory for a time at least.

One of the principal questions I have is whether or not the language selected in extending Lend-Lease aid to "any French province, colony, protectorate, mandated area or other territory" is broad and flexible enough to cover all the situations that are likely to arise in French North and West Africa, as well as in other parts of the world.

Sincerely yours,

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

[Annex]

*Draft Letter From President Roosevelt to the Lend-Lease  
Administrator (Stettinius)*<sup>64</sup>

[NOVEMBER 13, 1942.]

MY DEAR MR. STETTINIUS: For purposes of implementing the authority conferred upon you as Lend-Lease Administrator by Executive Order No. 8926, dated October 28, 1941, and to enable you to render more effective Lend-Lease aid to the French people, I wish to supplement the authority conferred on you in my letters dated November 11, 1941 and October 6, 1942. Accordingly, I hereby find that the defense of any French province, colony, protectorate, mandated area or other territory, not under the control of the Axis, is vital to the defense of the United States.

---

<sup>64</sup> Marginal note indicates that the Office of Lend-Lease Administration was informed of Mr. Acheson's approval. The President accepted and used this draft in his letter to Mr. Stettinius dated November 13, 1942.

The manner in which such aid shall be rendered and recorded should be determined by you from time to time, after consultation with the Secretary of State.

Very sincerely yours,

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OSEVELT]

851R.01/12a

*The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Chief of Staff,  
United States Army (Marshall)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 13, 1942.

MY DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: The President has asked me to bring to your personal attention the proposed telegram which I am attaching herewith which, in accordance with his desire, is to be sent to Mr. Murphy in Algiers.

Will you let me know if you see any objection to this proposed message?

Believe me

Yours very sincerely,

SUMNER WELLES

[Annex]

*Draft Telegram to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 13, 1942.

For Murphy. The Department is conscious of the burden borne by the Army and Navy in the conduct of the North African campaign and that consequently information coming through as to civilian matters has so far of necessity been limited. In this connection it is needless to add the appreciation of the President and Department of the part you have played. The civilian side of the question, however, will emerge shortly and we are bringing to your attention three points which you should have in mind with a view to seeking remedial measures:

1. Any officials of the Vichy regime who may be retained in Africa should not include those to whom well founded objection might be taken.

2. You should make every effort that any elements whose sole crime consists in having aided the cause of the United Nations or of having violated a law whose purpose was to impose restrictions on aid to the United Nations should not remain in jail.

3. Those anti-Jewish measures which have been imposed as a result of Vichy's surrender to German pressure should be lifted.

740.00112 European War 1939/7250a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1942—4 p. m.

408. For Murphy. Yesterday the Department received a letter from the Combined Chiefs of Staff<sup>ss</sup> stating that about 2 weeks ago the Combined Chiefs of Staff received a proposal from the British Chiefs of Staff regarding certain economic measures to be taken in North Africa upon our occupation of that area. The letter continued that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed that General Eisenhower should be informed that he would concern himself with economic policies only to the extent that they affect his operations and that further action in this regard would be handled by the appropriate civil departments of the United States and the United Kingdom. The letter added that the Combined Chiefs of Staff further agreed to recommend to the appropriate civil Departments of the United States and the United Kingdom that in working out the economic policies to be adopted in North Africa they maintain close collaboration with one another, and requested that the Secretary of State initiate whatever action was considered appropriate in this regard.

We shall have to deal in the immediate future with various questions of economic and financial policy in respect to North Africa and we desire to have your recommendations as soon as possible. We shall also have to arrange for the effective handling of such questions as the acquisition of commodities not needed locally or by military that may be available in the occupied areas; the movement of trade between the occupied areas and the outside world, especially the neutrals; the full use and organization of information in the conduct of economic warfare.

For these purposes we would normally wish to assign a small number of qualified persons to act in North Africa under your direction. These persons would include probably a senior Foreign Service officer with experience in financial matters, one or two persons selected by the Board of Economic Warfare with our approval, one officer designated by the Treasury, and possibly a representative of Lend-Lease. All would be given the status of regular or auxiliary Foreign Service officers and would report solely through you to the Department of State.

Before proceeding further along this line, however, we desire to obtain your views. It might be well for you to confer with the appropriate American military authorities in regard to your reply, since the group while operating under your direction would in cer-

---

<sup>ss</sup> Not printed.

tain particulars be subject to the control of the military commander, although the civilian officers would not of course concern themselves with military affairs.

Will you telegraph the Department your views as soon as possible since various branches of the Government are pressing us to go forward with questions that have already arisen.

HULL

---

125.4236/53 : Telegram

*The Consul at Dakar (Flexer) to the Secretary of State*

DAKAR, November 14, 1942.

[Received November 16—9 a. m.]

477. American consular staff incommunicado on premises British Consulate General since morning November 8th. All codes, ciphers were immediately destroyed. Office under police seal.

Last communication received was Department's 117, November 2.<sup>66</sup> Yesterday afternoon authorities delivered section 2 Department's encoded triple priority circular filed 10th.<sup>67</sup> Naturally undecipherable. Please repeat full telegram *en clair* if possible and now relevant.

Present telegram sent with approval Government General.

FLEXER

---

740.0011 European War 1939/25663 : Telegram

*The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State*

TANGIER, November 14, 1942—noon.

[Received 2:26 p. m.]

617. The Legation is receiving increasing visits from influential Moors who express astonishment and regret the Sultan and the Moorish people have not been mentioned in any American communication regarding the motives for the landing of American forces in Morocco or American territorial guarantees. They assert American prestige is high in their circles but by this circumstance runs risk of diminishing. While the Legation is not prepared to suggest that a gesture be made to the Sultan direct because of the possible adverse effect thereof on the French it would appreciate knowing if this possibly has been done.

CHILDS

---

<sup>66</sup> Not printed.

<sup>67</sup> Circular telegram, November 9, 8 p. m., not printed.

125.283H6/61 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Casablanca (Russell) to the Secretary of State*

CASABLANCA, November 14, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received November 15—12:48 p. m.]

871. Telegraphic communication just reestablished. American community in French Morocco safe as far as I am aware. Consular personnel interned in the interior returned November 11 at noon and offices and effects left in charge of Swiss Consul intact. Please communicate in Brown Code or in Gray Code.

RUSSELL

125.0051/250 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, November 15, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received November 16—8:22 a. m.]

16. From Murphy. Your 160 [222], November 12, 5 p. m., via Tangier. All consular officers in North Africa are being instructed as requested to maintain appropriate contacts with local officials as heretofore. They are extending full cooperation to our military authorities.

As the Department is undoubtedly aware my designation as personal representative of the President under his directive of September 22<sup>66</sup> ceased with the arrival of our armed forces and I am now acting under the same directive as "Civil Affairs Officer of Allied Forces". [Murphy.]

COLE

851R.01/17¼

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 16, 1942.

M. Tixier<sup>69</sup> came in to see me, at his request.

He said that the French National Committee was much disturbed and worried by the press reports of what was happening in North Africa. It appeared that some sort of recognition was being given to Admiral Darlan<sup>70</sup> as the government of North Africa.

<sup>66</sup> *Ante*, p. 379.

<sup>69</sup> Adrien Tixier of the Free French Delegation.

<sup>70</sup> Adm. Jean François Darlan, Commander in Chief of all French Armed Forces. For an account of a conversation on November 14, 1942, between Free French representatives and the Secretary of State regarding this matter and the latter's conversation with President Roosevelt, see *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, vol. II, pp. 1197-1199.

They have received telegrams from their various branches, and secret messages from their resistance centers in France. After all, de Gaulle himself could not forget the fact that it was Darlan who, as Prime Minister, had had General de Gaulle tried and had condemned him to death as a traitor for supporting the Allies. Further, he had imprisoned and killed a great many of their followers. If there was anything certain in life, it was that the Free French could not strike hands with Darlan.

General de Gaulle had requested to send emissaries to North Africa to try to work out an arrangement with General Giraud.<sup>71</sup> But, as soon as Darlan had appeared on the scene, and Giraud had accepted a nomination as Governor from Admiral Darlan, they had withdrawn the request. They could not deal with Darlan without dishonoring themselves.

Tixier concluded by asking what information I could give him about the situation.

I said that the arrangements being made were directly flowing from military operations and must be considered for the time being as military dispositions. I said that since the operations are not yet concluded, all of the elements in the situation were not wholly clear; but I understood Admiral Darlan to be substantially in the position of a representative of Vichy who had authority in North Africa; that as that representative he had negotiated for the capitulation of the territories to our armies, and that our dealing with him amounted merely to a recognition of Darlan as the actual authority in control who could work out terms of capitulation, and who was looked to to see that they were carried out. I understood that that was the present situation. I said that I knew of no commitment which involved any acceptance of Darlan as a prevalent government in North Africa, and understood indeed that all of these matters could not be definitively settled until the military operations now in progress had reached a different stage. We, too, were cognizant of the difficulties inherent in the entire matter; but the Free French must likewise realize that the fighting forces in North Africa necessarily had to make military arrangements as they went along.

Tixier said he could understand that perfectly; that there was the question of the fleet, and of Tunis; and he conceded that the Free French could not have assisted in delivering anything in North Africa. But he wished to express the earnest hope that no political combination we sanctioned would include Darlan, and pointed out that Darlan's appearance on the air, speaking from American headquarters, as the government of North Africa, created the greatest

---

<sup>71</sup> Gen. Henri Honoré Giraud, Commander in Chief of the French Forces in North Africa.



confusion in Free French circles in France. These were the men who were risking their lives to help the Allies; and to find Darlan, who had been killing them wherever possible, suddenly appearing on the air, naturally gave rise to confusion.

I said that of course capitulations were now carried on by radio and thus were generally known; but that, aside from that, there was nothing at all unusual in carrying on negotiations for the surrender of a province and the transfer of its assets and authority to the conquering armies by the authorities in charge thereof.

Finally, M. Tixier asked if we could give urgent attention to obtaining the release of the many thousands of Frenchmen and persons of other nationalities who had been imprisoned in North Africa solely because they favored the Allies and had opposed the policy of collaboration.

I said that this was a very real point, and I would see whether something could not be done about it.

A. A. B[ERLE], Jr.

---

851R.01/12¼

*The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall). to the  
Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

WASHINGTON, November 16, 1942.

DEAR MR. WELLES: I consider the dispatch of the proposed telegram to Mr. Murphy in Algiers<sup>72</sup> as inadvisable at this time.

Of the remedial measures suggested the first, "Any officials of the Vichy regime who may be officially retained in Africa should not include those to whom well-founded objections might be taken", appears to be directed at Darlan, the man to whom General Eisenhower must look for immediate results in the Tunisian operation and the matter of the French fleet.

As to the second and third measures suggested, I am in thorough accord with their purpose and I am sure that General Eisenhower will take measures to alleviate the condition of the Free French and the Jews as soon as such action will not jeopardize pending military operations. However, the release of a large number of individuals who will undoubtedly constitute a disturbing element in a most difficult situation might involve the immobilization of large numbers of American troops that are desperately needed elsewhere. For this reason I do not believe that General Eisenhower or Mr. Murphy should receive such definite instructions at this time.

---

<sup>72</sup> *Ante*, p. 437.

If you concur in the foregoing, I will convey to General Eisenhower the sense of the desires of the President with a suggestion that they be accomplished as soon as General Eisenhower considers these measures practicable.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

851R.01/12¼

*The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Chief of Staff,  
United States Army (Marshall)*

WASHINGTON, November 17, 1942.

MY DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I am entirely in accord with the suggestions contained in the last paragraph of your letter to me of November 16. I shall consequently be grateful if you will convey to General Eisenhower the sense of the desires of the President and if you will be kind enough to let us know here in the Department of State when a reply is received.

Believe me

Yours very sincerely,

SUMNER WELLES

740.00112 European War 1939/7274 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, November 17, 1942.

[Received November 19—9:45 a. m.]

147. From Murphy. Study and execution of a program of economic supply for French North Africa is a matter of urgent necessity. This in reference to your No. 72 of November 15, 6 p. m. [No. 408, November 13, 4 p. m.] The mere arrival here of our Armed Forces will by itself reduce the supply of consumers' goods. A grave and immediate problem is presented by the fact that North Africa is separated from France, its principal source of supply. It is extremely necessary that the Civil Departments of the United States and the United Kingdom take immediate action if the Commander-in-Chief will concern himself with economic policies only to the extent that they affect his operations in accordance with the decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We have skeleton organization to deal with these matters. A senior Foreign Service Officer who is experienced in financial matters would be of great use. Taylor and Bernstein of the Treasury and Matters [Matthews?] <sup>73</sup> of the State Department are at present temporarily handling financial questions. It would be wise to assign a representative of Lend-Lease and no more than two persons from the Board of Economic Warfare

<sup>73</sup>H. Freeman Matthews, Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom; temporarily on detail in North Africa.

at once. More important than personnel, however, is the need of information from the Department concerning our program of economic supply. Just what material, if any, is now en route and when will it arrive? The needs of the area are well known to the Department, and it is aware that items such as gasoline, medical supplies, coal, cotton goods, foodstuffs, newsprint and wearing apparel of all kinds are the requirements needed most urgently. The Department also knows the urgent need of another long list of products as it understands that industry in this area is of small proportions depending as it does on France as its principal source of supplies. Would very much like to have as soon as possible, your comments on the foregoing. [Murphy.]

COLE

---

740 00112 European War 1939/7305a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1942—4 p. m.

417. For Murphy. There are approximately 8,000 tons of cargo available here, selected by French officials over a long period of time as high priority material for North Africa. The Department has been directed in cooperation with the Lend-Lease Administration to take responsibility for arranging an adequate flow of supplies to North Africa, and is now actively engaged in the necessary work of procurement and preparation. The general principle in supply from now on will be to meet requirements to the greatest possible extent. At our direction the Lend-Lease Administration is now purchasing the available French cargo. It consists of the following items:

Cotton piece goods, \$2,000,000; Used cloth, \$300,000; Condensed milk, \$11,000; Powdered milk, \$100,000; Matches, \$100,000; Tea, \$100,000; Nails, \$670; Copper sulphate, \$450,000; Pharmaceutical products, \$3,700; Tobacco, \$17,900; Peruvian Sugar, \$100,000; Refined sugar, \$270,000.

The War Shipping Administration has directed that the two accord ships not be used for this purpose, since they are not armed or degaussed, but that more prompt shipping arrangements be made. The cargoes presently procurable may not fill available shipping space. If any further space is available, it is proposed tentatively to supplement these items with sugar, milk, green tea, soap, medical supplies, cotton textiles, second-hand clothing, kerosene and other articles. Give us your opinion of these proposals, and send forward for the benefit of the Department and the Lend-Lease Administration such recent information as you may have or may obtain on the immediate requirements of the North African areas. If you approve

this plan, loading of the ships will go forward as fast as possible. Sailing of course will be withheld until we receive further advice as to timing and needs.

It is the intention of the Department and the Lend-Lease Administration to operate in such a way as meet General Eisenhower's needs, and we would like word as to whether existing control facilities are adequate for the job of supervising distribution of prospective supplies. In preparing to supplant Europe as the chief source of supplies for North Africa, we should establish a civilian requirements staff in North Africa, to advise the supply agencies here. What personnel resources are presently available, and how considerable a staff would be needed?

HULL

---

851R.01/123

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 18, 1942.

The British Minister, Sir Ronald Campbell, called to see me this morning at his request.

Sir Ronald handed me a copy of a message sent on November 17 by Mr. Churchill to the President and an instruction the British Ambassador here had received under the same date from the British Foreign Office, both dealing with the Darlan question. These messages are attached herewith. I told Sir Ronald that the points raised in paragraph 6 of Mr. Eden's message to the British Embassy were actively under consideration.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

[Annex 1]

*Message Sent to the President by the British Prime Minister  
on November 17, 1942*

I ought to let you know that very deep currents of feeling are stirred by the arrangement with Darlan. The more I reflect upon it the more convinced I become that it can only be a temporary expedient justifiable solely by the stress of battle. We must not overlook the serious political injury which may be done to our cause not only in France but throughout Europe by the feeling that we are ready to make terms with local Quislings. Darlan has an odious record. It is he who has inculcated in French Navy its malignant disposition by promoting his creatures to command. It is but yesterday that French sailors were sent to their death against your line of battle off Casablanca and now for the sake of power and office

Darlan plays turn-coat. A permanent arrangement with Darlan or the formation of a Darlan government in French North Africa would not be understood by the great masses of ordinary people whose simple loyalties are our strength.

2. My own feeling is that we should get on with the fighting and let that overtake the parleys, and we are all very glad to hear that General Eisenhower expects to be able to order the leading elements of our First Army to attack the Germans in Tunis and Bizerta in the course of the next few days.

[Annex 2]

*Copy of Telegram From the British Foreign Office to the  
British Embassy in Washington, Dated November 17, 1942*

You will have seen from message sent by the Prime Minister to the President today that we are becoming increasingly concerned at grave political dangers into which we are running.

2. It may well be that Darlan's collaboration is indispensable for military reasons as an interim measure. But neither we nor I feel sure that United States Government could have any confidence in him as permanent head of a North African Administration.

3. Darlan's record needs no emphasis. He is universally distrusted and despised in France and throughout occupied Europe. De Gaulle has already made plain that he cannot work with Darlan in any circumstances. I realize that de Gaulle has not the same standing in the United States as he has here but we are pledged to de Gaulle and any appearance of throwing him over in favour of Darlan would produce a strong reaction in our public opinion.

4. But more serious than this is the disturbing and disillusioning effect which any enduring arrangement with Darlan must have upon the great body of men and women in France who are our friends. In occupied countries also feeling will now grow that we shall in the last resort make terms with their Quislings also. Nor can we expect the Soviet Government to take kindly to this development and recent improvement in our relations with them so painfully achieved may receive a set-back. There is above all our own moral position. We are fighting for international decency and Darlan is the antithesis of this.

5. For these reasons it seems to me imperative that we should not commit ourselves finally to Darlan as the permanent head of an Administration in North Africa, even though it has been found expedient to make terms with him for the time being. Moreover it is our joint intention to raise a French Army in North Africa and to supply it with equipment. We could never have confidence

in a Government headed by Darlan nor know against whom any tanks provided would in fact be used.

6. We do not know the long-term plans of United States Government. But once we have established ourselves firmly in Tunisia they will presumably wish to put men who have their confidence into key positions in North Africa and this would necessarily entail elimination of Darlan. It ought to be possible to find men who though they may not have come out openly on our side in the past, are not contaminated by Vichy and have not actively cooperated with the enemy. Noguès himself might fall into this category. Men like Giraud, Béthouart and Mast (the last two of whom are apparently still in prison) would of course be retained or placed in high command. Such an Administration would undertake actively to participate in the war with us against the Axis. It would be better perhaps not to call it a Government but to preserve some such title as "Provisional Administration".

7. If this course were followed we should hope that all resisting Frenchmen including those who have joined the Fighting French could be united.

8. We should be grateful if you would speak in this sense to the United States Government and let me have their views.

---

123 M 956/421 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1942—7 p. m.

418. For Murphy. I am highly gratified at the successful results of our policy in North Africa, in the formulation and execution of which you had such an important part. Your patience, tact and sound judgment were the basis on which that policy rested, and my confidence in your ability has been amply justified.

The work performed by our Foreign Service in carrying out its appointed tasks and in maintaining our relations in the North African territories during the difficult period just concluded has in my opinion been outstanding. I should like you to convey to the personnel of our offices in Algiers, Tangier, Casablanca and Tunis my deep appreciation of their faithful assistance and co-operation. My congratulations and thanks go alike to you personally and to every member of the staff at those posts.

HULL

851.01/784 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)  
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 18, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received November 18—9:44 p. m.]

6494. Personal to the Secretary. Re my 6451, November 17, 3 p. m.,<sup>74</sup> the President's statement<sup>75</sup> has cleared the Darlan situation here.

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/25663 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Tangier (Childs)*

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1942—midnight.

239. Your 617, Nov. 14, noon. In as much as it is believed that Murphy had this subject in mind, the Department suggests that you communicate your query to him.

HULL

851R.01/12¾

*The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall), to the  
Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1942.

DEAR MR. WELLES: A message has been sent to General Eisenhower, informing him of the desires of the President as indicated in the draft of a proposed message of instructions from the State Department to Mr. Murphy which you sent me under date of November 13, 1942. In the message I suggested to General Eisenhower that these matters be accomplished as soon as he considered the measures practicable.

You will be kept informed of the developments in the situation.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

740.0011 European War 1939/25876

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the  
Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 20, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received November 20—10:15 p. m.]

482. During my conversation with Molotov<sup>76</sup> this evening he said that the Soviet Government had been observing with interest de-

<sup>74</sup> Not printed.

<sup>75</sup> For statement released to the press by the White House November 17, 1942, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 21, 1942, p. 935.

<sup>76</sup> Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

velopments in Northwest Africa and was gratified at American successes.

He added that the Soviet authorities for a time had been somewhat puzzled at the decision of the American forces in Africa to cooperate with Darlan. The President's explanation, however, had been helpful in clarifying this situation. He would appreciate it if I would inform my Government that the Soviet Government was deeply interested in French Africa and that it hoped that the American Government would not take any steps in the direction of setting up any kind of a Government in French Africa without first consulting the Soviet Government. I told him that I would be glad to transmit his message.

As I was preparing to leave he said that he hoped that within a few days he would be able to give us some very good news from the Russian front.

HENDERSON

---

851R.50/21a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, November 21, 1942—6 p. m.

427. For Murphy. My nos. 408 and 417, November 13 and November 18, and your no. 147, November 17. The Department in conjunction with the other interested agencies of the Government is preparing a comprehensive program of economic cooperation with North Africa.

The first step must obviously be to meet the most urgent needs for essential supplies without delay and without benefit of elaborate investigation and machinery. The Department in its no. 417 of November 18 has listed certain supplies which are ready to go forward in the immediate future. Arrangements are being made to ship promptly additional quantities of the materials specifically mentioned in your no. 147 and you will be informed as shipments depart. A vessel laden with 15,000 tons of coal has left New York for Casablanca and is expected to arrive in the near future. It is understood that additional shipments of coal are en route from England to North Africa. You are requested to report any specific and especially pressing needs either for goods previously supplied under the North African Accord or for supplies normally imported from metropolitan France. Efforts will be made to meet these most pressing needs at once.

In the meantime the Department is preparing to send out to assist you in economic matters a staff somewhat more numerous than that suggested in my no. 408 November 13. The contemplated



functions to be performed by this group, under your direction and subject to the requirements of military operations, would include the following:

(1) The supply of essential materials to the civil population and to vital utilities and industries. This function will involve a continuing examination of needs and such participation in distribution as may prove desirable.

(2) The purchase both of strategic materials which are immediately required in the United Nations war effort and, in reasonable quantities, of other products, the production and normal markets for which have been disturbed by our occupation. This function will involve not only purchase and export but storage of the latter type of products for future sale or use in eventual United Nations operations.

(3) The handling of currency and financial problems, including the use of dollars as legal tender and the rate of exchange between dollars and francs, exchange control matters, banking problems generally and the control of undesirable commercial and financial activities by the fund freezing technique. This function would involve a survey of the whole financial situation and the establishment of whatever controls may prove necessary, as well as the examination of the files of Axis firms and of government documents with a view towards obtaining information concerning persons engaging in undesirable commercial and financial transactions and enemy plans and activities.

(4) The maintenance, repair and expansion of vital transportation facilities, including railroads, port facilities and automotive transport. This function will involve a careful survey of needs and advice and assistance in operation.

(5) The maintenance of public health. This function will involve an estimate of needed supplies and advice as to their utilization. The function will of course involve coordination with the Red Cross and other relief agencies.

(6) Expansion of the production of foodstuffs and other materials needed by the civil population, by our armed forces, or elsewhere in the United Nations. This function will involve a survey of the pertinent industries, the supply of needed equipment and advice and assistance in its installation and use.

All of the foregoing, of course, must be within the limit of our supply and shipping possibilities.

It is expected that experts to perform these functions will be supplied by the Department, OLLA," BEW, Treasury, War Shipping Administration, Department of Agriculture and United States Public Health Service. Those most pressingly needed will be sent at once and others later as the need is more clearly defined. All of these experts will be attached to your staff and will be under your direction. One will presumably act as your deputy in coordinating the entire economic program. The interested agencies

---

" Office of Lend-Lease Administration.

have in mind a total of approximately 20 officers to be sent in the immediate future. In the light of the program outlined above, does this seem to you a reasonable figure? It is desired to send enough to do the job well but not more than is actually necessary.

This general program is being discussed with British officials in Washington, and is being communicated to our Embassy in London. We desire to cooperate fully with the British in carrying out the program, while at the same time maintaining the basic responsibility as ours.

Your comments and recommendations in regard to any feature of the proposed program and in regard to its implementation will be most welcome. If you feel it desirable to do so, you may make known to the appropriate French authorities and to the press the general outline of the program or any particular feature which seems to have political value. The War Department has been informed and you should discuss the program with Eisenhower and invite his comments.

HULL

---

851R.01/18 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, November 21, 1942—6 p. m.

428. For Murphy. My Nos. 408 and 417, November 13 and November 18, and your No. 147, November 17. Please discuss the following with General Eisenhower and inform Department urgently whether the following arrangements meet your and his needs.

1. The Secretary of State has been directed and empowered by the President to arrange in the field and in Washington for the conduct of civil affairs in North Africa and other reoccupied areas and to call upon the various agencies of government for personnel and assistance as he may desire.

2. The Secretary understands that by directive of the President you are a member of General Eisenhower's staff and Chief Civil Affairs Officer for the area under his command.

3. The Secretary proposes to furnish you with the following additional staff:

(a) As Executive Assistant, Paul Culbertson, an Assistant Chief of the European Division, to which Division responsibility for dealing with all non-military matters arising as a result of the military occupation of territories in Europe and North Africa by the armed forces of the United Nations and affecting the interests of the United States has been assigned.

(b) As Economic Executive Assistant, Donald Hiss, at present Chief of Foreign Funds Control Division of the Department of

State. Mr. Hiss is familiar with the functioning of the various agencies in Washington and can assist you in coordinating the work under your instructions of the other members of the economic staff.

(c) A representative of the Lend-Lease organization (who may also act jointly for the Department of Agriculture) to assist you in whatever steps are necessary to establish and expand agricultural production and will also be empowered to act for the Lend-Lease Administration in obtaining here or elsewhere the necessary supplies for civilian use.

(d) Mr. Morris Rosenthal, Deputy Executive Director of the Board of Economic Warfare. Mr. Rosenthal can assist you in whatever steps are necessary to procure for export from North Africa materials needed by the United Nations and to increase, where desirable, the production thereof. He will also be empowered by the Board of Economic Warfare to take whatever other steps within its legal powers you may find necessary for the proper conduct of your mission.

(e) A representative of the United States Treasury Department. He can assist you in whatever steps are necessary in the fields of currency, banking, and exchange and fund control.

4. All of the foregoing will be temporarily incorporated in the Auxiliary Foreign Service, Reoccupation Division, although they will continue to be paid by their respective agencies. They will in all respects be member of your staff and subject to your direction. It is probable that each of them will need at the outset a small number of assistants; say, two or three. They will be sent as soon as the military authorities can provide transportation. It is proposed that they will report to you in Algiers.

5. It should be clearly understood that all communications with civilian departments or agencies in Washington shall be carried on solely through your office and the Department of State.

6. It is the view of the War Department, in which this Department concurs, that the transportation of civilian supplies must in the present state of military operations be in vessels under the control of the military and under naval escort. Such shipments will have at present to be fitted into the program of shipment of military supplies and entirely subject to military necessity. This will have to be done by coordinated planning with the military authorities both in North Africa and here. The civilian authorities here will procure and make available to the army whatever supplies you ask for, to be shipped to you in accordance with opportunities as outlined above.

Naturally we will welcome any comment which General Eisenhower and you may have to make.

HULL

851R.01/51

*Agreement Between General Mark Clark and Admiral François Darlan, Signed at Algiers, November 22, 1942*<sup>78</sup>

PREAMBLE

The forces of the United States and their Supporting Allies have landed in French North Africa for the purpose of preventing the domination of this territory by German and Italian forces and their Allies and for carrying on the war for the defeat of the Axis powers.

By a common agreement among leading French officials in French North Africa, a High Commissioner in French Africa has been established in the person of Admiral of the Fleet François Darlan.

It has been agreed by all French elements concerned and United States military authorities that French forces will aid and support the forces of the United States and their allies to expel from the soil of Africa the common enemy, to liberate France and to restore integrally the French Empire. In order that this high purpose

---

<sup>78</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department of State by Mr. Murphy under covering letter of December 5; received December 28. A draft of the agreement, then titled "Protocol Number One," was circulated in the Combined Chiefs of Staff on November 20, 1942, and on the same day the Combined Chiefs of Staff informed General Eisenhower that the President had approved the draft but had added a condition regarding the avoidance, if possible, of the formal diplomatic term "Protocol" as the title of the agreement. The signed version varies slightly from the approved text. In C. C. S. 103/17, General Eisenhower's comments precede Article I. In his statement, the Supreme Allied Commander set forth his views as follows:

"Clear distinction must be drawn between the preamble to the agreement and the agreement itself. The first two paragraphs of the preamble merely recite facts that have led up to the present situation. The mention of Darlan's name therein does not imply any obligations on the part of the Allied CINC to perpetuate Darlan in any position or to support him therein. Paragraph three of preamble is a recitation of the purposes commonly agreed upon between the Commander in Chief and the North African Commission, for which the subsequent agreement is made. Purposes recited extend beyond the immediate responsibility, mission, (and) Territory of the Allied Commander in Chief, but they are taken almost verbatim from letters written by Murphy to various French officers in this region prior to November 8, when he was acting as the personal representative here of the President of the United States.

Attention is invited, also, to the fact that this agreement is merely one between a Commander in the field and a Commission which is exercising ordinary civil and military functions in the theater in which he is operating. Its terms are intended only to facilitate the operations of the Allied Forces brought here, although, naturally, accomplishment of this purpose involves certain economic and transportation features. Moreover, it should be pointed out that the Allied Commander in Chief, as the signatory authority on one side, is also the interpreter for his own force of the terms and language employed. In addition, the effort to gain the cooperation needed by the Allied force is not going to be the product of exact terminology and language. It is going to be represented in the success of the Allied Commander in Chief in galvanizing the local population and local military forces into action along the general lines indicated in this draft." (851R.00/108½).

may be accomplished, and to make appropriate arrangements for the presence in North Africa of large forces of the United States and its allies, the following agreement is entered into at Algiers this 22nd day of November 1942.

I—There shall be the closest cooperation between the Commander-in-Chief of the French Land, Sea and Air forces and the Commanding General United States Army and supporting forces to accomplish the purpose set forth above.

II—The status, command, functions, employment, rights and privileges of French land, sea and air forces will remain under French direction. Such forces will continue in the service of internal security and will be employed, in cooperation with the forces of the United States and its allies, in driving Axis forces from French African territory and in protecting it from further violation by them. All movements of French military, naval or air forces from their normal stations will be notified to the Commanding General of the United States Army by the French command.

III—French governmental personnel will continue in the performance of their functions with loyalty to the purpose of the forces under the command of the Commanding General, United States Army and supporting forces. Such government personnel will take such measures as are necessary for the maintenance of order and public administrative services throughout the territory in consultation with the Commanding General of the United States Army.

IV—The control and command of all landing and other facilities for aircraft, harbor and port facilities, defenses, fortifications and arsenals will be available to the Commanding General of the United States Army, and supporting forces, for the purpose set forth in the preamble hereof. The control of these facilities will not involve the use of French personnel without the consent of the French authorities.

V—Full information will be given as to the location of all facilities, installations, equipment and devices (such as airfields, anti-aircraft batteries, observation posts, radio-location and other technical observing stations, minefields, tank traps, military, naval and air force stores, fuel, supplies and equipment, etc.) which may be a hindrance or useful to the purpose of the forces under the command of the Commanding General, United States Army and supporting forces.

VI—All telecommunication services will be operated and maintained normally by the French authorities. The United States military forces and supporting Allies will have the unrestricted use of the telecommunication services insofar as may be required for military purpose.

VII—French warships shall operate in close cooperation with the Commanding General, United States Army or allied representatives acting with his approval for the accomplishment of the purpose set forth in the preamble hereof. Such warships will continue to fly the French flag and be placed under French command, and will retain such personnel and equipment, and will be provided with fuel and all necessary supplies to enable them to become effective fighting units.

VIII—All French merchant vessels in the harbors of French North Africa or those which in the future may enter those harbors will be operated by crews, preferably French, under the French flag in cooperation with the Commanding General, United States Army or allied representatives acting with his approval. Such operations shall be by charter with the public or private owners. Such chartered vessels will be employed in the service of the United Nations to take part in the war effort against the Axis.

IX—All port facilities, harbor and naval installations and establishments in French North Africa, together with their records, will be placed intact at the disposal of the Commanding General, United States Army or allied representatives acting with his approval, all remaining under French Command, subject to the provisions of Par. IV above, and such assistance as he may require will be rendered to allow proper maintenance and operation of all machinery and fittings.

X—In North Africa, requisitioning of billets, supplies, lands, buildings, transportation and services for the military needs of the forces under command of the Commanding General, United States Army is authorized, if not procurable by agreement promptly, in sufficient quantities and fair prices. Requisitions will be made only by authorization of the Commanding Officer of the troops in the locality and upon the Mayor or other appropriate civil authorities, but may be upon individuals in cases of necessity. Payment will be made at once in cash or in voucher payable in cash by the disbursing Officer of the Army to which the officer belongs and upon whose authority the requisition is issued. Prices will be the fair market value to be fixed by agreement if possible, otherwise by the requisitioning military authority.

XI—The authorities in French North Africa will furnish the Commanding General, United States Army with a list of all persons of whatsoever nationality who have been placed under restriction, detention or sentence (including persons sentenced *in absentia*) on account of their dealings or sympathies with the United Nations. Those still under restriction or detention will be released when the Commanding General, United States Army, so directs.

XII—All service personnel and merchant seamen of any of the United Nations who are interned in French North Africa will be released forthwith and transferred as the Commanding General, United States Army may direct.

XIII—The authorities in French North Africa will take such measures as the Commanding General, United States Army, may deem appropriate with regard to the control of foreign property and of the persons and property of foreign nationals, neutral consular officers and such other persons as the Commanding General, United States Army, may direct.

XIV—In North Africa no tax, direct or indirect, will be collected upon the property of the United States, the Allied Governments, their representatives and civilian employees, governmental agencies or authorized welfare organizations; nor will any tax be collected upon any purchase from, sale to, or any transaction of any kind with the United States Government, its Allied Governments, their representatives, civilian employees, agencies or organizations.

XV—The Commanding General, United States Army, the forces under his command and supporting forces and their legal Governments, the representatives of their governments and civilian employees of these governments shall enjoy extraterritorial privileges and be exempt from the jurisdiction and immune to the process of the courts, civil and criminal, of the territory.

XVI—In North Africa areas deemed by the Commanding General, United States Army, to be of importance or useful to the purpose set forth in the preamble hereof, from time to time, may be declared by him to be military areas under his control whereupon the maintenance of order and administrative and public services in such areas shall come under the direct control of such Commanding General. The French authorities will be promptly notified in the event that such a step becomes necessary.

XVII—If the internal situation at any time be such as in his opinion to endanger his lines of communication or threaten disorder the Commanding General, United States Army will inform the French authorities of such danger and the French authorities will undertake, in concert with him, such administrative and other measures as may be necessary for the protection of the military interests of the forces under his command and supporting forces.

XVIII—The Commanding General, United States Army, will appoint such military, naval, air and economic and branch Missions as he may deem requisite to regulate, in liaison with such agency or agencies, as the local authorities will institute for this purpose, the application of the present accord.

XIX—There shall be immediately appointed a Joint Economic Commission which will be charged with the study of the economic needs of French North Africa. The Commission will suggest such measures as may seem appropriate to it regarding exportation and importation, as well as for the increase of agricultural production, as well as for the establishment of economic stability, and the creation of prosperity in French North African territories.

XX—A Joint censorship commission shall be established. It will extend its action to the press, radio broadcasts, telecommunications, postal services and all public means for the dissemination of information and shall operate in full conformity with the common purpose set forth in the preamble hereof. The French members of the Commission will be appointed by the High Commissioner.

XXI—The foregoing arrangements will be drawn up in the English and French languages. The English text is authoritative.

---

851T.00/53 : Telegram

*The Consul at Dakar (Flexer) to the Secretary of State*

DAKAR, November 23, 1942.

[Received November 26—10:07 a. m.]

478. Reference 477.<sup>79</sup> Conducted 11:30 to High Commissioner who informed that French West Africa placed under orders Admiral Darlan. Announcement made by radio Dakar 12:15. Text will follow.

Incommunicado against consular staff raised and seals have been removed but High Commissioner respectfully informed that reopening office in anomalous situation must await Department's instructions.

Only communication from Department since reported in 477 was undecipherable November 7, 6 p. m., filed 7th, received 22d.<sup>80</sup>

**FLEXER**

---

<sup>79</sup> Telegram No. 477, November 14, from the Consul at Dakar, p. 439.

<sup>80</sup> Circular telegram; it read: "Report to Department by quickest method local reactions to current developments in Africa." (740.0011 European War 1939/-25303a)



851T.00/54 : Telegram

*The Consul at Dakar (Flewer) to the Secretary of State*

DAKAR, November 23, 1942.

[Received November 26—12: 17 p. m.]

479. Reference today's 478. Declaration by the High Commissioner by radio Dakar at 12: 15, November 23d:

["] French men and women of West Africa. Since I took over the command of French West Africa my constant care has been the maintenance of French sovereignty in the territories which were confided to me.

It was this same care which inspired my decision, taken in full accord with the responsible military authorities, to place West Africa under the orders of Admiral Darlan.

This consideration, important as it is, would not alone have sufficed to bring us to this determination if we had not been certain that in doing so we were remaining true to the oath which we have given to the Marshal.

After my message there will be read to you the messages of Admiral Darlan through which there will be made clear to you the series of events and the definitions of the aims which he is adopting.

West Africa desires to take part in the realization of his plans. In doing so it will remain wholly and absolutely free from foreign occupation of whatever kind.

You have been thinking—I know it only too well—that your leaders have been slow in taking a stand. Today you will think, with better right, that they have passed through days hard to endure because of the responsibilities which they are taking over. Now that the decision has been reached, accept it with full seriousness. Think of France.

The path West Africa now will follow, together with North Africa, for the liberation of France and its Chief, will demand from all of you, however, a complete devotion of effort in absolute discipline.

Long live France. Long live the Marshal."

This was followed by the following broadcast of General Order Number 16 of General Barrau, Commander in Chief of the land, sea, and air forces of the A.O.F. (French West Africa) Colony:

["] The A.O.F. (French West Africa) has joined the North African bloc. The Governor General has made known the full reasons for his determining this course.

But no consideration would have been able to bring the General Commander in Chief to agree to that declaration if this act had seemed to him to be incompatible with military honor, and particularly with the oath given by the troops to the Marshal of France, the Chief of State, an oath from which no one can absolve them.

A careful study has made him completely certain that the action of the civil and military authorities of North Africa is entirely along the lines designed by Marshal Pétain.

Under these conditions the General Commander in Chief places himself and you, all of you, as well as all formations subject to your authority, under the orders of Admiral Darlan."

FLEXER

---

740.00112 European War 1939/7306 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, November 24, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received 4:58 p. m.]

31. From Murphy. Reply to your 417, November 18, 4 p. m. has been delayed due to my absence in Gibraltar.

We fully approve plans to forward at the earliest practicable date 8000 tons of cargos elected by the competent French officials as high priority material for North Africa to be supplemented by such quantities of sugar, milk, green tea, soap, medical supplies, cotton textiles, second-hand clothing, kerosene, and other articles. It is suggested that priority be given cotton textiles and second-hand clothing.

Control facilities will be adequate for the supervision of the distribution of prospective supplies.

With reference to the Department's plan to establish civilian requirement staff in North Africa, we of course have small nucleus consisting of the present control officers who are now functioning as part of the Civil Affairs Administration of the Army. I learned at Gibraltar of a plan to establish under the auspices of the Allied forces an organization to be known as the North African Economic Board which would recruit its personnel from civilian sources in the United States and possibly the United Kingdom as well as from the military. Department no doubt is discussing this matter with the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The personnel at present available includes the above-mentioned control officers, H. Freeman Matthews who states he will be required to return to London early in December and the following military personnel: Colonel Rooth, Colonel John Keveney, Lieutenant Colonel Bernstein, Colonel White, Majors Dostert and Spoford, Captain Lutwack and Taylor of Treasury. It will be augmented by a number of Allied Staff officers expected here this week including Major General Humphrey Gale who would be competent for phases relating to the United Kingdom. It is planned that Civil Affairs Section will operate in close liaison with the North African Economic Board when established. [Murphy.]

COLE

851R.50/21b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 24, 1942—8 p. m.

5915. The Department has received a letter from the Combined Chiefs of Staff<sup>a1</sup> stating that about 2 weeks ago the Combined Chiefs of Staff received a proposal from the British Chiefs of Staff regarding certain economic measures to be taken in North Africa upon our occupation of that area. The letter continued that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed that General Eisenhower should be informed that he would concern himself with economic policies only to the extent that they affect his operations and that further action in this regard would be handled by the appropriate civil departments of the United States and the United Kingdom. The letter added that the Combined Chiefs of Staff further agreed to recommend to the appropriate civil Departments of the United States and the United Kingdom that in working out the economic policies to be adopted in North Africa they maintain close collaboration with one another, and requested that the Secretary of State initiate whatever action was considered appropriate in this regard.

Since the receipt of this letter preliminary work has been done here in this Department and as a result the following telegram has been sent to Murphy:

[Here follows a paraphrase of telegram No. 427, November 21, 6 p. m., to the Consul General at Algiers, printed on page 449.]

You will note that we are discussing this matter with British officials in Washington. We will appreciate such recommendations, if any, as you may wish to offer in connection with the general outline we have presented to Murphy and any views which you may have with regard to the best means of developing our cooperation with the British Government. While it is our thought that the principal discussions will be carried on here in Washington with British officials here, you may nevertheless desire to discuss the matter with the authorities in London.

HULL

851T.00/59a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Dakar (Flewer)*

WASHINGTON, November 25, 1942.

119. Please report in clear in so far as you can what the situation is and developments as they occur.

HULL

<sup>a1</sup> Not printed. This letter was the one described in telegram No. 408, November 13, 4 p. m., to the Consul General at Algiers, p. 438.

851R.01/144

*Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Hackworth)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 25, 1942.

**MEMORANDUM FOR DISCUSSION WITH GENERAL HULL ON THE  
NORTH AFRICAN SITUATION**

It is a fundamental rule of international law that a military occupant is supreme in the occupied territory and that local laws may be set aside or superseded by decrees of the military occupant. This may be done by a single stroke of the military occupant or by degrees as the exigencies of the situation may dictate.

It is also a rule generally recognized that the military occupant should not interfere with local civil administration beyond the degree necessary for the safety of the military occupant and the carrying out of the purposes of the occupation; in other words, that the civil authorities—administrative and judicial—should be permitted to function with respect to matters of local concern and apply local law to the extent that this may be done with safety from the point of view of the purposes of the military occupation.

It is desirable that our conduct in occupied territory should afford a favorable contrast with that of the Axis powers in occupied territory, and that every effort should be made to cause the local population and the local officials to feel that we are their friends and not their oppressors; that the civil and judicial authorities will be allowed freely to function with respect to matters of local concern, provided they demean themselves in a manner consistent with the purposes of the military occupation, and that no military order or regulation shall in anywise be contravened; that offenses of a military character or offenses in contravention of a military order or regulation shall be cognizable only in the military tribunals.

These general propositions are, of course, no less in the mind of the War Department than in that of the Department of State.

In order that there may be complete collaboration between the two Departments, it is deemed desirable that there should be an understanding on some of the outstanding questions pertaining to the occupation of Northern Africa. Some of the questions are as follows:

(1) The extent to which the military are controlling civil administrative affairs in North Africa.

(2) If the civil authorities are being allowed to function, is complete freedom allowed in this respect or are they being given directives by the military or required to report to the military on any of their functions?

(3) What kind of proclamation or proclamations have been issued by the military authorities with respect to the relations between the civil and military authorities? It is assumed that the military authorities are at least controlling all means of communication and all entry and departure from the zone of military occupation, but information on this question would be of interest.

(4) To what extent and under what circumstances do the military authorities expect to continue to keep an eye on the over-all situation in the occupied areas to safeguard against subversive activities?

(5) What kind of an arrangement do the military authorities feel should be established for complete cooperation between the Department of State and the War Department toward coordinating their respective functions in the occupied area?

(6) Does the War Department contemplate the conferring upon the local administrative officials of greater freedom of action than they now have, and, if so, how do they contemplate that this shall be developed?

(7) Have the military authorities decided what French or other officials in the occupied area or areas are to be regarded as responsible for the proper functioning of the civil authorities—administrative and judicial—in the area or areas?

(8) Does the War Department feel that the existing local authorities or authorities that may be substituted for them in key positions are to be trusted, or is it desirable to proceed on a day-to-day basis with the military at all times in complete control of the whole situation?

(9) Have the military authorities taken any steps to set aside any laws or decrees of the Vichy regime? If so, what steps have been taken.

(10) The United States exercises extraterritorial rights in Morocco and American citizens and protégés are subject to the jurisdiction of the consular courts. Has any thought been given to the question as to whether these officials should continue to function in these respects?

(11) In what way can this Department be of assistance in any of these matters?

None of these questions is to be regarded as an effort to pry into the military operations or secrets but rather as a desire for information to enable the Department to determine for its own purposes in what respects it can be most helpful.

---

740.00112 European War 1939/7362

*The Commanding General, Services of Supply (Somervell), to the  
Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton)*

WASHINGTON, November 26., 1942.

MY DEAR MR. ATHERTON: I understand that the staff representing the various interested government agencies which will assist Mr.

Murphy in North Africa is being assembled and will be sent to North Africa at an early date. I would like to suggest that the original group be limited to such representatives as the State Department may desire to send as its own representatives and not more than one key representative from the other government agencies. I think in this way a survey can be undertaken promptly when the staff arrives in North Africa to develop the further staff needs with less of a drain on transportation than would be represented by sending a large staff prior to this survey being made on the ground.

I would appreciate your views with respect to restricting the size of this first group. It would also be helpful if you would let us have the names of the representatives of the various agencies to be in this group.

Sincerely yours,

BREHON SOMERVELL  
*Lieutenant General*

---

851R.50/23 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 30, 1942—8 p. m.  
[Received November 30—7:03 p. m.]

6763. Your 5915, November 24, 8 p. m. We have discussed contents of Department's 5915, relating to proposed organization to meet civil economic requirements of North African area with Foreign Office, Ministry of Economic Warfare, and Censorship.

British understand that North African Command now contemplates the organization of above activities under two boards both responsible to General Eisenhower, (1), a North African Shipping Board, and (2), a North African Economic Board. Both boards would have members from both Great Britain and the United States. We assume that this type of organization was worked out subsequent to despatch of Department's 5915 and that full details are known to you. We also assume that civil experts mentioned in Department's message will be responsible to these boards. British plan to despatch some supply, censorship and communication experts, and a Treasury representative soon.

British concur with other arrangements envisaged in Department's message. They feel primary responsibility rests with United States and are anxious to cooperate as circumstances permit. In addition to six functions outlined in Department's message, they and we wish to stress the importance of the following economic warfare objectives,

1. Censorship and Communications. Control of communications and the establishment of an effective censorship constitutes an essential element in both military and economic administration of North Africa. Immediate steps have been taken to secure ad interim censorship of mails. The situation with respect to wire and radio communications between North Africa and Axis Europe is obscure. Final steps for organization to control these activities and to integrate procedures into the general United Nation controls can only be worked out after a survey on the ground. Accordingly E. S. Herbert, Director, Postal and Telegraph Censorship here, desires to leave for North Africa this week with small party. After a short visit there he plans to proceed along to Washington to work out final arrangements with United States authorities. He is also anxious to explore the possibility of establishing a major censorship base for South American mails in North Africa. We feel this is important.

2. Contraband Control. We would suggest that possibility of combining such a base with a contraband control station to replace Gibraltar and free Gibraltar facilities for other uses be seriously explored. We have been engaged in informal discussions with British on this subject but have not as yet received definite suggestions for transmission for your consideration.

3. Export Control. Some system of export control in North Africa will be necessary to insure that goods shipped from North Africa do not reach the enemy. The border between French and Spanish Morocco, for example, would provide an easy route for such shipments as well as for the smuggling of diamonds.

4. Finance. To the various financial controls mentioned in the Department's message, there should be added the safeguarding of the Polish and Vichy gold in North Africa.

5. Supplies from North Africa. North African supplies can play an important part in our economic warfare activities, aside from the effects which we will gain by blockading the enemy from access to these commodities, particularly phosphates. You will no doubt remember that the British and ourselves gave assurances to Spain and Portugal that their economic interests would not be endangered by our occupation of North Africa. Subject to this consideration, phosphates should give us a strong bargaining counter.

6. Trading with Enemy Legislation. The opening of North Africa to our forces and the resumption by us of responsibility for its economic survival will require many readjustments in existing controls. Control of local concerns from enemy or Vichy territory will have to be broken.

7. Economic Intelligence. Access to North Africa and to official and business records there offers a large and fertile field for economic intelligence activities. We have already initiated work in this area, (1) by forwarding to the military authorities suggestions of type of economic information in which we and Ministry of Economic Warfare are interested, and (2) by preparing material to brief the examiners who are interrogating the members of the armistice commission who have been brought to this country. We have also requested permission from General Eisenhower for the imme-

diate despatch of Edmund Gullion of the Economic Warfare Division to North Africa for a brief stay to survey the problems of using this area for economic intelligence purposes. We have just received word from General Eisenhower that he welcomes this arrangement. Departmental instructions are accordingly urgently requested authorizing Gullion to travel to French North Africa for these temporary duties and return to this office upon their completion.

The British authorities, in discussing the various problems referred to above, have stressed the need for a pragmatic approach, particularly in view of present uncertainty with respect to exact status of existing French civil administration. They are not sure how far British personnel will be welcome. So far as Ministry of Economic Warfare is concerned, they welcome American initiative in economic warfare activities in North Africa and will give us the fullest support in any way we suggest.

Because so many of the economic warfare problems tie in intimately with the machinery now located in London as well as with the Washington controls, we recommend that one or two of the American civil experts contemplated in Department's message be drawn from the Economic Warfare Division here. The despatch of Gullion has already been arranged. He will be fully capable of making arrangements on matters relating to economic intelligence. We would now like to make a similar arrangement for the despatch of Major John Easton to North Africa. He is fully conversant with the British Economic Warfare controls as well as those in Washington, and would, we feel, make an excellent liaison officer during the early stages of organization of economic warfare activities in North Africa. We contemplate the return to the Economic Warfare Division of both Gullion and Easton as soon as the preliminary organization in North Africa is completed.

WINANT

---

851T.00/60 : Telegram

*The Consul at Dakar (Flexer) to the Secretary of State*

DAKAR, November 30, 1942.

[Received December 2—2: 32 p. m.]

487. Department's 119, 25th. Since censorship continues reports *en clair* possibly salutary although probably prejudicial consular relations.

Situation AOF most confused and unsatisfactory. Popular and military reaction masterly American stroke North Africa immediate. Possible opportunity arrest sinking prestige by riding wave popular enthusiasm muffed, Government General standing aloof until



inevitable course French North Africa definitely shaped, then taking decision send representative Algiers, whilst maintaining communication with Vichy, only when investigations special political agents must have disclosed if anything that population overwhelming clamorous joint action with North Africa block against Axis and most importantly that defence forces undependable against USA. Forced decision sacrificed effect spontaneity.

Noncommittal tenor belated official pronouncements November 23 decidedly dampening, whereas unqualified vigorous patriotic appeals might have salvaged official position. Moreover General Falvy, Commandant Supérieur Forces Terrestres AOF who was holdout against adherence later 23d issued order 3 whereof, follows:

"J'ajoute pour vous éclairer que les négociations qui ont été conduites reposent sur les conditions suivantes en ce concerne nos territoires: (a) aucune occupation militaire étrangère d'aucune sorte terrestre, navale, aérienne si minime soit elle; (b) aucune immixtion des britanniques et a fortiori des Gaullistes—vis-à-vis desquels nous maintenons notre attitude actuelle; (c) aucune base, aucun terrain d'aviation n'est mis présentement à la disposition de personne, hormis le cas d'avarie pour les Américains seulement."

Order widely circulated with effect general stupefaction. This planted Germanophile continues command.

Abrupt about-face Government-controlled press and radio without accompanying change personnel services [of] information only followed pronouncements 23d and unconvincing. Consistent opponents Vichy sham insistent upon general expurgation former collaborationists whereof no indications. Criticize delegation now Algiers as nonrepresentative and concerned with own office security. Claim to [re]laxation restrictions liberty political thought, citing that French citizen Firesquadded[?] as de Gaullist agent 19th, simultaneously with reaching accord with USA and that French Army officer arrested 27th, Falvy's order, probable court martial for printing pro-American flysheet for military distribution (see my 481, 25th, supplemented 482, 483, 485<sup>ss</sup>).

Elementary error throughout keeping public ignorant developments. Situation disquieting including armed forces and capable passing beyond control. No possibility achieving popularity whatever result Algiers conference. Except for Falvy who must go adjustment AOF new situation admittedly domestic matter between sharply divided camps. Our concern unification all Frenchmen behind United Nations cause possibly furthered if brief token show America uniform invited by Government General and acceptance possible but not if suggesting factional partisanship.

FLEXER

<sup>ss</sup> None printed.

740.00112 European War 1939/7862

*The Secretary of State to the Commanding General,  
Services of Supply (Somervell)*

WASHINGTON, December 1, 1942.

MY DEAR GENERAL SOMERVELL: Following the receipt of your letter of November 26 to Mr. Atherton in regard to the staff which is to proceed to North Africa to assist Mr. Murphy in civil affairs, I have discussed the matter further with the other interested agencies, i.e. the Treasury Department, the Board of Economic Warfare, the Lend Lease Administration, and the Department of Agriculture. With the exception of Agriculture, these agencies feel that it would be most desirable if the initial mission could include two representatives rather than one from each agency, since the problems to be surveyed are so various in character that they are beyond the competency of a single individual.

I am inclined to concur in the recommendation of the other agencies. Under these conditions the mission would include Mr. Paul Culbertson and Mr. Donald Hiss of the State Department, Mr. Lloyd Cutler and Mr. John Orchard of the Lend Lease Administration, Mr. Morris Rosenthal and Mr. Harold Starr of the Board of Economic Warfare, Mr. Garthoff of the Department of Agriculture and two representatives, as yet unnamed, of the Treasury Department. Three of these desire to proceed to North Africa via London; the others will follow whatever route you designate.

It is hoped that it may prove possible to make arrangements for the departure of this group early next week. I may add that I attach greatest importance to the work of this mission and believe that it will contribute materially to the long term success of our operations in North Africa.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

881.01/105

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On the 12th November the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs<sup>84</sup> asked Sir Samuel Hoare<sup>85</sup> whether the juridical status of Morocco would be changed by the Allied occupation. Sir Samuel Hoare replied that whilst he could not give him detailed information with-

<sup>84</sup> Count Francisco Gomez Jordana.

<sup>85</sup> British Ambassador in Spain.

out instructions from His Majesty's Government he thought Señor Jordana might be confident that His Majesty's Government desired to maintain the juridical status of Morocco and to treat the occupation as purely a military and temporary incident. Señor Jordana then asked whether there would still be a French High Commissioner in Morocco. Sir Samuel Hoare replied he could not give any details but undertook to draw the attention of His Majesty's Government to the anxiety of the Spanish Government to see that the juridical *status quo* was maintained.

2. The Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs has continued to show interest in the subject and Sir Samuel Hoare is anxious to be in a position to give him a definite reply. Subject to the views of the United States Government, His Majesty's Government propose to authorise him to say, if the question is raised again by the Spanish Government, that it is not the intention of the United Nations to interfere with the juridical status of French Morocco or to seek to abolish the post of Resident General.

3. His Majesty's Government would be glad to know as soon as possible whether the United States Government concur in the above proposed reply.

WASHINGTON, 1 December, 1942.

---

851R.01/52¼

*Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 1, 1942.

MR. WELLES: The telegram which I stated had been answered was Kuibyshev's 1014 of November 21, 3 p. m.,<sup>86</sup> giving the full text of the President's statement concerning Darlan.

The telegram to which you refer, namely Moscow's 482, November 20, 11 p. m., was considered in this Division. I venture to repeat Henderson's wording: "He (Molotov) would appreciate it if I would inform my Government that the Soviet Government was deeply interested in French Africa and that it hoped that the American Government would not take any steps in the direction of setting up any kind of a Government in French Africa without first consulting the Soviet Government. I told him that I would be glad to transmit his message."

I think this telegram of Moscow's should be read in connection with London's 6636 of November 25, 2 p. m.,<sup>87</sup> wherein Maisky<sup>88</sup>

---

<sup>86</sup> Not printed.

<sup>87</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>88</sup> Ivan M. Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

reports that "although the Russian Government could understand the situation, it disturbed their people for fear there might be political reasons in the future for dealing with the German generals or others". You will note that by this really what the Russians are seeking are assurances to bind our hands as to whom we intend to deal with when the time comes on the Continent and not North Africa alone. Consequently, Eu<sup>89</sup> is of the opinion it would be more advisable not to reply to Moscow's telegram first above referred to, to which you made reference, but let Admiral Standley<sup>90</sup> on his return state that he had arranged to be kept informed of our progress in North Africa and would be glad to keep the Russian Government informed of our future thinking.

Such a procedure would obviate what Eu considers might be the certain step once we give the assurances Molotov has asked of Henderson, namely, that this Government give similar assurances that the Russian Government would be consulted before we took any steps or made any undertakings of a political nature on the European Continent. I do not feel we can bind our hands to this extent and I do not believe we should pretend to the Russians that we will do something, if we have any reservations in our minds.

R[AY] A[THERTON]

851R.01/521

*Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the  
Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 2, 1942.

MR. ATHERTON: What the President desired is not that this matter be deferred until Admiral Standley returns to Moscow but to send immediately a message to Henderson letting the Russian Government know that we would, of course, be glad to keep them fully informed of all of our thoughts and intentions with regard to North Africa, and give him an outline of our policy.

If we do not take this attitude, I think you can understand how difficult it will be to get any information with regard to what the Russian Government may be planning concerning Finland, et cetera. In other words, I think a message of the character I have suggested should be sent immediately and that the question of policy involved is in the highest degree important.

There is no question of binding ourselves to anything. It is merely the form of reciprocal information which is in the highest degree desirable between the chief members of the United Nations.

<sup>89</sup> Division of European Affairs.

<sup>90</sup> Adm. William H. Standley, Ambassador to the Soviet Union, temporarily in the United States.

851R.01/521

*Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 2, 1942.

MR. WELLES: In compliance with the desire expressed in your memorandum of December 2,<sup>81</sup> a telegram has been prepared for Henderson (attached).<sup>82</sup>

May I enlarge on my previous reasoning as to this policy in the proposed telegram. It is to be noted that Molotov asks that the Soviet Government should be "first consulted" before we take any steps towards setting up a government in North Africa. In my estimation this means obtaining prior approval of the Soviet Government. This is quite different from keeping them fully informed as to developments. In the latter Eu entirely concurs. There is the further consideration that even if we agree to the commitment as Molotov seeks events might not make it possible. (If we had had such a commitment with the Russians Eisenhower's arrangement with Darlan would have been a breach of faith.)

On the other hand, although Molotov makes this request, I should be adverse to seeking from him a compensating assurance that the Soviets would keep us informed as to their future intentions before political action, since in the setting up of political administrations by the Russians in new territories, they could claim in that case this was done with the prior knowledge of the United States, and in any return (when military successes permitted) to the old frontiers of 1941, in which we are so vitally concerned, they would not feel it necessary to advise us at all.

Should the President desire to go beyond compliance by advising the Soviet Government we should "be prepared merely to keep them informed," I venture to suggest that the inherent problem be discussed in a conference. If, on the other hand, the President should be satisfied with merely informing the Soviet Government of the present status of the political situation in North Africa, then I suggest that this telegram be redrafted in that sense.

R[AY] A[THERTON]

---

<sup>81</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>82</sup> Not attached to file copy, but for telegram as sent, see telegram No. 620, December 9. 6 p. m., to the Chargé in the Soviet Union, p. 476.

851R.00/108i

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the  
Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Villard)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 3, 1942.

Participants: General Hull, Operations Division, War Department  
Mr. Murray<sup>23</sup>  
Mr. Villard

General Hull presented a message from General Eisenhower transmitting a draft of an announcement which the latter proposed to make on the conclusion of the agreement now being worked out at Algiers with Admiral Darlan and Governor General Boisson with regard to French West Africa. General Eisenhower proposed to state in this announcement that M. Boisson had agreed to cooperate in the prosecution of the war against the Axis and that he would cooperate fully with Admiral Darlan, the High Commissioner for French North Africa. The agreement related to the use of airfields, ports and port facilities, the release of Allied shipping in French West African ports and the release of internees of the United Nations.

General Eisenhower's message had mentioned the use of the designation "French Imperial Federation" by the French authorities now gathering some semblance of political formation in North Africa. General Eisenhower stated that no act on our part can recognize any government set-up in French Africa except such a provisional organization as might be formed for the purpose of military operations. On the other hand, we could not prevent any French group from using any label it might choose in conducting local affairs in the territory.

In the reply drafted by the War Department to General Eisenhower approval was given to the proposed announcement. However, General Eisenhower was cautioned to be careful not to make use of the title "French Imperial Federation" in any written agreements or communications with the French. This reply had been drafted at the direction of Admiral Leahy, who had given full approval thereto.

---

851T.00/55 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Dakar (Flewer)*

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1942.

127. Your 478, November 23 and 481, November 25.<sup>24</sup> Department desires you to reopen office at once. You will of course appreciate

---

<sup>23</sup> Wallace Murray, Adviser on Political Relations.

<sup>24</sup> Latter not printed.

the necessity of the Consulate functioning smoothly at this time. You should make every effort to adjust locally any problems or difficulties which may have arisen as to your position during the last few weeks, and to maintain satisfactory relations with the constituted authorities of French West Africa.

HULL

---

851R.01/40a

*The Secretary of State to the Chief of Staff, United States Army  
(Marshall)*

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1942.

MY DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I am sending you an outline of our thoughts concerning the points discussed with you over the telephone and with General Hull here on December 4, for whatever they may be worth to you and your associates. You will note that the memorandum is in the form of a suggested telegram to General Eisenhower and Mr. Murphy.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum of a Suggested Telegram to General Eisenhower and  
Mr. Murphy From General Marshall and the Secretary of State*<sup>95</sup>

We feel that it is important that you should seek the earliest moment you consider expedient orally to explain to Admiral Darlan the attitude of the United States Government along the following lines:

"The United States Government fully appreciates the important military contribution which Admiral Darlan has made and is continuing to make in the campaign which began in Africa but which is a prelude to the complete liberation of all French peoples both at home and in the empire from Axis domination and rule. It has been the consistent policy of this Government, expressed on many occasions by the Secretary of State, to welcome the active cooperation of all Frenchmen who desire to resist Axis aggression and the extension, wherever it may be found, of Axis domination and control. It is the common purpose of the United Nations to continue the struggle until the aims of the Atlantic Charter<sup>96</sup> are fulfilled and the peoples of each country are free to express their own will and to decide their future for themselves. Until these purposes are achieved, other considerations must be left for subsequent determination since dispersion of effort must weaken the military unity of

<sup>95</sup> This telegram was sent on December 7, 1942, via War Department cable.

<sup>96</sup> Joint statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, p. 367.

purpose. It is in the sense of the foregoing that we feel that Admiral Darlan has an important continuing part to play in supplementing the invaluable<sup>87</sup> contribution which he has already made. As long as his efforts are directed to the specific end of resistance to the Axis, we feel he has a definite role and a positive military contribution to make to our united effort consistent with the policy of the United States Government as outlined above. This will not be the case if he devotes his efforts to building up an organization, not directly connected with the military effort, since it must be borne in mind that other Frenchmen are likewise making contributions in the military field of considerable importance whose political aims have likewise never been 'gone along with' by this Government. This Government has too great a respect for France and the sovereignty of the French people to attempt to predetermine the choice which the French people will eventually have to make.

"You may further wish to add that any exhortation directed to Frenchmen to support the military effort is timely but to go beyond that into what is primarily a political appeal may now be detrimental to the cause of France."

For your private information, efforts of the character which we have in mind here as being contrary to this policy are Admiral Darlan's recent message to former Ambassador Peyrouton<sup>88</sup> at Buenos Aires asking the latter to serve as his accredited political representative to the Argentine Government, as well as his messages to other Chiefs of French Missions soliciting their political adherence.

---

851R 01/41a

*The Secretary of State to the Chief Civil Affairs Officer of the Allied Forces in North Africa (Murphy)*

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. MURPHY: You have already been informed by telegram of the civilian mission proceeding to join you in North Africa. By direction of the President, the responsibility for dealing with all non-military matters arising as a result of the occupation of foreign territories by American troops has been placed upon me. As the representative of the Department of State, you are directed to supervise and to coordinate these matters as a member of General Eisenhower's staff, since all civilian requirements are subject, in the first instance, to the military situation. There is enclosed a memorandum<sup>89</sup> outlining the arrangements provided both in North Africa and in Washington to deal with these matters.

---

<sup>87</sup> In the text of telegram sent the phrase "has an important continuing part to play in supplementing the invaluable" was changed to "is continuing to supplement the".

<sup>88</sup> Marcel Peyrouton, French Ambassador in Argentina, 1936-40.

<sup>89</sup> Not attached to file copy.



The various departments and agencies represented on the mission have likewise been informed of these arrangements and of your responsibility for operations in North Africa. A copy of my letter to the Board of Economic Warfare is enclosed.<sup>1</sup> Similar letters have been sent to the other agencies.

The members of the mission are specially competent in their respective fields and will exercise functions on behalf of their respective departments and agencies. It is my desire, however, that both you and they should feel they are in North Africa to assist in fulfilling the general aims of this Government in its prosecution of the war and that they may provide general as well as specific assistance to General Eisenhower and yourself.

You are authorized to designate any member of the mission as your alternate or replacement in such duties as you may wish to assign to him directly under your supervision and looking toward the coordination of these matters.

I take this occasion to repeat my sincere appreciation of the unusually valuable contribution you have made.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

---

851R.01/43b

*The Secretary of State to the Executive Director of the Board of Economic Warfare (Perkins)*<sup>2</sup>

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PERKINS: Pursuant to directives which the President has given to me concerning the economic, political and fiscal questions which are developing in the wake of our Armies in North Africa (and similar problems which will develop throughout the world) an Office of Foreign Territories has been established in the Department of State. By agreement between the Secretary of Agriculture and myself Mr. Paul Appleby has been temporarily loaned to the Department of State to serve as Special Assistant to me and to take charge of this Office which has responsibility for dealing with all non-military matters arising as a result of the military occupation of territories in Europe and North Africa by the armed forces of the United Nations and affecting the interests of the United States.

Since the President has put this responsibility upon me, and since obviously the carrying out of the assigned functions calls for

---

<sup>1</sup> *Infra.*

<sup>2</sup> Similar letters were sent to the Office of Lend-Lease Administration, the Department of Agriculture, and the Treasury Department.

cooperative action so as to assure the effective and coordinated use of the resources of various governmental departments and agencies, I am writing to request your cooperation and assistance.

Specifically, Mr. Appleby has been charged with the responsibility of organizing a special reoccupation mission, which will be sent to North Africa at the earliest possible date, to assist Mr. Robert Murphy, Chief Civil Affairs Officer and for the present, by directive of the President, a member of General Eisenhower's staff, in dealing with all non-military problems arising in that area. To assist Mr. Murphy in dealing with these questions, I shall greatly appreciate your detailing two competent members of your staff to accompany this special mission to North Africa. It is contemplated that the members of the mission will be assigned to the field only temporarily, for the purpose of getting the necessary work started. At an early date I shall probably request your assistance in recruiting personnel for more permanent staff assignment in North Africa.

In the case of the two representatives of the Board of Economic Warfare on the original and immediate mission, and the corresponding representatives of other agencies, their assignments will be temporary, though of varying and flexible periods. It is intended that they shall return to their duties in their respective agencies at the end of their present assignment. I assume, therefore, that you will wish them to retain in all respects their present status in the Board of Economic Warfare and that their salaries will continue to be paid by the Board of Economic Warfare in their capacity as employees of that agency. That is the plan which it is proposed to follow.

Since, on the other hand, it is essential that the members of this special mission be given appropriate status under the Department of State, they would be designated temporarily, for the duration of their respective assignments in North Africa, as Special Advisers on North African Affairs in the Office of Foreign Territories, Department of State; as such, appropriate instructions and travel orders will be issued to them by the Department, after consultation with your agency, and their travel and similar expenses, including per diem, would be paid by the Department from funds which have been made available by the President for this purpose. They will be given diplomatic passports.

The members of the aforementioned mission will report for duty in Algiers to Mr. Murphy, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer. They will be subject in all respects to his authority and they will work under the general direction of Mr. Murphy. Instructions prepared

as required in consultation with the other agencies concerned in Washington will be issued to them by the Secretary of State through Mr. Murphy. Reports and other communications will be made by them through Mr. Murphy to the Secretary of State and to the Board of Economic Warfare or other agencies. As a matter of practice, outgoing telegrams would be headed, e.g., "For Murphy and Rosenthal", and incoming telegrams would be headed "For OFT and BEW". It is intended that men who somewhat later may be sent to replace, for a longer period but not on permanent assignment, the chief representatives of the Board of Economic Warfare in this service, shall have like status in all respects.

In the case of personnel which the Department may later request you to nominate for more permanent staff assignment in North Africa, it is intended that such persons shall be appointed in the Auxiliary Foreign Service, Foreign Territories Division, Department of State. Their salaries, however, will continue to be paid by the department or agency with which they are connected, and their tenure as employees will continue to be dependent on the decision of their respective departments or agencies.

I should appreciate your informing me promptly if the foregoing arrangements are agreeable to you so that no further time may be lost in completing the organization of this mission and despatching it to North Africa.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

---

740.0011 European War 1939/25876f : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union  
(Henderson)*

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1942—6 p. m.

620. Your 482, November 20, 11 p. m., from Moscow. You are requested to see Molotov and refer to his conversation with you on November 20 in regard to North Africa. Please inform Molotov that a telegram has been sent to General Eisenhower and Murphy in order that they may seek to clarify to Admiral Darlan the attitude of the United States Government. We desire Mr. Molotov to be orally informed of this telegram. It is being simultaneously telegraphed to our Embassy in London in order that the Ambassador may read it to Mr. Churchill. Please read a paraphrase of the following telegram to Mr. Molotov:

[Here follows text of message of December 7 to General Eisenhower and Mr. Murphy, printed on page 472.]

. HULL

851R.50/28 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1942—10 p. m.

6236. Your 6763, November 30. We welcome the concurrence of the British Government in the arrangements envisaged by this Government and the British offer of cooperation. We feel that the interest of both Governments can be most expeditiously handled by the joint procedure envisaged in this and previous telegrams.

It is expected that the civilian mission composed of two representatives of State, BEW, and Lend-Lease, one Treasury and one Agriculture representative will proceed to North Africa within the next few days. Until they have had an opportunity, after consultation with General Eisenhower and his Civil Affairs staff, to submit recommendations, it is not our intention to formalize any specific procedure to deal with the non-military operations in North Africa. We have not been informed regarding the organization of the two boards mentioned in your telegram and believe that details of the organization should be left to the Civil Affairs staff under the direction of the Civil Affairs officer. The four following paragraphs represent the Department's views in this respect which are being communicated to Murphy:

During the period of actual military operations and until General Eisenhower has decided that full responsibility for civil affairs can be transferred to civil departments and agencies, non-military operations shall be carried on under the general supervision of the military commander and shall be subject to the exigencies of the military situation. The primary objective of all civilian officials in North Africa during this period shall be to contribute to the success of our military operations and particularly to assist in the supply of materials which are recommended by the Army as contributing to these operations.

It is anticipated that following this period of active military operations there will be a transition period during which the military commander will wish to divest himself of certain responsibilities for the conduct of civilian affairs. At that time and in accordance with the judgment of the military commander representatives of the civil departments and agencies, under the leadership of the State Department, will be able to undertake those responsibilities.

During the initial period non-military problems in North Africa will be dealt with by the Civil Affairs Staff of the Military Commander, which shall consist of both United States and British mem-

bers. All members of the staff shall be responsible to the Civil Affairs Officer of the Allied Forces, Mr. Murphy. Relations with the French authorities shall be conducted exclusively through or with the approval of the Civil Affairs Officer. Operating programs of supply, procurement, finance and other controls, under policies agreed to in Washington, and recommendations for policy consideration in Washington will be worked out in joint terms under Mr. Murphy's direction by the United States and British members of his staff and with such collaboration with the local authorities as seems desirable.

In Washington the formulation and implementation of the economic and social program has been placed under the Office of Foreign Territories in the European Division of the Department. Mr. Paul Appleby, Under Secretary of Agriculture, has been loaned to the Department for the purpose of assuming charge of this Office. The Office will be assisted by a number of advisory and operational committees on which the interested United States and British agencies will be represented. The facilities of these agencies, including the Combined Boards, will of course be used whenever possible. It seems desirable that questions arising under the program be dealt with in the first instance by these groups in Washington, subject of course to the recommendations of General Eisenhower and the Civil Affairs Officer, and to the concurrence in policy matters of the British authorities. The Office of Foreign Territories will of course maintain the closest liaison with the British Embassy on matters affecting the overall program.

The Department agrees with the British that the seven economic warfare objectives listed in your telegram are important and must be dealt with as promptly as possible. It is envisaged that the operating Committee and the Civil Affairs Staffs will give early consideration to them. In the meanwhile, we should welcome any further British views on these subjects. We regard, however, censorship and communication in the present stage of operations as military in character to be handled by the military, under whose joint United States and British direction any necessary surveys should be undertaken.

As to the dispatch of United States personnel from London to North Africa, the Department is authorizing Gullion to proceed for the specific purpose of surveying under the general direction of the Civil Affairs Staff, the problems of using this area for economic intelligence purposes. In general, however, the Department would prefer that no further United States personnel proceed from London until our mission has had an opportunity to examine the situation and report their personnel needs, as well as their other recommenda-

tions. In view of the novel and complicated problems of organization faced by the Civil Staff in North Africa, it seems desirable that United States Civil personnel be dispatched from Washington after instruction here as to their duties and position in the field.

HULL

---

851R.50/23 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1942—10 p. m.

475. For Murphy. The Civil Mission to be attached to General Eisenhower's Civil Affairs Staff under your direction is expected to proceed this week to North Africa. The Mission will be composed of Messrs. Culbertson and Hiss of the Department, Cutler and Short of Lend-Lease, Rosenthal and Starr of BEW, DuBois of Treasury and Garthoff of Agriculture.

Until they have had an opportunity after consultation with General Eisenhower and yourself to submit recommendations, it is not our intention to formalize any specific procedure to handle the non-military operations in North Africa. For the time being and until you and General Eisenhower may recommend another organization, we have informed the members of the mission, other interested Departments and the British Government as follows:

During the initial period non-military problems in North Africa will be dealt with by the Civil Affairs Staff of the Military Commander, which shall consist of both United States and British members. All members of the staff shall be responsible to the Civil Affairs Officer of the Allied Forces, Mr. Murphy. Relations with the French authorities shall be conducted exclusively through or with the approval of the Civil Affairs Officer. Operating programs of supply, procurement, finance and other controls, under policies agreed to in Washington, and recommendations for policy consideration in Washington will be worked out in joint terms under Mr. Murphy's direction by the United States and British members of his staff and with such collaboration with the local authorities as seems desirable.

In Washington the formulation and implementation of the economic and social program shall be under the supervision of the Office of Foreign Territories under Mr. Appleby, assisted by an Inter-departmental Advisory Committee, of which Mr. Appleby shall be chairman, consisting of representatives of State, Army, Lend-Lease, BEW, Treasury and perhaps other agencies. The Office of Foreign Territories shall maintain close liaison with the

appropriate British and other foreign representatives on matters affecting the over-all program, as well as with the military authorities in Washington.

It has been reported to us that a North African economic board or boards has been established but we have no confirmation or knowledge of any details of its organization. We assume, however, that if it exists, it will function as a committee under your Staff.

Full details of the combined U.S.-British organization in Washington which has been established will be brought to you by the Mission.

HULL

---

865C.01/18

*Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1942.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The following is a paraphrase of a radio-gram received from General Eisenhower this morning addressed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

"It is my recommendation that, regardless of questions of ultimate command, a decision be made that administration under American policies of territories liberated in North Africa cease at the eastern boundary of Tunisia. I recommend that the civil administration in Tripolitania be considered as coming within the sphere of the British Chief Political Officer of the Middle East. The effect of this will be to establish the eastern boundary of Tunisia as a line dividing primary responsibilities of civil administration between the United States and Great Britain."

At a conference with the Joint Chiefs of Staff this afternoon the President directed that this matter be referred to the State Department for direct discussion and settlement with the British Foreign Office. In this connection the President clearly indicated that in his opinion all of Tripoli is definitely linked to Tunisia and Northwest Africa both socially and economically. He stated that he felt that the negotiations should be aimed toward including Tripoli under the area of American responsibility. The President stated that this was his opinion but that he would not make any great point of it.

I am sending a radio to General Eisenhower informing him that this matter has been referred to the State Department.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

851R.00/117a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Cole)*

WASHINGTON, December 11, 1942—midnight.

490. For Murphy. Your 1580, December 9.<sup>3</sup> We assume this message was sent either prior to the receipt of General Marshall's and my message to you and General Eisenhower<sup>4</sup> as regards Admiral Darlan's position or before you had a chance to consult with him in regard thereto. We naturally regard the whole North African situation from a military point of view and therefore subordinate to that all civil questions except as they contribute to the military effectiveness. We must consider Darlan's request for Peyrouton in this light and if General Eisenhower considers that failure to agree would result in friction or in any way impair the chances of our greatest military success then the State Department is prepared for the moment to place no obstacles in the way of Darlan's request for Peyrouton. Should General Eisenhower recommend we will be prepared even to facilitate Peyrouton's trip to North Africa.

We feel, however, that in reaching any final judgment on this matter the political connotations involved in Peyrouton's arrival in North Africa should be evaluated particularly in view of his former position as Minister of the Interior in the Vichy Government.

HULL

851R.01/49a

*The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, December 15, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: With reference to the message which Admiral Leahy delivered to me from you this afternoon, I am transmitting herewith the suggested message to be sent by the War Department to General Eisenhower.

If this meets with your approval<sup>5</sup> I shall arrange to have it sent off by the War Department as soon as possible.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

<sup>3</sup> Not found in Department files; for substance, see *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, vol. II, p. 1201.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 95, p. 472.

<sup>5</sup> Approved by President Roosevelt.



[Enclosure]

*Draft of Telegram To Be Sent by the War Department  
to General Eisenhower*

"I am today appointing Mr. Murphy to be my personal representative in North Africa with the rank of Minister. He will continue on General Eisenhower's staff in his present capacity as Civil Affairs Officer until such a time as consultation with the War Department suggests a change.

"The British Government is being informed in the above sense today."

DECEMBER 15, 1942.

---

SS1R.01/67

*Statement Issued to the Press by President Roosevelt,  
December 16, 1942*

Since November 8th the people of North Africa have accomplished much in support of the war effort of the United Nations, and in doing so have definitely allied themselves on the side of liberalism against all for which the Axis stands in government. I am informed in this connection by General Eisenhower that Admiral Darlan has made the following declaration:

"French Africa with the Allies must make the maximum military effort for the defeat of Germany and Italy. This will be accomplished by the unity of all citizens, regardless of their political or religious opinions, in an orderly and cohesive fashion.

"At last liberated from German and Italian restrictions, the French authorities in Africa will adjust the situation which has existed in accordance with French national traditions. Once France and the French Empire is free from the Axis yoke, the French people themselves will decide freely the form of government and national policy they desire.

"In actual accomplishment the high commissioner has already granted full and complete amnesty to all against whom any action had been taken because of sympathy to the Allies. Certain of these have been given important posts in the High Commissariat. He has restored to their proper ranks and emoluments all Army officers who had been suspended from office because of rendering aid to the Allies. He is now organizing a body of representative private citizens to work with him in an advisory and consultative capacity in carrying on official business. Prisoners and internees of the United Nations were promptly released and their travel to seaboard expedited.

"The High Commissioner has begun the restoration of rights to those persons from whom these had previously been taken because of race. Measures have been taken to stop immediately whatever

persecution of the Jews may have resulted from the laws passed in France under German pressure. His announced purpose is to give just treatment to all elements making up the complex North African population to the end that all can dwell and work together under laws insuring mutual tolerance and respect for rights.

"There is little industrial development in North Africa and Vichy laws prejudicial to labor unions had little or no application and all reports show no serious problem here. Censorship of the press and radio in which Allied authorities participate is only that which is necessary for the security of military operation.

"On the practical military side, General Giraud has conducted the most active participation of the Armed Forces of North and West Africa in the Allied war effort. Units of substantial size under the leadership of General Giraud are fighting side by side with the United Nations in Tunisia against the Germans and Italians. All post and airfield facilities including the services of officials and technicians have been made freely available for use by the Allies. North African shipping is already entering the services of the Allied Nations. Railroads, motor trucks, communications, public and private buildings and everything that North Africa has to give have been freely offered to the Allied Forces, wherever a military need exists.

"I have stated emphatically and repeatedly to the Commander in Chief, General Eisenhower, that in leading North and West Africa against Germany and Italy and into the ranks of the United Nations, I seek no assistance or support for any personal ambitions. I have announced that my sole purpose is to save French Africa, help free France and then retire to private life with a hope that the future leaders of France may be selected by the French people themselves and by no one else."

---

851R.01/67

*Press Release Issued by the Department of State, December 17, 1942*

At his press conference today, the Secretary was asked the following question by a correspondent:

"Apart from Admiral Darlan's statement, do you think that those French leaders who are eager to help us in bringing about the defeat of the Axis should now try to cooperate with one and another in the common effort?"

In reply the Secretary made the following statement:

"I have had only one view with respect to the two central points in the international situation as they address themselves especially to the Allied nations, and that view applies universally and not to any one country or one people any more than another. The first central point is that every person in sympathy with the cause of the United Nations and every group of persons and every other one concerned should strive to unify their efforts in the support of the Allied military cause until final success. That is the supreme

and the immediate question that addresses itself to each and all of us alike in every part of the world. We need all the help we can get.

"With the victory won and freedom restored to those who have lost it or who are seeking it, there would then arise under point three of the Atlantic Charter the fullest opportunity for each people to select their leaders and their forms of government. These two central points of the world situation have been expressed heretofore by myself and others."

For the possible assistance of correspondents, point Three of the Atlantic Charter is quoted below:

"Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them."

---

851R.00/504

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1942.

The British Ambassador called to see me this morning at my request.

Lord Halifax spoke about developments in North Africa and the statement issued last night by Admiral Darlan. He said he felt that the statement had helped very much to clarify the situation and would meet with a satisfactory response from public opinion in England as well as in the United States. He told me, for my confidential information, of a personal message he had had last night from Prime Minister Churchill stating that the secret session of the House of Commons with regard to the Darlan question had been completely satisfactory, that the opinion of the members of the House had been practically unanimous in favor of the position taken by the British Government, and that Mr. Churchill had absolutely no "political difficulty" in connection with this matter.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

881.01/105

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In its *aide-mémoire* of December 1, 1942 the British Embassy has brought to the attention of the Department a question raised with Sir Samuel Hoare by the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs

respecting the juridical status of Morocco as effected by the Allied occupation.

Should the question be raised again, this Government concurs in the reply proposed in the second paragraph of the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* to the effect that it is not the intention of the United Nations to interfere with the juridical status of French Morocco or to seek to abolish the post of Resident General.

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1942.

---

551R.00/204 : Airgram

*The Consul General at Casablanca (Russell) to the  
Secretary of State*

CASABLANCA, December 21, 1942—11 a. m.  
[Received January 27, 1943—4 p. m.]

A-9. At the moment of the American landing in Morocco there were some 4,000 persons, excluding French and Moroccans, in workers' camps or internment camps in Morocco. Of these approximately 500 were British, 500 Poles, 50 Czechs, 2,000 Spanish Republicans and 500 ex-Germans and ex-Austrians, the rest being of various nationalities.

All the British were released almost immediately after the termination of hostilities and the greater part of those desiring to go to England have already left on American Army transports returning to the United States.

The local Polish and Czech representatives are making arrangements for their men to be liberated and sent to join their armies in Great Britain.

The Protectorate authorities have informally expressed the desire to have the Spanish Republicans sent to Mexico under the Franco-Mexican agreement of 1939 by which the Mexican Government gives travelling papers and passage to Spanish refugees. These men are of military age but do not wish to join a French unit because of the treatment they received in the camps. They could be used in the Mexican Army. There is, however, no Mexican Consul in Morocco who can arrange their departure. The Department may see fit to bring this situation to the attention of the Mexican Government.

The ex-Germans and ex-Austrians are for the most part Jews who volunteered in the French Army before the Franco-German Armistice and were put in workers camps after that Armistice through German pressure. Those who are not Jews refused to be repatriated in spite of bad conditions in the camps and heavy

pressure from the German Armistice Commission. Most of these men now desire to join a United Nations Army, but not a French unit because of the treatment they received in the camps. Many have offered to enlist in the American Army, but the instructions of the local military authorities do not permit this.

The local press has carried accounts of the formation of a Jewish army in Palestine and an Austrian battalion attached to the American Army. The Consulate has received many offers of service in these two units and would appreciate any information or instructions the Department may desire to give.

For the remaining persons the American military authorities are attempting to organize a voluntary construction battalion.

It may be said that the French authorities are making unnecessary difficulties to prevent the liberation of these persons.

RUSSELL

---

865C.01/13

*The Secretary of State to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy*

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1942.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL LEAHY: With reference to your letter of December 10, 1942 concerning General Eisenhower's recommendation that administration under American policies of territories liberated in North Africa cease at the eastern boundary of Tunisia and that civil administration in Tripolitania be considered as coming within the sphere of the British Chief Political Officer in the Middle East, I have consulted the British Ambassador and have obtained the advice of his Government as follows:

It is the view of the British Government that the dividing line ought clearly to be on the frontier between Tunisia and Tripoli. The Ambassador's letter continues;

"They point out that relations between Tunisia and Tripoli, both social and economic are of the slenderest. Communications are extremely bad and there is no railway. Contact between the two territories before the war was minimized owing to Franco-Italian hostility in the Colonial sphere. It is true that there is a large Italian Colony in Tunisia, but this by itself does not seem to be an argument for drawing a dividing line elsewhere than at the frontier between French and Italian territory.

From the political and administrative point of view it would be inconvenient and illogical to divide Tripoli from Cyrenaica seeing that they were both part of the same administration, and it would obviously be more satisfactory that there should be only one occupying power so as to avoid any divergence of local policy.

The British Chiefs-of-Staff have not yet had an opportunity of discussing the question with their United States colleagues but as a result of preliminary discussion amongst themselves, they take the view that on military grounds the land boundary between the Command of the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, and the Allied Commander-in-Chief should be the frontier between Tunisia and Tripolitania; and they consider that the military and political boundaries should be the same since political control and maintenance of internal security are so closely interlocked.

There are well established economic contacts between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica and it would be undesirable for these to be sundered by a political or administrative dividing line.

The Tripoli-Tunisia frontier has long been an effective currency frontier with exchange control operating on both sides, so as to separate the financial systems of the two territories completely. The whole of the former Italian possessions in Africa except Tripolitania are already under British administration, and arrangements of long standing which have worked quite satisfactorily are in force with regard to the status of the local currency. In particular, an exchange rate of one pound equals 480 Lira has been firmly established. The British Forces have now, in fact, entered Tripolitania and have started to apply the 480 rate there. There is also the point that unless the Tripoli-Tunisia frontier is preserved, United States dollars will find their way into the whole of North Africa, including Egypt and perhaps further into the Middle East. This will be embarrassing to the currency authorities concerned in the same way as widespread use of dollars in Poland after the last war was an embarrassment to the Polish authorities. It would also presumably be unwelcome to the United States Government.

In view of these important practical considerations, I am sure you will agree that the Tripoli-Tunisia frontier is the logical line of division between the two spheres of responsibility."

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

---

740.0011 European War 1939/26733 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State*

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), December 23, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received December 26—2:02 a. m.]

1133. (1) During November and December Schmittlein, then in charge of Fighting French affairs here,\* carried on an active campaign among Russian officials and members of the Diplomatic Corps against our policy in North Africa. He became so emotional on the subject that occasionally even impugned the motives of the United States implying that it was prepared to make a compromise peace

---

\* Maj. Raymond Schmittlein, Military Attaché.

in Europe which would leave Germany and the various Quislings in a dominant position, so that full attention could be devoted to the war in the Far East. On December 7 I had a personal talk with him and pointed out in a friendly manner how foolishly he was behaving. He expressed regret at having talked so irresponsibly and since, although continuing to condemn our policies, has not so far as I am aware questioned our motives.

(2) The Soviet press during November and early December carried numerous Tass reports quoting foreign press criticism of our policy towards Darlan, and minor Soviet officials during that period also on various occasions expressed a lack of understanding of, and even dissatisfaction with, this policy. There was the general impression, therefore, among members of the Diplomatic Corps that the Soviet Government did not approve our attitude towards Darlan. It was probably with the idea that they were following a line pleasing to the Soviet Government that the Czechoslovak Minister and to a lesser extent the Yugoslav Minister have also displayed a tendency to question our policy. Both of these Ministers have shown a friendly attitude towards the United States in the past, and apparently have not questioned our motives so far as Darlan is concerned.

(3) Garreau, the de Gaulle diplomatic representative, has now returned from a visit to London. He called on me yesterday and during our conversation referred with considerable bitterness to our North African policy. He said that he did not question our motives but felt that we were making a serious blunder since Darlan was a traitor condemned to death by the de Gaulle Government, and that French officials adhering to him were minor Quislings. He said that he or any patriotic Frenchman would not hesitate to shoot Darlan on sight. Patriotic Frenchmen were astonished at the attitude displayed by the United States. In view of this attitude he now regretted that the Fighting French had declared war on Japan. They would have been in a better position if they had remained neutral so far as the Far East was concerned. Ninety-nine percent of the population of France considered the Fighting French as the true French Government. Even if the Fighting French did not have the support of the majority of the French people, they were determined to gain control of France and would fight to do so if necessary. He felt that if America should pursue its present policy France might be pushed into civil war. He expressed especial annoyance at the appointment of Murphy as the President's representative in Algiers. He said that the contact between de Gaulle and the United States was through American military authorities, whereas Darlan would now be able to approach the American Government through diplomatic channels.

HENDERSON

851T.00/69 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Dakar (Barnes) to the Secretary of State*

DAKAR, December 23, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received December 25—1:55 p.m.]

523. The Glassford<sup>7</sup> Mission has successfully established contact with the civil, military and naval authorities and is now engaged in full discussion with these authorities of the problems enumerated in the secret directive of December 9 issued to the Mission by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On the whole the French authorities appear ready to cooperate fully. It does not seem likely that those who still entertain reservations such as perhaps the commanding general of the land forces, the commander of the air force and certain naval officers should be able materially to lessen the good results hoped for. On the other hand it is not probable that any United Nations command established here can hope to have the last word with respect to the employment of French West African forces. The Governor General seems really to have made his choice and to possess the authority and force of character necessary to impose decisions so long as matters of high policy or high military strategy with respect to which Darlan would seem to be supreme are not at issue.

Progress has been rapid through the efforts of Generals Fitzgerald, Hyde and Smith who were on the ground here sometime before the arrival of the Mission. Arrangements are now in effect for the construction and the early operation of a temporary airfield for the transport command and for the construction of a new permanent air field for United Nations needs. Materials for the temporary field are now being unloaded from the first American ship to enter this port since September 1940 and army engineer corps personnel of perhaps a thousand are expected soon. It is anticipated that General Fitzgerald now on his way to Washington will remove his headquarters from Accra to Dakar within the next few months.

French authorities while still strongly anti-British understand the primacy of British concern in these waters and have requested that British representatives on Glassford Mission arrive soon. It is probable that such United Nations aid as may be necessary to perfect port facilities can be provided only by us and that the presence of United States Navy construction battalion may be required for a time.

In so far as it can be said that public opinion exists in this colony of 16 million natives and a slight and scattered European population the general attitude of the inhabitants with respect to the Govern-

---

<sup>7</sup> Rear Adm. William A. Glassford, Head of the United States Military Mission to French West Africa. For information on this Mission, see Howe, *The Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Northwest Africa*, pp. 271-272.



ment in the new situation created by our action in Africa seems to be one of "let's wait and see". The contrast between Vichy policy and French objectives at the outset of the war and the resumption now of the earlier position that Germany and not England is the enemy has provided fertile soil for doubt and skepticism. The authorities anticipate that civilian supplies from the United States particularly cotton goods and rice will go far to correct this situation. The presence of American troops although non-combatant of necessity should also have a good effect but energetic employment in the war effort of such French resources and manpower as remain should prove the best antidote to the present confusion and apathy.

The Mission will deal with the problems of civilian supplies and United Nations utilization of the economic resources of the country as the more urgent military and naval problems are disposed of. The imminent arrival of American forces has brought the exchange rate question to the fore.

Repeated to Algiers for Murphy.

BARNES

---

851R 01/90

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] December 24, 1942.

The British Ambassador called at his request and said that sometime ago Mr. Eden<sup>a</sup> had sent Mr. Winant a communication with regard to the civil administration of reoccupied territories and that Mr. Eden would appreciate an indication of our views. I stated that I would be glad to confer with the European Division and let him know what progress is being made on our reply to the British note.

With reference to the request of the British Government for the appointment of a British official to act jointly with Murphy in North Africa under the direction of General Eisenhower I said that this would be agreeable if a similar appointment of an American on the British civilian staff in Libya and the area to the east being occupied by the British would be acceptable to the British Government. The Ambassador thought that this arrangement would be entirely agreeable and said that he would present it to his Government at once.

I referred to the question of a line between British and American jurisdiction in northwest Africa and said that this Government would agree with the British Government for that line to be the boundary between Tunisia and Libya so far as temporary provisional military government is concerned, and that any future phases could be taken up at the proper stages.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

---

<sup>a</sup> Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

851R.01/614

*Memorandum by Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the  
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy\**

WASHINGTON, December 24, 1942.

The President desires that I bring the attached despatch to your attention and that I prepare for him a draft reply.

I shall appreciate receiving, as soon as practicable, your suggestions concerning the reply, as well as any comment you may desire to make on the situation discussed in the Prime Minister's message.

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

[Enclosure]

*Telegram No. 239, December 23, 1942, From Prime Minister  
Churchill to President Roosevelt*

Your number 241. Due to the differences between our systems of government it is impossible to achieve exact similarity. For example, by minister I meant political minister and you think diplomatic minister. Again Murphy is the personal representative of you as head of the state. It would be impossible for me to make a similar appointment of a diplomatic character. The best that can be done is to send Macmillan out as "His Majesty's Government's Political Representative at General Eisenhower's Headquarters", reporting directly to me, and enjoying precise equality of rank with Murphy. Will this suit you? <sup>9a</sup>

In your number 219 of November 20 <sup>9b</sup> you seemed to contemplate the two political representatives being capable of relieving Eisenhower of large part of his political burdens and that real power should be vested in them jointly subject of course to the ultimate military control of the Commander in Chief. I believe this is most urgently necessary as from all I hear the tangles of local French politics and their world implications force themselves into the first place in the military mind and might well become detrimental to operations.

PRIME

\* Addressed to the Secretary of State and the Chief of Staff of the United States Army (Marshall).

<sup>9a</sup> In his telegram No. 247, December 29, President Roosevelt replied: "The designation of Macmillan as 'Minister Resident at Allied Headquarters' is satisfactory to me. It is my understanding that General Eisenhower will continue to have full veto power over all civil officials in the area of operations when in his Eisenhower's opinion such veto is advantageous to military operations or prospects." Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. A White House memorandum of the same date indicated concurrence by the Secretary of State.

<sup>9b</sup> See Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. iv, *The Hinge of Fate* (Boston, 1950), p. 635.

851R.00/120 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the  
Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 25, 1942—2 a. m.  
[Received December 24—10:41 p. m.]

7347. Radio Algiers has just announced that Admiral Darlan was attacked and subsequently died this afternoon and that his assassin was caught and is being questioned.

MATTHEWS

851R.00/1461

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the  
Division of European Affairs (Reber)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1942.

Participants: Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil of General Giraud's Civil Affairs Staff, Mr. Georges-Picot, Liaison Officer with the Giraud mission, Mr. Ray Atherton and Mr. Reber

In discussing the future situation in North Africa Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil said that prior to his departure he had had several discussions with Admiral Darlan, Admiral [General] Giraud and others envisaging the creation of a system in North Africa, which would not only provide adequate administration for North Africa but a framework for the unification of all French elements outside Axis-occupied French territory. The establishment of such a system would, no doubt, now be facilitated by the removal of Admiral Darlan from the scene. The primary objective, naturally, of the organization would be to bring all French elements into the war together.

Lemaigre-Dubreuil felt that this could be achieved through an organization to be headed by General Giraud as High Commissioner. He would be assisted by a consultative group composed of three members to advise him in dealing with civil and political problems so that he could devote his principal energies to the prosecution of the war. These three members would deal respectively with empire problems, relations with other governments and internal North African matters. It is also envisaged that an imperial council and a council composed of the Conseils Généraux of North Africa to be re-established by ordinance would constitute the executive bodies of the organization. The latter, naturally, would deal with North African affairs and would be reconstituted in accordance with the democratic traditions of the Third Republic. The imperial council would include delegates from all unoccupied French territories,

North Africa, New Caledonia, French Equatorial Africa, the French Antilles et cetera.

According to his information, General de Gaulle would be prepared to associate himself in some way with this organization, perhaps by becoming a member himself of the Consultation Committee or the Imperial Council or by appointing delegates to the latter. In any event Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil felt that it was important that contact be re-established with General de Gaulle and hoped for that purpose General de Gaulle's visit to the United States could be expedited as he was empowered by General Giraud to deal directly with de Gaulle in this sense.

If some such organization could be established, thereby creating unity among the various French elements, it would expect early recognition by foreign governments as a provisional government until such a time as the French people are free to signify their own choice of a government.

---

851R.01/87

*Press Release Issued by the Department of State, December 28, 1942*

#### STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The selection of General Giraud to his new post<sup>20</sup> is a most fortunate choice and one that will, I am sure, receive the enthusiastic commendation of all. General Giraud is one of the great military commanders of the world today and his recent selection will result in greater unification of all groups and elements behind his military leadership and will go far to insure the common victory with the restoration of French liberty everywhere.

---

851R 01/181

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Reber)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 28, 1942.

Participants: The Secretary of State; Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil of General Giraud's Civil Affairs Staff; Mr. Georges-Picot, Liaison Officer with the Giraud mission; Mr. Atherton and Mr. Reber

After welcoming Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil to the United States, the Secretary explained the policy which this Government has followed with respect to France since the fall of Paris, emphasizing that the

---

<sup>20</sup> Gen. Henri Honoré Giraud was appointed High Commissioner in French North Africa following the death of Admiral Darlan.

degree of resistance to German aggression by the various French elements provided the basis of American relations with them. After reviewing the position taken in the past and mentioning the policy of dealing with the French authorities on the basis of the foregoing and of their control of French territory, the Secretary asked whether Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil had any views with regard to the relations between General Giraud and General de Gaulle and specifically mentioned the four-point program alleged to have been prepared by the French National Committee in London making it the political representative body for all French elements.

Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil replied indicating that he had no specific information regarding General Giraud's views subsequent to the assassination of Admiral Darlan. He continued, however, that previous to his departure General Giraud's position could be summarized along the following lines:

1. It was at the invitation of the group of Frenchmen who had never accepted the German victory that discussions looking toward the eventual entry of American troops into North Africa had been carried on since 1940. These talks had been directed to the end that France and French North Africa would re-enter the war but as a French entity rather than as the result of American occupation.

2. General Giraud had agreed to return and head the movement upon the basis of a specific accord with Murphy recognizing him as the head of a French Government.

3. Whatever Government that might be established to unify French resistance could only take the form of a provisional government until France should be free.

4. The establishment of some such Government should not be delayed as otherwise time would give the French National Committee ideas regarding its own status and an opportunity to bargain, thus weakening the position of General Giraud.

5. The present indications are that General de Gaulle is prepared to associate himself in some fashion with General Giraud; but such association cannot be along the lines desired by the French National Committee, namely, that entire political control should be exercised by the latter.

6. The necessity for a unified command under the supreme head of General Giraud was inherent in the military situation. (Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil later indicated that whereas the cooperation between General Eisenhower and General Giraud was complete the same could not be said for General Anderson<sup>11</sup> and this difficulty could only be solved by appointing General Giraud to the supreme command.)

<sup>11</sup> Gen. Sir Kenneth A. N. Anderson, Commanding British First Army.

7. General Giraud's group considers that de Gaulle should be brought into the general French organization in the first instance through an association with the Imperial Council and secondly as a military commander in which past technical knowledge and experience would be of extreme value.

---

851.01/984a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom  
(Matthews)*

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1942—4 p. m.

6631. Under date of December 27 Frederick Kuh<sup>12</sup> reports after a luncheon with Prime Minister Churchill, de Gaulle has drawn up the following 4-fold program to meet the new situation in North Africa:

"(1) De Gaulle will remain president of French National Committee, which will assume the administration of all French territory under Allied control.

"(2) The committee will transfer its headquarters from London to Algiers.

"(3) Giraud will be designated commander in chief of all the French armed forces fighting with the Allies.

"(4) General Georges Catroux, Fighting French high commissioner for Syria, will be a candidate for the French high commissionership of North Africa."

Kuh alleges reliable sources for this story. Can you confirm and also whether the origin is from British or French contacts? Repeat your reply to Murphy.

HULL

---

851R.00/131 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, December 29, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received 11 : 45 p. m.]

7408. In private conversation with an American officer friend of long standing, Major Desmond Morton of the Prime Minister's office spoke with some bitterness yesterday of what he termed "the State Department's obstructionist tactics" in opposing the British Government's desire to send a high ranking political adviser to French North Africa "to relieve General Eisenhower of some of the burden

---

<sup>12</sup> Chief of London Bureau of the *Chicago Sun*.

of diplomatic and political negotiations". The officer in question (who knows none of the background) said that according to Morton the British desire to send someone of Cabinet rank "whose authority would be comparable to that of Casey<sup>13</sup> in the Middle East". (Please see my telegrams Nos. 7323, December 24, 2 p. m.; and 7325, December 24, 6 p. m.<sup>14</sup>) Morton added that this political adviser would not have a status similar to that of Murphy "because Murphy is a member of General Eisenhower's staff".

There is no doubt in my mind that our friends here, particularly the Foreign Office, are really unhappy at what they consider the secondary role they have had to play in the North African negotiations. The suggestion of the dangers of crossing wires with General Eisenhower in the extremely delicate and difficult task confronting him should some independent high Allied authority appear on the spot strikes no responsive chord in these quarters. I even hear of occasional casual allusions to "the inexperience of the State Department and of American Generals" in handling French affairs and of our lack of "real understanding of the French state of mind".

The Department may wish to read the foregoing in connection with my telegram No. 7407, December 29, 6 p. m.;<sup>15</sup> and with the following sentences appearing in the Foreign Office Political intelligence summary for the week ending December 16:

"The most recent authoritative reports from Algiers do not paint a very rosy picture either of French or of Arab morale. It is probable that three quarters of the population are sympathetic to the Allies, with an inclination, at any rate in some quarters, *to show friendliness chiefly towards the British*, but it cannot be said that morale is high, or that there is so much enthusiasm for the Allied cause as to create a real widespread desire for active cooperation."

MATTHEWS

---

851R.00/208 : Airgram

*The Consul General at Casablanca (Russell) to the Secretary of State*

CASABLANCA, December 30, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received January 28, 1943—11 a. m.]

A-12. Moroccan public reaction almost 100 percent favorable to appointment of General Giraud. Press of all political tinges has expressed enthusiasm in tones of unusual sincerity. Left and Gaullist elements feel this is a step away from totalitarian tendencies.

<sup>13</sup> Richard G. Casey, British Minister of State Resident in the Middle East.

<sup>14</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>15</sup> Not printed.

Right and monarchists feel Giraud can be trusted to maintain order. Army pleased at reacquiring predominance over Navy and certain that now its expansion and rearming will not be hampered by politicians. Slight luke-warmness observed in Navy and upper circles of Residency where loss of independence and prestige is feared.

All sides unite however in praising Giraud's glorious past, his uncompromising anti-German attitude in past two years and his will to fight. Since all Frenchmen can unite around him they feel that final victory is thus assured.

RUSSELL

---

851R.00/186 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 30, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received 9:30 p. m.]

7441. Department's 6631, December 29, 4 p. m. Kuh was given this story by French contacts at Carlton Gardens. With the possible exception of point 4 it represents closely the views of all the Fighting French. None of them to whom I have talked personally or whose conversations have been reported to me has shown any conception of an agreement with General Giraud and North African elements on any basis other than de Gaulle and National Committee political supremacy. As I have reported (please see my telegram 7407, December 29, 6 p. m.<sup>16</sup>) they consider that de Gaulle is the one man to whom the French people have entrusted their hope for a better future. Furthermore their jobs are at stake. I see no indication that our British friends are endeavoring to discourage the high and unrealistic hopes of the National Committee and de Gaulle's immediate entourage.

Repeated to Murphy.

MATTHEWS

---

<sup>16</sup> Not printed.



851T.24/17

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Thomas C. Wasson of the  
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] December 30, 1942.

Participants: Colonel Connor, OPD,<sup>17</sup> War Department.  
Colonel Ferenbaugh, OPD, War Department.  
Colonel Johnson, OPD, War Department.  
Colonel Magruder, OPD, War Department.  
Mr. Wasson.

I referred to a telegram (no. 523, December 23, 5 p. m.) from Dakar, which mentioned that the Glassford Mission will deal with the problems of civilian supplies and United Nations utilization of the economic resources of French West Africa, and inquired whether any steps had been taken to ship consumers' goods from the United States, particularly cotton goods and foodstuffs, to that area. Colonel Ferenbaugh replied that in so far as he knew the War Department had done nothing about this matter. He went on to say that when General Fitzgerald proceeded to Dakar he filled a large bomber with foodstuffs, including turkeys and canned goods of various kinds, which he gave to the Governor General.

Colonel Ferenbaugh informed me that in any event it will not be possible to send much to French West Africa because of the difficult shipping situation. Exports to that country will of necessity be on a minimum scale. He stated that the French were not placing all of their merchant vessels in the United Nations' shipping pool, and that after those that they were retaining were degaussed they might be used in trade between the United States and French West Africa. In that case they would have to be fitted with guns to protect them against submarines. It was suggested that French naval escort vessels should be equipped with depth charges and that these could be used for convoy purposes along the West African coast.

Colonel Ferenbaugh said that French West Africa could be considered as part of French North Africa in connection with the civilian supply problem, or it could be grouped with British West Africa. The officers present seemed to be of the opinion that a case could be made for special treatment of French West Africa, but that for political reasons it might be expedient to include it with the French North African territories in so far as civilian supplies were concerned. Colonel Ferenbaugh expressed the opinion that the French should participate in the supply program for French West Africa and that it might be well for them to establish a small economic mission in the United States with which the American

<sup>17</sup> Operations Division.

authorities could clear questions involving exports to and imports from that area. A long-range policy could thus be developed and a mutual economy established. He hoped that the French would be required to pay for everything they obtain, with the exception of Red Cross relief, as that would make them feel that they were on an equal footing in the war effort and would enhance their self-respect. Gifts of food and clothing, on the other hand, would not win us any worthwhile friends.

Colonel Johnson remarked that the overall shipping problem was serious and that all available bottoms were required for sending war supplies to the various theaters of operations, and that French West Africa's economy would be governed to a large extent by the amount of shipping which it turned loose. The Combined Transport Committee allocates vessels for particular runs and it is primarily responsible for the overall picture of shipping requirements.

---

740.0011 European War 1939/26849a

*The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am sending you herewith the suggested instruction to General Eisenhower and to Murphy, of which I understand you will also wish to send a copy by cable to Mr. Churchill.

The Secretary asked me to let you know that he approves this suggested statement about policy, but feels very strongly indeed that you should simultaneously make a public statement with regard to our policy towards France and particularly with regard to General de Gaulle's present efforts to obtain complete control over all French territories and activities. He is sending you a suggested draft for such a statement.<sup>13</sup>

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

[Enclosure]

*Suggested Instruction to General Eisenhower and to Mr. Murphy*<sup>13a</sup>

In view of General Giraud's recent conversations with you on the subject of the recognition by the United States of French sover-

<sup>13</sup> Not found in Department files; statement not issued.

<sup>13a</sup> A memorandum in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library of January 9, 1943, by Harry L. Hopkins indicates this was not sent, the President believing a telegram he had sent to Prime Minister Churchill had covered the matter.

eignty in North Africa, and in view of recent statements made by the Fighting French National Committee in London and newspaper articles apparently inspired by the latter relative to the immediate need for the creation of a provisional French government to be installed in North Africa, the President desires that the following statement be sent to you which sets forth the policy of the Government of the United States with regard to the French people and French territory and possessions.

You should be guided by this statement in your conversations with General Giraud as well as in the determination of all questions which have inherent in them political aspects.

The supreme objective of the United States is the defeat of the Axis powers, and in the achievement of that objective, in cooperation with the other United Nations, the Government of the United States desires the cooperation of all elements of French resistance.

It hopes that General de Gaulle and all other elements of French resistance will be willing to cooperate with General Giraud as Commander-in-Chief of the French forces in North Africa in every effective and practicable manner for the attainment of the defeat of Germany and her allies. The Government of the United States believes that satisfactory arrangements of a military character can undoubtedly be made between General Giraud and General de Gaulle for the coordination of such cooperative effort between them and their associates. Such coordination would provide a basis for this Government to work with a unified French command, and would be favored by the United States.

Effective protection of French interests abroad may be worked out as the situation develops.

The Government of the United States will continue the policy it has pursued since June 1940 of dealing, in all French territories, with the French authorities in effective control of such territories actively resisting the Axis. The Government of the United States recognizes the sovereignty of the French people over French territories and, subject solely to the rights legitimately pertaining to its military forces, desires that civil administration by French authorities in North Africa be maintained. The relationship of the United States to such civil administration will remain incidental to its military operation.

The Government of the United States, as one of its war objectives, intends, in cooperation with the other United Nations, to bring about the liberation of France. It will take no step which will in the slightest degree impair the right of the French people to determine with complete freedom their own destinies and to select their own government, once France has been liberated. It considers that the most effective results for all concerned can be attained if the military

effort is kept divorced from political considerations. For these reasons, the Government of the United States will not accord recognition to any provisional government of France, no matter how constituted and no matter where constituted, until the French people have themselves been afforded the opportunity freely to select such government.

The Government of the United States therefore believes that until such time has come, its cooperation with the forces of French resistance in North Africa and elsewhere must properly be concentrated along the lines of military and naval endeavor and in the rendering of such relief and economic assistance as may be found desirable and necessary by the French authorities in North Africa and in other French territories.

---

851R.20/49a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom  
(Matthews)*

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1942—9 p. m.

6662. A draft telegram<sup>19</sup> outlining our position in North Africa was presented to the White House this morning.

To clear any possible misunderstanding the contents of such a telegram should not be communicated to anyone until further specific instructions are received.

HULL

---

851R 50/29

*Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall),  
to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1942.

The following paragraph is quoted from a personal letter received this morning from General Eisenhower:

"This morning I received your telegram concerning the functions of the State Department in developing the economy of this particular theater. I agree with every word of it and I can assure you that no trouble whatsoever will occur in the execution of the plan. I shall be obliged if you will assure the Secretary of State of my desire to assist him in every possible way. The sooner I can get rid of all these questions that are outside the military in scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live ten years each week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters."

G. C. MARSHALL

---

<sup>19</sup> *Supra*.

## RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE FREE FRENCH FORCES

711.51/1984

*Memorandum by Mr. Samuel Reber of the Division of  
European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] January 12, 1942.

In July 1941 M. Pleven, a representative of General de Gaulle,<sup>20</sup> arrived in the United States in order to establish some basis of relation between this country and the Free French Movement. M. Pleven was introduced by the British Ambassador and presented a memorandum<sup>21</sup> regarding the principal needs of the Free French, particularly as regards the colonial possessions under their authority. These involved primarily shipping and certain supplies. M. Pleven was informed that this Government was thoroughly sympathetic with these requirements of the French colonial possessions under General de Gaulle's authority and arrangements were made to permit purchases of quantities of non-military supplies. At the instance of the Department the Barber Line, an American company, agreed to call at Free French ports in Equatorial Africa. The Red Cross has allotted a supply of drugs and pharmaceutical products. With regard to military supplies, the Department recommended on July 16 that the British Embassy be informed, and the Consul at Leopoldville<sup>22</sup> was instructed, that the question of military supplies to the Free French colony could be treated as part of the problem of aid to Great Britain to be delivered under the terms of the Lend-Lease Act.<sup>23</sup> Requests from the Free French authorities were to be treated as an integral part of aid to the British and would be given equal consideration when presented through British channels.

This was implemented on November 11 by the President's declaration in the form of a letter to the Lend-Lease Administrator which stated that "in order to enable you to arrange for Lend-Lease aid to the French Volunteer Forces (Free French) by way of retransfer from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom or their allies, I hereby find that the defense of any French territory under the control of the French Volunteer Forces (Free French) is vital to the defense of the United States." It was agreed with M. Pleven that Free French naval vessels could enter American ports for repairs on the same status as British war vessels, it being understood that arrangements should be made through the British Admiralty which at that time was coordinating Free French naval effort with its own.

<sup>20</sup> Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the National Committee of the Free French at London.

<sup>21</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, pp. 573, 574.

<sup>22</sup> Patrick Mallon.

<sup>23</sup> Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

In order that the needs of the strategically important Free French colony of Equatorial Africa might be properly evaluated as well as its military requirements a commission composed of an Army officer, a naval officer and a representative of the Department of State was despatched to Brazzaville in September.<sup>24</sup> The naval and State Department members have returned to the United States and the latter's report setting forth the needs of the colony in detail as well as the possibilities for increased trade was concluded late in December and is now under study by the appropriate officials of the Government.

A Free French Delegation which is in constant contact with the Department of State as well as with other departments of the Government, has been established in Washington and relations with it have been on a very cordial basis in so far as this Department is concerned. Upon received [*receiving*] an official notification of the constitution of the French National Committee in London the Department of State replied officially as follows:

"I have been directed by the Secretary of State to express appreciation of your courtesy in thus notifying this Government of the constitution of the National Committee in London and of the relationship of the authorities of certain French territories with the aforesaid Committee. The policy of this Government as regards France is based upon the maintenance of the integrity of France and of the French Empire and of the eventual restoration of the complete independence of all French territories. Mindful of its traditional friendship for France this Government has deeply sympathized with the desire of the French people to maintain their territories and to preserve them intact. In its relations with the local French authorities in French territories, the United States will be governed by the manifest effectiveness with which those authorities endeavor to protect these territories from domination and control by those powers which are seeking to extend their rule by force and conquest, or by the threat thereof."

---

851.01/379

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 9, 1942.

M. Tixier<sup>25</sup> came in to see me today by reference from Mr. Ather-ton.<sup>26</sup>

I said that in view of the fact that M. Tixier was now discussing not merely European questions but also African and Pacific ques-

---

<sup>24</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, pp. 570 ff.

<sup>25</sup> Adrien Tixier, Head of the Free French Delegation in Washington. For M. Tixier's report of his interview with Secretary of State Hull on January 19, 1942, see Charles de Gaulle, *War Memoirs*, vol. I: *The Call to Honour, 1940-1942, Documents*, p. 263.

<sup>26</sup> Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

tions as well, we had thought he might wish a broader field of contact than his previous talks with Eu.<sup>28</sup> For this purpose, I hoped I could be of service. M. Tixier said he was glad of this.

I then said that we hoped certain matters could be more definitely channeled through him as means of communication. I referred especially to requests for visas for Free French officials who came and went in the United States.

I said that I had recently heard with great unhappiness that Admiral Muselier<sup>29</sup> had applied for a visa and had been refused. On examination it developed that he had merely discussed coming to the United States with our Minister in Canada and had never applied for a visa. Had he applied, I was certain it would have been granted. Accordingly, to prevent further misunderstanding, I hoped that Free French officials desiring visas might present their requests through their representatives here. Our policy, I told him, was to give the most favorable consideration possible to all requests presented by the Free French Delegation in Washington.

M. Tixier said that he would be glad to act in that capacity. He had previously sent cables requesting that this be done; but unfortunately his committee had not seen fit to follow up and as a result, requests for visas were presented in all sorts of differing contacts.

I said that in future I thought we might properly suggest to our people that when requests for visas were presented, the applicant be requested to communicate with the Free French Delegation here, in which case we would give prompt and sympathetic consideration to any recommendation they might make.

M. Tixier on his own motion then brought up the problem of a French military mission. He said that he had never been informed that the Free French desired to have a military mission here. The first he knew about it was when a request for visas had been presented on behalf of Colonel de Chevigné as head of such a mission. This, he thought, was not the way to go at it and, in any event, he (Tixier) on learning of the matter, had urged that there be not a military mission but a couple of regular military attachés stationed here.

I said that I hoped M. Tixier would inform his people that we should be glad to receive a Free French military mission and would be glad to know the names of the men they wished to send. In the alternative, if they wished to send military attachés here, I saw no objection to that. Naturally, I did not undertake to enter into discussions as to whether it should be a military mission or a group of attachés.

---

<sup>28</sup> Division of European Affairs.

<sup>29</sup> Adm. Emile Muselier, Free French National Commissioner for Navy

M. Tixier said he understood that perfectly.

I said I understood the situation to be that no request was now made because the question as to whether there should be a mission or group of attachés was still unsettled between the Free French Delegation and the French National Committee; we would await word from them and would be glad to arrange for appropriate visas on learning their wishes in the matter.

M. Tixier then brought up the request which had been made from London that the United States issue a declaration of intention in respect of the French colonies in the Pacific, particularly Nouméa and Tahiti. He said that Admiral de Coux<sup>30</sup> had been broadcasting, saying that the United States recognized the neutrality of France and recognized Admiral de Coux as the authority in the Pacific. He himself knew that this was quite untrue but that the Governor of Nouméa feared lest these broadcasts might be undermining his authority.

I referred to the message which we had sent to him for transmission to General de Gaulle in our letter of January 22, 1942<sup>31</sup> (this being the statement suggested by the United States General Staff). I said that I had no reason to believe that that message had ever reached Nouméa.

M. Tixier said that he had sent the message and that he had received a note from his government saying that it had been forwarded but that he was by no means sure it had been received. He asked if we could not send the message to our consul there, under his name, for transmission to the Governor.

I said I would consult my associates but I saw no reason why we should not do this.

M. Tixier observed that a public statement would, of course, be far more to the point and he hoped we could do this.

I said that speaking frankly and confidentially, I hoped he would put this request on one side, and bring it up in another couple of weeks or so. I hoped meanwhile that he might use his influence to see that none of the work going forward in Nouméa should be interrupted.

I said it was perfectly plain that the allegations made by Admiral de Coux were contrary to every statement of policy and every act of ours. He had turned over ships and rice to the Japanese; had adopted declarations and generally behaved himself in a manner which was anything but neutral.

I did not, however, think that this time the best interests of all would be served by a public declaration and therefore suggested that

---

<sup>30</sup> Adm. Jean Decoux, Vichy High Commissioner for French possessions in the Pacific.

<sup>31</sup> Not printed; it stated that measures were being initiated for the defense of New Caledonia (811.34551L/5).



he bring this up somewhat later when perhaps conditions might be more favorable.

M. Tixier seemed to understand the situation and agreed.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

---

811.111 W.R./888

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 11, 1942.

M. Tixier came in to see me, at his request. He raised two problems:

(1) He wished to inform us that henceforth the Free French Delegation would issue visas in respect of persons desiring to enter Free French territory, and would charge a fee for so doing. He proposed to send a note to that effect. He did not wish to send it if we were to reject the contention, and asked our view.

I observed that my impression was that in practice the Free French were issuing visas now. The note amounted to a unilateral statement on their part of something which was actually going on.

M. Tixier said that this was true but that what he really hoped was that we would issue instructions to our missions directing them to accept Free French visas. Obviously the Vichy Government could not grant visas to these places, and equally obviously, the need of control over people coming into Free French Africa and New Caledonia was pressing.

I said I noted his observation and that there would be no objection to his giving us notification as suggested. I would consider what, if any, further instructions should be given to our people. M. Tixier said that their most important instructions ought to be given in New York, since whenever the New York officials charged with determining whether an individual could leave the United States ran across a French visa, they promptly telephoned to find out what it was all about. I said we would take this situation up.

(2) M. Tixier said that the problem of issuing Free French passports had now come up. Free Frenchmen could not easily get passports from the Vichy Government, and in many cases did not want them. Free French officials naturally did not ask for such passports. Without some kind of document Free Frenchmen could not move in or across American territory. The United States had ample control through its own visa machinery and he thought we might now accept Free French passports.

I said I would consult with my associates and give him a definite answer. It was not our policy to prevent the movement of Free Frenchmen by either denying them a mechanism by which they could attain an American visa, or forcing them to abide by the determination of the Government at Vichy.<sup>32</sup>

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

---

851.01/368

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 19, 1942.

Mr. Tixier called on Mr. Welles by appointment today, and the latter said he was very glad to welcome him for the first time. Mr. Tixier said that he came in to see Mr. Welles because he was leaving Washington within a short time and he desired to talk with the Under Secretary and specifically raise the question as to his attitude and the future attitude of this Government towards the Free French Movement. He went on to say that he had never met General de Gaulle himself but if he was able to establish a satisfactory relationship with the Free French Movement once he arrived in London, naturally the first question they would ask of him would be the attitude of this Government not only towards himself but towards the Free French Movement in general. Mr. Welles said that he would like to answer the question but before undertaking to do so he would be very appreciative if Mr. Tixier would be a little more precise as to what his question entailed. Mr. Tixier said the Free French Movement had been begun as a military movement by a French General who was not willing to accept the surrender of France and therefore sought to continue a military effort against Germany. This latter developed into a movement of gathering political importance with headquarters in London. General de Gaulle had not only established military but also political contacts with the British and later this had developed into the formation of the French National Committee in London which was now a recognized movement by the British Government. He said it was from that point of view he was making his inquiry of Mr. Welles. The Under Secretary replied that he appreciated Mr. Tixier's statement but of course the latter must realize the position of the British Government and that of ours was quite dissimilar and even the

---

<sup>32</sup> On March 6, 1942, the Department sent instructions to its diplomatic and consular officers to accept "Free French" passports presented by citizens of France who adhered to the cause of General de Gaulle.

backgrounds were not the same. However, he was disposed to examine Mr. Tixier's question and, in the meantime, if Mr. Tixier wished to add any further details it would enable Mr. Welles to have a more complete background for reflection on the matter until Mr. Tixier returned from London. Mr. Tixier said that he did not know exactly when he was leaving for London; it was always a question of priorities. Mr. Welles requested that Mr. Atherton get in touch with Mr. Burke<sup>33</sup> and do everything to facilitate the early departure Mr. Tixier desired. Mr. Tixier thanked Mr. Welles and stated that in his relations since he came here, in the first instance with the European Division, he had received most cooperative treatment, and his contacts with Mr. Atherton and Mr. Reber had been marked by the utmost cordiality and friendliness. This was, however, not the entire recognition that he sought and the question he raised with Mr. Welles was whether the Free French Movement would be recognized by the American Government. Mr. Tixier went on to say he did not pretend as the representative of that movement here to exclude the efforts of all other Frenchmen the world over who were working for the interests of the French people and the restoration of France, but it would give great encouragement to the Free French Movement if the American Government would deal with him as the official representative of a group of Frenchmen headed by General de Gaulle who had definitely established aims. Mr. Tixier added that he hoped that upon his return he might be able to report that the Free French Movement was going to base its policies and its activities upon the basis of individual liberty and democracy for the France of the future. Mr. Welles replied that in that event he felt confident that he would be able to give him a satisfactory and encouraging reaction on the part of this Government.

Mr. Tixier then touched in a very vague manner on the St. Pierre-Miquelon situation.<sup>34</sup> He stressed the fact that he had given no public statements in this matter and was being much criticized for not having dramatized the situation more from his angle. He expressed appreciation to Mr. Welles for having received him.

R[AY] A[THERTON]

---

<sup>33</sup> Presumably Thomas Burke, Chief of the Division of International Communications.

<sup>34</sup> For correspondence with regard to the St. Pierre-Miquelon situation, see pp. 654 ff.

851.01/890 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the  
Secretary of State*

LONDON, March 26, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received March 26—9:45 p. m.]

1453. I received a call from Tixier, Chief of the Free French Delegation at Washington, who is shortly returning to the United States. I found him unhappy over the situation he has found here. He feels that neither the British Government nor our own "understands" the situation in France and that General de Gaulle and his entourage at Carlton Gardens are equally devoid of all "sense of realism". His thesis is briefly this: France must again become a battle field before the end of the war. The seeds of resistance which exist in France should therefore be carefully nurtured. Those seeds of resistance are only to be found in the "people". De Gaulle and his followers, he says, have no contact with "the people". Specifically what he wants, apparently, is to have the British through clandestine means bring over a few trusted persons who will subsequently return to France and organize for "the day". He finds the Free French headquarters here so occupied with "their own petty squabbles" as to be unable to give that leadership "devoid of self-seeking" which the movement requires.

While he touched on it only briefly, I gather that his criticism of our Government is not the maintenance of relations with Vichy but alleged efforts to discourage financially generous and well-disposed groups in the United States from giving that material and moral aid that he would like to see.

Tixier impressed me, as he apparently has the British, as honest and intelligent. Whether, however, in view of his own long absence from his country, he has a proper evaluation of the situation in France today and of the sentiments of his fellow countrymen I am not sure. I thought the Department might be interested, however, in a brief account of his views and his impressions since arriving here.

MATTHEWS

851.01/452a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, May 2, 1942—5 p. m.

1920. For your information the following background is submitted with regard to the present status of discussions held with Tixier

after his return from London. Tixier has informed the Department that his trip to England convinced him that General de Gaulle is the only possible representative of the French Resistance Movement both in France and abroad and that it was his hope that the Movement could be strengthened as a national movement of French resistance. According to Mr. Tixier's account, representatives of the principal labor resistance movement in France had sent representatives to London to confer with General de Gaulle and to accept him as the head of French resistance, civil and military, under certain specified conditions. These conditions which the General is said to have accepted are in general as follows:

1. A declaration by General de Gaulle that he is the enemy of any regime of personal power; in other words, that he is against dictators.

2. A declaration that the internal resistance of France is organized by the democratic people of France and that General de Gaulle realizes if he wishes to collaborate and represent all elements of French resistance, both external and internal, that he is a full participant of a democratic France for that country after the war.

3. A declaration by the General that his power was only provisional and that after the war if he is in such a position of power he will not hesitate to return that power to the French people and call a national assembly along established lines to decide the future of France.

In communicating this decision of the General to the Department, Tixier asked whether it would be possible to issue some further official statement in the name of the American Government, giving encouragement to the Free French Movement under General de Gaulle, since various Free French elements had been at a loss to understand why this had not been done. He was informed that the policy of this Government had been and would continue to be to give the broadest possible encouragement to all elements resisting aggression and at the moment, since the war was in progress, this encouragement has been given on military lines. Mr. Tixier then went on to say that the declarations as set forth above which General de Gaulle had agreed to make, had not yet been made since the timing of them was dependent upon the results of Tixier's conversations in Washington. When he was asked for an explanation of why the two subjects were related, he said that naturally General de Gaulle would be influenced by the importance which the American Government attached to the acceptance by the labor syndicates in France of General de Gaulle as leader, but Tixier was not willing to pursue the point that General de Gaulle in accepting to become the national leader of French resistance had undertaken to issue the statements, as stated had been agreed with the labor syndicates.

He was informed that new issues had been raised by his request which would have to be considered, but in the meanwhile positive assurance could be given that the President and Secretary of State were intensely sympathetic with the resistance by the Free French.

The British Embassy has likewise communicated to Dept. on behalf of the Foreign Office a statement<sup>35</sup> that the British Government would continue to recognize the French National Committee on existing lines as competent to represent such Frenchmen and French territories as have rallied to the Movement and has expressed the hope that this Government announce some similar recognition. These requests are being given very careful consideration in the Department, but it would be of value in determining what sort of statement can be issued if General de Gaulle's final decision as to the issue of the declarations requested by French labor, could be ascertained.

HULL

---

851.01/496

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 8, 1942.

The British Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at his request. The Ambassador first of all handed me the memorandum, herewith attached<sup>36</sup> which contains information received from his Government concerning the reaction of the Free French Committee in London to the occupation by the British of Madagascar.<sup>37</sup>

The Ambassador then went on to discuss the general topic of the Free French movement. He said he had discussed this question with the Secretary of State the other day<sup>38</sup> and he had rather gained the impression that Mr. Hull and he were at cross purposes. He asked me if I would clarify the situation for him and let him have more specific information regarding the position of this Government in the matter.

I said that Secretary Hull had spoken with me regarding his conversation with the Ambassador and that it had seemed to me that the Secretary of State had outlined our position as clearly as possible, granted the somewhat fluid state in which the Free French movement and everything relating to it found themselves.

---

<sup>35</sup> Not found in Department files.

<sup>36</sup> Not printed.

<sup>37</sup> For correspondence with regard to the occupation of Madagascar, see pp. 687 ff.

<sup>38</sup> See memorandum by the Secretary of State, May 4, p. 182.

I said that I had not, however, had an opportunity of discussing the question in full detail with Secretary Hull and that I had not discussed the matter fully recently with the President and that I consequently wished to make it clear that the statement I was about to make to the Ambassador was to be regarded as entirely individual and in no sense an exposition of the considered or final position of this Government.

I stated that in my opinion this Government should never undertake to recognize any French national committee as a French government in exile. I said that I made this statement because of my belief that neither the British nor the United States Government had any right to determine for the French people what their government should be after the war since such a government could only be determined upon by the French people themselves. I added that if we undertook now to accord recognition to a French group as the legitimate government of France in exile, we would undertake to do something that was purely fictitious, that would exasperate French public opinion and strengthen the hand of the Germans, and that, finally, would constitute a step which would result in placing certain French individuals in a preferential position should they seek to utilize such position to further their own selfish political ends.

At the same time, I said, it was very clear to me that the Free French movement as represented by General de Gaulle and his associates was rapidly falling to pieces. Knowledge of the situation in London and in the United States made this particularly clear. I said I thought that the result of this would be exceedingly unfortunate both on the morale of the French people in occupied and in unoccupied France and likewise from a purely practical standpoint because of the fact that it made it infinitely more difficult for the United Nations to deal with French colonies and territories not under the control of Vichy from the military and naval standpoint.

It was my thought, therefore, that a solution could be found through the creation, as a result of United States and British agreement, of a French national committee composed of not more than fifteen persons, representative of all tendencies among the French people, who were determined to resist Germany and to assist in the fight for the regaining of French independence. It seemed to me, I said, that the sole requirements should be that the individuals forming this committee be undistained from the standpoint of French public opinion from the political or financial point of view, and that they be really representative of liberal democratic French thought. Such a committee I felt should have no executive authority, but should be primarily consultative and

perhaps be given some administrative control with regard to civilian administration in Free French colonies. If this were done obviously General de Gaulle should be a member of such committee and should perhaps be recognized as having supreme command both over Free French military and naval forces. If General de Gaulle and this committee could pull together in the manner prescribed, I felt that the beginning of a solution might be achieved. If further developments took place, of course this rudimentary idea might have to be modified or expanded, as the case might be.

In any event, I said some step in my judgment should promptly be taken by the British and United States Governments in order to avert a complete collapse of any semblance of unity among the Free French elements.

The Ambassador asked if I would talk with him again on this subject after this Government had reached a more considered point of view and I said that I should be glad to see that he was kept informed.

---

851.01/496

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 11, 1942.

The British Ambassador called to see me this evening. The Ambassador went over, point by point and step by step, the views I had expressed to him in my previous conversation<sup>39</sup> regarding the remedial measures which I thought should be taken concerning the Free French movement in general. Lord Halifax said that he had reported fully to his Government his last conversation with me on this subject but that he had not as yet received any views from his Government. I said I thought it urgently necessary that, at least in general terms, our two Governments agree as to the steps which should be taken. I said that if we agreed with regard to the general policy to be pursued, the Ambassador would be handed an *aide-mémoire* putting down in writing in full detail the steps which, in our judgment, should now be undertaken. I said it was very clear that the course of events was moving rapidly and that the relations of this Government with the French Government in Vichy might be modified drastically in the near future. If that were the case, I said it certainly would be desirable, not only from the standpoint of this Government but from the standpoint of the British Government as well, that French resistance to Germany throughout the world be effectively focused and that I saw no way in which this

---

<sup>39</sup> See *supra*.



could be done except through the creation of an effective representative French national committee, of which General de Gaulle would be a part but by which he would be controlled to a far greater degree than had been the case during the past two years. At the present moment, I said, the Free French movement was breaking to pieces not only in England and in the United States but in every other part of the world and it was of supreme importance that this breakdown be averted before it was too late. I said I saw no way in which this could be corrected except in the manner we had proposed. The Ambassador said he would immediately cable his Government and get its views which he would promptly communicate to the Department of State.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

851.01/472

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Berle)*

[Extract]

[WASHINGTON,] May 12, 1942.

M. Tixier came in to see me today at his request.

Tixier then started in on Martinique.<sup>39a</sup> He said he had received instructions to give us a note but before giving it, he wanted to talk to me. His Committee wished to discuss questions raised both by Madagascar and by Martinique. They considered that the Free French Movement had as its principal object the bringing of all French territory into the war against the Axis. Accordingly, they considered:

- (1) That they were entitled to be associated with every military effort to seize any part of French territory, and
- (2) That they were entitled to the government of these territories as and when recovered.

I said that this communication raised two separate and distinct points.

The first was military. I could not admit that military measures were the subject of discussion along these lines. The armed forces had to take such measures as were needed for their safety. I was by no means clear that bringing Frenchmen of the Free French Movement to fight other Frenchmen was a sound military principle, since thus far it had resulted in the killing of Frenchman by Frenchman, and in great bitterness.

---

<sup>39a</sup> For correspondence regarding French possessions in the Caribbean, see pp. 611 ff.

The second point was political. As to Madagascar, I imagined that the participation of the Free French in the government of that island was more properly a matter for discussion between the Free French Committee in London and the British Government than for discussion in Washington. As to Martinique, we were acting only in the military plane, the object being to immobilize the French forces there. I did not consider that we were dealing with political matters at this time.

Tixier said that our communiqué<sup>40</sup> went farther than that. It intimated that we were recognizing Admiral Robert<sup>41</sup> as the governor of the possessions.

I said that he had misinterpreted the situation. What was proposed was not an occupation of Martinique but the military immobilization of forces there. Naturally there would be no change in government unless American forces were compelled to move in. Only when that happened would the problem of a changed government arise.

I said I permitted myself to give M. Tixier two words of personal advice in this matter. The first was that it would be, in my judgment, highly unwise to raise the question of the political status of the French islands and of Guiana at this time. Once that discussion was opened, there were other strong nations lying close by who might have something to say about it; and it was vastly better to leave the matter in abeyance.

Second, I said I thought the Free French might seriously consider learning how to govern the territories they had before insisting on an absolute right to undertake the government of others.

I said we all hoped, of course, that the Free French Movement might so evolve that it might have a wider scope; but that there was a great deal of work to be done first.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

---

851.01/847

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 13, 1942.

M. Tixier, the delegate of the de Gaulle committee, called to see me this afternoon at his request.

M. Tixier first handed me a copy of a message<sup>42</sup> addressed by General de Gaulle to the French resistance organizations which M.

---

<sup>40</sup> See press release of May 9, Department of State *Bulletin*, May 9, 1942, p. 391.

<sup>41</sup> Adm. Georges Robert, Supreme Commander of French Islands in the Western Hemisphere.

<sup>42</sup> Not printed.

Tixier had received yesterday by telegram. He said this would show how greatly General de Gaulle's manner of thinking had developed since the General had been in touch with important leaders of French resistance and particularly since his, Tixier's, recent conversations with de Gaulle in London. M. Tixier asked me to read the document, which I did hastily, and I then said that it seemed to me interesting and that I would read it more carefully when I had more leisure.

M. Tixier then said (having evidently received some information from the British Embassy with regard to my recent conversation with Lord Halifax on this subject) that General de Gaulle and he were heartily in favor of enlarging and strengthening the membership of the French National Committee, but within certain very definite limits. He stated that he had received a message from General de Gaulle saying that the leaders would be willing to cooperate in enlarging the French National Committee, providing that the following categories of persons were not to be included therein: (a) individuals who were in any way connected with the signing of the French armistice or who had opposed the departure of the French Government to North Africa; (b) individuals who had cooperated with the Germans through association with the Vichy government; and (c) individuals who had openly attacked and criticized General de Gaulle and his associates.

M. Tixier said he wished, by General de Gaulle's instructions, to know what I thought of these limitations.

I stated that I was surprised by this request, inasmuch as any discussions which I might have with M. Tixier were not on a personal basis but purely in my official capacity. I said that in that capacity and speaking for my Government, I wished to make it very clear that questions of this character were regarded in Washington as matters for the French who were cooperating in resistance to the Axis powers to determine for themselves. I said that it was, however, very decidedly the opinion of this Government that in the interest of the restoration of France and in the interest of the great objective which the Free French and the peoples of the United Nations both were endeavoring to achieve, namely, the defeat of the Axis powers, it seemed in the highest degree desirable that all elements among the French people sincerely resisting the Axis powers might be joined together in a common effort and might not be split by internecine feuds which had had and which were increasingly having a disastrous effect upon public opinion in this country. I said it seemed unbelievable in the present state of world affairs that French men and French women, who were supposedly determined to do their utmost to further the victory of the United Nations, should be spending ninety-five percent of their time in

petty quarrels of the character which was only too evident among the Free French in the United States and in England.

[Here follow accounts of complaints by Mr. Welles regarding inaccurate and unfriendly reports as to his conversations with former French Premier Camille Chautemps on a personal matter, and regarding M. Tixier's criticism of another Free French official.]

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

851 01/4523

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Ambassador reported to the Foreign Office the substance of his conversations with Mr. Welles on May 9th [8th?] and May 12th [11th?] with regard to the Free French Movement, and in particular Mr. Welles' tentative proposal that the United States Government and His Majesty's Government should work together with a view to reorganizing and strengthening the French National Committee, which might be composed of, say, 15 representative Frenchmen. The function of this Committee would, Mr. Welles suggested, be consultative with the United States Government and His Majesty's Government, though it might also enjoy an administrative character with regard to the Free French Colonies. In no sense, however, should it be a government to which political recognition would be extended now or later. General de Gaulle ought to be a member and might naturally be the military member, with such responsibilities as the Committee might entrust to him. Wherever the Committee was located, Mr. Welles attached importance to having responsible representatives established in Washington. Mr. Welles also mentioned one or two names of persons who might suitably be members of the Committee or who might be consulted as to its constitution.

Lord Halifax has now received the views of His Majesty's Government on these suggestions and on the general Free French situation. The aims of His Majesty's Government are to encourage French resistance to the Germans in every way that they can, and to bring back into the war as much of the French Empire as possible in the hope that a fighting France may be able to take her place at the Peace Conference as one of the United Nations. For this reason, the closest contact with the people of France itself must be developed. The future of France and of Europe itself requires that efforts should be made to guide events along these lines.

His Majesty's Government agree that it would be a mistake for the

United States Government either to recognize the National Committee as a Government, or to go further than His Majesty's Government have done in the degree of recognition to be accorded to them.

General de Gaulle has many defects but he has brought over important French territories, kept the French flag flying in the war, and made himself a symbol of resistance in Occupied France, which contains over two-thirds of the French population and where the tempo of resistance is rising. He has made a better impression on militant resisters in France than on men like General Odic, who have no first-hand knowledge of French popular feeling. The temper of the French people is shown by their acts of sabotage, while the violent attacks made on *Gaullisme* by German controlled propaganda indicate that he is regarded as inspiring the French to resist. If he were to disappear, there would be no obvious French personality to put in his place.

General de Gaulle has recently drawn up a declaration concerning the war aims of the French people, a copy of which is attached.<sup>43</sup> This declaration was communicated to certain organizations in France, and may have provoked the following references to General de Gaulle contained in a May Day message from the Trade Unionists of France to the International Federation of Trade Unions:

"Our representative, the representative of the people of France, General de Gaulle, fights with the Allies. Although his army is still small, a huge imprisoned force is behind him in France. The enemy will not perhaps always be able to keep this force enchained."

The Frenchman with whom General de Gaulle's declaration was negotiated is regarded in London as a reliable person and he stated that the resisters in France were behind de Gaulle.

The best solution of the problem in the view of His Majesty's Government would be that General de Gaulle should put his house in order and form a more broadly based Committee, bringing in at least a few more people of independent mind, who would not obey blindly, as do the members of the present Committee, whatever orders de Gaulle may give. The British authorities are trying to bring to London some leaders of the "Liberation" movement of left wing sympathies, who could speak with authority for opinion in France and who would not hesitate to stand up to de Gaulle. Thus reinforced the Committee might become an effective body. In view of its governmental responsibilities in respect of the Free French territories, the Committee must necessarily have executive functions and cannot be of a merely consultative character. The time may also have come for de Gaulle to launch a programme of wider appeal under which he might bring over many of those Frenchmen outside

---

<sup>43</sup> Filed separately under 851.01/847; not printed.

France who have hitherto refused to join him. On the military side, de Gaulle already has some excellent officers of whom he might make better use.

For the reasons given above, His Majesty's Government consider that it would be impossible to reduce the General to a lesser position than that of President of the Committee. Moreover, his followers would not tolerate it. In commenting on local reactions to the recent British action in Madagascar, and the American action in the French West Indies, which are assumed to have been taken without consultation with the Free French Movement, His Majesty's Consul at Brazzaville has reported that opinion in French Equatorial Africa is already gravely disturbed. Feeling is running so high that the Governor General has felt it necessary to send instructions to the Provincial Governors that discussion of the situation should be discouraged and anti-Allied criticism repressed. His Majesty's Consul has stated that in his opinion there is no chance at all of all of the Free French African territories remaining with the United Nations should de Gaulle retire to his tent.

Since the main centre of French resistance is among the twenty-eight million in Occupied France, His Majesty's Government think that the seat of the Committee would have to remain in London but they entirely agree with the United States Government on the importance of its suitable and adequate representation in Washington.

As regards the composition of the Committee, His Majesty's Government fear that it would not be practicable for the United States Government and His Majesty's Government to hand pick its members. As already stated, it is hoped considerably to strengthen the Committee by the addition of representatives of the resistance movements in France. His Majesty's Government doubt whether any of the Frenchmen in the United States, with the possible exceptions of M. Léger<sup>44</sup> and Professor Maritain,<sup>45</sup> would strengthen the movement or increase its prestige. They are aware that attempts have been made by certain Frenchmen in this country—e.g. Messrs. Chauteemps and Rougier,<sup>46</sup>—to form a middle movement composed of time servers who do not approve of General de Gaulle, who feel that Pétain<sup>47</sup> is "doing his best" and who at the same time claim to be supporters of the Allied cause. His Majesty's Government sincerely hope that the United States Government will give such a movement no encouragement. Chauteemps is in their view the worst type of French politician and holds a large responsibility for the surrender of Bordeaux. Of the names mentioned by Mr. Welles to Lord Hali-

<sup>44</sup> Alexis Léger, formerly Secretary General of the French Foreign Office.

<sup>45</sup> Jacques Maritain, professor of philosophy at Columbia University.

<sup>46</sup> Professor Louis Rougier.

<sup>47</sup> Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, French Chief of State.

fax in their recent conversation Admiral Auboyneau is already a member of the Committee which has functioned better since his arrival. Reports which His Majesty's Government have received of General Sice's behaviour in Africa do not however altogether lead them to share Mr. Welles' favourable impression of him. Generals Catroux, de Larminat, Leclerc and other good soldiers are required in Africa. The chances of inducing such men as M. Jeanneney <sup>48</sup> and Herriot <sup>49</sup> to leave France are very slight and the main hope of strengthening the Committee would perhaps seem as stated above to lie in recruiting members of the movements of resistance in France itself.

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1942.

---

851.01/498

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 15, 1942.

M. Tixier came in to see me, at my request.

I told him my purpose in calling him was merely to inform him that General de Gaulle had accepted an invitation to broadcast to the United States on May 17th. I thought that he might have heard this from London but if this had not happened he might be interested to know the arrangements.

I answered his inquiry about the liability of Free Frenchmen to the American selective service. I pointed out that General Hershey <sup>50</sup> had ruled on February 9th that Free Frenchmen, like other aliens, were obliged to register on or before May 16th, unless they had later come to the country, in which case the date was three months from the date of entry. I further told him that where they had enlisted in the Free French army they should so state to the Selective Service Board, in which case deferment might be based on that fact.

M. Tixier said that that involved the men having volunteered in the Free French armies. They had not recruited any Free Frenchmen here, based on our law against recruiting notified to them last year. He wondered whether now they might not accept volunteers.

I told him that the law against recruiting was still in effect. But if in fact Free Frenchmen agreed to take service in the Free French army I doubted if anyone would object. The President had directed that an alien who had not filed first papers and was called for military service here might have the option to enlist in his own army,

---

<sup>48</sup> Jules Jeanneney, formerly President of the French Senate.

<sup>49</sup> Edouard Herriot, formerly President of the French Chamber of Deputies.

<sup>50</sup> Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, Director, Selective Service System.

instead of serving in the army of the United States; and this implied that such aliens might make arrangements to join their own armies if they so desired.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

---

851.01/460

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] May 21, 1942.

The British Ambassador called at his request.

He made some reference to the Free French problem and added that he thought that General de Gaulle could well put out a statement to the effect that he was engaged in the prosecution of the war; that at the end of the war he would become merely an individual citizen of France, and that he would not in the meantime be engaged in building up a political organization for the post-war government of France.

I expressed interest in the Ambassador's suggestion and emphasized again that this Government is only interested in carrying on the war from a military standpoint and that we do not propose to take up with General de Gaulle any phase of the political situation in France either now or after the war; that in point of fact, I have no information that de Gaulle has a political organization for the purpose of governing France during the war; that his organization is purely military with such further functions as are necessary to deal with the political angle in local situations as they arise in New Caledonia, Central Africa and other areas which have been occupied for military reasons during the war, or where, as in the case of Central Africa, the country was occupied and controlled by the Free French since the Armistice. I added that any incidental political control over these widely separated areas, especially when the military objectives of the allied nations are primarily served by the British and the Americans, is a different matter compared to political rule over France herself. The Ambassador seemed to take notice of this viewpoint.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

---

851.01/607

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 28, 1942.

The British Ambassador called to see me this afternoon. I discussed again with the Ambassador at some length, the situation concerning the Free French movement.



I told the Ambassador that it would seem to me almost incredible that highly confidential views which I had expressed to the Ambassador in recent conversations, intended solely for the secret information of the British Government, regarding the possibility of a reorganization of the Free French movement under General de Gaulle—views which were intended solely as a part of a preliminary discussion between our two Governments—should have appeared *in extenso* in recent news despatches in the American press from London and should undoubtedly have formed the basis for the highly unfortunate diatribe on General de Gaulle as published yesterday. I said that the situation of which I complained had reached the point where it became necessary for us here in the Department of State to question the wisdom of undertaking to discuss matters of this character informally and confidentially with the British Government. Obviously, I said, publicity of this character completely defeated the constructive and desirable purposes which we had in mind when we undertook these discussions.

The Ambassador said that he fully agreed, that he could not offer a word to the contrary and that he had already cabled his Government remonstrating emphatically against what had happened.

The Ambassador attempted to palliate to a certain extent General de Gaulle's statements to the press<sup>51</sup> as published yesterday and said that he could not interpret them as being so damaging and destructive as I believed them to be. He said he felt that what General de Gaulle had had to say with regard to political recognition could be satisfactorily met by giving him some kind of ostensible recognition as chief of resistance forces within France. To that I replied that I could not share the Ambassador's views in this regard and that it seemed to me from our knowledge of the situation within France that while certain elements of resistance within occupied and unoccupied France might be responsive to General de Gaulle, other equally important, if not more important, elements of resistance were totally opposed to General de Gaulle and would certainly be more so after his demand for political recognition, and that it seemed to me unwise and inexpedient officially to acknowledge General de Gaulle as the supreme head of elements of resistance in France which had showed and were showing no inclination to accept his leadership.

We discussed some of the features of these questions along the same lines of my previous conversation with the Ambassador and I finally stated that within the next two days I would send the Ambassador in writing the precise views of this Government as to the most desirable basis for the Free French movement headed by General de Gaulle, as well as the basis for cooperation which, in

---

<sup>51</sup> See the *New York Times*, May 26, 1942, p. 6.

certain contingencies, this Government would be willing to extend to General de Gaulle and his Free French movement.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

851.01/484

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Government of the United States is subordinating all other questions to the one supreme purpose of achieving military success in the war and carrying it forward to a successful conclusion. This is understood also to be the aim and purpose of the French National Committee and this Government is proceeding to deal with that Committee on this understanding.

This Government recognizes the contribution of General de Gaulle and the work of the French National Committee in keeping alive the spirit of French traditions and institutions and believes that the military aims necessary for an effective prosecution of the war, and hence the realization of our combined aims, are best advanced by lending all possible military assistance and support to the French National Committee as an expression of French resistance in general against the Axis powers. This Government wholeheartedly agrees with the view of the British Government, which is also understood to be the view of the French National Committee, that the destiny and political organization of France must, in the last analysis, be determined by free expression of the French people under conditions giving them freedom to express their desires unswayed by any form of coercion.

In pursuing the common war objective, the Government of the United States will continue to deal with the local Free French officials in their respective territories where they are in control with manifest effectiveness. An essential part of the policy of the Government of the United States for war collaboration is assistance to the military and naval forces of Free France, which is being extended under the terms of the President's statement of November 11, 1941,<sup>52</sup> that the defense of those French territories under the control of Free French forces is vital to the defense of the United States.

In harmony with the foregoing observations, the Government of the United States will be prepared to consult with the French National Committee in regard to appropriate naval and military matters through representatives of the United States armed services in London. It would also be agreeable to the appointment of military

---

<sup>52</sup> See second paragraph of memorandum by Mr. Samuel Reber, January 12, p. 502.

and naval representatives of the French National Committee, possibly including civilian advisers, to serve in Washington for purposes of appropriate cooperation in the common war effort.

WASHINGTON, June 11, 1942.

---

851.01/848

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 11, 1942.

M. Tixier came in to see me today. He presented a note dated June 11, 1942<sup>53</sup> referring to his note of May 18.<sup>54</sup>

He said that he hoped we would study the note and thereafter discuss it with him orally. His personal view was that the note should not be the foundation for an exchange of notes. (Having glanced at it, I fully agree with M. Tixier.)

The note is, in brief, a protest against our "neutralization" of the French colonies in the New World and an insistence that what we are really doing is creating a third French government, namely, the government of Admiral Robert. The note then wanders on to a statement that unless we turn over these various colonies to the Free French we diminish their effectiveness in the war effort and their usefulness in the ultimate reorganization of France.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

---

851.01/848

*The Delegation of the French National Committee in the  
United States to the Department of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, June 11, 1942.

Referring to its note of May 18, the Delegation of the French National Committee in the United States has the honor to send herewith to the Department of State, by order of the National Committee, the text of a Memorandum<sup>55</sup> which defines and elaborates the views already expressed in the above-mentioned note on the conditions of Combatant France in the question concerning the war status of the French possessions in America.

Copy of this communication has been sent to Ambassador Drexel Biddle<sup>55</sup> in London.

---

<sup>53</sup> *Infra.*

<sup>54</sup> *Post*, p. 701.

<sup>55</sup> Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile at London and Minister to the Governments in Exile at London of Czechoslovakia, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, and Yugoslavia.

851.01/848

*The Delegation of the French National Committee in the  
United States to the Department of State*

[Translation]

MEMORANDUM

1. The French National Committee understands that the United States Government feels the urgent need of taking measures of security concerning the French territories still under the control of the Vichy Government. Nevertheless, the National Committee thinks that the method which the United States Government seems to wish to adopt runs the risk of entailing the gravest consequences for France and her Empire. It amounts practically to the demilitarization of the French colonies in the Caribbean Sea, French sovereignty being maintained and exercised by Admiral Robert, who would have to furnish positive guaranties. The American Government would have the intention of safeguarding these possessions for the French people.

2. The future of France will depend in a very large measure on the active part she will have taken in the war and the victory. The two principal elements of the French participation are the internal resistance and the active cooperation of the territories freed from the terms of the armistice.

Now, under the present circumstances, these two forces run the risk of being ruined by neutralization. The system of neutralization of the parts of the Empire not subject to the control of Vichy prevents such cooperation from developing and deprives France practically of the last elements of force which remain to her to win back her place in the world.

In fact that confirms the regime of the armistice and extends it to the parts of over-seas France on which Germany has not had the means of imposing it. That constitutes an apology for the capitulation and tends indeed to create categories of Frenchmen, who, having the means of fighting for their country, may consider themselves to be exempted from doing so, and whose passive attitude will be approved by the Allies. Nothing could be more demoralizing for the Frenchmen in France whose resistance, in spite of famine, arrests, shootings, is possible only because of an energy and a spirit of sacrifice often carried to the point of heroism.

In this regard the neutralization of certain French territories neglects the fact that this war is above all a conflict of moral forces. In the situation in which France finds itself the moral factor is preponderant.

3. Moreover, applied now to one French colony, now to another, this method results in fact in the complete breaking up of the Empire and cannot fail to lead to a break up of France itself. Already, at the present time the home country is divided materially and morally by the line of demarcation. One part of over-seas France is in the hands of the Japanese, another under the control of Vichy, the third under the authority of the French National Committee. The American policy will create one more, that of Admiral Robert. Tomorrow perhaps French West Africa will also be given a separate regime under the authority of such or such power. The propaganda of Berlin and Vichy will have a free play to develop the theme of Anglo-Saxon imperialism and to try to convince the French people that the Allies do not deserve its confidence and that they are trying to profit from its misfortunes to rob it.

The French will to resist may be seriously affected thereby. This will is closely bound up with the name of General de Gaulle; it rests on the conviction that the place of France in the Allied camp remains marked by Combatant France. If the French nation perceives that this is not the case at all, that General de Gaulle is not even consulted with respect to the French territories, that he is not able to prevent the dismemberment of the Empire, discouragement may take possession of the French masses at the moment when their resistance is one of the most important trumps of the Allies.

If in France the will to resist, symbolic and supported by Combatant France, should weaken, we should see the only uniting factor now conceivable among the French vanish; the country would then be surrendered to all the undertakings of disintegration. After the departure of the Germans and the inevitable disappearance of the Vichy Government, no authority could unite the French. The country would be turned over to anarchy.

The work of European reconstruction and reorganization of the world would not thereby be facilitated.

4. As for the Free French, they would lose all esteem in the eyes of their people and in their own eyes, if the Allied Powers deprived them systematically of the means of increasing France's share in the conflict, and of continuing to stimulate and organize the internal resistance.

5. One of the principal objectives of Combatant France being to rally the greatest possible number of Frenchmen animated by the will to continue the struggle for the deliverance of the country, it goes without saying that it is ready to welcome all [men of] <sup>67</sup> good will and all who sincerely return to the great duty of the war.

---

<sup>67</sup> Brackets appear in the file translation.

It intends to leave aside only the personalities who, too much compromised in the capitulation or the collaboration with the enemy, shall have lost all title to the confidence of the French people.

JUNE 11, 1942.

---

851.01/488 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the  
Secretary of State*

LONDON, June 13, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received 11:35 p. m.]

3300. Lord Halifax telegraphed the text of the memorandum given him by the Secretary<sup>58</sup> concerning our relations with the Free French. The Foreign Office has decided that it would not be wise to show the memorandum to General de Gaulle at the present time even in confidence as Halifax reported Mr. Eden<sup>59</sup> was authorized to do. While the first Foreign Office reaction was to the effect that General de Gaulle "would be well advised to accept" the bases of relationship between us and the Free French as set forth therein, it is apparently their feeling that he will be disappointed at the lack of "political recognition" implied therein. The Foreign Office is considering the advisability of telegraphing Lord Halifax suggesting two modifications in our memorandum. They believe that the indication that we would continue to deal with "local Free French officials wherever they are in control" rather than through the National Committee will prove irritating to de Gaulle and of no practical value since, in their view, such local officials will invariably refer matters under discussion to the General and the National Committee in London. The second Foreign Office observation has to do with the intimation that we would be agreeable to the appointment of military and naval representatives of the Free French "and possibly a civilian adviser" to deal with our Government authorities in Washington. The Foreign Office takes the view that as far as territories actually under Free French control are concerned, the Free French do have certain "Governmental responsibilities with respect to such territories" and that consequently it would be preferable to put our relations with the Free French in Washington on a basis which will recognize that *de facto* situation.

With the exception of these two points, however, the Foreign Office appears to have been pleased with the memorandum.

WINANT

---

<sup>58</sup> *Aide-mémoire* of June 11, p. 523.

<sup>59</sup> Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Eden feels that if the State Department found it possible to agree to the two modifications suggested above, General de Gaulle should be satisfied for the time being, though naturally this cannot be guaranteed.

In his telegram, Mr. Eden adds that pending the State Department's comments on the above suggestions, he does not propose to show the text of the *aide-mémoire* even in confidence to General de Gaulle, or to inform him of its existence, since he considers the risk of leakage is too great.

WASHINGTON, June 18, 1942.

---

851.01/533

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] June 23, 1942.

Participants: Secretary of State Hull, The British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, and Mr. Harold Butler <sup>60</sup>

The British Ambassador called at my request.

He was accompanied by Mr. Harold Butler, who desired to come in to pay his respects. There was the usual exchange of greetings and of welcome.

I handed to the Ambassador a memorandum regarding the Free French situation, a copy of which is attached hereto.<sup>61</sup> He said that he would send it to Mr. Eden with the request that, if Great Britain agrees to the proposal, he could then take the matter up with General De Gaulle and make him familiar with it with a view to a complete agreement between the Governments of Great Britain and the United States and the French National Committee.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

---

851.01/533

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*

MEMORANDUM

The Government of the United States is subordinating all other questions to the one supreme purpose of achieving military success in the war and carrying it forward to a successful conclusion. The French National Committee has the same objective and is undertaking active military measures for the preservation of French territory for the French people.

---

<sup>60</sup> British Minister in the United States.

<sup>61</sup> *Infra*.

The Government of the United States recognizes the contribution of General de Gaulle and the work of the French National Committee in keeping alive the spirit of French traditions and institutions and believes that the military aims necessary for an effective prosecution of the war, and hence the realization of our combined aims, are best advanced by lending all possible military assistance and support to the French National Committee as a symbol of French resistance in general against the Axis powers. The Government of the United States wholeheartedly agrees with the view of the British Government, which is also understood to be the view of the French National Committee, that the destiny and political organization of France must, in the last analysis, be determined by free expression of the French people under conditions giving them freedom to express their desires unswayed by any form of coercion.

In pursuing the common war objective, the Government of the United States will continue to deal with the local Free French officials in their respective territories where they are in control with manifest effectiveness. Realizing the need for coordinating their common efforts the Government of the United States perceives every advantage in centralizing the discussion of those matters relating to the prosecution of the war with the French National Committee in London. An essential part of the policy of the Government of the United States for war collaboration is assistance to the military and naval forces of Free France, which is being extended under the terms of the President's statement of November 11, 1941, that the defense of those French territories under the control of Free French forces is vital to the defense of the United States.

In harmony with the foregoing observations the Government of the United States is prepared to appoint representatives in London for purposes of consultation.

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1942.

---

851.01/535 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the  
Secretary of State*

LONDON, June 29, 1942—3 p. m.  
[Received June 29—11: 10 a. m.]

3595. Embassy's telegram 3300, June 13, 11 p. m. Eden is seeing General de Gaulle today and personally handing him the memorandum given Lord Halifax as subsequently amended by the Department. We understand that the Foreign Office is pleased with the



amended draft and that Eden will strongly urge General de Gaulle "to accept it" as the basis of relationship between us and the Free French. We are told that as requested by the Department he will caution the General to secrecy and to that end is handing him a French translation to obviate the necessity for the General to show it to the less discreet members of his entourage.

WINANT

---

851.01/536 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the  
Secretary of State*

LONDON, June 29, 1942—9 p. m.

[Received June 29—5:20 p. m.]

3618. Embassy's telegram 3595, June 29, 3 p.m. We are informed that General de Gaulle seemed quite pleased with the memorandum which Eden gave him today. The only point he raised we are told concerned the statement that "the Government of the United States will continue to deal with the local Free French officials" et cetera. He pointed out that unfortunately some of his local officials were not always "reliable" and mentioned the difficulties in New Caledonia. Eden pointed out the following sentence with reference to the advantage which our Government perceives "in centralizing discussions of those matters relating to the prosecution of the war with the French National Committee in London" and to the Department's expression of willingness "to appoint representatives in London for purposes of consultation".

De Gaulle promised not to show the memorandum to any of his subordinates and to give Eden his "reply" in the immediate future.

WINANT

---

851.01/542

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*<sup>62</sup>

TEXT OF A TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM MR. EDEN ON  
JUNE 29TH, 1942

I have received General de Gaulle's written reply of which the following is a summary.

---

<sup>62</sup> Handed to the Secretary of State by the British Ambassador on June 30 as a reply to the Department's memorandum to the British Embassy of June 23, p. 530.

The changes suggested in paragraphs marked (a) and (c) were accepted by the Department and appear in its memorandum as released to the press July 9, printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, July 11, 1942, p. 613.

The National Committee highly appreciates the spirit of Mr. Hull's communication, subordinating as it does all its activities to the determination to win the war, the Committee congratulates itself on the desire of the United States Government to mark the identity of objectives pursued by the National Committee and the United States Government.

The National Committee much appreciates the United States Government's wish to recognize the efforts of General de Gaulle and the National Committee to maintain alive the traditional spirit of France and its institutions, and their recognition of the National Committee as a symbol of French resistance to the Axis powers. The Committee also much appreciates the United States Government's determination to lend all possible military assistance to the Committee.

The Committee is glad that the United States Government is disposed to appoint representatives with whom it may discuss all questions relating to the prosecution of the war in common.

The National Committee is very glad to express its agreement with the text communicated by the United States Government. They would like however to draw attention to the three following points.

(a) Since General de Gaulle has frequently said that it is for the French people alone to establish political institutions of liberated France the National Committee would prefer that the word "known" should be substituted for "understood" in the second sentence of paragraph 2.

(b) While it is anxious to see the most intimate relations established between local French and United States authorities in the various territories, the National Committee considers that it is for the Committee to maintain direct relations with the United States Government. They would, therefore, propose that in the first sentence of paragraph 3 the words "The appropriate authorities of the United States will continue" should be substituted for "The Government of the United States will continue".

(c) In order to avoid any possible difference in interpretation, the National Committee would prefer that the concluding words of the first sentence of paragraph 3 should be "Where they are in effective control" instead of "Where they are in control with manifest effectiveness".

The National Committee hopes that the slight amendments which it desires will not delay the establishment between the United States Government and the Committee of a basis for collaboration to which the Committee attach the greatest importance.

These modifications seem harmless and I hope Mr. Hull will find it possible to accept them.

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1942.

851.01/535 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1942—5 p. m.

3107. Your 3595, June 29, 3 p. m. I have, through the British Embassy here, suggested an arrangement by which we would provide for consultation and cooperation between our military forces and those of the French National Committee in London, with which you have no doubt been kept familiar by the Foreign Office. If this arrangement is finally adopted, it will call for the appointment of an American Admiral and General to act as this Government's representatives to consult with the French National Committee in London on all matters relating to the conduct of the war. The Secretary of the Navy <sup>62a</sup> has designated Admiral Stark <sup>63</sup> as the naval representative. The War Department states that General Eisenhower <sup>64</sup> has been authorized to designate the army representative.<sup>65</sup> Please obtain from him the name of the army officer to be appointed for this purpose.

No announcement of the discussions of this question nor of the representatives to be designated should be made until such announcement is authorized here.

HULL

851.01/571 : Telegram

*The President of the French National Committee (de Gaulle)  
to the Secretary of State*

[Translation] \*\*

LONDON, July 10, 1942—8:32 p. m.

[Received July 10—3:56 p. m.]

It is with great satisfaction that the French National Committee welcomes in London the distinguished representatives of the Government of the United States. I thank you for the personal part you have taken in this decision. The confident collaboration which the France which has remained faithful to the Allies and to the great American democracy will thus establish will certainly contribute in an effective manner to the final victory of the United Nations.

C. DE GAULLE

<sup>62a</sup> Frank Knox.<sup>63</sup> Adm. Harold R. Stark, Commanding U. S. Naval Forces in Europe.<sup>64</sup> Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander of U. S. Forces in European Theater of Operations.<sup>65</sup> Brig. Gen. Charles L. Bolte was named army representative; he was later succeeded by Gen. John E. Dahlquist.<sup>\*\*</sup> File translation revised by the editors.

851.01/567 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, July 11, 1942—8 p. m.  
[Received July 11—4:37 p. m.]

1014. The newspapers in both occupied and unoccupied France have quite naturally not been permitted to publish a single word on the subject of our announcement<sup>67</sup> that we will lend all possible military assistance and support to the French National Committee and to that end have designated military and naval representatives to consult with the National Committee in London. In so far as we know there has thus far been little public comment and it is too early to know whether this announcement will cause any great reaction on the part of the French public.

In official circles in Vichy the announcement did not apparently occasion any marked excitement or agitation. The general opinion in such circles seems to be that this latest step on our part is but the logical consequence of our policy announced some months ago of recognizing Free French representatives in French territories over which they exercise effective control and of extending lend lease aid to the Free French forces. Therefore officials point out that there is nothing really new in our latest step as it does not represent and [any?] departure from our announced policy. There seems to be little doubt that the distinction which we make between military and political recognition has not passed unnoticed and is largely responsible for the equanimity with which the announcement is greeted. In my conversation with Laval<sup>68</sup> this morning (Embassy's telegram no. 1010 July 11, 1 p. m.)<sup>69</sup> he mentioned the matter to me but did not appear to attach much importance to this step.

Repeated to London.

TUCK

851.01/572 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, July 13, 1942—8 p. m.  
[Received 11:06 p. m.]

1025. Embassy's 1014, July 11, 8 p. m. During my talk with Laval this afternoon I soon had reason to learn that it was not his intention to allow our Government's recent announcement regarding the

<sup>67</sup> Press release of July 9; see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 11, 1942, p. 618.

<sup>68</sup> Pierre Laval, French Chief of Government.

<sup>69</sup> Not printed.

French National Committee to go unnoticed. In this connection he handed me a note dated July 13 of which the following is a close translation:

"The Department of State announced on July 10 that a memorandum had been sent by the American Government to an organization known as the 'French National Committee'. It also announced that the American Government had designated two military representatives charged with consulting this committee on all matters relating to the conduct of the war.

On the one hand the American Government maintains with the French Government official relations. On the other hand the American Government favors and encourages elements which are in rebellion against the French Government.

The American Government goes even further. By confirming that the defense of French territories under the control of Free French forces is of vital importance for the defense of the United States it questions the right of the French Government to reestablish the order and authority of France in French territories.

The French Government protests formally against the attitude of the American Government and its interference in questions which affecting as they do the sovereign right of France belong exclusively to the judgment and decisions of the French Government.

The French Government raises the same protest against the help given by the American Government to a group of rebels to their country. It considers that such an attitude on the part of the American Government towards it in no way corresponds to the desire so often expressed in Washington to maintain normal relations with the French Government."

In handing me this note Laval stated that this was a delicate matter and referred to the "political recognition" which our Government appeared to be giving to the French National Committee. I replied that this was not correct and that the Secretary's statement to the press (Radio Bulletin 161, July 9, 1942) had made very clear the nature of the assistance which our Government was seeking to give the Committee.

Repeated to London.

TUCK

---

851.01/598 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the  
Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 7, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received 8:49 p. m.]

4418. We have received from Admiral Stark and General Bolte the following memorandum on suggested procedure for dealing with General de Gaulle and the French National Committee:

"Admiral Stark and General Bolte, after discussion with General de Gaulle would propose to adopt the following procedure in consultations with National Committee of Fighting France:

1st. They propose to establish joint secretariat with common files under their respective aides and with the assistance of liaison officers designated by them from their staffs.

2d. They have suggested that communications of French on all subjects directly or indirectly related to conduct of the war be addressed to them. They will consult Embassy for advice or assistance on all questions not specifically military or naval in character.

3d. They will discuss with French authorities any questions submitted by State Department, Chief of Staff United States Army or Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. They will hope to receive assistance and advice of appropriate members of Embassy or staffs United States missions in London on all questions not specifically naval or military in character.

4th. Reports of results of such consultations on questions of either French or American origin will be submitted to Chief of Staff United States Army on purely military questions; to Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet, on purely naval questions; and to our Embassy London for transmission to State Department on all other questions. General de Gaulle was informally consulted and has agreed to this method of organization of consultations of services on French National Committee by United States military representatives. He proposes following procedures by French National Committee for organization of their participation in discussions with United States military representatives:

1st. All communications on purely military or naval subjects should be addressed to chief of his personal military staff for discussion with military, naval or aviation officers.

2d. All communications related to conduct of war which have economic or political implications should be addressed to Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Maurice Dejean for study by appropriate French services.

3d. French suggest that technical questions be examined together by liaison officers or experts to be designated for each such discussion by Admiral Stark or General Bolte on American side and by Commissioner of Foreign Affairs on French side.

4th. French had proposed also eventual direct consultation with officers of Embassy on nonmilitary subjects. They have been informed that only designated military representatives are now authorized to participate in such consultations. Officials of Embassy and United States missions assisting or advising on specific questions would act merely as expert advisers to military representatives. Admiral Stark and General Bolte would appreciate knowing whether State Department considers the above procedures acceptable."

With reference to General de Gaulle's fourth suggestion above, both Admiral Stark and General Bolte as well as the Embassy itself have noticed an endeavor on the part of the Fighting French to put emphasis on the political aspects of the movement and a desire to

approach the Embassy directly on such questions. The Department is of course well aware of the feeling of the Fighting French that it is impossible to divorce the movement from its political significance and they are of course hopeful of obtaining some future further recognition of this aspect. In the light however of the Department's designation of Admiral Stark and General Bolte to represent our Government, it seems preferable that the French National Committee should in the first instance make all approaches through Admiral Stark and General Bolte. The Embassy is of course assisting the latter to the fullest extent in all matters such as the proposed tripartite economic accord, reverse lend lease, etc.

WINANT

---

851.01/652 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 12, 1942—8 p. m.

4422. The procedure outlined in paragraphs numbered 1 to 4 inclusive of the memorandum drawn up by Admiral Stark and General Bolte, and contained in your telegram no. 4418 of August 7, 7 p. m., is satisfactory.

The Secretary of the Navy requests specifically that military matters and those matters having political or economic implications which are primarily connected with the war effort be submitted to the United States Chiefs of Staff.

With respect to the proposals put forward informally by General de Gaulle, it was correct to remind the General that only the officers designated by this Government are authorized to consult with the National Committee on matters relating to the prosecution of the war.

The National Committee should be informally advised that pursuant to the Department's memorandum of July 9, 1942,<sup>11</sup> which General de Gaulle approved, all communications directly or indirectly related to the conduct of the war will be addressed to the National Committee or, if the General prefers, to the chief of his personal military staff.

(For your information, no communications should be addressed to the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs as such.)

The procedure to be followed in consulting with the French authorities on technical questions is left to the discretion of Admiral Stark and General Dahlquist, who are free to call upon the Embassy for advice or assistance as suggested in paragraph 3 of the memo-

---

<sup>11</sup> See Department of State *Bulletin*, July 11, 1942, p. 613.

randum prepared by the Admiral and General Bolte. The French authorities should be made clearly to understand that in consultations in which officers of the Embassy may take part, the latter are acting in a purely technical and advisory capacity under the direct orders of Admiral Stark and General Dahlquist.

HULL

851.01/651 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, September 15, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received 9:42 p. m.]

1370. For Atherton. René Massigli<sup>72</sup> called today and informed me that he has been asked by General de Gaulle to join him and take over the direction of Foreign Affairs of the National Committee. He is hesitant because he has wind of disagreements between the Gaullists and the Governments of London and Washington. He is under the impression that it is not Washington's intention to give full support to the Gaullist movement. Massigli is today convinced that de Gaulle enjoys such prestige in the country that he constitutes an essential element in the future restoration of France. He is, therefore, ready and willing to collaborate with de Gaulle and Edouard Herriot, whom he has seen, encourages him to do so. He does not, however, wish to do so unless he is certain of being *persona grata* with Washington and unless he is sure that his arrival would be viewed with pleasure and that a confident collaboration in the common interest could be established.

Would appreciate your reaction which I could convey by a sure means to him.

Repeated very secretly for Matthews in London.

TUCK

851.01/651 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Tuck)*

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1942—6 p. m.

582. Your 1370, September 15, 4 p. m. Policy of this Government with the French National Committee was clearly explained to them many months ago and has been progressively followed without deviation. Ample evidence could be cited to show that this policy has developed normally and steadily in the direction of ever closer collaboration. The most recent particular points to note are this Gov-

<sup>72</sup> Formerly French Ambassador to Turkey, at this time unassigned.



ernment's declaration of July 9 and the signing of the Lend-Lease Agreement on September 3.<sup>73</sup>

We have refrained from any general political commitments but naturally, any strengthening of the French National Committee in London, would be of friendly interest to this Government, since it is our hope for greater and more extended collaboration for the ultimate defeat of our common enemies.

HULL

---

851.01/677

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 28, 1942.

Monsieur Tixier, the representative in Washington of the French National Committee, called to see me this afternoon in order to present to me Mr. Philip Baudet.<sup>74</sup>

Monsieur Tixier spoke of the return of General de Gaulle to London last Friday<sup>75</sup> and expressed his belief that the General's return at this time would make possible the solution of many important and urgent problems. Monsieur Tixier took the trouble to add, with great emphasis, and Monsieur Baudet concurred therein equally emphatically, that while reports might be sent to the Department alleging that General de Gaulle was anti-American or suspicious of the ulterior motives of the United States, such reports were completely untrue and unfounded. Monsieur Tixier insisted that the whole trouble was due to the fact that General de Gaulle had never been in the United States, knew nothing about the United States outside of its military history, and could not even speak English. He said that under those conditions it was of course difficult for General de Gaulle to have any estimate of public opinion in this country and any correct apprehension of the true feeling and policy of this Government. He said, however, that he wished to assure me that the French National Committee, and General de Gaulle in particular, fully realized that France could never be restored to its position as an independent nation without the assistance of the United States, and that all of them had unanimously the deepest feeling and gratitude for the generous attitude displayed towards the French people by this country.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

<sup>73</sup> For text of Lend-Lease Agreement between the United States and Fighting France, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 273, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1614.

<sup>74</sup> Member of the Free French Delegation in Washington.

<sup>75</sup> September 25.

851.01/722½

*The President of the French National Committee at London  
(de Gaulle) to President Roosevelt*<sup>76</sup>

[Translation]

MR. PRESIDENT: [Here follows account of circumstances giving rise to the Free French movement and General de Gaulle's leadership of the movement.]

I was not a political leader. All my life I had kept strictly within my profession. It is true that before the war I had tried to interest the political leaders in some of my ideas, but it was only to bring to realization some military project for the benefit of the country. Likewise at the time of the Vichy armistice<sup>77</sup> it was primarily along military lines that I appealed to the country. When we observed, however, that larger and larger groups responded, that whole territories adhered or were joined to the Fighting French, and that we alone were in a position to act with any form of organization, we saw that larger responsibilities had fallen to us. We have seen in France the growth of a sort of mystical conception directed toward us, and bit by bit uniting all the elements of resistance. Thus we have become, by force of circumstance, a French moral entity. This has created for us duties for which we feel deeply responsible and which we could not avoid without betraying the respect of the country and the hopes placed in us by the French people.

We are told that we should not engage in political activity. If this means that we ought not to take up the former party controversies or dictate the form of government of the country, we need no such advice, because as a matter of principle we abstain from any such pretensions. But we do not hesitate before the word "politics" if it means to rally not only a few troops but the whole French nation in the war, or if it means to deal with our Allies on matters concerning the interests of France at the same time that we defend those interests against the enemy. Who, except ourselves, could represent those interests? Or should France remain silent in matters concerning her affairs? Or should these affairs be discussed with the United Nations by the Vichy people in the manner and form that Hitler may judge appropriate? It is not a question of our self-assertion toward our Allies but consideration of the three

---

<sup>76</sup> This letter was brought to Washington by M. André Philip, a member of General de Gaulle's National Committee in London, and was handed to Under Secretary of State Welles on or shortly before October 27 for transmittal to President Roosevelt.

<sup>77</sup> Armistice agreement between the German High Command of the Armed Forces and French Plenipotentiaries, signed at Compiègne, June 22, 1940; for text, see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1919-1945*, ser. D. vol. ix. p. 671.

following factors which has determined our attitude: Only Frenchmen can be the judge of their national interests; the French people are convinced that when treating with the Allies we speak for the nation just as we fight for its interests at the side of our Allies; in their misfortunes the French people have become extremely sensitive to the fate of their empire, and any appearance of abuse of these interests on the part of any ally is exploited by the enemy and by Vichy in a manner dangerous to the national sensibilities.

Since circumstances unprecedented in our history have given us this task, can we think of imposing upon France some regime of personal power, as some people, chiefly abroad, are suggesting? To have such vile feelings as to want to cheat the French people of their future liberty would be to prove our complete ignorance of our own people. The French nation is in character the most deeply opposed to a regime of personal power. It has never been easy to impose such power, but now, after the odious experience of the personal regime of Pétain which has been possible because of the connivance of the Germans and because of the oppressions in the administration, and after the long and heavy burden of the invasion, who would be absurd enough to imagine that he could establish and maintain a regime of personal power in France? The dreamer who would try that, whatever services he may have rendered to the country in the past, would find the whole nation ranged against him.

It is worth noting, however, that no one in France has accused us of aspiring to dictatorship. Let me refer to the fact that men like Mr. Jouhaux, President of the General Federation of Labor, Mr. Edouard Herriot, Leader of the Radical Party, Mr. Léon Blum, Leader of the Socialist Party, even the leaders of the Communist Party, have placed themselves at our disposition, and have informed us that we can count on them in our work, of which they unreservedly approve both the direction and the aims. Even among our adversaries, not only the Vichy people but also those like Doriot and Déat, there has been no one to accuse us of wanting a dictatorship. They reproach us with being mercenaries paid by the democracies, but they have never reproached us with trying to set up a personal and anti-democratic power in France.

Let me say, Mr. President, that in this immense war which demands the cooperation and unity of every element fighting against the same enemies, wisdom and justice demand that the Fighting French receive real and powerful aid. But apart from the moral and material support which the Allies can give us, and without demanding that we be recognized as the Government of France, we consider that it is necessary that we be consulted (*abordé*) each time there is question either of the general interests of France, or of French

participation in the war, or of the administration of those French territories which the developments of the war may gradually place in a position where they can again take part in it,—territories which have not been able spontaneously to join with us.

Your name and your personality have an enormous prestige in France. France knows that she can count on your friendship. But in your conversations with France, with whom can you speak? Is it the France of yesterday? The men who were the most representative authorize me to say that they are with us. Is it the France of Vichy? Perhaps you think that its leaders might some day take up arms at our side. I regret to say I cannot believe it; but if such a thing were possible, one thing is certain—today they are collaborating with Hitler, and in your conversations with them he is always present as a third party. Is it the France of tomorrow? How can we know what that is, until the leaders can be chosen by a freely constituted assembly? Meanwhile has not the French Nation proved that it has not deserted the camp of the Allies, and that the nation is politically carrying on, in spite of everything, through the agency of our organization, both in a military and in a territorial sense?

I have been told that persons who have access to you (*de votre entourage*) may be fearful lest in recognizing our existence one would prejudice the chances that certain elements, particularly of a military character, now attached to the Vichy Government, might again take part in the war. But do you believe that by ignoring those Frenchmen who are fighting, and by leaving them in a discouraging isolation, you would attract others for war service? Think of the risk to France, on the other hand, in the fact that her allies seem to be promoting the disintegration of the country by favoring the formation of several rival factions, some of them neutralized by agreement with the Allies themselves, and others trying to fight separately, but for the same cause. After all, have not the two years of bitter experience demonstrated that every element which separated itself from Vichy either found its way to the Fighting French or, if left apart, remained in ineffectual isolation? In the tragic situation in which the French people have been placed they see things very simply. They see that their only choice is between war and capitulation. If the choice is to be war, then it means naturally the Fighting French, and the national instinct rallies them around those in whom they see the symbol of their war effort. In this we have the real explanation of the fact that in spite of the extreme difficulties under which the Fighting French have kept going in the last two years, they have held fast and gained in solidarity.

Notwithstanding the capitulation and the armistice, France still represents a power in the world which must not be ignored. We

must find a way for her to return as a participant in the war along with the United Nations while preserving both her susceptibilities and her unity. This is one of the most important problems of the war, and it is for this reason that I ask you to agree to undertake a general and direct examination of the relations between the United States and the Fighting French. Whatever may be the procedure to this end, I believe there is no other way of approaching with complete openness of mind a problem for which I feel with deep conviction, because of the sacred cause for which we are fighting, there must be found a solution.

Accept [etc.]

[File copy not signed]

---

85L.01/722½

*Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 26, 1942.

MR. WELLES: If this letter <sup>78</sup> had been written on the outset of the de Gaulle movement it would have been a great asset in our relations with them but it is two years too late and takes some ten pages of introduction to get down into the very little meat there is in it.

Unhappily General de Gaulle seems to have no conception of the reasons for our relations with Vichy or that the United Nations have acquiesced in and benefited from them or that our information from France thereby is possibly as good as his and we have been able to maintain our contacts with the French people both in unoccupied France and North Africa. This blindness of General de Gaulle is more tragic in view of the fact of our ever-increasing collaboration with him and that we have fully explained to his representatives here and even later obtained the agreement of many of them that our policy was based on the best hopes for preserving the French Empire.

France must be saved not only by the Frenchmen outside of France but by the Frenchmen within France as well. Britain's experiences are proving this daily, but with the resignation of the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the French National Committee in London, M. Dejean, and the succession to this office of M. Pleven, I fear General de Gaulle will blindly attempt to force himself and his Committee on the French people, by foreign arms, which if acquiesced in could only lead to a postponement of the final reorganization of France.

RAY ATHERTON

---

<sup>78</sup> *Supra*.

740.001 E. W. 1989/26220

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 10, 1942.

M. Tixier came in to see me, at his request.

He observed that the condition of the world had changed since we last met. After some general conversation about the North African expedition,<sup>79</sup> M. Tixier came to the point.

He said that General de Gaulle in London had urged everyone to cooperate with the American expedition. They were glad that General Giraud had undertaken to rally Frenchmen to fight.<sup>80</sup> So far as the Fighting French were concerned, everyone thought that the North African expedition was first-rate.

But, he said, there was always the danger that the French resistance might become divided. He had no message from his Government, but speaking on his own account, he hoped we would keep in mind the desirability of unifying, and keeping unified, the French forces who are fighting the Axis.

I said that this was a matter to which we were continuously giving time and thought; and that we, too, hoped that all French resistance might be, and remain, united. In this regard, I said General de Gaulle's speech had been excellent. I said that we were, of course, feeling our way, since the North African operation was still too young to permit any clear picture of how the political forces would work out.

M. Tixier then said that he had had some fleeting ideas as to what might be done, though he did not urge them. It might be that General Giraud might at once be made a member of the French National Committee; and might promptly be named High Commissioner for North Africa. I said I noted the suggestion but could not, of course, comment on it at this time. (It must have been obvious to Tixier, as it was to me, that this was really a polite invitation to General Giraud to accept a position under General de Gaulle's orders.) I said that the matter of the existence of France and the maintenance of French resistance was a cause which far transcended any personalities, and that if all personal interests were subordinated in the supreme effort to liberate France, I thought there would be no ultimate difficulty.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

<sup>79</sup> See pp. 429 ff. General de Gaulle had not been previously informed; see Winston S. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, pp. 604-606, and *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, vol. II, pp. 1195-1196.

<sup>80</sup> By pre-arrangement Gen. Henri Giraud left France and accompanied the American forces occupying North Africa to take command of French forces there.

851.01/798½

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 20, 1942.

Participants: The President,  
M. André Philip,  
M. Adrien Tixier,<sup>80a</sup>  
Mr. Welles.

The President this morning received M. André Philip and M. Adrien Tixier of the de Gaulle National Committee.

The President received them in the most friendly way and at the outset of the conversation said that he believed it would be useful for him and General de Gaulle to sit down and talk together and that he would be glad if M. Philip would let General de Gaulle know that he would be glad to welcome General de Gaulle in Washington when it was convenient for the General to come here. He said that he understood that the agreement expressed by Mr. Churchill<sup>81</sup> and himself to the suggestion earlier made by General de Gaulle that he be permitted to send a delegation to Algiers to confer with General Giraud had not been availed of by General de Gaulle on the ground that he did not wish to confer with General Giraud in view of the latter's acceptance of a military command at the hands of Admiral Darlan.<sup>82</sup>

The President reiterated the position he had publicly taken three days ago with regard to Admiral Darlan.<sup>83</sup> He emphasized the fact that the operations undertaken by the United States in North Africa subordinated all other considerations to the achievement of a victory by the United States and the allied powers and that nothing should be permitted to detract from the achievement at the earliest possible date of that victory in order that the liberation of France might thereby be advanced. The President made it emphatically clear that the appointment of Admiral Darlan was based solely on military considerations and that if at any moment the President had reason to believe that Admiral Darlan was not satisfactory in that position, he would at once remove him therefrom. He stated that this applied equally to all other authorities in Northern Africa. The President made it equally clear that so long as the United States was the occupying power in North Africa, the final decisions would be reached solely by the occupying power.

<sup>80a</sup> For M. Tixier's account of this conversation, see General de Gaulle's *War Memoirs, Unity, 1942-1944, Documents*, p. 94.

<sup>81</sup> Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.

<sup>82</sup> Adm. Jean François Darlan, former French Deputy Premier and Commander in Chief of French military forces.

<sup>83</sup> For text of the President's statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 21, 1942, p. 935.

The President then went on to explain that the operations undertaken by the United States and Great Britain in North Africa were of a very extended character and that it was premature as yet even to discuss with any precision that part of Europe which would be invaded from North Africa. He made it clear that it was therefore impossible as yet to foresee how or where the first step towards the liberation of Metropolitan France would be undertaken, but expressed it as his policy that until all of France were liberated the sole decision as to what, if any, Frenchmen would administer the liberated territory was a matter solely for this Government to determine.

M. Philip and M. Tixier both immediately and categorically stated that this was not at all the policy upon which the de Gaulle Committee would agree. They said that they had made quite different plans and that their plans envisaged the creation of a provisional French Government which, while recognizing the military supremacy of the occupying forces, nevertheless, would conduct with complete autonomy the administration of every part of liberated France whether in North Africa or Metropolitan France. They went on to assert that they would never "permit" any liberated French town, village, or farmhouse to be administered by foreign powers and that their decision in this regard was final.

. . . . .  
It is noteworthy that throughout the entire conversation which lasted some fifty minutes, neither one of them expressed the slightest gratitude or recognition of the liberation of North Africa by American forces, but insisted over and over again in almost exactly the same words that the administration of North Africa must be in their own hands "not later than two or three weeks from now which will give you time to occupy Tunisia."

After this had gone on for some time, I suggested to the President that the interview might terminate and that the practical suggestion which he had made at the outset of the interview had better be carried out, namely, that if General de Gaulle came to Washington, the President and General de Gaulle could discuss questions of high policy together.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]



851.01/834j

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 28, 1942.

M. Tixier came in to see me today, at his request. The conversation, which lasted more than an hour, was filled with every kind of emotion.

He began by asking whether I knew whether de Gaulle were coming. He said he understood he had been invited, but for a few days or more he had had no word from de Gaulle. I said I had no special information, but that my understanding was that he was coming. M. Tixier asked why it was kept so secret. I said that quite frequently when distinguished people were coming nothing was said to anyone, so that the plane voyage should not be interrupted.

M. Tixier then asked whether we had seriously considered the possibilities of the situation. When President Roosevelt had talked to André Philip, he had indicated that he felt the victim of an injustice regarding his French policy, and had shown some resentment. General de Gaulle, as Tixier knew, was not only filled with a sense of injustice, but was brim full of bitterness. He thought that when the two men met there would be a very violent scene.

I said I had great respect for the common sense of both men. Plainly, our task was to work out a common basis on which all Frenchmen could fight the common enemy; and the principle, as Tixier had himself said on a previous occasion, must be the unification of French resistance. This was a task full of the greatest difficulty and of the most dramatic paradoxes; but it remained, nevertheless, the duty of all of us to try to work it out.

Tixier said that he had counseled de Gaulle to accept the fact of Darlan merely as a military fact, for the time being; that in view of the actual military situation, indeed, there was nothing else to do. But if Darlan ever entered France, especially at the head of a French army equipped by Americans, there would be civil war at once. Tixier said that he himself would join the hundreds of thousands who would fight and die rather than let Darlan, and men of his kind, attempt the reconstitution of France, in view of the fact that they had been traitors and had played the role of traitors for two years. In General de Gaulle's case, Darlan had condemned him to death and published his sentence of death as a traitor in every French town, terribly impressing the sentiment of France. De Gaulle could never forget that he had begged Darlan to take the fleet and go to North Africa and do, two years ago, what our

forces are attempting to do now; and that Darlan had sternly refused. For this reason, French Africa had remained virtually inactive and had contributed nothing to the fight against Germany until the present. And for this reason the French sailors at Toulon had clung to a point of honor, namely, that they would resist anyone, no matter who it was, and eventually had sunk their fleet and virtually committed suicide, in a magnificent, but sterile, gesture.

I said that the past was unalterable, but that by taking thought we might be of some help to the future. The fact was that the French fleet had sunk itself on an order given by Darlan in 1940, designed to prevent it from falling into the hands of the enemy. Quite irrespective of what one thought of Darlan for the moment, he had undeniably brought North Africa to the side of the United Nations, and brought French armies into active cooperation, at length, against the common enemy. These were military facts, which no one could deny.

Tixier said that no one was readier than he to recognize the military fact. But did it mean that the last man who had finally seen the light must now be accepted by men who had been fighting all the time, and who had been arrested, tortured and killed by Darlan's orders? Having no ready answer to this, I said that I supposed that none of us could reach a result in high statecraft by merely indulging in bitterness. In fact, I said, the men who subordinated themselves most to the true interests of France would probably have the greatest recognition in the end. General Giraud, for instance, who had had every reason to feel much as they had, had nevertheless accepted a military command in North Africa, resigning any desire to play a role, and was now actively fighting the Germans. This had been the courageous act of a big man, and I considered that the less everyone thought of their own position and the more they thought of France which was now completely in the power of a brutal enemy, the more they could let older matters lie, and devote themselves to a common cause.

Tixier then reverted to the visit of General de Gaulle. Would the State Department, he asked, endeavor to prevent a rupture between President Roosevelt and General de Gaulle? He thought that the skeans were loaded for a complete explosion. His intimation was that perhaps General de Gaulle had been brought here to do just that, and destroy himself.

I said that Tixier had lived in the United States long enough to know us fairly well. This was not a government of intrigue. We did not bring people to Washington for the purpose of breaking something, but for the purpose of endeavoring to make something.

Of course, General de Gaulle could destroy himself in passion; but I trusted that he would not do that.

Tixier said that he proposed to do everything possible to prevent that from happening. He hoped we would help. I said that I thought he could count on every cooperation from this Department.

Tixier then said that he thought the one man who really understood de Gaulle best was Admiral Stark,—rather indicating that he wished Admiral Stark were here while this was going on. I noted the suggestion.

To make a diversion, I said that I understood Admiral D'Argenlieu, former High Commissioner for New Caledonia, was arriving in San Francisco today. The Army had asked what the diplomacy of his reception should be, and I had told them to receive him, naturally, with the courtesies which would be accorded to an Allied Admiral.

Tixier finished this part of the conversation by saying that he hoped we could make use of General Catroux, who, he said, was a good general and a great African expert. In this regard he stood somewhat on a par with Giraud. I made no comment, except to say that the talents of everyone could be employed.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

---

851.01/6588

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division  
of European Affairs (Atherton)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 8, 1942.

Participants: The Secretary;

M. Tixier and Admiral D'Argenlieu, both of the Free  
French Movement;

Mr. Atherton.

These gentlemen called on me by appointment made at their request and the conversation was carried on in French and English.

Admiral D'Argenlieu began the conversation by an expression of appreciation of his prompt reception by the State Department since he wished to have his first indications of American policy direct from headquarters. He would also like to state that he was returning from his Pacific post to London with the most happy impressions of his cooperation with the American forces in the Far East. There had been very much distorted rumors of friction between himself and General Patch<sup>85a</sup> but it was obvious that in the first days of a military arrival amounting to some 25,000 American troops in New Caledonia the political, civilian and military questions could not be

---

<sup>85a</sup> Maj. Gen. Alexander M. Patch.

solved at once and there was for two or three days a certain tension which happily was dispelled into extremely cordial relations which had existed ever since. These relations of extreme cordiality were not confined to New Caledonia only but likewise in the Admiral's travels through Australia. He had the closest relations with the American Consuls concerned with New Caledonia, General MacArthur<sup>84</sup> and indeed his prompt and easy journey to San Francisco by plane was entirely due to the kindly attitude of the American Army.

The Secretary stated that he welcomed the Admiral not only because of the collaboration that he had shown with the United States in the Pacific but also because he was proceeding to London and, with knowledge of the importance of his fresh judgment on the scene there, Mr. Hull was anxious to outline in full the American point of view in its fight for victory over the Axis and, more especially, in the ever developing and ever changing North African military scene. Mr. Hull then reviewed at some length American military policy beginning with the assurances obtained from the Vichy Government in 1940 regarding the French fleet. He referred to his first conversation with the French Ambassador here stating that although we were going to assume all the outward forms of diplomatic contact with the French Government at Vichy we had not that confidence that would permit us to maintain this more than from a day to day basis. Our reasons for maintaining this contact were American reasons in that it permitted us the establishment of observation points within enemy territory and due to our North African agreement it permitted us a series of observers in addition. Besides all this it gave us the greatest opportunity of all, that is, contact with the French people themselves.

Mr. Hull stressed particularly the phases of American policy whereby every Frenchman who resisted aggression of the Axis could count on the friendship and support of the United States and said that on this basis we were cooperating with Frenchmen the world over, although naturally certain French elements were giving much more to their country than others and this of course was the role of the Fighting French. They were all, however, bound together with us for military victory over the Axis forces.

Mr. Hull then dwelt at some length on the actual situation in North Africa; how General Giraud had been at first the choice of the American military but even this great French General when he had landed in Africa found he was unable to command the support of the French armed forces. Undoubtedly the reason for this was that for two years past Admiral Darlan had been filling all places of importance with his own followers. However, General

---

<sup>84</sup> Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area.

Giraud was a big enough man to realize that when he could not command the necessary support he was willing to subordinate himself to Admiral Darlan who appeared on the scene entirely unexpectedly but was able to prove that the fighting strength of the French in North Africa as indeed in other places, including Toulon, was under his orders. This military collaboration of Admiral Darlan has saved the lives of many American soldiers even in the first moments of occupation, but when it was added to the lives saved by the collaboration of West Africa as well, the total mounted up into very impressive figures. Also our military plans were advanced by French collaboration by at least sixty days and thus we were sixty days nearer contact with the Germans, sixty days nearer the winning of the war and the final military victory in North Africa which was the common aim of all concerned.

Mr. Hull added that if he were attacked by a thug on the street and someone came to his assistance he would welcome the assistance of his collaborator in destroying the would-be murderer but he would not cease to fight and ask his unexpected collaborator to tell him his name and antecedents. Mr. Hull went on to say that in war time one should be wary of politicians. He had been a politician himself all his life and he knew they had limitations in a purely military effort. However, Mr. Hull did think a great deal of the alleged fear of Darlan as a menace to France at this particular moment was somewhat exaggerated since he could not conceive that Darlan in North Africa, an unsettled area that at most had under three million European inhabitants, could impose himself on the French nation of forty-five millions as a political figure if the French people did not wish it, and Mr. Hull added he was quite sure in his own mind the French people did not wish this and therefore Admiral Darlan remained a military figure and his only collaboration with the United States was purely a military arrangement. This was the background against which the President had spoken of any such arrangement with Darlan as purely temporary. Mr. Hull pointed out also that the British and American fleets were in control of the Mediterranean and this in itself controlled Darlan's approach to France.

The Secretary then went on to say that General de Gaulle was in all eyes a great military figure. He stood for something very special to all Americans in the French situation and it was the prayer of the American people that all Frenchmen who had anything to contribute to a military victory which would restore France to her independence would give their fullest military collaboration in the war against Hitler leaving all policies aside. This earnest expression Mr. Hull wanted personally to convey to Admiral D'Argenlieu.

At the end of the talk M. Tixier stated that he had never had such a clear picture himself and Admiral D'Argenlieu was warm in his appreciation of at last understanding the composite whole of what previously he had only known in varying degrees from outside sources. He said he felt France was worthy of the Secretary's trust and the Secretary's support for the restoration of France and her territories.

In leaving M. Tixier said to Mr. Atherton if General de Gaulle ever visited this country he would bring him direct from the airplane to the Secretary's office that Mr. Hull might make the same explanation to him that he had just made to the Admiral because it was a perfect answer to all or any Fighting French apprehensions.

RAY ATHERTON

---

740.0011 E. W. 1939/26867

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] December 21, 1942.

The British Ambassador called at his request.

I reminded the Ambassador that the President has made one or more worldwide appeals for the unification of all United Nations military forces and all people behind the lines in support of those forces. I added that I myself have made two broad appeals to this same effect.

I then with emphasis remarked that not one word has come from the British Government with regard to this matter, but instead constant reports of a trouble-making nature relating to de Gaulle and this country, de Gaulle and Darlan, or de Gaulle and some other disturbing factor have been received here through despatches from our Embassy at London and through the British press and radio. I said the war is not yet won. It could be lost. The battle of Africa is not won and it is not at all certain that the last word has been spoken in Spain. The situation behind the lines in the African campaign is as difficult and delicate as it can possibly be. In these circumstances, I stated that it did seem to me that the British Government could serve the Allied cause very much by putting out to the world an earnest appeal for unity and teamwork among all the United Nations, such as the President and I have already issued more than once. The Ambassador said he agreed that something should be done and he would present the matter to his Government.

In referring to the de Gaulle situation, which, as I remarked, leaves trouble in its path much too often, the British Ambassador said that the fact de Gaulle refused to go along with the Vichy

Government, but instead joined with them in opposing the Axis after the overthrow of France, naturally caused the British to feel most kindly toward de Gaulle and that this probably accounts for the existing relationship. I replied that that was all fine and I appreciated the spirit of the British and the splendid patriotism of de Gaulle. I said that he was entitled to a great deal of credit for his position and for his services in support of the United Nations cause, and all of us should see to it that he gets recognition accordingly. I added that on the other hand this Government maintained diplomatic relations with Vichy despite its strong hostility toward any and all elements there that were tainted at all with Hitlerism, in a determined effort to keep the French fleet, air and naval bases from falling into the hands of the Nazis. I then remarked that it would not be difficult to look back now and see what probably would have occurred had this Government joined with the British in active support of the de Gaulle movement and denounced the Vichy Government. The probability, of course, is that the fleet and the bases would have gone almost straight into the hands of Hitler. Our policy of maintaining diplomatic relations with Vichy was constantly commended and insisted upon by Mr. Churchill and others in the British Government during the two years in which we were planning and working first with respect to the French fleet, the air and naval bases, as stated heretofore, and second to build up everywhere in France and Africa a constantly increasing disposition and spirit to resist Hitler militarily as well as in other respects. We think that all of these undertakings proved to be valuable and timely if not indispensable to the Allied cause. I added that as to de Gaulle, we have never felt unkindly toward him, but we have frankly felt that at times he was making himself a sort of nuisance by constantly injecting personal and political matters when we felt that we should have been confining our thoughts and efforts jointly to military matters and objectives. However, I said there were no hard feelings whatever and that this situation is but natural for the reason that we are all struggling as best we can in a common cause but a spirit of cooperation must prevail, if success is to be the outcome. I concluded by saying that, of course, when we are confronted with such extremely critical situations as for instance the great movement to win over the western and central Mediterranean coast of Africa with the entire matter hanging in the balance, it is all-important that individuals, groups and large segments of the military forces whether under the command of General de Gaulle, some Britisher or an American, should make it their primary objective to make themselves a component part of the military structure and to function one hundred percent militarily. I had in mind the example

of General Longstreet with his marvelous ability as a commanding officer and the excellent troops which he commanded, whose failure to attack when ordered at Gettysburg, probably caused the loss of that decisive battle. The British Ambassador agreed that the view I expressed was sound and timely.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

---

851.01/916

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 28, 1942.

Monsieur Tixier called to see me this morning at his request. Monsieur Tixier inquired whether I had any information with regard to General de Gaulle's visit to Washington. I said I was informed that the President had suggested to General de Gaulle, through the American Naval Attaché in London, that, on account of the unsettled conditions in North Africa,<sup>86</sup> it would be well for him to postpone his visit to Washington. I said that I had just read a report from the American Naval Attaché in London saying that General de Gaulle appeared to believe that, in view of the uncertainty prevailing in North Africa, this suggestion on the part of the President was a wise one.

Monsieur Tixier then stated that he felt, in view of the selection as High Commissioner of General Giraud, that it was now of the greatest importance that General de Gaulle's visit to Washington should no longer be postponed. He thought it was indispensable that General de Gaulle understand for himself the views of the President and of the members of the Government of the United States since he, Tixier, in view of the atmosphere prevailing in London, was unable any longer effectively to influence the course of General de Gaulle. I said that the question was, of course, under consideration by the President and that if the President had any further messages to communicate to me with regard to the visit of General de Gaulle, I would be glad to inform Monsieur Tixier accordingly.

Monsieur Tixier handed me a list of the individuals who would accompany General de Gaulle to Washington when he came. The list is attached herewith.<sup>87</sup>

Monsieur Tixier stated that General Catroux had just been in Gibraltar where he had had several conversations with General

---

<sup>86</sup> For situation in North Africa following the assassination of Admiral Darlan, see pp. 492 ff.

<sup>87</sup> Not printed.



Béthouart, the representative of General Giraud. He believed that an understanding between General de Gaulle and General Giraud would be easy of accomplishment were it not for the influence in North Africa of the former Vichy governors of Algeria and of Dakar and of the French Resident General in Morocco, General Noguès. I said I regretted to see that there still continued to be such a very wide divergence of views between Monsieur Tixier and myself. I said I could only repeat what I had said to him so often in the past that, from the standpoint of this Government, there was only one objective at the present time and that was the unification of all French elements of resistance behind the military effort of the United Nations in North Africa until the Axis powers had been driven out of Africa. It seemed to me, I said, that all political questions should be left in abeyance until that objective had been attained. Monsieur Tixier said he was not in the slightest degree in disagreement with me on this and that he himself would inform General de Gaulle that it was his belief that all Frenchmen in North Africa who could be of service in winning the fight against the Axis powers should be utilized. He said that it was the French National Committee in London which was opposed to this policy and it was that which he implied when he said that the former Vichy French officials in North Africa were proving an obstacle in the reaching of an understanding between General de Gaulle and General Giraud.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

740.00115 European War 1939/5545

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 31, 1942.

Last night after dinner I met up with Sir Ronald Campbell.<sup>88</sup> Our conversation came around to North Africa.

I said I was thoroughly concerned and unhappy about the situation. I thought that in Britain there was a feeling that General de Gaulle should promptly be imposed on North Africa by our forces in some fashion or other; and that the cry for "unification" meant handing everything over to de Gaulle. I said that to me it was amazing that this sort of issue should be precipitated in the midst of a critical battle, in respect of which, incidentally the news was not too good.

---

<sup>88</sup> British Minister in the United States.

I said that the curious and sharp difference of opinion had led me to do some thinking. Apparently the difference lay in a complete conflict in our interpretation of the basic facts, as against the British. In that case it ought to be possible to get together and find out what the facts really were. If there was a conflict in policy, then that was another question.

Sir Ronald promptly agreed. He said if there was a difference in policy, the only possible safety was to get at this, hammer out the question and reach an agreement.

I said this was my view and that I was very much concerned. Hammering away in the propaganda press and so forth could do nothing but make relations unhappy between the two countries, and as a matter of incidental but highly important interest, probably endanger safety in North Africa.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

---

PROTEST BY FRENCH GOVERNMENT AT VICHY REGARDING ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AMERICAN CONSULATE AT BRAZZAVILLE, FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA

125.226/1a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Leopoldville  
(Mallon)*

WASHINGTON, April 2, 1942—9 p. m.

39. Please ascertain immediately from High Commissioner<sup>89</sup> at Brazzaville if he is agreeable to establishment of Consulate at Brazzaville and if assignment of Laurence W. Taylor as Consul is acceptable. Mr. Taylor will be furnished with a commission but no exequatur will be requested for him.

WELLES

---

125.226/2 : Telegram

*The Consul at Leopoldville (Mallon) to the Secretary of State*

LEOPOLDVILLE, April 4, 1942—noon.

[Received 5:42 p. m.]

73. Referred to in the Department's telegram number 39, April 2, 9 a. m. [p. m.]. High Commissioner agreeable to establishment of Consulate at Brazzaville and delighted to accept Laurence W. Taylor as Consul.<sup>90</sup>

MALLON

---

<sup>89</sup> Gen. Marie Eugène Adolphe Sicé.

<sup>90</sup> Public announcement was made on April 4, 1942; see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 4, 1942, p. 273.

125.226/8 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, April 7, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received April 8—9:29 a. m.]

515. The Department's decision to establish a Consulate General at Brazzaville has caused little comment in Vichy and the press of unoccupied France (we hear on orders of the Ministry of Information) has published nothing on this subject. Officials with whom we have spoken seem to take a practical view of this decision and seem to recognize our vital interest in seeing to it that the flow of American supplies to the Near East via Africa is not impeded.

Today's Paris press, however, develops the theme that this constitutes practically official recognition of the government of de Gaulle<sup>91</sup> and is but another form of American blackmail in an attempt to keep France from playing her "proper role in the constitution of a new Europe".

LEAHY

125 226/41

---

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] April 8, 1942.

The French Ambassador<sup>92</sup> called to see me this afternoon at his request. The Ambassador said that his appointment with the President had been cancelled and that he consequently had asked to see me immediately. The Ambassador read to me the text of an instruction he had received by cable from his Government which constituted a protest against the sending of a consul general by the United States to Brazzaville. The protest ended with a demand that the United States make some public declaration to the effect that the action of the United States did not constitute political recognition of the Free French movement and the protest was based upon the allegation that the failure to obtain an exequatur for the consul general from the French Government at Vichy constituted a violation of the Treaty of 1851 [1853]<sup>93</sup> between France and the United States.

---

<sup>91</sup> Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the National Committee of the Free French at London.

<sup>92</sup> Gaston Henry-Haye.

<sup>93</sup> Consular Convention between the United States and France, signed at Washington, February 23, 1853. For text, see Hunter Miller (ed.), *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America*, vol. 6, p. 169.

The Ambassador then went on to say that the action taken by this Government was in violation of assurances given his Government in November 1941<sup>44</sup> and on March 6, 1942 with regard to the policy of this Government not to give political recognition to the Free French authorities in Equatorial Africa.

I immediately stated that no assurances had been given the French Government and that in my previous conversations with the Ambassador on these points I had stated that the actions taken by this Government at the times mentioned had not then implied political recognition. I said that there was not the slightest useful purpose to be served by discussing these questions on a legalistic basis. I stated that it had been and would continue to be the considered policy of this Government to favor the maintenance of the independence and integrity of France. That was the basis upon which our policy rested—one of deep friendship for the French people and a sincere desire to see the French people restored to their independent position in the world. I said that the issues raised at the present time were issues of fact. The Ambassador was well aware of the fact that French Equatorial Africa was under the control of the Free French authorities and that for reasons which were notorious it was necessary for us to deal with the local authorities in French Equatorial Africa. I said I was quite sure that both he and his Government recognized this need on our part and likewise recognized the fact that any action which we had taken or would take in this regard was completely in accord with the general policy relating to France which I had now reiterated. I said I felt it would be preferable for the Ambassador to give me a written communication to which I would reply in writing and that any enunciation of policy which this Government desired to make would be contained in my reply to him.

The Ambassador attempted to get me to agree that my reply would contain a statement that this Government recognized the jurisdiction of the French Government in Vichy over all French territories and colonies.

I said I would make no such commitment and that while I could not prevent him speculating as to what I would say in reply, I had no present intention of detailing to him what the nature of the reply would be.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

<sup>44</sup> See memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, November 6, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, p. 582.

125.226/6

*The French Ambassador (Henry-Haye) to the Acting Secretary  
of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1942.

The Ambassador of France to the United States presents his compliments to His Excellency the Secretary of State a. i. and, responding to the desire which the latter was good enough to express in the course of their conversation yesterday, has the honor clearly to set forth below the position of the French Government with respect to the communiqué published on April 4, 1941 [1942] by the Department of State, with respect to the creation of a consulate general of the United States at Brazzaville and the appointment of Mr. Maynard Barnes to that post.

According to the provisions of the Consular Convention of February 23, 1853, the Federal Government should have taken up with the French Government in advance its intention to create a consular post in French Equatorial Africa and should have requested, in the manner contemplated, the exequatur for the holder of this new post.

The French Government is all the more surprised by this innovation because the American Government has constantly recognized, whatever the local *de facto* situation may have been, the sovereign rights of France over all parts of her Empire as well as the exclusive exercise of these rights by the French Government, and in particular, by the regular notification, on February 13, 1941 of the appointment of Mr. MacVitty as Consul of the United States at Nouméa and on September 19, 1941 that of Mr. Scott to the Consulate General at Beirut.

The French Government is convinced that it is only a case of inadvertence and that by notifying it, in accordance with the procedure contemplated, of the appointment of Mr. Maynard Barnes to the post of Consul General of the United States at Brazzaville, it will be pleased to recognize publicly that this designation has no political character and must not in any manner be interpreted as an attack of any kind on the exclusive rights of the French Government over the territories in question.

Mr. Henry-Haye is happy to avail himself [etc.]

125.226/4b

*The Acting Secretary of State to the French Ambassador  
(Henry-Haye)*

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1942.

EXCELLENCY: I have received Your Excellency's communication of April 9, 1942, containing certain observations of the French Government at Vichy with regard to the announcement of the establishment of a Consulate General of the United States at Brazzaville.

In this communication Your Excellency informs me that your Government trusts that the Government of the United States will make it known publicly that this step on the part of the United States should not be interpreted as having any political implications, and that it should likewise not be interpreted as being a step in derogation of the "exclusive rights of the French Government over the territory in question".

The considerations advanced in the communication addressed to me by Your Excellency provide an appropriate and welcome opportunity for the Government of the United States to reiterate with the utmost clarity its policy with regard to France and with regard to the French people.

From the earliest days of the independence of the United States of America the relations between the people of France and the people of the United States have been founded upon ties of more than ordinary friendship and confidence. The Government of France and many citizens of France, assisted the people of the United States in achieving their freedom. The great principles of liberty, equality and fraternity proclaimed by the French revolution have been an inspiration to the American people throughout their national existence, and the traditional understanding between our two nations has in no small part been due to their common faith in democratic institutions and in their like devotion to the cause of human freedom.

Only twenty-five years ago the armies of France and of the United States were fighting side by side against the same ruthless aggressor who has now once more invaded France.

As this Government has informed Your Excellency's Government upon several occasions, the Government of the United States recognizes the sovereign jurisdiction of the people of France over the territory of France and over French possessions overseas.

The Government of the United States fervently hopes that it may see the reestablishment of the independence of France and of the integrity of French territory.

But only by the total destruction of the present criminal regime in Germany, and by the complete defeat of the armies of Germany and of the dictatorships which have aligned themselves with Germany, can that hope be realized. That is a fact well known to all of the people of France, including even that handful of Frenchmen who, in contempt for the high tradition of liberty and individual freedom which has made France great, have sordidly and abjectly, under the guise of "collaboration", attempted to prostitute their country to that very regime in Germany which is bent upon nothing less than the permanent enslavement of France.

At the present moment continental France is in great part occupied by German armies. Your Excellency's Government is bound by the terms of the armistice agreement into which it entered with Germany in June 1940.<sup>95</sup>

Marshal Pétain<sup>96</sup> has had occasion to appreciate the full understanding of the Government of the United States of the difficulties under which he and his Government have been suffering because of these reasons, and the sympathy of the Government and people of the United States for the people of France in the tragic situation in which they have been placed.

A part of France's territories overseas remains under the effective jurisdiction of Your Excellency's Government. Still other territories of France are under the effective control of French authorities who do not recognize the jurisdiction of the French Government at Vichy, but who are fighting actively on the side of the forces of freedom.

This latter situation is the case in French Equatorial Africa and the Cameroons where the Government of the United States has recently appointed a Consul General at Brazzaville. This is the step to which Your Excellency's communication under acknowledgment refers.

Were the French Government at Vichy in effective control of the territory in question, the Government of the United States would necessarily have communicated with Your Excellency's Government prior to the establishment of this Consulate General of the United States, in accordance with the convention between our two countries of February 23, 1853 to which reference is made in Your Excellency's communication.

The French Government at Vichy, however, is not in control of that territory.

---

<sup>95</sup> Signed June 22, 1940; for text, see Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. ix (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 671.

<sup>96</sup> Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, French Chief of State.

Consequently, until the final victory of the United Nations is won, and the people of France are once more in full and sovereign control of their own destinies, the Government of the United States, in accordance with the policy above set forth, will continue, with regard to French territories in Africa or in the Pacific areas, to maintain, or to enter into, relations with those French citizens who are in actual control of such territories.

The German invaders by deceit, and by their habitual propaganda of falsehood, are daily seeking to sow doubt and mistrust of their traditional and proven friends among the minds of the French people. That effort has failed, and will continue to fail. The people of France have never doubted the sincerity of the friendship of the people of the United States.

The French people may rest assured that the Government and people of the United States will continue to maintain unimpaired their full respect for the sovereign rights of the people of France. They may continue to be confident that by the victory of the United Nations those rights will be restored intact to them.

Accept [etc.]

SUMNER WELLES

---

125.226/5 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, April 15, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received 9:37 p. m.]

547. The following is a translation of the Havas OFI<sup>97</sup> communiqué which was published in Tiding's press concerning the note which was delivered to the French Ambassador in Washington with regard to the opening of a Consulate at Brazzaville:

"After having taken cognizance of the American note handed on April 13th to the French Ambassador at Washington by the Department of State concerning the opening of an American Consulate at Brazzaville the French Government at once instructed Monsieur Henry-Haye to inform the Secretary of State<sup>98</sup> that the French Government does not accept the note of the American Government couched in injurious terms which tend to discredit in the eyes of the world the conduct of French citizens who do not need to receive lessons of patriotism from abroad.

Furthermore the French Government is obliged to note that the immediate disclosure under unusual conditions of this strange document shows that it was drawn up for propaganda purposes and in order to endeavor to confuse public opinion, furthermore it does not answer the question which was asked."

---

<sup>97</sup> Office Français d'Information.

<sup>98</sup> See memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State, April 16, p. 172.



We are told by a responsible Foreign Office official, who is in Darlan's Cabinet, that Darlan was enraged at certain parts of our note particularly the paragraph relating to certain Frenchmen, who in the guise of collaboration, abjectly attempt to prostitute their country to the German regime, and that Darlan personally drafted the above communiqué which Darlan instructed should be published in the French press and given to foreign journalists. This communiqué was given to the foreign press shortly after 7 o'clock last evening and was immediately cabled by foreign correspondents. We are informed by a member of Rochat's<sup>99</sup> staff, that at quarter past eight, Von Nidda<sup>1</sup> sent a message to Rochat that the publication of such a communiqué was obviously calculated to embarrass Laval<sup>2</sup> upon his entry into office and to create difficulties for him with the United States, and that it should be suppressed. Accordingly the Ministry of Information requested the foreign correspondents to cancel the story.

Shortly before midnight the Ministry of Information communicated again with the foreign correspondents and stated that the ban on the story had been lifted and that they were free to use it.

A responsible official tells us that the German delegation in Vichy, after requesting the Foreign Office to suppress the communiqué, communicated later in the evening with Laval in Paris and that he stated that in so far as he was concerned the communiqué could be issued. Accordingly the Germans notified the Ministry of Information that they withdrew their objection to its publication.

LEAHY

---

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FREE FRENCH RESPECTING USE BY THE UNITED STATES OF AIR BASE AT POINTE-NOIRE, FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA

851U.7962/21

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 26, 1942.

M. Tixier<sup>3</sup> came in to see me today, at his request.

He referred to our request early in February that the Free French National Committee should study favorably the use of the airdrome at Pointe Noire and take steps for the immediate undertaking of work necessary to improve the airdrome so that it might serve as a part of

---

<sup>99</sup> Charles Antoine Rochat, Secretary General of the French Foreign Office.

<sup>1</sup> Hans Roland Krug von Nidda, German representative at Vichy.

<sup>2</sup> Pierre Laval, appointed French Chief of Government on April 18, 1942.

<sup>3</sup> Adrien Tixier, Head of the Free French Delegation in Washington.

the air route between the United States and Australia via Africa. M. Tixier handed me the attached note on the aerial base at Pointe Noire. This consists of a description of the present installations at the base; and the suggestion that there be sent forthwith to Pointe Noire a qualified representative of the American army who could speak French and who might discuss the necessary work there with Col. Carretier.<sup>4</sup> It was suggested that no rent would be charged for the base or for the services; but that new installations and improvements should be in the charge of the American authorities and should become the property of the French after the war. The note likewise indicates that the aerial and land forces of the Free French are capable of furnishing all necessary personnel but that matériel would be needed, and presumably would have to be furnished under the Lend-Lease Act.<sup>5</sup>

M. Tixier indicated that it was entirely consistent with the policy of the French National Committee to grant the facilities requested or needed at Pointe Noire. He indicated that no conditions were laid down by the Committee, but it must be understood that the sovereignty of France is recognized and safeguarded. He did indicate, however, that the French National Committee felt that if the United States requested the collaboration of Free France, it ought to find some way of recognizing Free France as an ally.

I said that it had been the continuously expressed policy of the United States to recognize the sovereignty of France over all parts of the French Empire and that I had not the slightest hesitation in saying that the use of the airdrome at Pointe Noire would be merely within this policy. It was not different from the arrangements which we had with a great many countries on this Hemisphere and elsewhere. Naturally, the considerations of technical use suggested in the attached note would be gone into with great care; subject to the opinion of our experts I saw no difficulty arising out of it.

M. Tixier then said that there was, however, one consideration which weighed so heavily on the minds of the Free French authorities that he felt justified in including it in the present negotiation. This was the fact that there was very grave need of air transport in French Africa. The planes there were old and unsafe. General de Gaulle,<sup>6</sup> in traveling through the territory recently, had had four accidents in a single flight, arising out of the quality and condition of the planes. Further, he had requested some few months ago thirty planes from the British, who were assumed to get them

<sup>4</sup> Chief of the Free French Air Force.

<sup>5</sup> Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

<sup>6</sup> Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the National Committee of the Free French at London.

from us by the lend-lease procedure. After two months of negotiation this request had been refused, leaving the Free French territory without safe transport and with no apparent visible means of getting any. Specifically, they wanted eight Lockheed Lodestar transport planes. The Free French Committee proposed to give their High Commissioner in Africa<sup>7</sup> instructions regarding the air base, but hoped that this could be simultaneous with receiving some assurance that they would get these eight transport planes.

I said to M. Tixier that I would take up at once the question of seeing what could be done about transport planes. I said that I noted the desire that the eight transport planes might be promised simultaneously with the airdrome permission. I said that I assumed that the Free French National Committee would hardly care to make a matter of urgent military necessity, such as the airdrome, a point of bargaining between the United States and the Free French Committee; this would be indeed a method of going at things which was hardly compatible either with the dignity of the United States or with that of the Free French Committee. I assumed, therefore, that this was merely a method of emphasizing the urgency of the need and the very real concern of the Free French in a matter of great importance to them.

M. Tixier agreed that he thought this was probably the underlying consideration, and he explained at some length the very great difficulties that they were having with air transport as explaining the exigency of the Free French National Committee in this regard.

I said to M. Tixier that I thought that he might well take advantage of this opportunity to explain to his Committee the principles on which the United States had consistently carried on negotiations of this kind. We had in no case made a bargain about any military cooperation. We had not bargained with the British when they granted us bases in British colonies along the American Coast.<sup>8</sup> Neither had we bargained with them when we had supplied them with destroyers, later airships, and still later, lend-lease assistance. We had not bargained with Greenland when we had obtained landing rights there.<sup>9</sup> Instead, we had in each case agreed to give sympathetic consideration to the necessities of our colleagues, as well as of ourselves, and had gone farther than any nation in history towards meeting those necessities in a spirit of pure cooperation. A similar practice had been followed among the members of the American family of nations in the Western Hemisphere. That was, in fact, the only way, as we saw matters, by which a proper basis of

<sup>7</sup> Gen. Marie Eugène Adolphe Sicé.

<sup>8</sup> For correspondence on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 49 ff.

<sup>9</sup> For correspondence on this subject, see *ibid.*, 1941, vol. II, pp. 35 ff.

cooperation could be reached, and I was very sure that the Free French Committee, on considering the matter, would come to the same conclusion.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

[Annex—Translation]

MEMORANDUM ON THE POINTE NOIRE AIR BASE

FEBRUARY 26, 1942.

The base includes:

1. The airdrome and the runways, with two large hangars;
2. Radio and meteorological installations as well as large machine shops of the Congo-Ocean railroad which make it possible to take care of repairs and maintenance on the spot.

A. The repairing of a road joining the two land and sea bases is almost completely finished. Railroad sidings are provided for and they will be easy to build and will make possible the accumulation of stocks. An engineer who is a specialist in the building of air fields is available; he has worked in North America and is informed of the Pan American's requirements.

B. These installations could be shared between us and the American Army, which will probably wish for certain improvements, such as a lengthening of the runways, the establishment of special repair shops and quarters for its personnel at Pointe Noire.

There is an inn available now for the crews.

It appears necessary immediately to send to Pointe Noire a qualified representative of the American Army, who knows the French language and who can discuss with Colonel Carretier the work which should be performed either by ourselves or by contractors. There are enough Frenchmen on the spot to take care of the direction of (undecipherable group) and to furnish all the personnel necessary for the operation of the airport.

C. No rent will be asked for the air base or for the radio and meteorological services. The financing of new installations will be borne by the American authorities and these installations or improvements will remain the property of France after the war without any compensation therefor.

D. The organization of the land and air defense may be studied with Colonel de Chevigné who will shortly arrive in Washington.

French air and land forces are in a position to furnish all the necessary personnel, but this personnel will need material which it will be to the advantage of the American Government to furnish in accordance with the provisions of the Lease-Lend Act.

851.248/473

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 26, 1942.

M. Tixier came in to see me today at his request.

He discussed the possibility of an airdrome at Pointe Noire, and in his presence I dictated the memorandum of conversation covering that subject.<sup>10</sup> This is in the nature of an addendum.

Tixier showed me a copy of his telegram of instruction from De Gaulle. He had carried it around for three days before daring to present it. The telegram said quite concisely that if we expected to ask help from the Free French we ought to recognize them as a full ally, but did not make this a condition of granting landing rights at the airdrome. It stated bluntly that permission to use the airdrome would be given as soon as the Free French received a binding assurance from us that we would give them eight Lockheed transport planes.

I said to Tixier that I appreciated his frankness. In that case, I would speak entirely personally. In matters like this it was infantile to "bargain" with the United States. We would consider sympathetically requests for assistance, quite irrespective of any airdrome, and expected that they would do the same with requests which we made.

Tixier said he knew this perfectly well and that was why he was unhappy about the instruction. He said he thought he could have a certain amount of discretion in handling the matter, and then asked whether we could not work out a way of stating the matter officially so that the harshness of the telegram was softened. I then dictated the memorandum of conversation.

Tixier went on to say that London was extremely difficult to deal with, and expatiated on his difficulties at some length.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

851.01/395 : Telegram

*The Consul at Leopoldville (Mallon) to the Secretary of State*

LEOPOLDVILLE, April 1, 1942—9 a. m.

[Received 9:45 p. m.]

70. Sicé has received telegram from National Committee at London (see my 65, March 30, 6 p. m.)<sup>11</sup> stating that Committee has advised American Government thru British diplomatic channels that

<sup>10</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>11</sup> Not printed.

permission to use Pointe Noire as air ferry base will not be granted owing to failure of United States to recognize Free French National Committee and failure to deliver 18 airplanes allegedly promised.

General Sicé is very angry at this news and has informed me that in spite of National Committee's decision, he, as High Commissioner of Free French Africa, on his own responsibility and by virtue of his authority will ignore Committee's ruling and will permit Pointe Noire to be used as base. Runway, installations and housing construction will proceed uninterrupted.

He has so informed London Committee and proposes to discuss matter further during his coming visit. French authorities here believe it is Pleven<sup>12</sup> who is "playing politics" with the war effort, not de Gaulle.

Sicé refuses to accept London Committee's thesis that Free French Africa is under British protection or subject to British orders. He states he himself will be accountable to French people for independence and integrity and proper administration their African territories under his control.

MALLON

---

841.248/1198 : Telegram

*The Consul at Leopoldville (Mallon) to the Secretary of State*

LEOPOLDVILLE, April 4, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received April 4—11:11 a. m.]

74. General Sicé received telegram this afternoon from de Gaulle stating London Committee has withdrawn objections to establishment air ferry base at Pointe Noire but expressing disapproval of Sicé's show of independence in the affair.

MALLON

---

811.248/687

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the  
Assistant Chief of Staff (Handy)*

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1942.

MY DEAR GENERAL HANDY: I refer to your letter of June 17 addressed to Mr. Atherton<sup>13</sup> in regard to the request of the War Department that permission be obtained from the Government of French Equatorial Africa for the improvement and operation of the airport at Pointe Noire for use by the United States Army.

---

<sup>12</sup> René Pleven, Free French Commissioner for Economics, Finance, and the Colonies.

<sup>13</sup> Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs; letter of June 17 not printed.

On June 11 I was informed by Mr. Adrien Tixier<sup>14</sup> of the Free French Delegation that an agreement had been reached by the Military Commandant on the ground at Pointe Noire which had placed the Commandant in a state of "technical insurrection" to General de Gaulle. Before considering this matter further I should appreciate receiving from the War Department detailed information with respect to the negotiations which, according to Mr. Tixier, have been carried on with the Military Commandant at Pointe Noire.

Sincerely yours,

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.

851U.7962/4

*The Assistant Chief of Staff (Handy) to the  
Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. BERLE: In your letter of June 24th, you make reference to an agreement reached by the Military Commandant at Pointe Noire concerning the use of the airport at Pointe Noire by the United States. No formal negotiations have been carried on with the Military Commandant of Pointe Noire by representatives of the War Department. However, informal discussions have been carried on with General Sicé and Colonel Carretier at Brazzaville, and with the Military Commandant of Pointe Noire. These discussions concerned only matters of a technical nature and were conducted by U. S. Army Engineer and Air Corps officers in connection with the survey and reconnaissance of the air ferry route through Pointe Noire. The above officers were not authorized to make any formal agreements or commitments involving the United States. Any understandings reached were purely of an unofficial nature.

Enclosed are a paraphrase of a cablegram sent by the Army Air Forces Ferrying Command through the State Department to the American Consul at Leopoldville, 15 March 1942, and extracts from a Report on Reconnaissance of Additional Air Routes to Australia, dated April 18, 1942.<sup>15</sup> The above-mentioned papers indicate the nature and substance of all informal discussions which have taken place between Free French authorities and the above mentioned U. S. Army personnel.

Early action toward obtaining permission from the Government of French Equatorial Africa for improvement and operation by the U. S. Army of the Airport at Pointe Noire together with such sup-

<sup>14</sup> Memorandum of conversation not printed.

<sup>15</sup> Enclosures not attached to file copy of this letter.

ply installations as may be required in that connection, will be appreciated.

THOS. T. HANDY  
*Brigadier General*

851U.7962/10

---

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary  
of State (Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 20, 1942.

M. Tixier came in to see me at his request.

He brought up the question of the installations at Pointe Noire. He said that the officer at Pointe Noire had sent to him a quite elaborate set of material covering plans, work being done on the quay, etc.; that work was civilian. At the same time other work was being done on the field itself; this was military. He thought we ought promptly to get together to discuss this work so that the matériel sent from here did not duplicate matériels they had, etc.

I asked whether it would not be simpler to discuss it in London since our Army officers were now directly in touch with de Gaulle.

Tixier said he thought not. He said that the actual handling of matériel and shipments started from here. He said that it was not wholly a military matter since on their side it was civilian.

I said that on our side it was purely military. We were not engaged in any work at Pointe Noire except as a result of our military operations; no one had even thought of civil arrangements, but merely of arrangements for mutual assistance in a mutual military effort.

Tixier then said that London was anxious to know whether, at the close of the war, the permanent installations at Pointe Noire would revert to France, without payment of indemnity for costs.

I said this was a typical question they should discuss with the Army. I could only give him my personal view, which was that they should revert to France without charge since it did plainly cost more to tear down houses, hangars, radio masts, etc., and transport them back to the United States than to construct material here; but I was by no means clear whether the Army had arrived at a solution of these matters. I said, however, I would take it up. Meanwhile, I said I wished to urge them to arrange to have some single authority in Pointe Noire with whom our officers could deal. Our people would have a hard time if they met one view on the part of the Free French Army officers, and another view on the part of the civil authorities.

Tixier said that exactly such a difference did exist. The arrangements they were working under had been made by General Sicé. But the Civil Governor, through his economic man, had not agreed.





851P.7982/6 : Telegram

The verbal instructions concerning Pointe-Noire were made by the Consul at Brazzaville (Taylor) to the Secretary of State, Brazzaville, July 25, 1942—3 p. m. (Received July 25—12:09 p. m.)

1. Department's 66. Local officials consider matter settled based on instructions received from National Committee, London, as follows: which could be accomplished within the material and financial means available. Americans may, at own expense, construct whatever installations are necessary to war effort at Pointe Noire on land selected by local authorities without payment of rent.

2. No duty will be collected on construction materials or supplies for camp in use or reexported after war. Conditions same as for American troops in France last war.

3. Control of their installations will be with Americans for duration and 6 months after.

Local interpretation of: 1. buildings and maintenance of runway and French buildings, main roads, temporary rail spurs, temporary gasoline storage place to be charged to colony. Building and maintenance of taxi strips and disposal area, camps, roads and buildings, oil tanks and pipe line to be paid by United States of America. Since abolishment, High Commission no local authority qualified to treat with United States of America. Modifications of above must be referred to London.

Things not provided for: 1. Method of payment to French for work done on American projects. 2. Disposition of equipment including oil tanks and pipe lines after war.

Despatch follows.

Taylor

The situation was verbally explained on the part of the

the Consul at Brazzaville (Taylor) to the Secretary of State

No. 36

the Consul at Brazzaville (Taylor) to the Secretary of State

the Consul at Brazzaville (Taylor) to the Secretary of State

Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department's telegram

No. 66 of July 20, 1942 instructing me to take up with local officials

the terms of an agreement covering the American aviation installation at Pointe-Noire and my No. 57 of July 25, 1942 reporting that

the local officials were not competent to act but giving the bases on

which an agreement could be drawn up

I have the honor to refer also to my report dated July 25, 1942

which describes the present political situation in French Equatorial Africa.

<sup>17</sup> Not found in Department files.

The verbal agreements concerning Pointe-Noire were made between General Sicé and several representatives of the army, particularly Colonel Pohl, Colonel Harding and Captain Vann; Consul Mallon was also present at the conferences.

General Sicé wished to give the American army full possession of whatever facilities were needed and intended to construct, out of the resources of the colony any improvements works or foundations which could be accomplished within the material and financial means of the colony. He agreed to such an arrangement and immediately ordered the work started. In his letter to Consul Mallon dated April 8, 1942 General Sicé stated:

. . . I have the honor to confirm by means of this letter that we will increase our efforts tenfold in order to make the airfield at Pointe-Noire entirely practicable for American planes with the shortest possible delay.

You may count on us and guarantee to your Government that the airfield at Pointe-Noire, the use of which was suggested last year to President Roosevelt's Government by General de Gaulle, will be in condition to give adequate service . . .<sup>18</sup>

It appears that General Sicé was censured for his initiative by the National Committee at London which considered that the matter should have been referred to it. It appears that the National Committee wished to tie up the arrangements at Pointe-Noire with the recognition of the Free French Government and the delivery to French Equatorial Africa of certain military equipment as noted in Mr. Mallon's telegram No. 70 of April 1, 1942.

Since General Sicé's word had been given, however, the National Committee decided not to press the conditions and permitted the work to continue.

The situation was gradually regularized on the part of the National Committee which, through a series of instructions authorized or confirmed the development as it took shape. For example the construction of the runway, the erection of the gasoline reservoirs and the laying of the pipe line have been separately authorized as has the preparation of the hotel which is being reserved for Americans at Pointe-Noire.

The question of an overall agreement which is essentially political in nature, now gives the National Committee an opportunity to bring pressure to bear on the United States.

General Sicé's gesture toward the United States is undoubtedly the cause of his removal from the office, not because of the act itself but because his action was typical of his disregard for the authority of the National Committee. The National Committee is also smart-

---

<sup>18</sup> Omissions indicated in the original despatch.

ing under the slight of being ignored in the American negotiations concerning Martinique and may attempt to recover some of its prestige by being slow to come to terms over the Pointe-Noire concession.

It will not be possible to come to any formal agreement with any administrative officers here regarding Pointe-Noire but I am of the opinion that if no agreement is arrived at, the work will be continued along the lines indicated in my telegram No. 57.

It may interest the Department to know that an agreement has been concluded between the National Committee and the British Government for the installation at Pointe-Noire of reservoirs to contain oil for refueling British ships. The agreement provides that the installation is to be built by the British at British expense and that it becomes French property on completion. It will be operated by the French but the facilities will be available to the British for the duration of the war without fee.

Further items not mentioned in my telegram No. 57 concerning which the local authorities would like to have an agreement with the Americans consist of the following:

A hotel has been taken over and renovated by the Administration at Pointe-Noire and is being reserved for the Americans as described in my report of June 6, 1942 "Preparation to receive Americans at Pointe-Noire".<sup>19</sup> The hotel will be privately managed and reasonable prices will be charged for room and board. The administration expects that the returns will pay running expenses and the cost of renovating in a reasonable time but would like a guarantee against any deficit which might remain whenever the Americans decide they have no further use for the service.

The Comptroller of Finance requests that American dollars be kept out of circulation in French Equatorial Africa. He would like to have paymasters cash their drafts at the bank and pay men only in Free French francs. Any American will be able to buy back dollars for what francs he has left over when he is leaving.

The administration at Pointe-Noire would like to establish a price schedule for articles on the retail market and for native labor. It has been promised that the prices will not be raised to Americans and the request is made that Americans pay no more than the list prices. Laborers, laundry boys, cooks, etc., will be recruited for the Americans at the wage scale by the administration whenever requested.

Respectfully yours,

LAURENCE W. TAYLOR

---

<sup>19</sup> Not printed.



with the American authorities for the furnishing the French forces of a small number of transport aircraft indispensable to the security of the borders. The realization of the wish expressed by the French Government will, in effect, not only be an additional means for the Axis to direct its attention and perhaps its activities towards French Equatorial Africa, especially as a consequence of the recent operations in Northern Libya and Egypt, for one thing, and also as a retaliation for the raids by my troops in the Tchad and Southern Libya, for another thing. The renewed flying over our coastal areas on the course of the last few weeks by Spanish aircraft, the reported presence of submarines in the Gulf of Guinea, the reinforcements of the garrisons at Rio Muni and at Fernando Po, the constitution at Angola of a very active intelligence service, including the possibility of the organization of infiltration into our territory through Cabinda (Angola) and the coast, and the presence of numerous air-borne landings of troops in the Tchad and in the necessary reinforcements of our posts in the French Command have at its disposal some liaison and transport aircraft to permit it at any moment to reach any point in the very vast territory which constitutes Free French Africa. I will be much obliged if you will present these considerations to the competent American authorities in order to explain our reasons for attaching such importance to the furnishing of the few aircraft which we have been asking for for the past several months. You may also inform them of my hope in our common interest to see that all the arrangements concerning the airport at Pointe Noire are concluded as rapidly as possible.

General Bolte states that he has no information concerning any serious negotiations now in progress with regard to the aircraft referred to above but that he recommends favorable consideration and asks to be informed of my decision taken with respect thereto.

851 U. 7962/8 : Telegram

*The Consul at Brazzaville (Taylor) to the Secretary of State*

BRAZZAVILLE, August 1, 1942-10:10 a.m.

[Received 13:11 m.]  
to the Secretary of State (Taylor) (1942-10:10 a.m.)

62. Department's 76; my 57, written before receipt by General Federic of telegram from London. Instructions referred to in my 57 are those received over period of several months and agree with certain portions of work undertaken. On July 24 Secretary General Laurentie promised me copies of instructions regarding Pointe Noire, next day he refused after receiving telegram which was dated July 23. There is no mention of Pointe Noire in the telegram.

" See footnote 21, p. 578. Referred to the Consul at Brazzaville as No. 851 U. 7962/8, p. 578.  
" See footnote 21, p. 578.  
" August 1, 10 a.m., p. 577.

In my opinion General de Gaulle's statement means nothing as technical questions have been freely discussed and easily solved here. The important question is financial. Free French have completed all work they expect to pay for. Nothing more will be done until method of payment is decided on and funds made available for construction, they also want definite signal from London to go ahead.

United States army officer in charge restless over present inactivity ordered SS *Calhoun* to leave Pointe Noire July 30 for Matadi to unload. Pointe Noire cargo will be held on board awaiting developments and a possible return.

Added at noon. Secretary General Laurentie has just received telegram from General de Gaulle as quoted in Department's 76. Telegram requests consideration be given by Americans to aviation needs of colony. Despatch follows.

TAYLOR

---

811.24551U/4a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the  
United Kingdom (Winant)* <sup>25</sup>

WASHINGTON, August 3, 1942—9 p. m.

3628. The War Department advises that approximately 1,500 United States Army troops are due to arrive at Pointe Noire about September 1. The majority of these troops will pass through French Equatorial Africa en route to other destinations. The War Department desires to station a small force at Pointe Noire. It requests that this matter be taken up with the French National Committee and that the permission of General de Gaulle be sought by General Bolte.

WELLES

---

851U.7962/9 : Telegram

*The Consul at Brazzaville (Taylor) to the Secretary of State*

BRAZZAVILLE, August 4, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received August 5—12:08 p. m.]

67. Department's 76,<sup>26</sup> my 62.<sup>27</sup> Colonel Hyde and American officers in conference with Secretary General Laurentie today agreed in principle to

1. Establishment of telephonic communication between airfield Pointe Noire and airfield Leopoldville.

<sup>25</sup> Repeated to the Consul at Brazzaville as No. 85, August 3, 9 p. m.

<sup>26</sup> See footnote 21, p. 576.

<sup>27</sup> August 1, 10 a. m., p. 577.

2. Construction secondary runway at Pointe Noire.
3. Increased personnel for meteorological stations to be supplied by us.
4. French to furnish 300 native laborers at expense of United States Army.
5. Priority for debarkation American personnel and baggage and preference for unloading American war supplies at Pointe Noire.
6. Permission to establish radio communication system and use of French system augmented by American personnel while waiting construction.
7. Storage stevedoring railroad and dock expenses to be put on books for settlement later under Lend-Lease Agreement.
8. Effective control of Portuguese planes, crews and passengers on service between Pointe Noire and Luanda.

No agreement of American demand to control mechanics of landing planes at Pointe Noire with American personnel.

Matters to be discussed further next week and formal memorandum drawn up for Washington and London.

TAYLOR

---

811.24551U/12

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 4, 1942.

Monsieur Tixier called to see me this afternoon at his request.

Monsieur Tixier raised the question of the work to be carried on by the War Department at Pointe Noire in French Equatorial West Africa. He referred to a communication which he had left in the Department of State under date of February 26 last, of which he handed me a copy for my information. He said no reply had, however, been received to this communication, and he called my attention to the last sentence in paragraph C of this communication, which requests an agreement on the part of the American Government that any installation undertaken by the military authorities of the United States at Pointe Noire become the property of the French people at the end of the war, with the understanding that no compensation therefor would be claimed by the United States. He said that was a very important question of principle and he thought it would be very desirable to have the matter settled. I said I would be glad to take this matter up with the War Department and let him know what their views might be. He asked also that some information be given to the National Committee as to the kind of work which the War Department intended to carry on at Pointe Noire, and further stated that General de Gaulle would like our agreement to the appointment by him of a Free French officer to act



as liaison with the American military and naval forces at Pointe-Noire. It was decided that this matter would also be carried on in that place.

4. French to furnish 800 native laborers at Brazzaville.

5. Priority for unloading American war supplies at Pointe-Noire.

6. Permission to establish radio communication system and use of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation by American personnel while waiting for the American Embassy at Brazzaville.

7. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

8. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

9. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

10. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

11. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

12. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

13. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

14. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

15. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

16. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

17. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

18. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

19. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

20. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

21. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

22. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

23. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

24. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

25. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

26. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

27. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

28. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

29. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

30. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

31. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

32. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

33. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

34. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

35. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

36. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

37. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

38. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

39. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

40. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

41. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

42. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

43. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

44. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

45. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

46. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

47. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

48. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

49. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

50. American personnel to be housed in the American Hotel at Brazzaville.

\* Not printed.

[illegible]

and Brazzaville has been accorded to me and will be extended to the American Army. In order to get a connection to Leopoldville, wire and exchange equipment from the United States will be needed as the present equipment is very bad and there is none in reserve.

6. [49] The second runway is a new idea which should have been decided on before. It will complicate matters to start work on that project when the labor is needed to build the camp and dispersal field. Possibly the runway can wait until the camp is built.

1. The control of the mechanics of landing and taking off, will have to be in American hands. Whether a French officer should be placed over the whole base and what his power would be may be one of the questions the Department of State may want to discuss with the National Committee.

9. I do not assume that there will be any objection to the establishment of a radio station which will meet the needs of the American community. There are not enough trained men to operate the British stations during twenty four hours. It is anticipated that enough Americans will be added to the staff to assume continuity of service.

3. The use of American personnel will guarantee continuous service.

Another question was discussed by Colonel Hyde and not mentioned in Secretary General Laurentie's memorandum. Colonel Hyde requested that all charges for unloading, stacking, storage and transportation which should be payable to a government owned or controlled agency, should be entered on the books as charges against the United States Government and settled sometime later under the terms of the Lend-Lease agreement. (This may be a matter for the discussion) between the Department and the National Committee. It should be remembered, however, that the economy of this country is maintained by means of British funds. Any financial burdens placed on the Free French will, probably, eventually have to be met by the British.

Another question discussed and not included in the memorandum is an agreement on the part of the Free French to find, hire and put to work, on American undertakings at Pointe-à-Notre before

August 20, not less than 300 native laborers. The expenses will be paid by the American Army.

The second enclosure <sup>29</sup> is the memorandum prepared by Colonel Hyde covering the same meeting and also the agreements reached at Pointe-Noire with Mr. Lauraint the day before the meeting in Brazzaville.

Respectfully yours,

LAURENCE W. TAYLOR

811.24551U/11

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)  
to the Secretary of State*

No. 5078

LONDON, August 17, 1942.

[Received August 25.]

SIR: Referring to the Department's telegram No. 3628, dated August 3rd concerning the landing of American troops at Pointe-Noire, I have the honor to transmit for the record the text and translation of a letter dated August 4th from General de Gaulle, assenting to the presence of American troops at Pointe-Noire, French Equatorial Africa, together with a further communication from the Commander-in-Chief of Fighting France covering both the utilisation by the American Army of the facilities available at Pointe-Noire and a request for a number of American transport airplanes for use by the local French officials.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

W. J. GALLMAN

[Enclosure 1—Translation]

*The President of the National Committee of Free French at  
London (de Gaulle) to Brigadier General Bolte*

4 CARLTON GARDENS, S.W.1.

August 4, 1942.

MY DEAR GENERAL: In reply to your letter of August 4th, I take pleasure in advising you that the French National Committee willingly agrees to the request of the United States Government in connection with the disembarkation at Pointe-Noire of about 1,500 American troops, the journey of these troops across French Equatorial Africa and the stationing of a small American detachment at Pointe-Noire.

<sup>29</sup> Not printed.

I am giving the necessary orders to the Commanding General in Free French Africa. All details regarding the disembarkation, reception, stationing and movements of these troops will naturally be arranged by the Commanding General in Free French Africa in accordance with the request of the American representatives on the spot.

Yours sincerely,

C. DE GAULLE

[Enclosure 2—Translation]

*The President of the National Committee of Free French at London  
(de Gaulle) to Brigadier General Bolte*

4 CARLTON GARDENS, S.W.1.

July 25, 1942.

MY DEAR GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of July 23rd and am pleased to confirm that I have authorised the local authorities in French Equatorial Africa to discuss with the American Consul General at Brazzaville and any authorised American experts the technical questions connected with the improvement and the use by the American Army of the facilities of the airport at Pointe-Noire and with any installations which may be necessary for refuelling with gasoline.

I take this opportunity to remind you of the security reasons which we have already brought to the attention of the United States Government and which compel us to make the effective use of the Pointe-Noire airport dependent upon an arrangement with the American authorities for the supply of a small number of transport aircraft which are indispensable to the safety of the territory. The use of the Pointe-Noire air base by American Forces would, in fact, constitute a further reason for the Axis to direct its attention and perhaps its action to French Equatorial Africa, particularly in view of the recent operations, on the one hand, in North Libya and Egypt and, on the other hand, as a reprisal for the raids of the Chad troops in South Libya.

The renewed flight of Spanish aircraft over our coastal territory during recent weeks, the presence of submarines in the Gulf of Guinea, the reinforcement of the garrisons at Rio Muni and Fernando Po, and the establishment in Angola of a very active Axis information service, which might organize an infiltration into our territory through Cabinda and the coast, not to mention several aerial bombardments at our posts at Chad, compel the French Command to have at their disposal some liaison and transport aircraft which would allow them at any given moment to move to any point in the vast territory comprising Free French Africa.

will be a very important factor in the consideration of the situation before the Commission. It is a fact that the Commission will be dealing with a situation which is very different from the one which it has dealt with in the past. It is a fact that the Commission will be dealing with a situation which is very different from the one which it has dealt with in the past. It is a fact that the Commission will be dealing with a situation which is very different from the one which it has dealt with in the past.

Yours sincerely,

C. DE GAULLE

[Enclosure 2—Translation]

The President of the National Committee of Free French of London (de Gaulle) to Brigadier General Bolle  
The Secretary of State to the Consul at Brazzaville (Taylor)

A CARLTON GARDENS, S.W.1.  
July 25, 1942

WASHINGTON, August 21, 1942—9 p. m.

111. Department's 85. August 3, 9 p. m.<sup>10</sup> War Department has been informed by a member of General Bolle's staff in London that General de Gaulle's Air Chief has said he fears disagreeable incidents will occur if American aircraft or personnel arrive at Pointe Noire before agreement is reached on fighting French requests for eight liaison aircraft. This may merely be an effort to exert pressure on War Department. Please telegraph immediately whether you consider that such a statement is to be taken seriously.

Full take this opportunity to remind you of the security reasons which we have already brought to the attention of the United States Government and which compel us to make the effective use of the

The Consul at Brazzaville (Taylor) to the Secretary of State

111. Department's 111. No incident would occur here unless ordered from London in which case instructions would probably be followed. Local authorities want to please Americans but are afraid to move without instructions from London. (See report July 25<sup>31</sup> and despatch 36<sup>32</sup>). Because of vacillating attitude of French here

American Army has decided not to put hospital post office at Pointe Noire but at Leopoldville. Pointe Noire is now considered only United States refueling depot on way to Leopoldville. Reference Department's 85. no troops will embark at Pointe Noire, enroute to Matadi arriving August 26.

French Captain Morgan in charge construction airport Pointe Noire has been transferred because too friendly with Americans.

111. Department's 111. No incident would occur here unless ordered from London in which case instructions would probably be followed. Local authorities want to please Americans but are afraid to move without instructions from London. (See report July 25<sup>31</sup> and despatch 36<sup>32</sup>). Because of vacillating attitude of French here

<sup>10</sup> Not found in Department files  
<sup>31</sup> July 27, p. 573.

851U.7962/19a : Telegram

851U.7962/19a

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Secretary of State) to Mr. Tixier  
Head of the French Delegation

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1942—midnight.

4071. For General Dahlquist.<sup>33</sup>  
1. An inquiry was addressed to Brazzaville in connection with General Valin's suggestion that disagreeable incidents might occur should American aircraft or personnel arrive at Pointe Noire before agreement is reached on the request for eight aircraft for French Equatorial Africa. Tixier replied that in his opinion no incident would occur there unless ordered from London in which case instructions would probably be followed. He added that local authorities wish to please Americans but are afraid to move without instructions from London. For example, French Captain Morgan in charge of airport construction at Pointe Noire has been transferred because he was too friendly to us.

Following the lines of War Department's instructions to you, Mr. Tixier, Chief of Free French Delegation here is being informally advised that although every effort will be made consistent with the needs of our common cause to furnish eight transport planes for French Equatorial Africa, this Government must continue to maintain its position that the question of these planes cannot be considered as an integral part of the Pointe Noire agreement, and that the completion of the Pointe Noire project is of common interest in the war effort and should be dealt with strictly on its merits.

2. At the same time Tixier is being informed that this Government is willing to bear the cost of the installations and improvements made by the United States army for its own purposes and that these installations or improvements will remain the property of France after the war without any compensation.

3. Tixier is being informed that the War Department would welcome the appointment of a Fighting French officer for purposes of liaison with the American authorities in charge of the work to be carried out at Pointe Noire.

HULL

<sup>33</sup> Successor to General Bolte as United States representative to deal with the Free French regarding military matters.

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1942—p. m.

125. General Valin has informed General Dahlquist, General Bolte's successor in London that necessary instructions have been

851U.7962/28

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to Mr. Adrien Tixier,  
Head of the Free French Delegation*

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. TIXIER: The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of August 7, 1942,<sup>35</sup> in which you inquire whether this Government is prepared to give assurances that the installations being constructed by the United States Army at Pointe Noire will remain the property of France after the war.

In reply, I am glad to inform you that this Government is willing to bear the costs of the installations and improvements made by the United States Army for its own purposes at Pointe Noire and that these installations and improvements will remain the property of France after the war without compensation therefor.

Furthermore, the question of providing eight transport aircraft for French Equatorial Africa is receiving urgent consideration and every effort will be made consistent with the needs of our common cause to furnish these planes. As I have told you on several occasions, however, this Government cannot accept the proposition that the question of these planes is an integral part of the Pointe Noire project and a *sine qua non* for the conclusion of an agreement on that subject. The early completion of the Pointe Noire project is so clearly of great importance to our common interests in the prosecution of the war that it should be settled between us purely on its merits.

With reference to your request to be advised of the type of work which the War Department intends to carry on at Pointe Noire, I am pleased to enclose for your information a tabulation prepared by that Department.<sup>36</sup>

Finally, I am advised by the War Department that they would welcome the appointment of a Fighting French officer for the purpose of liaison with the American authorities in charge of the work at Pointe Noire.

Sincerely yours,

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.

---

811.24551U/14a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Brazzaville (Taylor)*

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1942—5 p. m.

125. General Valin has informed General Dahlquist, General Bolte's successor, in London that necessary instructions have been

---

<sup>35</sup> Not printed.

<sup>36</sup> Not attached to file copy.

sent to military authorities in French Equatorial Africa to facilitate transit of American forces who arrived some days ago and to extend facilities to our aircraft at Pointe Noire. The former added that agreement for utilization of Pointe Noire airport now only awaits approval of General de Gaulle.

HULL

851U.7962/80

*The Consul at Brazzaville (Taylor) to the Secretary of State*

No. 58

BRAZZAVILLE, September 11, 1942.

[Received September 22.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 41 entitled "Memorandum Agreement between the Free French at Brazzaville and American Army Representatives" and my telegraphic despatch No. 67 of August 4, 1942 and No. 56 of September 10, 1942.<sup>27</sup> The despatches refer to the agreement entered into here covering the technical phases of the airport and auxiliary installation at Pointe-Noire.

A formal agreement has now been drawn up by Colonel Todd in charge of the American Army Forces at Leopoldville and approved by the Governor General of French Equatorial Africa.

The document was signed today by the Governor General and was transmitted to Colonel Todd to be sent to Accra for the signature of General Fitzgerald.<sup>28</sup>

Copies of the Agreement are enclosed.<sup>29</sup> Extra copies have been given to the Governor General, the Secretary General, the Commander of the Air Force and the Director of the Port and adjacent area at Pointe-Noire, all officers of the Administration of French Equatorial Africa. Copies have also been given to General Fitzgerald, Commander in charge of the American operations in Central Africa, Colonel Todd in charge of American operations at Leopoldville and Colonel Kemp in charge of Aviation at Leopoldville.

It is assumed that the two original signed copies will be forward[ed] to the National Committee in London and to the General Staff at Washington.

Respectfully yours,

LAURENCE W. TAYLOR

<sup>27</sup> Despatch No. 56 not printed.

<sup>28</sup> Brig. Gen. S. W. Fitzgerald, Commanding General, U. S. Armed Forces in Central Africa.

<sup>29</sup> Not printed.



811.245517/24

sent to military authorities in French Equatorial Africa to facilitate the transfer of aircraft to the Secretary of State. The transfer of aircraft to the Secretary of State is being handled by the French Equatorial Africa authorities. The transfer of aircraft to the Secretary of State is being handled by the French Equatorial Africa authorities. The transfer of aircraft to the Secretary of State is being handled by the French Equatorial Africa authorities.

Sir: I have the honor to refer to my telegraphic despatches Nos. 92 of August 21, 1942 and 131 of September 12, 1942<sup>40</sup> and my despatches Nos. 36, July 27, 1942, 41, August 10, 1942, 56, September 10, 1942<sup>41</sup> and 58, September 11, 1942, concerning the American airport at Pointe-Noire.

General Fitzgerald, in charge of operations in Central Africa, visited Brazzaville today with Mr. Burnham, Director of Socony-Vacuum at Leopoldville. A conference was arranged with M. Laurentie, Secretary-General with regard to paragraph nine of the agreement reported in my despatch No. 56 of September 11, 1942. The paragraph states that the Administration agrees to the installation of gasoline tanks and pipe lines at Pointe-Noire under terms to be agreed upon by the Fighting French authorities and the Socony-Vacuum. Mr. Burnham, supported by General Fitzgerald, requested that provisions concerning the disposition of the equipment after the war be included in the agreement. M. Laurentie and Colonel Carreter, Chief of the Fighting French Air Force, agreed that there was no authority in French Equatorial Africa capable of assuming the responsibility for such an agreement. M. Laurentie stated that the Americans were authorized to install, use and super-vise their equipment at Pointe-Noire during hostilities. Any agreement that went beyond that would have to be made by the National Committee at London.

M. Laurentie produced a telegram received from London which was a copy of instructions to the Fighting French Delegation in New York. The instructions authorized the installation at Pointe-Noire, giving details of buildings, equipment and personnel anticipated. The last paragraph states that all equipment will revert to the French State without cost at the end of hostilities.

I have been informed by representatives of the American Army that the installation at Pointe-Noire is not indispensable to the proper functioning of the southern flight route. If the conditions imposed by the National Committee are too severe for acceptance it would be possible to move the coastal base to Boma or another place in the Belgian Congo. The Pointe-Noire base has already been divested of much of its utility since the hospital and post office have been transferred to Leopoldville. Pointe-Noire will be

<sup>40</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>41</sup> Despatch No. 56 not printed.

at least a refunding of the cost of the fuel and the cost of the maintenance of the aircraft. The United States Army for the purpose of the purchase of the fuel and the cost of the maintenance of the aircraft.

A few changes have been made in the draft of the agreement and a copy of the final draft is enclosed with this despatch. The installation will be necessary in the near future.

Respectfully yours, **LAURENCE W. TAYLOR**  
 Undersecretary of the Army, United States.

The Government General of French Equatorial Africa and the contracting party, all installations will remain the property of the United States during the period of the agreement. The contractor shall have the right to sublease any or all installations upon thirty days notification in writing. The Government General of French Equatorial Africa.

The Army of the United States of America.

**Scope of Agreement:**  
 The construction and maintenance of buildings and facilities necessary to the operation of the air base at Pointe-Noire including accommodations for the American troops to be stationed there.

**Points to be noted:**

1/ The Port authorities at Pointe-Noire undertake to grant first priority for the disembarkation of troops and baggage.

2/ Priority will be granted for the discharge of war materials at Pointe-Noire as far as possible and in agreement with the British authorities concerned.

3/ The right of requisition of supplies available at Pointe-Noire is granted to the American Forces in emergency cases only and on condition that they be replaced as soon as possible.

4/ All supplies and equipment destined for the American Forces will be granted free entry. Such information as the customs authorities may desire concerning such supplies will be furnished on request.

5/ Authority is given to install one 10 KW radio station and one 300 watt radio station.

6/ Authority is given to build a new runway 1750 mts long and diagonal to the present runway.

7/ The control of the air field will be in the hands of the American Aviation Authorities and will include the control of the landing, distribution and taking off of all planes. The Chief of the base will be a French Officer who will be appointed to assist American authorities and act to permit or deny the use of the field to planes of neutral or friendly countries other than those of the United States and to have control of all French Military operations. It is understood that tactical operations will have priority on the field.

8/ Sufficient ground adjacent to the air field will be granted to the United States Army for the purpose of constructing buildings for housing personnel and for the storage of equipment.

9/ Authority is granted for the installation of gasoline storage tanks and necessary pipe lines. The installation will be constructed, managed and subsequently leased to a contractor selected by the United States. Under the terms of the lease to be agreed upon between the Government General of French Equatorial Africa and the contracting party, all installations will remain the property of the United States during the period of hostilities. The contractor shall have the right to sublease any or all installations upon thirty (30) days notification in writing. Final disposition of all installations will be the subject of further negotiations between the two countries.

September , 1942  
For the Government General of  
French Equatorial Africa.

September , 1942  
For the Army of the United States  
of America.

---

855A.6368/10-2842

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 28, 1942.

M. Tixier came in to see me at his request.

He raised a question which disturbs me considerably. He said that yesterday a man named Sheets, representing the Socony-Vacuum Company, had come around to see him. He said that he was operating under the authority of the War Ferry Command and wanted to discuss the gasoline tank installations which were being made at Pointe Noire. He said that they were prepared to install these tanks for use by the Army but they wanted it understood that after the war was over, these installations and the right to use them should belong to Socony-Vacuum.

Tixier said that his understanding with the State Department and War Department was that installations made for the Army would be negotiated solely with the U.S. Army; further, that they had insisted, and the Department had agreed, that installations made on French territory would belong to France after the war. By consequence, he asked Mr. Sheets to show him his credentials as

representing War Ferry Command. Mr. Sheets said he would do so, but never came back.

It appeared, however, that a similar request had been made in Brazzaville and that the local authorities had turned it down.

Tixier wanted to know whether the Government was behind this.

I said I knew nothing about it and would have to look into it. My impression was the same as his own, namely, that all negotiations about these matters had to be carried on between the French authorities and the American military authorities. I had no intimation that any of these negotiations involved setting up of post-war private rights. I would, however, endeavor to check into the matter and see.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

---

855A.6868/10-2842

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Perry N. Jester of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] November 18, 1942—3 p. m.

Participants: Mr. Sheets, Socony Vacuum Oil Company;  
Mr. Case, Socony Vacuum Oil Company;  
Mr. Murray;<sup>42</sup>  
Mr. Alling;<sup>43</sup>  
Mr. Jester.

Mr. Sheets stated that he had called especially to present the need for consideration of post-war American interests in the handling of installations now being erected in various parts of the world, of which the installation at Pointe Noire was an example. He pointed out that the Fighting French were holding out for the complete reversion of the installations at Pointe Noire to the French State without cost at the close of hostilities, that these installations were only of minor importance, but that the principle involved was very important. He stated that negotiations which had been conducted by the Army Air Force with the French authorities in French Equatorial Africa had as their object on this point either the right of the United States Government to sublease or sell such installations to American interests at the end of the war, or secondly, to hold the matter in abeyance as a subject of further negotiations between the two countries. He related, however, the substance of several conversations which he had had with Monsieur Tixier, the Fighting French Delegate in Washington, by whom he had been

---

<sup>42</sup> Wallace Murray, Adviser on Political Relations.

<sup>43</sup> Paul H. Alling, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

informed that Mr. Berle had agreed, by a letter under date of August 27, 1942, that these installations and improvements would remain the property of France after the war. Mr. Sheets pointed out that if this were done and the principle followed in other cases the post-war positions of American oil companies would be jeopardized in other countries where competing foreign interests would be supplied with expensive and valuable equipment at the expense of the American taxpayers, and that the position of the American oil companies in those markets would be detrimentally affected. He hoped that Mr. Murray and the Near Eastern Division would do everything possible to prevent any such action being finally agreed upon. Mr. Sheets requested that a check be made on the dates of correspondence on this subject, which appeared to be a letter from Monsieur Tixier to either the Secretary of State or an Assistant Secretary of State under date of February 26, 1942, and Mr. Berle's letter of August 27, 1942 above referred to.

Mr. Sheets was undoubtedly aware of the fact that the negotiations for the agreement with the Fighting French regarding installations in French Equatorial Africa have been completed and that a memorandum of agreement has been drawn up, with the exception, however, that the negotiating parties had not agreed on the final sentence of Article 9 which states that final disposition of all installations will be the subject of future negotiations between the two countries".

Mr. Sheets stated that his company was most interested to know of any errors of omission or commission in their activities abroad and would appreciate being informed by the Department of any instance when, in its opinion, any action of theirs had been amiss. Mr. Jester raised the question of the possible misunderstanding by the public of the close working relationship between the United States Army Air Force and representatives of Socony Vacuum Oil Company in negotiating leases in Africa for ground and other installations, the point being that it might appear as if the United States Government, through the United States Army, was assisting one American oil company to obtain preferential leases abroad to the exclusion of other American oil interests. Mr. Sheets replied that this contention could only be raised by a misunderstanding or ignorance of all the facts which were that (1) these installations were being erected with funds supplied by the United States Government; (2) that the Socony Vacuum organization was acting solely in the capacity of an agent for the United States Government; (3) that the title to the property remained with the United States Government for the duration of hostilities; and (4) that the subsequent manner of disposal would be for the United States Government to decide,

which would probably be sold to the highest bidder at which time any American interest would have the opportunity of bidding for the purchase of such equipment. Provided of course we did not give them a way to other Governments.

With regard to the report of the Air Force, Mr. Sheets stated that a considerable amount of information had been obtained from the French National Committee in French Equatorial Africa. Mr. Sheets stated that his company was very much interested in obtaining any information available on this subject. In reply to a question, he stated that his company did not have any partnership agreement with the Dutch Shell Company for operations in this field.

Mr. Sheets stated further that he felt that American interests should endeavor to obtain concessions abroad whenever possible if the standard of living in this country was to be maintained.

The standard of living in this country was to be maintained. The standard of living in this country was to be maintained. The standard of living in this country was to be maintained.

No information was given by Mr. Sheets or Mr. Case concerning the action previously taken by Mr. Barkley as the result of the decision raised in the last sentence of Section 9 of the War Relocation Act. This decision had been settled by the decision of the State Department. This was a point which the French National Committee felt, therefore, could not be discussed by the French National Committee with the representatives of the War Department. It further discussion of this point seemed to be necessary for the War Department to raise the question of the State Department.

On November 18, 1942, a memorandum of agreement was signed at Brazzaville by General Fitzgerald for the United States and Monsieur Laurence, Secretary General of the Government of French Equatorial Africa, for the fighting French regarding the construction, maintenance, control and future disposition of the air base at Pointe Noire, French Equatorial Africa. Article nine of this agreement concerns the installation of gasoline storage tanks and pipelines, and the final sentence of this article provided that the "final disposition of all installations will be the subject of further negotiations between the two countries." This agreement was not considered sufficiently specific as regards all the points involved, and especially as regards the action specified by the last sentence just quoted of Article nine.

The French National Committee claimed that in accordance with an agreement reached with the State Department, these installations

should revert to the French State without cost after the war. This point, along with others requiring clarification, was the subject of conferences held in London on October 2, 3, 4 and 5, 1942 by representatives of this Government and the French National Committee. (Please see the report of the Air Transport Command by Lieutenant Colonel Merrick and Lieutenant Colonel Fixel transmitted to Major General George under date of October 14, 1942.<sup>44</sup>)

The eventual disposition of the installations in question was extensively discussed at these conferences, but no agreement was reached on this point, the French remaining adamant. Monsieur René Pleven, the Vice President of the French National Committee, is reported in the minutes of a conversation with Lieutenant Commander Kittredge, on October 5, 1942, to have stated that:

"He (Mr. Pleven) felt however, that the agreement negotiated with the State Department and confirmed by Mr. Berle's letter of August 27, 1942, had formally determined that the installations constructed or established by the United States military authorities for war purposes in French territory would revert to the French Government without compensation at the end of the war. The question raised in the last sentence of Section 9 of the Brazzaville agreement had been settled by the decision of the State Department. This was a point which the French National Committee felt, therefore, could not be discussed by the French National Committee with the representatives of the War Department. If further discussion of this point seemed advisable it would appear necessary for the War Department to raise the question with the State Department."

By transmitting his report and complete file on this subject to the Department of State, Lieutenant Colonel Merrick has thereby, on behalf of the War Department, raised this subject for further consideration by this Department.

On November 18, 1942, Mr. Sheets and Mr. Case of Socony Vacuum called at the Department to raise the question of the undesirability in connection with the principle and policy involved, and as evidenced in the case of the Pointe Noire base, of allowing petroleum installations abroad, erected at United States Government expense, to fall into the hands of foreign governments and hence of foreign competing interests in the post-war period. (See memorandum of conversation of that date attached as enclosure no. 1.<sup>45</sup>)

At a conference in Mr. Berle's office on November 30, 1942, attended by representatives of the War Department, Mr. Murray, Political Adviser, and Messrs. Villard and Jester, (please see memorandum of conversation attached as enclosure no. 2<sup>46</sup>), it was decided as

---

<sup>44</sup> Not printed.

<sup>45</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>46</sup> Not found in Department files.

desirable that an effort should be made to reopen the negotiations with the Fighting French and endeavor to obtain "a better deal". (Please see paragraph 3, page 1 and paragraph 1, page 4.)

At a conference on December 2, 1942, presided over by Mr. Thornburg and attended by representatives of the War Department, the Socony Vacuum Oil Company, and Messrs. Villard and Jester of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, it was agreed, in connection with discussion of a "Proposed State Department Program Regarding Petroleum Installations Abroad Erected in Connection With the War Effort", (attached as enclosure no. 3<sup>47</sup>), that the re-opening of the negotiations with the Fighting French should be recommended with a view to obtaining agreement for the removal after the war by the United States Government of all installations erected at public expense, if no other disposition suitable to American interests could be agreed upon at that time. (Please see paragraph 1, page 5, of the memorandum of conversation dated December 2, 1942, attached hereto as enclosure no. 4.<sup>47</sup>)

As a tentative suggestion of the approach that might be made (possibly by means of instructions to the American Ambassador at London for reference direct to the French National Committee), it might be pointed out:

1. That subsequent to the prior agreement cited by the French National Committee, which was made with a view toward indicating our friendly interest in the future welfare of France and its Empire, it has become apparent that the operations of our military forces overseas were expanding in ever widening orbits and requiring installations in an ever increasing number of countries. It has therefore become necessary to adopt a uniform policy with regard to the post-war disposition of installations and bases erected in all of these countries at the expense of the American people. We could not permit the reversion of any such Government owned and constructed equipment to the French State without according the same concession to all other similarly concerned countries, and such action is not now regarded as feasible, especially since lend-lease agreements are being entered into with all the United Nations for the extension of such material assistance as the American people are able to give. Accordingly it is desired that the memorandum of agreement of September 16, 1942 regarding the Pointe Noire installations should be amended to provide for the right, reserved by this Government, to remove all structures and equipment erected or installed at public expense subject to the usual restoration of the land to its original condition immediately prior to the beginning of these operations. It

---

<sup>47</sup> Not found in Department files.



might also be agreed, however, that the option to remove such structures and equipment would not be exercised if arrangements could be made, following the termination of the war, suitable to the United States Government and to the then duly constituted Government of the French State for the maintenance and operation of these facilities by commercial interests in such a manner as to best provide for the mutual interests of the French territory concerned and the American people.

It might be further explained informally that this Government fully appreciates the position of the French National Committee in this matter, as brought out by Monsieur Pleyen in the discussions in London on October 5, 1942, and especially its attitude toward all matters concerning oil and the granting of facilities for post-war trade in petroleum products. It would appear, however, that the suggested arrangement provides an entirely free hand both to the post-war Government of the French State as regards future arrangements, and to the United States Government in safeguarding assets acquired with public funds and in protecting American rights and interests. The point might also be touched upon that in as much as the French National Committee could not enter into any commitments for the French State concerning the post-war period, it was at least morally obligated not to accept any concessions on behalf of the State involving economic arrangements applicable to the same period.

It should be obvious without the necessity of emphasis that the failure of the Committee to agree to these proposals could result in a reduction of the plans heretofore contemplated for the construction of the air base at Pointe Noire and might even affect the extent of lend-lease assistance (assuming an integration of policy by this Government) which is otherwise provided for but also extended on behalf of the American taxpayers.

Efforts by the United States to bring about peaceful collaboration of French Somaliland with the United Nations

of such material assistance as the American people have given to the United Nations since the beginning of the European War 1939-1945: Telegram

The Consul at Aden (Timberlake) to the Secretary of State

Aden, December 1, 1942. 11:40 P.M.  
[Received December 2, 1942. 1:30 P.M.]

Aden will probably collapse within a week. Since Friday 1,500 Senegalese and 600 French officers troops have crossed border to Eritrea and British Somaliland. Last estimated garrison was

5,000 Senegals, 1,000 French. Alisa Bivet garrison expected, come over momentarily. Reports indicate Djibouti has announced troops may leave and these departed report no interference.

Governor Nouillhetas has been in France for last month. Antoine probably acting for him. Army nominally under Truffert but it is reported that General Dupont has assumed charge.

Aden naval and air patrols off coast are prepared stop ships making for Yemen. Believe Italian Armistice Commission and anti-Axis elements may try such escape.

Governor and A.O.C.<sup>48</sup> Aden informed me this a. m. absolutely no negotiations or talks going on with Djibouti; that Aden will take no initiative this respect but would lend attentive ear if approached by Djibouti. General Platt<sup>49</sup> Twelfth Division Nairobi advised A.O.C. 2 days ago he was "letting developments take normal course". British hence appear to await French approach.

Local rumor unconfirmed says Djibouti negotiating with Americans and/or Darlan. I know . . . settlement would be easier and perhaps hastened if French thought Americans, British or Darlan would conduct negotiations.

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Aden (Timberlake).*  
WASHINGTON, December 4, 1942—10 p. m.

36. Your December 1, 11 a. m. You should proceed immediately to Djibouti in order to investigate and report to the Department by the best means available to you concerning the situation in French Somaliland and the attitude of the authorities at Djibouti. This assignment is not made at your request nor for your convenience. The Department would especially like to have your views as to the most suitable method of bringing about the cooperation of French Somaliland with the United Nations. Such information may be valuable to supply regarding the economic needs of the territory and also be of interest. Transportation expenses and per diem from Aden to Djibouti and return, and \$7.00 per diem while at Djibouti authorized subject to travel regulations chargeable. Transportation Foreign Service. Travel by air authorized.

Air Officer Commanding.  
Lt. Gen. Sir William Platt, British Commander in Chief of the East African Command.

Adm. Jean Francois Darlan, former French Deputy Premier, and Commander in Chief of French military forces de facto head of the French government in French North Africa.

Adm. Jean Francois Darlan, former French Deputy Premier, and Commander in Chief of French military forces de facto head of the French government in French North Africa.

123 Timberlake, Clare H./284 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Aden (Timberlake)*

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1942—2 p. m.

40. Department's telegram December 3 [4], 10 p. m. You are to interpret the instructions sent you as being solely in order that the Department may receive your views and recommendations on the subject mentioned. The Department does not desire you to have any conversations about suggested cooperation with French authorities or any British officials who may at present be in Djibouti. You should return to Aden at the earliest moment possible after obtaining the information necessary upon which to base your recommendations.

HULL

123 Timberlake, Clare H./282 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Aden (Timberlake)*

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1942—7 p. m.

41. British Embassy informs us that British authorities highly appreciate your assistance at Djibouti. You are authorized to maintain contact with the British authorities but to enter into no negotiations or commitments with the French authorities. You should return to Aden and report results of your trip and your recommendations as soon as you find it advisable to do so.

HULL

851V.01/1 : Telegram

*The Consul at Aden (Timberlake) to the Secretary of State*

ADEN, December 9, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received December 10—8:24 a. m.]

47. My 46, December 6.<sup>51</sup> Entered French Somaliland 6 p. m. 6th; returned Aden p. m. today.

Briefly situation excellent for opening negotiations, majority French favor active support so long as "French" sovereignty retained, all acknowledge Vichy no longer speaks for France but French reverence for person of Pétain<sup>52</sup> must be respected, first approach should be American or Anglo-American, and not include Darlanists or, especially, de Gaullists. Either might be worked in later. Threat of attack now would preclude negotiations and French would fight.

<sup>51</sup> Not printed.

<sup>52</sup> Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, French Chief of State.

Food adequate for 6 months, medical position good.

British General Platt very worried during my visit in spite of fact my instructions clearly understood here beforehand. Have already seen Platt at Harar his urgent request yesterday; have told him enough to allay all anxiety establish very friendly relations. Worry result of local report December 4 which I had heard that Djibouti was "negotiating" with me. Report put out in Djibouti to placate people and stop desertions. Categorically denied truth to Governor on 4th and 5th and then when Department's orders received gave Governor exact statement of them anticipating possibilities misunderstanding.

French want and Platt suggested purely American gambit because of British de Gaulle commitments. Platt coming Aden tomorrow for conference with Governor, AOC, Commodore, me and Hopkinson<sup>53</sup> who was in Syrian negotiations.

In following telegram will give detailed report positions French and British and recommend manner of approach.

TIMBERLAKE

---

851V.01/4 : Telegram

*The Consul at Aden (Timberlake) to the Secretary of State*

ADEN, December 10, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received December 14—8:52 a. m.]

48. Following report on Djibouti visit, refer Department's telegram December 4, 10 p. m. Very cordial reception by General Dupont, who is now Governor, and Antoine. My visit could be used give face their false statement re negotiations already reported. We three talked from arrival 11:00 p. m. to 1:00 a. m. I clearly stated terms instructions and insisted repeatedly I was only an official reporter and entirely without power to take any positive action, make any commitments or give any indication of Department's present attitude or future policy re French Somaliland. Then requested statement their position and hopes, supply and medical position and urgent needs.

Their first position was as follows:

1. French Somaliland must at all costs remain French with French flag flying.

2. Vichy directive to be retained, strict neutrality to be preserved.

4. [*sic*] Economic agreement only to be sought and no political questions to be introduced.

5. No introduction Free French or Darlanists. They said food adequate for 6 to 8 months, popular health good, no epidemics and

---

<sup>53</sup> Henry Lennor d'Aubigné Hopkinson, Counsellor in the British Foreign Office, on staff of British Minister of State in the Middle East.

still have slender medical supplies (I obtained trustworthy independent verification supply medical situation and believe no present possibility collapse that account). Lack canned milk, prepared baby food, vitamins and dry goods.

Stating comments were personally mine. I said I felt sure they would admit that Vichy prisoner of Germany could [not] speak for France or Frenchmen, that developments North and West Africa had to be carefully taken into account, that Dillboui's geographic and political isolation following North African and Madagascar reorganization was very obvious and that Allied nations now most anxious obtain voluntary cooperation against the common enemy. I said I felt time had come for them to acknowledge Vichy lacks independence of action and declare change in politics. They then said (very ingeniously) they would have to consult Vichy regarding any such change.

At 9:00 next morning had further talk Governor and Antoine and they produced position number two as follows:

1. Point 1, position 1, retained intact.
2. Agreed discard Vichy directive after opening any future conversations but continue reporting Vichy time being.
3. Form neutrality to be observed but vague statement cooperation with Allied nations to be made.
4. Agree political implications could not be avoided in discussions.
5. Desire purely local gentleman's agreement on line of Robert's agreement: St. Martinique and definite exclusion Free French or Darlanist intervention; agreement to be American preferably, or Anglo-American.

I said, in my opinion, Germany had to be beaten; that active cooperation was needed; that most Frenchmen realize how Germany's hand in France blew and any pretense of usefulness scrapped; that the opinion of all of large number of French recently following Dillboui was same and that time for positive assistance to Allied war effort had arrived; General Dupont, who is an honest and sincere soldier and no politician, was worried over rejection Vichy not because of politics but because of his oath to Pétain. Antoine, a very clever politician, supported Dupont's position regarding oath and added that a flat statement of full cooperation would give Germans cause to wreak vengeance on families in France. Dupont agreed.

Dupont and Antoine then tried get me to leave so that I could make report and also instructions, expressing hope I could obtain position on basis of ad hoc agreement on basis their second position. I had been

Agreement entered into by the French High Commissioner in the French West Indies, Admiral Robert, and Admiral Greenhous, U.S. Navy, August 6, 1940. See despatch No. 6, August 7, 1940, from the Vice Consul at Fort de France. *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. II, p. 518.

Office on staff of British Minister of State in the Middle East.

and taking active part in the war effort in other words, but carefully prevented so far from talking with anyone except those mentioned and particularly wanted to see Vincens, head of Bank, Gerbal, head Railway, Monnot, head Navy, Delge, head Air Force, and Bertrand, a leading merchant. I said I very much wanted to see first two and Bertrand. Antoine temporized and so I of course had to wait for deeper interviews (1). I said I would not say I could hardly expect my Government to give much weight to a report if I was forced to admit I had been able to obtain only the official governmental attitude and had not sounded financial business and private opinion. Antoine then came back with the proposal that 10 leading citizens submit through Governor to me written, apparent omission, said I wanted to cover ground which they might not cover in memoranda and then asked the Governor and Antoine flatly whether they wished me not to see the people I wished to see. They gave way gracefully in the end.

Had 2-hour talk with Vincens, a very good friend, informed and trustworthy, who gave following: 1. Large majority French favor active full cooperation with Allied war effort. 2. That sentiment strong all business people and all officers up to rank Colonel above but not Monnot or Delge, are conservative and on fence, unanimous commanding desire all people French Somaliland remain French. 3. Grip of Governor and Antoine very precarious but Dupont now best and most trusted person for Governor due honesty and control army. 4. Antoine's influence strong, his honesty not impugned but known ability and love of political maneuvering mistrusted to considerable extent. 5. On November 28, General Truphot resigned governorship given him on November 10 when Nouillhetas left. Resigned because inability choose whether obey path of office as Governor and soldier and order deserters shot or follow his humanitarian instincts and knowledge hopeless position to permit unmolested exit. Pouvreau who was very Vichyist Secretary General then issued proclamation he had assumed governorship. Vincens and any others then staged demonstration 28th forced Pouvreau out and put Dupont in. Antoine preferred Pouvreau but went with Dupont. Position present Government shaky or Vincens et al would be in jail. Vincens believes Dupont best available Governor and that Antoine can be won over or neutralized. I agree entirely. Gerbal, Guignot, Bertrand, Monnot and Delge are in complete accord with Vincens.

Italian Armistice Commissioners still Dubout still surprised, not ill when North Africa occupied. They are not expected to try escape. Had final conference Governor and Antoine 10 a.m. 8th giving following as personal observations: Feel people who have left and large majority still French Somaliland demand change policy scrap-

ping Vichy and taking active part Allied war effort, in other words militant not passive policy, that present Government shaky as shown by disturbances, reason is failure to make such declaration, that pressure from outside is being felt and that a decision on policy must come soon. Suggested they make unilateral declaration along following lines: (1) statement respect for Pétain and allegiance to France, (2) acknowledge Vichy can no longer speak for France, (3) offer collaboration with Allies. I said if they wanted to make such a unilateral declaration I would take it out report it to Department and subject Department's approval present it to whomever they wished. They said such declaration would burn their bridges and this they would not do so unless they knew whether such declaration would be accepted. They proposed I seek authority my Government to negotiate. I said question negotiations not raised by Department but I would report their desire. I am certain they would accept this formula as basis for negotiations. I also know they prefer me to obtain authority to make such preliminary agreement because feeling against de Gaullists still as before and they are not at all certain of Darlanists or latter's political weight. They fear even unilateral approach by British would carry Free French commitments and are confident though they did not express it that de Gaullists would promptly put in their own people in Government Djibouti. Five minutes before departure Djibouti Vincens showed me a telegram just received from French Indochina Bank, Marseilles, saying transfer all Djibouti branch funds and credits to Algiers or Dakar had been made and needed only Vincens telegraphic confirmation either place. Governor and Antoine worried over finance. Vichy has allowed over past 2 years only limited monthly transfers credit Djibouti to keep Vichy financial pressure strong. This very significant point.

Platt practically kidnapped me on return Zeila Tuesday p. m. but I knew reason and guessed London or Platt or both were unadvised previous my visit and I wanted to see him urgently anyway to give him indication that some sort of peaceful settlement appeared to me quite possible and suggest that no undue pressure be exerted on the border pending consideration my report by Department if a peaceful settlement was a prime consideration. I also wanted personally to reassure him regarding my instructions. Had an hour with Platt alone and then another hour including General Fowkes.<sup>55</sup> Their instructions obviously to throw Somaliland to de Gaulle by all possible means short of attack. I told them position Djibouti just about same as 2 years before, e.g., the last people they wanted were the Free French and latter had practically no chance by them-

---

<sup>55</sup> Maj. Gen. Charles C. Fowkes, British Army.

selves. Platt then asked my opinion possible success of joint Anglo-French approach. I said it might have better chance of success but doubted that French would be fooled since they know Anglo-de Gaulle commitments.

It was quite obvious that British do not want American representation in actual negotiations and I am sure they fear America is holding brief for Darlan. Platt spent long time pointing out the irresponsible security that area, that America has neither troops or other personnel to undertake Somali security and that North Africa is far away and de Gaullists are already on French border and eventual personnel already named to take over in Djibouti.

Chancel, Free French representative, came in with us after dinner and of course pressed Free French interest. Avoiding direct insinuation Free French were unpopular and had no chance alone or with British even, Platt eventually suggested that since the original approach seemed most important in getting cooperation perhaps I was the best person to make the advance.

I got back to Aden, 9th, p. m., sent first telegram. Yesterday had conference as anticipated that telegram. It was even more obvious that British order preference is (1) Free French alone; (2) British Free French approach; (3) using me as mailman to deliver Anglo-Free French proposals.

For the moment the only known action being taken is letter sent 10th from Chancel to Dupont giving numerous assurances and asking opening conversations direct Chancel-Dupont.

Platt came to see me 8 a. m. today before going to Harar. Said would wait for reasonable time reply to Chancel then had recommended to London that if no reply or negative reply London ask State Department instruct me go Djibouti with following proposal.

"A. Give Dupont assurances of continuance of French sovereignty over French Somaliland.

B. Assure him that H.M.G. and Fighting French genuinely desire to arrive at an arrangement with the authorities of French Somaliland designed to defeat the Axis as common enemy.

C. Invite him to enter into discussions or send representatives to enter discussions with myself assuming East Africa Command or my representative and M. Chancel delegate of the French National Committee on basis 'for France and defeat of Axis'."

I am absolutely sure Djibouti has long been and still is a sop promised by British . . . and British are making every effort to make it not a military but a political victory for de Gaulle.

Chancel received reply his letter today. Dupont said he would await possible further news from me. I am sure French will reject Platt's proposal unless they are assured America will not join in



actual negotiations. French hope we will. If Department's policy resolution problem French Somaliland is merely to be helpful to British and/or de Gaulle and desire me to deliver Platt's proposal suggest instruct me do so and try persuasion with additional instruction to be used only if first fails stating more or less that while United States is sympathetic, et cetera, this area is really British security problem and we could not or do not wish to take active part in actual settlement. This might work but chances very slim. If Department has any other policy in mind and/or wants to participate in actual negotiations please instruct and I will indicate other possibilities.

TIMBERLAKE

---

740.0011 European War 1939/26450 : Telegram

*The Consul at Aden (Timberlake) to the Secretary of State*

ADEN, December 10, 1942—midnight.

[Received December 13—2:45 p. m.]

49. Have seen telegraph from London Foreign Office which states Platt's instructions are to throw French Somaliland to de Gaulle "using all means short of serious bloodshed". Please note use word serious.

I feel very strongly the apparent British willingness to sacrifice not only the fate of French Somaliland but also the present strong desire of its people to cooperate in the Allied war effort to the satisfaction of a purely political deal or promise to de Gaulle.

Please await end my telegram No. 48 before instructing me further. A few days will make no difference here.

Date this telegram December 13, 6 p. m.

TIMBERLAKE

---

851V.01/8

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 11, 1942.

The British Ambassador<sup>56</sup> called to see me this morning at his request.

I read to the Ambassador Mr. Timberlake's telegram of December 9 reporting on his trip to Djibouti. The Ambassador laughed at the portion of the telegram which reported that General Platt, who had at first so vigorously protested against Mr. Timberlake going to Djibouti, was now asking Mr. Timberlake to undertake

---

<sup>56</sup> Viscount Halifax.

negotiations to get the French in that colony on the side of the United Nations. He apologized again for the thoroughly unnecessary trouble which his Government had caused the Department in this connection. I told the Ambassador that Mr. Timberlake would be instructed to hold the suggested conference in Aden and that we would then subsequently determine what action, if any, he should further undertake.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

851V.01/1 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Aden (Timberlake)*

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1942—9 p. m.

43. Your 47, December 9, 10 p. m. Department approves of the proposed conference and awaits your reports thereon. The British Ambassador has expressed the regret of his Government for the confusion in the instructions which were sent to you by the Department concerning your trip to Djibouti. The confusion was caused by General Platt's protest at your visit, prior to your talk with him at Harar. The British are now most appreciative of the results of your trip.

HULL

---

740.0011 European War 1939/26496 : Telegram

*The Consul at Aden (Timberlake) to the Secretary of State*

ADEN, December 15, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 11:45 a. m.]

50. Reference my telegram No. 49, December 10. It is now an important factor since Platt telegraphed today he will send his proposal to Dupont direct unless I am as he hopes instructed by tonight to deliver them by tonight. I think I have stalled him until tomorrow night. For many reasons I believe it of great importance in securing voluntary cooperation of French that I take in proposal and urgently request Department instruct me as suggested last paragraph my telegram No. [48].

TIMBERLAKE

---

740.0011 European War 1939/26496 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Aden (Timberlake)*

WASHINGTON, December 15, 1942—9 p. m.

44. Your 50, December 15, 11 a. m. The matter is being taken up urgently with the British Government and is being taken up with the

British Ambassador here. Therefore please request General Platt to withhold action until such time as a decision is reached and instructions issued to you.

HULL

---

740.0011 European War 1939/26629b

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*<sup>57</sup>

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department of State has been informed by the American Consul at Aden, Mr. Timberlake, of the results of a conference in which he participated at that place with British military and civil representatives concerning the situation at Djibouti, French Somaliland. It appears that following the conference General Platt, the British military commander at Harar, stated to Mr. Timberlake that he would recommend that certain proposals should be submitted to the French authorities at Djibouti looking to an arrangement with the French National Committee and the British Government designed to assure the continuance of French sovereignty over French Somaliland and to bring about the defeat of the Axis. Mr. Timberlake recently completed a visit to French Somaliland for the purpose of investigating the situation in that area and his report forms the basis of the conclusions reached below.

It is obvious that in the existing circumstances French Somaliland occupies an isolated position in relation to the war and constitutes no menace to the United Nations. The authorities at Djibouti have indicated that they would resist by force of arms any attempt to turn that territory over to the French National Committee, an act which would inevitably result in a useless sacrifice of French lives. Moreover, the authorities have asserted that intervention by representatives of Admiral Darlan would also be unwelcome, but have indicated their willingness to enter into an agreement with the American and British Governments.

At a time when the position of the United Nations in North and West Africa has not yet been consolidated and still requires a delicate adjustment, it would be most unfortunate in the view of the United States Government if French blood should be shed in an area which may be considered a potential ally in the common cause. The repercussions which would take place, particularly in French West Africa, in the event of a clash in French Somaliland at this

---

<sup>57</sup> Repeated to the Consul at Aden in telegrams Nos. 46 and 47, December 21, noon, and to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom in telegram No. 6884, December 16, with the additional instruction to take up urgently with the Foreign Office the subject discussed in the *aide-mémoire*.

time, would unquestionably be serious. It should therefore be the purpose of the British and American Governments to avoid by every means in their power the threat of civil strife in French Somaliland.

In the light of the above, it is suggested that Mr. Timberlake, together with appropriate representatives of the British Government, should be authorized to proceed to Djibouti with the view to discussing with the French authorities the possibility of effecting a peaceful arrangement under which French Somaliland would freely join the United Nations. These British and American representatives would submit to their respective Governments their joint recommendations as to the best means of bringing about this aim, on the basis of which they would receive further instructions.

The Department of State would appreciate being informed as soon as possible whether the British Government concurs in the above suggestion.

WASHINGTON, December 16, 1942.

---

740.0011 European War 1939/26584 : Telegram

*The Consul at Aden (Timberlake) to the Secretary of State*

ADEN, December 16, 1942—noon.

[Received December 16—10:55 a. m.]

51. Department's 44, December 15, 11 a. m. [9 p. m.] received and action taken at 11 a. m. today as instructed. Will report outcome.

Respectfully and urgently request Department assign temporarily to Aden a competent confidential stenographer also authorized to use codes. I can arrange suitable accommodations for male or female. Suggest be flown from Egypt to remain until completion Djibouti affair.

Can the Department advise when Vice Consul Truex may be expected at Aden?

TIMBERLAKE

---

740.0011 European War 1939/26579 : Telegram

*The Consul at Aden (Timberlake) to the Secretary of State*

ADEN, December 17, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received December 18—1:05 a. m.]

52. Reference my 51, December 16, paragraph 1. At 1 a. m. today I received following telegram from General Fowkes at Harar. (Platt is in Nairobi and I had my telegram requesting withhold action repeated to both Fowkes and Platt.)

["General Dupont has invited me to visit him tomorrow and I await instructions whether I am to go. I do not think formal negotiations should be delayed any longer, but I hope you will soon be authorized to reassure Jibuti authorities either verbally or in writing that Great Britain and United States are in accord or alternatively, that Jibuti authorities are no longer bound by 'the gentleman's agreement' under which they claim you were permitted to carry out investigations as prelude to negotiations. Without such assurance or release by you no progress possible. Repeated by Hopkinson to Foreign Office."

At 3 a. m. received following copy of telegram to Fowkes from Platt:

"1. I have discussed your 15313 and Aden 88 with M. Bayardelle. He and I are in agreement on following instructions.

2. You will proceed on 17 December to see General Dupont. You will at the outset tell Dupont that it is impossible for you to discuss any future arrangements without presence of Fighting French.

3. The colony has got to come over to the side of the United Nations and the only way of that being implemented is through the Fighting French.

4. Within above terms use all persuasion you can to arrange meeting between Dupont and Chancel.

5. You are on no account to discuss any arrangements excluding Fighting French.

6. I greatly regret not being able to accept American Consul's request to withhold action. General Fowkes having received Dupont's invitation any delay in taking preliminary advantage thereof would be prejudicial to future."

Under paragraph I of above 15315 is telegram from Fowkes to Platt asking instructions, Aden 88 is my request, Bayardelle is believed to be Chancel's representative in Nairobi.

I have taken further action on receipt above. Unable determine whether Platt acting under stand[ing] instructions or special instruction following my request to him. My telegram to him repeated to London direct from Aden and Platt had 12 hours to receive fresh instructions between time origin my telegram and time origin second telegram quoted above.

TIMBERLAKE

---

740.0011 European War 1939/26611 : Telegram

*The Consul at Aden (Timberlake) to the Secretary of State*

ADEN, December 19, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received December 20—4:03 a. m.]

53. Reference my telegram No. 52, and particularly telegram quoted therein from Fowkes to me referring to "a gentlemen's agreement". I have just seen copies of two telegrams from Foreign

Office to Department concerning such alleged agreement. I wish to assure Department there was no agreement of any kind understood or implied. I entered French Somaliland and made investigation without any prearrangement with Jibuti authorities or knowledge by them that I was going there. I was permitted as reported to carry on investigation by tacit consent French and without any arrangement whatever. They may, of course, be using such story to hold out against pressure to accept Free French. Since Fowkes appears to be using two telegrams of mine to try and persuade French that I am out of the picture I quote the correspondence herewith. Following is telegram from Platt [*Fowkes?*] to me dated December 14:

"As unfortunately you have not yet been authorized to make approach to Jibuti authorities suggested by General Platt in his message of December 11 through the Governor of Aden I have now been instructed by General Platt to approach Governor myself along similar lines. I am therefore addressing a letter to General Dupont in which after referring to principles set out in General Platt's message, I have requested him to fix a meeting with Chancel and myself at an early date. As Jibuti authorities in a reply to Chancel's letter have indicated that they are awaiting some further move from you I am informing them that you are aware of my proposed action, which from information received from HM Ambassador Washington I gather does not conflict with views of United States Government. It would certainly help in my discussions with Governor if you felt able to send me a message by tomorrow night, to effect that you had no instructions to embark on any discussions over future of Jibuti. This will prevent any attempt to drive a wedge between ourselves and yourself". I replied December 15 as follows: "My Government could not have received my full report until late December 13 and I expect reply by tomorrow 16. I recommended Department authorize me deliver General Platt's proposal and try persuade General Dupont accept. I believe that if I am authorized by my Government to urge acceptance and so inform Dupont the chances of securing cooperation of Jibuti will be considerably improved."

On receipt Department's No. 44, I telegraphed as follows to Platt and Fowkes:

"I have just been instructed urgently by my Government that it is taking up urgently with British Government and British Ambassador at Washington the matter of presentation of joint Anglo-Fighting French proposal to General Dupont. I am instructed 'to request General Platt to withhold action until such time as a decision is reached and further instructions issued to me.'["]

[TIMBERLAKE]

851V.00/9

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] December 21, 1942.

The British Ambassador called at his request.

I brought up the Djibouti matter and said that this Government is not disposed to interfere with British steps dealing with the French situation there provided the British did not get into a military clash with the French resulting in French blood being shed. I said that we were very much opposed to such a step, that it would play havoc with our situation in North and West Africa and materially affect the prosecution of the African campaign, if not the war itself. The Ambassador said he fully appreciated this view and personally agreed, adding that he would place the matter before his Government.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

851V.00/10

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] December 24, 1942.

The British Ambassador called at his request and I said that with respect to Djibouti and the confused situation existing there that to avoid bloodshed or danger of a clash among French factions with the serious risk of bad repercussions throughout northwest Africa at this critical time seriously affecting the military campaign there, this Government would suggest the advisability of the British and the American Governments each selecting an individual and these two persons in turn selecting a suitable Frenchman not conspicuously identified with either French faction and let him become the head of the French civil affairs at Djibouti. The Ambassador said that he would put that up to his Government.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.0011 European War 1939/26938 : Telegram

*The Consul at Aden (Timberlake) to the Secretary of State*

ADEN, January 3, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received January 5—6:59 a. m.]

1. French Somaliland capitulated on December 28 without a shot having been fired. Agreement<sup>58</sup> signed by General Dupont, Fowkes and Chancel places colony under Free French with British liaison in all essential services such as port, railway, radio and security.

<sup>58</sup> The agreement was dated December 28, 1942.

Bayardelle is our new Governor, P. Antoine, Pouvreau, Monnot, Delge and 5 others made prisoners of war.

Fifteen Italian Armistice Commissioners also prisoners. I asked Hopkinson to suggest and recommend turning Commissioners over to us for trading purposes. He agreed and said he did not believe British wanted them. Suggest Department approach London this respect.

TIMBERLAKE

---

**EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH ADMIRAL ROBERT CONCERNING THE MAINTENANCE OF NEUTRALITY BY THE FRENCH POSSESSIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN\***

851B.01/61 : Telegram

*The Consul in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State*

FORT-DE-FRANCE, February 21, 1942—9 a. m.  
[Received 4:28 p. m.]

37. Censor and I referring United Press and Associated Press inquiries re events my 35, 36<sup>60</sup> to "Washington" to calm populace prey to rumors, Admiralty communiqué restricted to newspapers will cite facts briefly without naming *Del Plata*. Though prohibited reach abroad for fear distortion, alarming reports based thereon are expected circulate abroad eventually and advisability some kind of release now by Department indicated.

Local release reads:

"Yesterday news arrived of the torpedoing of an American merchant vessel off Dominica. When informed, the Admiral High Commissioner,<sup>61</sup> on an inspection tour in Guadeloupe, sent the *Barfleur* to the rescue of the ship's crew, the number saved being not yet known.

Last night about 10:30, a German submarine appeared off the port control station and after identifying itself by the usual international signals asked to be allowed to debark a wounded man. The submarine remained off the station and the control launch went out to it and took off the man who, crudely amputated of a foot, was in urgent need of care ashore. The submarine departed immediately westward and the man taken to the hospital.["]

It is to be noted that the submarine did not enter even the outer harbor and restricted itself to debarking a seriously injured man in minimum time.

MALIGE

---

\* For previous correspondence concerning the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. II, pp. 493 ff.

<sup>60</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>61</sup> Adm. Georges Robert.



862.88/225a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, February 21, 1942—6 p. m.

124. Please call immediately upon Admiral Darlan<sup>62</sup> and inform him, by direction of the President, that this Government is advised that a German submarine this morning entered the port of Fort-de-France in the Island of Martinique for the hospitalization of an officer and has there obtained facilities which will assist it to continue its operations against the shipping of the United States and of other nations associated with the United States.

The United States Government cannot permit any of the French possessions of the Western Hemisphere to be used as a base for Axis operations. The utilization of French islands and territories in the Western Hemisphere for this purpose would be an immediate and direct blow at the vital national interests of the United States and at the security of the Western Hemisphere.

Unless the Government of the United States immediately receives categorical assurances from the French Government that under no circumstances or conditions will the French authorities again permit Axis vessels or airplanes to enter French ports or territory within the Western Hemisphere, and unless such assurances, if given, are rigidly maintained, the Government of the United States will take such action in the interest of its own defense and in the interest of the security of the Western Hemisphere as may, in its own judgment, be necessary, and as may be in accordance with its existing inter-American obligations.

WELLES

862.88/231 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, February 23, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received February 24—1 : 53 a. m.]

274. At 4 p. m. today I delivered to Admiral Darlan orally the message contained in your 124, February 21, 6 p. m. An *aide-mémoire* on the subject was also left with him.

Darlan replied with a statement that the German authorities had informed him in advance of their desire that a submarine should enter the harbor of Fort-de-France for the purpose of hospitalizing a patient and that he had attempted to dissuade them. He stated further that the submarine received no assistance whatever, that the

<sup>62</sup> Adm. Jean François Darlan, Vice President of the French Council of Ministers and Commander in Chief of Land, Sea, and Air Forces.

United States representative in Martinique was immediately informed, and that the submarine departed at once when the patient was landed.

He said that by international law it would be difficult for a neutral port to refuse medical assistance to patients from a belligerent ship when requested to do so but that he will without delay give a memorandum reply to our request for a categorical assurance that Axis vessels and aircraft will not hereafter be permitted to enter French territory in the Western Hemisphere.

Admiral Darlan spoke at length of his desire, his repeated promises and his intention to remain neutral and to not grant to the Axis the use of base facilities or the use of French naval vessels.

In reply to a question he said he does not believe the Axis Powers will attempt to use Madagascar<sup>63</sup> and that he will resist with his submarine force such an attempt if it should be made. He added that in the event of an Axis attack on Madagascar he would welcome American assistance.

He seemed seriously concerned about America's recent attitude in the matter of reported assistance given by France to the Axis and expressed a desire on his part and on the part of the Marshal<sup>64</sup> to retain the good will of America and to deserve our confidence in his good intentions.

I gathered the impression that America's positive reaction to the shipment of Axis supplies via Tunis<sup>65</sup> and to the submarine visit at Fort-de-France definitely has him worried.

LEAHY

---

851B.76/2a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul in Martinique (Malige)*

WASHINGTON, February 23, 1942—6 p. m.

13. The Department has been informed from a reliable source that a high frequency shortwave broadcaster connects Martinique direct with Berlin and that German submarines are expected to find refuge in Martinique and French Guiana.

Please endeavor urgently to check through any source available to you the accuracy of the foregoing information.

WELLES

---

<sup>63</sup> For correspondence concerning Madagascar, see pp. 687 ff.

<sup>64</sup> Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, French Chief of State.

<sup>65</sup> For correspondence regarding concern of the United States over French aid to Axis forces in Libya, see pp. 123 ff.

862.33/232 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, February 24, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received 1:08 p. m.]

281. The following is an accurate translation of a note received yesterday evening in reply to Department's request contained in your 124, February 21, 6 p. m. for categorical assurances that the French Government will under no circumstances again permit Axis vessels or airplanes to enter French territory in the Western Hemisphere:

"Vichy February 23. In reply to the *aide-mémoire* left on February 23 by Admiral Leahy and after having made it clear that the landing on February 21 at Fort-de-France of a wounded person is in complete conformity with international law (article 15, convention X of The Hague of October 18, 1907<sup>66</sup>), that no facility of any kind was given the vessel on which the wounded person was, and the fact that this landing was immediately brought to the attention of the American representative, Admiral Darlan has the honor to inform Admiral Leahy.

(1) That the German authorities have never requested the French Government for authorization to utilize any of the French possessions of the Western Hemisphere as a base of operations; (2) that these possessions have not served as bases for Axis forces for military, naval or air operations; (3) that the French Government, faithful to the neutral position which it intends to maintain, particularly insofar as the access to ports in French territory is concerned, will not authorize under any circumstances the utilization of French possessions in the Western Hemisphere by any of the belligerents as a base of operations. Darlan."

This note appears to fail to give the "categorical assurances" requested and clearly stated by me orally and in writing to Admiral Darlan.

LEAHY

862.33/232 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, February 24, 1942—8 p. m.

131. Your 281, February 24, 10 a. m. You should immediately address a communication to the Foreign Office in response to the *aide-mémoire* quoted in your telegram under reference. You should state that the *aide-mémoire* in question fails in the opinion of the American Government to give the categorical assurances requested by it that under no circumstances or conditions would the French

<sup>66</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. 2, pp. 1229, 1233.

Government again permit Axis vessels or airplanes to enter French ports or French territory within the Western Hemisphere. It should be repeated that without such assurances given and maintained it will be necessary for the Government of the United States to take such action as may in its own judgment be necessary in the interests of the defense of the United States and the security of the Western Hemisphere. The attention of the French Government may also be drawn to the persistent rumors relating to the presence of German submarines in the territorial waters of French Guiana, the strengthening of a military garrison there and increased supplies of gasoline.

It may be pointed out in this connection that although it is specifically stated by the French Government that it will not authorize the utilization of any French possessions in the Western Hemisphere by any of the belligerents as a base of operations, it has nevertheless failed to permit this Government to send a consular officer to French Guiana who would be in a position to obtain authentic information which, it is hoped, would give clear proof that French territory is not being used for this purpose.

WELLES

---

862.33/234 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, February 26, 1942—noon.

[Received February 26—11:20 a. m.]

303. A note prepared in the sense indicated in the Department's 131, February 24, 8 p. m. was delivered to the Foreign Office today.

The substance of the second paragraph of the telegram under acknowledgment will be brought to the attention of Admiral whom I am seeing tomorrow.

As regards the matter referred to in the final paragraph of the Department's 131, February 24, 8 p. m. the Embassy acting on instructions contained in the Department's strictly confidential telegram 104, February 14, 4 p. m.<sup>67</sup> addressed a note to the Foreign Office in this sense on February 16.

Rochat<sup>68</sup> who was reminded of the matter yesterday promised us an early reply. Should the French Government not consent to our reopening the Consulate at Cayenne I will not fail to bring to Admiral Darlan's attention Department's observations outlined in the final paragraph above referred to.

LEAHY

---

<sup>67</sup> Not printed; it instructed Admiral Leahy to inform the French Government that the Department had decided to reopen the American Consulate at Cayenne in French Guiana (125.286/10b).

<sup>68</sup> Charles Antoine Rochat, Secretary General of the French Foreign Office.

862.33/238 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, February 26, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 4:56 p. m.]

304. M. Rochat has given us the following information in strict confidence with the evident hope that it would be transmitted for your information:

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is informed that shortly following the entry of the German submarine into Fort-de-France on February 21, the United States Naval observer there reported by cable that it had arrived to obtain assistance or supplies.

Later when he found that the submarine did not desire assistance or supplies, the Naval observer corrected his previous cable report by 'air mail letter'.

The young officer landed at Fort-de-France for medical attention, is the son of an officer high in the German Admiralty, which probably accounts for the German insistence on providing satisfactory medical facilities. The injury is of a nature to require amputation.["]

LEAHY

862.33/238 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, February 27, 1942—9 p. m.

[Received February 28—5:57 p. m.]

314. Reference Embassy's 281, February 24, 10 a. m. and Department's 131 of February 24, 8 p. m. The following is a translation of a communication dated February 27 signed by Admiral Darlan which was received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

"Mr. Ambassador: In reply to your letter of February 26 and while maintaining the indications of fact contained in the *aide-mémoire* of February 23, I have the honor to declare to Your Excellency that under no circumstances and under no pretext will the French Government allow war vessels or military planes of any belligerent power to enter French ports or territory of the Western Hemisphere (Antilles, Guiana, St. Pierre, Miquelon).

The French Government awaits from the American Government the assurance that this decision, which should dissipate all apprehensions recently expressed at Washington, should imply necessarily on the part of the United States Government the strict respect or reestablishment by action and by law of French sovereignty over these territories as well as of the status of neutrality in which it intends to maintain them, please accept, et cetera, Darlan."

In handing this note to us which he described as containing a complete reversal of the French position, Rochat expressed the hope

that it would meet with our Government's approval. He stressed the fact that this step when applied would serve "hermetically to seal" French possessions in the Western Hemisphere to vessels of belligerent powers, naturally including the United States. He pointed out however that the decision would not become operative until our Government had formally signified its agreement thereto, at which time all belligerent powers would be formally notified thereof.

Insofar as the reference to neutrality in the penultimate paragraph of the communication is concerned, Rochat pointed out that his Government felt it was stretching a point in permitting our Naval observer to remain in Martinique.

This note appears definitely to propose that the United States and the Axis Powers be subjected to exactly the same restrictions in the French possessions mentioned therein.

LEAHY

---

862.33/238 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, March 2, 1942—9 p. m.

140. Your 314, February 27, 9 p. m. The note received from Admiral Darlan fails completely to take into consideration the position of this country in the Western Hemisphere and its request not that war vessels or military planes of any belligerent power should be prohibited entry from French ports or territory in the Western Hemisphere but that Axis war vessels and planes should be denied admission. Furthermore, Admiral Darlan's proposal constitutes a revision of the Greenslade-Robert agreement<sup>69</sup> as amended by the Horne-Robert memorandum<sup>70</sup> establishing the daily patrol service in the French Antilles. Should the French Government desire to amend these agreements in such fashion it will be necessary for the United States Government to review all phases of its agreements relating to the French Antilles and to make such changes therein which are required by the new position adopted by the French Government. This Government is unable to enter into any agreement which would restrict in any way its right to patrol the

---

<sup>69</sup> For correspondence regarding the Greenslade-Robert agreements of August 5 and 6, 1940, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. II, pp. 513-516.

<sup>70</sup> Memorandum dated December 17, 1941, confirming the Greenslade-Robert agreements, not printed. Admiral Horne of the United States Navy, arrived at Fort-de-France on December 17, 1941, where he had been sent for the purpose of conferring with Admiral Robert on the Caribbean situation, changed by the entrance of the United States into the war.

Atlantic and Caribbean areas and take such measures for the defense of these areas against Axis attacks which in its judgment are considered desirable or necessary. This includes such matters as airplane patrol of ports, harbors and sea coasts.

The French Government has stated that it desires to maintain a status of neutrality as regards its possessions in the Western Hemisphere. This Government is not prepared to agree that any such status will prevent it from exercising its particular responsibility as regards these territories.

This Government must continue to insist upon receiving the assurances previously requested that Axis planes and vessels shall not be permitted to enter French ports in this area.

WELLES

---

862.33/234 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, March 2, 1942—11 p. m.

142. Your 303, February 26, noon. In discussing with the French Government the entry of the German submarine into Fort-de-France harbor it may be pointed out that this Government received from the French Embassy in Washington on August 21, 1916 a communication from the Allied Governments announcing their decision that:

"Submarine vessels should be excluded from the benefit of the rules hitherto recognized by the Law of Nations regarding the admission of vessels of war or merchant vessels into neutral waters, roadsteads or ports and their sojourn in them. Any belligerent submarine entering a neutral port shall be detained there." (See *Foreign Relations* 1916 Supplement, page 769-770.)

As you are aware by proclamation of the President dated November 4, 1939<sup>71</sup> belligerent submarines were prohibited from entering ports or territorial waters of the United States.

It may be added that the position taken by the French Government when a belligerent as regards neutral rights seems at variance with its present position that provisions of the Hague Convention are applicable.

WELLES

---

<sup>71</sup> Department of State *Bulletin*, November 4, 1939, p. 456.

862.88/275

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] March 5, 1942.

The British Ambassador<sup>72</sup> called to see me at my request this morning.

The Ambassador said that he had received last night a telegram from Mr. Eden<sup>73</sup> who said that he had been informed of the entrance into the harbor of Fort-de-France, Martinique, of a German submarine in order to discharge for hospitalization a gravely wounded sailor. Mr. Eden desired this Government to know that in his opinion the United States Government should immediately have proceeded to occupy Martinique as a result of this incident.

I said to the Ambassador that I thought it would be useful for his Government to be informed that the Government of the United States felt itself quite competent to decide this question for itself. I stated that there were many considerations regarding the occupation of Martinique by the United States which had not, perhaps, occurred to Mr. Eden. Among these, I said, were the persistent efforts made by the United States during the last 18 months, at the urgent request and insistence of the British Government, to maintain effective influence over the Vichy Government so as to prevent the transfer into German hands of the French fleet and the occupation of North Africa by German forces. I said that perhaps it had not occurred to Mr. Eden that the occupation in this way by the United States of Martinique could hardly have resulted in anything other than a complete break of relations between Vichy and the United States. Furthermore, I said, Mr. Eden may not have been informed that the United States is a party to an inter-American convention<sup>74</sup> which provides for joint agreement between the American Republics when it becomes necessary for the American Republics or one of them to take over jurisdiction of the Western Hemisphere possessions of some non-American power. I concluded by saying that I trusted that this information regarding the entrance of this German submarine into Fort-de-France would not immediately be given to the press by the British Government. At the very moment when the United States was doing its utmost to obtain complete and satisfactory assurances from the Vichy Government with regard to vital

<sup>72</sup> Viscount Halifax.

<sup>73</sup> Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>74</sup> Convention for the Provisional Administration of European Colonies and Possessions in the Americas between the United States and other American Republics, signed at Habana July 30, 1940. For text, see Department of State Treaty Series No. 977, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1273.



questions now under discussion, a deliberate leakage of this character would not be conducive to the success of our efforts.

Lord Halifax said he agreed and would inform Mr. Eden accordingly.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

862.24/604 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1942—9 p. m.

156. The future development in American-French relations depends in a large measure upon satisfactory assurances being received from the French Government in response to this Government's communications concerning the status of French possessions in the Caribbean and furnishing of supplies to the Axis powers in North Africa which formed the subjects of the Department's telegrams no. 140, March 2, 9 p. m. and no. 139, March 2, 8 p. m.<sup>75</sup> You are requested again to bring these considerations to the attention of the French Government and to request an urgent response to the two communications in question.

WELLES

---

740.0011 European War 1939/21044

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] March 11, 1942.

The French Ambassador<sup>76</sup> called to see me at his request.

The Ambassador said that he had just received a further cable from his Government concerning the demand of the United States that the French Government agree that no Axis vessels or aircraft be permitted to enter the jurisdiction of French authorities in the Western Hemisphere. The Ambassador gave me to understand that this last message he had received ordered him to call upon me to find out if I were serious with regard to the demands made upon the French Government. I made it clear to the Ambassador that the point of view of this Government was that the assurances requested constituted an absolutely imperative necessity for the United States.

The Ambassador then stated that he was preparing a telegram to his Government on this matter insisting that the wishes of the United States be met and pointing out that the agreements entered into culminating in the Horne-Robert agreement should not be modi-

---

<sup>75</sup> *Ante*, pp. 617 and 144, respectively.

<sup>76</sup> Gaston Henry-Haye.

fied or superseded by any changes or developments in the war situation. The Ambassador insisted that his Government agree to meet the demands of the United States and yet, at the same time, maintain intact the right already granted the United States of observation and of patrol.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

862.33/248 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, March 12, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received March 13—12:37 p. m.]

381. Reference Department's 140, March 2, 9 p. m.; and Embassy's 369, March 10, 3 p. m.<sup>77</sup> The following is a translation of a note dated March 12 signed by Admiral Darlan relative to the attitude of the French Government in connection with French possessions in the Western Hemisphere:

"Mr. Ambassador: In your letter of the 5th of this month, Your Excellency kindly conveyed to me the observations formulated by the Government of the United States with regard to the regime to which in the future warships and military planes of belligerent countries will be subjected in French possessions of the Western Hemisphere. Your Excellency, in particular, expressed the opinion that the proposal made by the French Government might imply a revision of the Robert-Greenslade agreement and of the arrangement reached between Admiral Robert and Admiral Horne.

The American Government should not fail to understand the reasons, prompted both by the general provisions of international law as well as by existing circumstances, which oblige the French Government to adopt a regime providing for equality of treatment in regard to all of the belligerents. The proposal submitted in the note of February 27 last, however, has neither as its object or as its effect the modification of the Robert-Greenslade and Robert-Horne agreements; the French Government gives the assurance to the American Government that it does not intend to question these agreements to the maintenance of which it remains bound and which are compatible with the proposed new regime.

The French Government is on the other hand prepared to confirm to the High Commissioner the instructions previously given with a view to the settlement from the local point of view and in the spirit of the existing agreements of the difficulties which might arise on French territories of the Western Hemisphere.

The French Government having thus clearly defined its position awaits in its turn from the American Government, the assurances requested in the last paragraph of the note of February 27.

Accept et cetera."

<sup>77</sup> *Ante*, p. 147.

Admiral Darlan's note still fails to give the assurances previously requested that Axis planes and vessels shall not be permitted to enter French ports in this area. However, Rochat, whom we saw this afternoon, stated that his Government's attitude was more a theoretical maintenance of the French position of neutrality and he assured us emphatically that there was no question of a revision of the Greenslade-Robert or Horne-Robert agreements which would remain unimpaired. Under such circumstances he felt that his Government could reasonably expect the assurances requested in the final paragraph of its note of February 27.

Should this note be accepted by the United States it will, in my opinion, be understood by Vichy as a guarantee that sovereignty over the French Islands will remain with the present Government of France.

In view of present and possible future naval developments in the western Atlantic it is suggested if the note is accepted that, in order to prevent future misunderstandings, Vichy be officially informed that the United States reserves full liberty of action in connection with French Colonies in the Western Hemisphere which it may consider necessary to the defense of America.

LEAHY

---

862 33/243 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1942—3 p. m.

197. Your 381, March 12, 8 p. m. You may inform Admiral Darlan in response to his communication cited in your telegram under reference, that due note has been taken of the assurances with regard to the entry of belligerent war vessels and airplanes in French possessions and territorial waters in the Western Hemisphere. It is further understood that the agreement not to permit war vessels or military planes to enter French ports in no sense modifies the commitments accepted by the French Government and embodied in the Robert-Greenslade agreement and the arrangement reached between Admiral Robert and Admiral Horne.

In the operation of these agreements and for the safeguarding of the interests of the United Nations in the defense area of the Caribbean, the Government of the United States, however, reserves full liberty of action in connection with French colonies which it may consider necessary for the defense of the Western Hemisphere. In reserving this liberty of action the United States Government, however, declares that it has no intention to alter the basic French

sovereignty of the territories in question whatever temporary measures are required by the exigencies of a developing war situation.

WELLES

862.88/258 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, April 3, 1942—noon.

[Received 7:39 p. m.]

494. Referring to Department's 197, March 22, 3 p. m. The following is translation of a note dated April 1st signed by Admiral Darlan received from the Foreign Office today:

"By letter dated the 24th instant Your Excellency was good enough in the name of Your Government to take note of the new measures adopted by the French Government to ensure the maintenance of the position of neutrality of French possessions in the Western Hemisphere; Your Excellency likewise took note of the assurances given by the French Government concerning the maintenance of the agreements concluded between Admiral Robert on the one hand and Admirals Greenslade and Horne on the other.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of this letter and to inform Your Excellency that under date of March 26 the French Government instructed its representatives near the interested powers to inform them that dating from April 1 it will not permit, under any circumstances and under any pretext whatsoever, military planes and warships of belligerent countries to enter the territories, ports and territorial waters of French possessions in America.

In the same letter, Your Excellency informed me of the intention of the Government of the United States to reserve as regards the said French Colonies and in the operation of the aforementioned agreements the full liberty of action which it may consider necessary in the defense of the Western Hemisphere but, that in reserving this liberty of action, the Government of the United States does not intend to modify French sovereignty of the territories in question whatever temporary measures are required through the development of the military situation.

The French Government takes note of the renewed assurance that it is not the intention of the American Government to modify the sovereignty of France over its American possessions; but it must make the most explicit reservations concerning the liberty of action which the Federal Government intends to retain under the circumstances and which is not compatible either with the commitments undertaken at the time of the Greenslade-Robert and Horne-Robert agreements or with the assurance given on December 14 [1941] by President Roosevelt himself 'that the United States will continue to recognize fully the agreement between our two Governments concerning the *status quo* of French Colonies in the Western Hemisphere'."

LEAHY

851B.20/86a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General in Martinique  
(Malige)*<sup>78</sup>

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1942—8 p. m.

92. The French Embassy was requested today to advise Admiral Robert that Admiral Hoover<sup>79</sup> and Mr. Reber<sup>80</sup> are scheduled to arrive at Fort-de-France tomorrow morning, Saturday, May 9, by plane from Puerto Rico for consultation with the High Commissioner.

HULL

851B.20/24 : Telegram

*The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State*

FORT-DE-FRANCE, May 9, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 6:05 p. m.]

163. From Reber. Admiral Hoover is reporting direct to Commander in Chief regarding results of the conference this morning with Admiral Robert to whom the text of the note contained in the Navy Department's message of May 8 was delivered at 16:15 Greenwich time.<sup>81</sup> The High Commissioner is telegraphing the text of the message to Vichy and asking for instruction. It is hoped that the reply can be received in time to arrange a second meeting on Monday<sup>82</sup> although it may be delayed by the intervening national holiday in France tomorrow. Unless otherwise instructed, I shall remain in Fort-de-France until the reply is received.

Judging from the preliminary conversations this morning it is apparent that Admiral Robert will not act independently of his Government and will carry out whatever orders he receives from Vichy.

Please inform Navy. [Reber.]

MALIGE

---

<sup>78</sup> On April 10, 1942, Mr. Malige was promoted from Consul to Consul General in Martinique.

<sup>79</sup> Adm. John H. Hoover, U. S. Commander of the Caribbean Sea Front.

<sup>80</sup> Samuel Reber of the Division of European Affairs.

<sup>81</sup> See *infra*.

<sup>82</sup> May 11.

851B.20/5-1542

*The United States Commander of the Caribbean Sea Front (Hoover) to the French High Commissioner in the French West Indies (Robert)*<sup>83</sup>

[FORT-DE-FRANCE, May 9, 1942.]

Admiral Hoover presents his compliments to the French High Commissioner and points out that he is charged with the protection of the Caribbean Sea Frontier and of the American forces and interests in that area. He is sure that the High Commissioner will entirely agree that the United States cannot admit the possibility of collaboration between the French forces in the Caribbean area and the enemies of the United States. Under the existing arrangements with Admiral Robert such collaboration might become possible at any time upon notice given by him to the United States authorities. Under the circumstances it is imperative that local measures be taken for the safety of American forces in the area under its protection.

The United States has accordingly proposed that the French High Commissioner accept the prompt immobilization of the French warships in the French West Indies. Should an acceptance not be received promptly the High Commissioner will recognize that the United States must take such local measures as may be required to provide for the security of its forces and interests there.

851B.20/5-1542

*The United States Commander of the Caribbean Sea Front (Hoover) to the French High Commissioner in the French West Indies (Robert)*<sup>83</sup>

[FORT-DE-FRANCE, May 9, 1942.]

#### MEMORANDUM

In the light of the announced policy of the present Chief of the French Government at Vichy,<sup>84</sup> looking toward further collaboration with Germany, it is no longer possible for the Government of the United States to maintain the present arrangements, entered into between Admiral Robert and Admirals Greenslade and Horne, with

<sup>83</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department at the request of Mr. Reber by Adm. Ernest J. King, Chief of the U. S. Fleet, in his letter dated Washington, May 15, 1942.

<sup>84</sup> Pierre Laval, French Chief of Government.

respect to the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere, which have previously been considered satisfactory. Under these arrangements the French possessions might become the bases of axis aggression either upon notice given or upon the arrival of a new French High Commissioner. German pressure to that end must be expected and these possessions are subject to the orders of M. Laval which cannot be considered to represent the free will of the French authorities.

Provided certain conditions are met the Government of the United States is prepared to deal with the High Commissioner of the French Antilles and Guiana as the ultimate governing authority of these possessions on behalf of France and under the French flag but acting independently of Vichy.

These conditions are:

- (1) Effective measures under American supervision to immobilize the French war vessels and planes now in the West Indies.
- (2) Effective control over radio and telegraph communications by American authorities and mail censorship.
- (3) American supervision of commercial traffic, immigration and travel to and from the French colonies.
- (4) Activities of the French military and naval forces now in the colonies to be limited to necessary police duties.
- (5) French commercial vessels presently immobilized in the West Indies to be made available on equitable terms for use by the United States.
- (6) The gold and French Government funds held in the French possessions be frozen and held for the ultimate use of the French people.

On its part the United States is prepared to agree:

- (1) That French crews may continue to live on board French warships; such ships to continue to fly the French flag and to remain French property. The United States will arrange for the repatriation of French military, naval or civilian personnel desirous of returning to France.
- (2) That Admiral Robert will be recognized as the ultimate governing authority of French possessions in the Caribbean on behalf of France. French law courts and civil authority will continue.
- (3) To enter into an economic arrangement to insure necessary supplies for the colonies—this arrangement to cover the trade between the French possessions and neighboring territories.
- (4) To purchase the principal exports of the French possessions and thereby assist in maintaining the economic life of the colonies.

It is necessary to require that a specific answer be given to the first of these conditions promptly, namely, that relating to the immobilization of the French war vessels and planes. An early reply to the other proposals which are subject to friendly negotiations will be appreciated.

The High Commissioner alone is in a position to make a peaceful arrangement safeguarding the interests of France and preserving these French possessions for the people of France. He will recognize that should he cease to control the situation the status of the territories might deteriorate to a point where the United States could no longer guarantee their retention by the French people.

---

711.51/238

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] May 11, 1942.

The French Ambassador called at his request. He proceeded to speak orally in compliance with certain communications from his Government at Vichy. He began by saying that he knows how this Government and this country view Mr. Laval, that is, how we appraise his present attitude and chief purposes. The Ambassador said that he thought this appraisal is different from what it should be; for example, if we judge Laval by his speech, we would adopt a cautious attitude toward him and his purposes. He then added that Laval, about the time he last came into the Government, had made a statement to Admiral Leahy which he, the Ambassador, feels that he could back up; that the substance of this statement was that Laval does not desire any trouble or any disturbance of the amicable relations between our two countries. The Ambassador then said that Laval's political backing would not let him offend the United States and that Laval knows enough not to do so, and that it is not his inclination to do so. He added that Laval has a difficult and trying job, but that he would not hurt the United States; that he is not a tricky man as some think, but he does on occasion use words direct and even brutal. The Ambassador proceeded to say that he believes Laval will with Pétain and Darlan give the fullest consideration to every phase of the situation relating to Martinique and the French colonies in the Caribbean area; that Laval says that he cannot decide this matter until Pétain's return and so cannot answer the first question put forth by the United States; that his Government, therefore, asks delay until Wednesday,<sup>28</sup> particularly because of the question relating to immobilization of the warships at Martinique, and also in regard to the merchant fleet, France having obtained several advantages from the arrangements with us which were not called for in the German Armistice; that the negotiations must depend upon Pétain, that the Ambassador is his personal representative in this country and must depend upon him (Pétain).

---

<sup>28</sup> May 13.



The Ambassador closed his statement to me with the rather emphatic remark that Laval's telegram on the whole is a very liberal one and that he does not close the door. I inquired whether this communication had also been sent to Admiral Robert, and the Ambassador replied that he was satisfied it had been so sent, but did not know for certain. In making his final request for time until Wednesday, the Ambassador sought to create the impression that the French officials would proceed in moderation and would be slow to initiate an act of force or military assault.

I proceeded to reply by saying to the Ambassador that regardless of what he and certain others around Laval may think of him and his attitude toward this country in the present situation, every person in this country is convinced that he is associated with Hitler and that this Government cannot consider for a moment any negotiations with Laval in regard to Martinique and other French colonial possessions in the Caribbean area; that Laval is avowedly pro-Hitler in every sense possible; that Laval is very desirous of seeing Hitler win the war; that all the people of this country are unanimously of the view that Hitler and Hitlerism personify everything that is inhuman and everything that is calculated, if Hitler succeeds, to inflict the greatest blow to the human race since the dawn of history. I said that I need not enumerate all of Hitler's savage methods and the indescribable suffering of men, women and children everywhere in order to gratify his brutal lust for power and dominion; that the Japanese masses are on the level of barbarians led by the worst elements of savage barbarism in a desperate effort to cause injuries to the human race comparable to those that Hitler is seeking to inflict. I then said with some emphasis that with Laval bound by ties of friendship and loyalty to Hitler in this unspeakable movement of utter destruction of everything that is worthwhile to humanity, and having particularly in mind the betrayal of Indochina to Japan under orders by Hitler, it would be incomprehensible that this Government would even remotely consider sitting down and negotiating in the instant situation with Laval. The Ambassador did not seek seriously to take issue with my remarks about Laval and what he stands for. I stated that an additional number of German submarines are appearing in the Caribbean area and that this country has reached the point where it will proceed without delay to clean up and clean out any and every condition that might probably or even possibly lend aid to such submarine activities. I said that this relates to the French island possessions in the Caribbean area.

I next pointed out the great benefit which would accrue to the people of the French possessions under an arrangement such as this Government is proposing to Admiral Robert as High Commissioner, and I added that, unless somewhere there is a purpose to foment a

clash and a conflict, I could see no reason from the viewpoint of any government or any individual to insist on a course that would prevent a settlement desired by all fair-minded disinterested persons. I said that this would be the test of whether an effort is made from abroad to foment bloodshed. Having again emphasized that this Government can only negotiate with Admiral Robert, as stated, I said that I assumed that he will communicate during today probably with Admiral Hoover, who is on the ground, and make known any desires on Robert's part for an extension of time for the submission of a reply until Wednesday. I added thus far I have heard nothing today from Admiral Hoover as to a postponement until Wednesday.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

---

851B.20/32 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, May 13, 1942—noon.

[Received 3:43 p. m.]

705. It would be helpful if the Department would keep me informed of the progress of negotiations between our representatives and Admiral Robert. So far I have received no information supplementary to that contained in the Department's 317, May 9, 7 p. m.<sup>87</sup>

Certain friendly Foreign Office officials are seriously concerned over the possible effect of a message which was recently received from Admiral Robert concerning these negotiations. According to Robert's report our negotiators informed him that in the event of his failure to accept our Government's terms "French sovereignty" would not be guaranteed by the United States. The interpretation which these officials are placing upon this report is that if Admiral Robert does not agree to our terms the United States will occupy the territory and will not return it to the French people when the war is over. They point out that such a policy on our part would immediately be seized upon by the collaborationists and the German propaganda machine and would create serious disillusionment in French public opinion as to the "purity" of our motives. It would also enable Axis propagandists to portray the United States as a greedy imperialistic power which while talking of holding in trust for the French people those French territories more distant from the United States (such as New Caledonia and Madagascar) is prepared to seize outright those French possessions which as a result of geographical and political factors are more important to the United States.

---

<sup>87</sup> Not printed.

In order that there can be no doubt concerning our motives these officials urge that our Government lose no time in issuing a statement similar to that put out at the time of the occupation of Madagascar and New Caledonia <sup>87a</sup> to the effect that it is vital to the security of the United States to have certain satisfactory guarantees concerning French West Indian possessions and that if through failure to obtain such guarantees we are forced to occupy the island we will nevertheless hold it in trust for the French people.

The Marshal returned to Vichy yesterday morning and immediately held interviews with Laval, Darlan and the Minister of Marine, Admiral Auphan.

Judging from reactions which continue to reach me from responsible Government officials I consider that the situation, insofar as our future relations with this Government are concerned, is serious.

TUCK

---

851.85/510 : Telegram

*The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State*

FORT-DE-FRANCE, May 13, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received 7:27 p. m.]

167. From Reber. The High Commissioner informed Admiral Hoover this afternoon that he had been authorized by his Government to negotiate an agreement for the immobilization of the French vessels. The principle of immobilization was today guaranteed by Admiral Robert who will as a preliminary measure remove the fuel. He has likewise accepted the removal of certain pieces of machinery to be determined in agreement with Admiral Hoover's technical representative.

Please inform Navy.

I assume French Government reply has also been delivered through Embassy and shall not telegraph text unless instructed. [Reber.]

MALIGE

---

851B.20/58

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

No. 968

VICHY, May 14, 1942.

[Received June 2.]

SIR: With reference to my telegram No. 711 of May 13, 6 p. m.,<sup>88</sup> I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of the note dated

---

<sup>87a</sup> For statement regarding New Caledonia, see pp. 691-692; for that regarding Madagascar, see pp. 698-699. These statements were released to the press.

<sup>88</sup> Not printed.

May 13, 1942, handed to me by M. Rochat of the Foreign Office and the text of which was cabled to Admiral Robert in Martinique for the information of Admiral Hoover.

Respectfully yours,

S. PINKNEY TUCK

[Enclosure—Translation \*\*]

*The French Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the  
American Embassy*

1. In October 1940, at a time when the United States was not at war, an accord was concluded between the French Government and the Federal Government [of the United States] <sup>oo</sup> to determine in the light of events the particular status of our possessions in America (St. Pierre-Miquelon, the West Indies, and Guiana).

2. May 9, 1942, the American Admiral Hoover, accompanied by Mr. Reber of the State Department, presented to Admiral Robert, High Commissioner of France in the West Indies, demands tending to modify greatly this status.

3. These demands gravely threatened French sovereignty over the West Indies, and Admiral Hoover declared that if they were not accepted the American Government would no longer guarantee that sovereignty.

4. The status in effect since 1940 corresponded to the essential interests of the two countries: it had been reaffirmed and clarified last March by the two Governments.

5. The French Government has always respected its obligations, and no change in the constitution of the new government can lead it to modify this attitude.

6. Recent statements made to Admiral Leahy established the fact that the chief of Government not only never envisaged repudiating the engagements undertaken vis-à-vis the United States but, that, on the contrary, he affirmed in the clearest manner his wish to do nothing that could affect Franco-American harmony.

7. The French Government protests this interference by the American Government in French internal politics. By casting doubt on official declarations made in the name of the French Government the Department of State adopted an offensive attitude toward our country, which intends to maintain the freedom of choice of its government.

8. The Federal Government, in acting as it has, commits toward the French people a grave psychological error arising no doubt from

---

\*\* Translation supplied by the editors.

\*\* See *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. II, pp. 385-386.

the activities in the United States by French émigrés, rebels against their country, who are pursuing in foreign lands partisan struggles from which France has already suffered so much.

9. The Federal Government has just transmitted propositions that, if they were accepted, would have the effect of removing from the French Government, sole repository of National sovereignty, the exercise of its essential rights in colonies that have been French territory for three centuries.

10. The Federal Government in refusing Admiral Robert, the High Commissioner, the right to report on his administration to the only French authorities to which he is responsible, and by virtue of which he holds power, formulated urgent demand that the French Government is duty bound to reject.

11. The Federal Government, moreover, also demands the delivery of merchant vessels at present immobilized in West Indian ports. It cannot be unaware that such a surrender is formally prohibited by the terms of the armistice. If the French submitted to the American demand, it would violate the armistice convention, and this hypothesis, by reason of the consequences it would entail, cannot be envisaged by the French Government.

12. The Federal Government, in demanding the immobilization of warships at present in West Indian waters, seems to fear the utilization of that force against American interests. The Federal Government cannot invoke any argument of a military nature that would justify such pretensions.

13. The French Government, which has never failed its word, reaffirms, in order to dissipate any equivocation in this connection, its determination strictly to respect the undertakings it has already made.

14. The French Government reaffirms today, solemnly, that it will never assume responsibility for an act that might compromise relations with the American people. It can say this much: While remaining faithful to the obligations arising from the armistice convention, it preserves its independence and its liberty of action.

15. The French Government is disposed to consider and to negotiate through the medium of Admiral Robert, High Commissioner of France, all proposals which may be made to it regarding French sovereignty and neutrality, tending to settle the status of our Western Hemisphere possessions and which would give complete assurance to the Federal Government regarding the immobilization of our ships of war and commerce with the definite understanding that in no case would they be utilized by the United States.

16. The Federal Government which is aware that France is in distress and is doing all she can to assure her reconstruction in line with her noble national traditions, would assume heavy responsibility before history by breaking with unjustified violence the bonds of friendship that have always united our two peoples.

[VICHY, May 13, 1942.]

---

#51B.20/34 : Telegram

*The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State*

FORT-DE-FRANCE, May 14, 1942—noon.

[Received 11:21 p. m.]

169. From Reber. My 167, May 13, 6 p. m. I have received a note from the High Commissioner this morning which reads in translation as follows:

"I have received May 9 a note signed by Admiral Hoover and a memorandum from the American Government.

The French Government's reply to this memorandum was given you yesterday May 13.

During the meeting which took place at the Admiralty on that occasion, my position was defined as follows.

1. I accept the principle of immobilization of the warships, which immediately became effective on my word of honor. I am ready to put into effect the material measures that will render physical movement of the vessels impossible.

I have been unable to agree to the removal of the ordnance which I consider indispensable for the defense with which you have recognized I am charged. I have requested that the pieces removed be stored at the American Consulate.

2. The French note avoids the infringements of French sovereignty and neutrality to which my country is committed. The satisfactions which have been given you seem to me should permit the return without delay to those relations of a good neighbor which I personally have made every effort to maintain.

My task would be facilitated if you could give me a favorable answer to the following questions: (a) Renewal of the guarantees of free passage of merchant ships engaged in the trade of the Antilles and Guiana, (b) maintenance of the *Barfleur* for the purpose of effecting liaison of authority and police, (c) relief of civilian and military personnel coming from France or North Africa who for reasons of health or expiration of service should leave the colonies, (d) grant of economic facilities necessary for these possessions with regard to which a special memorandum is being delivered to you, (e) I recall my remarks about the special situation of the *Bearn* which is obliged to anchor in the outer harbor and which must be in a position to manoeuvre in case of a hurricane. I may add that this old vessel has no military value and its condition will not permit it to navigate. (Signed) Robert."

It is evident that he expects a reply before proceeding to discussion of the other proposals. In answer to a specific inquiry I stated that there would appear to be no objection to the early departure of the *Guadeloupe* for New York. [Reber.]

MALIGE

---

851.85/510 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General in Martinique (Malige)*

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1942—3 p. m.

99. Personal for Reber. Your 167, May 13, 6 p. m. Since we have insisted with French Embassy that all negotiations must be with Admiral Robert we do not expect to receive from the French Embassy the text of the French Government reply. However Admiral Hoover states a copy is en route by air mail which may arrive tomorrow. In the meantime we are considering Admiral Hoover's suggestion of a commission to Fort-de-France to complete these negotiations and the Admiral is being requested by the Navy Department to formulate his ideas as to Navy and/or Army personnel. The Department of State would appreciate your views on the question of civilian members of the commission and your recommendations as to what civilian departments of the Government should be represented.

In the meantime while the effective steps to immobilize warships and planes are exclusively in the hands of the Navy Department, we are considering the necessary measures of control and censorship we would wish to impose on communications from French Caribbean possessions. An effective censorship of all of this through American channels will undoubtedly be one of our final non-negotiable demands. The Department would be interested in receiving your views as to the best method of accomplishing this end.

In one way or another present arrangements necessitate prior agreement with the United States before any French merchant ship can sail from French Caribbean possessions. We recognize that the economic life of the area has in the past been in large measure dependent on French commercial tonnage. We visualize that in the future the economic life of the area may depend on the increased use of this French tonnage. It is not our intention to insist on taking physical possession of this French commercial tonnage now in French Caribbean possessions but an attempt to sabotage it would have, during the war period, an adverse effect on our economic assistance to these possessions and likewise would deprive the French people of this commercial tonnage asset in the post war period.

HULL

851.85/512 : Telegram

*The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State*

FORT-DE-FRANCE, May 15, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received 5:02 p. m.]

173. From Reber. Department's 99, May 14, 6 [3] p. m. Of the six conditions presented to Admiral Robert, the first is in the process of accomplishment, numbers 3, 5, and 6 present no substantial difficulties as they do not greatly modify the agreements already in existence. Control of communications will be the principal point of discussion but I question whether it is necessary to send a commission solely for this. There are economic questions relating to licenses, etc., for discussion with the Board of Economic Warfare but these are dependent upon the conclusion of present negotiations.

Should it be agreed, however, to establish a commission the Department may wish to consider naming the Consul General here as the principal civilian member. He is fully acquainted with local problems and in any case will serve as the channel of communication with Robert when the present situation has been clarified. If he serves on the commission his future dealings with Robert would be facilitated.

In a preliminary discussion of the problem of communications with Robert he pointed out that even under the Armistice terms he was enabled to send messages to his Government of which the Germans had no knowledge and insists that some form of free communication for him is an essential requisite of the sovereignty which we have guaranteed to respect. If he is permitted something of this nature he might be prepared promptly to agree to censorship of other messages. This point might be brought out in answering his memorandum of May 14.<sup>61</sup> In any case I suggest radio Guadeloupe be closed. [Reber.]

MALIGE

851 80/166 : Telegram

*The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State*

FORT-DE-FRANCE, May 17, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received 10:24 p. m.]

176. From Reber. At Admiral Hoover's request I saw Robert this afternoon to insist upon storage in San Juan of pieces removed from vessels and have replied that Robert urges reconsideration of the possibility of storage on French soil and offers any guarantee and inspection we may ask. He insists that removal of arms constitute

<sup>61</sup> See telegram No. 169, May 14, noon, from the Consul General in Martinique, p. 633.



surrender, is incompatible with sovereignty and exceeds armistice terms<sup>92</sup> which only give Germans right of inspection on French soil. [Reber.]

MALIGE

851B.00/60

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary  
of State (Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 18, 1942.

M. Tixier<sup>93</sup> came in to see me, at his request. He presented a note<sup>94</sup> regarding the Martinique observations, of which a copy has gone forward to EU.<sup>95</sup> In general, the note insists on two points: a protest that they were not associated with the United States in our negotiations with Admiral Robert, whom they considered a traitor; second, a demand that they be offered the government of Martinique.

As a preface to the negotiations, M. Tixier said that he had been instructed by General de Gaulle<sup>96</sup> to say that de Gaulle was convinced of the friendliness of the United States and that there was nothing offensive to him in the method adopted by the negotiations. On the other hand, he felt that he, as head of the French resistance, should be recognized in the proceedings, and note should be taken of their view that French territory was not neutral, but was actively at war with the Germans.

I said I took note of all this. I could merely repeat what I had told M. Tixier before. The negotiations at Martinique were proceeding on a purely military line and had to do with the elimination of the military threat to our lines. The question of the government of the islands had not arisen and it was therefore unnecessary to discuss it at this point.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

851B.20/43 : Telegram

*The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary  
of State*

FORT-DE-FRANCE, May 25, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received May 26—4:25 a. m.]

188. From Reber. My No. 186 May 25, 10 a. m.<sup>97</sup> The French authorities who insist that the guarantee of sovereignty includes con-

<sup>92</sup> For text of the German-French armistice agreement of June 22, 1940, see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. ix, p. 671.

<sup>93</sup> Adrien Tixier, Head of the Free French Delegation in Washington.

<sup>94</sup> *Post*, p. 701.

<sup>95</sup> Division of European Affairs.

<sup>96</sup> Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the National Committee of Free French at London.

<sup>97</sup> Not printed.

trol by them of their communications state categorically and are prepared to give assurances that all messages, both radio and cable, are under the absolute control of the High Commissioner and that no communications which could be of value to the enemy are permitted. They are insistent upon the right of direct communications with Vichy and between the Caribbean possessions but are considering the possibility of furnishing us with a full list of all frequencies and times of transmission in order to permit complete monitoring.

In this connection might it not be possible to maintain the radio stations for transmission of messages in clear or in commercial codes at agreed times which could be supervised through monitoring. Code messages to Vichy would be transmitted through an agreed channel. There remains, however, the problem of intercolonial messages of administration, et cetera, which according to the local authorities can only be transmitted on frequencies that can be heard outside this area.

As regards mail censorship, mail on the *Guadeloupe* is now censored in New York. The French are prepared to agree that if either the *Saint Domingue* or *Duc D'Aumale* carry mail this would pass through a censorship point. It is already agreed that any vessel in the North African service shall not carry any mail except one sack of official correspondence and the irregularity of the approved voyages prevents misuse to any extent of this privilege. There are no other vessels now in service with these islands. If this procedure is satisfactory it would eliminate the necessity of establishing a complex system of mail censorship on the spot and would insure greater cooperation in other matters by the local authorities.

With regard to the control of shipping, the present system of approved voyages of French vessels to other than French Caribbean possessions can if properly controlled provide adequate guarantees against the transportation of undesirable elements except as between the French islands. Since the principal means of transportation between these islands is by small boats, whose movements are impossible to control even with a large group of observers in all ports it would seem sufficient to control entry into French territories by adequate supervision of "approved voyages". [Reber.]

MALIGE

---

851B.20/56 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General in Martinique (Malige)*

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1942—2 p. m.

115. For Reber from Atherton.<sup>98</sup> The Secretary feels you should remain at Fort de France.

---

<sup>98</sup> Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

The lengthy memorandum to which you refer in your 199, May 30, 5 p. m.<sup>99</sup> which only constitutes "a provisional reply" leads him to believe Admiral Robert does not yet understand the situation and that this Government is not willing to proceed into lengthy or protracted negotiations. The war mentality of this country is looking for an immediate solution to this problem which is receiving increased attention. The interests of other governments in this hemisphere has to be considered especially those which join the United Nations. Reports of sinkings and attacks on commercial and naval vessels from submarines operating within the 3-mile limit even though exaggerated naturally arouses suspicion in the public mind that only an immediate and satisfactory ending to these discussions can allay.

We have endeavored in all possible ways to appreciate the French point of view by the very nature of our proposals, by blocked fund releases and economic assistance, by ship clearances, by restraint of press and unfounded criticisms. We have dispatched Admiral Hoover with instructions and authority to negotiate.

Laval has not only made public our proposals but also his instructions to Robert.

For all these reasons you should remain in Fort de France that you may by your very presence there indicate to Robert the situation is pressing, that our position is taken, and a failure by him to reach an immediate agreement with Admiral Hoover must necessarily and progressively undermine confidence as to French intent and French policy in these possessions now under French Sovereignty but within our defense area. Will you take early occasion to make this clear and report.

Suggest you inform Admiral Hoover of contents of this cable by daily mail plane. [Atherton.]

HULL

---

851.20/57 : Telegram

*The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State*

FORT-DE-FRANCE, June 1, 1942—5 p. m.  
[Received 9:02 p. m.]

203. Department's No. 115, May 31. From Reber. In conversation with Robert today I explained the Department's position as set forth in telegram under reference. He appreciates necessity for early conclusion of negotiations and since arrival of preliminary instructions embodied in his "provisional reply" has continued to press

---

<sup>99</sup> Not printed.

Vichy for a definite answer as well as authority for early departure *Sagittaire*. He has been informed answer will be sent as soon as Laval returns to Vichy tomorrow.

I have sent Atherton by airmail this morning a copy of Robert's memo<sup>1</sup> together with comments. Admiral Hoover has also been furnished copies. [Reber.]

MALIGE

---

851B.20/60 : Telegram

*The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State*

FORT-DE-FRANCE, June 3, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received 7:31 p. m.]

211. From Reber. My telegram No. 203, June 1. Robert has received the definitive reply of the French Government which confirms the instructions previously given him as to the position set forth in his memorandum instruction of May 30 and note to me of May 31 the texts of which in translation have been forwarded by air mail.<sup>2</sup> The note states that since the Armistice the French Government has not chartered any merchant vessel to another power without the consent of all belligerents and expresses the hope that this question involving relatively small amount of tonnage will not prevent the conclusion of an arrangement regulating all problems imposed by the war as regards the French possessions in this Hemisphere. Robert adds that his instructions indicate that authority for the departure of the *Sagittaire* and other vessels will shortly be forthcoming. He believes this might be expedited and some indication could be given that his memorandum is being favorably considered at least as a basis of discussion. [Reber.]

MALIGE

---

851B.20/278½

*The French Ambassador (Henry-Haye) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1942.

The Ambassador of France in the United States presents his compliments to His Excellency the Secretary of State and, acting on instructions from his Government, has the honor to forward to him herewith, for purposes of information, a copy of the note which was

---

<sup>1</sup> *Post*, p. 640.

<sup>2</sup> These translations not found in Department files.

transmitted directly to Mr. Samuel Reber by Admiral Robert, High Commissioner in the West Indies.

Mr. Henry-Haye is happy to take this occasion to renew [etc.]

[Enclosure—Translation]

*The French High Commissioner in the French West Indies (Robert) to Mr. Samuel Reber, Representative of the Department of State in Martinique*

1. The French Government has studied the proposals made in the American memorandum of May 23.<sup>3</sup>

2. It draws therefrom a more accurate understanding of the situation, particularly with regard to the regularization of the relations existing between the French Government and its representative in the West Indies, Admiral Robert.

3. It has given the latter all necessary instructions to proceed with the American negotiators to an examination of the suggestions presented in the memorandum of May 23 and replied to the questions posed therein.

4. With respect to the utilization of the merchant ships, the French Government cannot agree to the American proposal providing for their chartering to a company to be established in a neutral South American country. Such a solution would be in contradiction to the obligations entailed on it by the armistice conventions and, on that account, cannot be considered. The French Government, since the armistice, has not chartered merchant ships to another party except with the agreement of all the belligerents.

5. The French Government is still compelled to maintain its proposal of May 13 for the immobilization of merchant ships in West Indian waters, except those the movements of which are strictly necessary to carry on the economic life of the islands and indispensable relations with French North Africa, that is: the *Saint-Domingue*, the *Guadeloupe*, the *Duc d'Aumale*, together with the *Angoulême*, the *Merope*, the *Indiana*, the *Mont Everest* and, if possible an oil tanker, the *Oregon* on the one hand and the *Sagittaire* on the other.

6. The French Government hopes that this question of merchant tonnage, of a relatively low amount if compared with the present amounts being built or destroyed in the world, will not create any obstacle to the conclusion of an agreement which should make possible, with respect for French sovereignty and neutrality, a settlement of the problems arising in the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere from the war.

---

<sup>3</sup>Not found in Department files. Apparently this was a note presented at Fort-de-France by Admiral Hoover to Admiral Robert.

851B.20/60 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General in Martinique (Malige)*

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1942—4 p. m.

121. For Reber. Your telegram 211, June 3, 5 p. m. and the air mail letter referred to duly received.

The position which Admiral Robert has accepted in these negotiations as set forth therein is disquieting; since by refusal to accept responsibility for negotiating independently of Vichy he is permitting a situation to develop whereby the Wiesbaden Commission<sup>4</sup> is participating directly in the negotiations and whereby even the economic life of the Islands through lack of shipping may be so upset that some outside force may eventually be compelled to intervene. It is clear that as to the disposal of the removed machinery parts, not only has the Wiesbaden Commission not permitted these to be stored in the American Consulate at Cayenne, according to our earlier suggestion, but also is delaying the *Sagittaire* from carrying them to Casablanca as now agreed to by Admiral Robert.

As to the statement that since the Armistice the French Government has not chartered merchant vessels to another power without the consent of all belligerents this is a mere play on words since with no attempt to thwart Axis designs in Indochina the Japanese were permitted to commandeer French ships there in seaworthy condition, and these are now operated by the Japanese reportedly with any necessary French personnel.<sup>5</sup>

You will please forward a copy of this telegram to Admiral Hoover, and if he agrees you will seek an early moment to discuss the situation with Admiral Robert, pointing out that if he continues unwilling to accept any responsibility for carrying out the details of these negotiations without reference to Vichy he is thereby jeopardizing French sovereignty over the French Antilles.

HULL

815B.20/82 : Telegram

*The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State*

FORT-DE-FRANCE, July 13, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received 12:42 p. m.]

263. From Reber. My 260, July 10.<sup>6</sup> Robert has been informed by his Government that the agreement giving United States Consul at Casablanca permanent control of the parts taken from the ships

<sup>4</sup> German Armistice Commission set up to supervise carrying out of the terms of the German-French armistice agreement of June 22, 1940.

<sup>5</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1942, China, pp. 749 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

and planes here will be carried out and that new instructions have been sent to Casablanca so that there will be no further misunderstanding. [Reber.]

MALIGE

---

851B.20/1421

*The French High Commissioner in the French West Indies (Robert) to Mr. Samuel Reber, Representative of the Department of State in Martinique*<sup>1</sup>

[Translation]

NOTE VERBALE

OCTOBER 27, 1942.

With regard to the final conclusion of the general agreement, my Government informs me that the agreement, contrary to what I had supposed, cannot include secret clauses. It must have only one text which, if necessary, can be made known.

My Government is obliged to attach particular importance to the question of form since the public emphasis placed upon certain claims has put it in a delicate position and has drawn attention and mistrust to its intentions in regard thereto.

Consequently, the text of the agreement must be of such a nature that if it is made known it will not give rise to reprisals or bargaining, the results of which would be contrary to the end sought by our two Governments. In particular, it is important that knowledge of it will not adversely affect American control in North Africa.

With these requirements in mind the following represent the solutions proposed for the different questions:

I. *Monitoring.*

As I had indicated to you and in view of the foregoing considerations, our general agreement cannot contain a provision permitting the establishment of an American monitoring station at Fort-de-France which would be directly contrary to our position of neutrality.

Moreover, I continue to believe that this station would not bring any positive technical advantage to its operators and that the assurances which I gave you on August 25, and which I repeat herewith, will give you, objectively speaking, the desired guarantees.

The detection of clandestine stations is an internal affair, and the measures already taken as regards these territories have been strengthened by a law dated October 15 which increases the severity

---

<sup>1</sup> Copy in translation transmitted to the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs by Mr. Reber in his letter of November 3; received December 23.

of penalties for the utilization or possession of non-authorized radio stations and entrusts the energetic suppression of any infringements to a special court.

## II. *Shipwrecked Seamen.*

I have no intention of modifying the attitude which up to the present I have adopted in regard to these seamen, whom I have always had well treated and whose early departure I have facilitated without requiring any counterpart.

If as an exception I was once obliged to detain certain seamen, you are aware of the justification therefor.

Confident that I should not again be given reason to act in this way, I released these men in advance without asking similar assurances for the future. I hope the same confidence may be placed in me.

To insist upon the inclusion of a special provision in the general agreement would be to withhold recognition of my liberal attitude and in calling attention to a matter, which can best be handled locally, would risk reactions that we do not desire.

## III. *Activities Contrary to the Interests of the United States.*

Article IV of the draft agreement is sufficiently explicit and comprehensive definitely to mean that these possessions will not serve as a base for activities contrary to the military interests of the United States.

The special provision which we had envisaged therefore appears unnecessary, and furthermore, the present system of control of immigration and traffic as well as the liberty of movement enjoyed by the various local American officials should give you full guarantees.

## IV. *Supply of Sugar to the United States.*

The French Government has shown a real desire for cooperation in agreeing to sell to the United States the various products of the Colonies and particularly the available sugar and in also accepting the principle that they should be transported on French ships in the Antilles-United States service.

Account must, however, be taken of the heavy servitudes which the Armistice conditions have imposed upon the movements of French ships and of the results, contrary to our common interests, which any violation of these conditions would inevitably bring.

Therefore hesitating to make any promises which it cannot be sure of fulfilling, the French Government cannot at the present time undertake formally to transport within a fixed time a specific tonnage of sugar or other products to the United States and must make reservation as to the effect brought about by any opposition, which might block its intentions.



Under these conditions and having in mind the considerations set forth earlier, I propose that the last paragraph of Article XI of the draft agreement be replaced by the following:

"In any event, the United States Government will receive various available produce of the Antilles which is not transported to North Africa."

But I undertake personally, in the most explicit fashion, to make every effort within my power to deliver and transport on vessels of the Antilles-New Orleans service a maximum of 60,000 tons of sugar per annum. I confirm that I am ready at the present time to make the first shipment immediately.

Finally, our two Governments, I am glad to note, are in agreement as to the substance of all questions. There only remains to establishment, in view of the foregoing considerations, the final form of the agreement. I propose that it shall take the form of the draft agreement which we prepared with the change in Article XI set forth above. If you agree I am prepared to sign the agreement at once.

With respect to the undertakings I have given as regards the clandestine stations and sugar, my attitude for the past two years and the confirmation which the French Government has always given to my actions are guarantees of the undertakings that I assume.

Thus our mutual good relations will be defined and consolidated. Also in this way the United States will be assured of having the security and the benefits it sought without increasing the difficulties in which circumstances have placed my Government.

---

[On the basis of communications from Mr. Samuel Reber and of preliminary conversations relating to a final text of an agreement, Admiral Robert prepared a draft agreement. Mr. Reber forwarded a translation of this draft in a letter of October 13, 1942, to Mr. Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs. With a reply of October 29, 1942, Mr. Atherton enclosed a revised draft (851B.20/133½). Presumably this was the agreement referred to in following correspondence as the agreement reached on November 7 but not signed. The above-mentioned correspondence is not printed.]

On November 8, following the landing of American troops in North Africa, the Vichy Government severed diplomatic relations with the United States. See telegram No. 1651, November 8, 8 p. m., from the Chargé in France, printed on page 201.]

851B.20/144½ : Telegram

*The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State*

FORT-DE-FRANCE, November 8, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received November 9—1:44 a. m.]

473. From Reber. I have just delivered message from Cominch,<sup>8</sup> received through Admiral Hoover this morning, to the High Commissioner who replied giving me his positive assurance that in consequence he will maintain all existing agreements and insure that no action is taken in these possessions detrimental to security of the United States.

He is informing his Government that he reached agreement on terms of accord with the United States yesterday afternoon and that he is bound by it. In this way he will forestall efforts on the part of Wiesbaden to force a change in position and proposes to maintain the existing situation as regards these territories in accordance with the accord. I informed him I was prepared to accept the agreement and to consider that the formality of signing was the only part lacking. I should appreciate immediate instructions on this point and authority, if necessary, to initial the accord as of November 7 as in this way only is it possible to obtain the binding assurances we desire.

If this can be accepted, the formal signature might be delayed until he can agree to sign without appearing to reach a new agreement subsequent to the landing in North Africa.<sup>9</sup> He regrets signature did not occur yesterday.

Although Vichy is now delaying departure *Sagittaire*, Robert asked that the *Guadeloupe*, which is about to leave Pointe-à-Pitre, might come here without interference. I agreed and have so informed Admiral Hoover. Please confirm.

All quiet here up to now and, in view of assurances received from us, Robert is apparently taking no military precautions. [Reber.]

MALIGE

851B.20/145½ : Telegram

*The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State*

FORT-DE-FRANCE, November 9, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received 2:45 p. m.]

474. From Reber. My 473, November 8. Although Robert has learned—through radio news—of severance of diplomatic relations

<sup>8</sup> Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, Adm. Ernest J. King.

<sup>9</sup> American forces landed in French North Africa on the night of November 7-8; see pp. 429 ff.

between Vichy and the United States he has no official confirmation or instructions. He has cabled Vichy that some way must be found so that he can continue to use financial and purchasing services in United States since the economic life of the islands depends upon maintenance of his relations with United States Government.

He has asked me to secure as soon as possible confirmation that this agreement with United States is in force and that his vessels can continue to circulate in this hemisphere under its provisions. He urgently requests reply.

Situation here unusually placid. No radio comments of local origin except Robert's communiqué broadcast yesterday urging calm be maintained. [Reber.]

MALIGE

---

740.0011 European War 1939/25424 : Telegram

*The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State*

FORT-DE-FRANCE, November 10, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received 9:59 p. m.]

479. From Reber. My 473, November 8, and 478, November 10.<sup>10</sup> Robert has just informed me that Vichy has expressed its desire that he maintain relations with the United States on the basis of the agreement reached November 7 and has entrusted him with carrying on official relations of the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere. [Reber.]

MALIGE

---

851B.20/135 : Telegram

*The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State*

FORT-DE-FRANCE, November 11, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received 8:18 p. m.]

481. From Reber. At Robert's request I am sending text of "agreement of November 7" to Admiral Hoover probably by special plane tomorrow and am informing him that I am asking that instructions be sent him direct as to the possibility that he might sign or initial as of November 7 both the agreement and the letter<sup>11</sup> containing our understanding of the four supplementary assurances.

I expect to see the High Commissioner tomorrow to inquire regarding the attitude he will adopt on such matters as communication with Vichy and German approval for ship movements here now that the Armistice provisions apparently no longer apply. [Reber.]

MALIGE

---

<sup>10</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>11</sup> See *note verbale* of October 27, p. 642.

851B.20/138b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General in Martinique (Malige)*

WASHINGTON, November 12, 1942—6 p. m.

252. For Reber. Please inform the High Commissioner that in spite of the action of the Vichy Government in severing diplomatic relations with the United States, this Government with the President's approval is prepared to continue to maintain relations with the territories under Admiral Robert's jurisdiction on the basis of an unsigned "gentlemen's agreement" along the lines of the draft upon which substantial agreement had been reached prior to November 8. In view of the imminent full German occupation of France, this Government regards any French regime which the Germans may permit to function in metropolitan France as being under the complete domination of Hitler and therefore not a sovereign independent Government. In the circumstances this Government could not consent to the maintenance of communications in code between Admiral Robert and any such regime.

We are prepared at once to examine with the High Commissioner, in the same spirit as in the past, whatever aspects of our relations may be necessitated by the new situation, including discussion of the means of providing him with funds and facilities to enable him to satisfy the economic needs of the Antilles and Guiana in this country.

Upon obtaining Admiral Robert's assent to the procedure outlined above you should return to Washington immediately.

For Malige

Upon Reber's departure please consult with Admiral Robert as circumstances require and submit any recommendations which you may care to make looking toward the fulfillment of the general policy outlined above.

HULL

851B 20/137 : Telegram

*The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State*

FORT-DE-FRANCE, November 12, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received 10:20 p. m.]

488. From Reber. My 481, November 11. I called on Robert today to inquire what effect Pétain's declaration concerning the Armistice published yesterday would have upon the status of these Colonies.

Robert admitted he had little information as to the situation in France but in the absence of specific directives insists that no change in his relations with "his Government" is contemplated, that only the territorial clauses of the Armistice have been affected. He wishes to

maintain his communications with Vichy and will still consider that he needs to give the Germans advance notice regarding the movements of his ships. It is obvious that he desires to make as little change in the *status quo* as possible and will take no action that might appear contrary to whatever attitude may be adopted by Pétain. He is waiting further clarification before finally determining his position. [Reber.]

MALIGE

---

851B.20/146

*The French High Commissioner in the French West Indies (Robert) to Mr. Samuel Reber, Representative of the Department of State in Martinique*<sup>12</sup>

[Translation]

FORT-DE-FRANCE, November 14, 1942.

ADMIRAL ROBERT TO MR. SAMUEL REBER: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of November 13 in which you inform me that the Government of the United States has given its approval to the text of the agreement which we had established and the draft of which had been completed November 6.

This agreement is not, however, to be signed and should be considered a gentlemen's agreement.

I take note of this agreement and I undertake to abide by it.

Your Government has, however, made an important reservation against which I cannot but react. It considers that under present circumstances the Chief of the French State no longer enjoys independence vis-à-vis the German authorities and for that reason cannot permit me to continue to communicate with him in code.

This interpretation is incorrect. I have just received formal confirmation thereof by a telegram from the Secretariat of State for the Colonies. The Government of Marshal Pétain has complete liberty of communication both at home and abroad.

Furthermore, the Marshal would never have given way to a curtailment of French sovereignty, particularly in this respect.

I must moreover insist upon the necessity, imposed upon us by our situation and from which your Government can only look for benefits, of sending certain important messages in code, the contents of which should remain unknown to the Germans.

My attitude in the past, the formal engagement which I have undertaken to preserve strict neutrality are positive guarantees of the trust which you can place in me. You may rest assured that the

---

<sup>12</sup> Copy in translation transmitted to the Department by Mr. Reber in his despatch of November 17; received November 24.

information thus transmitted will not be utilized by Axis powers against American interests.

It seems most important to me that your Government might change its decision. I request your urgent intervention to this end.

With reference to means of payment and purchases of the colonies in this Hemisphere, I propose the following organization which has already been suggested to your Government by the French Ambassador: it is necessary to maintain a mission in New York to liquidate French financial matters; this mission could be headed by Monsieur Marquais, Payeur Général of the French State in the United States; Monsieur Marquais could be authorized to perform the financial and commercial transactions, formerly conducted on behalf of the French Antilles and Guiana by him, the Financial Attaché and the Commercial Attaché. Methods of administration will be proposed as soon as I am able to communicate with Monsieur Marquais.

ROBERT

---

851B 20/146a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General in Martinique (Malige)*

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1942—5 p. m.

256. For Reber. Unless you consider that your continued presence in Fort-de-France for a few more days would serve a useful purpose, you should return to Washington as quickly as possible relinquishing to Malige the conduct of future negotiations with Admiral Robert. Navy Department approves.

Department's policy remains as set forth in its telegram no. 252 of November 12.

HULL

---

*Memorandum of Press Conference of Secretary of State Cordell Hull,  
November 23, 1942*<sup>13</sup>

[Extract]

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wondered if you care to tell us anything about the situation in Martinique?

A. I think it was in 1940 when Admiral Greenslade entered into an agreement with the government at Martinique, the French Government, and the High Commissioner, Admiral Robert. The next year a similar arrangement was entered into between him and Admiral Horne representing primarily our Government. A further continuance with modifications and additions to that agreement has recently been concluded, Admiral Hoover and Mr. Samuel Reber of

---

<sup>13</sup> Copy from Press Conference file in the News Division.

this Department being the principal negotiators. The primary purpose, as you know I think, of this agreement is related to American security and the secondary purpose is related to the economic life of the people of those islands. We are not quite in a position yet to give you the details of the agreement but we will be glad to give that matter attention right soon.

Q. Could you tell us, Sir, whether under the new agreement Admiral Robert is acting completely independently of the Laval Government?

A. I think we made clear repeatedly when we entered on these negotiations that we were negotiating with the local government alone.

Q. Sir, hitherto, the Admiral, I believe, has been referring everything to Vichy. Is he now acting independently, do you know?

A. We don't know following up on that especially during these negotiations because we made clear to him and I guess he made clear to Vichy that we were not having anything to do with Vichy on this matter. We were dealing solely with the local government. That is our part in it and that is about all I can say.

Q. In that connection, Sir, one report we have from London is to the effect that the French West Indies, French Guiana, have joined the United Nations.

A. No, I don't know in what sense that statement is made. Of course, they are related to us only to the extent of the renewal—to the extent of this agreement that I have spoken of and not presumably in the sense of signing the Declaration of the 28 nations or anything of that kind.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are French Guiana and those other countries covered by the Martinique negotiations?

A. French Guiana? Yes—yes.

Q. That is, all possessions in the Caribbean?

A. Yes, exactly.

Q. Could you tell us, Sir, whether this agreement is now sufficiently satisfactory to render it unnecessary to consider occupying those possessions?

A. It seems to be.

. . . . .

---

740.00112 European War 1939/7492 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General in Martinique (Malige)*

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1942—5 p. m.

275. Please take up the following matter with Admiral Robert at the earliest possible moment.

Military operations in North Africa, involving the temporary suspension of trade and communications with Metropolitan France, have brought about abrupt and serious changes in the economic life of that French territory. It is the earnest desire of the United States Government, as it must be of all true Frenchmen, to minimize to the fullest possible extent the economic shock to the civilian population of French North Africa. To this end the United States Government is bending every effort toward providing those imports which are most urgently needed, namely, petroleum products, wheat, foodstuffs, textiles and medical supplies destined for distribution to the civilian population.

In this connection the question of shipping is obviously of the greatest importance and it is believed that Frenchmen in the Antilles would wish to play their part in alleviating the economic difficulties of their fellow citizens in North Africa, particularly when such cooperation with the efforts being made by the United States Government can result in the resumption of communications with Africa.

It is obvious that vessels proceeding to French African ports cannot do so without some form of naval protection. We should be glad to discuss with Admiral Robert the possibility that his own units might assist in providing such protection but in any case merchant vessels to North Africa would be obliged to follow routing to be established for each voyage by the United States Navy, which might include joining a convoy. It would also be necessary that the vessels themselves carry some protection in accordance with United States naval requirements. It is realized that it will take some time to condition and place vessels now unused in the Antilles in such a service but it is understood that at least two of the tankers could be made immediately available to proceed to a United States port for conditioning and to transport petroleum products to the civilian population of North Africa. We wish to emphasize in this connection that the use of these tankers and the two French merchant vessels will specifically contribute to the needs of the French civilian population in North Africa. It is recognized that this proposal involves a further degree of collaboration with the United States than Robert has up to the present been prepared to give, but we must emphasize that in order to provide adequately both for French civilians in North Africa and the Antilles a further degree of cooperation is essential. Such cooperation would likewise facilitate the solution of other problems which may arise in addition to those technical questions connected with the maintenance of relations with the United States that are in the course of adjustment at present. The use of these tankers and other ships with French crews and sailing under the French flag need not involve greater collaboration



between the French authorities in the Antilles and the French authorities in North Africa than is desired by either party.

You may also inform the High Commissioner that arrangements have been made to permit the departure to the Antilles of some 500 French nationals who have been awaiting transportation in Morocco for some months. It is expected that they will shortly arrive in this hemisphere. If the *Sagittaire* and the *Oregon* equipped with adequate protective means are to operate they could transport Antilles passengers and cargo. More frequent voyages than envisaged under the gentlemen's agreement would be contemplated, provided the French authorities are willing to accept protection afforded by the United States Navy and to follow its requirements in that respect.

If Robert is willing in principle to accept some such proposals, details will be elaborated later.

HULL

---

740.00112 European War 1939/7544

*The French High Commissioner in the French West Indies (Robert)  
to the Consul General in Martinique (Malige)*<sup>14</sup>

[Translation]

FORT-DE-FRANCE, December 29, 1942.

MY DEAR CONSUL: I desire first of all to state that if the current military operations have caused brutal changes in the economic life of North Africa, these same changes will have greater and graver repercussions on the economic life of the Frenchmen in the Metropole.

While the American Government proposes to attenuate this harm itself and for the purpose disposes of French tonnage seized in North Africa, compared with which that of the Antilles offers very weak possibilities, Frenchmen of the Antilles regard with much greater favor the case of Frenchmen of the Metropole because it is they who are in more pressing need of aid and who represent in the highest degree the real France gathered about its leader.

Collaborating in the work undertaken by your Government of helping the population of North Africa would therefore be attended here with a guilty feeling of unfairness and with the legitimate fear that, in openly assisting the population of North Africa, Frenchmen of the Antilles would cause those of the Metropole to support the consequences in the form of additional aggravations to their situation.

---

<sup>14</sup> Copy of translation transmitted to the Department by the Consul General in his despatch No. 335, December 29, 1942; received January 2, 1943.

I must be vigilant in the duties which I bear that any cooperation on my part will not react harmfully upon the interests of the people under me nor, in a more general way, upon French interests.

The French interests are naturally the safeguard of French shipping and also the maintenance for these possessions of a *modus vivendi* that does not bring German reprisals on the Metropole, a *modus vivendi* established by the terms of the gentlemen's agreement of November 7, the terms of which were approved by my Government after being acknowledged by Washington and which your Government confirmed after the rupture of diplomatic relations.

The reciprocal agreement as to neutrality in Article IV of the gentlemen's agreement appears to me to be particularly satisfactory in this regard for the interested parties.

The collaboration that you envisage should therefore not go beyond the limits of that neutrality. And it then appears to me evident that it can not go as far as the supplying direct of populations that are in an occupied zone and even more in a zone of military operations. What is true in this case for foodstuffs is all the more (true) for petroleum products, even though all together they are, as you assured, limited and reserved for the needs of the civilian population.

On the other hand, I must acknowledge that the use of available tonnage and the exchange of products in this hemisphere constitute two problems which by their nature are joined together. This consideration was presented to me before and I had adopted it only very partially in the form of F.O.B. purchases of Antilles products.

Circumstances lead me today, with a view to acceding to the desire of the Government of the United States, to envisage the possibility of delivering those products under the French flag to a port of the Caribbean or of the Southern Coast of the United States but in any case outside the zone of total war.

Perhaps might I go, in order to give a supplementary pledge of my good-will, as far as to concede that the deliveries of petroleum needed by the Antilles be accompanied by the transport of equivalent quantities between the bases of production and that of the United States in the Caribbean.

This cooperation, intended to lighten the pressure on Allied tonnage in these waters and thus render tonnage available for other purposes, brings no counterpart of appreciable advantage to my own service of supply. The latter will still depend upon products imported from the United States and in lesser measure from Brazil, by the French ships the use of which the American Government has recognized as indispensable to the minimum needs of these possessions (Art. XI of the gentlemen's agreement).

You are aware how the various phases of the conflict, by their distant repercussions, have too often since the armistice suspended the flow of this traffic and the want resulting therefrom in this island at the present time.

You are aware that the resumption of this traffic, as I envisaged it before your proposal, involved a security that will no longer exist when the cooperation I am suggesting to you will enter in vigor.

I will therefore need a formal guarantee that the insufficiency of tonnage of which we might suffer as a result of the prolongation of voyages or the loss of ships will be compensated by your Government.

These observations are dictated solely by solicitude for the essential interests of French populations—my counterproposals assume therefore that you acknowledge that they are based on those interests and that you admit the latter as the basis for future discussions.

It has been possible to present to you these counterproposals, which I regard as substantial, because they do not involve any act of hostility towards the powers with which France was compelled to sign the armistice and because they eliminate entry into relations with the local authorities in North Africa. These two points, which your note of December 18 did not leave in doubt, remain for me fundamental.

ROBERT

---

CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES OVER THE SEIZURE OF ST. PIERRE-MIQUELON ISLANDS BY FREE FRENCH FORCES<sup>15</sup>

851A 01/28 : Telegram

*The Minister in Canada (Moffat) to the Secretary of State*

OTTAWA, January 1, 1942—noon.

[Received 12:54 p. m.]

1. Reference various telephone conversations regarding status of St. Pierre-Miquelon. The problems raised by Admiral Muselier's<sup>16</sup> occupancy of the islands of St. Pierre-Miquelon are under continued discussion in the Canadian press. Although public sympathy has from the beginning been with the Admiral there was a willingness to recognize that his move might have such far flung repercussions on

---

<sup>15</sup> For previous correspondence concerning the situation in St. Pierre-Miquelon, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, pp. 540 ff. The British Prime Minister, Winston S. Churchill, came to Washington for conferences with President Roosevelt, December 22, 1941–January 14, 1942, interrupted by trips to Ottawa and Palm Beach. The question of the seizure of St. Pierre-Miquelon came up in these discussions. Correspondence relating to this Washington Conference is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

<sup>16</sup> Adm. Emile Muselier, Free French Minister of the Navy.

North Africa, the French Fleet, hemispheric policies, etc., that some form of accommodation, which safeguarded wireless communications, might be a wise move. Since Mr. Churchill's speech before Parliament<sup>17</sup> in which he excoriated Vichy's plans and purposes, public opinion has swung as a virtual unit against any form of attempted compromise. Led by prominent members of Parliament and echoes by the press, Mr. King<sup>18</sup> is being petitioned to take no part in any policy that would savor of a rebuff to General de Gaulle.<sup>19</sup> The unfortunate impression is gaining ground that there is a rift in policy between London and Washington in the matter of dealing with France and public opinion in its present mood is behind what it thinks is London's position.

MOFFAT

---

851A.01/35

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] January 2, 1942.

The French Ambassador<sup>20</sup> called at his request. He said that he had sent to his Government the substance of his last talk with me<sup>21</sup> relative to the St. Pierre-Miquelon question, without including some of the sharp points contained in my conversation. He then expressed his regret that the matter had not progressed further at Vichy. At this point I clearly expressed the deep disappointment which I had felt upon receiving a reply that seemed to be indifferent and lacking in appreciation of the unusual conditions and circumstances surrounding this matter. I added that it was vitally important to his Government to realize that, unless a settlement is made now, everything will be thrown wide open insofar as the conduct and attitude of the countries interested may be concerned, with the result that nothing but inevitable injury to the French and ourselves would follow. I said that, therefore, both sides should move promptly in a spirit of mutual concession. I stated that this action would not do the slightest injury to the prestige of France, but would safeguard her rights and interests in the Western Hemisphere, which would otherwise be thrown more or less open to seizure by other countries.

After a few interchanges of suggestions we reached the conclusion that his Government could well afford at once to propose on its part

---

<sup>17</sup> Speech of British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill before the Canadian Parliament, December 30, 1941.

<sup>18</sup> W. L. Mackenzie King, Canadian Prime Minister.

<sup>19</sup> Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the National Committee of the Free French at London.

<sup>20</sup> Gaston Henry-Haye.

<sup>21</sup> See Secretary Hull's memorandum of December 30, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, p. 565.

first, that it would select a governor whose conduct and attitude would be broad enough and impersonal enough to be free from reasonable objections on the part of the United States, the Canadians and the British and any considerable number of the people on the islands, and second, to shut down each of the radio or wireless stations on these islands and agree for the Canadians to observe these stations sufficiently to see that they are not reopened and used at any time and for any purpose. We further reached the conclusion that this Government could well attach one or two naval observers to the American Consulate at St. Pierre just as we have done at Martinique. The Canadians could do likewise with the further understanding that their newly established naval attachés were to observe the radio situation at all times to the extent of seeing to it that none of the stations is used. This method of attaching naval officers to the consulates of this country and Canada would save the face of the French on the question of sovereignty. In return, the radio difficulties and dangers having been thus safeguarded and provision made for a peaceful and non-partisan conduct of the affairs on the islands, the Free French forces would depart simultaneously with the changes made by the French, the Americans and Canadians in accordance with the agreement, above stated. The Ambassador said that he was strongly in favor of this proposal and would cable his Government in the hope that it would approve the proposal without delay.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

---

851A 01/1-342

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Minister in Canada  
(Moffat)*

[Extract]

. . . . .  
At three o'clock I telephoned Mr. Robertson<sup>22</sup> again and read to him the text of a draft declaration prepared at the White House between the President and Mr. Churchill. Mr. Churchill was going to clear it with the Canadian Government but Mr. Hull thought that Mr. King might like to have the text in advance before it was sent him for clearance. It struck me as extremely adroit.

"The United States, British and Canadian Governments view this incident as on a very small scale compared to what is going on all over the world. The problems involved relate to the safeguarding of British, Canadian and American shipping in the North Atlantic and existing international commitments. Nevertheless it must be

---

<sup>22</sup> Norman A. Robertson, Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs.

made clear that the Free French action was taken not only without their assent, but in the face of the declared wishes of the British Government.

"Accordingly, the three Governments have agreed that the principle that these islands are to be regarded in the present phase as demilitarized and out of the war shall be maintained. All armed forces will be withdrawn, it being understood that at the same time adequate steps shall be taken to assure that no radio station situated on the islands shall be used contrary to the interests of the United Nations.

"The local inhabitants will be left in full exercise of their rights of domestic self-government, arrangements being made both to continue the supplies from the United States and Canada on which they are dependent, and also to provide for the seasonal supply of fish to the French inhabitants of Martinique.

"Meanwhile, in the light of the relevant facts there should be no occasion for confusion or misunderstanding since there is no divergence of policy and there is complete cooperation and understanding between the United States, Great Britain and Canada in this as in other matters."

I had asked Mr. Dunn<sup>23</sup> the circumstances of its release. He said he was not quite clear on this point and did not know whether the plan was to release it at once or to wait until a favorable reply had been received from Vichy to Mr. Hull's suggestions.

Mr. Robertson thanked me for giving him the text and said that if Mr. King or he had any observations to offer he would telephone me Saturday evening or Sunday. Not having heard further, I assume that the Canadians will clear as soon as received.

OTTAWA, January 3, 1942.

---

851A.01/30a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1942—3 p. m.

5. As a result of recent conversations here between the British, Canadians and ourselves, the French Ambassador was informed today that the Vichy Government had the opportunities to make a contribution in settlement of the Saint Pierre-Miquelon situation and that he himself could play no inconsiderable part. It was impressed upon him that time was of the essence and he undertook to telephone his Government this afternoon informing it of this fact and of the following proposals which were being advanced as a possible solution agreeable to all sides:

Simultaneous action in regard to

(1) Withdrawal of the Free French forces.

---

<sup>23</sup> James Clement Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations.

(2) Admiral Robert<sup>24</sup> will call the present Administrator to Fort de France for extended consultation and will name as temporary Administrator a local inhabitant of the Islands whose appointment would be agreeable to the population of the Islands.

(3) The American and Canadian Governments to name observers attached to their Consulates at the Islands to supervise the closing and continued cessation of all wireless operation.

You should also discuss these proposals with the appropriate authorities in an attempt to facilitate and expedite a reply.

The French Ambassador has telephoned Admiral Darlan personally this afternoon along the above lines.

HULL

---

851A.00/53

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] January 5, 1942.

The French Ambassador called at his request and proceeded at once to lay before me what he said was the reply of his Government to his recent communication concerning a plan or proposal entailing support by the French Government of certain steps calculated to settle the matters in controversy at St. Pierre-Miquelon. The Ambassador's recent communication to his Government set out this plan or proposal as contained in my memorandum of conversation with the Ambassador on January third [*second?*].

The Ambassador said that the first proposal of his Government was (1) to accept the idea of placing three or four people on these islands selected from Canadian and United States citizens, with the title of naval observer or something similar, whose function would be to see to it that no objectionable information went out through any of the radio stations on the islands. He said further that his Government would agree to order these stations not to send out weather reports in the future.

(2) He said that the present Administrator, whose presence there is objectionable to the interested governments, will be called to report to Admiral Robert in Martinique, and Admiral Robert will designate a new temporary Administrator to act in the place of the present Administrator. He added that the present Administrator will not be sent back until and unless there is an agreement on the date and, I inferred, until the situation was fairly satisfactory. I gathered that it would apparently be the purpose of the French to develop a good atmosphere there as rapidly as possible. I did not accept or comment on his proposal.

---

<sup>24</sup>Adm. Georges Robert, French High Commissioner in the French West Indies and Supreme Commander of French Islands in the Western Hemisphere.

(3) The Canadian Government should give a declaration that it will respect the sovereignty of these islands. He also mentioned the idea of neutrality in this connection, but it was not possible fully to understand its significance, as he expressed it.

I said to the Ambassador that he could not get any guarantees from Canada, Great Britain or my own country on the points mentioned under (3) until and unless the people on these islands made it absolutely clear and certain to Canada and other governments that their shipping would be safe from any such dangers as those to which reference has been made on several occasions. I stated that this requirement, which I had just set forth, was on all-fours with our pledges to Admiral Robert at Martinique with the exception that the considerations involved were slightly different. I proceeded to elaborate so as to prepare him and his Government for a broader position on this matter, if such is deemed at all necessary.

I then read to him from what purported to be a private memorandum of mine, in which I had jotted down some points in regard to the matter (certain excerpts from the British draft of a proposal dated January first and revised by my office) such as the following:

"that the principle that these islands are to be regarded in the present phase as demilitarized and out of the war shall be maintained. All armed forces will be withdrawn, it being understood that at the same time adequate steps shall be taken to assure that no radio station situated on the islands shall be used contrary to the interests of the united nations. The local inhabitants will be left in full exercise of their rights of domestic self government, arrangements being made both to continue the supplies from the United States and Canada on which they are dependent and also to provide for the seasonal supply of fish to the French inhabitants of Martinique."

The Ambassador made some reference to the question of what was meant by rights of domestic self government, adding that it was the same government as the French Republic had afforded before the war, et cetera, et cetera. This represents about what took place when I read from our revision of the British draft.

I strongly emphasized to the Ambassador that his Government must work out a reasonable proposition for the reason that there would be no settlement on the part of the Canadians and the British certainly until they feel actually safeguarded against submarines, wireless or other like dangers; that this was a duty that the owners of this territory owed as a neutral and that unless safety is assured to Great Britain, Canada and this country, there would be no settlement and serious trouble would result in more ways than one.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]



851A.01/36 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, January 5, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received January 6—9:25 a. m.]

15. Department's 5, January 3, 3 p. m. We saw Rochat, who has just been given the rank of Ambassador and named Secretary General of the Foreign Office, this afternoon with regard to the proposals advanced [as] a possible solution in settling the Saint Pierre-Miquelon situation.

He informed us that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been apprized by the French Ambassador in Washington of the three points mentioned in the Department's telegram referred to above, and said that his Government was in virtual agreement with them with the following reservations:

As regards the appointment of an administrator, he said that his Government did not consider that there was any inhabitant of the islands competent to fulfill these duties satisfactorily. Consequently it was suggested that as soon as the present administrator was released by Admiral Muselier he should resume his duties during the brief period until Admiral Robert could send from Fort-de-France a competent official to replace him as administrator.

Rochat added that his Government had some slight susceptibility with regard to this point and he indicated that if permission were given to the present administrator to resume his duties, even for the briefest of periods and until he could be replaced by Admiral Robert's selection, the Vichy Government would be satisfied.

The French Government agreed to the appointment of American and Canadian observers to their Consulates in the islands but would request, from the Canadian Government, a declaration as to its respect of the territorial sovereignty of the islands. The French Government would also request a strictly limited use of the wireless for transmission of messages of a purely administrative order.

He said that instructions as to the selection of an administrator had been telegraphed to Admiral Robert at noon yesterday and the French Ambassador in Washington had been advised yesterday afternoon of the French Government's views concerning these proposals.

LEAHY

851A.01/37 : Telegram

*The Consul in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State*

FORT-DE-FRANCE, January 6, 1942—9 a. m.

[Received 4:40 p. m.]

3. Department's 1, January 3, 4 p. m.<sup>25</sup> I have just received the following from Admiral Robert.

"The French Government, after considering Mr. Hull's proposals, authorizes me to reply through you.

"Referring to President Roosevelt's communication of December 14 [13?] to Marshal Pétain<sup>26</sup> regarding French possessions in this hemisphere, confirmed by yours to me of December 23, I regard the American Government as obligated to obtain the reestablishment of French sovereignty over St. Pierre Miquelon.

"The French Government, which has never deviated from its policy of strict neutrality and desires like myself to facilitate the American Government's task under the circumstances, is prepared in this case to give further proof thereof satisfactory to all interested parties.

"It requests in exchange that the Canadian Government on this occasion give assurances to respect French sovereignty over these territories similar to those received from the American Government.

"It accepts the principle of the presence at Saint Pierre of American and Canadian observers, three at most, attached to their respective Consulates, charged with watching over the strict neutrality of the territory, without interfering with the administration proper except as concerns the radio station for which the French Government consents to a control permitting verification that there is no transmission *en clair* susceptible of being used by the belligerents and that there is no transmission in code other than official telegrams sent under the administrator's responsibility. It is understood that no meteorological bulletins will be sent.

"The Administrator of the islands, M. de Bournat retains the French Government's confidence and mine. I desire that he be reinstated in authority, it being understood that no reprisal will be exercised. It is indispensable that he come to Martinique as much to receive my instructions conforming to the new agreement as to report on the situation to me. I request that his journey be facilitated and that he may immediately enter into telegraphic communication with me for choosing a substitute to administer the territories during his absence.

"Finally I request that his return from Fort-de-France to St. Pierre Miquelon by the *Barfleur* be recognized in order to confirm the restoration of French sovereignty in these islands. The *Barfleur* would return to Fort-de-France immediately after this peaceful mission."

<sup>25</sup> Not printed.

<sup>26</sup> The President in his message of December 13 to Marshal Pétain, French Chief of State, stated:

"You may rest assured that the Government of the United States under present circumstances and in view of the instructions which you have issued to Admiral Robert will continue to give full recognition to the agreement reached by our two governments involving the maintenance of the *status quo* of the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere." (851A.01/37a)

My letter of December 23 to the Admiral contained substance of Department's undated telegram drafted December 22<sup>28</sup> following Admiral Horne's<sup>29</sup> return.

At the Admiral's request I shall call on him this afternoon, cabling the Department immediately afterwards.<sup>30</sup>

MALIGE

---

851A.01/47

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] January 8, 1942.

The British Minister, Sir Ronald Campbell, called and said that he understood that I desired to talk with him about the St. Pierre-Miquelon matter. I replied that I had sent some data<sup>31</sup> in connection with it to the President at Hyde Park and that when I heard from the President, I would then discuss it with the Minister.

I then proceeded to criticize the British Government, as far as one could well go, about its conduct in fomenting against the United States for British benefit the bitter agitation against this country in regard to St. Pierre and Miquelon, led by the incendiary speech of the British Prime Minister in Canada, which gave trouble-making people a pretext to make it appear that the British were the only friends the Free French had, and, inferentially, that the United States was not their friend; that the British were violently opposed to any connection with Vichy, and that, inferentially, the United States was tied with Vichy to a damaging extent and to an extent subject to criticism. I inquired why in the world the British Government had done this, and especially the Prime Minister. I said that throughout the week I strongly pled with him to say just a few words to correct the wrong impressions, just pointed out, which he could have done without in the remotest way affecting the British relations with the Free French. I had asked him to do this in simple fairness to the United States, so as to cause a cessation of the injurious propaganda being circulated in the name of the Prime Minister since his speech in Canada. I spoke as I have not spoken lately on these lines, and I said I wondered whether the British were more interested in twelve or so Free Frenchmen, who seized these islands, and the capital they can make out of it primarily at the expense of the United States Government, than they were in Singapore and in the world war situation itself. I said I had neither seen nor heard of anything from British spokesmen that would in-

---

<sup>28</sup> Undated telegram not found in Department files.

<sup>29</sup> Rear Adm. F. J. Horne of the U. S. Navy.

<sup>30</sup> Telegram No. 4, January 6, 1942, not printed.

<sup>31</sup> See the document *infra*, portion dated January 14.

dicate to me that there existed a world war compared with the St. Pierre-Miquelon situation. I elaborated along these lines at some length.

The Minister said next to nothing in reply.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

851A 01/1-1842

*Memoranda by the Minister in Canada (Moffat) of Telephone Conversations, January 14-19, Regarding St. Pierre-Miquelon*<sup>32</sup>

January 14.

Mr. Dunn telephoned me as follows:

On Thursday, January 8th, the Secretary of State had sent to the President the following suggested formula for solving the St. Pierre-Miquelon mix-up.<sup>33</sup> It was to be cleared with the British and Canadians and then once again with Vichy. On Monday, January 12th, Mr. Churchill had approved the formula, sent it to London for clearance with the British Government and had undertaken to clear it with Ottawa.

The formula follows:

1. The islands are French and will remain French.
2. To avoid any potential threat to the shipping of the governments concerned, the use of the wireless stations on the islands will be subject to the supervision and control by observers appointed by the American and Canadian Governments and attached to their respective consulates.
3. The islands shall be neutralized and demilitarized and shall be considered out of the war.
4. The present Administrator shall be withdrawn for the period of the war; the appointment of an Administrator shall be withheld for the same period, and the administration of the islands shall be left in the hands of the Consultative Council.
5. All armed forces will be withdrawn.
6. The Canadian and American Governments agree and undertake to continue economic assistance to the inhabitants of the islands, and the respective consuls of those countries will confer with the local authorities as to the nature of the assistance to be given. Arrangements are being made both to continue the supplies from the United States and Canada on which the islands are dependent, and to provide the seasonal supply of fish to the French inhabitants of Martinique.

Mr. Dunn instructed me to read the foregoing to the Canadians, find out whether they had already received the text from the British, and, if so, the nature of their reaction. I was also to explain to

<sup>32</sup> Memoranda obviously drafted in Ottawa and apparently received by the Department about January 21, 1942.

<sup>33</sup> Secretary Hull's memorandum to President Roosevelt not printed.

Mr. King that whereas the Secretary had understood that the two of them were to work out the solution, in practice Mr. Churchill kept taking the ball in his hands, insisting that he would clear the formula with Ottawa, and then apparently did nothing about it. The Secretary was afraid that Mr. King would feel that he was being sidetracked, and accordingly wondered if Mr. King would prefer any other method of proceeding than the one now being followed.

I telephoned Mr. Robertson who told me that the Canadians had seen a copy of Mr. Churchill's telegram to London containing the new formula. Mr. Churchill had stressed the urgency of a reply. He had also included the phrase: "I understand that Mr. King has taken the position that he will accept any formula that is agreeable to the President and ourselves." That being the position of the Canadian Government there was no desire on the part of Ottawa to bring out any new points. Nonetheless, Mr. Robertson felt that two points that he understood would be brought out by the British Government were very sound:

(1) The British felt that the phrase "the administration of the islands shall be left in the hands of the Consultative Council" should make it clear that a new body was meant. I said that I had been told that the phrase was purposely ambiguous. Mr. Robertson replied that whatever advantages ambiguity might have in submitting the formula to Vichy, he did not feel that any ambiguity should remain in our thinking.

(2) The French [*British?*] were going to suggest that there be a delay after the formula had been cleared with everybody, including Vichy, in order to allow General de Gaulle to withdraw his expedition on his own, before public announcement was made. Did I know how far London had gotten with General de Gaulle? I said that our Government was not interested and wanted to keep out of this phase. Personally, the suggestion of a delay before public announcement struck me as a good one. Mr. Robertson said it had so struck Mr. King. I said: "May I then say, when the British have presented this formula to us, which they had not yet done, that it seems to Mr. King and yourself to possess real merit?" He said: "Very definitely."

The conversation then dealt with the method of approach and I gathered that there were no hurt feelings in Ottawa on this score.

I telephoned Mr. Atherton<sup>34</sup> (Mr. Dunn had left for Florida). I told him that the Canadians had seen Mr. Churchill's telegram giving the draft. He asked whether Mr. Churchill had given the formula full endorsement. I said I judged he had. Had the Canadians seen the British reply? I said I gathered that they had,—purely inferentially,—as they knew two points about the British attitude. I then

---

<sup>34</sup> Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

told him what these were. I added that I liked the suggestion about a delay between clearance and announcement in order to enable General de Gaulle to withdraw his troops, apparently voluntarily. Mr. Atherton indicated that he did also. I urged that every step be taken to clear this problem up quickly as it was beginning to fester. Mr. Atherton said that no one was in greater haste than the Secretary and he.

*January 15.*

Mr. Robertson telephoned me this morning to say that there had been a meeting of the War Cabinet late yesterday afternoon after he had spoken to me. Mr. King had not been present but most of the senior Ministers were. The telegram from Mr. Churchill to the British Government had been read to the War Cabinet and had caused the utmost consternation. Churchill's tone was pretty savage. De Gaulle must be made to pull out was the gist of his message; if necessary, the *Arkansas* would steam into the harbor of St. Pierre-Miquelon. The War Cabinet was pretty angry that the use of force to eject de Gaulle should even be suggested. They were fearful about its effect on public opinion in the Province of Quebec. They felt it would be a blow to the war effort and unity. There was no wish to justify de Gaulle's original action, but there was a feeling that redress by force would have almost as many adverse repercussions as the original seizure.

The foregoing had been reported to Mr. King who had been impressed by it. I remarked to Robertson that all the foregoing dealt with Mr. Churchill's outgoing message to London; he had not referred to London's reply. He said that London most reluctantly accepted Churchill's recommendations but gave no indication whatsoever of de Gaulle's attitude. Mr. King, although he stood by his position that he would accept what the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to, asked that a message be conveyed to the President explaining the effect any use of force would have upon Canadian unity and his hope that every means, including delay, be tried before armed ejection was considered. That message he was sending through me. A similar message was being sent via the Canadian Legation in Washington to Mr. Churchill. I said that any intimation that Canada was balking at a U.S.-U.K. agreement would just encourage de Gaulle to hold out. He said that no such intimation could possibly reach him, as there had been no talking on any subject between the Canadians and the Free French for between three weeks and a month.

---

I telephoned the foregoing to Ray Atherton. I remarked that it was the first I had ever heard of the possibility of an ejection by

force. Mr. Atherton asked if Mr. Churchill had specifically referred to an American ship. I said yes, by name. He seemed surprised by the message and said he would report it to the Secretary within the next few minutes and call me back probably in the afternoon.

Mr. Atherton called up a few hours later to say that the Secretary wished to thank me for the information. He had instructed Mr. Atherton to tell me the following textually, over the telephone: "One thing the President has consistently opposed is any idea of sending armed ships to the islands. Every time the President and the Secretary have talked about the islands, the Secretary has assured him that the State Department has not even considered such a solution. The Secretary had no reason to believe and does not believe that the President's position has changed in any way."

I said that I had been thinking about the problem, which divided itself into two parts: first, the acceptance of the formula; second, British pressure on General de Gaulle. When Robertson referred to London's "reluctant consent," he could not have referred to the formula but must have been referring to putting pressure on de Gaulle. The suggestion that the Americans might use force *may* have been given London by Churchill as an indication that pressure must be put on de Gaulle and must be put on him quickly. The delay in Churchill's answering about the formula may be due to the fact that he was still without information from London as to de Gaulle's attitude. All this was supposition, but it was at least logical. I could not probe in greater detail as the Canadians were naturally somewhat reluctant about discussing Churchill's private messages to London with me. More accurately, they were worried that Churchill should find out that they were doing so.

Was I to pass on the Secretary's message to the Canadians. Mr. Atherton, instead of replying directly, said: "Wasn't I instructed to tell you this by telephone? That is hardly a secret means of communication." "No", I replied, "I used to know the man who listened into my conversations but I think he has been changed and I am not sure whether they listen in when I telephone from the house."

An hour or two later Mr. Atherton called back to say that on second thought the Secretary would prefer that I do not pass on his message to the Canadians for fear that it would reach the British and perhaps complicate matters.

*January 19.*

I called on Mr. Robertson this morning and asked if he had any late news on St. Pierre. He said that Mr. Eden<sup>55</sup> had seen General de Gaulle on Wednesday and had reported to Mr. Churchill that he

<sup>55</sup> Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

endeavored to persuade him to accept the new draft. General de Gaulle had refused once and for all to accept in any way the sentence—"The islands shall be neutralized and demilitarized and shall be considered out of the war." He said that his whole purpose was to bring French territory back into the war. Acceptance of such a condition would destroy the very foundations on which he was working. He was willing to go along with a modified draft excluding this sentence, subject to three secret reservations. These reservations were: (1) that the Free French Administrator remain on the island, though he might be assimilated into the new elective Consultative Council; (2) that the French Marines remain on the island in order to protect it from attack; (3) that the Canadian-American observers do not control the wireless but cooperate with the authorities.<sup>86</sup> General de Gaulle would issue a statement that it had never been his intention to keep ships stationed at the islands. This was as far as he was willing to go.

Mr. Churchill had apparently discussed this with the President, and as far as I could make out had been impressed by the de Gaulle formula but had been worried by the secret reservations. He had told the President that British opinion was very hostile to anything savoring of "appeasing Vichy", and would be most reluctant to support anything savoring of a breach with de Gaulle. In the circumstances, he asked that the matter be left over until he returned to London and could see de Gaulle in person. The President had agreed. Nothing further has been heard.

The only reference to the use of an American naval ship was Eden's report of a comment by General de Gaulle with reference to the "first sentence of Churchill's paragraph five". He remarked: "Does this mean they would be willing to fire on me?"

Mr. Robertson again commented that both the State Department and the British Embassy seemed to be about two days behind the Roosevelt-Churchill conversations.

---

851A.01/85

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*<sup>87</sup>

[LONDON,] January 23, 1942.

Personal. I saw General de Gaulle yesterday and after a severe conversation he agreed to the communiqué which I left with you

---

<sup>86</sup> An informal memorandum from an officer in the British Embassy, January 26, 1942, gives the third reservation as "The Council will be under the orders of the National Committee." (851A.01/86)

<sup>87</sup> This copy of the message to President Roosevelt was transmitted to the Secretary of State by the British Ambassador in his note of January 24. The original was sent to President Roosevelt on the same date.



being published by United States, British and Canadian Governments without any acceptance by us of his proposed secret conditions. He feels it necessary to consult Admiral Muselier who is a member of the National Committee but I understand that I am to receive final assent of Free French tomorrow when I will immediately telegraph confirmation to you.

2. Assuming the above, what procedure do you want followed? Will Mr. Hull put it to Vichy or will you simply issue communiqué straight away? I think the latter course would be better and these two tiny islands can then relapse into the obscurity from which they have more than once emerged since the Treaty of Utrecht.<sup>38</sup>

3. Meanwhile we are also informing Canada and asking them to communicate through appropriate channels with you. It is important that no statement should be made till the Canadians' definite agreement has been received.

4. I do hope the solution for which I have worked here will be satisfactory to Mr. Hull and the State Department. I understood fully the difficulty in which they were placed. Public opinion here was of course delighted at the Vichyites being overthrown by an overwhelming popular vote and [1 word undecypherable]<sup>39</sup> of de Gaulle would have been very popular.

---

851A.01/1-2642

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Minister  
in Canada (Moffat)*

I telephoned Mr. Atherton this morning to tell him of the British message to the Canadians that de Gaulle had dropped his three secret reservations mentioned in my memorandum of January 19th and that Churchill in turn was prepared to accept de Gaulle's two points of refusing to take the islands "out of the war" and to give the Canadians and Americans supervision of (as opposed to an advisory connection with) the question of wireless communications. Mr. Atherton said that thus far he had heard nothing from the British.

At two o'clock Mr. Atherton called me up again to say that the British had now informed the Department that the three secret reservations had been withdrawn but had never officially told them what the three secret reservations were. The only source from which he had heard about the secret reservations up to this point was myself. He wanted to refresh his mind as to their nature. I told him that as I recalled them they had to do with leaving the

---

<sup>38</sup> Treaty of April 11, 1713, ending the War of the Spanish Succession.

<sup>39</sup> Brackets appear in this copy of message.

acting Administrator on the island, with leaving marines there to repel a possible attack and to clarify the legal status of supervision over the wireless. I said I was speaking from memory, that I was away from the office at the time but that he could check up by means of a memorandum I had sent Jack Hickerson <sup>40</sup> last week.

I returned to the lunch table where I was sitting next to Mr. Robertson and told him the story. His recollection of the three secret reservations coincided with my own, but said the matter had only academic interest as they had been definitely withdrawn. He then indicated that British and Canadians both would be very relieved when they were certain that Admiral Muselier would obey de Gaulle's orders and in effect leave the islands.

OTTAWA, January 26, 1942.

---

851A.01/2 242

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] February 2, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I refer to your memorandum of January 26 <sup>41</sup> on the subject of the St. Pierre-Miquelon occupation.

In view of the fact that certain policies and obligations of this Government relating to the war situation were materially affected on both sides of the Atlantic by the unexpected occupation of the St. Pierre-Miquelon islands by Free French naval forces on December 24, 1941, this Government proceeded, in a spirit of friendly cooperation with the British and Canadian Governments, to seek a settlement which could be found acceptable by all concerned. This Government suggested a broad basic proposal, a copy of which is hereto attached.<sup>42</sup> This proposal was in line with the policy we have continuously pursued to the present time—that of holding the Vichy Government to its assurances regarding the French fleet, the North African bases, and French colonial possessions.

As you will recall, Prime Minister Churchill agreed in general with you and with me on this suggested proposal, conditional upon his ability to secure the approval of General de Gaulle. It now appears that Prime Minister Churchill was not able to obtain General de Gaulle's accord. The draft formula substituted by Mr.

---

<sup>40</sup> John D. Hickerson, Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs. The memorandum referred to is presumably that of January 14-19, p. 663.

<sup>41</sup> Not printed; it merely transmitted the message of January 23 from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt and asked the Secretary of State to prepare a reply (851R.01/10½).

<sup>42</sup> For proposal, see memorandum of January 14-19, p. 663.

Churchill, referred to in his telegram to you, would not be of assistance to us in holding the Vichy Government to its assurances, nor would it appear to be acceptable to that Government.

In view of the failure to achieve a general satisfactory settlement which would conform with the policies and obligations of this Government on both sides of the Atlantic, and in view of the paramount importance of furthering unity and harmony in the maximum cooperative war effort with Great Britain, Canada, and the other United Nations, I recommend that further negotiations or discussions of the matter be postponed for the period of the war.

---

851A.01/91 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, March 9, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received March 10—7:01 a. m.]

362. Department's 5, January 3, 3 p. m. The following is the text in translation of a third person note dated March 9, 1942 received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requesting a settlement of the Saint Pierre-Miquelon situation:

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor again to call to the attention of the Embassy of the United States the situation created by the landing of dissident forces at St. Pierre-Miquelon on December 24 last.

This operation was immediately disavowed in the clearest possible terms by the Federal Government which at once took steps toward the reestablishment of the *status quo*. During the days which followed this surprise attack, the Department of State raised with the French Government the question of the broadcasts from the wireless station on the island and requested the dispatch of American and Canadian observers to St. Pierre et Miquelon. The French Government examined these suggestions in the spirit of the agreement reached in October 1940<sup>48</sup> between the two Governments in regard to French possessions in the Western Hemisphere and sent to Washington at the beginning of January proposals calculated to give satisfaction to the Federal Government.

On January 13 the Department of State informed the French Embassy in Washington that a proposal for the settlement of the Saint Pierre matter had been submitted for examination to President Roosevelt.

From that date and despite several *démarches* made to the State Department by Monsieur Henry-Haye the Federal Government has not made known its views on the question and simply advised the French Government not to make any declaration with regard to the matter until the settlement of the incident.

---

<sup>48</sup> See memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, October 7, 1940, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. II, p. 384.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs would be grateful if the Embassy would inform the Government of the United States that the French Government urges the reestablishment without further delay of its authority over the territory of St. Pierre-Miquelon and would be obliged if the Department of State would inform it as soon as possible as to its final position in this respect."

LEAHY

---

851A.01/93

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at St. Pierre-Miquelon  
(Pasquet)*

WASHINGTON, March 26, 1942.

SIR: Reference is made to your despatch No. 96 of February 20, 1942," requesting advice regarding the attitude to be taken as regards the Free French forces in occupation at St. Pierre-Miquelon.

Whereas the status of St. Pierre-Miquelon in so far as the relations of its administration with this Government have not yet been finally determined, it would nevertheless seem desirable that your relations with them take into account the "de facto" situation. There is no reason why your personal relations with the Free French officials should not be maintained upon the most cordial basis and the method which you have adopted in taking personal acknowledgment of the signatures of officials is approved.<sup>45</sup>

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:  
A. A. BERLE, JR.

---

**EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO KEEP FRANCE FROM PERMITTING USE BY JAPANESE FORCES OF FRENCH VESSELS IN THE FAR EAST; SEIZURE OF SHIPS BY JAPAN**

851.85/429 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, January 31, 1942—3 p. m.

65. Information has reached this Government to the effect that the French authorities are under severe pressure by the Japanese to permit the use of French merchant vessels in Indochina by the Japanese for military purposes. It is understood that the negotiations are already in an advanced stage.

---

<sup>45</sup> Not printed.

<sup>46</sup> The Department announced on July 9, 1942, that the United States Government would "continue to deal with the local Free French officials in their respective territories where they are in effective control". See Department of State *Bulletin*, July 11, 1942, p. 614.

You are requested urgently to take this matter up with Marshal Pétain<sup>46</sup> and to point out that any agreement by the French authorities which would permit the use of French vessels by the Japanese forces would be a most unfriendly act. Immediate action is necessary if the agreement is not to be concluded.

Please report immediately the results of your representations.

HULL

---

851 85/432 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, February 2, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received 11:06 p. m.]

167. At 4:00 p. m. today I obtained an interview with Marshal Pétain, with Darlan<sup>47</sup> present, and delivered to him orally the information contained in your 65, January 31, 3 p. m., in which I informed the Marshal that an "agreement by the French authorities which would permit the use of French vessels by the Japanese forces would be a most unfriendly act".

Admiral Darlan replied that the Governor General of Indochina has been directed to not take any definite action in this matter as the French Government is negotiating with Japan with the purpose of avoiding seizure of the ships by entering into an agreement that some of the ships be permitted to engage in purely commercial trade between Indochina and Japan under the French flag in which they would carry no troops or contraband "which includes rubber". These negotiations have not been concluded and no decision has yet been made.

Darlan questioned me as to whether the United States would prefer that all French ships in Japanese-controlled waters be seized by Japan or that an arrangement be made to permit some of them being used for purely commercial purposes.

I replied that I am not informed as to the preference of my Government but that I am informed that an agreement by France to permit the use of French vessels by Japanese forces would be considered an unfriendly act.

He then stated that the Japanese proposal was very like the one previously made by the United States in regard to the French vessels in American waters to which I replied that the French-American arrangement<sup>48</sup> to which he referred was made between

---

<sup>46</sup> Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, French Chief of State.

<sup>47</sup> Adm. Jean François Darlan, Vice President of the French Council of Ministers and Commander in Chief of Land, Sea, and Air Forces.

<sup>48</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, pp. 526 ff.

two neutral nations and that any assistance given now to Japan would be helping a declared enemy of the United States.

Darlan concluded with a statement that he is in this question only making an effort to save as much as is possible of the French merchant marine.

The Marshal who was always very friendly in his attitude and understanding throughout the interview expressed his pleasure that I had brought the matter to his attention, stating that such discussions are always helpful to him in his ever present difficulties.

A memorandum expected from the Foreign Office this evening covering details of the agreement suggested by the French Government for consideration will be cabled later.<sup>49</sup>

LEAHY

---

851.85/438 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, February 2, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received February 3—12:48 a. m.]

169. Reference Embassy's telegram number 167. Following is translation of the text of the confidential memorandum from the Foreign Office. We understand that its purport has been telegraphed to Henry-Haye.<sup>50</sup>

"On January 20 the Naval Commandant at Saigon received an urgent *démarche* from the Japanese Naval Mission in Indochina suggesting the use in behalf of Japanese interests, and under exclusively French exploitation, of French vessels of 4000 tons or more immobilized in Indochinese ports.

At the same time the Japanese Embassy put forward to the French Government at Vichy a request for the chartering of 80,000 tons of French merchant vessels stationed in Far Eastern ports (9 ships of 4000 tons or more) of which 50,000 would be used for the Manchukuo-China-Indochina traffic and 30,000 tons for Japanese-Indochina traffic.

The Government of Tokyo intimated that if satisfaction was not given to its request it would find itself obliged to proceed to the requisition of the total tonnage of French merchant vessels in the Far East (over 100,000 tons of shipping) of which certain vessels are directly under Japanese control at Shanghai and Macao.

The Naval Commandant in Indochina received instructions to defer placing the ships stationed in our colony at the disposal of the Japanese Naval Mission.

In the meanwhile the French Government is endeavoring to obtain from the Japanese Government:

(a) That France should retain the maximum number of vessels for exclusively French needs;

---

<sup>49</sup> See *infra*.

<sup>50</sup> Gaston Henry-Haye, French Ambassador in the United States.

(b) That should it prove impossible to prevent the placing of certain ships at the disposal of Japan, these ships should at least be used exclusively for commercial traffic between Indochina and Japan in accordance with the Franco-Japanese Commercial Accord of May 6, 1941,<sup>51</sup> it being understood that all transport of war material or that [of?] rubber as well as troops on behalf of Japan would be strictly prohibited. These negotiations have not only not resulted in any agreement but are at present still in their [apparent omission] stages.

It is not without interest to note that in so far as the Japanese request is concerned the French Government finds itself in a position similar to that in which it was placed by American exigencies regarding French tonnage in the United States. The Federal Government should have no difficulty in understanding that between the threat of seizure which would result in depriving France of all of her tonnage in the Far East and allowing the Japanese to utilize this tonnage for military needs on the one hand and the alternative of a negotiation which will prevent in exchange for certain limited concessions the use of French vessels for military purposes and the retention of some of these ships for French needs on the other hand the French Government should have chosen to negotiate.

It is well to add that France's position in the matter is no more contrary to neutrality than the accord<sup>52</sup> initialed by Monsieur Henry-Haye, and Admiral Land<sup>53</sup> with regard to French tonnage in the United States.

While the French Government was unable to prevent the *Normandie* being used as a troop transport, it is making every effort that this should not be the case as regards vessels which it will not be able to avoid chartering to Japan."

LEAHY

---

740.0011 Pacific War/1830 : Telegram

*The Consul at Nouméa (MacVitty) to the Secretary of State*

NOUMÉA, February 5, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received February 5—2:12 p. m.]

17. The Australian Intelligence officer here today, informed me that a radio message from the Japanese Commissioner at Hanoi to Tokyo intercepted by his service reads:

"Admiral Decoux<sup>54</sup> has agreed to cooperate with the Japanese in taking possession of all French territory in the Pacific with the understanding that French sovereignty will be preserved.["]

---

<sup>51</sup> For text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLIV, pp. 767, 775.

<sup>52</sup> See bracketed note, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, p. 589.

<sup>53</sup> Adm. Emory S. Land, Chairman of United States Maritime Commission.

<sup>54</sup> Adm. Jean Decoux, Governor General of Indochina and High Commissioner for French Possessions in the Pacific.

In this connection d'Argenlieu<sup>55</sup> recently gave me to understand that he believed the State Department had come to some agreement with Vichy whereby no protection would be given by the United States to French possessions in the Pacific. He inferred that this belief was also shared by General de Gaulle.<sup>56</sup>

MACVITTY

---

851 85/488 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1942—8 p. m.

76. Your telegrams 167, February 2, 6 p. m., and 169, February 2, 8 p. m. You should inform the French Government that this Government is unable to accept any analogy between the accord initialed by Monsieur Henry-Haye and Admiral Land in regard to French tonnage in the United States and the proposed agreement permitting the use of French vessels in Indochina by the Japanese. It will be noted that the vessels in American ports were in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States whereas the proposed arrangement between the French and Japanese Governments deals with vessels in ports of Indochina, a French possession, over which France's sovereign rights still continue to be recognized by this Government at the request of the French Government. Any agreement whatsoever which makes French vessels available for use against this country would, as stated in our previous message, be considered an unfriendly act.

HULL

---

740.0011 Pacific War/1830 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Nouméa (MacVitty)*

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1942—11 p. m.

20. Your no. 17 February 5, 5 p. m. You should promptly assure the High Commissioner that no such agreement between this Government and Vichy as the one mentioned in your telegram under reference exists. We had assumed that by this time he would have received instructions from London to indicate the contrary.

HULL

---

<sup>55</sup> Thierry d'Argenlieu, Free French High Commissioner for the Pacific.

<sup>56</sup> Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the National Committee of the Free French at London.



740.0011 Pacific War/1842a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, February 7, 1942—5 p. m.

82. The recent activities of Admiral Decoux have given rise to the belief that he is proposing active cooperation with the Japanese forces in the Pacific area. The Department has called to the attention of the French Embassy his recent radio broadcasts, his acceptance of a Japanese decoration and his discussions with regard to French ships in Indochina, all calculated to give the impression that he is acting in conjunction with or under Japanese duress. The French Ambassador has informed the Department that he had communicated these representations to his Government.

There is now further evidence that Decoux's collaboration with the Japanese authorities goes all the way from negotiations with regard to food supplies to the possibilities of cooperative effort with the Japanese. You should take an early occasion to inquire on behalf of this Government what action by the French Government is contemplated in that area.

HULL

862 24/573 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, February 9, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received February 10—2:56 a. m.]

214. [For first portion of this telegram dealing with transportation in French ships of materials to Axis forces in North Africa, see page 128.]

I also took up with the Marshal the question of the use by Japan of French ships in Indochina (your 76, February 5, 8 p. m.) which was communicated by note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on February 7. In view of a possibility that the Marshal may not have seen this note, my purpose in discussing this matter orally was to insure his getting a formal statement of my Government that any agreement which will make French vessels in Indochina available for use against the United States will be considered an unfriendly act. Admiral Darlan replied that negotiations with Japan have not been completed and in reply to a specific question as to whether I may inform my Government that France will not agree to the use of its vessels against the United States, he replied that France will not agree to the use of its ships for any military

purpose. He added that of course Japan may seize the ships without the consent of France.

Repeated to Murphy<sup>67</sup> at Casablanca.

LEAHY

851 85/446 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, February 14, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received 5:15 p. m.]

241. The following note, dated February 13, one day subsequent to my delivery of the President's message<sup>68</sup> regarding the use of French shipping in the furtherance of Axis aggression in any theater of war, is quoted as of interest in view of its possible bearing on the entire question of the use of French merchant shipping:

"Mr. Ambassador: By note dated February 7 and in reply to indications contained in the confidential *aide-mémoire* regarding French tonnage in Indochina which was sent to the Embassy of the United States following the *démarche* which you made to Marshal Pétain and myself on February 2, Your Excellency was kind enough to inform me that the Federal Government could not 'accept any analogy between the accord initialed by the French Ambassador at Washington and Admiral Land in regard to French tonnage in the United States and the proposed agreement permitting the use of French vessels in Indochina by the Japanese'. Your Excellency adds that 'The French vessels in American ports were in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States whereas the proposed arrangement between the French and Japanese Governments deals with vessels in ports of Indochina, a French possession, over which France's sovereign rights still continue to be recognized by the Government of the United States at the request of the French Government'.

Your Excellency indicates that the Government of the United States 'considers that any agreement whatsoever which would make French vessels available for use against the United States would be an unfriendly act'.

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that if it is true that the greater part of French tonnage susceptible of being chartered to Japan is in Indochinese ports where French sovereignty has been recognized by the belligerent Governments of the United States and Japan, several ships are lying in ports in occupied China (Shanghai and Macao). Furthermore, French ships actually in Indochinese ports are liable because of the presence of Japanese troops in Indochina of being subjected by these troops to measures

<sup>67</sup> Robert D. Murphy, Counselor of Embassy in France on special mission to French North Africa.

<sup>68</sup> For text of President Roosevelt's message, see telegram No. 88, February 10, 7 p. m., to the Ambassador in France, p. 131.

of restraint against which the military means available to the French Government in that colony allow no opposition.

Furthermore, as it has already been pointed out to Your Excellency the Japanese Government has intimated that, failing an amicable understanding with the French Government, it has decided to proceed to the unilateral chartering for its own account of French merchant ships now in the Far East.

It is because the French Government wishes to avoid such measures of restraint and to safeguard for its own use the maximum number of ships of its merchant fleet, that it agrees to negotiate on this point with the Japanese Government the main lines of which negotiations are already known to the Federal Government. The French Government hopes moreover to obtain at this time the indispensable resumption of traffic between the various ports of Indochina as well as between that possession and Madagascar by means of French vessels controlled by the French Government. It can be assumed in fact that in the event of a breakdown of these negotiations, the Japanese Government would not fail to ensure by its own means traffic between Indochinese ports, which is not in the interest of France.

Faithful to its neutral position, the French Government is none the less endeavoring to obtain from the Japanese Government the guarantee that French ships, chartered to Japan, will be chartered under well defined conditions, which would definitely exclude their military use.

I do not doubt that the above indications will be of a nature fully to reassure Your Excellency and the Federal Government concerning the consequences, as regards the United States, of the negotiations at present in progress between France and Japan in connection with the chartering of French vessels. Accept etc.

Signed Darlan."

LEAHY

---

851.85/451 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, February 19, 1942—noon.

[Received 6:15 p. m.]

258. An informant considered thoroughly reliable has made it possible for us to peruse in the strictest confidence and to make copies of a note dated January 25, 1942 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Embassy containing a counter-proposal for submission to the Japanese Government relative to French shipping in Indochina. While Admiral Darlan on February 9 informed me that negotiations with Japan had not been completed and assured me (Embassy's 214, February 9, 7 p. m.) that France would not agree to the use of these vessels for military purposes, this note nevertheless furnishes an interesting indication of the length to which the French Government is apparently willing

to go in order to satisfy Japanese demands. We have no information as to whether this counter-proposal has proved acceptable to the Japanese Government.

The counter-proposal is made in reply to the Japanese proposal that all French ships of over 4,000 tons in Indochinese ports or at Shanghai should be chartered to the Japanese Government. Briefly summarized, its terms are the following:

1. The French Government agrees to the chartering of the following ships of the French merchant fleet in the Far East to the Japanese Government:

On the Manchukuo-Shanghai-China or Manchukuo-Shanghai-Japan run: *Bougainville* 7110 tons; *Persee* 5795 tons; *Bernardin de Saint Pierre* 10,086 tons; *Leconte de Lisle* 9877 tons.

These ships total 33,000 odd tons. In addition and to meet the Japanese request for a total of 50,000 tons the French Government agrees to charter to Japan the *Maréchal Joffre* of 11,732 tons, believed to be Manila, and the *Sikiang*, 7014 tons. The six vessels, totalling 51,700 tons, would be reserved to traffic benefiting Japan exclusively. They would be chartered in full (*conquenne*) to Japan and would operate with Japanese crew and officers and under the Japanese flag.

(b) [2?] For the Indo-China-Shanghai and Indo-China-Japan run, the French Government would be willing to charter to the Japanese Government the *Aramis* (17,537 tons) and the *D'Artagnan* (15,100 tons) a total of 32,000 odd tons.

Since the Indo-China-Shanghai-Japan traffic is of interest to commercial exchanges with Indo-China, the French Government would like to have the above mentioned vessels operate under a time charter with French officers and crew and under the French flag. The French Government, however, would be willing to agree that the movements of these ships should be controlled by the Japanese authorities while their commercial operation should remain in the hands of French companies. It is further stipulated that the above mentioned ships will engage only in purely commercial traffic to the exclusion of troops and material or contraband of war.

The remainder of the note refers to three vessels of over 4000 tons to be placed on the Saigon, Haiphong and Indo-China runs respectively and concludes with clauses providing for the safeguarding, operation, payment, eventual return and replacement of these vessels.

The agreement is for a period of 6 months and is automatically renewable for further periods of 6 months unless 1 month's previous notice of denunciation is given. The agreement would also come to an end 1 month after an armistice signed between the Japanese

Government and the Anglo-Saxon Governments. The note requests the Japanese Embassy to inform the Foreign Office whether the foregoing proposals meet with the approval of the Japanese Government and concludes with the statement that these proposals represent the maximum concessions which the French Government is prepared to make.

Copies of the note being forwarded by air mail.

This proposal of the French Government if it has been or should be accepted by Japan would appear to being [*be in?*] direct opposition to the demand made by the President in his message to the Marshal (your 88, February 10, 7 p. m.<sup>59</sup>) that French ships will not be used by Italy, Germany, and Japan "in the furtherance of their acts of aggression in any theater of war whatever".

LEAHY

---

851.85/490 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, April 2, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 4:55 p. m.]

490. Reference Department's 76, February 5, 8 p. m. The Foreign Office official handling matters connected with French shipping in Indochina requested us to call urgently this morning. He confirmed that negotiations between the French and Japanese authorities, conducted through the Governor General of Indochina, had been in progress for some time but that no definite solution had as yet been arrived at. Yesterday the Japanese Embassy in Vichy had informed the Foreign Office that unless a solution could be reached by April 5, the Japanese Government intended to seize for its own use the entire 100,000 tons of French shipping now in Indo-chinese and other Far Eastern ports. The official said that in view of this situation, the French Government intended to offer the Japanese Government a solution what he described as "local agreement" as opposed to "governmental agreement". According to this local agreement, the French authorities at Hanoi would be instructed to try to persuade the Japanese to accept the following proposal:

Of the available 100,000 tons of French shipping in Far Eastern waters the French Government would agree.

(1) To barter to the Japanese Government 59,000 tons composed chiefly of the larger vessels and 7,000 tons of smaller shipping now in Indo-Chinese and the Far Eastern ports for traffic on the Shanghai-Manila-Japan run but not to Manchukuo ports;

---

<sup>59</sup> *Ante*, p. 131.

- (2) These ships would not transport war material or troops;
- (3) These ships would operate with French captains and crews and would fly the French flag;
- (4) An additional 20,000 tons of French shipping would be chartered to the Japanese Government under the same conditions enumerated above but with the right given to the French Government to operate them on the Indochina-Madagascar run;
- (5) The remaining 14,000 tons composed chiefly of smaller vessels would remain to France and would be operated in the Indochina coastwise trade.

The official expressed the hope that the conclusion of such a "local agreement" if acceptable to the Japanese (which he considered doubtful) would not be construed by the United States Government as "an unfriendly act" and as "making French vessels available for use against the United States".

He emphasized the urgency of the matter and added that the French Government was naturally anxious to endeavor to prevent by all means at its disposal the seizure of all French merchant shipping in the Far East. He felt that the proposed "local agreement" was under the circumstances the only solution possible.

Subsequently the Embassy received a visit from another official in the same Department whose attitude has always proved helpful and friendly in the past. After confirming the situation outlined above he remarked that he felt that the United States would have to weigh carefully the pros and cons of such a proposed "local agreement" which if put into operation would free a considerable number of Japanese merchant seamen for other duties while permitting a commercial traffic advantageous to Japan. On the other hand, a failure to come to terms with the Japanese would almost certainly lead to the immediate seizure by Japan of the entire 100,000 tons of French shipping involved.

He offered in the strictest confidence and as his personal opinion that it would be advisable for our Government to protest energetically and immediately on grounds of neutrality against any such agreement.

LEAHY

---

851.85/490 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1942—5 p. m.

229. Your 490, April 2, 3 p. m. We have taken note of the information relating to the proposed "local agreement" with regard to the use of French ships in Indochinese and other Far Eastern ports by the Japanese Government.

We cannot accept the argument that any "local agreement" absolves the French Government from its responsibility with regard to ships in its own territorial waters and would consider any such arrangement as constituting the agreed delivery of French vessels to the Japanese for their military ends, since it would mean that French vessels will be used with the consent of the French Government against the United States. In particular, any service operating vessels between Japanese controlled ports and Madagascar could not be considered in conformity with the assurances given by the French Government concerning the extension of any foreign influence as regards Madagascar, and moreover operation of such a service would further undermine French security. You should inform the French Government accordingly.

WELLES

---

851.85/494 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, April 7, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received 9:17 p. m.]

512. The purport of Department's 229 of April 3, 5 p. m. was communicated to the Foreign Office which in a note dated April 6, 1942, has replied as follows:

"Referring to the note from the Embassy of the United States dated April 4, 1942, relating to the use by the Japanese Government of French ships in Far Eastern ports, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to communicate the following to the Embassy:

(1) The French Government was careful as soon as it was informed of the objections put forward by the United States (conversation between Mr. Atherton<sup>60</sup> and M. Henry-Haye on January 31, 1942<sup>61</sup>) opposing the Japanese charter demand to inform the Embassy of the United States and the Department of State of the proposed solutions. The Ministry in particular stressed (*aide-mémoire* and note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Embassy of the United States dated February 2 and February 13, 1942, respectively<sup>62</sup>) that in order to take these objections into consideration it would do its best to obtain the consent of Japan that the ships liable to be chartered to that power should not be used for military purposes.

Despite the fact that the communication of February 13 received no answer from the Federal Government the French Government did not fail to follow these lines in these negotiations and obtained

---

<sup>60</sup> Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

<sup>61</sup> No record of conversation found in Department files.

<sup>62</sup> For texts of *aide-mémoire* and note, see Embassy's telegrams No. 169, February 2, 8 p. m., and No. 241, February 14, 10 a. m., respectively, pp. 673 and 677.

from Japan the formal promise to utilize those French ships which might be put at its disposal only for purely commercial transport and on strictly limited itineraries.

Faced by the Tokyo Government with the necessity of proceeding to a conclusion embodying these guarantees—failing which unilateral measures would be taken by the Japanese—the French Government took the initiative on April 2 of informing the Embassy of the United States of the proposed provisions.<sup>63</sup>

(2) In its note of 543, 1942,<sup>64</sup> the Embassy of the United States stressed that 'any agreement whatsoever which would make French ships available for use against the United States would be an unfriendly act'.

From the indications given in paragraph (1) above it is apparent beyond contention that none of these French vessels, the charter of which is at present planned, could be 'made available for use against the United States'.

(3) The French Government was therefore very much surprised to see that the note delivered on April 4 in reply to its *démarche* of April 2 which was made on its own initiative by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Embassy is in opposition to the proposed Franco-Japanese agreement and considers it 'as constituting the agreed delivery of French vessels to Japan for their military ends'.

(4) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot share this viewpoint which furthermore is not in agreement with that set forth in the Embassy's note of February 7. It considers on the contrary that for the reasons set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 above the modalities of the Franco-Japanese proposed agreement are of such a nature as to deprive it of all character of military assistance. Furthermore it believes it necessary to call the attention of the Embassy to the fact that these modalities present as regards the United States far less serious drawbacks than might result from unilateral measures to which failing the conclusion of an agreement the Japanese authorities might be induced to proceed.

As a matter of fact the conclusion of an agreement such as is at present planned:

(a) excludes all military use of vessels chartered to Japan and permits the limitation of their itineraries to the Indochina-Shanghai-Japan run only;

(b) leaves at the disposition of the French authorities in Indochina a large part of French tonnage at present in the Far East.

On the other hand the unilateral seizure by Japan of the French Fleet would permit the Japanese authorities:

(a) to make use of the total tonnage of this merchant fleet;

(b) to use it for all operations which they may consider necessary (including the transport of troops, of material of war and the conversion of these ships into auxiliary cruisers) that is

<sup>63</sup> See telegram No. 490, April 2, 3 p. m., from the Ambassador in France p. 680.

<sup>64</sup> This phrase may be garbled.



to say for military purposes as such against the Armed Forces of the United States. The Federal Government under such circumstances could not avoid the consequences which the French Government was able to avoid by negotiation with the Tokyo Government—that is to say the ‘delivery of French vessels to Japan for the military ends of that power’ against the delivery of which the Embassy’s note of April 4 is in specific opposition.

(5) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs believes it necessary to point out to the Embassy that in addition to these grave consequences for the United States, the seizure by Japan of the French merchant fleet in the Far East will have a serious effect on the sovereignty and political prestige of France in Indochina. Effected in a territory where this sovereignty has been recognized by Japan, a seizure of this kind, which is contrary to the basic element of national heritage, runs the risk of establishing a precedent for similar measures which might affect other elements of such a heritage (mines, industrial enterprises, banks, et cetera) which the French Government is anxious to safeguard to its utmost.

(6) It appears consequently that by persisting in considering the proposed agreement in the light of a measure of assistance against the United States and in forcing the French Government to forego any arrangement calculated to limit Japanese domination over the French merchant marine, the American Government assumes a responsibility for which it must be fully conscious.

(7) If therefore the Government of the United States finds it necessary to maintain its point of view despite the foregoing arguments, the French Government could only resign itself thereto provided it could be assured of adequate compensation for Japanese unilateral measures. Consequently and in the event that the French Government, owing to the opposition of the United States, should be kept from carrying out the Franco-Japanese charter negotiations, and in the event that this should result in the seizure of French ships in the Far East by the Japanese authorities, it would be essential for the Federal Government to place at the disposal of the French authorities an equivalent amount of tonnage through the release of French ships captured by Great Britain or, failing this, by the return, to a French port, of ships at present immobilized in the West Indies.”

The *aide-mémoire* and the note referred to in the above paragraph numbered 1 were transmitted in our telegrams Nos. 169, February 2, 8 p. m. and 241, February 14, 11 [10] a. m.

LEAHY

---

851.85/494 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1942—5 p. m.

245. Your 512, April 7, 8 p. m. Department cannot accept reasons stated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in an attempted justifica-

tion of its proposed action in making French ships available to the Japanese Government.

The statement that the vessels would be used for purely commercial purposes, even if true, wholly ignores the fact that they will be of tremendous assistance in the Japanese war effort, and would serve to release other vessels for more direct use against the United States. The modalities of the proposed arrangement, stressed by the Ministry, cannot deprive it of the character of direct military assistance.

The position of the Ministry is premised on the proposition that the alternative to a charter agreement might be a seizure of the French merchant fleet, which it is stated would have a serious effect on the sovereignty and political prestige of France in Indo-China and establish a precedent which the French Government is anxious to avoid. To avoid such a precedent the Ministry proposes to create another that would be equally bad and asks us to acquiesce. This we cannot do. The sovereignty and prestige of the French Government can, in the opinion of the United States, best be maintained by the taking of a firm stand on the basis of its sovereign rights and international law.

The United States is even more surprised that the Ministry should suggest that if the vessels should be seized by the Japanese Government the United States should make available to France an equivalent amount of tonnage—in other words, that the United States should compensate France for the illegal acts of Japan in her war effort against this country. The mere statement of the proposition demonstrates its absurdity. It would be more in keeping with the logic of the situation if France should offer to the United States tonnage equivalent to that which she proposes to make available to Japan or which the latter might seize. This Government hopes that it will not be forced to take this position.

Rights of the United States as a belligerent are directly involved and it must insist upon those rights.

In brief, what the United States expects, and is entitled to insist upon, is that France shall maintain by every means at her command a neutral attitude and shall not endeavor to find means of assisting our enemies who have demonstrated no greater respect for France than for ourselves.

You will please deliver a formal communication to the Foreign Office in the sense of the foregoing.

WELLES

851.85/499 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, April 27, 1942—noon.

[Received 12:47 p. m.]

617. Department's 245, April 10, 5 p. m. and previous. The following is a translation of a note dated April 27 received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs relating to French shipping in the Far East:

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to inform the Embassy of the United States that following the exchange of views which took place with the Embassy concerning the use by Japan of French merchant shipping at present in the Far East the Japanese Naval authorities have seized the greater part of these vessels.

In bringing the foregoing to the knowledge of the Embassy of the United States the Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out the large degree of responsibility incurred by the Government of the United States for the harm which has thus been caused to the French merchant marine."

The Foreign Office official who delivered this note informed us that the Japanese naval authorities were taking over approximately 90,000 tons of French merchant shipping and that he believed that the remaining 10,000 tons would be retained by the French authorities for use in coastwise trade between Indochinese ports.

LEAHY

851.85/499 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1942—6 p. m.

300. Your 617, April 27, noon. In acknowledging the receipt of the note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs you should state that this Government is unable to understand why the French Government should even suggest that the Government of the United States is in anywise responsible for the harm that has been caused the French Merchant Marine by the arbitrary acts of the Japanese Government in seizing French shipping.

The French Government requested that the United States should acquiesce in an unwarrantable arrangement between it and the Japanese Government in the hope of placating that Government and giving direct aid to the Japanese Government in its war effort against the United States. For the United States to have assented to the proposed arrangement would have amounted to a waiver of its belligerent rights in the situation—an unconscionable thing to

expect. The complaint of the French Government should be directed to the Japanese rather than to this Government.

HULL

---

**POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING THE PROTECTION OF  
FRENCH ISLAND POSSESSIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND INDIAN  
OCEANS; BRITISH OCCUPATION OF MADAGASCAR**

851.0144/1-2342

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the  
Division of European Affairs (Atherton)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 23, 1942.

The French Ambassador<sup>65</sup> called on me by appointment. In the course of his remarks he touched upon the Islands of Madagascar and Réunion. I made a point at the end of our conversation to speak to him alone. I referred to previous conversations in which he had explained the difficulty of the French position in Indochina<sup>66</sup> and said his further reference to Madagascar made me wish to bring his particular attention to recent assurances<sup>67</sup> that had been given to Vichy as the policy of the United States in maintaining the integrity of the French Empire and its eventual return in full sovereignty to the French people. Since this was our stated object I felt he should keep this in mind in any interpretations he might put upon contemplated French action. I knew he would deplore as much as I would any one group of Frenchmen fighting any other group of Frenchmen, since the eventual policy of either side was undoubtedly the same in looking toward the final integrity of the French Empire. Likewise, any group of Frenchmen that under Axis duress were attempting to thwart the integrity of the French Empire were not only defeating their own interest but were counter-acting the powerful support the United States had already volunteered to the same ends. I then referred to my particular point lest the appointment of Governor Decoux<sup>68</sup> as High Commissioner might stimulate him, with Japanese support, to extend his influences into French Oceania or even as far afield as Réunion and Madagascar. I referred to the alleged Saigon radio communication with the Island of Wallis and said I trusted this was not in any way an attempt by the Japanese to use French facilities to their own ends.

---

<sup>65</sup> Gaston Henry-Haye.

<sup>66</sup> See pp. 671 ff.

<sup>67</sup> See memorandum by Mr. Samuel Reber of the Division of European Affairs, dated January 12, p. 502.

<sup>68</sup> Adm. Jean Decoux, French Governor General for Indochina and High Commissioner for French possessions in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

The French Ambassador said he was not prepared right away to raise this matter with his Government as coming from the State Department but he would look into such information as was available to them and raise the question again with the idea at a later date of letting Vichy know we were following this situation. In the meantime, he could assure me that he personally was in full sympathy with the views I had expressed. Further, he undertook on his own initiative to emphasize with his Government the importance of maintaining the present *status quo* of French possessions in the Pacific.

---

851L.20/15

*The Free French High Commissioner for the Pacific (d'Argenlieu)  
to the Secretary of State*

[Translation <sup>a</sup>]

NOUMÉA, January 28, 1942.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: I have the honour to introduce the bearer of this letter, Mr. Maurice Schwob, Attaché to my Civilian Cabinet.

I have asked Mr. Schwob to inform you personally of the assistance which I believe it is absolutely essential that we obtain immediately from your Government to insure the defence of the French possessions in the Pacific, especially New Caledonia, and the problem of supplying their civilian and military requirements.

New Caledonia is participating to its fullest extent and with all its energy to supplying the United States with Nickel and Chrome, products essential to their armament program.

It is my hope that while constantly increasing the production of these minerals, we can protect these sources of supply against any attack.

But I must have the wherewithal.

I have, of course, taken all precautions to eventually destroy and render useless to the enemy all existing installations: nickel refining factories, mines, docks, etc.

These measures will be taken immediately in the event of Japanese troops or other non-allied troops landing on the island.

However, I think it preferable from all points of view that we defend and keep that which we possess.

I am happy to be able to assure you that not only the troops under my command, but also the civilian population of New Caledonia are prepared to endure all rather than surrender.

---

<sup>a</sup> The translation and original of this message were left at the Department by Mr. Schwob on March 13, 1942.

But, in order to maintain this high morale, and to make their defence effective, they must see that the necessary armaments are provided.

The Fate of the French Possessions in the Pacific is in your hands.

Persuaded of the interest you will not fail to take in our situation, and thanking you for the reception which you have been kind enough to grant to my representative, I remain [etc.]

THIERRY D'ARGENLIEU  
*High Commissioner of France  
 for the Pacific*

---

740.00115 Pacific War/179 : Telegram

*The Consul at Nouméa (MacVitty) to the Secretary of State*

NOUMÉA, February 17, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received February 17—9:50 a. m.]

22. The High Commissioner, in connection with the probable defence of New Caledonia by United States forces, requests that he be assured that the American Government recognizes that French sovereignty of the French Pacific possession is exercised by General de Gaulle's<sup>70</sup> Comité National Français. Also whether an attack by Vichy adherents from Indochina in joint action with the Japanese would be resisted by the American forces.

MACVITTY

---

740.00115 Pacific War/179 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Nouméa (MacVitty)*

WASHINGTON, February 19, 1942—6 p. m.

29. Your 22, February 17, 5 p. m. You may inform the High Commissioner that in all matters relating to the defense of New Caledonia this Government is prepared to recognize that the French National Committee has authority over the Island and deals with the representatives of General de Gaulle in all matters relating to its defense.

You may also inform the High Commissioner that this Government has warned the Government of Vichy against taking any action in these colonies which might give the appearance of acting under Japanese duress.<sup>71</sup>

HULL

---

<sup>70</sup> Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the National Committee of the Free French at London.

<sup>71</sup> See memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs, January 23, p. 687.

740.0011 Pacific War/1980

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Samuel Reber of the  
Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] February 22, 1942.

Participants: Mr. Tixier, Free French Delegate  
Mr. Boegner, Member of Free French Delegation  
Gen. Robert Crawford, War Plans Division, War Dept.  
Col. Stevens, United States Army  
Mr. Atherton  
Mr. Reber

Mr. Tixier called urgently, at his request, to say that he had received a telegram from General de Gaulle in which the latter asked that assurances be obtained from this Government in respect of the following:

"1. The authority of the National Committee over our possessions in the Pacific—New Hebrides, New Caledonia, Oceania—should be explicitly recognized.

"2. The High Command of the Allied Forces cooperating in *direct defense* of our possessions should be in the hands of the Admiral, who would thus be integrated within the frame work of the Pacific Interallied High Command.

"3. The (?) base should eventually be in the command of American officers under the Admiral's high authority."

With regard to the first point, Mr. Atherton stated that the authority of the French National Committee over French possessions in the Pacific had been recognized by this Government as Mr. Tixier was aware and the American Consul in Nouméa had been instructed<sup>12</sup> so to inform the High Commissioner, d'Argenlieu. Mr. Tixier felt, nevertheless, that it would be most important that a public statement should be issued to this effect in as much as Admiral Decoux in Indo-China was making use of his recent appointment as Vichy High Commissioner for French Possessions in the Pacific to demonstrate that Vichy authority in the Pacific Islands had been recognized by the United States.

With regard to the High Command of the Allied forces in the Pacific, Mr. Tixier explained that the High Commissioner had, several months ago, urgently requested ammunition and personnel for the defense of the islands. He had been informed that defense forces were on their way but was without information regarding the command of these forces. General de Gaulle was insistent that

<sup>12</sup> See telegram dated February 23, 4 p. m., *infra*; this telegram was originally dated February 22.

High Commissioner d'Argenlieu should have direct command of forces in the French Islands. General Crawford explained that no Pacific Interallied High Command had been organized. The French Islands were located in the Pacific area which was under the command of the American Naval C. in C. He considered that it was necessary that the High Commissioner discuss this question directly with General Emmons who is in command of the United States land forces in that area or with the naval Commander-in-Chief. The unity of command between the various forces operating in that area has not yet been integrated and it is felt that integration should take place between the commands. Mr. Tixier insisted upon the urgency of the situation in view of the immediate threat to the islands.

With regard to the High Commissioner's authority over the local bases, General Crawford stated he felt that this would be acceptable in line with the general procedure which had been followed in similar cases.<sup>72a</sup>

. . . . .

---

711.51/205a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Nouméa (MacVitty)*

WASHINGTON, February 23, 1942—4 p. m.

31. You are requested immediately to call upon the High Commissioner to make the following statement in the name of the United States Government.

"The policy of the Government of the United States as regards France and French territory has been based upon the maintenance of the integrity of France and of the French Empire and of the eventual restoration of the complete independence of all French territories. Mindful of its traditional friendship for France, this Government deeply sympathizes not only with the desire of the French people to maintain their territories intact but with the efforts of the French people to continue to resist the forces of aggression. In its relations with the local French authorities in French territories the United States has been and will continue to be governed by the manifest effectiveness with which those authorities endeavor to protect their territories from domination and control by the common enemy.

---

<sup>72a</sup> By correspondence in December 1941 and January 1942 between the Free French Delegate (Tixier) and the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton), general agreement was reached for use by U. S. military and naval authorities of an air field on New Caledonia and a naval base on Bora-Bora. Details of the arrangements for these and other bases, if needed, were to be made by agreements with the local authorities. Correspondence not printed. (File 811.34551 L)



With the French authorities in effective control of French territories in the Pacific this Government has treated and will continue to treat on the basis of their actual administration of the territories involved. This Government recognizes, in particular, that French island possessions in that area are under the effective control of the French National Committee established in London and the United States authorities are cooperating for the defense of these islands with the authorities established by the French National Committee and with no other French authority. This Government appreciates the importance of New Caledonia in the defense of the Pacific area."

You may leave a copy of this statement with the High Commissioner for whatever use he may desire to make of it. The Free French delegate in Washington, who has also received a copy, has been asked to arrange that no publicity be given to the statement either here or in London until after it has been made public in New Caledonia.<sup>73</sup>

WELLES

---

851L 01/12 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, March 3, 1942—9 p. m.

[Received March 4—1:22 p. m.]

331. We saw Rochat<sup>74</sup> by appointment this afternoon who stated that the French Embassy in Washington had telegraphed the text of the announcement made public by the High Commissioner of New Caledonia on February 28 which he said coincided almost exactly with the text as published in our Radio Bulletin 51, of March 2.

While he had as yet received no reply to telegraphic requests for clarification sent yesterday and today to Henry-Haye, Rochat said that for the time being—and in the absence of further information—he felt that our Government's decision as to New Caledonia was "a serious one".

Rochat added that he was at loss to understand the meaning of the words as published in the Bulletin "and the United States authorities are combining for the defense of these islands with the authorities established by the French National Committee and with no other French authority".

---

<sup>73</sup> The text of this statement was made public by the High Commissioner of New Caledonia on February 28, 1942; for press release issued by the Department of State March 2, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 7, 1942, p. 208.

<sup>74</sup> Charles Antoine Rochat, Secretary General of the French Foreign Office.

He remarked with some emphasis that there is only one "authority" with which the United States Government can maintain relations and that is the Government of Marshal Pétain,<sup>75</sup> and if any decision is to be taken with regard to defense measures involving French territorial possessions in no matter what theater of war, it can only be taken after consultation with the Pétain Government. He therefore expressed the hope that our Government would without delay make known its reasons for a decision of so serious a nature.

Rochat was informed that we had as yet received no information regarding the matter other than that contained in our Radio Bulletin but that we would be glad to convey his Government's point of view to the Department.

LEAHY

---

851L 01/12 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)*

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1942—noon.

151. Your 331 March 3, 9:00 p. m. In a conversation in the Department on January 23,<sup>76</sup> the French Ambassador was urged to inform his Government that from reports reaching here the activities of Admiral Decoux were being interpreted as "in conjunction with or under Japanese duress", and that the situation thereby created must influence the considerations of policy of this Government.

It was obvious, therefore, that any attempt to cooperate for the defense of French possessions in the Pacific area must be with the local authorities who were also resisting Japanese aggression. Coincidentally, it was, in the opinion of this Government, useless to discuss with the Government at Vichy military measures of protection as to areas under which that Government had no control.

Accordingly, on February 28, the American Consul at Nouméa was authorized to make an official statement<sup>77</sup> as to the attitude of this Government, which was transmitted in the "Radio Bulletin" of March 2.

Although the entire text should be clearly understood by the Vichy Government, its attention should be called specifically to the first paragraph defining the policy of this Government and particularly to the sentence reading "Mindful of its traditional friend-

---

<sup>75</sup> Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, French Chief of State.

<sup>76</sup> See memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs, January 23, p. 687.

<sup>77</sup> See footnote 73, p. 692.

ship for France, this Government deeply sympathizes not only with the desire of the French people to maintain their territories intact but with the efforts of the French people to continue to resist the forces of aggression".

WELLES

851L.01/24

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] March 5, 1942.

The French Ambassador called to see me this morning at his request.

The Ambassador read to me a telegraphic instruction he had received from his Government instructing him to protest to this Government regarding the statement issued in New Caledonia which made it clear that the United States would only deal with the authorities in effective control of the French islands in the Pacific. The instruction he had received contained a portion of a statement issued by the Free French Committee in London which alleged that the action of the United States constituted recognition of the Free French Committee in so far as the Pacific was concerned and his instruction also contained a portion of a British Broadcasting Company announcement which further alleged that letters had been exchanged between the American Consul in New Caledonia and the Free French High Commissioner there which constituted formal recognition by the United States of those authorities.

I said to the Ambassador that I could not accept the protest. I stated that neither the Free French Committee in London nor the British Broadcasting Company were authorized to speak for the United States. I said that the official communiqué issued here in the State Department containing the text of the statement made in New Caledonia was the sole official statement issued by this Government on the subject and that that statement spoke for itself.

I then took up one by one the points mentioned in the Department's telegram of March 4 [5] to Ambassador Leahy in clarification of the policy of this Government and of the views of this Government with regard to the situation in the French islands in the Pacific. I emphasized that the policy of this Government up to the present time and at this time was a policy of recognizing the right of the French people to maintain intact French territory. I said it seemed to me it must be obvious to the Ambassador that the best way of keeping French territory out of Axis hands was not to create dissidence within the French populations resident in French territories, but rather to encourage the French people to

pull together and to unite wherever it was possible in order to resist Axis aggression. I stressed the fact that this Government was engaged in an all out war effort. It was inconceivable that the Vichy Government would expect us to discuss with it arrangements covering military and naval cooperation with the French in French islands in the Pacific over which the Vichy Government had no control whatever and much less to discuss these questions with the French Commissioner in Indochina who was engaged in a policy of all out and open collaboration with the Japanese.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

740.0011 Pacific War/2329

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] March 11, 1942.

The French Ambassador called to see me at his request.

The Ambassador said that his task would be greatly lightened if some official and public statement could be made by this Government explaining that its attitude in dealing with the Free French authorities in the Pacific in no way affected its recognition of the sovereignty of France over the French possessions in the Pacific. I asked the Ambassador what he had in mind. He thereupon handed me the draft attached herewith.<sup>78</sup> He said this draft was not satisfactory to him but that it indicated in a rough way what he believed would be desirable. It was evident from the way the Ambassador spoke that he had received peremptory instructions from his Government to request this Government to make such a declaration. I said that consideration would be given to this request. The Ambassador asked if he could inform his Government that we viewed the request sympathetically. I replied that what I had said was that the matter "would be given consideration" and that he was not authorized to say any more than that.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

740.0011 Pacific War/2112 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, March 12, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 3:51 p. m.]

376. In the course of our conversation with Rochat on March 10 we asked him whether there had been any developments in connec-

---

<sup>78</sup> Not printed.

tion with Madagascar stating that the matter had been receiving considerable attention in the American press.

Rochat said that he could give us his formal assurance that there had been no developments whatsoever and that neither the Japanese nor the Germans had made any suggestions to the French Government with regard to the use of Madagascar as a base.

He said that as of possible interest to us the French Ministry of Colonies had instructed the Governor General of Madagascar <sup>78a</sup> to conduct an investigation in regard to possible Japanese subversive activity on the island and a report had been received from that official that there were only two Japanese residing there and that there was no espionage activity.

LEAHY

---

740 0011 Pacific War/2136 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Tananarive (Carter) to the  
Secretary of State*

TANANARIVE, March 14, 1942.

[Received March 16—9:56 a. m.]

8. Department's 7, 12th,<sup>79</sup> received today. Late yesterday afternoon I had conversation with Governor General with view to telegraphing Department any pertinent information in consideration of recent radio and press statements concerning Madagascar and Department's inquiries near France and assurances offered by latter.

Governor General confirmed statements accredited to him in cabled press notices from Vichy and in local press the latter reading substantially:

"Returning from a trip in the south where I noticed how much everyone at his post was endeavoring in working calmly to remedy difficulties caused by refraction of economic connections I have just learned of foreign press articles touching the eventual situation of Madagascar in the development of the world conflict.

I declare once more and affirm that there be well understood that Madagascar has but one will, to remain French.

For this she does not need the aid even temporarily of any other nation.

Animated by this will and conscious of its defensive force she will be able to face the case being any menace of aggression from whatever source it may come."

The Governor General confirmed to me the Vichy press statement accredited to him that in Madagascar there were only an old Japanese woman and a Japanese laborer residing in the island and in a

---

<sup>78a</sup> Armand-Prosper Annet.

<sup>79</sup> Not printed.

further conversation this afternoon he declared to me that there was no mission in Madagascar or contemplated or envisaged from Japan or elsewhere and he knew of no plan or anything in view of inviting aid from anyone. The Governor General gave me to understand that if any mission would be contemplated in the future, which he did not envisage, I would be able to know. He reiterated the intention of the island to defend itself against any intervention and a similar statement was made to me several days ago by the Commandant of the Marine at Diego-Suarez when in Tananarive.

I shall endeavor to keep Department informed.

CARTER

---

851L.20/15

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Free French High  
Commissioner for the Pacific (d'Argenlieu)*

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1942.

EXCELLENCY: I have received your communication of January 28, 1942, which was brought by Mr. Maurice Schwob, Attaché of your Civil Cabinet.

I am deeply grateful for the cooperation which Your Excellency has been good enough to give the forces of the United States in their task of organizing defenses in the Pacific which serve the common purpose against the attacks of the aggressor.

Subsequent to the despatch of your communication, however, you are in full possession of information relating to the measures which this Government has taken, and is desirous of taking, for the defense of the territories under your authority. Any further requests for assistance which Mr. Schwob has discussed with the competent military and naval authorities are being given the utmost consideration.

Accept [etc.]

SUMNER WELLES

---

851L.20/16

*The French Ambassador (Henry-Haye) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, April 28, 1942.

The Ambassador of France to the United States presents his compliments to His Excellency the Secretary of State and, referring to the communiqué published on April 25, 1942, by the American War Department with regard to the landing of United States troops on the French Islands of New Caledonia,<sup>80</sup> has the honor to advise

---

<sup>80</sup> An earlier American defense force had arrived in New Caledonia on March 12, 1942.

His Excellency that he has received instructions from his Government to make a formal protest against this step, which constitutes a violation of the rights of sovereignty of France over those islands.

The French Government is of the opinion that no consideration could be invoked for prejudicing its rights.

In her distress France has seen herself deprived of the military means necessary to assure the effective defense of certain of its overseas territories; but conscious of the civilizing rôle which she has played there at the cost of immense efforts and sacrifices, France has remained as confident of her future as proud of her past. Her Government, in addressing this protest to the Federal Government which has on many occasions, affirmed that it intended to respect French sovereignty, also appeals to the ideal of the American people and to the fundamental principles of their history.<sup>81</sup>

Mr. Henry-Haye is happy [etc.]

---

740.0011 Pacific War/2404a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Tuck)*

WASHINGTON, May 4, 1942.

307. Please present the following statement <sup>81a</sup> to Marshal Pétain or M. Laval <sup>82</sup> immediately on receipt of this:

"The President of the United States has been informed that Madagascar has been occupied by British forces.<sup>83</sup> This occupation has the full approval and support of the Government of the United States. The Island of Madagascar presents the definite danger to the United Nations of occupation or use by the Axis Powers, especially Japan. Such occupation by the Axis Powers would constitute a definite and serious danger to the United Nations, in their fight to maintain the kind of civilization to which France and to which the United Nations have been so long accustomed.

"The Government of the United States is at war with the Axis Powers and if it becomes necessary or desirable for American troops or ships to use Madagascar in the common cause, the United States will not hesitate to do so at any time.

"The United States and Great Britain are in accord that Madagascar will, of course, be restored to France after the war or at any time the occupation of Madagascar is no longer essential to the common cause of the United Nations.

"In view of the fact that the Island of Madagascar will be held in trust for France, in order to protect it from attack by any one

---

<sup>81</sup> In a memorandum addressed to the Under Secretary of State and attached to this French note, the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs suggested that no reply seemed to be necessary as the Department's position on the subject had been made clear earlier.

<sup>81a</sup> This statement was released to the press on May 4.

<sup>82</sup> Pierre Laval, French Chief of Government.

<sup>83</sup> British forces landed at Diego-Suarez on May 4, 1942.

of the Axis Powers, any war-like act permitted by the French Government against the Government of Great Britain or the Government of the United States would, of necessity, have to be regarded by the Government of the United States as an attack upon the United Nations as a whole."

HULL

---

740.0011 Pacific War/2405 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, May 5, 1942—noon.

[Received May 5—9:23 a. m.]

661. Department's 308, May 4, 10 p. m.<sup>64</sup> I saw Monsieur Laval this morning at 10:45 and delivered to him the statement contained in the Department's 307 of May 4. Rochat was also present.

M. Laval informed me that he had already been advised of the matter by his Ambassador in Washington and that he wished to take this occasion to formulate the most energetic protest on behalf of the Marshal's Government both against the action taken in Madagascar and against the tenor of the statement which I had delivered to him. He informed me that Madagascar would be defended—in fact was being defended—and he read to me parts of a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief advising that Diego-Suarez had been attacked and that measures of defense had been taken. In this message the Commander-in-Chief expressed his personal loyalty to the French Government and maintained that his sentiments were shared by the inhabitants of the island.

During our interview M. Laval repeated on two occasions that he considered that the declaration contained in the final paragraph of our statement was "fabulous" (*énorme*). The Japanese he said in sending troops to Indochina had at least had the good grace to negotiate and had left the French Government sovereign rights in that colony whereas the United States Government not only judged it sufficient to confront him with a *fait accompli* but warned his Government at the same time that any warlike act on its part would be regarded as an attack upon the United Nations.

In view of the very serious nature of the situation he informed me that I would receive from him today for transmission to my Government a formal protest in writing.

The atmosphere during the meeting while correct was very strained.

TUCK

---

<sup>64</sup> Not printed.



740.0011 Pacific War/2411 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, May 5, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received May 6—1:45 a. m.]

665. Embassy's 661, May 5, noon. Monsieur Laval sent for me this afternoon at 6 o'clock and handed me a note in the third person dated May 5 a translation of which follows:

"In reply to the note delivered today by the Chargé d'Affaires of the United States of America, the French Government formulates the most energetic protest against the aggression to which Madagascar has been subjected by British forces.

It takes note of the assurance that Madagascar will one day be returned to France.

It rejects as inadmissible the pretension of the Government of the United States to forbid France to defend herself when her territory is attacked. The French Government is the only judge of the obligations which its honor imposes upon it. This, moreover, has been rightly understood by the defenders of Madagascar: They have not hesitated, despite their numerical inferiority, to fulfill their duty in accordance with the most noble traditions of French arms.

England has so often since the Armistice shown its hostility towards France that the aggression which it has just committed against Madagascar comes as no surprise to the French Government.

The French Government on the other hand regrets to note that the Government of the United States today approves and supports the British Government and it can but leave to President Roosevelt the share of responsibility which will devolve upon him in war which may result from this aggression."

M. Laval said that before delivering the note to me he had wished to acquaint the Marshal of its contents. He again mentioned his feelings towards the United States which he had expressed at the time of his recent call on Ambassador Leahy and repeated that he desired to commit no unfriendly act against us. This sentiment he thought represented the true feeling of the people of both countries.

TUCK

851W.20/11 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)  
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 7, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received May 7—2:40 p. m.]

2445. In my talks with Eden<sup>85</sup> I went into some detail covering position in relation to Vichy as it related to British interests, ex-

<sup>85</sup> Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

plaining your position and the reasons for it. As a result of our conversations, he is making the following statement in a speech which he will deliver in Edinburgh tomorrow night:

"His Majesty's Government and the United States Government are agreed that the territory of Madagascar remains French and will continue to be part of the French Empire.

In this, as in other aspects of policy towards France, we and the United States Government have been and are in complete accord.

In particular we have been agreed with the policy of the United States Government to maintain contact with the Vichy Government."

He hopes that the statement will help clarify the respective position of our two Governments. The British have been very appreciative of our statement on Madagascar.

WINANT

---

851.01/15184

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The following communiqué was issued in London on the evening of May 13th in agreement with General de Gaulle.

"As has been previously explained the intention of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in undertaking the recent operation in Madagascar was to prevent this territory from being used by the Axis, to preserve it for France and to safeguard French sovereignty. It is the intention of His Majesty's Government that the Free French National Committee should play its due part in the administration of the liberated French territory since the National Committee is cooperating with the United Nations as the representative of fighting France."

WASHINGTON, 15 May, 1942.

---

851.01/8474

*The Delegation of the French National Committee in the United States to the Department of State*<sup>88</sup>

[Translation]

NOTE

At the time of the occupation of Madagascar by the British Forces, it was stated in an official communiqué of the Department of State that the United States and Great Britain were in agreement that Madagascar should be returned to France after the war

---

<sup>88</sup> For an account of the presentation of this note, see p. 636.

or when the occupation would no longer be essential to the Allied cause. At the same time, it was specified that the Island would be administered under trusteeship for France.

Furthermore, the negotiations which have just been carried on at Fort-de-France between the local authorities and Admiral Hoover<sup>87</sup> have also formed the subject of an official communiqué of the Department of State, under the terms of which the Government of the United States would be prepared to guarantee the maintenance of the West Indies under French sovereignty and to recognize Admiral Robert as exercising supreme governmental authority in the French possessions of the Caribbean Sea, if the latter would consent to the conclusion of agreements guaranteeing that the said possessions will not furnish any aid or assistance to the Forces of the Axis.

After taking cognizance of the above-mentioned statements, the French National Committee has given its Delegation in the United States instructions to submit to the Department of State the following observations:

1. Immediately after the Armistice of June 1940, General de Gaulle, Chief of the Free French, organized the Free French Forces for the purpose of continuing the fight against the Axis Powers at the side of the Allies.

After its establishment in 1941, the French National Committee publicly affirmed that the main purpose of its action was to unite the largest possible number of French citizens and French territories in the fight against the Axis Powers at the side of the Allies and to see that our country plays a part in the victory of the United Nations which will liberate France and its Empire and which will return their sovereignty to the French people.

2. For the realization of these aims, the French National Committee and its Head, General de Gaulle, feel themselves to be in complete accord with the large majority of the French people who every day reaffirm their will to continue the fight at the side of the United Nations by all the means which they have at their disposal. This resistance of the French people is manifested in Occupied and Unoccupied France by more and more frequent acts in the commission of which they daily risk their lives and their liberty in the fight against the Axis Powers.

3. The Free French Land, Sea and Air Forces, which are *de facto* allies of the United States, and the Free French territories do not recognize any supreme authority other than General de Gaulle and the French National Committee.

4. The French National Committee deems that it is the duty of the United Nations, in the interest of the common cause, not to place any obstacle in the way of the re-entry of French citizens and French territories into the war.

---

<sup>87</sup> Adm. John H. Hoover, U. S. Commander of the Caribbean Sea Front.

Likewise, it is to the interest of the United Nations that French participation in the war be under a single French authority which can be only that of the French National Committee and its Head, General de Gaulle.

5. The French National Committee is of the opinion that the occupation and administration of French territories by foreign forces or authorities, as well as any agreements concluded with local authorities which neutralize French territories and put them out of the war, can only discourage the spirit of resistance in France and delay the time when all French territories, both Metropolitan France and the Empire, may take part with the maximum effectiveness in the fight against the Axis Powers.

Such occupations by foreign forces without cooperation with the Free French Forces and such agreements for the neutralization of French territories are exploited by the Vichy Government and by the governments of the Axis Powers and risk causing the dislocation of the French Empire and instilling doubts in the minds of the French people concerning the future of France.

6. Consequently, the French National Committee, in the common interest of France and the United Nations, thinks:

That the operations for the liberation of the French territories should be carried out in cooperation with the Free French Forces;

That the administration of the liberated territories should be entrusted to the French National Committee, the only authority qualified to direct French resistance until the French people are in a position to choose their representatives freely.

The French National Committee sincerely hopes that the Government of the United States will declare itself in agreement with the foregoing ideas and principles and will facilitate their application in the various French territories, and, particularly, in the French possessions located on the American Continent.

MAY 18, 1942.

---

851W.20/28

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*<sup>88</sup>

On August 12th the British Embassy communicated an *Aide-Mémoire* to the State Department<sup>89</sup> containing the latest information regarding the situation in Madagascar.

Lord Halifax<sup>90</sup> has now been instructed to inform the Secretary of State for his most secret information that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have come to the conclusion that no useful purpose will be served by further attempts to reach a *modus vivendi* in Madagascar through negotiation with the Gov-

---

<sup>88</sup> Handed to the Secretary of State by the British Ambassador on August 24.

<sup>89</sup> Not printed.

<sup>90</sup> British Ambassador in the United States.

ernor-General. It is clear that the Governor-General is unwilling to take action without authority of the Vichy Government and that the latter will accept no settlement likely to cause them trouble with the Germans. There is thus no hope of obtaining by peaceful means adequate safeguards against future Axis penetration.

In these circumstances His Majesty's Government have decided to undertake further harassing operations in Madagascar with a view to extending their occupation over the whole Island. The date of the operation is imminent.

His Majesty's Government's intention is that the French National Committee should take over the civil administration of Madagascar as soon as possible after the conclusion of operations. The defence of the Island would be a British responsibility. Diego Suarez and possibly other strategic areas would remain under direct British military control. In order to avoid the risk of strengthening resistance nothing will be published for the time being about the further role of the Fighting French in Madagascar. No Free French troops will take part in the operations.

Nothing will be said to the Fighting French about the operations until a few hours before zero hour when General de Gaulle will be informed of the plans in strictest confidence. He will be told of His Majesty's Government's intention to associate the Fighting French with the administration of Madagascar and will be asked to have someone ready to assume the functions of the Governor-General as soon as the general military situation permits. His Majesty's Government will suggest that General Legentilhomme<sup>91</sup> might well be appointed for the purpose. His Majesty's Government will also explain to General de Gaulle why they are postponing any public mention of the future role of the Fighting French in Madagascar.

As soon as the operations have begun His Majesty's Government propose to issue a declaration explaining their action, the provisional draft outline of which is attached.<sup>92</sup>

In communicating the foregoing to Mr. Hull for his most secret information, the British Embassy has been instructed to express the hope that the United States Government will be prepared, as in the case of the operations against Diego Suarez, to issue a simultaneous statement on their account indicating that His Majesty's Government have acted with their entire approval.

AUGUST 24, 1942.

---

<sup>91</sup> Gen. Paul Legentilhomme, Free French National Commissioner for War.

<sup>92</sup> Not printed.

851W.20/33

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, September 2, 1942.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: You will remember that when I saw you on August 24th and handed you an *aide-mémoire* about the situation in Madagascar, I explained that the British Government very much hoped that the United States Government would be prepared, as in the case of the earlier operations against Diego Suarez, to issue a statement on their own account indicating that the British Government had acted with their entire approval. You were good enough to say that you would have this proposal examined.

I should be very grateful to know what decision you have reached in the matter. If, as I hope, the United States Government feel that they can issue such a statement,<sup>93</sup> then I would suggest that it would be convenient if this were to be made public in Washington at the same time as the British declaration, the text<sup>94</sup> of which was attached to my *aide-mémoire* of August 24th, is published in London. From a telegram which I have just received from the Foreign Office, I gather that the publication of the British declaration is likely to take place fairly soon.

Believe me [etc.]

HALIFAX

851W 20/34

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1942.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have had another telegram from the Foreign Office with reference to the question of Madagascar about which I wrote to you on September 2nd. In the *aide-mémoire* which I left with you on August 24th it was stated that the British Government's intention was that the French National Committee should take over the civil administration of the island as soon as possible after the conclusion of the military operations, but that it was not proposed to say anything to the Fighting French authorities until very shortly before the start of these operations. I have now been asked to let you know for your most secret information that the question of the participation of the Fighting French in the administration of Madagascar has been affected by General de Gaulle's recent embarrassing behaviour in Syria.<sup>95</sup> Until the Syrian situation

<sup>93</sup> For Department's statement of approval issued on September 10, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 12, 1942, p. 750.

<sup>94</sup> Not printed.

<sup>95</sup> See vol. iv, section under Syria and Lebanon entitled "Concern of the United States regarding British-Free French differences in Syria and Lebanon; attempts to effect settlement."

is satisfactorily cleared up, the British Government do not propose to commit themselves to General de Gaulle to allow the Fighting French to assume the administration of Madagascar. The British authorities are considering whether in these circumstances they should still give the General advance warning of the impending military operations, and if so, what if anything they should say to him about the question of the administration of the island. As soon as a decision on these points has been taken, the Foreign Office will telegraph again to the Embassy.

In another telegram from the Foreign Office, Mr. Eden emphasises once again how anxious the British Government are that the United States Government should issue at the appropriate moment some statement on the lines of the very helpful announcement which they made at the outset of operations against Diego Suarez early in May. I very much hope that the United States Government will feel able to take action in this sense, and should be very grateful to be informed as soon as possible of the decision which they reach in the matter.

Believe me [etc.]

HALIFAX

---

851W.20/35

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1942.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In my letter of September 4th I told you that the British authorities were considering whether, in view of the difficulties which had arisen with General de Gaulle in Syria, they should give him advance warning of the impending operations in Madagascar, and if so, what if anything they should say to him about the question of the administration of the Island.

I have now received a further telegram from the Foreign Office informing me that a communication will be made to the Acting President of the French National Committee under pledge of secrecy a few hours before the zero hour in the following sense:—

“His Majesty’s Government are about to undertake further operations in Madagascar. It had been their intention to invite the National Committee to assume the administration of the occupied territory. Indeed they had had it in mind to ask that an administrator, preferably General Legentilhomme, should be sent out so as to be ready to take over the administration without undue delay. In view however of General de Gaulle’s present attitude about the Levantine States and of his unjustified suspicions of the

good faith of His Majesty's Government, His Majesty's Government cannot at present proceed on lines proposed. If however General de Gaulle will return immediately to London as he has been invited by the Prime Minister to do to discuss the question of the Levantine States, His Majesty's Government will still be ready to discuss with him the possibility of proceeding with their original intention as regards Madagascar. Unless the General can now return to London as suggested, His Majesty's Government will be obliged to make other arrangements as regards Madagascar."

Believe me [etc.]

HALIFAX

---

851W.20/38

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Wesley Jones  
of the Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] September 16, 1942.

Mr. Barclay<sup>96</sup> came in this afternoon at our request.

Among other things, he said that the Embassy wished us informed of the most recent developments with respect to General de Gaulle. He referred to Lord Halifax' secret communication of September 9 to the Secretary containing a proposed communication to General de Gaulle with respect to the future administration of Madagascar. Mr. Barclay went on to say that the communication had in fact been delivered to Messrs. Dejean and Pleven of the French National Committee in London who had in turn related the message to General de Gaulle in Syria with the suggestion that he accept the offer contained therein and return to London. General de Gaulle's reply indicated his pleasure at the British proposal with respect to Madagascar and stated that he would return to London but must first visit Fighting French West Africa (French Equatorial Africa). He is now en route to Brazzaville, will return on September 23 to Cairo and thence will proceed to London.

I did not think it necessary to tell Mr. Barclay that the above developments had already been reported by our Consul at Beirut.<sup>97</sup>

Mr. Barclay said that General de Gaulle appeared in his reply to have interpreted the British communication too liberally, that in fact the British were not committed to any definite line of action with respect to the future administration of Madagascar, that they had merely told the General what their original intentions had

---

<sup>96</sup> B. E. Barclay, Second Secretary of the British Embassy.

<sup>97</sup> Telegram No. 344, September 14, 8 p. m., from the Consul at Beirut, printed in vol. IV, in section under Syria and Lebanon entitled "Concern of the United States regarding British-Free French differences in Syria and Lebanon; attempts to effect settlement."



been in that respect and had said that they would discuss this proposition if he would agree to return to London. Barclay concluded, however, that whatever would eventually be worked out would probably be along the lines of the original British plans for a Free French Administrator in the Island.

---

851W.01/25 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)  
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 14, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received 6:10 p. m.]

7069. The Foreign Office has just informed us that the agreement with General de Gaulle covering the administration of Madagascar is being signed this afternoon.<sup>97a</sup> The agreement we are told preserves "French sovereignty" over the Island and provides for the transfer of civil administration from British to French hands. General Legentilhomme, who has been named High Commissioner, is leaving almost immediately for Madagascar but will confer with General Platt at Nairobi en route concerning details of the turnover. The agreement is to take effect only upon Legentilhomme's arrival. Provision is made that the British will be responsible for the defense of Madagascar. We have been promised the full text of the agreement which consists of the general terms and three annexes. The first of the latter gives the powers of the British General Officer commanding, the second is a special annex governing operations of the naval base of Diego Suarez and the third covers jurisdiction over British military and non-French nationals. It will be forwarded by air mail.<sup>98</sup> An earlier draft was forwarded with the Embassy's despatch No. 6313, November 18.<sup>99</sup> A communiqué will be issued this afternoon but the text of the agreement is not being made public.

WINANT

---

**AGREEMENT FOR RECIPROCAL LEND-LEASE AID BETWEEN THE  
UNITED STATES AND FIGHTING FRANCE, EFFECTED BY EXCHANGE  
OF NOTES SIGNED SEPTEMBER 3, 1942**

[For text of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 273, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1614.]

---

<sup>97a</sup> For text, see British Cmd. 6986, Treaty Series No. 55 (1946).

<sup>98</sup> Despatch No. 6732, December 15, 1942, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, not printed.

<sup>99</sup> Not printed.

REPRESENTATIONS TO THE VICHY GOVERNMENT CONCERNING  
TREATMENT OF AMERICAN JEWS AND OTHER JEWS OF FOREIGN  
NATIONALITY IN FRANCE<sup>1</sup>

351.115 Hirsch Sons, Inc., G./15 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Tuck)*

WASHINGTON, August 13, 1942—9 p. m.

500. Your despatch 817 of March 9, and your telegram 892 of June 19, 3 p. m.<sup>2</sup> You should seek an interview with Laval<sup>3</sup> and bring the following to his attention:

The Government of the United States has, through its Embassy, informed the French Government on various occasions in the past of the importance it attaches to the non-discriminatory treatment of American citizens regardless of race or creed. The Government of the United States has noted with growing concern the continued application of anti-Semitic laws to the property of American nationals in unoccupied France. It is regretted that its representations in specific instances of discrimination have remained unanswered.

For reasons which have already been made clear to the French Government the United States cannot admit the right of any foreign government to discriminate against citizens of the United States because of race or religion. If the French Government persists in applying its anti-Semitic laws to American nationals or their property in unoccupied France, this Government will be forced to take such steps as may be necessary to protect its nationals against these unwarranted and unconscionable measures of the French Government. Authority for such measures exists and will be exercised.

For your own information, the President has broad authority under the First War Powers Act, 1941,<sup>4</sup> with respect to the property of foreign governments and their nationals which, while not thus far exercised with respect to non-enemy countries, could be looked to if necessary. Retaliatory action could likewise be effected through our control of French blocked funds in this country.

[Here follow references to three individual cases.]

HULL

---

<sup>1</sup> For previous correspondence concerning treatment of Jews in France, see *Foreign Relations*. 1941, vol. II, pp. 503 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>3</sup> Pierre Laval. French Chief of Government.

<sup>4</sup> 55 Stat. 838.

740.0011 European War 1939/23824 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, August 26, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received August 27—4:11 p. m.]

1255. Department's 512, August 19, 9 p. m.<sup>5</sup> During the course of my conversation with Laval yesterday I took up as forcefully as I could the question of the treatment of Jews of foreign nationality in France. I asked him if he realized the extent to which the recent occurrences in Paris had shocked public opinion throughout the civilized world and added that while it was reported that these inhuman measures had been ordered by the occupying authorities they had nevertheless been carried out on French soil and by the French police (here he interrupted me to say that he had protested at the time energetically to General von Oberg against the manner in which these arrests had been carried out). His Government, I told him, would certainly have to accept full responsibility for measures now in force in the unoccupied zone which obliged these unfortunate people—who had originally sought and been granted asylum in France—to be turned back to their persecutors. There were, I added, further circumstances which had been brought to my attention by responsible Americans connected with relief organizations which were of so revolting a character that I felt fully justified in making this personal appeal on humanitarian grounds. I referred to the separation of children from their parents in numbers estimated at 4,000 and between the ages of 2 and 15 who were now reported to be in concentration camps at Pithiviers, Drancy and Beaune-la-Rolande in the occupied zone.

It was even alleged that their documents of identification had been purposely destroyed so that they might never be able to rejoin their parents in exile.

Laval immediately questioned this statement and said that he would not admit that children had been separated from their parents. He asked me to furnish him with proof of this. I said that I would be only too glad to furnish him with the texts of the reports I had received if by so doing anything could be done to remedy this appalling situation.

It was evident from Laval's attitude that he had neither interest nor sympathy in the fate of any Jews, who he callously remarked, were already far too numerous in France. I again reminded him that the French Government had at one time given these people asylum to save them from Nazi persecution and that history would judge the Government which was prepared to surrender them.

<sup>5</sup> Vol. I, p. 465.

The present situation with regard to foreign Jews in France must be regarded as serious. Our Consul General in Marseille<sup>6</sup> reported on August 20 that the total deportation of non-Aryan foreigners distributed over five different camps already amounted to 3220. It is understood that the French authorities acting under German pressure contemplate deporting 10,000 Jews who came to France subsequent to 1936 and who are considered to be without nationality. It is believed that persons in this category entered France without proper authorization and their entry is consequently considered to have been technically illegal.

In this connection I also received from a secret but reliable source the copy of a circular telegram addressed on August 9 by the Ministry of the Interior to all Prefectures directing that all foreign Jews who entered France after January 1st, 1936 should be sent to the occupied zone before September 15. Dr. Lowrie,<sup>7</sup> president of the committee for coordination of relief work in concentration camps, has furnished me with a confidential document which he considers reliable entitled "The Ten Thousand" which states that "during August and September 10,000 foreign Jews are to be delivered to the occupying authorities in addition to the 3,600 which have already been sent to concentration camps". He also furnished me with a copy of a letter of protest dated August 20 which Pastor Boegner<sup>8</sup> addressed to the Marshal<sup>9</sup> and which refers to a communication from the Council of the Protestant Federation in France protesting against the measures taken in the occupied zone with regard to foreign Jews. The Department's attention in this connection is also invited to our airmail despatch 1204, August 20 enclosing a copy of a memorandum relating to the recent arrest and deportation of Foreign Jews in Paris.<sup>10</sup>

I am forced to the conclusion that the arrest and deportation of these Jews, which I have reason to believe may shortly be followed by the arrest and deportation of certain categories of foreigners (not necessarily Jews) now in France, may constitute a partial attempt by Laval to meet the German Government's demand for workers. According to reliable reports the Jews so far deported have been sent to Lorraine, Poland and the Ukraine; travelling in cattle cars in bestial conditions with men and women up to the age of 65 included in their number.

---

<sup>6</sup> J. Webb Benton.

<sup>7</sup> Donald Lowrie, Y. M. C. A. representative, assigned to European duty.

<sup>8</sup> Marc Boegner, President of the Protestant Federation of France.

<sup>9</sup> Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, French Chief of State.

<sup>10</sup> Neither printed.

I am sending Laval the report regarding the children but his present attitude does not encourage me to believe that this intervention will in any way serve to remedy the situation.

TUCK

---

851.4016/92 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, September 11, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 4:52 p. m.]

1346. I am greatly disturbed as to the fate of foreign Jewish children in the unoccupied zone who have been and are still being separated from their parents. I am convinced that it is useless to expect any moderation in the restrictive measures now being enforced against foreign Jews young or old. I therefore strongly advocate that our Government should if humanly possible give immediate consideration to the advisability of presenting through this Embassy a concrete proposal to Laval that as many of these children as we may be prepared to accept should be permitted to emigrate to the United States. I have reason to believe that Laval would accept such a proposal if only because it might in a measure calm the storm of criticism which his inhumane policy has aroused throughout the country.

In conversation he has twice sarcastically referred to the "high moral tone" adopted by certain governments in connection with the treatment of foreign Jews in France remarking that these governments at the same time consistently refused to admit Jewish refugees within their own border. He mentioned in this connection that the only concrete offer that he had so far received had been from the Dominican Republic which had declared its willingness to admit 3,000 Jewish children. (Laval, I believe might even be induced to consent to the emigration of certain categories of adult foreign Jews.)

The situation of these separated children is desperate. Many of them from the occupied zone are now filtering into southern France and this movement will probably continue. It is estimated that in the unoccupied zone alone between 5 and 8,000 of these children will soon be in the charge of welfare agencies. As it appears to be the intention of the Nazi authorities that their deported parents should not survive the treatment they are now undergoing many of these children may already be considered as orphans. To leave them in France is to expose them to constant danger to the threat

of possible Nazi aggression (even against Jewish children) and to the serious difficulties of feeding, clothing and sheltering which face the whole population of France during the coming winter.

I am remaining in close contact with Dr. Donald Lowrie who continues to give this tragic situation his earnest attention. He has been appointed Chairman of an Emergency Committee set up in Geneva which groups a number of organizations religious and non-sectarian such as the National Migration Service and Save the Children Fund. The primary purpose of this Committee is to bring all possible pressure to bear in order to secure the necessary immigration authorizations from our Government for foreign Jews in France.

I fully realize the difficulties which such a proposal entails particularly insofar as transportation and funds are concerned. Nothing, however, can alter the fact that the fate of these little people hangs in the balance. Should the Germans decide to order them over the demarcation line into the occupied zone they may be considered as lost.

TUCK

---

811.111 Refugee Children/92 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Tuck)*

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1942—8 p. m.

600. Your 1346,<sup>11</sup> 1414 and 1415<sup>12</sup> regarding visas for refugee children. You may inform Laval that subject, of course, to approval by the French authorities of permission to depart from France, the issuance of visas to 1000 children has so far been authorized by the Department and that as arrangements are being made by the interested persons to receive 5000 children, further visa authorizations will be made for the larger group as plans for the reception of the children are completed.

Department desires to know whether Laval will cooperate in facilitating the departure of the children from France.

The information requested in your 1415 will be forwarded as soon as compiled.

Keep Department informed by cable of developments.

HULL

---

<sup>11</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>12</sup> Neither printed.

851.4016/108 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, October 3, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received October 3—4:22 p. m.]

1475. Embassy's 1346, September 11, 11 a. m. and 1414, September 23, 7 p. m.<sup>13</sup> and Department's 600, September 28, 8 p. m. I conveyed the purport of the Department's reference telegram to Laval on the afternoon of September 30 and asked him whether he would be willing to cooperate in facilitating the departure of these children from France. He at once replied that he gave his agreement in principle (his words were "*mon accord vous est acquit en principe*"). He added that he would be only too glad to be rid of them. He asked me as a favor not to advise the Department until he was in a position to give me an official reply which he said might be slightly delayed owing to certain "administrative difficulties".

This afternoon Jordin, Chief of Laval's Special Cabinet, asked me to come and see him. I found him in a state of great embarrassment. He informed me in strictest confidence that less than 2 hours after my visit on September 30, the German Consul General Krug von Nidda had called on Laval and had stated that the German Government had learned of our intention to admit these children. The Germans wished to be consulted in this proposed move as it was feared that our Government might make use of these children upon their arrival in the United States as an effective medium of anti-German propaganda. I am forced to the conclusion that von Nidda learned of our Government's intention to admit these children through the Department's *en clair* message number 1851 of September 18 to Marseille.<sup>14</sup>

Jordin added that Laval found himself in an extremely awkward predicament and that while he was honestly anxious to carry out his promise to me he would first have to obtain German consent to our proposal.

I had difficulty in restraining my anger. I told Jordin that my Government had decided to take this step on humanitarian grounds alone and to imply that we intended to use these children for propaganda purposes was a base and contemptible suggestion. Coming from the Germans I said it did not surprise me. I was willing, however, to wait until I received Laval's reply on October 5 and suggested that in the meantime he would do well to consider the

<sup>13</sup> Latter not printed.<sup>14</sup> Not printed.

effect which a rejection of my Government's proposal would produce upon the civilized world.

TUCK

---

811.111 Refugee Children/99 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, October 9, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received October 10—5:45 a. m.]

1503. Reference Department's 600, September 28, 8 p. m., Laval sent for me this afternoon and stated that he was prepared to allow the children to leave France provided I could obtain an official assurance from my Government that their arrival in the United States would not be made the subject of propaganda or the occasion for public demonstrations. I replied that such a request was a preposterous one to ask me to put forward. I told him that the step which we desired to take was prompted by humanitarian motives alone and that in a country in which there existed freedom of press and public opinion my Government was in no position to give such assurances.

I therefore suggested that he should authorize me to inform the Department that he agreed to the departure of these children from France and that I would at the same time agree to recommend—in the interest of those Jews remaining in Europe and the possibility of German reprisal—that the eventual arrival of these refugee children in the United States should not be made the occasion for propaganda or demonstrations.

He agreed to this suggestion and authorized me to inform my Government accordingly. He then asked me what plans would be made for evacuating the children and whether they would leave in large numbers or in dribblets. I replied that I was not familiar with the details but that I presumed that in view of the existing transportation difficulties it was reasonable to assume that they would leave in successive and limited groups. Laval instructed Bousquet, Secretary General of Police at the Ministry of the Interior, (who was present at the meeting) to prepare a census of these children. I have made arrangements whereby Dr. Lowrie and other persons representing American organizations interested in this matter will get in touch with Bousquet on October 16 to arrange details.



I took occasion to inform Laval of the purport of the Department's 613 October 6, 7 p. m.,<sup>16</sup> to which he expressed agreement.

TUCK

---

[Vichy France broke off diplomatic relations with the United States on November 8, 1942, following the Allied landing in North Africa. Consequently the agreement regarding the evacuation of children from Vichy France was never executed.]

---

**REPRESENTATIONS TO THE VICHY GOVERNMENT REGARDING BAN  
ON SHOWING OF AMERICAN FILMS IN FRANCE AND TRANSIT OF  
AMERICAN FILMS THROUGH FRANCE**

851.4061 Motion Pictures/449 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, September 12, 1942—noon.

[Received 5:48 p. m.]

1352. Department's 501, August 13, 10 p. m.<sup>17</sup> We learn from the Foreign Office that the Government Commissioner for the Cinema has decided to prohibit the showing of all American films in unoccupied France and overseas possessions as of October 15; that this measure has the approval of the Government and that although hitherto unpublished it can be considered as official. The Foreign Office plans to make one more attempt (we gather with little hope of success) to avert this violation of the 1936 Trade Agreement.<sup>18</sup>

While this matter is certainly a minor one in the general picture of our relations with the French Government the projected action is a clear-cut treaty violation.

We believe that it would be in line with our policy of opposing all collaborationist tendencies (to say nothing of vigorously protecting American interests) to present the French Government with a program of concrete reprisals in the event the projected measure is given effect. This would give the Foreign Office a stronger argument against the advocates of the measure than the juridical one of

---

<sup>16</sup> Not printed; it stated that the authorization of visas relating to refugee children applied to those born in France of refugee parents (811.111 Refugee Children/92).

<sup>17</sup> Not printed; it authorized the Chargé to file official protest with French authorities should they issue an order suppressing American films in unoccupied France (851.4061 Motion Pictures/443).

<sup>18</sup> Signed at Washington May 6, 1936. For text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 146, or 53 Stat. (pt. 3) 2236; for correspondence regarding this agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1936, vol. II, pp. 85 ff.

treaty violation. Furthermore since we have reason to believe that the real motive of the measure is the personal profit of certain French motion picture interests and that it has only lukewarm German support it is not impossible that vigorous action on our part prior to the promulgation of the measure will result in averting its application.

TUCK

---

851.4061 Motion Pictures/481 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, September 24, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received 10:54 a. m.]

4359. Legation has been informed by a Swiss distributor of American films that French customs authorities of Cerbère have since mid-September refused permission to his transport agent there to effect transit to Switzerland of films of American origin. Through same source Legation has now received a copy of a letter dated August 22, 1942 from Ministry of Information, General Director of Motion Pictures, to Minister of National Economy and Finance, General Director of Customs, in which former states that he approves measures proposed by latter under date of August 19 "with regard to transit through France of American films coming from Spain or from Portugal". Under date of August 28 General Director of Customs Vichy transmitted a copy of above cited letter of August 22 to regional customs directors with instructions that measures cited therein be applied strictly. These instructions as contained in letter of August 19 as cited in that of August 27 are as follows in translation:

"[1] Exportation of exposed motion picture films is subordinated to the visa of the Chief of Information Division or of his delegate (decree of August 27, 1939).

(2) This measure concerns the exportation in all customs categories of such films, it therefore applies to foreign films in transit through French territory.

(3) The General Direction of Motion Pictures having decided to refuse its visa for American films of any nature (newsreels or others) shipped from Spain or from Portugal to Switzerland in direct transit through France such films shall be returned to the country from which they have come without having to be submitted to the visa of the information services.

(4) American films from countries other than Portugal or Spain will not be turned back automatically but will be submitted to the visa of the information services.

This will be the case in particular regarding American films coming from Switzerland and destined to Spain or Portugal.

(5) Films other than American films will not be returned automatically and will be submitted to preliminary visa of information services whatever may be their country of origin or destination."

HARRISON

851.4061 Motion Pictures/450: Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, September 26, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received September 27—3:43 p. m.]

1427. Bern's 4359, September 24, 10 a. m. We have been unable so far to obtain from Foreign Office officials confirmation of the existence of the order forbidding transit through France to Switzerland of American films but these officials privately admit it is in effect and that it constitutes direct violation of the 1936 Trade Agreement.

We believe that if the Foreign Office is [garbled word] in suppressing either this measure or that banning American films from French screens they must be provided with a threat of concrete reprisals as suggested in our telegram number 1352 of September 12.

We understand that the measure forbidding transits [is?] in response to direct German pressure and consequently will be harder to have countermanded than that banning American films which is almost certainly of purely French inspiration.

Repeated to Bern.

TUCK

851.4061 Motion Pictures/467

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the President of the French Council of Ministers (Laval)*<sup>19</sup>

[Translation]

No. 373

VICHY, October 2, 1942.

MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to call Your Excellency's attention to the following clause (Schedule III, Ex 469 quater, Note c) of the Trade Agreement concluded between the United States and France on May 6, 1936:

"The French Government will take no new measures which would have the effect of placing American films in a position, in comparison with French films, or with those of any other foreign country, less favorable than that which they now enjoy"

<sup>19</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department by the Chargé in France in his despatch No. 1410, November 7, 1942; received February 19, 1943.

and to certain measures, contemplated or already carried out by the French Government or its departments, which appear to constitute a direct violation of the foregoing clause.

1. Since the middle of September 1942, the French Customs Authorities have refused transit through France to American films intended for Switzerland. The customhouse agents charged with the transit of these American films received from the Customs Authorities as justification for the refusal of admission a copy of a circular citing the text of a letter under date of August 22, 1942 from the Office of the Director General of Motion Pictures addressed to the Director General of Customs, containing a formal order to refuse admission to all American films shipped from Spain or Portugal to Switzerland. A copy of the circular, as it was supplied to the Embassy, is transmitted herewith.

2. About mid-September, the Committee on Organization of the Motion Picture Industry informed the distributors of American films in nonoccupied France and North Africa officially by letter that the Office of the Director General of the Cinema had decided to withdraw visas for the showing of American films after October 15, 1942, and requested them to hold the copies of such films at the disposal of the Ministry of Information. A copy of this notice is enclosed.

Pursuant to my Government's instructions<sup>20</sup> I have the honor to invoke officially the clause referred to above of the Trade Agreement between our two countries, and to reserve all my Government's rights as regards the adoption of appropriate measures of reprisal in the event that the restrictions applied to the transit of American films and those contemplated with respect to the showing of American films are not lifted.

Accept [etc.]

S. PINKNEY TUCK

---

851.4061 Motion Pictures/449 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Tuck)*

WASHINGTON, October 6, 1942—9 p. m.

614. Embassy's 1352, September 12, noon.

1. A representative of the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America, Inc. has informed the Department that the motion picture companies are anxious to do everything possible to keep their pictures on the screens of France, particularly because

---

<sup>20</sup> Department's telegram No. 501, August 13, 1942, 10 p. m., to the Chargé in France, not printed.

they keep before the public in unoccupied France the American way of life. It is obviously to the advantage of this Government to have the people of France continue to see such pictures.

Motion picture companies also point out that the rights of these films are vested in the New York companies and have never been transferred to the French Branches and if these films are confiscated the French Government will have confiscated American property.

Companies also inquire what reasons the French authorities have given, if any, for the decision to ban American films.

2. As indicated in the Department's no. 501 of August 13, 1942,<sup>21</sup> we would as a minimum, of course, expect to make vigorous formal representations against the proposed action and reserve all of our legal rights in the matter pursuant to the pertinent terms of the trade agreement.

3. We have been considering what counter-measures might be taken. Since our imports from France are now largely cut off anyway, termination, or threat thereof, by us of the trade agreement might not do any good; on the other hand, the increased rates of duty resulting from termination would affect adversely our trade with third countries. The Department would appreciate receiving your suggestions as to action which in your opinion might be effective. Meanwhile you may continue, in your discretion, to do what you can to forestall the proposed prohibition.

WELLES

---

851.4061 Motion Pictures/452 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, October 12, 1942—9 p. m.

[Received October 13—4:56 p. m.]

1519. Department's 614, October 6, 9 p. m. As the date of execution of the measure banning American films (October 15) was approached, we addressed a formal note to Laval on October 2, citing the effective and projected violations of the provision contained in Schedule [III] Ex 469 quater, note (c) of the 1936 Trade Agreement and reserving the rights of our Government to take appropriate measures of reprisal unless the restrictions already applied to the transit and those contemplated for the showing of American films were not revoked.

---

<sup>21</sup> Not printed.

According to a friendly Foreign Office official the following are the surprisingly favorable results of a stormy meeting of representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance and Information which took place on October 10:

1. Complete agreement that the ban on the showing of American films be not applied in North Africa.

2. Agreement in principle subject to ratification by "Higher Authority" that:

- (a) The ban on the showing of American films be indefinitely postponed.

- (b) That in the matter of transit (which was the subject of a stiff protest parallel in course by the Swiss Legation here) the German demand be acceded to only in so far as newsreels and short subjects are concerned but that feature pictures instead of being turned back be submitted to Vichy for "censorship". In practice, we are assured, the majority would reach their destination.

It is possible that the measures outlined in the last paragraph will not be ratified although the Foreign Office is hopeful of their final acceptance. If they are not we shall return to the question of concrete reprisals.

TUCK

---

851.4061 Motion Pictures/457 : Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

VICHY, November 6, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 9:18 p. m.]

1635. Embassy's 1519, October 12, 9 p. m. A note signed by Laval and dated October 31 states that after examination of the question raised in our note of October 2,

"the necessary instructions have been issued to the customs service with a view to applying once more to American films in transit to Switzerland the regime in force before August 22 last. Consequently, the transit of these films is authorized subject to the approval of the Chief of the Information Service or his delegate.

I shall advise you separately of the French Government's answer to the point raised in your note under reference relative to the showing of American films in the unoccupied zone."

Thus we have, with the cooperation of the Swiss, won a partial victory in the matter of transit. We understand that feature pictures and non-political short subjects will go through to Switzerland while newsreels will be held up. (Please see numbered paragraph 2 (b) of our reference telegram.)

We learn that another meeting will be held to reconsider the question of again permitting American films to be shown in unoccupied France. In view of private French interests close to Laval (his son-in-law René de Chambrun) it appears unlikely that a favorable decision will be reached.

TUCK

## GERMANY

### ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY PERTAINING TO REPATRIATION AND HOSPITALIZATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

[Arrangement regarding the reciprocal application of Model Agreement annexed to the Convention signed at Geneva July 27, 1929, effected by exchange of notes dated March 4 and 30, 1942, between the Secretary of State and the Minister of Switzerland at Washington, in charge of German interests. For text of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 255, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1507.]



## GREECE

### PARTICIPATION BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING RELIEF SUPPLIES FOR AXIS-OCCUPIED GREECE

868.48/1172 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1941—11 p. m.

5630. Berry, Second Secretary at Rome, who has just returned from Athens where he has been distributing British relief payments, confirms reports of unparalleled suffering in Greece and states that mass starvation is now a fact there. The Embassy in Rome emphasizes that a chief German propaganda argument in Greece, and one which is having effect in causing even staunch supporters of Britain in Greece to waver in their loyalty, is a report that the British Government refuses to permit Australian wheat, bought by the Royal Greek Government and already shipped as far as Egypt, to be sent on to Greece.

Mr. MacMurray<sup>1</sup> reports that the Turkish people have been asking themselves whether it is worthwhile for Turkey to resist aggression if nations such as Greece are allowed by Britain and America to starve after they resist gallantly but are overrun.

Please make known these reports to the British authorities. In view (1) of the appalling need in Greece, (2) of the fact that even well-disposed Greeks are reported to resent the withholding of wheat already purchased, and (3) of the effect on Turkey of the policy adopted with regard to the relief of Greece, the British Government may consider it desirable for the wheat in question to be permitted to be shipped from Egypt, on the understanding that the distribution in Greece will be under the supervision of the International Red Cross representative there and that Berry will be permitted to visit Greece freely and to report on conditions there. Alternatively, the British Government might wish to consider the possibility of permitting the wheat in Egypt to be shipped to Turkey with the understanding that the Turks would release an equal amount for direct shipment to Greece. The American Em-

---

<sup>1</sup> J. V. A. MacMurray, Ambassador in Turkey.

bassy at Ankara has already discussed with the Turkish authorities the possibility of making shipments of wheat from Turkey to Greece and has found those authorities receptive provided that any wheat supplied by Turkey is replaced at an early date from some other source. Such replacement was said to be imperative in view of the existing shortage in Turkey.

The Department considers that the general question of the policy to be adopted with regard to the relief of Greece, and particularly the political considerations involved such as the effect of this policy on Turkey, is primarily for the British Government to decide. The Department will be glad to cooperate, however, with regard to any feasible measures for the relief of Greece and believes the situation there to deserve particularly sympathetic consideration.

HULL

---

868.48/2011

*The Greek Minister (Diamantopoulos) to the Secretary of State*

No. 3683

WASHINGTON, December 22, 1941.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to transmit to you herewith the text of a cabled appeal sent by the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Emmanuel Tsouderos, to the President of the United States, and to beg that you be kind enough to communicate this message to its high destination.

Accept [etc.]

C. DIAMANTOPOULOS

[Enclosure]

*The Greek Prime Minister (Tsouderos) to President Roosevelt*

MISTER PRESIDENT: The food situation in Greece has become desperate. Accurate information from various sources confirms that people are dying in the streets from starvation. During the last weeks daily deaths in Athens and Piraeus amount to five hundred conservative estimate, other reports state one thousand. This information is confirmed by representatives of International Red Cross and Red Crescent accompanying shipments of foodstuffs for Greece. I am indeed grateful to the British Government for allowing shipment to Greece despite blockade regulations of small quantities of foodstuffs produced in Turkey. These do not exceed 4,000 tons monthly. However, an unending insistence in refusing shipments of wheat threatens to bring about a real disaster in that gallant country and to contribute to the annihilation of the race. The emotion of the Greeks is indescribable in face of this situation

and from every quarter within and without Greece I receive desperate appeals on behalf of our starving people. The principle according to which the invader is obliged to feed the population in occupied areas is one of International Law but the brutal Germans have long since discarded respect for any law and their only object is the reduction of the world by fire, sword and famine. Therefore, we cannot take refuge behind a principle of International Law and deliberately ignore a state of affairs which exists. We have not ceased believing in blockade as a means of waging war but every measure however necessary for carrying on the war when it overlooks in its application those principles which are imposed by our duty towards defenseless human beings will I fear be very severely criticized and condemned by History. I believe that if my expressions are sharp they will be judged by the measure of my grief and I pray that in interceding on behalf of the Greeks you forgive the manner in which I put my thoughts and feelings before you.

TSOUDEROS

868.48/2012

---

*The Greek Minister (Diamantopoulos) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 24, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Monday last<sup>2</sup> I had the opportunity of submitting to the State Department a cabled message of Prime Minister Tsouderos of Greece to President Roosevelt describing the awful situation of the Greek people from the viewpoint of food-stuffs.

In this letter I shall limit myself to the statement, based on reliable sources, that the number of deaths from starvation in Athens and Piraeus alone, run from 600 to 1000 daily, most of whom are children. Moreover, there is information given by a German newspaper to the effect that the Medical Society of Athens has requested permission of the Oecumenical Patriarch, religious head of all Orthodox people, to cremate the dead, due to lack of time to bury them as required by the established Orthodox ritual.

In the face of such tragic conditions, I venture to suggest to Your Excellency, who has always been kindly interested in all matters affecting Greece, that the American Government take advantage of the presence in the United States of The Right Honorable Winston Churchill<sup>3</sup> to further investigate the possibility of giving immediate relief to the suffering Greek people.

---

<sup>2</sup> December 22, 1941.

<sup>3</sup> The British Prime Minister was in Washington to confer with President Roosevelt.

May I be permitted to believe that Greece, having waged its heroic struggle against the Axis Powers in the pursuit of the common victory, shall be deemed worthy, today when the entire Greek race is vitally threatened, to receive a token of special consideration on the part of the two great nations, who alone are in a position to give her practical relief in her present plight.

Hoping that Your Excellency will concur in the timeliness of my suggestion, I remain

Yours sincerely,

C. P. DIAMANTOPOULOS

---

868.48/1194

*The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*<sup>4</sup>

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: There is enclosed a communication from the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Tsouderos, addressed to you,<sup>5</sup> which the Greek Minister in Washington has delivered to the Department under instructions from his Government. The communication expresses the earnest hope that permission will be granted for relief supplies notably wheat, to be sent to Greece.

There is attached a suggested reply to the Greek Prime Minister, for your consideration.

There is also enclosed a copy of a letter from the Greek Minister in Washington, dated December 24, 1941,<sup>6</sup> suggesting that advantage be taken of the presence of the British Prime Minister in Washington to discuss with him the question of possible measures for the relief of Greece. It seems to me that the Greek Minister's suggestion merits consideration, in view of the necessity of coordinating our policy with that of Great Britain in the matter of relief for Axis occupied areas.

The information which the Prime Minister reports regarding the appalling conditions in Greece are similar to those we have received from our own missions in Rome, Ankara and Cairo. There can be little doubt that conditions in Greece are desperate. The Second Secretary of our Embassy in Rome, who recently visited Greece, reports that mass starvation is a fact there at present.

As you are doubtless aware, some food has been sent into Greece from Turkey recently, and further shipments are planned, on a small Turkish freighter. The food has been purchased in Turkey by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, an agency of

---

<sup>4</sup> Notation on original: "CH OK FDR."

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, p. 725.

<sup>6</sup> *Supra*.

the British Government, which has advanced the funds on the assurance of being reimbursed in part at least by the Greek War Relief Association, an American organization headed by Mr. Harold Vanderbilt. The Turkish Red Crescent has cooperated in the arrangements and has contributed some supplies.

But the relief supplies being sent to Greece from Turkey constitute merely a token, and there are many things, such as medical supplies, vitamin concentrates, and milk for children, which may not be obtained in Turkey at all. Small quantities of such supplies are available in Switzerland which could be shipped to Greece. The British Government's attitude regarding supplies already in Europe and therefore potentially available to the Axis is, I understand, to encourage the use of such supplies by non-Axis nationals, as a means of reducing the supplies the Axis might obtain. A difficulty is presented to us by the fact that before materials such as medical supplies and condensed milk can be purchased in Switzerland for shipment to Greece, funds must be transferred to Switzerland for their purchase.

Mr. Norman Davis<sup>7</sup> has recently given considerable attention to the Greek situation and has written to the Department, on December 15, 1941,<sup>8</sup> recommending that the American Government grant permission for the transfer of 153,000 Swiss francs (about \$38,000) to the International Red Cross at Geneva for medical supplies, vitamins, sera, and condensed milk to be sent to Greece. The funds would be supplied by the Greek War Relief Association, in an earmarked contribution to the American Red Cross. The Red Cross would assume charge of the matter, and the representative in Greece of the International Red Cross would supervise the distribution in Greece, to assure its use by the Greek people themselves. I recommend that the American Government's permission be granted for this transaction.

Mr. Davis is also considering the urgent need of Greece for wheat. The Turkish authorities might be persuaded to permit wheat to be shipped to Greece immediately from their own meager supplies if assured that an equivalent amount of wheat, in replacement, would be sent to Turkey at an early date. The Turkish Government has shown a desire to do what it can for the relief of Greece, and has been deeply moved by an appeal of the refugee Greek authorities to send to Greece even "fish heads and scraps which the Turks would not eat". The Turks, however, have barely enough wheat for their own urgent needs. I recommend, subject

---

<sup>7</sup> Chairman, American Red Cross.

<sup>8</sup> Letter not printed.

to your approval, that we inform Mr. Davis that this Government looks with favor, in principle, on arrangements for sending wheat to Greece from Turkey against an undertaking, if necessary, by the Red Cross to replace the wheat shipped from Turkey.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

[Enclosure]

*Draft of Letter From President Roosevelt to the  
Greek Prime Minister (Tsouderos)\**

MY DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: The distressing situation which exists today in your noble country, depicted in your recent letter, moves me very deeply indeed. The information you report is similar to that which other sources have confirmed all too unmistakably. No further evidence is necessary to convince any humane person, whatever his allegiance, that countries which have been overrun by Axis tyranny, and notably Greece, are in desperate want, and should be aided by every feasible means.

The American Government has given serious consideration to proposals for furnishing relief to Greece, has cooperated in arrangements for sending food supplies from Turkey, and is at present giving active attention to suggestions for more adequate relief.

Our endeavors to aid Greece are limited by the necessity of avoiding any action which would assist the Axis Powers. The unconscionable actions of the Axis forces in despoiling Greece are beyond adequate condemnation. As you are doubtless aware, Hitler has boasted to the world of Germany's resources of food at the very moment he was giving orders for the removal from Greece of the meager supplies which were available to the people of that country. We should not lose sight for one moment of the full responsibility of the Axis for the situation existing in occupied territory and of the crimes which should be on the consciences of those who have ordered and those who have carried out measures which have taken even the grain seed away.

I concur, however, in your view, Mr. Prime Minister, that the fact that the Axis powers have every duty to feed the peoples over whom they have extended their domination does not alter the fact that the people are in desperate need. The American Government will continue its efforts to find a means of bringing aid to the Greeks in their tragic plight without compromising the prime

---

\* Filed separately under 888.48/2012. A pencilled notation by Mr. George V. Allen of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs states this letter was signed by President Roosevelt on December 31, 1941.

objective; namely, victory over the Axis powers. This objective is as vital to the Greeks as to ourselves, since Greece can be fully relieved only through such victory.

Very sincerely yours,

---

868.48/2008

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 31, 1941.

The Greek Minister came in to see me at his request. He referred to previous discussions we had had about the growing starvation in Greece, to his conversation with Mr. Welles and to a conversation he had had with Mr. Norman Davis on Monday of this week.<sup>10</sup>

He said that the Turkish Government had made available to them a ship, the *Kourtoulus*, which had made two monthly trips from Turkey to the Piraeus, and had thereby carried food enough to enable the Greek Relief to give one hundred fifty thousand soup rations per day. Now they were informed that the Turkish Government had commandeered the ship.

He wondered whether we could take this up with the Turkish Government, encouraging them, if possible, to revoke the order and permit them to go on using the ship, and to ask that if they could not do that whether the Turkish Government could make any helpful suggestion.

He said that he had agreed with Norman Davis that wheat must be brought into the Near East since there was no surplus of wheat. Egypt and Turkey herself were beginning to go on short rations. The plan he had worked out was as follows:

(1) To see whether wheat could not be loaded on the American transports going to Egypt. He asked whether we would undertake to find out how far this could be done. I said we would endeavor to tackle it with the Maritime Commission.

(2) They had a fleet of ships now operating for the British. Under their agreement with the British they had the right to withdraw two of these to carry foodstuffs to Greece. He proposed to withdraw these ships and start them carrying wheat for Egypt to build up a stock there.

(3) They also had some ships which were being used by the Swiss and they had the right to withdraw one or perhaps two of these ships. With these he proposed to carry the wheat from Egypt to Turkey, and thence to Piraeus. He thought it unlikely that direct communication would be permitted between Egypt and Greece.

---

<sup>10</sup> December 29, 1941.

The tragedy of this, he said, was that arrangements might not be completed within two or three months. For that reason he hoped we could expedite matters and keep the Turks supplying some food to Greece. A voyage from the United States to the Near East, at present schedules, took something like sixty days—and many hundreds were dying daily.

I said I would see what could be done about our end of it, and expressed my sympathy and horror at the Greek situation.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

---

868.48/1172 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, January 5, 1942—7 p. m.

44. Please expedite reply to Department's no. 5630, December 3, 11 p. m. Specific information would be helpful regarding the alleged payment by the Greek Government for Australian wheat shipped as far as Egypt and held there by the British Government. Rumors regarding such wheat continue to circulate in Greece, and Axis propaganda has not failed to take advantage of them.

HULL

---

868.48/2013a

*The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Greek Minister  
(Diamantopoulos)*

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. MINISTER: I refer to your letter of December 23 [22], 1941, transmitting a communication from His Excellency Emmanuel Tsouderos, Prime Minister of Greece, addressed to the President, regarding the situation in Greece and the need for relief supplies to be sent to that country. I also refer to your letter of December 24, 1941, in which you suggest that advantage be taken of the presence in the United States of the British Prime Minister to discuss with him the question of the relief of Greece.

The communication from the Greek Prime Minister and a copy of your own letter were placed before the President. Mr. Roosevelt has now requested me to transmit to you, for forwarding to its high destination, his reply to Mr. Tsouderos' communication. I have pleasure in enclosing the President's response.<sup>11</sup>

Sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES

---

<sup>11</sup> Not attached to file copy, but see draft of letter from President Roosevelt to the Greek Prime Minister, p. 729.



868.48/2002 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)  
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 13, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received 5:47 p. m.]

180. Department's 5630, December 3, 11 p. m. and Department's 44, January 5, 7 p. m. I have just received the following letter dated January 12 signed by Mr. Eden:<sup>12</sup>

"I have seen your letter of the 6th of January to Sargent<sup>13</sup> about food for Greece.

I am very sorry indeed that we have not so far been able to give you a reply on this question. The reason is that the subject is receiving immediate and very serious attention at this moment and we wish to let you have our considered views.

I will write to you again immediately I am in a position to do so.

I can, however, give you the facts as regards the Axis propaganda story that we are preventing the despatch to Greece of wheat bought by the Greek Government. There were at the time of the occupation of Greece several cargoes of wheat and flour afloat which had been purchased by the Greek Government. The situation was fully discussed at all stages with the Greek authorities, in particular with the Greek Shipping Committee, and it was agreed that His Majesty's Government should take over the cargoes of cereals owned by the Greek Government at the free on board price paid by them. It was also agreed that should any of the cargoes be required for the purposes of the Greek Government in unoccupied Greek territory or for the Greek forces, they could be released for that purpose. At no time was any objection raised to this arrangement by any Greek authority though the Greek shipping committee did ask that the goods should be transferred to His Majesty's Government by way of agreement rather than by requisition, a request which we were glad to meet. The cargoes in question have of course long since been disposed of by the Middle East Supply Center. You will appreciate therefore that there is no substance whatever in the allegation that we are preventing the despatch of these cargoes to Greece.

As the Greek authorities acted throughout of their own free will in the arrangements made as regards these cargoes we have so far thought it best not to broadcast the full facts of the case in answer to the Axis stories, since we do not wish to cause any possible embarrassment to the Greek Government. It is, however, obvious that Allied shipping could not proceed to enemy occupied ports and the arrangements agreed upon between ourselves and the Greek Government were clearly necessary and reasonable.["]

WINANT

<sup>12</sup> Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>13</sup> Sir Orme Sargent, British Deputy Under Secretary of State.

868.48/2008 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)  
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 17, 1942—4 a. m.

[Received 6:45 a. m.]

249. Following up my message 180 of January 13th in which I forwarded a communication from Mr. Eden on the question of food shipments to Greece through the British blockade, I am attaching a memorandum given me this evening by the Foreign Office with a request for comment and reply.

The delay in getting a decision on this matter and in answering the Department's cable 5630 of December 3rd stemmed from the same source. More than 2 months ago I took up with the Foreign Office the need of sending foodstuffs to Greece and also mode of getting reestablished the quota for meat allowed to pass through the British blockade for French prisoners of war in Germany. The British position on both these issues were making enemies for her in both Greece and France. Eden promised to assist but had to leave for Russia and delegated the task to Sargent in the Foreign Office. Both issues went before the Cabinet and Dalton, Minister of Economic Warfare, got them turned down. Eden has been able to get a reversal on these positions since his return. He tells me that although Cabinet authority has been granted to attached memo for only that one shipment of wheat to Greece it is realized that in making this concession monthly shipments will follow.

I talked over these two problems with Burckhardt<sup>14</sup> who was here for the Red Cross and also the possibility of doing something for Greek children. The British are discussing with the Greeks the possibility of evacuating a large number of them although I am very dubious about the successful culmination of this plan. I also arranged a meeting between Maisky<sup>15</sup> and Burckhardt to discuss prisoners of war problem. Maisky told me on his return here that he had urged his Government to take action in relation to the treatment of prisoners of war as recognized under the Geneva Convention.<sup>16</sup> Eden supported him in this.

I had hoped that the Russians might sign the Geneva Convention or at least agree to adhere to its provisions on a reciprocal basis. Brutal practices in the treatment of some prisoners are apt to affect the treatment of all prisoners captured in the same area.

---

<sup>14</sup> Charles J. Burckhardt, President, Mixed Commission of the International Red Cross.

<sup>15</sup> I. M. Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

<sup>16</sup> Signed July 27, 1929, *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. I, p. 336.

Burckhardt was there when we were attacked by Japan. I knew him when I was in Switzerland and more particularly Huber, Chairman of the International Red Cross. Burckhardt brought me a message from him. I am sure that they will want to protect our interests.

The *aide-mémoire* from the Foreign Office follows.

"The Cabinet have given the most serious consideration to Mr. Winant's letter of December 11th. Reports reaching His Majesty's Government agree with the information of the United States Government as to the deplorable and terrible conditions existing in Greece and His Majesty's Government have also reached the conclusion that some relaxation of the blockade in the Greek favor is now imperative. Of the two proposals contained in the telegram from the State Department enclosed in Mr. Winant's letter His Majesty's Government greatly prefer the former, namely the despatch of a single cargo of wheat to Greece under the auspices of the International Red Cross. It is considered that this proposal is likely to be both more expeditious and effective in practice and more easily justified against the general background of the blockade.

2. His Majesty's Government are grateful for the public support which Mr. Hull has given to their blockade policy and particularly to the basic principle that Axis are responsible for the territories they have overrun. His Majesty's Government are indeed fully conscious that without the support they could not have maintained the blockade in the face of the insistent and moving appeals of the various allied governments notably the Belgian Government. The making of the concession to Greece now contemplated will inevitably lead to a renewal of these appeals and it will be impossible for His Majesty's Government to maintain their position unless the United States Government are ready to continue their support and associate themselves fully and publicly with the measure now proposed.

3. As regards the immediate steps to be taken His Majesty's Government propose to instruct the Minister of State at Cairo to arrange with the International Red Cross for the immediate despatch of a large shipload of wheat from Alexandria to the Piraeus. The International Red Cross will be asked to obtain a safe conduct from the Axis and to supervise distribution through its organization already existing in Athens.

4. It is not proposed to give any advance publicity to this shipment but when it becomes necessary to make a statement it is suggested that generally similar engagements might be issued in London, Cairo.

"The United Kingdom and United States Governments have viewed with increasing dismay the appalling conditions observed in Greece. Despite their undoubted ability to do so, the German Government have done practically nothing to meet the situation created by the pillage and extortion of their Armies in the spring of 1941. They have indeed shown themselves quite indifferent to the fate of the Greek population, no doubt because the industrial resources of Greece are too small to be of any value to the German war machine.

His Majesty's Government and the United States Government have accordingly authorized a single shipment of 8,000 tons of wheat to Greece to be

applied under the auspices of the International Red Cross in relief of the present emergency. This is an addition to the existing relief schemes namely shipments of foodstuff from Turkey (not justifiable inside the blockade area) and the proposed evacuation of Greek children and nursing mothers.

The two Governments, nevertheless, continue to maintain in the most categorical manner that it is incumbent upon the enemy to feed the countries occupied by him and their policy in this respect remains unaffected by the exception which it has been found necessary to make in the special circumstances obtaining in Greece.'

5. His Majesty's Government would be glad to receive urgently the observations of the United States Government on the foregoing more especially as to their willingness to lend the indispensable weight of their authority to the proposed policy."

WINANT

---

868 48/2008 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, January 21, 1942—7 p. m.

247. Your 249, January 17, 4 a. m. British *aide-mémoire* and suggested public announcement are under urgent consideration. Meanwhile, the following telegram no. 92, January 17, 2 p. m., has been received from Stockholm:

"Foreign Office states that Swedish Red Cross has arranged to send the Swedish ship *Hallaren* of about 5,000 tons to Greece to transport children to Turkey and return to Greece with food supplies for starving population. Foreign Office has obtained British approval<sup>17</sup> and is today approaching the German and Italian Governments. Provided Axis approval is granted, this ship will presumably remain in the Mediterranean plying back and forth between Turkey and Greece as long as conditions warrant."

HULL

---

868.48/2008 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, January 21, 1942—10 p. m.

254. Your 249, January 17, 4 a. m. The British *aide-mémoire* and the suggested statement for issuance in Cairo and London have been carefully considered. It is observed that the British Government contemplates (1) the shipment of 8,000 tons of wheat from

---

<sup>17</sup> Telegram No. 398, January 28, 5 p. m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, quoted a letter from the British Foreign Minister in which it was stated that the British Government had agreed to pay the cost of chartering the S. S. *Hallaren* on a non-profit basis (868.48/2015).

Egypt to Greece in the near future provided adequate safe conduct is obtained from the Axis and provided the International Red Cross will supervise the distribution in Greece, (2) a continuation of existing relief schemes involving shipments to Greece from Turkey, and (3) the possibility of evacuating from Greece children and nursing mothers.

Please inform the Foreign Office that the American Government has no hesitancy in assuring the British Government of its readiness to continue to support the principle of relief for Greece in the manner suggested, and concurs in the suggested statement quoted in Section 3 of your telegram under reference.<sup>18</sup>

The *aide-mémoire* makes no reference to the financing of the contemplated measures. The Department assumes that any American funds which may become involved would be transferred to the United Kingdom.

HULL

---

868.48/2040

*The King of the Hellenes (George II) to President Roosevelt*<sup>19</sup>

On behalf of my distressed and suffering countrymen, may I appeal to you, Mr. President, as the head of the great American Nation, whose beneficent help and humanitarian ideals have contributed so much to alleviate man's suffering throughout the world, to inaugurate relief for Greece by supplying its eight million inhabitants with the bare necessities of life. If this relief is not granted immediately the present appalling situation will continue and thousands more of my countrymen will surely die of starvation. An outstanding citizen of your country could, with the aid of the International Red Cross Committee, rally the necessary support and thus prevent what threatens to be one of the great tragedies of modern times.

Due to the fact that the quickest possible way of supplying Greece is the purchasing and transporting of foodstuffs from the Middle East, principally from Turkey, I venture to suggest that the American personality in question be provided with the necessary funds and be entrusted with the task of coordinating and supervising on the spot the whole effort.

LONDON, February 6, 1942.

GEORGE II

---

<sup>18</sup> Statement quoted in paragraph numbered 4, p. 734. The statement was made by the British Minister of Economic Warfare in the House of Commons, January 27, 1942; see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 31, 1942, p. 93.

<sup>19</sup> Sent to the Under Secretary of State by President Roosevelt on February 12, with the following memorandum: "This was brought in by the Greek Minister and I talked the situation over with him. I do not know whether this calls for a reply or not. What do you think? F.D.R."

868.48/2041

*The Greek Minister (Diamantopoulos) to the  
Acting Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, February 17, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am instructed by my Government to convey to the President the heartfelt thanks of His Majesty the King and the Prime Minister for the keen interest he showed in the question of supplying foodstuffs to Greece, to which I had the honor of calling his attention last week.

Concerning the President's suggestion about Mr. Henry Morgenthau,<sup>20</sup> my Government wish to state that no one in Greece has forgotten the valuable and devoted services Mr. Morgenthau rendered during the trying years of the influx of the Greek refugees from Asia Minor.

I desire also to advise Your Excellency that according to latest information from our Legation in Ankara the situation in Greece is becoming worse and worse, and that any decision would be most welcome.

With kindest regards [etc.]

C. DIAMANTOPOULOS

---

868 48/2030a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, February 17, 1942—6 p. m.

616. Greek War Relief Association desires to charter Swedish Vessel *Industria* now in New York for single voyage to Turkey with 2,300 tons of flour to be furnished Greece under Lend-Lease. Turkish Government would be requested, when vessel is ready to sail, to permit equivalent amount of flour to be sent to Greece at once, and *Industria* cargo, upon arrival, would consequently enter Turkish stocks as replacement. Since vessel will be ready for loading February 19 and time is needed for accumulating cargo, views of British Government are urgently requested. The Department, after consideration, is inclined to view the plan with favor, on the clear understanding that approval is granted for a single shipment of 2,300 tons.

HULL

---

<sup>20</sup> Henry Morgenthau, Chairman of the Greek Refugee Settlement Commission established by the League of Nations, 1923. For correspondence regarding activities of the United States on behalf of Greek refugees, see *Foreign Relations*, 1922, vol. II, pp. 414 ff., and *ibid.*, 1923, vol. II, pp. 318 ff.

868.48/2081 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)  
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, February 18, 1942—4 p. m.  
[Received February 18—3:45 p. m.]

752. Your 616, February 17, 6 p. m. This question has been taken up urgently with the Foreign Office which is hopeful that it can obtain prompt agreement of the authorities concerned to permit this shipment direct to Greece. It is doubtful whether it can obtain agreement for shipment to Turkey. However, it thinks that direct shipment from New York would reach Greece as quickly as proposed shipment from Turkey because of probable delay in negotiations with Turkey and particularly in view of lack of available ships in Turkish ports.

WINANT

868.48/2084 : Telegram

---

*The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the Secretary of State*

ANKARA, February 21, 1942—7 p. m.  
[Received 9:43 p. m.]

96. Your 47, February 7, 7 p. m.<sup>21</sup> The Minister for Foreign Affairs<sup>22</sup> with whom I have twice discussed the matter informed me today that his Government does not feel that it is in a position to send wheat to Greece at the present time. However, if the improvement in the weather continues during the next few weeks the Government expects the peasants to bring more grain on to the market and in such event it may be found possible to release some wheat for Greece. It is emphasized that Turkey at the moment was living from hand to mouth in respect to wheat and that the Government has been having great difficulty in maintaining adequate supplies for the cities.

In referring to conditions in Greece he said that the Turkish Government had agreed to take a thousand Greek children who would be brought to Turkey on the second next return trip of the *Dumlupinar*. In response to an inquiry he said that this boat (which is sailing today with 2,100 tons of foodstuffs) would continue to be available to transport food supplies to Greece but that the kinds of food shipped would have to vary from trip to trip inasmuch as Turkey was running short of some of vegetables hitherto sent. He said that the Turkish Government realized that

---

<sup>21</sup> Not printed.

<sup>22</sup> Sükrü Saracoğlu.

the next 2 months would be a very critical time for Greece and was desirous of giving all aid possible.

In view of reports that the present voyage of the above mentioned ship would be the last the British Chargé (who transmitted a personal message from his Government) and the Greek Ambassador made representations to the Minister for Foreign Affairs last Tuesday with regard to continuation of shipment of provision to Greece during at least the next 2 months.

KELLEY

---

868.48/2085 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)  
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, February 22, 1942—midnight.  
[Received February 23—2:10 a. m.]

845. I have just received the following letter from Mr. Eden of the Foreign Office:

"As you know the 8000 tons of wheat which His Majesty's Government and the United States Government decided should be sent to Greece through the blockade as an exceptional emergency measure will if all goes well be shipped shortly from Haifa.

This concession by no means satisfied the Greek Government and the Greek Prime Minister has hinted that he will resign if further shipments are not allowed. It is indeed clear that the famine in Greece is on too large a scale for this single shipment to make any appreciable impression and all reports indicate that the situation has if anything deteriorated further. We have reached the conclusion therefore that as an exceptional case further shipments of wheat or flour to Greece should be arranged though the objections to allowing relief through the blockade to other occupied countries are as strong as ever.

There are, however, many disadvantages in making piecemeal concessions. These would involve allowing unconditional and therefore entirely uncontrolled shipments; upsetting the program of the Middle Eastern Supply Center; temporarily withdrawing tonnage urgently needed by our own war services; and setting a precedent for uncontrolled relief which will be invoked by the governments of other occupied countries. We consider therefore that strict conditions should be laid down for further relief shipments to Greece.

In particular we should in order to save our shipping resources insist that future shipments shall be made in neutral ships (not now under Allied charter) and with neutral crews and that these ships should be given safe conducts enabling them to go to the country where wheat is produced and carry it direct to Greece. A suggestion that the Axis should be made to release Greek ships under their control for the proposed shipments has been examined but rejected because there are not many of these vessels; they are



in bad condition and their tonnage is unsuitable. We understand, however, from His Majesty's Minister of [at] Stockholm that there are number of suitable Swedish ships available in the Baltic and we hope it may be possible to induce the Swedish Government to allow them to be chartered and to encourage Swedish Red Cross to undertake distribution in Greece under the auspices of the International Red Cross. There is evidence that the Swedish Red Cross will be willing to undertake work of this kind and it is thought that they are in a better position to do so than the International Red Cross itself.

As regards quantities, the Greek Prime Minister has asked for 33,000 tons a month which is about the total average import in normal years. There could be no question of our undertaking to supply so large an amount. The quantity to be supplied under the scheme now proposed must be governed by the shipping available. To give an example regular shipments of 15,000 tons a month from Canada would, we understand, require not less than 6 ships of 5,000 tons gross tonnage each.

We should of course like the United States Government to be associated with us in this matter and the procedure we would propose to adopt is to ask the Swedish Government whether they will offer the use of Swedish ships for the purpose indicated and also offer the service of the Swedish Red Cross to supervise distribution. We should go on to say that if they will do so we would suggest that they should so inform the International Red Cross for communication to the occupying powers in Greece, adding that they understand that the United States and United Kingdom Governments would agree to the use of the ships for carrying wheat or flour to Greece subject to the five conditions enclosed herewith.

The two footnotes are not for communication to the occupying powers: There [They?] will be covered by our making clear to the Swedes that the whole proposal depends on (a) their requesting safe conducts for their ships to the point of loading, and (b) their being able to make satisfactory arrangements for the proposed commission of control to report fully to us.

We have attempted to draw up the conditions in such a manner as not to provoke their rejection by the Germans on prestige grounds but they do in fact represent what we regard as the most reasonable conditions we can offer and it is not our intention to enter into debate with the Axis about them.

I should be most grateful if you could ascertain as a matter of great urgency whether your Government would be agreeable to proceeding on these lines.

It would be appreciated if the approval of the United States Government if given could cover our putting the proposal to the enemy powers through the International Red Cross ourselves should the Swedes not be willing to do so.

I would add that as the above arrangements must, of course, take some time to come into effect we are considering your memorandum of the 18th February about the despatch of the *Industria* from the United States to Turkey as a separate question. I hope to let you have a reply as regards this in the very near future."

Following is the enclosure to the above quoted letter:

"1. All belligerents to give safe conduct in both directions for ships engaged in carrying foodstuffs to Greece for distribution as relief under this scheme.

2. A neutral commission to be established in Greece and have under its direct control the distribution of all goods imported as relief.

3. Foodstuffs imported as relief through the blockade to be reserved solely for the Greek population and to be distributed where in the opinion of the commission the need is greatest.

4. Foodstuffs originating in Greece to be reserved solely for persons normally resident in Greece in peacetime except insofar as any foodstuffs consumed in Greece by the armed forces or officials of the occupying powers are replaced by equivalent imports of foodstuffs into Greece for the Greek population.

5. The commission to have the right and duty to verify by direct observation that these conditions are fulfilled, to be sufficiently numerous and to maintain a sufficient staff, and to enjoy (with its officers) such complete freedom of movement and facilities for inspection and inquiry as are necessary for this purpose.

Footnote[s]

(a) If as is contemplated the ships used for the relief mission are Swedish the safe conducts will have to cover the original voyage from the Baltic to the port of loading.

(b) In addition we shall require an assurance that the commission will be able to report fully to His Majesty's Government on all matters connected with the working of this scheme."

WINANT

868.48/2040

*The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, February 23, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: You will recall that the attached communication from the King of Greece<sup>23</sup> was delivered to you recently by the Greek Minister, appealing for the relief of Greece and suggesting that you send an outstanding American citizen to the Near East, supplied with the necessary funds, to supervise the relief of Greece from that area.

The Greek Minister has informed me that he reported to his Government your intimation that Mr. Henry Morgenthau, Senior, might be entrusted with the assignment. The Minister has now been instructed by his Government to state that no one in Greece has forgotten the valuable and devoted services which Mr. Morgenthau rendered during the trying years of the influx of Greek refugees from Asia Minor.

<sup>23</sup> Dated February 6, p. 736.

I attach for your consideration a suggested reply to the communication from King George II, which avoids any direct commitment regarding his appeal (1) for funds or (2) for the designation of an emissary. If, however, you desire to take some action now on these two questions, a more positive reply to the King would be possible.

I am inclined to believe that the appointment of a prominent American to act as your representative to investigate the question of according relief to occupied areas, notably Greece, would serve a useful purpose in convincing the residents of those areas of the American Government's interest in their tragic condition and might also result in means being found to accord them more relief supplies than at present, without injury to the war effort. It might not be necessary for your representative to visit the Near East in person, at least for the present, since we already have considerable information regarding conditions in occupied areas and feasible means of relief which we could place readily at his disposal.

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

[Enclosure]

*Draft of Letter From President Roosevelt to the King of the Hellenes (George II)*

MY DEAR KING GEORGE: I have received Your Majesty's communication of February 6, 1942, delivered to me by the Greek Minister in Washington, suggesting that an outstanding representative of the American people might be sent to the Near East to supervise measures for the relief of the suffering inhabitants of Greece.

As Your Majesty is doubtless aware from my recent letter to Mr. Tsouderos, the situation in Greece has moved the American people profoundly. The sufferings of civilian populations under Axis domination, and particularly the cruel hardships of your own country, are perhaps the most tragic of the many evils which Axis aggression has produced. The American people have not been lacking in their demonstrations of sympathy for human suffering in various parts of the world, from whatever cause, but their emotion for Greece at the present time is of an especial kind, resulting not only from the matchless example which Greece gave in its fight during five months, with its limited resources, against the attack of Italy and later of Germany, but also from the unequalled want to which the residents of Greece have been reduced.

I have taken under urgent consideration the specific suggestions contained in Your Majesty's communication, and I will write to you further with regard thereto. I realize how close this problem lies to your heart.

Very sincerely yours,

---

868.48/2036 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)  
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, February 24, 1942—7 p. m.  
[Received February 24—2:12 p. m.]

877. Your 616, February 17 and Embassy's 845, February 22. The Foreign Office has just informed us that they fully approve of the proposed wheat shipment on steamer *Industria* or substitute ship either to Greece or Turkey as we wish. They have telegraphed their Embassy in Washington to this effect.<sup>24</sup>

WINANT

---

868.48/2035 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the  
United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, February 26, 1942—midnight.

860. Your 845, February 22, midnight. The American Government will be glad to associate itself with the British Government in the plans for the relief of Greece as outlined in Mr. Eden's letter.

WELLES

---

868.48/2049 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, March 2, 1942—7 p. m.  
[Received 11:43 p. m.]

399. On February 28 British Minister<sup>25</sup> showed me a telegram he had received from London instructing him to approach Swedish Government with view to securing an offer for use of Swedish shipping for transport of wheat to Greece and service of Swedish Red Cross in supervising distribution. This telegram stated United States Government and British Government had decided that in view

---

<sup>24</sup> For statement released to the press March 6 on this subject, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 7, 1942, p. 208.

<sup>25</sup> V. A. Mallet.

appalling conditions in Greece and as an exceptional measure they would allow consignment of 8,000 tons of wheat to be sent to that country through blockade and that it was hoped this consignment would be shipped shortly from Haifa. There followed description of famine in Greece which was stated to be on too large a scale for this single shipment or other measures in the blockade area to make an appreciable impression. The British Government and United States Government were said to have reached conclusion, therefore, that in view of exceptional circumstances further shipments of wheat or flour should be allowed. I understand Department is informed of details of proposals and conditions, et cetera, and will not telegraph them unless desired.

I also received on Saturday a telegram from American Embassy London dated February 27 stating that Foreign Office would appreciate my associating myself with British Minister in approaching Swedish Government regarding matter.

I told British Minister I had not yet received instructions. He said that in light of his instructions he felt it very important to act at once and after some discussion I told him that I would be willing to accompany him to see Mr. Boheman, Secretary General of Foreign Office, making it clear however that I had not yet received official instructions.

Mr. Mallet and I today called by appointment on Mr. Boheman who seemed already informed of matter and mentioned that Prince Carl, Chairman of Swedish Red Cross, had telegraphed to American Red Cross in this connection on February 28. I took no active part in discussion between Mr. Mallet and Mr. Boheman. I informed latter that I had not yet received instructions but with that understanding I was glad to associate myself in principle with what the British Minister had said. Mr. Boheman's response was immediate and entirely favorable. He also said that he did not think there would be any difficulty in regard to necessary shipping. He received an *aide-mémoire* from the British Minister embodying the proposals and conditions which he said he would take up at once in the proper quarters. He expressed agreement with both, but said he thought condition 4 might be clarified and made more precise as he anticipated objection on part of Germans as now worded.

I would appreciate Department's confirmation of my action with British Minister so that Foreign Office may be advised.

JOHNSON

868.48/2049 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, March 3, 1942—8 p. m.

121. The Department's approval of the plans to which you refer for the relief of Greece has been made known to the British Government. You are consequently requested to associate yourself with the British Minister in the necessary discussions with the Swedish Government.

WELLES

---

868.48/2052 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, March 4, 1942—noon.

[Received March 4—11:41 a. m.]

415. Department's 121, March 3, 8 p. m. Among suggestions made by British Government regarding relief for Greece was one to effect that proposal as far as Germans concerned should appear to come from Swedish initiative and that if possible Germans should not be allowed to know of British-American action. Boheman agreed.

JOHNSON

---

868 48/2054 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, March 6, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received March 7—12:11 a. m.]

447. Department's 121, March 3, 8 p. m., my 399, March 2, 7 p. m.; and 415, March 4, noon. British Minister and I saw Secretary General of Foreign Office this afternoon at latter's request.

Mr. Boheman said that Swedish Government and Swedish Red Cross will be happy to cooperate toward realization of plan for shipments of wheat and flour to Greece as outlined in *aide-mémoire* given him by British Minister on March 2. He stated that Swedish ships with tonnage totalling 45,000 to 50,000 tons are available for purpose and could be time-chartered on conditions to be agreed upon—for example on basis of conditions laid down in Anglo-Swedish shipping agreement. He said that there were seven or eight ships available now in Baltic averaging nearly 7,500 tons each rather than the 50,000 tons mentioned in British *aide-mémoire*. He thought that this tonnage would be sufficient for maintaining shipments at rate indicated in *aide-mémoire* of March 2.

He suggested that commission of control should consist of two or three members under presidency of Mr. Allard, Swedish Chargé d'Affaires in Sofia and Athens, now resident at Sofia. He pointed out that Allard was personally well qualified for job as he had spent many years in Greece as Chargé d'Affaires and had detailed knowledge of country and very wide acquaintance. He also mentioned incidentally that Allard was *persona grata* to Germans as he had been instrumental in saving life of German Minister in Greece when fighting was going on. Other suitable candidates are available and their names will be submitted shortly. He suggested informally that Mr. Gyllenram at present in charge of Swedish office at Vichy engaged in protection of certain foreign interests be made another member of commission. He said Gyllenram was a man of wide experience including experience in feeding populations. They also have in mind a man with good business qualifications. He suggested that commission should be assisted by clerical staff and stated that Swedish Government is prepared to defray expenses of such a commission of control and he said that his Government realized cost would not be great but that it would like to make this small contribution to so worthy an undertaking.

As to conditions guaranteeing Greek population would derive entire benefit from relief action Swedish Government and Swedish Red Cross are prepared to enter into negotiations with German and Italian Government on line indicated in *aide-mémoire*. He thought that this direct approach by Swedes would save a great deal of time and would have more useful results than if the proposal were taken up with German and Italian Governments initially by International Red Cross as had been suggested in British *aide-mémoire*. Mr. Boheman further suggested that United States and British Governments inform International Red Cross Committee at Geneva of the scheme and ask that body to assume protection of the relief action in order that it might be carried out under its general auspices. Both Mallet and I suggested that it would seem to us preferable for Sweden itself to inform International Red Cross in sense suggested after German Government's consent had been obtained. Boheman agreed and said his Government was entirely agreeable to any suggestion we might make regarding approach to International Red Cross. He emphasized more than once importance of avoiding any move which Germans might regard as an affront to their prestige. It was this point on which they were most sensitive and unless matter were handled carefully the scheme might encounter real difficulties.

He had two further suggestions to make informally:

(1) Pointing out that as conditions stated in British *aide-mémoire* did not expressly stipulate that Swedish ships after their errand had been performed would be returned to their "prison" in the Baltic it was most important that Germans clearly understand this will be done and that they have no suspicion the shipping might subsequently fall into Allied hands. He thought conditions in British *aide-mémoire* should be modified to make this plain as Germans would be sure to pick it up.

(2) He suggested that in any publicity which the United States and British Governments might feel it necessary to make regarding safeguards for food reaching Greek people only, they limit themselves simply to saying that adequate guarantees had been given that Greek population will get full and sole benefit from food distribution without making public details of the conditions. He thought that would be wisest course to take with view to avoiding any difficulty with Germans in point of prestige.

JOHNSON

868.48/2057

*The Greek Minister (Diamantopoulos) to the  
Acting Secretary of State*

No. 540

WASHINGTON, March 6, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have the honor to transmit herewith a message received from His Majesty the King of the Hellenes for the President of the United States, and should appreciate if you kindly have it forwarded to its high destination.

Accept [etc.]

C. DIAMANTOPOULOS

[Enclosure]

*The King of the Hellenes (George II) to President Roosevelt*

I am deeply moved by your reply<sup>26</sup> to my communication of the sixth of February. The great North American Union which has never failed to come to Greece's assistance at every moment of difficulty has on this, the most tragic occasion of all, again shown all her generosity and understanding. The Greek people will never forget it. All who, thanks to your noble solicitude will be delivered from certain death, will always bless your name they and their parents and their children and the thought that the American people is at their side will give them strength in the moral struggle that tirelessly they continue to wage against the invaders.

GEORGE II

<sup>26</sup> See draft of letter from President Roosevelt to the King of the Hellenes, p. 742.



868.48/2055 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, March 7, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received March 7—11:30 a. m.]

456. My 447, March 6, 8 p. m. Swedish ships referred to in first paragraph are all oil-burning. British Minister has telegraphed substance of our conversation with Mr. Boheman to his Government. We both hope that earliest possible instructions may reach us so that Swedish Government may go ahead.

JOHNSON

868.48/2069

*The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt*<sup>27</sup>

WASHINGTON, March 11, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: You may recall that the King of Greece, in a letter to you dated February 6, 1942, requested that the American Government supply funds for the relief of Greece and asked you to appoint a representative to administer activities relating to Greek relief. In acknowledging this request, you informed King George that you would communicate with him later concerning his proposal.

There is now enclosed a further communication from the King of Greece<sup>28</sup> forwarded by the Greek Minister on March 6, which expresses the King's appreciation for your consideration of his requests.

Meanwhile, the British Government has entered, with our concurrence and support, into discussions with the Swedish Government and the Swedish Red Cross for the use of seven or eight Swedish ships, now tied up in the Baltic, for the relief of Greece. The ships would take food, principally wheat, to Greece from producing countries such as Canada and the United States, and a well-qualified Swedish committee would be sent to Greece to supervise distribution, under the general auspices of the International Red Cross Committee.

No suggestions have yet been made to us by the British or Swedish Governments regarding funds to defray the expenses involved in sending the food to Greece, but I have no doubt that we shall be asked to contribute to the financing of the arrangements, if they succeed.

<sup>27</sup> Notation on original: "SW OK FDR."

<sup>28</sup> *Ante*, p. 747.

In view of the above, I suggest the postponement of further consideration, at least for the present, of King George's requests. If the Swedish plan should not succeed or if it should prove inadequate, the proposal of the King of Greece might be revived.

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

---

868.48/2056 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, March 11, 1942—11 p. m.

135. Your 447, March 6, 8 p. m., and your 456, March 7, 2 p. m. The Department is gratified at the progress being made in the plan for the relief of Greece and hopes that arrangements along the lines of Mr. Boheman's suggestions may be put into effect at the earliest possible date.

WELLES

---

868 48/2086b : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, March 28, 1942—9 p. m.

1299. The following message has been received from the Greek War Relief Association in New York:

"Argentine Government has given to Greek Government 20,000 tons wheat for starving Greek people. Greek War Relief Association is informed of opportunity to charter one privately-owned 4000-ton freighter or Argentine Government-owned 7000 to 8000-ton freight[er], both flying Argentine flag, to ship this wheat to Greece. We feel this is wonderful chance to save the lives of thousands in Greece and appeal to you for help in securing permission American Government and if possible through you to seek British Government's consent. Word from you as quickly as possible under present circumstances will be very deeply appreciated."

With respect to the use of the Argentine flag vessels, the following from the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee immobilized ship plan of August 28, 1941 may be of use:

"Paragraph 5) The Government of the United States has been informed that the British Government agrees to recognize the transfers of vessels resulting from this plan of operation and to waive its belligerent rights so long as the following conditions are met:

"Section b) The vessels are operated under the flag of any American republic in inter-American trade, or by the Govern-

ment of the United States in general services in accordance with paragraph (4).

"Section c) Such service of the vessels now inactive shall not result in the diversion of any other vessels owned or controlled by Governments or nationals of an American republic to services inimical to the interests of Great Britain."

The Argentine Government vessel mentioned is probably a former Axis immobilized ship and would not be available for trade outside this hemisphere.

The Department is favorably inclined toward this proposal in general but before approving the transaction in principle wishes to receive the views of the British Government. Please cable reply.

WELLES

---

868.48/2082 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, March 31, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 5:55 p. m.]

697. Department's 189, March 28, midnight.<sup>29</sup> Present status of negotiations is that they are at standstill. Swedish Minister in Rome<sup>30</sup> put proposals before Ciano<sup>31</sup> personally whose reactions were favorable in principle although he did not commit himself. He asked rather naïve question whether Italy would be expected to pay for wheat and was assured that would not be the case. He referred Swedish Minister to technical experts in Foreign Office who assured him matter would have full consideration but that before a reply could be given they would have to consult Germany.

Swedish Minister in Berlin<sup>32</sup> similarly placed proposals before German Foreign Office but has had no reply. Germans also promised to examine matter fully but suggested two preliminary objections: (1) To number 4 of original conditions put before Swedish Foreign Office by British Minister that foodstuffs originating in Greece be reserved solely for persons normally resident there in peace time except that foodstuffs consumed in Greece by armed forces or officials of occupying powers be replaced by equivalent imports into Greece for Greek population and (2) suggested that in any such plans Sweden proposed for feeding Greeks, German and Italian Red Cross with perhaps representative of International Red Cross would be

---

<sup>29</sup> Not printed.

<sup>30</sup> Baron Hans Gustaf Beck-Friis.

<sup>31</sup> Count Galeazzo Ciano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>32</sup> Arvid G. Richert.

most appropriate agency for distribution. Swedish Minister assured them this would be unacceptable.

When consent of Italian and German Governments has been obtained it is intention of Swedish Government to advise International Red Cross.

JOHNSON

---

868.48/2087 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews)  
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 7, 1942—1 a. m.  
[Received April 6—8:45 p. m.]

1654. Department's 1299, March 28, midnight [9 p. m.] We have just received from the Foreign Office the following letter giving their reactions to the proposal to transport to Greece in Argentine flag vessels the 20,000 tons of wheat donated by the Argentine Government:

"As you know, the Axis is at present considering the proposal put to them by the Swedish Government at our joint instigation that safe conduct should be given to Swedish shipping at present in the Baltic to carry wheat to Greece, provided that the Axis accept certain conditions. If the plan is accepted, our intention is that the wheat should be fetched from Canada as being the shortest haul.

In our view, the optimum solution of the Greek relief question is that the Axis should accept this proposal, since it has the great advantage from the preemptive point of view of getting Swedish ships out of German clutches and involves no cost either direct or indirect to the shipping resources of the United Nations. We also attach considerable importance to the acceptance by the Axis of our conditions, as minimizing the benefit to the enemy of relief shipments.

The shipments which we have already either initiated or agreed to are definitely regarded by us as interim arrangements to meet the emergency pending the institution of a proper controlled scheme.

In these circumstances we are not much taken with the idea that Argentine ships should be allocated for relief shipments which might otherwise be contributing, even if indirectly, to the common shipping pool; nor do we wish the enemy to get the idea that the series of interim uncontrolled shipments will continue indefinitely. If, however, the enemy do reject or delay the Swedish scheme on one pretext or another, it may be that we should have to fall back on this Argentine plan to tide the Greeks over.

In all these circumstances, we think the best thing to do is to stall, perhaps by saying that other proposals are under consideration, and that it is not possible to give a decision on their part. We have encouraged the Greek Minister here to take this line with his contacts in the Argentine."

868.48/2088 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 7, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received April 7—2:17 p. m.]

755. My 697, March 31, 6 [3] p. m. Foreign Office informed me this morning that Swedish Minister in Berlin has received acknowledgment in writing from German Foreign Office of proposals for food relief for Greece. German acknowledgment expresses interest in project and promises early reply.

Swedish Red Cross has received communications from both German and Italian Red Cross expressing sympathy and interest in undertaking.

Foreign Office is encouraged by these indications and hopes for favorable reply but anticipates difficulties will arise on details which will require negotiation, particularly with respect to control of distribution. It was stated all necessary arrangements have been made here to start work immediately necessary clearance is received from Germany and Italy.

JOHNSON

868.48/3186

---

*The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt*<sup>33</sup>

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Mr. Norman Davis has written to the Department reporting further urgent appeals which the American Red Cross has received from the International Red Cross for assistance in providing relief for Greece, where the food situation is said to be rapidly deteriorating. Mr. Davis indicates his hope that through some channel relief for the Greek people can be arranged.

A fundamental question arises regarding the providing of funds for Greek relief. Mr. Davis points out that it has been the policy of the American Red Cross not to use its funds or to recommend to you allotment of the President's Fund to send food to areas where the American Red Cross is not able to send its own representatives to supervise the actual distribution of the relief supplies. The American Red Cross is of course unable to send representatives to Greece at present. Before taking any action on the appeals he has received, therefore, Mr. Davis desires to learn the attitude of this Department towards the question.

---

<sup>33</sup> Notation on original: "S.W. OK FDR."

The principle which the American Red Cross has followed of limiting its food relief to areas where its own officers may supervise the distribution is entirely sound, and exception should be made, in my opinion, only in a very unusual emergency. We are faced with the fact, however, that as many as 1,000,000 persons may die in Greece during 1942 if relief is not sent to them, according to a recent estimate contained in a report prepared by the office of the Coordinator of Information, and it seems to me imperative for the United States to make every effort possible to come to the aid of those heroic people.

I recommend, therefore, that the Department be authorized to inform Mr. Davis that we should be glad for the American Red Cross, as an exceptional measure, to assist in the relief of Greece, through such funds or supplies as may be available to it for the purpose, with the understanding, of course, that the Red Cross will satisfy itself that adequate provision for the supervision of distribution in Greece by the International Red Cross Committee or other acceptable agency is included in any relief plan involving the use of American funds or supplies.

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

---

868.48/2089 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 15, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received April 15—3:12 p. m.]

840. My 755, April 7, 4 p. m. Foreign Office has just informed me Italian reply received to proposals for Greek food relief. Reply is in some detail and imposes conditions, but Foreign Office feels it is on whole favorable and that there is now open prospect of immediate progress. It was intimated in Italian reply that German reply would be identical. Foreign Office will ask Mallet and me to meet appropriate official tomorrow when details will be communicated.

JOHNSON

---

868.48/2092 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 19, 1942—noon.

[Received 2:54 p. m.]

890. My 840, April 15, 4 p. m. Boheman sent for British Minister and me yesterday afternoon for communication of further details regarding Italian reply to proposals for Greek food relief. He gave

us a memorandum embodying substance of this reply which reads as follows:

"The Italian Government have—according to a report recently received from the Swedish Minister at Rome—given their consent to the proposed relief action in favor of Greece on the following conditions:

(1) They are prepared to give safe-conduct in both directions for the Swedish ships transporting the foodstuffs from Canada to Greece.

(2) The Italian authorities will offer no objection to the allocation of all foodstuffs imported to Greece as relief under the scheme being made and controlled by one of the organs of the International Red Cross. Delegates of the Swedish Red Cross might be included on conditions to be agreed upon between the Swedish Red Cross and the International Red Cross Committee.

(3) The Italian Government agree that foodstuffs imported to Greece by the Swedish Red Cross will be reserved solely for the Greek population. As the quantity of grain to be transported monthly is limited, the Italian Government are of the opinion that it would be advantageous to concentrate its distribution to such area where the need is greatest, i. e. Greece's mainland, Peloponnesus and Crete (reservation made for more detailed specification later).

(4) The Italian Government are in principle also of the opinion that foodstuffs originating in Greece are to be reserved for the Greek civil population.

The Italian Government reserve their rights at any time, when in their opinion the conditions so require, to withdraw their consent to the relief scheme; due notification of any such step will however, beforehand be given to the Swedish Legation at Rome. The Italian Government wish to state that they have no objection to negotiations being continued through the Swedish Government in order to arrive at an agreement concerning the practical method of execution of this scheme.

The Swedish Red Cross intends to get in touch immediately with the International Red Cross Committee at Geneva asking them eventually to assume protection of the proposed relief scheme and to collaborate with the Swedish Government and the Swedish Red Cross towards the elaboration of a plan of control, which would meet the requirements of the American and British Governments. The Swedish Government will be glad to submit the plan to the said Governments as soon as conditions permit. Stockholm 18th, April, 1942."

See immediately following telegram.

JOHNSON

868.48/2098 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 19, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 2:41 p. m.]

891. My 890, April 19, noon. Despite intimation in Italian reply reported in my 840, April 15, 4 p. m. reply has not yet been received from the Germans. Boheman told Mallet and me that Foreign Office has been pressing daily for German reply both at Berlin and through German Legation Stockholm.

In his opinion hitch is more than it appears to be and hinges around condition number 2 in Italian reply. It is obvious that Italians and probably Germans object to control committee being in hands of Swedish Red Cross and that counter-proposal made by Italians for control by International Red Cross with Swedish representation is motivated by considerations of prestige. He said that his Government now proposes to go immediately to International Red Cross informing them that two proposals have been advanced—(1) proposal by American and British Governments for a Swedish committee and (2) counter-proposal from Italian Government for an International Red Cross Committee. Swedes will suggest to International Red Cross that International Red Cross and Swedish Government propose to both sides a compromise joint committee of International Red Cross and Swedish Red Cross which will elect its own chairman.

Boheman feels that Italian reply is satisfactory except for Italian condition number 2. He assumes that main consideration in mind of American and British Governments is that control commissions should be neutral but that we would not insist it be composed exclusively of Swedes. Both Mallet and I said that we personally believed there would be no difficulty on this point. Boheman pointed out that Italians have agreed without reservations to use of Swedish tonnage for carrying foodstuffs and felt that this would give satisfaction all around.

Please see my despatch number 291, March 7, 1942, enclosing copy of *aide-mémoire* handed by British Minister to Foreign Office on March 2, 1942.<sup>34</sup> It will be noted from this *aide-mémoire* that suggestions made by Mr. Boheman for meeting Italian condition number 2 regarding control follow line original suggestions of British Government.

See immediately following telegram.

JOHNSON

---

<sup>34</sup> Neither printed.



868.48/2094 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 19, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received April 19—1:38 p. m.]

892. My 891, April 19, 1 p. m. Mallet told Boheman and me that British Foreign Office is under some pressure in Parliament for a statement regarding progress of these negotiations and that they felt it imperative to make a public statement in the near future. Boheman agreed to this and British Minister is suggesting following text to the Foreign Office as a possible reply to be made Monday or Tuesday to question in the House of Commons:

"On the initiative of the Swedish Red Cross negotiations have for the past month been proceeding with both the belligerent parties regarding a relief action for the population of Greece. The Swedish Government having declared themselves ready to place Swedish tonnage now lying in Swedish ports at the disposal of the parties interested, the British and United States Governments have stated their willingness to authorize monthly shipments of 15,000 tons of wheat or flour from Canada to Greece. It is hoped that the German and Italian Governments will be prepared to facilitate the relief action. The Swedish Government continue their negotiations with both the belligerent parties with a view to arriving at an early agreement regarding the conditions under which the relief action is to be carried out probably under the auspices of the International Red Cross."

JOHNSON

868 48/3004 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 30, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received May 1—2:42 a. m.]

1019. My 973, April 27, 8 p. m.<sup>35</sup> Boheman, Secretary General Foreign Office, asked British Minister and me to see him today. He gave us a draft translation of German reply which has just been received to proposals for Greek food relief. Following is text furnished by Foreign Office.

"The German Government have taken *ad notam* that the British and United States Governments on an appeal from the Swedish Red Cross have declared themselves willing to give free passage, including free return to Swedish ports, for Swedish ships which are to be placed at disposal for the transport of wheat and flour to the Greek civil population.

---

<sup>35</sup> Not printed.

The German Government in this connection understand:

(a) That the Swedish ships until their return to Swedish ports shall [not?] only be safeguarded against prize courts proceedings but also against any other seizure,

(b) That the Swedish ships may not, during the time they are being used in the interest of the Greek population, be used for any other purpose by the other belligerent party and that they will return to Swedish ports immediately after the termination of the aforesaid activity,

(c) That the assurances given by the British and United States Governments are also valid with regard to their Allies.

If the above mentioned assumptions are correct the German Government define as follows their attitude towards the details of the Swedish relief plan.

1. The German Government are prepared to give instructions to its armed forces not to interfere with the Swedish ships transporting wheat and flour to Greece, either on the outward or on the return voyage. The German Government will, in agreement with the Swedish Government, draw up a plan for the practical arrangements in detail. They wish, however, already now to point out that the exigencies of war may make it necessary for the shipments to take place from other than Canadian and North American ports. In order to get the plan working as soon as possible, the German Government are prepared temporarily also to allow shipments from the North American continent.

2. The German Government have no objection to the distribution of the foodstuffs imported to Greece under the scheme being handled by a commission of Swedish citizens and to the due control by this commission of the distribution. In that connection it may be pointed out that the relief work already carried out for the benefit of the Greek population is placed under the control of a special commission, consisting of one representative each from the International Red Cross Committee, the German, Italian and Greek Red Crosses. This commission is responsible for the just distribution of the imported commodities of every kind to the distressed Greek population. It works to the satisfaction of all parties concerned. In order to avoid the overlapping of the activity of two different commissions and to ascertain a proper distribution of all commodities imported to Greece under different relief schemes, it seems advisable that a close collaboration should be established between the Swedish commission and the above mentioned commission of representatives of the International Red Cross, et cetera.

3. The German Government are in agreement with the condition that the foodstuffs imported to Greece from overseas under the Swedish relief scheme should be exclusively reserved for the Greek population. In view of the complicated geographical structure of Greece, communication with the many small isles situated in the operative areas of the sea and air forces of the belligerent parties is extremely difficult. The Swedish commission will therefore have no practical possibilities of control in those islands. In the view of the German Government it would therefore be advisable, in order to

ensure the smooth functioning of the Swedish plan, that the distribution of foodstuffs be limited to those districts, which can be visited and which belong to the most distressed areas, viz. the Greek mainland, the Peloponnesus, and the Island of Crete.

The German Government are in agreement with the condition, that foodstuffs produced in these areas should be reserved for the Greek civil population. This should however not exclude in the normal exchange of goods. The German Government argue that the Royal Swedish Government continue their discussions concerning the relief scheme with both belligerent parties in order to arrive at an agreement about the details. The German Government also find it expedient that the Swedish Red Cross, as suggested, gets into touch with the International Committee of the Red Cross.

As the Swedish plan does not mention any specific length of time for carrying out the proposed scheme, the German Government assume that the work is intended to be carried out for an indefinite period until one of the participants might be forced to terminate its cooperation on account of unforeseen circumstances."

See immediately following telegram.

JOHNSON

868.48/3005 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 30, 1942—9 p. m.

[Received 10:20 p. m.]

1020. My 1019, April 30. Boheman was of opinion that German reply is more satisfactory than he had ever expected and with this view both Mallet and I agree. Swedish Government will proceed immediately to reconciling German reply with Italian and Boheman thinks there will be no real difficulty encountered at Rome. They will likewise start conversations immediately on basis of German reply with International Red Cross and within a very few days will submit to American and British Governments concrete suggestions for implementing the undertaking. I understand from Boheman that practical arrangements for the ships are very near completion.

See immediately following telegram.

JOHNSON

868.48/3006 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 30, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received (May 1<sup>st</sup>)—1:10 a. m.]

1021. My 1020, April 30. As of possible interest to Department following is substance of conversation which Boheman had yesterday

with Mallet and me before German reply had been received: Pending receipt of German reply Swedish Minister at Bern took matter up directly with International Red Cross. Fortunately M. Brunel, a Swiss, head of International Red Cross Commission in Greece, happened to be in Geneva at time. Brunel whom Boheman said Swedish Minister had described as an unusually able man of finest character made long entailed [*detailed?*] statement to Swedish Minister regarding work of his Commission in Greece and how it operates there now. There is a High Committee of International Red Cross to direct activities of Red Cross in Greece composed of Brunel and representatives of German, Italian and Greek Red Cross and Turkish Red Crescent. (It will be recalled that German reply made no mention of Turkish Red Crescent.) Under this High Committee there is an executive organ known as Committee of Action which is charged with the actual distribution of relief. This sub-committee is composed entirely of Swiss and Greeks. Brunel said that committee in Greece was extraordinarily dependent on cooperation of occupying powers forsaking [*for making?*] any effective distribution of relief. Principal reason for this dependence is total lack of transportation facilities except such as may be granted by occupying military power. Situation is different to that which obtained in Belgium during last war when Hoover Commission brought its own transportation and petrol.<sup>37</sup> Brunel also said that as practical matter cooperation of German and Italian Red Cross members of High Committee had been invaluable and irreplaceable in securing a minimum of transportation from occupying military. Brunel expressed opinion that it would be impossible to organize relief in Greece under any plan, without close collaboration with occupying power. He therefore told Swedish Minister that in his opinion there should not be created any new organ for distribution of relief to Greece; that existing organization should be used with High Committee reinforced by Swedes and Sub-committee of Action, now composed of Swiss and Greeks, should have Swedish members added. Swedish Minister is reported to have told Brunel that he did not believe his plan would be acceptable to British and American Governments. He asked Brunel if he would not try to think out some system of control which would be acceptable to Allied Governments and which would not meet with objections on score of lack adequate control and supervision.

---

<sup>37</sup> For correspondence on efforts of the United States for the relief of Belgium during World War I, see *Foreign Relations*, 1914, supp., pp. 809 ff.; *ibid.*, 1915, supp., pp. 1023 ff.; *ibid.*, 1916, supp., pp. 871 ff.; and *ibid.*, 1917, supp. 1, pp. 628 ff.

Brunel also had interesting observations to make that there was no shortage of edible fats in Greece; that in some districts there was actually a surplus of olive oil but that total lack of transportation and containers for edible oil made it impossible to distribute surplus. He suggested that containers for edible oils should be sent to Greece in connection with any relief scheme. Brunel also said that if his suggestions should be acceptable he not only would welcome addition of Swedes but felt that it would be essential under new plan as he would otherwise have no means of dealing with ships which brought food and asked that one of Swedes should be a shipping expert.

Boheman said that viewing matter realistically he was impressed by Brunel's suggestions and said that he thought it would be very helpful in ironing matter out if American and British Ministers in Switzerland should make direct contact with International Red Cross—either Huber, the President, or Burckhardt. He seemed uncertain whether Brunel was still at Geneva. Boheman feels that by British and American Ministers talking with International Red Cross they can ask any questions they like and that after thorough exploration of International Red Cross suggestions they may be in a position to judge how far it may be necessary to alter Brunel's proposal.

Department will of course realize that foregoing discussion took place before favorable nature of German reply was known. It is, however, of considerable interest as indicating a view of International Red Cross which there is no reason to believe is insincere.

JOHNSON

---

868.48/3011 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, May 8, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received May 8—7:26 p. m.]

1108. My 1019, April 30, 8 p. m., 1020, April 30, 9 p. m., and 1021, April 30, 10 p. m. Boheman told me this afternoon that Swedish Minister at Rome was having difficulty with Italians on point of machinery for control of distribution Greek food relief. Italians want to use existing set up with perhaps addition of Swedes but without Swedish control. Boheman said he realized that this goes to very essence of matter from American point of view. Result of conversation with International Red Cross has, however, been highly satisfactory. A Swiss representative of International Red Cross named Junod has gone to Rome and will assist Swedish Minister in endeavor to iron out difficulties with Italians and to arrive at some

agreed proposal which may be placed before American and British Governments. These conversations are expected to take place tomorrow and Boheman will communicate result to Mallet and me as soon as possible.

JOHNSON

868 48/3144 : Telegram

---

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, June 10, 1942—9 p. m.

[Received 9:20 p. m.]

1465. My 1108, May 8, 8 p. m. Boheman sent for Mallet and me this afternoon to compare the text of a communication made by the International Red Cross to the Italian Government with specific recommendations. These recommendations are the result of extensive conversations which were carried on in Rome by the Italian authorities and the Swedish Minister and M. Junod, Swiss representative of International Red Cross. Following is translation:

"The International Committee of the Red Cross after having studied the desires expressed by the different belligerent governments in the matter of distribution of relief to the civil population of Greece and to the supervision of that distribution by the delegation of the International Red Cross in Greece, and in understanding with the Swedish and Swiss Red Cross, submits to the Italian Government the following note:

The International Committee of the Red Cross desires to maintain in Greece the organization for supervision of distribution such as it has existed up to the present, under the form of the High Committee of Direction presided over by Monsieur Brunel of which delegates of the Italian and German Red Cross are members as well as the President of the Greek Red Cross, and of a Committee of Action presided over by a delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross, other members being Greeks.

However, by reason of the increasing amount of relief supplies being sent to Greece the International Committee of the Red Cross considers as absolutely necessary in order to encourage still more the dispatch of relief goods, to add to its delegation in Greece several new collaborators chosen from among the representatives of the Swedish and Swiss Red Cross. These representatives would be entitled to supervise the distribution of gifts and relief supplies from their respective countries in their capacity as delegates of their national Red Cross societies. On the other hand they would be actively associated in the supervision exercised in the name of the International Committee of the Red Cross over distribution of relief coming from overseas.

In this latter circumstance several of them would be members of the Committee of Action.

The Committee of Action would thus be composed of Monsieur Brunel, Delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross and of delegates of the neutral Swedish and Swiss Red Cross who would thus become assistants to Monsieur Brunel.

The Committee of Action would be authorized to organize according to the requirements of the situation subcommittees in other parts of Greece than Athens or Piraeus.

The competence of the Committee of Action would be, (a) to receive all consignments of relief which come to Greece from neutral countries or from overseas; (b) to proceed to organization of distribution of this relief in Greece; (c) to make a report to International Committee of the Red Cross on the situation of the civil population of Greece and on opportunities for augmenting or diminishing relief from overseas.

This Committee of Action would therefore be constituted of members exclusively neutral but would be competent to admit Greeks especially chosen by itself. It would be in constant contact with the High Committee of Direction which would establish the relations indispensable to its work with the authorities of the occupying powers."

Boheman at the same time gave us an *aide-mémoire* dated today reading as follows:

"After the receipt of the answers of the Italian and German Governments regarding the proposed relief action in favor of Greece—the contents of which were communicated to the American and British Ministers at Stockholm on the 18th and 30th of April respectively—the Swedish Government and the Swedish Red Cross approached the International Red Cross Committee at Geneva, under whose auspices, according to the original plan, the scheme should be administered, for the purpose of arriving, first of all, at a solution of the question of control, acceptable to both of the belligerent parties. Definite proposals to this effect, essentially corresponding with the conditions laid down by the American and British Governments, have been worked out by Dr. Junod, delegate of the International Red Cross Committee, and it has been ascertained that these proposals have every prospect of being accepted by the Italian and German Governments. The text is herewith submitted for the consideration of the American and British Governments. As soon as they have indicated their position with regard to these proposals, the Swedish Government and the Swedish Red Cross are prepared in collaboration with the International Red Cross immediately to start organizing the machinery of control. It would seem expedient that it be left to the proposed Swedish-Swiss Commission to endeavor to find on the spot adequate solutions of special questions that remain outstanding; thus the plan as a whole need not be held up any further."

Please see immediately following telegram.

JOHNSON

868.48/8145 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, June 10, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received 10:27 p. m.]

1466. My 1465, today. Boheman told us that he felt Junod had done a good job with the Italians and he urged that both American and British Governments agree to International Red Cross proposals as soon as possible. If we do Swedes will start chartering ships at once and will send Swedish representatives immediately to Athens. They will ask safe conduct for ships and for three to go at once or more if British and American Governments agree in view of long delay. Allard, Swedish Chargé d'Affaires at Sofia, will be one of members and Risberg, a Swedish subject, formerly representative Swedish Ball-Bearing Company in Athens and now Swedish Consul at Athens, another. Boheman knows Risberg personally and says he has highest opinion not only of his honesty but of his intimate knowledge of Greece and conditions in that country. Risberg has already reported to Foreign Office his opinion that it is extremely desirable for neutral commission to get to work at once. He says food now being distributed by International Red Cross is not taken by occupying authorities which on contrary are showing disposition to get it to Greek civilians but due to lack of personnel and proper supervision distribution is bad and some of it is getting to black market. Foreign Office is of opinion that adequate number of neutral personnel to be attached to commission is essential to effective supervision and they think that there should be at least 30 individuals for this purpose of whom presumably half would be Swedes and half Swiss. A careful search is now being made for suitable personnel among Swedish businessmen and in quartermaster service of the army as well as elsewhere.

Boheman pointed out that all of original conditions put forward by British Government have been fully covered by assurances given to Swedish Government by Axis Governments and he stated that performance of these conditions will be fully covered in reports which Swedish Government will make to British and American Governments. If any hitch occurs on the ground Swedish delegates will report at once and Allied Governments can take any action they see fit. Boheman thinks essential thing is to get approval and to start organizational ground work at once.

He said that there was one point that should be made clear with respect to chartering of ships. The Swedish Red Cross which is nominal charterer and Swedish ship owners are not satisfied to have



only Greek Government as responsible party and desire what is essentially a British-American underwriting guaranty. It is important that Greek Government in London not appear in any open communication in this connection as it would only serve to make trouble with Axis.

The Italian Government has given assurances to Junod and reaffirmed these assurances to Swedish Minister at Rome that all food stuffs produced in Greece will be reserved exclusively for civil Greek population and that if there is any surplus which may eventually be exported it will be entirely compensated for by other foodstuffs imported into Greece. This communication was made to Swedish Minister at Rome on June 5.

Boheman finally pointed out that both Risberg and Allard have emphasized the necessity for motor transportation and fuel being made available to commission and that without it effective supervision is impossible. Both transportation and fuel would be unprocurable in Greece and should be sent out with grain ships. Swedes will undertake responsibility for vehicles and for their proper use, tagging them with necessary Red Cross and other emblems to insure their identity.

JOHNSON

---

868.48/3144 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1942—6 p. m.

2731. The Department has received from the American Minister at Stockholm the text of an *Aide-Mémoire* of the Swedish Foreign Office, dated June 10, submitting for the consideration of the American and British Governments a translation of a communication which has been addressed by Dr. Junod of the International Red Cross Committee to the Italian Government making specific recommendations regarding the distribution of the proposed relief shipments to be made to Greece in Swedish vessels. The Secretary General of the Swedish Foreign Office urged that the American and British Governments agree to the International Red Cross proposal as soon as possible. The British Foreign Office has no doubt received the same information from the British Minister at Stockholm.

The Department has also received detailed reports from Wadsworth and Berry, who have recently returned from Rome,<sup>ss</sup> regard-

---

<sup>ss</sup> George Wadsworth and Burton Y. Berry, Counselor of Embassy and Second Secretary of Embassy in Italy, respectively, who had returned to the United States in the exchange of American and Italian officials in May 1942.

ing the distribution of the relief heretofore sent to Greece. These officers have had an opportunity to follow closely the work of the International Red Cross in connection with Greek relief, and express full confidence in the integrity and trustworthiness of the organization set up by M. Brunel for the purpose, and particularly in the dependability of M. Brunel himself. The addition of representatives of the Swedish and Swiss Red Cross should be sufficient, in their view, adequately to safeguard the distribution of the additional relief envisaged.

This Government is prepared to approve the recommendations of the International Red Cross Committee concerning distribution in Greece and will so inform the American Minister at Stockholm upon the receipt of information from you that the British Government likewise concurs.

HULL

---

868.48/3161 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, June 21, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 2:09 p. m.]

1576. Mallet and I saw Boheman yesterday morning and Mallet gave him two *aide-mémoires* in reply to Swedish recommendations on Greek relief reported in my 1465, June 10, 9 p. m. (see also my 1466, June 10, 10 p. m.). I understand Mallet's instructions on which reply was based were communicated to Washington.

Yesterday afternoon we met again with Boheman, other members of Foreign Office and Dr. Junod and listened to a full résumé of report of his activities and plans and conditions in Greece. Junod states his report has been sent both to Washington and London. At same time Boheman handed Mallet two *aide-mémoires* in reply to those given him yesterday morning, substance of which follows:

1. Swedish Government considers that reports from Swedish members of Committee of Action should be forwarded through Swedish Chargé in Sofia. He will act on Committee of High Direction to Swedish Government by diplomatic courier.<sup>29</sup> His reports will be communicated to British and American Governments.

Wheat should be consigned to "La Délégation de C. I. C. R. (Comité International de la Croix Rouge)," Athens.

2. Following negotiations with German and Italian Governments and assurances given thereunder Swedish Government satisfied:

- (a) That delegates on Committee of Action will receive facilities for supervising and distribution of relief on lines already laid

---

<sup>29</sup> Apparently there is some omission in this sentence.

down by British and American Governments, that is, Committee will have right and duty to verify by direct observation that these conditions are fulfilled; to be sufficiently numerous and to maintain sufficient staff and enjoy necessary complete freedom of movement and facilities for inspection and enquiry;

(b) That assurance given by Italian Government that all food stuffs produced in Greece will be reserved for Greek population exclusively and any surplus which may be exported eventually will be entirely compensated by imported foodstuffs, holds good for German Government as well;

(c) That Dr. Junod's proposed arrangement places in hands of a purely neutral committee management of all functions and powers assigned to neutral commission as specified in conditions originally laid down by British and American Governments including control of allocation of relief as well as distribution and supervisory duties referred to in paragraph (a) ;

(d) That President of Committee of Action will be a Swede and that committee will be formed of equal number of Swedish and Swiss delegates and will act as an organ of International Red Cross;

(e) That functions of High Committee of Direction mentioned in Junod's proposals are as regards this specific scheme confined to those of liaison between occupation authorities and Committee of Action.

Swedish Government intends to inform German and Italian Governments immediately that it considers sufficient agreement to have been reached between belligerent parties to put scheme in action and request safe conduct for first three ships. This Boheman states was done yesterday.

Dr. Junod stated that when certain data concerning number of motor cars needed and gasoline for their operation for transport under scheme had been determined a request would be made that they be supplied, gasoline and oil to be sent monthly probably by relief ships. If these are not forthcoming whole scheme would bog down for lack of transport.

Boheman stated that expenses of Swedish members of committee would be paid from private sources through Swedish Government and similarly Swiss members would be provided for through Swiss Government.

As regards composition of Committee of Action it is planned to have total of 15 including three delegates each from Sweden and Switzerland; others also to be Swedes and Swiss approximately equally divided.

JOHNSON

868.48/3167 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, June 29, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 5:05 p. m.]

1641. Legation's 1576, June 21, 11 a. m. British Government has now sent instructions to Mallet stating that technical details concerning shipments have been arranged with Canadian Government including those for first three ships. Shipping documents are to be made out to Swedish Red Cross.

Despite its earlier agreement in principle British Government objects to that part of Junod scheme leaving arrangements in Greece to International Red Cross. They wish Swedish Government to keep a firm hold on all of activities and fear that International Red Cross would gradually take lead and attempt to deal directly with British, United States and Canadian Governments causing confusion. British Government stated to Mallet that it has had trouble with International Red Cross heretofore in Greek relief and feels that it would be bombarded with requests to amend scheme if Swedish Red Cross were not to be in absolute control and demands that Stockholm must be center. Mallet is today discussing practical arrangements with Swedish Foreign Office but is not officially taking up this objection until British Foreign Office replies to his requests for reconsideration of question of control in Greece.

He has pointed out that framework acceptable to Axis Powers is Junod scheme which does not provide that Swedish Red Cross act independently in Greece. Mallet also pointed out that Mohn, Secretary of Swedish Legation in Rome, was to be chairman of Committee of Action and not Brunel to whom British Government appears to have some objection. Mallet pointed out that Swedish Government is convinced that it is essential to maintain fiction that plan is to function under International Red Cross at least until scheme is in operation. Although he is not taking this up officially with Swedish Government today he has informally mentioned matter to Boheman who has also informally stated that it would be very confusing to have a change made at this time but that if British Government insists upon it steps will have to be taken to permit Swedish Red Cross to act independently in Greece rather than to scrap scheme.

Further report will be submitted when Mallet receives reply to his request for reconsideration.

British Government states that it will be unable to supply cars and fuel oil mentioned Legation's 1631, June 27, 3 p. m.<sup>40</sup> Swedish

<sup>40</sup> Not printed.

Government may be expected shortly to suggest that United States Government attempt to arrange for supply of these cars and fuel with Greek Relief Committee in United States.

JOHNSON

---

868.48/8169 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, July 3, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received 6:41 p. m.]

1694. Mallet has now had further instructions in reply to request for reconsideration mentioned penultimate paragraph Legation's 1641, June 29, 3 p. m. He has expressed officially and orally to Foreign Office British Government's view that it wishes further dealings to be through Swedes for obvious reasons and also because Swedish Government has given assurances that British Government's conditions will be observed. He also pointed out that it was desired that Swedes on Committee of Action be free to insist among other things on method of distribution which would satisfy these conditions. He pointed out that it was feared that if stores from Canada went to International Red Cross in Greece rather than Sweden it might result in international body claiming a decisive vote in their disposal and causing them to treat Committee only as its agent. As it was desired however to get ships away as soon as possible British Government did not wish to be obstructive if Swedish Government felt there would be no difficulty in consigning shipment to Swedish Red Cross. Boheman of Foreign Office stated that while he wished to reflect on matter, on principle he felt that it should be perfectly possible to consign the stores to Mr. Mohn, Swedish Red Cross representative at Piraeus, who would be chairman of Committee of Action. Swedish Government would instruct Consul General in Montreal regarding details and any alteration in name of consignee if required could be perfectly well arranged later. It is hoped that ships can get away by July 12 as Germans seem about to agree although possibly there may be slight modification of route. (Boheman has not yet replied to these suggestions.)

Mallet has informed me that as a last resort he has authority from British Foreign Office to agree to consignment to International Red Cross delegate or alternatively to Committee of Action if Swedes are sure this will not frustrate British intentions and provided they find genuine difficulty in consigning to Swedish Red Cross.

JOHNSON

868 48/3173 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, July 9, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received 5:40 p. m.]

1765. My 1694, July 3, 4 p. m. British Minister has now submitted a further *aide-mémoire* concerning Greek relief to Foreign Office. He has pointed out that British Government does not approve suggestion that wheat received from Canada be sold to so-called "Ministère de Ravitaillement" at Athens at 21 drachma per kilogram as a means of covering certain administrative expenses in Greece although are agreeable to certain small charges to cover essential costs. British Government fears that by distribution on a commercial basis through agency of an enemy controlled administration, this would lead to many complications. It expresses hope Swedish Government will judge question in light of this principle and not be bound by precedent established by International Red Cross in case of wheat shipped from Near East.

While willing to consider sympathetically recommendations made by Swedish Government in light of experience to extend relief scheme to other commodities British Government gives no guarantee of their acceptance.

It agrees to distribution of medical goods freely admitted through blockade if Swedish Government is satisfied that goods will be distributed under conditions of control acceptable to British Government. British Government would welcome efforts to end that native Greek products as well as imported wheat be distributed on equitable basis for benefit of Greek population to prevent misappropriation or misdirection of native produce by occupational authorities misuse of which would be as harmful as that of foodstuffs arriving from overseas.

British Minister at same time he submitted this *aide-mémoire* informed Foreign Office that Swedish ship *Stureholm* chartered some months ago by British Government and operated by International Red Cross to carry wheat from Haifa to Greece was struck by a German aerial torpedo and sank on a return trip to Haifa last month, and a certain number of Swedish lives were lost. Ship was struck while brilliantly lighted and carrying Red Cross insignia. Mallet stated to me confidentially but has not informed Swedish Government that this ship was 30 miles off its course. A protest will be made to German Government nevertheless by International Red Cross.

JOHNSON

868.48/3218

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*MEMORANDUM REGARDING GREEK RELIEF SHIPMENTS  
ON SWEDISH VESSELS

1. The initiative on this proposal having been taken in London by the British and Greek Governments, which have apparently agreed between themselves, with the assent of the Canadian Government, with regard to the financial arrangements for the chartering of the Swedish vessels and the supply of Canadian wheat, the United States Government is prepared in general to be guided by the recommendations of the British Government regarding the supplies to be sent to Greece under the Swedish plan and the arrangements regarding their distribution in Greece. Consideration has been given in this matter also to the primary role of British agencies in the operation of the continental blockade.

2. This Government has received reports from its own agents in a position to be in close touch with the situation which satisfy it regarding the integrity and trustworthiness of the committees set up by the International Red Cross Committee, under Dr. Junod and Mr. Brunel, to distribute the foodstuffs heretofore sent to Greece under United Nations' auspices. However, this Government is in agreement with the British Government that it would be desirable to place as much responsibility as possible for the distribution of larger quantities of supplies to be shipped under the "Swedish" plan upon the Swedish representatives, especially in view of the fact that the Swedish Government has undertaken the negotiations with the Axis Governments and has received from them assurances with respect to the conditions governing the distribution of these relief supplies and of Greek native produce in the interests of the Greek people.

3. The British and American Governments have both agreed in principle to permitting shipments of medical supplies on the Swedish vessels, subject to their approval of the specific types and quantities involved.

The American Red Cross plans to send \$35,000 worth of such supplies to Montreal for loading on the first three Swedish vessels. The Red Cross is applying to the Board of Economic Warfare at Washington for an export permit. In view of the close collaboration between the Board of Economic Warfare and representatives of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, it is assumed that this will ensure both American and British examination and approval of the specific items to be shipped.

The Department has learned informally that the Canadian Red Cross is likewise planning to send certain medical supplies on these vessels. It will of course apply for an export permit to the appropriate Canadian authorities, who will presumably clear with the American and British Governments before approving.

4. The British Government having indicated that it considers the furnishing of motor vehicles and fuels therefor as necessary to enable the Control Commission properly to carry out its functions, the Greek War Relief Association is endeavoring to procure for shipment on the first vessels the supplies requested by the Swedish Foreign Office.

5. In response to a request of the Greek War Relief Association, the British Government agreed exceptionally to permit the forwarding to Greece, with a shipment of breadstuffs, of a small quantity (not exceeding 50 tons) of milk, on condition that it be distributed by the Swedish-Swiss Control Commission to Greek children, and on the understanding that publicity regarding this shipment would be subordinated. This approval has been communicated to the Association, with the support of this Government.

6. Reports have reached this Department indicating that the German forces in Greece have withheld and are still withholding large stores of native olive oil in the country, while the Greek population suffers particularly from lack of fats. The International Red Cross Committee, despite persistent efforts, has been unable to secure the release of even 400 tons of oil per month necessary for the operation of the Athens soup kitchens.

Shortly after the "Swedish" plan gets into operation the American and British Governments might well call this situation forcibly to the attention of the Swedish Government, making it clear that they expect the release of presently blockaded stocks of Greek olive oil and the reservation of future production for consumption by the Greek people, except insofar as there may be a genuine export surplus compensated for with foodstuffs imported from Axis sources in conformity with the terms of condition no. 4 of the scheme.

WASHINGTON, July 28, 1942.

---

868.48/3221

*Press Release Issued by the Department of State, August 7, 1942*

On the initiative of the Swedish Red Cross negotiations were undertaken some months ago through the Swedish Government regarding relief for the starving population of Greece. The Swedish



Government having expressed its willingness that Swedish vessels lying in Swedish ports be employed for this purpose, the United States, British and Canadian Governments immediately declared themselves ready to authorize monthly shipments of 15,000 tons of wheat or flour from North America to Greece, subject to appropriate conditions governing the distribution of these imports and of Greek native produce in the interests of the Greek people and on the understanding that a neutral commission would receive the necessary control and reporting facilities from the occupying powers. Following the negotiations conducted by the Swedish Government, the German and Italian Governments agreed to this proposal. The belligerent powers have accordingly granted safe conducts for the voyages of the Swedish vessels which will be used. The first three, the *Formosa*, *Eros* and *Camelia*, have already loaded and are scheduled to leave Montreal today for Greece. A Swedish-Swiss Commission has been set up to handle the actual distribution of the supplies, under the general supervision of the existing organization of the International Red Cross Committee, in Greece.

The Greek Government, the American and Canadian Red Cross Societies, and the Greek War Relief Association are actively supporting and cooperating in the operation of this plan.

Reports reaching the Department from Greece have portrayed conditions of suffering from inanition and death from starvation appalling almost beyond belief.

Information has also been received through American officials recently returning from Europe confirming that the small quantities of foodstuffs which have been sent to Greece during the past year under United Nations' auspices and with the cooperation of the Turkish Government have been effectively distributed through the agency of the International Red Cross Committee and consumed by the Greek people only. The reports of these officials indicate, however, that although these supplies have unquestionably saved many persons from death, they have been inadequate to prevent further deterioration of the general food supply situation.

---

868.48/3255a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt)* <sup>41</sup>

WASHINGTON, September 3, 1942—midnight.

424. Greek War Relief Association has expressed serious concern over anticipated termination of food relief shipments from Turkey

---

<sup>41</sup> Repeated to Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., Minister to the Greek Government in Exile at London, as Greek Series No. 7, September 4, 11 p. m.

to Greece because of unavailability of suitable foodstuffs, particularly dried vegetables, for export from Turkey.

The Department understands that the foodstuffs in question have been acquired by UKCC in Turkey and shipped on a Swedish vessel chartered (perhaps indirectly) by the Greek Government. Reports have been received indicating that these supplies were the mainstay of the soup kitchens organized by the International Red Cross which last winter provided a minimum nourishment for as many as 700,000 persons in the Athens area alone.

The Department hopes, for humanitarian reasons, that the shipment to Greece from Turkey of dried vegetables and other food products suitable for soup kitchens can be maintained, especially since this Government would be reluctant to consider extending the concessions already made in connection with Greek relief to include food supplies other than breadstuffs originating outside the blockade area. Turkey is considered inside the blockade area. The Department has been informed that the British Government holds similar views.

The Department would appreciate your comments on this matter. Should the reported unavailability of foodstuffs be due to restrictions of the Turkish Government you are authorized to intervene informally with the Turkish authorities if you feel that any useful purpose would be served by your so doing.

Repeated to London.

HULL

---

868.48/3296

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1942.

The Greek Minister came in to see me, at my request.

I said that I wished to clear up the matter of the dried vegetables and other foods which Lend-Lease was proposing to send to Greece. I said that Lend-Lease had gone ahead with making up its schedules and so forth but that this had been done before any international clearance, either through the Department or with the British, in anticipation of possible later clearance. We were now advised that the British did not feel that they wished to extend the agreement, but wished to limit shipments to wheat. We understood that this attitude on the part of the British would keep up in any event until a report was received from the Swedish-Swiss Commission as to the extent of the need for dried vegetables and other foods. At that time, presumably, the question might be re-examined. For the

time being, therefore, I thought that the idea of sending dried vegetables and other foods was out of the question, though after the proposed Swedish-Swiss Commission report came in we would look at it again in the light of the then attitude of the British.

The Greek Minister said that he had a cable from his Prime Minister in London substantially along the same lines. He would therefore work on that basis.

At that time, too, the Prime Minister had said that in anticipation of a possible favorable report from the Swedish-Swiss Commission and a change of attitude of the British Government, he had been directed to work towards getting 2,000 tons of dried vegetables as soon as possible and thereafter 2,000 tons monthly.

I said I noted that, and I thought that in the event of a change of attitude on behalf of the British Government, the food itself could be provided. But until we had some further word, there was not much to be done at the moment.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

---

868.48/8251 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, September 7, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received 9:06 p. m.]

2420. British Minister informs me that he has received instructions from Foreign Office to bring following to attention of Swedish Government. He had been requested to ascertain beforehand if I had any objection. I told Mr. Mallet that I could think of no objection as inquiries he presented involved no definite commitment which might affect United States nor apparently Great Britain.

British Government in view of Committee of Action for Greek relief now being at work states that it would welcome advice of Committee as to question of admission into Greece of certain articles not covered by terms of special arrangement for Greek relief nor normally admitted through blockade. Surgical dressings, bandages and milk concentrates for children were articles mentioned. British Government felt it necessary in this connection to mention that it has reports that Germans have pillaged medical stores, quinine in particular, have commandeered hospitals and equipment and reserved for occupying forces all available milk in towns.

British observed moreover that substantial quantities of cotton from which bandages can be made are produced in Greece and that in peacetime almost all milk necessary for home consumption is produced in Greece. Information particularly required by British Government concerns (a) degree of present shortage in Greece (in

case of foodstuffs, supplies now available for individuals in fact) (b) why such shortage exists (c) statement as to extent locally available supplies [are used?] in most efficient way (d) statement prospects insuring that any goods sent to Greece will be properly controlled and that in future local resources will be properly used.

Mr. Mallet told me that in telegram received from Foreign Office mention had been made of instructions which I would receive on same aspect of Greek relief and he was instructed to support any action I might take in this connection. I told him that I had not yet received instructions to which Foreign Office made reference.

JOHNSON

---

868.48/3264 : Airgram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)  
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, September 11, 1942—2:30 p. m.

[Received September 15—2 p. m.]

A-105. Greek Series from Biddle. With reference to Department's telegram Greek Series No. 7, September 4, 11 p. m.,<sup>42</sup> regarding relief food shipments for Greece, Prime Minister Tsouderos, in note of September 8, requests me to convey to you following account of situation:

"As is known, the solution of the problem of supplying the bare necessities in the way of foodstuffs to the starving population of Greece was based on securing the despatch of some elementary foods, indispensable for the maintenance of the people, such as (a) a certain proportion of the population's wheat requirements, and (b) a small quantity of pulses by means of which the popular feeding-centres prepare a little hot food to accompany the ration of bread. The question of the wheat has entered a favourable phase, thanks to the fact that the scheme for regular shipments in Swedish vessels has begun to be applied. On the other hand, the question of the pulses, which during last winter had been more or less solved by means of shipments from Turkey, has since a few months ago been faced with a fresh and insuperable difficulty in the aggravation of the food situation in Turkey. Exports from Turkey were attended by progressively greater difficulties. The articles of food exported began to be restricted, during the last voyages of the Turkish steamship *Dumlupinar* the cargoes consisted mainly of dried fruits, the value of course, far less than that of pulses. Finally, some time ago the Turkish Government, faced by its own difficulties, declared that it would be compelled to discontinue the *Dumlupinar's* voyages. It was only as a result of persistent efforts on the part of the British that permission for these voyages to be

---

<sup>42</sup> See footnote 41, p. 772.

continued was obtained, though no undertaking was given as to the duration of this permission, with the consequence that through the progressive deterioration of the food situation in Turkey we are threatened with the possibility of the suppression of the voyages at any moment.

"But a particularly serious aspect of the matter is that the quality even of the small quantities still being despatched from Turkey to Greece has fallen to such a degree that some of these foodstuffs are imperilling the consumers' health. According to information of an absolutely confidential nature which has reached us from various reliable sources, some of the food carried during the latest voyages of the *Dumlupinar* was in a state of utter decomposition. Naturally responsibility for this can in no way be laid either to the Turkish or the Allied competent authorities, to whom we are ever grateful for their truly indefatigable endeavours. It is clear that it is due to the prevailing condition of the market and its restricted resources. Nevertheless it would be a tragic matter if these damaged foodstuffs, so far from bringing relief, were to aggravate the health of the Greek population, whose systems are already enduring such a strain.

"It should be noted that our requests for foodstuffs other than wheat are extremely modest. We have given express instructions to our Embassy at Washington to concentrate all their efforts on securing the despatch of pulses and, indeed, that any such despatch should entail a proportionate reduction in the shipments of wheat; in this way additional transport facilities would not be required. It is necessary to stress the fact that the available stocks of pulses in Turkey are exhausted, and that every attempt at obtaining these articles from other countries in the Middle East has met with an absolute refusal on the part of the blockade authorities. Pulses however as well as an adequate quantity of milk or milk products for the salvation of the imperilled children, must be considered, from a purely humanitarian point of view, as indispensable for even an elementary relief of the sufferings of the Greek population. If wheat alone is available without the above vital nourishment, it is to be feared that we shall have to face new tragedies.

"We address to you, Mr. Ambassador, a fervent request that you be so good as to communicate the above facts to your Government at your earliest convenience. We are making a similar request to the British Government since, as you state in your letter No. 67, the latter is in touch with the Department of State, respecting this matter.

"It is our firm conviction that the American Government which has always shown so lively and deep a concern for the suffering population of Greece, will on this occasion also take the necessary steps to ensure a regular and unhampered shipment to Greece of a minimum quantity of the foodstuffs necessary for the bare maintenance of life among the population."

Not repeated to Ankara. [Biddle.]

WINANT

868.48/3263 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State*

ANKARA, September 12, 1942—noon.  
[Received September 13—1:50 a. m.]

903. Department's 424, September 3. While I appreciate the natural concern of the Greek War Relief Association at the possible imminent termination of food relief shipments from Turkey to Greece, I feel that it would be unwise for me to intervene in this matter with the Turkish authorities even informally at this time for the following reasons:

1. Notwithstanding the shortage of foodstuffs including dried vegetables for consumption in Turkey which has resulted in exorbitant prices to the Turkish public, the Turkish authorities for humanitarian reasons have been more than generous in permitting the export to Greece of substantial quantities of foodstuffs. In this connection I desire to point out that the efforts made by the Turkish Government to ameliorate the appalling food conditions in Greece have not been limited to the foodstuffs shipped directly to Greece but have encompassed shipments to the Islands as well as the feeding of thousands of Greek refugees on Turkish soil.

2. As the Department is aware the Turkish Government has for some months past been endeavoring to obtain limited quantities of wheat from the United States and Great Britain in order to make good a domestic insufficiency. These efforts in so far as the United States is concerned have resulted in the promise of the delivery of a total of 15,000 tons of wheat over a period of months.<sup>43</sup> At the same time great publicity has been given to the shipment to Greece of 15,000 tons of wheat monthly from Canada. The Turkish Government is therefore fully conscious of the provision of 15,000 tons of wheat monthly for Greece as against a total of 15,000 tons for Turkey from the United States over a period of months with no assurance of additional deliveries of wheat from the United States. Furthermore, during recent months the Turkish Government has encountered difficulties in obtaining adequate quantities of wheat for its immediate needs from the Middle East Supply Center, and although some shipments have been made they have been considerably less than the Turkish authorities deemed necessary.

3. There is at the present time an acute shortage of all foodstuffs throughout Turkey including dried vegetables. This is due in part to the fact that the harvest has not yet been made. Furthermore, the Government is struggling against a steady rise in the cost of all foodstuffs which has already resulted in the following prices per pound in dollars for staples: sugar, .37; fish, from .55 to 2.21; fruit, from .28 to .40; dried beans, .23; butter, 1.10; black bread, .071½; rice, .40; milk per quart, .23.

4. I am informed by the British Commercial Counselor that the Minister of Commerce yesterday informed him in reply to repre-

<sup>43</sup> For correspondence on this subject, see vol. iv, section under Turkey entitled "Favorable response by the United States to Turkish requests for additional wheat."

sentations similar to those requested of us that Turkey no longer has enough dried vegetables to feed its own army, and that in consequence the Turkish Government could not countenance further shipments of dried vegetables to Greece.

In view of the foregoing, I hesitate to make even informal representations to the Turkish authorities lest we lay ourselves open to a rebuff which might involve a request for assistance to Turkey in solving its own shortage of foodstuffs.

Repeated to London.

STEINHARDT

---

868 48/3270a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, September 14, 1942—10 p. m.

772. The Greek Legation has submitted a request to the Office of Lend-Lease Administration for a monthly quantity of 2,000 tons of dried vegetables and beans to be supplied to the population in occupied Greece (presumably on the Swedish vessels from Montreal) and distributed through the existing distributing arrangements in Greece.

The interested authorities of this Government share the reluctance expressed by the British authorities to consider extending the blockade concessions already made in connection with Greek relief, particularly pending the receipt of the views of the Swedish members of the Control Commission requested through the Swedish Foreign Office by the British Minister at Stockholm on July 31. We should be glad to receive these views as soon as possible, however, as well as the views of the British Government in this matter, and are meanwhile requesting the Lend-Lease Administration to defer action on the Greek Legation's requisition.

Repeated to London as no. 4462.

HULL

---

868.48/3319

*The Financial Counselor of the British Embassy (Stopford)  
to the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)*

(W.T. 4/113/42)

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. LONG: I am writing with reference to the Department's memorandum of July 28th on the subject of Greek Relief shipments of Swedish vessels. We have recently received some telegrams from London which I think you will find of interest. In the first, London inform us that the Swedish controllers were due

to arrive in Greece on August 26th. Two further shipments were to have sailed about August 29th from Canada, and three more when the Commission so advises. At the date when London sent these, that is to say, August 30th, no export license applications had been referred to the Ministry of Economic Warfare, either in respect to medical supplies or in respect of milk.

The Greek Government have urged the shipment of two or three tons of pulse a month on Swedish vessels replacing wheat if necessary. The Commission have been asked to report on the question. If the report is satisfactory and favourable, London are disposed to agree subject to supply possibilities and to the views of the United States Government.

London expect requests for milk concentrates for children and for bandages and surgical dressings which are at present excluded from the terms of the concession. Meanwhile they think that an obstinate refusal would be mistaken, as they feel that they cannot either (a) treat Greece conspicuously better than other occupied countries or (b) make good Axis depredations. The British authorities therefore propose to consult the Commission in this matter.

London had already stressed the importance of the condition reserving Greek foodstuffs for the Greek people and referred to reports of Axis requisitioning of oil and exported vegetable produce this season. They would most warmly welcome a similar approach by the U.S. Government and have asked the British Minister at Stockholm to support this when made.

You will also be interested in a telegram addressed by the Minister of Economic Warfare to the British Minister in Stockholm on this and related questions. I therefore attach a copy " for your information.

Yours sincerely,

R. J. STOPFORD

---

868 48/3271 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State*

ANKARA, September 16, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 9:38 p. m.]

916. My 903, September 12, noon. The Greek Chargé d'Affaires called to see me yesterday and requested me to transmit to the Department the proposal that instead of the contemplated shipments of 15,000 tons of wheat monthly from Canada to Greece the shipments comprise 13,000 tons of wheat and 2,000 tons of dried vegetables. He gave as his reason the urgent necessity of obtaining

---

" Not printed.



dried vegetables as the soup kitchens furnished the only warm meal daily to 700,000 people and that while wheat was highly desirable it would not be possible to maintain the soup kitchens without dried vegetables.

STEINHARDT

868.48/3320

*The Second Secretary of the British Embassy (Ritchie) to  
Mr. Foy D. Kohler of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

SD-144

WASHINGTON, 18 September, 1942.

DEAR MR. KOHLER: About a month ago you mentioned to Mr. Murray<sup>45</sup> the provision of funds to pay the charter costs of the Swedish ships carrying wheat for the relief of the Greek population. We inquired from London what were the financial arrangements for the scheme, and we have now received the following information in reply.

Although the Canadian Government arranged to supply the wheat as a free gift, the British Government thought the Greek Government would probably wish to be associated with the scheme and to meet the cost of chartering the Swedish vessels. It was understood that the Greek Government had dollar resources available which they could use for this purpose.

The Greek Government agreed to pay the charter monies and the charterparties which are in the name of the Swedish Red Cross were signed by the Greek Chargé d'Affaires in Stockholm on behalf of his Government. The Swedish Government and ship owners insisted upon the guarantee of the British Government or the United States Government, and in order to avoid any possible delay the British Minister at Stockholm conveyed a private guarantee to the Swedish Government. This is for your confidential information, since the Greek Government have not been told that we were asked for this guarantee.

The position, therefore, is that the Greek Government are directly responsible for all expenditure in connection with the charter of the ships, and the British Government will only be called upon under this guarantee if they are unable to pay. We should warmly welcome anything which contributes to the success of the scheme and if the Greek Government were having difficulty in finding the necessary funds, and the United States Government were willing to assist them, we should be happy to see an arrangement concluded for such assistance. In our view, any such arrangement should be

<sup>45</sup> J. D. Murray, Second Secretary of the British Embassy.

made directly between the United States Government and the Greek Government, to whom this matter has not yet been mentioned.

Yours sincerely,

W. RITCHIE

---

868.48/3362

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs  
(Alling) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 21, 1942.

MR. LONG: In connection with our conversation on September 17, the so-called "Swedish plan" for Greek relief, and particularly the question of the payment of freight on the vessels, developed as follows:

1. On the insistence of the Greek Government at London and in appreciation of the further deterioration of the tragic food situation in Greece, the British Foreign Secretary addressed a note to Ambassador Winant on February 22, 1942,<sup>45</sup> requesting this Government to associate itself with the British Government in proposing to the Swedish Government that Swedish ships be made available to carry 15,000 tons of wheat monthly from Canada to Greece, and that the Swedish Red Cross supervise the distribution of the supplies thus shipped. No mention was made of any arrangements for financing the scheme in this proposal.

2. On February 26 the Department replied as follows: "The American Government will be glad to associate itself with the British Government in the plans for the relief of Greece as outlined in Mr. Eden's letter."<sup>47</sup> In pursuance of this action the American Minister in Stockholm accompanied the British Minister to the Swedish Foreign Office on March 2 when the latter left an *Aide-Mémoire* embodying the proposal.<sup>48</sup>

The officers in the Department who were dealing with the subject considered asking the British Government at the time regarding the financial arrangements for the scheme, but it was decided that inquiry on this subject would be inviting a request by the British that we help pay for it, so we made no inquiry of the British on the subject at this time.

3. The Swedish Government agreed to the proposal and, in due course, negotiations were completed for its acceptance also by the Axis powers. Eight Swedish ships were made available and char-

---

<sup>45</sup> See telegram No. 845, February 22, midnight, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 739.

<sup>47</sup> See telegram No. 860, February 23, midnight, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 743.

<sup>48</sup> See telegram No. 390, March 2, 7 p. m., from the Minister in Sweden, p. 743.

tered to the Swedish Red Cross, against a financial guarantee of the Greek Government at London.

4. During his recent visit to the United States the Greek Premier appealed to the officials of the Greek War Relief Association to take over the obligation of paying the freight, which was estimated to run to some \$900,000 per month, and the Association agreed to do so to the extent that its funds would permit.

5. In connection with its current drive for contributions, the Greek War Relief Association has obtained the approval of the Community War Chest Organization for the allocation to the Association of \$1,000,000 per month for an initial period of six months. The War Chest officials felt, however, that this program was entirely too large for private philanthropy and should be handled by some Governmental agency.

6. Officials of the Community War Chest Organization took the question up in this vein with the President's War Relief Board. The latter agreed with their view, and undertook to explore whether some American government funds might not be available for the purpose.

7. To this end Mr. Charles Taft, Acting Chairman of the War Relief Board took the initiative of calling a meeting of interested official agencies, which was held at the Treasury, and attended by representatives of the Treasury, Bureau of the Budget, War Relief Board, American Red Cross, and State Department (Allen and Kohler of NE<sup>49</sup>). Among the possible sources of funds discussed was the emergency foreign war relief funds granted to the President, usually referred to as "The President's Fund". During the discussions Mr. Mitchell of the Red Cross expressed doubt as to whether the Comptroller General would approve the use of these funds for payment of freight on supplies not purchased in the United States. Mr. Taft suggested that the question be presented to the Comptroller General for a definite ruling, and undertook to do so himself. No objections were raised to this proposal by anyone present at the meeting.

8. NE's interest in the financial aspects of the Greek relief scheme resulted from our general endeavors, on instructions from Mr. Welles and Mr. Berle, to investigate means of aiding the Greek Government financially, in accordance with a promise we understand to have been made to the Greek King by the President during the King's recent visit to the United States. The increasing expenditures for the chartering of relief vessels is one of the heavier obligations against the limited resources of the Greek Government (See Lon-

---

<sup>49</sup> Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

don's telegram 5202, September 17, 6 p. m.<sup>50</sup>). This interest was expressed by our representatives at the meeting at the Treasury Department.

9. Following the meeting, Mr. Taft prepared a letter<sup>51</sup> requesting a ruling from the Comptroller General on the question of the possible use of the President's fund for the payment of this freight. At the request of Mr. Taft, Mr. Allen of this Division accompanied him to the Office of the Comptroller General when he submitted this letter.

10. In response to Mr. Taft's letter, the Comptroller General ruled that the President's fund could be used to pay the freight. Mr. Taft informed the Department in a letter<sup>52</sup> now in the Special Division. Mr. Taft also informed the Red Cross of the Comptroller General's ruling.

11. Mr. Norman Davis called Mr. Allen on September 18, to say that he had learned of the Comptroller General's ruling. He said that regardless of the ruling he did not favor use of the funds in this manner. He said that it had been his understanding that neither the President nor the State Department had favored such use of the funds and inquired whether there had been any change in this respect. Mr. Allen said that he had acted under general instructions to investigate sources of possible United States Government assistance to the Greek Government, that the use of the President's fund had often been mentioned as one possible source in this connection, and that since Mr. Mitchell of the Red Cross had stated that the Red Cross was not certain whether the Comptroller General would approve the use of the fund in this manner, Mr. Taft had taken steps to determine this question, in order to eliminate any further consideration of this source if it could not be used. Mr. Allen said that it had also been desirable, from the point of view of his study of the general question of financial assistance to Greece, to have this question determined.

Mr. Davis said that he considered the Comptroller General's decision legally untenable and that he intended to disregard it because (1) the Budget Bureau would not approve anyway and (2) he had given the Finance Committee of the Senate his personal promise, when the last appropriation for the President's fund was approved, that none of the funds so appropriated would be used for relief in Axis occupied territory. He said he could not go back on his word, no matter what the Comptroller General might say.

---

<sup>50</sup> *Post*, p. 803.

<sup>51</sup> Dated August 28, 1942, not printed.

<sup>52</sup> Dated September 11, 1942, not printed.

Mr. Allen said that he had understood Mr. Taft's action as a necessary step to determine merely whether the fund *could* be so used, and not to have involved any decision as to whether it *should* be used in this manner. He said that in view of Mr. Davis' position it seemed clear that those who had been looking towards the President's fund either as a source specifically of Greek relief or as a means of aiding the Greek Government financially would have to look elsewhere for funds.

Mr. Davis said he thought no harm had been done but that he wanted to make his position on the subject clear to the Department.

12. While the above developments have been taking place, officers of the Division have endeavored to learn informally from the British the exact financial arrangements for the "Swedish Plan for Greek Relief". Attached is a letter which has now been received from the British Embassy,<sup>53</sup> reporting that the Greek Government has assumed full responsibility for payment of the freight but that the British Government, unknown to the Greek authorities, has given an underwriting guarantee to the Swedish Government.

PAUL H. ALLING

---

868.48/3280

*The Department of State to the Greek Legation*

MEMORANDUM

Reference is made to the Greek Legation's memorandum which was left with Mr. Welles by the Minister on August 13, 1942<sup>54</sup> with further reference to the request previously made that the United States Government extend the use of the facilities available to it to effect the remittance of \$39,576.96 from this country to the Banque des Reglements Internationaux for the account of the International Red Cross for use by that organization in the purchase of supplies for relief in Greece.

As the Legation is aware, this Government has every sympathy for the plight of the Greek people and appreciates their great need for outside assistance. The exception to the blockade policy which has been made in favor of Greece in connection with the current relief scheme involving substantial shipments of breadstuffs and medicines from the Western Hemisphere to Greece is evidence of the sympathetic attitude of this Government and of the Governments associated with it in the war effort.

---

<sup>53</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>54</sup> Not printed.

Note has been taken of the statement in the memorandum under reference that these shipments, though substantial, are far from securing the current needs of the Greek population and, therefore, that supplemental invoices from other countries are still urgent. The Department of State is obliged to point out, however, that the shipments referred to above are permitted passage through the blockade only as an exceptional measure and until the effect in Greece of the shipments now being made can be observed and evaluated, it will not be considered feasible to make further concessions of this character.

WASHINGTON, September 23, 1942.

---

868.24/166

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 25, 1942.

The Greek Minister came in to see me, at his request.

He said that he had received a cable from his Government relating to relief shipments to Greece. This made it clear that the understanding of the Greek Government in London, and of the British Government in London, was exactly the same as the understanding which he had had of the situation, following his conversation with me. This was that only wheat was to be shipped to Greece, but that a report from the Swedish-Swiss Commission was to be expected; and that at that time the situation might be reviewed.

The Minister said that his Government had now requested him to ask this Government for a commitment to supply 2,000 tons of dried vegetables, under Lend-Lease, if, as and when, and in the event that, the British Government and ourselves were agreed that these could go forward. In other words, in the contingency that both governments were willing that this food should go forward, the Greek Government wanted a commitment that it would be supplied under Lend-Lease.

I said that I would have to take this up with the appropriate authorities. As he knew, I had handled the matter of the earlier supplies, in Mr. Acheson's absence, but I would endeavor to ascertain from Lend-Lease whether they were prepared to make a commitment at this time.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

868.48/3282 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Sweden (Greene) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, September 28, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received 2:23 p. m.]

2686. Legation's 2594, September 21, 6 p. m.<sup>55</sup> Foreign Office states following just received from Greek Relief Committee of Action.

Committee has taken over supplying of bread to population of Athens and Piraeus. Ministry has been eliminated. Wheat is delivered directly to mills. Output after milling 75%. Exclusive rights and full control has been secured to dispose of product of mills Sankt, Geori and Attike. Profits and expenses at mills and bakeries now subject to control. Bread price fixed without commercial consideration only covering transportation, milling and general costs. Any surplus obtained is used to compensate prices or for gratis distribution. To lessen possibility of cheating it has been prescribed that ratio between flour delivered and bread supplies shall not be less than 100 to 140. Bakeries convicted of negligence will be closed permanently. Control of 700 bakeries is being successively established. Pending completion of Commission's own distribution organization lists for requisitioning of bakery flour are being examined and endorsed. Bread card system also examined to reduce excessive cards. Establishment of new bread card system under control of Commission being considered. Normal ration is 190 grams; extra rations given only to certain sick persons and public utility workmen. General plan will be ready shortly covering distribution to provinces. Cyclades will come first as need there greatest. Preparations also being made for Patras and Peloponnesus. Distribution of bran in exchange for milk for children and sick persons being organized to exclude interests of occupying powers in future. Preparations being made for distribution under satisfactory control of medical stores.

GREENE

868 48/3251 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Sweden (Greene)*

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1942—7 p. m.

847. Your 2420, September 7, 8 p. m., final paragraph. In a memorandum handed to the British Embassy on July 28, the Department suggested a concerted British and American approach to the Swedish Government regarding our expectation that the Control

<sup>55</sup> Not printed.

Commission would take measures to secure Axis observation of the fourth condition of the relief scheme, particularly as respects native olive oil which we were reliably informed the Germans were continuing to withhold. A reply to this memorandum has only now been received, confirming the report in your 1997, July 31, 5 p. m.<sup>56</sup> that the British Minister had already received instructions to take this matter up with the Swedish Foreign Office. Since he appeared to have done so in consultation with you, a separate *démarche* has seemed unnecessary. You may, however, upon appropriate occasion make it clear to the Swedish authorities that this Government fully associates itself with the British *aide-mémoire* reported in your telegrams under reference.

WELLES

---

868 48/3336

*The Greek Embassy<sup>57</sup> to the Department of State*

WASHINGTON, October 29, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

The following is a paraphrase of a cable sent to the Royal Greek Embassy in Washington by the Greek Government, dated October 27.

"It was communicated to us by the British Government that they have decided to allow monthly transportation of a hundred tons of condensed milk and three thousand tons of dry vegetables to Greece. Please contact the competent American authorities for immediate transportation to Montreal of the vegetables put at our disposal in accordance with arrangements made by you with the American Government."

---

868.48/3329

*The Second Secretary of the British Embassy (Murray) to  
Mr. Foy D. Kohler of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

W.T. 4/135/42

WASHINGTON, 31 October, 1942.

DEAR KOHLER: Many thanks for sending me the paraphrase of the cable dated October 27th which the Greek Embassy in Washington received from the Greek Government. We have now received two telegrams from London which fill in some of the shading.

The Ministry of Economic Warfare begin by expressing their gratitude for the prompt decision of the United States authorities

---

<sup>56</sup> Not printed.

<sup>57</sup> The Greek Legation was raised to the status of an Embassy on October 6, 1942.



regarding powdered milk. They say that 30 tons of powdered milk held by the Canadian Red Cross are being licensed for shipment if they are still available. This is no doubt the consignment originally intended for the *Sicilia*. They add that the Greek Government are considering arrangements for obtaining the further supplies which will be necessary shortly. Here the Ministry remark that it is desirable to exclude uncoordinated action by private would-be donors and that they are temporarily trying to avoid publicity being given to the joint decision that 100 tons of milk may be sent to Greece each month. I know that you are studying the question of further supplies and that, at first sight at least, you favour supplies being purchased by the Greek War Relief Association. In this connection it might be desirable to consider whether that Association should not be required to turn over the milk it may obtain either from donations or by purchase to the American or Canadian Red Cross for export. This is consistent with the principle laid down by the State Department that the American Red Cross should be responsible for all exports of relief goods from this country to destinations inside the blockade, and it might avoid trouble in future if it could be established that while the Greek War Relief Association might in certain circumstances acquire by purchase or donation goods intended for Greece, they should invariably be exported in the name of the national Red Cross society of their country of origin.

With reference to Mr. Long's request to Mr. Hall for information regarding the exact nature of the pulses being provided in Canada, the Ministry state that the 3,000 tons being supplied to the Greeks is part of an odd lot of 10,000 tons of leguminous vegetables suitable for making soup which is held by the British Ministry of Food in Canada. They were prepared for shipment so that there should be as little delay as possible after the anticipated favourable recommendation was received from Monsieur Allard and the Control Commission. When the favourable recommendation of the above-mentioned authorities reached London on October 27th, instructions were given for the 3,000 tons of pulses to be loaded in vessels then due to leave Montreal very shortly.

The Ministry inform us that pulses from the United States will be required in future as regular supplies cannot be made available in Canada, though in this connection the Greeks may eventually take over the balance of the 10,000 tons mentioned above. The Ministry have been given to understand that the Greeks have asked for a consignment of pulses to be sent forward from the United States

under Lend Lease for loading on ships due to leave Canada at the end of November.

In telegraphing to His Majesty's Minister at Stockholm to inform him of the latest developments, the Ministry remarked that while they welcomed the possibility of accelerated turn round of relief ships in Greek ports, they are not at present able to authorise an increase in the actual rate of shipments above 15,000 tons a month. They expressed the hope that H. M. Minister would be able to provide a very early and full reply to the questions addressed to him regarding conditions in Greece and the efficiency of the controls now being established. They remark that they still have no clear picture of the general food situation in Greece nor information about control and disposal of Greek produce as provided in the terms covering the relief scheme. While they appreciate that the Control Commission has already achieved a great deal, they point out that Monsieur Allard's silence on these points makes it difficult to give proper consideration to various proposals put forward for additional relief.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Brandt.<sup>58</sup>

Yours sincerely,

J. D. MURRAY

---

868.48/3321 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Sweden (Greene) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, November 5, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received November 5—10:12 a. m.]

3121. Swedish Chargé d'Affaires at Athens states Germans and Italians prepared send food from respective countries in compensation for products consumed by troops of occupation. Italians will send 2500 tons of cereal for civil population; Germans prepared to send 20 to 25,000 tons of potatoes, 5,000 tons of seed potatoes, 15,000 tons of sugar and 15,000 tons of pulse. Swedes suggested that *Mongabarra* now unloading at Piraeus be sent to Trieste to load and transport these goods to Piraeus. Germans suggest that *Hallaren* be sent as well. Swedish control officer can be placed on board if desired. Swedes consider that it is urgent that these goods reach Greece before worst of cold weather arrives and that in no other way can they be sent there. They desire to know if this is agreeable to United States Government. Same request made of British Government. Last Greek relief telegram 3069 October 31, 3 p. m.<sup>59</sup>

GREENE

---

<sup>58</sup> George Louis Brandt, Executive Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State.

<sup>59</sup> Not printed

868.48/3322 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Sweden (Greene) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, November 5, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received November 5—4:06 p. m.]

3132. Foreign Office states that it has today received another telegram from Swedish Chargé d'Affaires in Athens along lines my 3121 November 5, 1 p. m. and strongly urging that plans for sending *Mongabarra* and *Hallaren* to Trieste be approved and stating Axis Powers agreed in addition to importing amounts mentioned to "reduce" consumption by forces now in Greece.

GREENE

868.48/3316 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Sweden (Greene)*

WASHINGTON, November 6, 1942—10 p. m.

961. Your 3069, October 31.<sup>60</sup> The interested agencies of this Government have approved the shipment to Greece of monthly quantities of 2000 tons of dried vegetables and 100 tons of powdered milk, and agree that these amounts may be in addition to the 15,000 tons of wheat now going forward each month if the shipping space available permits. It is understood that distribution will be effected by the Committee of Action under the agreed conditions of the scheme and that the milk will be reserved for needy Greek children, mothers and invalids.

The 2000 tons of dried vegetables will be supplied by this Government, through Lend-Lease to the Greek Government. Procurement is already in course, and it is expected that the first Lend-Lease shipment will reach Montreal for loading late this month, following the initial shipment of 3000 tons of Canadian dried vegetables now going forward.

The foregoing has been communicated to the British Embassy here for transmission to London.

HULL

868.48/3322 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*<sup>61</sup>

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1942—midnight.

5701. The Legation at Stockholm reports that the Swedish Chargé d'Affaires at Athens has urged that the Swedish vessels *Mongabarra*,

<sup>60</sup> Not printed.<sup>61</sup> Repeated to the Minister in Sweden as telegram No. 988, November 13, midnight.

now unloading at Piraeus, and *Hallaren*, which has been operating in the Eastern Mediterranean, be sent to Trieste to load and transport to Greece certain foods which the Germans and Italians are stated to be prepared to supply in compensation for native Greek products consumed by the occupying troops. These are said to include: from the Italians, 2,500 tons of cereal; from the Germans, 15,000 tons pulse; 15,000 tons sugar; 20 to 25,000 tons potatoes, and 5,000 tons of seed potatoes.

This proposal is agreeable to this Government provided the British Government concurs and on the understanding that: 1) a Swedish observer would be placed on board these vessels; 2) these supplies would be distributed to the Greek people in conformity with the conditions of the relief scheme; and 3) the vessels would be used solely for the transportation of these supplies and returned to their present status as soon as that operation is completed.

It is assumed that the Greek and British Governments would make appropriate stipulations as regards the payment of the freight on these vessels and that the latter would take the necessary action as regards granting of safe-conduct.

Repeated to Stockholm for information and for communication to the Swedish Foreign Office if and when the British Minister receives similar instructions.

Please communicate foregoing to appropriate British authorities.

HULL

---

868.48/3350b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 17, 1942—10 p. m.

5767. Legation at Stockholm has been informed by the Swedish Foreign Office that German Government has now consented to supply of foodstuffs to Aegean islands in conformity with Greek relief scheme. It is proposed that one of Swedish relief ships unload at Smyrna where arrangements would be made to store grain, which would be transported to islands in motor sailboats furnished by German navy and manned by Greek crews and distributed under control of International Red Cross representative in Turkey. Legation reports further that the Germans declare Crete should be provisioned from Kalamata and Swedish Chargé Athens inquires whether the steamer *Camelia* might unload at that port which is said to have storage facilities for about 6,000 tons grain. Germans

suggest that a 60 [600?] ton Swedish vessel be made available to carry grain from Kalamata to Crete and Swedish Chargé believes such vessel might also be used between Piraeus and Cyclades.

This Government is prepared to agree to the first of these proposals, if the British find them satisfactory, and will be glad to instruct the Embassy at Ankara to indicate to the Turkish Government our interest in the use of Smyrna as a distribution base, if such action seems desirable. As regards the second proposal, we have no objections in principle, but should like information regarding the arrangements contemplated for the chartering and fueling of the 60 [600?] ton Swedish vessel which it is proposed to use.

Repeated to Ankara for information and to Stockholm for information and appropriate action in consultation with British Legation.

Please take up with competent British authorities.

HULL

868.48/3349 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Sweden (Greene) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, November 23, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received November 23—2:49 p. m.]

3329. British Minister and I are submitting *aides-mémoire* to Swedish Government this afternoon in sense of Department's 988, November 13, midnight,<sup>62</sup> British Minister taking up in addition question of payment of freight and certain details concerning safe conduct including marking of vessels.

GREENE

868.48/3389 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews)  
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 23, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received—9:30 p. m.]

7291. Department's 5767, November 17, 10 p. m. The following is the substance of a Foreign Office note dated December 19:

The British Minister at Stockholm was authorized on December 10 to inform the Swedish Government that the British Government in principle agreed to the setting up of a food depot at Izmir and to the use of caiques, with Greek crews, to transport relief goods from Izmir to Mytilene, Chios, and Samos, provided that satisfactory

<sup>62</sup> See footnote 61, p. 790.

control could be established by the Commission. Conditions under which such control would be satisfactory are the following:

(1) No delivery of relief goods should be made to any island where there are Axis forces unless permanent residence has been taken up by a neutral supervisor.

(2) Control of the relief administration should be so exercised as not to assist the occupying powers in exacting labor from the inhabitants on works of military importance or in the maintaining there of their own forces. The Neutral Commission should control the requisitioning and export of local produce, which of course should be prohibited in the rise of staple foods which are similar to those being imported as relief goods.

(3) In cases where wheat or flour is sent in bags, these bags should be kept under one commission's control either for return or for its own use.

(4) Any vessel engaged in this work may carry only relief goods at any stage of its voyage, and cannot carry passengers other than the Neutral Commission's authorized representatives. Unless reliable control is possible at all the ports visited, therefore, a neutral supervisor should be carried on all voyages in Greek water.

(5) Deliveries should be suspended by the Commission when its requirements are not fulfilled. The Commission should, for this purpose, be in a position to arrange that the necessary information is available regularly.

Insofar as Crete and the Cyclades group are concerned, the British Government was obliged to inform the Swedish Government on November 5 that, because of operational reasons, it could not agree to the use of small craft plying between the islands themselves or from the mainland to the islands. On the other hand, there is no objection on the part of the British Government to the use of one Swedish vessel of not less than 600 tons for the purpose of provisioning the islands of the Cyclades and Crete if the Swedish Government is able to make available from shipping now in Swedish waters a vessel for this purpose. Nevertheless, the British Government would require the fulfillment of the same conditions of control as set forth above for the Aegean Islands. On December 8 the British Minister at Stockholm was instructed to inform the Swedish Government accordingly, but subject to the concurrence of the American Chargé d'Affaires in Stockholm and without prejudice to fueling arrangements and the question of chartering.

The American Government (says the Foreign Office note) may be aware that the Italian Government, having at first cooperated in the arrangements for the despatch of the steamer *Eros* to Kalamata to unload there a portion of her cargo, upon her arrival refused to permit her to be unloaded. Apparently this development rules out, at any rate for some time, the possibility of provisions

acquiesce in its formal suppression by the Greek Government. Subsequently, still more detailed modifications to the loan contracts would have to be negotiated between the Greek Government and the various bankers, who are trustees for loans; also with His Majesty's Government in respect of guaranteed loans still outstanding, and with the United States Government in respect of the loan made by them in 1929.

The points (a) to (g) constitute the safeguards, etc., which our Treasury have in mind, but they are not final and may be modified or amplified in the course of the various discussions with the Greek Minister of Finance."

Foreign Office has given us copy of telegram concerning these proposals sent by League Loans Committee in London to Federal Reserve Bank New York for communication to Wadsworth care Red Cross Washington with copy to National City Bank New York. We presume this is available to Department.<sup>64</sup>

MATTHEWS

---

868.51 War Credits/786 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1942.

2251. Your 1497, March 28. In a letter commenting on the contemplated abolition of the International Financial Commission at Athens, the Treasury refers to its interest in the continuation of the Commission under the terms of the debt agreement with Greece of May 10, 1929 and the supplementary agreement of May 24, 1932<sup>65</sup> and, after quoting the security provisions in Part II of the agreement of May 10, 1929, says:

"The Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to execute the agreement of May 10, 1929 pursuant to the Act of Congress approved February 14, 1929.<sup>66</sup> Under these circumstances the Secretary of the Treasury is not in a position to formally consent to the action proposed by the Greek Government for the abolition of the International Financial Commission at Athens. However, the Treasury appreciates the position of the Greek Government in the

---

<sup>64</sup> Telegram of March 26, 1942, from the Bank of England to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, not printed; it described in part the anxiety of the Greek Government to abolish the Commission as (Vichy) French and Italian representatives, possibly with the addition of reappointed Germans, were competent to exercise the functions of the Commission; it indicated further that the British Government was in principle disposed to withdraw its representative, who was unable to exercise his functions in any case, and had no objection to the termination of the Commission by the Greek Government. A copy of the telegram was furnished to the Department on April 1, 1942, by Elliot Wadsworth who was American member of the League Loans Committee in London. (868.51/1651)

<sup>65</sup> *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1932*, p. 291.

<sup>66</sup> 45 Stat. 1176.

present circumstances. In the event the Greek Government should proceed with such action, it is considered desirable that appropriate assurances be obtained that its action does not prejudice the interests of the United States and that all existing rights of securities and priorities applicable to the indebtedness of Greece to the United States under the agreements of May 10, 1929 and May 24, 1932 remain unchanged and that arrangement will be made for functions hitherto discharged by the International Financial Commission to be committed to the Bank of Greece or other appropriate body. It appears that assurances of this character will be acceptable to the League Loans Committee (London) and the British Government.

Upon receipt of notification of any action taken by the Government of Greece to abolish the International Financial Commission the Treasury, at the appropriate time, will be glad to consider any action on the part of this Government which may be necessary to bring the provisions of the agreements of May 10, 1929 and May 24, 1932 into accord with the changed conditions brought about by the arrangements made by the Greek Government."

HULL

---

#### VISIT OF KING GEORGE II TO THE UNITED STATES

[Plans were made public by the Department of State on November 17, 1941, that King George II would visit the United States shortly for a three-week visit. Four days later, the Department announced that the visit had been postponed. For relevant press releases, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 22, 1941, page 406.]

On February 27, 1942, the Greek Minister, Cimon P. Diamantopoulos, informed the Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, that King George II had expressed the earnest hope he might return from Egypt to England by way of the United States, his visit to be on an informal basis. On March 2, Mr. Welles informed the Greek Minister that President Roosevelt had approved the visit on this basis. (868.001G291/86½)

The King, accompanied by the Greek Prime Minister, Emmanouel Tsouderos, and a small party, arrived in Washington on June 10. The itinerary planned for the early part of the King's visit is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 6, page 523. On June 26, the King handed to President Roosevelt copies of memoranda regarding the drafting of Greek subjects in the United States, dated June 15 (page 818), the financial problems of the Greek Government, dated June 15 (page 798), and the post-war aims of Greece, dated June 12 (page 822), and a photographic record of conditions in Greece. The President expressed his appreciation for the documents left with him in a letter to the King on July 7 which stated: "I understand that Mr. Tsouderos has handed copies of these memoranda to the Secretary



and the Under Secretary of State and that they are already receiving the attention of the appropriate officials of this Government." (868.00/1157)

President Roosevelt and King George ended their conversations on July 9 and prepared a joint statement which was released by the White House the same day. This statement is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 11, page 601. The statement indicated the Secretary of State and the Greek Prime Minister would sign on the following day an agreement on the principles applying to mutual aid in the prosecution of the war.

For correspondence on the Lend-Lease Agreement between the United States and Greece, signed July 10, see pages 814 ff.

For comment by the Secretary of State on December 14 regarding the visit of King George, see footnote 71, page 800.]

---

#### CONSIDERATION BY THE UNITED STATES OF REQUESTS BY THE GREEK GOVERNMENT FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

868.2222/4

*Memorandum by the Greek Prime Minister (Tsouderos)  
Concerning Financial Problem*<sup>67</sup>

The Greek public expenditure increases daily for the following reasons:

a) Our armed forces are constantly increasing by the continuous addition of new volunteers escaping from Greece. It is to our interests, both for Greece and the Allied cause, to strengthen our armed forces to the highest degree. The armament, equipment and maintenance of the Army, Navy and Air Forces, are taken care of by Great Britain through a system similar to the Lease-Lend. However, all other expenditures of the armed Greek forces—salaries, etc.—burden the Greek budget. Today the monthly expenditure for this purpose approximates 200,000 Pounds.

b) The needs for relief of the refugees (women and children) are substantially increasing daily because, due to starvation the inhabitants escape, especially from the Greek Islands, coming to the Middle East. The expense for their support burdens us, because the help of the Red Cross in this direction is limited. I estimate the yearly expenditure for the support of the refugees who have arrived up to this time, at 200,000 Pounds. In addition to this, one can add the expense required for the evacuation of the children from Greece, should this materialize.

c) The expense for revictualling Greece, for the most part, is also the burden of the Greek Government. Up till now, the food-stuffs sent from Turkey were paid for by the Greek War Relief.

---

<sup>67</sup> Transmitted to the Under Secretary of State by the Greek Prime Minister in his letter of June 16, p. 817. A copy of this memorandum was handed to President Roosevelt by King George II on June 26; see bracketed note, *supra*.

It seems, however, that the means of this Organization are not adequate to continue these payments. Consequently, the Greek Government will have to continue, as a guarantor, to make these payments.

To meet such large expenditures, Greece has limited income—namely, whatever she collects annually from our mercantile marine, or from taxes, or from sharing in freight receipts. This amount does not exceed by a great margin yearly the amount of 1,800,000 Pounds. This income is daily diminishing due to the loss of boats through torpedoing.

The Greek Government still has on deposit a balance which is a little over two million pounds.

From the above statements, it follows that the Greek Government will soon find itself facing financial difficulties unless the expenditures for the refugees, the evacuation of children and of the sending of foodstuffs to Greece will be met either by money provided by philanthropic organizations (Red Cross, etc.) or by credits in dollars based on the system of Lease-Lend.

On the above matters, we should appreciate Your Excellency's counsel.

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1942.

---

868.51/1654

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 23, 1942.

The Greek Minister <sup>68</sup> called to see me this afternoon at his request.

The Minister said that in accordance with the request of the President to the King and to the Prime Minister that this matter be discussed directly with me, he would now give me preliminary figures covering the financial situation of the Greek Government. The Minister stated that the Greek Government at present had remaining on deposit some \$8,000,000. The expenses of the Greek Government at present were \$9,600,000 a year for the maintenance of the Greek military, air and naval forces operating in North Africa. In addition thereto, the Greek Government is obliged to spend at the rate of some \$1,300,000 a year for the upkeep of refugees and for the transfer of civilian refugees, particularly children. He said that the income of the Greek Government from the charter of Greek merchant shipping was approximately \$7,200,000 a year.

---

<sup>68</sup> Cimon P. Diamantopoulos.

Consequently, at the present rate they were incurring a deficit of close to \$4,000,000 a year, and with the constant shrinking in merchant shipping due to sinkings, this deficit would undoubtedly increase from month to month. Obviously the Greek Government could not find money with which to meet its continuing deficit for more than a relatively brief period.

He said that the King and the Prime Minister had had the impression that the upkeep of Greek refugees might be met by the American Red Cross or by charitable organizations in this country, but the Minister had made it clear to them that this was impossible. He further stated that they had also believed that Lend-Lease arrangements might be resorted to for the purpose of obtaining dollar credits with which to meet their military and naval expenditures. The Minister said that he had also made it clear to them that under the terms of the statutes in force this likewise was not possible.

In accordance with the President's request, the Minister therefore asked that immediate consideration be given to requirements of the Greek Government with a view to ascertaining what assistance this Government might be able and willing to render. I stated that I would be very glad to ask that immediate thought be given to this problem and that as soon as the situation had been canvassed by the appropriate authorities of the Government I would be glad to speak again to the Minister.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

868.51/1654

*Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 23, 1942.

I suggest that you discuss this problem<sup>69</sup> with Dr. Berle,<sup>70</sup> and I further suggest that, unless you see some objection, the Bureau of the Budget be requested to give its advice as to the best way of handling this situation. It is my understanding that the President has decided that some arrangement must be made whereby the Greek Government can be kept going.<sup>71</sup> The amounts involved are relatively small and

<sup>69</sup> See memorandum of conversation, *supra*.

<sup>70</sup> Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.

<sup>71</sup> In a letter of December 14, 1942, to the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau), the Secretary of State said: "King George of Greece and the Greek Premier, during their visit to this country last June, stated that the financial situation of the Greek Government was rapidly deteriorating and appealed to this Government for financial assistance. It is my understanding that the President has decided that some arrangement must be made by which the Greek Government can be kept going." (868.51/1662) Regarding the visit of King George II to the United States, see bracketed note, p. 797.

it would seem to me that the time has come for us to consider the desirability of ascertaining whether the Congress would approve a government-to-government credit for arrangements of this character with the refugee governments.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

868 48/3258

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 14, 1942.

The Greek Minister came in to see me, at his request.

He referred to a conversation he had had with Mr. Welles with respect to financial assistance for the Greek Government. His point was that he hoped a way might be found by which the United States Government could perhaps take over the burden of supporting a very large number of refugees whom the Greek Government was presently supporting in various countries of the Middle East. He mentioned particularly Turkey, and Palestine, and Egypt. His impression was that roughly two hundred thousand pounds sterling a year were being spent for this purpose, and perhaps we could help in that regard.

I said that I would want to go into the matter before giving him a considered view. I asked if he would be good enough to send me, for our information, a memorandum as to the number of refugees, and their location, and the cost of taking care of them. I would then see what could be done about it. The Minister agreed to do so.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

---

868.51/1657

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of  
Near Eastern Affairs (Ailing)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 27, 1942.

The Greek Minister called today at my request.

Referring to the Minister's conversation with Mr. Welles on July 23, 1942, I told him that an intelligent understanding of his Government's financial problem and consideration by the Department and the other concerned authorities of the ways in which this Government might be of assistance would be greatly facilitated if he could secure and transmit to us fully detailed information concerning the finances of the exiled Government since its departure from Greece.

In the ensuing conversation I mentioned, in particular, information as to:

1. The amount and status of Greek reserves, including those of the Bank of Greece;
2. The sources and amounts of the revenues available to his Government, past, present and prospective;
3. The amounts and purposes of the Greek Government's expenditures, past, present and prospective;
4. The extent of assistance being received by the Greek Government, directly or indirectly, from the British Government and other sources.

I added that I thought it would assist the Department in its discussion of the matter with other branches of this Government if we were in a position to state what measures the Greek Government has taken and is taking to cut its expenditures to an irreducible minimum.

---

868.51/1657a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the  
United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1942—2 p. m.

4138. During their recent visit to this country the Greek King and Premier stated that because of declining resources the Greek Government would soon need funds to continue its operations and appealed for financial assistance from this Government.

In connection with its consideration of this request, the Department would welcome any information which the British Government may be able to furnish regarding any financial arrangements it may have made with the Greek Government and the extent of the assistance which the British are now rendering or plan to render to that Government, particularly in connection with the equipment and maintenance of Greek military forces, the relief of Greek refugees in the Near East, and the chartering of the Swedish vessels carrying relief shipments to continental Greece.<sup>72</sup>

WELLES

---

<sup>72</sup> For correspondence on the last-mentioned subject, see pp. 724 ff.

868.51/1659 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)  
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, September 17, 1942—6 p. m.  
[Received September 17—5:46 p. m.]

5202. Department's 4138, August 29, 2 p. m. According to the Foreign Office the present financial relations between the British Government and the Greeks are as follows:

1. An agreement between the British and Greek Governments was signed on March 9, 1942, under the terms of which the British Government agreed not to claim reimbursement for cost of the equipment and maintenance of the Greek Armed Forces nor for the supply of war material. This means in effect that the Greek Government is being supplied by the British Government on lend lease terms with everything needed by the Greek Armed Forces insofar as this is available from the resources of the sterling area, except cash disbursements or advances for pay or for special purposes. The exact number involved is not known but it is estimated that the personnel of the Greek Army, Navy and Air Force in the Middle East is well in excess of 20,000.

2. Contributions toward Greek relief consist of wheat valued at approximately 300,000 pounds taken from British stocks in the Middle East and defraying the expense of chartering the Swedish ship *Hallaren* during the last 6 months in Swedish gold crowns at the daily rate of approximately 100 pounds.

3. Before the occupation of Greece the British Government advanced (a) 10 million pounds for purchases in the sterling area, (b) 35 million pounds for internal Greek needs and for covering an increase in note issue and (c) 5 million pounds for the purchase in the United States of certain essentials.

4. (a) Is practically exhausted; as the funds under (b) were sold to the Bank of Greece against drachma the Greek Government contends that the 27 million pounds which remain are not available. This may be discussed by the British and Greeks at some later date but for the present the Greek Government is self-sufficient in sterling, most of which it is deriving from shipping subsidies and taxation; it is now [not?] known how much remains of (c) but it is thought to be very little.

With reference to the Greek financial position in general, the Foreign Office comments that it is without doubt becoming tighter due to increasing expenditures for the chartering of Swedish ships for purposes of relief and for harbor disbursements connected with relief activities; increasing expenditures called for by the rapid growth of the Greek Armed Forces in the Middle East; and increasing expenditures made necessary by the arrival of larger numbers of refugees from Greece by devious routes.

The provision of sterling necessary for the Greeks, the Foreign Office states, is generally speaking regarded as falling within the province of the British. Foreign Office adds however that in view of increasing financial difficulties faced by the Greeks the British Government would be glad if the Greeks were given help in other respects from American sources.

WINANT

868.51/1662

*Report by the Greek Minister of Finance (Varvaressos)*<sup>73</sup>

I. STATEMENT OF THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT FROM 23 APRIL 1941 UNTIL 31 AUGUST 1942

At the moment when the Greek Government was compelled to leave Greece it had at its disposal abroad the following funds to meet the expenditure which it was undertaking for the purpose of continuing the struggle:

a) £4,417,000.— balance of a credit of £10,000,000 granted by the British Government to the Greek Government at the beginning of the Greco-Italian war to meet war expenditure incurred outside Greece, and, in particular, for the payment of war material purchased within the Sterling area. The difference, amounting to £5,583,000 between the total credit of £10,000,000, and the aforementioned balance had been expended by the Greek Government before the enemy invasion of Greece.

b) \$4,975,000.— (i.e. £1,235,000.—) which the British Government likewise made available to the Greek Government for payment of the value of war material purchased outside the Sterling area.

Thus, at the time of its departure from Greece the Greek Government had at its disposal the sum of £5,652,000 from the above mentioned credits granted by the British Government.

After the seat of Government had been established outside Greece, and more particularly after it had been established in London, the Greek Government created the following sources of revenue:

a) it imposed taxation on Greek merchant ships with retrospective application from April 1941. Up to the 31st August 1942 this had yielded £415,000.—. Unfortunately, this will of necessity be a progressively declining source of revenue, by reason of the continuing heavy losses sustained by the Greek Mercantile Marine; these losses now amount to 60% of its pre-war strength.

b) by means of a legislative measure it enacted that any difference between the freight paid by the British Government, on the basis of the time-charter agreement, and any other higher freight

<sup>73</sup> No indication on file copy as to when this report reached the Department. On December 10, the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs referred to this report "recently handed to me by the Greek Ambassador". (868.51/1664)

actually realised by a Greek ship from any cause whatsoever, shall constitute public revenue and, as such, be assigned to the needs of the State.

This arrangement also had retrospective application from April 1941. The sums, however, collected from this source up to the end of November 1941 were by law set aside in fulfillment of the obligations undertaken by the Greek State in connection with the insurance scheme which it had established. Losses were sustained on account of the fact that very many of the Greek ships insured under the scheme were lost in the course of the occupation of the country by the enemy.

At the present moment there is only a very small number of ships in respect of which the above-mentioned item of revenue (from difference in freight) can accrue. Certain arrangements have, however, been made ensuring that, under certain conditions, this item of revenue will be retained in Public Funds as long as the ships in this category (which in the past were trading on the free market) survive. The revenue collected from this source for Public Funds (after deduction of the sums required in fulfillment of obligations under the insurance scheme, as mentioned above) is reckoned at £1,000,000 up to the 31st August 1942.

To the above sums must be added one of \$2,000,000.— (approximately £500,000.—), being the unutilized balance of a remittance from the Greek Government to the Greek Legation at Washington, made prior to the enemy invasion and intended for the purchase of supplies.

Thus, the total of the funds both capital and revenue, which the Greek Government had at its disposal from the date of its departure from Greece until the 31st August 1942 amounted to £7,567,000.— Out of these available funds, however, a sum of £1,610,000 was expended in payment of the value of supplies which though ordered by the Greek Government before the enemy occupation of the Country, fell due for payment after the Government's departure from Greece.

Consequently, the actual amount of funds available to the Greek Government in the period up to 31st August 1942, for meeting public expenditure was £5,957,000.—

## II. GREEK GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE FROM 23 APRIL 1941 TO 31 AUGUST 1942

Against the aforementioned assets expenditure incurred by the Greek Government from the date of its departure from Greece up to 31 August 1942 amounted to a total of £3,582,000.—



It should be noted that this figure does not include expenditure of the Ministry of Marine for the period April–August 1942, nor that of the Air Ministry for the month of August, as the relative accounts have not as yet been made up.

The apportionment of the above total is as follows:

Ministry of War	£1,355,100
“ “ Marine (up to March 1942)	727,200
“ “ Air (up to July 1942)	202,400
“ “ Foreign Affairs (Embassies, Legations and Consulates)	362,000
“ “ Mercantile Marine (including expenditure for ships chartered to the Greek Government.)	298,300
Revictualling and Relief of Refugees	442,000
Fixed charges:—	
Royal Household, Pensions etc.	104,000
Other Administrative expenses	91,000
Total	<hr/> £3,582,000.

After deduction of the above figure of total expenditure from the afore-mentioned total of assets, amounting to £5,957,000 there remained a balance at the disposal of the Greek Government on the 31st August 1942 of £2,375,000. This sum will, however, be reduced by at least £500,000 when the deferred payments for account of the Ministries of Marine and Air have been effected up to the 31st August.

Thus the balance available to the Greek Government at 1st September 1942 may be reckoned at approximately £1,875,000.

### III. ESTIMATES FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

#### A.—ESTIMATES OF EXPENDITURE

The estimate made at the beginning of the current year regarding expenditure in the financial year 1942–43 (April 1942–March 1943) had to be radically revised on account of the heavy increase in expenditure on the Fighting services. This increase is attributable to the substantial growth in the numbers of our armed forces in the Middle East. There has been, and still is a steady flow of new recruits—both officers and other ranks—to the Army, Navy and Air Force. Hence the estimates for the current financial year 1942–43 are as follows:—

1 April 1942—31 March 1943.

Ministry of War	£1,480,000
"    " Marine	1,100,000
"    " Air	360,000
"    " Foreign Affairs	280,000
Fixed Charges:	
(Royal Household, Pensions etc.,)	80,000
Ministry of Mercantile Marine	
(including expenditure for ships chartered to the Greek Government)	200,000
Other Administrative expenses	100,000
Total	<hr/> £3,600,000.

As is shown below, in the section dealing with the financial assistance afforded by the British Government, the above estimates of expenditure for account of the Armed Forces include only the cash disbursements for salaries and allowances, for which the Greek Government is liable. No expenditure for material of any kind is included therein, inasmuch as, by the Agreement referred to below, the British Government undertook to supply such material to our armed forces.

To this expenditure should be added the probable expenditure on the partial revictualling of Greece up to the limit allowed by the Great Allied Powers, as well as the necessary expenditure on relief for the refugees escaping from Greece.

The heavy financial burden of despatching foodstuffs to Greece is lightened for the Greek Government (a) by the Canadian Government's generous gift of 15,000 tons of wheat monthly, which are allowed to be shipped to Greece, (b) by the splendid work of the Greek War Relief Association in U. S. A., a work which enjoys the moving and whole-hearted support of the American people, (c) by the liberality of the United States Government which has promised to supply on Lease-lend terms foodstuffs and other commodities the importation of which into Greece may be permitted, (d) by the support given by the British Government and British people, and (e) by the assistance forthcoming from various International Organizations, in particular the International Red Cross, Swiss Red Cross, Swedish Red Cross.

The Greek people cannot ever forget the warm-hearted support, moral and material, which it has received from these Governments and Organisations; and it will ever recall with gratitude the splendid spirit of solidarity which, at the moment of its suffering, all nations with a high standard of moral civilization showed towards it.

But, as in the past so too in the future, the Greek Government will of necessity share in the expenses of despatching foodstuffs to the Greek people. Likewise, it will bear the cost of relief for refugees escaping from Greece.

It is clearly impossible to make an exact estimate of such expenditure. Nevertheless, the experience of the past few months combined with an examination of certain obligations which have already been undertaken leads one to envisage an expenditure of not less than £1,000,000.

Thus, for the financial year 1942-43 the total of the outgoings which it is possible to foresee with any degree of certainty will probably amount to the sum of £4,600,000. Of this sum £1,880,000 have already been spent in the five months 1 April-31 August 1942 (the figure includes expenditure of the Ministries of Marine and Air entered at £500,000, the accounts of which as mentioned above, have not yet been made up). *It follows, therefore, that a sum of £2,720,000 falls for expenditure in the remainder of the financial year i.e. the seven months 1 September 1942 to 31 March 1943.*

#### B.—ESTIMATED RECEIPTS

The resources which may be anticipated to be available to the Greek Government during the same period from 1 September 1942 to 31 March 1943 are reckoned to be the following:—

- a) The afore-mentioned balance of earlier funds, viz. £1,875,000.
- b) The proportion of taxes imposed upon Greek ships, and of the difference of freight collected for account of Public Revenue, as detailed above.

The amounts accruing in a full year are reckoned at £300,000 from taxes, and £1,500,000 from difference of freight, i.e. a total yearly revenue from these sources of £1,800,000. Hence for the period to the end of the financial year (seven months, 1/9/42-31/3/43) the proportion of revenue from these sources amounts to £1,050,000.

Consequently the total of resources at the disposal of the Greek Government up to the end of the financial year may be estimated at £2,925,000 against expenditure, as estimated above, of £2,720,000.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the attainment of these figures of revenue as a whole is a matter depending on the extent of the losses sustained by our Mercantile Marine. As already pointed out, taxation and difference of freight depend on the number of vessels surviving. Heavy losses would inevitably entail a reduction in revenue from this source.

On the other hand, the corresponding expenditure up to the end of the financial year has been estimated at £2,720,000. This estimate,

however, rests on the assumption that no events will occur calling for any considerable increase in expenditure, such as (to name the principal items) a growth in the numbers of our Armed Forces or in the Revictualling or Refugee Relief requirements. Yet such increases are extremely probable, and, if occurring would certainly wipe out the small margin of £200,000 between revenue and expenditure shown in the above estimates.

The conclusion to be drawn from the above is that, if the Greek Government has hitherto been able, and will, in all probability, be able, up to the end of the financial year (31.3.43) to meet expenditure, this is due to the fact that it had at its disposal the aforementioned funds from earlier credits; as appeared above, these sums totalled £4,542,000 (total of sums available up to 31 August 1942 £5,957,000 less taxes and difference of freight £1,415,000 leaving a balance of funds available, derived from earlier credits, of £4,542,000).

Unfortunately, however, by the 31 March 1943 these funds will have been wholly exhausted, as clearly emerges from the foregoing account.

Hence the estimates for the following financial year (April 1943–March 1944) will be:

*Receipts:* £1,800,000. (on the assumption that the losses of our merchant ships will not be such as seriously to reduce this amount)

*Expenditure:* certainly in excess of the figure of £4,600,000 estimated for the current financial year.

#### IV. FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

From the very beginning of the Greco-Italian War the British Government gave the fullest measure of financial assistance to Greece. This consisted in the granting:

1) of the credits referred to on the first page of the present Report under (a) and (b).

2) of further substantial credits which the British Government had granted to the Greek Government in monthly instalments, for the purpose of meeting war expenditure within Greece. The amount of these credits totalling £35,000,000, had been wholly utilized by the Greek Government in Greece in drachmae which it acquired by the sale of the aforesaid sterling amount to the Bank of Greece.

But the financial assistance afforded by the British Government did not cease with the occupation of Greece by the enemy.

By an agreement dated the 9th March 1942 between the British and Greek Governments, "concerning the organisation and the employment of the Greek Armed Forces", His Britannic Majesty's Government undertook to provide all material necessary for the arming, equipment and maintenance of the Greek Armed Forces, and to make no claim on the Greek Government for reimbursement

of the cost so incurred. The Greek Government for its part undertook to return to the Government of the United Kingdom on the cessation of the hostilities in which the Greek Forces are participating such of the war material and other supplies in question as would be still under their control and as the Government of the United Kingdom may request them so to return.

As a consequence of this Agreement the Greek Government bears all expenditure for the General Administration of public affairs, and, in respect of the Fighting Services, all cash payments for salaries and allowances for the officers and other ranks of our armed forces, while the British Government bears the expenditure for all material and supplies required for the arming, equipment and maintenance of the Greek Armed Forces.

At the date of signature of this Agreement the Greek Government had envisaged neither the tremendous increase in Services expenditure arising from the growth in the numbers of our armed forces, nor the great cost of the revictualling programme.

The Greek Government hoped that the funds available at that time, together with the revenues provided by the mercantile marine, would suffice to meet the expenditure undertaken by it for a relatively long period of time, which it then estimated, somewhat optimistically, at about two years.

But expenditure, as estimated at that date, had almost doubled viz. it has increased by £2,000,000 through the growth of the armed forces and the revictualling requirements. In consequence the available funds will be exhausted during the current financial year, and the Greek Government's assets for meeting the increased expenditure of the financial year 1st April 1943–31 March 1944, will be limited merely to the receipts from the Mercantile Marine, as detailed above.

#### V. ASSETS OF THE BANK OF GREECE

The Bank of Greece was established in the year 1928 as an independent issuing Bank, in the form of a Limited Liability Company, in fulfillment of the Geneva Protocol of 1927.<sup>74</sup> This protocol embodied among other things, the programme of monetary and banking reorganization which had been worked out by the Financial Committee of the League of Nations in conjunction with the Greek Government, and which was introduced in Greece immediately thereafter. The principal measure envisaged by this programme was the creation of an autonomous Central Bank, possessing the exclusive right to issue bank-notes. The Administration, Management and Functioning of the Bank are free from State intervention.

<sup>74</sup> Greek Loan Protocol, signed at Geneva, September 15, 1927, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. LXX, p. 9.

The State has the right to inquire only into the legality of the Bank's acts and decisions.

In the year 1932 the Bank of Greece acquired by law the exclusive right to buy and sell gold and foreign exchange.

This right could be granted to other reorganized Banks also on the recommendation of the Bank of Greece, but such Banks were obliged to hand over to the Bank of Greece any difference between purchases and sales of foreign exchange.

On the other hand, anyone exporting goods from Greece was obliged to hand over the resultant foreign exchange against the equivalent in drachmas to the Bank of Greece or to one of the above mentioned Banks, which were, in their turn, obliged to transfer it to the Bank of Greece after fulfilling their obligations.

In general, anyone importing foreign exchange into the country and wishing to obtain drachmae was obliged to sell it to the Bank of Greece, according to the above procedure.

In like manner, if the State held foreign exchange abroad and wished to obtain an equivalent amount of drachmae in Greece, it ought to sell such exchange to the Bank of Greece.

Thus the Bank of Greece was the institution which concentrated in its hands all the foreign exchange assets of the Country which the holders imported (either in order to conform with a legal obligation, or voluntarily) in order to obtain an equivalent amount of National currency.

The foreign exchange so acquired was sold by the Bank of Greece, against its equivalent in drachmae, to persons having lawful payments to make in foreign countries.

Shortly before the enemy invasion the Bank of Greece had succeeded in safeguarding the whole of its gold reserve. It was transferred, first to Crete, later to Egypt and finally to South Africa.

By virtue of a Law issued in Crete the Bank of Greece accompanied the Greek Government on the latter's departure from Greece and establishment abroad; the Bank's headquarters were transferred to the country in which at any given time the Greek Government would have its seat, and the Bank, of course, took control of its gold and foreign exchange assets lying outside Greece.

These assets (which have undergone only very slight alteration since that date) consist of the following items:—

a) Gold.

In the United States of America	ozs. 191,602.
In the Union of South Africa	“ 608,350.
Total	ozs. 799,952.

b) Sterling.

£35,000,000.

c) U. S. Dollars.

\$9,336,000.

The amount of the assets is higher than it would ordinarily have been in normal circumstances. It should, however, be stressed that this accumulation of foreign exchange does not result from the normal process of exchange of goods and services with foreign countries, but is due to wholly exceptional conditions. From the beginning of the present war in 1939, and more particularly, from the time of its extension to the Mediterranean the import of all kinds of goods required in Greece had been severely restricted. The control on the part of the belligerents of the production and supply of the principal commodities, the serious difficulties of sea transport, on which the provisioning of Greece depends, and the imposition of blockade by sea, which necessarily led to the control and restriction of imports even into the neutral countries of Europe, had as their result that, even while still neutral, Greece was unable to utilize her foreign assets for the purpose of satisfying the great needs of the population and the existing demand either in foodstuffs or other consumption goods or in raw materials, machinery or other production goods. Thus the Bank's assets while increased through the Greek Government's selling to it, in exchange for drachmae, a large part of the credits granted by the British Government, as mentioned above, could not be utilized for the purpose for which they were intended, and therefore accumulated at the Bank.

On the other hand, the quantities of national currency representing the equivalent of these assets remained in circulation and thus created even at that time inflationary conditions.

There is no need to point out that since the enemy occupation of the Country imports of consumption or production goods necessary to the population and to the Country's economy have almost entirely ceased.

It is obvious that the protracted privations of the Greek people and the terrible destruction of the country's wealth—machinery, tools, raw materials, buildings, and, generally, every stock and every productive asset—will, at the end of the war, create an enormous demand for goods from other countries, and that it will be impossible for even a small part of this demand to be met through the exporting capacity of a ruined economy.

Consequently, on the cessation of hostilities, the Bank of Greece will be faced with the following tasks:—

a) Together with the international action of assistance to the countries which have suffered from protracted enemy occupation, the Bank will have to satisfy, within limits, the purchasing power of the population by granting foreign exchange against drachmae for the purpose of providing from other countries the consumption and production goods for which there will be an enormous demand and of which the country will have been deprived.

b) By means of adequate reserves it will have to restore and safeguard the national monetary system, which together with the whole economy of the country will have been completely dislocated in the course of the country's occupation by the enemy.

It is only in this way that the country's economy can return to some form of normal functioning and thereby be enabled to confront the hard task of reconstruction.

Greece's recent monetary history shows that even reserves regarded as adequate may soon be exhausted if abnormal conditions would occur. In December 1928 that is at the end of the year in which the country's monetary and banking system was radically reorganized, the Bank of Greece's net reserves in gold and gold exchange amounted to 66,000,000 gold dollars. This fact did not prevent these reserves from falling in April 1932 to 11,000,000 dollars, nor did it prevent the serious monetary crisis which caused the abandonment of the gold standard and a return to a paper currency.

LONDON, 15 October 1942.

The Minister of Finance  
K. VARVARESSOS

---

868.51/1664

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 1, 1942.

The Greek Ambassador <sup>75</sup> came in to see me, at his request.

After a little general conversation, he said that he was interested in bringing up again the problem of financial assistance to the Greek Government. He had submitted figures to NE <sup>76</sup> and had discussed the matter with them, and he wondered how this might work out.

He said that when I had discussed this matter with him before, I had suggested that he might also consider the problem of assistance to the Greek Government in handling the Greek refugees, which were a constant drain on their finances. He wondered whether the two should be considered separately.

I said we were presently reviewing the Greek financial situation and in the event that something were worked out along that line it would presumably include the expenditures for relief. If, however, it were decided that nothing could be worked out, then we were prepared to consider separately the possibility of assistance to them for relief purposes.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

---

<sup>75</sup> The Greek Legation was raised to the status of an Embassy on October 6, 1942.

<sup>76</sup> Division of Near Eastern Affairs.



LEND-LEASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND  
GREECE, SIGNED JULY 10, 1942

868.24/155

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] June 8, 1942.

The Greek Minister <sup>77</sup> called at my request.

I handed to him the proposed Lease-Lend Agreement <sup>78</sup> to be entered into between our two Governments, if mutually agreeable. I explained to the Minister that this was in substance the same as our agreement entered into with the British Government.<sup>79</sup> I then added that this Government would from time to time be having purely casual exchange of information with one or more economists or qualified persons from each of the countries concerned; that for the present there would be no official conferences except with representatives of one country at a time, and that there will be no secrets about the negotiations and each government would, if it so desired, be kept informed of everything taking place with the other negotiators. The Minister seemed much interested and personally seemed to think that his Government would approve the proposal without delay.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

868.24/157

*Memorandum by Mr. Charles Bunn, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1942.

MR. ACHESON: Mr. Murray,<sup>80</sup> Mr. George Allen,<sup>81</sup> and I spoke briefly to the Greek Minister Thursday afternoon, July 2, with the following result:

(1) The text of the Lend-Lease agreement delivered by the Secretary to the Greek Minister on June 8 is acceptable.

(2) The Prime Minister will be here on July 10, and desires the signature to occur on that day. Mr. Barnes <sup>82</sup> has been notified and will have the papers ready.

(3) The "financial requirements of the Greek Government" which the Minister has in mind are connected not with any payment to

<sup>77</sup> Cimon P. Diamantopoulos.

<sup>78</sup> Not printed.

<sup>79</sup> Signed February 23, 1942; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 241, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1433.

<sup>80</sup> Wallace Murray, Adviser on Political Relations.

<sup>81</sup> Of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

<sup>82</sup> Charles M. Barnes, Chief of the Treaty Division.

be made for Lend-Lease goods, but with the needs of the Greek Government for financial assistance discussed in a memorandum which the Prime Minister has sent to the Under Secretary.<sup>85</sup> It was explained to the Minister that under the Lend-Lease Act, the President has authority to make available goods, services, or information, but not money, and that therefore any discussion of these financial requirements must be outside the orbit of Lend-Lease. The Minister indicated again that the Prime Minister will wish to discuss these financial requirements when he comes.

CHARLES BUNN

868.24/161

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)*<sup>86</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1942.

The Greek Prime Minister will return to Washington on July 9, and desires to sign the master Lend-Lease Agreement the following day. We are informed by TA<sup>85</sup> and TD<sup>86</sup> that those Divisions know of no reason why the ceremony should not take place at that time.

If you approve, we shall request the Treaty Division to have the document ready for signature on the morning of July 10.<sup>87</sup>

PAUL H. ALLING

#### FORMATION OF SEPARATE BATTALIONS OF GREEK SUBJECTS IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY

868.00/1145

*The Greek Minister (Diamantopoulos) to the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)*

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1942.

DEAR MR. MURRAY: From certain Greek quarters anxious to show loyalty and devotion to the United States in their war effort, and their willingness to make any sacrifice for the common cause, I have been asked to inquire if the formations of Greek volunteer units will be agreeable to the United States Military Authorities.

<sup>85</sup> Dated June 15, p. 798.

<sup>86</sup> Addressed to the Secretary of State who marked it "OK", and to the Under Secretary of State who noted on the margin: "Yes—the President is in accord."

<sup>87</sup> Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements.

<sup>88</sup> Treaty Division.

<sup>89</sup> Agreement signed July 10, 1942. For text, see Executive Agreement Series No. 260, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1559. For joint statement by President Roosevelt and the King of Greece, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 11, 1942, p. 601; for press release issued by the Department July 10, including text of agreement, see *ibid.*

I should be much obliged, my dear Mr. Murray, if you kindly informed me accordingly.

With my kind personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

C. DIAMANTOPOULOS

---

811.2222 (1940)/988

*Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of  
European Affairs (Hickerson)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 13, 1942.

After extensive conversations between officials of the Department of State and officials of the Selective Service Administration, the following has been tentatively agreed upon (subject to official approval by the Selective Service Administration, the Department of State and, where necessary, the War Department) as the policy to be followed by the Government of the United States in regard to the status in the United States of nationals of those countries at war with the Axis Powers in respect to our draft law; and the enlistment in certain cases in the armed forces of their respective countries of these nationals:

The United States Selective Training and Service Act of 1940,<sup>88</sup> as amended, provides that every male citizen of the United States and every male residing in the United States, between the ages of 18 and 65 shall register. Certain special groups such as officials of foreign governments who are not American citizens and active members of foreign armed forces are exempt from registration. The Act, as amended, provides further that registrants between the ages of 20 and 44 are liable for active military service in the United States armed forces.

The Act, as amended, provides special treatment for nationals of neutral countries and enemy aliens. This memorandum therefore, as pointed out above, deals solely with aliens who are nationals of countries at war with the Axis Powers. As it is recognized that from the standpoint of morale some special action would appear to be desirable with respect to these aliens, the Selective Service Administration is prepared to allow such aliens who have not declared an intention of becoming an American citizen to indicate whether they desire to enlist voluntarily in the forces of their own country prior to their induction into the military forces of the United States. Provided the United States War Department informs the Selective Service Administration that the alien's country has adequate training facilities, the Selective Service Administration will pass on to

---

<sup>88</sup> Approved September 16, 1940; 54 Stat. 885.

representatives of the alien's country in the United States the names of those aliens who indicate preference to serve in the forces of that country. It will then be open to the authorities of the country to enlist such an alien in their armed forces. If such enlistment takes place, the representative of the country in question will inform the Selective Service Administration and the latter will grant deferment to the alien under the United States draft law for so long as he continues to serve in the foreign force. If the alien in question does not enlist in the forces of his own country he will, of course, be drafted in the regular manner into the armed forces of the United States.

The foregoing régime will be subject to the following conditions:

1. That the representative in the United States of the foreign government in question accept the engagement that no threat or compulsion of any nature will be exercised by that government to induce an alien in the United States to enlist in the forces of the foreign government.

2. That any foreign government participating in the scheme should give this Government an assurance of reciprocal treatment within its own territory as regards American citizens being permitted to enlist in the forces of the United States.

3. That the foreign governments participating will give an undertaking not to accept enlistments from American citizens subject to registration nor from aliens of any nationality who have declared their intention of becoming American citizens and are subject to registration.

---

868.2222/4

*The Greek Prime Minister (Tsouderos) to the Under Secretary  
of State (Welles)*

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. WELLES: Relative to the question of mobilization of Greek subjects in America about which I had the honor to speak to you last evening, I enclose herewith a brief notation wherein I explain our plan on the subject.

I deemed it appropriate to send also the attached note concerning the financial problem<sup>89</sup> which is now being anxiously considered by my colleague the Minister of Finance.

I hope that before our departure from America I shall have the honor to greet you personally and to express to you once more our deepest gratitude for the very cordial reception which was accorded to us by all and especially by the United States Government.

Yours very sincerely,

EM. J. TSOUDEROS

---

<sup>89</sup> *Ante*, p. 798.

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by the Greek Prime Minister (Tsouderos)  
Concerning the Drafting of Greek Subjects*<sup>90</sup>

The Greek subjects in the United States amount to one hundred thousand. The drafting of these men for our Army in the Middle East presents difficulties due to the distance and the consequent problem of transporting them then becomes dangerous and expensive.

We are hoping that we shall be permitted to draft these Greeks in America and to concentrate and train them here in groups in American army centers under American officers together with Greek officers of lower rank.

These Greek troops could be incorporated into larger American units as this is being done in the Middle East where Greek brigades are incorporated into British divisions. The armament, equipment and maintenance of these troops in the Middle East is borne by the British under a system similar to the Lease-Lend.

If the above suggestions were accepted, the drafting of Greek subjects could be extended to South America also, whence it would be convenient to transport the recruits to serve in the Greek regiments in this country.

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1942.

---

868.2222/5

*The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As you are aware, the Greek Government is anxious to obtain our consent for the recruitment of a considerable number of the Greek subjects in the United States for military service. The Greek authorities envisage, I believe, the creation of a rather sizable command from among the approximately 80,000 Greek subjects (men, women and children) in this country.

We have referred the matter to the War Department, and have been informed that while the War Department does not concur in the proposal of the Prime Minister of Greece that a great number of Greek subjects be drafted for organization into large separate units, the War Department will give favorable consideration to the recruitment of a limited number of separate battalions of Greeks to be assigned, when fully trained, to the various divisions of the United States Army.

---

<sup>90</sup> A copy of this memorandum was handed to President Roosevelt by King George II on June 26; see bracketed note, p. 797.

A separate battalion of Norwegians is already being organized in the United States Army. I believe that separate battalions of certain of the foreign-language residents of the United States, including the Greeks, may be useful for psychological warfare purposes and for strictly military purposes in the event of active military operations in specific areas. I think it should be clearly understood, however, that they are regular units of the United States Army, serving under the American flag, and liable for service in any area where the American Army may be called upon to operate.

If you concur,<sup>91</sup> we shall be glad to hand to the Greek Prime Minister the attached memorandum on his return to Washington on July 10, 1942 for the purpose of signing the Lend-Lease Agreement.

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

[Enclosure]

*Draft Memorandum*

The United States military authorities have been consulted with regard to the proposal contained in Mr. Tsouderos' memorandum of June 15, 1942 regarding the drafting of Greek subjects residing in the United States.

According to this proposal, the Greek troops would be trained in groups in United States Army centers, under the direction of American officers and of Greek officers of lower rank, for subsequent incorporation into larger American units, similar to the manner in which Greek brigades serving in the Middle East are incorporated into British divisions.

While the War Department is not able to concur in the proposal of the Greek Prime Minister that a great number of Greek subjects in the United States be drafted for organization into large separate units, it will give favorable consideration to the recruitment of a limited number of separate battalions of Greeks to be assigned, when fully trained, to the various divisions of the American Army.

It should be pointed out, to avoid any misunderstanding, that the separate battalions of Greek subjects would constitute regular units of the United States Army and would be liable for service, in case of necessity, in any area where the American Army may be called upon to operate.

---

<sup>91</sup> President Roosevelt indicated his approval on July 8 by a marginal note on the original.

868.2222/4

*The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Greek Minister  
(Diamantopoulos)*

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. MINISTER: I regretted exceedingly not having been able to receive the Prime Minister on Thursday last as I had hoped to do. Mr. Berle<sup>92</sup> informs me that he believes the Prime Minister has now left the United States and I am more than sorry that for that reason I shall not have the chance of talking with him again during his present visit to this country.

As you will remember, the Prime Minister sent to me a memorandum regarding recruitment of Greek subjects in the United States for military service. This memorandum has had the most attentive study by the military authorities of the United States and by the Department of State. I am enclosing herewith a memorandum<sup>93</sup> which is in the nature of a reply to the memorandum sent to me by the Prime Minister and I shall ask your kindness in seeing that this memorandum is transmitted to him. I may add that the reply of this Government as set forth in the memorandum enclosed herewith has been approved by the President.

With my kind regards, believe me

Yours very sincerely,

SUMNER WELLES

868.2222/10

---

*The Greek Ambassador<sup>94</sup> (Diamantopoulos) to the  
Acting Secretary of State*

No. 2635

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1942.

MR. SECRETARY: Referring to your Excellency's letter dated July 13, and to the memorandum attached thereto concerning the formation of separate battalions of Greeks to be assigned to the various divisions of the American Army, I beg to enclose herewith an outline of the conclusions reached by Colonel F. W. Evans, General Staff, Chief, Mobilization-Organization Branch, and by Colonel Demetrios Xenos of the Greek Army, and to make a formal application for final decision from the War Department, these conclusions having been agreed to by the Greek Government.

Accept [etc.]

C. DIAMANTOPOULOS

---

<sup>92</sup> Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.

<sup>93</sup> Not attached to file copy; see draft memorandum as submitted to President Roosevelt July 7, *supra*.

<sup>94</sup> The Greek Legation was raised to the status of an Embassy on October 6, 1942.

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by the Greek Embassy*

1. The drafting of Greek Citizens in the United States will take place on the same basis as drafting of Americans. Voluntary enlistment is preferred.

2. At the beginning one Infantry Battalion will be formed.

3. The United States uniform, with a special badge or insignia indicating the Greek character of the unit, will be worn.

4. Officers of the Unit. Officers of the United States Army who are of Greek origin and are already serving in the United States Army or are to be chosen from the unit being formed. A number of officers of the Greek Army may be accepted on condition of their incorporation with the United States Army officers.

5. If a second or a third battalion has to be formed, all three battalions will form an infantry regiment.

6. If a further number of recruits are available the formation of an artillery unit is not excluded.

7. The nucleus of the first battalion will be composed of Greek-American citizens who speak Greek.

8. In case the number of the Greek recruits is not sufficient for the formation of the first battalion, it will be filled up by American citizens speaking Greek who expressed the desire to serve in the Greek unit.

9. The entire expense for matériel and maintenance of the above formations to be borne by the American Government.

10. Men enlisted in these battalions will have all the rights enjoyed by those serving in other American units.

---

808.2222/10

*The Secretary of State to the Greek Ambassador (Diamantopoulos)*

WASHINGTON, December 12, 1942.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to my note of October 30, 1942,<sup>95</sup> regarding the formation of separate battalions of Greek subjects in the Army of the United States.

There is quoted below the text of a communication on this subject which has been received from the War Department:

"The War Department is initiating action to form an Infantry Battalion with Greek Nationals at an early date. Announcement of

---

<sup>95</sup> Not printed.



this action will be made to the public at the Secretary of War's next press conference."<sup>96</sup>

Accept [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:  
SUMNER WELLES

---

REPRESENTATIONS BY THE GREEK GOVERNMENT RESPECTING  
POST-WAR FRONTIERS OF GREECE

740.00119 European War 1939/1942

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] June 12, 1942.

The Prime Minister<sup>97</sup> and the Minister of Greece<sup>98</sup> called and handed me some documents (copies attached<sup>99</sup>) relative to the views and attitude of Greece with respect to certain problems which appropriately would come up at the end of the war. I thanked him and said that I would receive them solely as information at present and not from the standpoint of giving consideration to them at this time.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

---

740.00119 European War 1939/1942

*Memorandum by the Greek Prime Minister (Tsouderos)*<sup>1</sup>

MEMORANDUM

1. The Greek Government is confident that the United States of America, which has already manifested so much sympathy toward the struggling Greek Nation, will, together with its ally, Great Britain, give to it all possible assistance when the time comes for the reestablishment of an enduring and just peace.

2. The recognition of our rights would constitute the most concrete encouragement in the hard struggle against oppression and hunger which the Greek people are today waging with such fortitude and daring. The Greek, naturally sensitive, is ready to endure everything to support the ideology of the Allies, knowing that his sacrifices will ultimately benefit his country as well.

Enemy propaganda anticipating this psychology, is endeavoring, with its usual sinister lying, to discourage the Nation, by giving

---

<sup>96</sup> Announcement was made by the War Department on December 12, 1942.

<sup>97</sup> Emmanuel J. Tsouderos.

<sup>98</sup> Cimon P. Diamantopoulos.

<sup>99</sup> The memorandum *infra*, and its attachments (not printed).

<sup>1</sup> Handed to the Secretary of State on June 12; see *supra*. A copy of this memorandum was handed to President Roosevelt by King George II on June 26; see bracketed note, p. 797.

currency to and advocating the idea that our great Allies in the hour of victory will look only to their own interests and that by imputing responsibility for Bulgaria's Acts only to its rulers, our powerful friends will favor Bulgaria.

3. The national claims of Greece are clearly outlined by experience and the teachings of recent history. What Greece desires more than anything else is to be assured that in a moment of international confusion, it will not again become the victim of aggression from the North. Four times during the last thirty years Greece sustained wholly unprovoked similar attacks: in 1913, in 1916, in 1940 and in 1941. The Greek people would regard it as the most flagrant injustice against them if in the negotiations for peace these harsh precedents were not taken into account.

4. The establishment of a post war collective security and the realization of the Balkan Union to which Greece has been a faithful adherent ever since 1912 will undoubtedly make more effective than was heretofore possible the opposition against the greedy aspirations of successive invaders. However, no matter what form this collective security shall take, it becomes clearly necessary that those nations which are exposed to attack, as is Greece, be strengthened in the best possible manner against aggression so that in the event of an unprovoked attack against them they will be able sufficiently to protract their own defense, until effective aid can reach them, thus too, alleviating the task of international assistance. It is known that the situation created in the Balkans in April, 1941 would have been entirely different if geographical conditions at the Greek-Serbian-Bulgarian front did not enable the enemy, easily and within a very short time to prevent contact between the Greek and Yugoslav armies.

5. Consequently it is indispensable that in the realignment of boundaries in the Balkan Peninsula these needs be taken into consideration. The extension of the Greek boundaries in the Northeast to the Rhodope Mountains and in the Northwest to the Adriatic, and a comparable readjustment of the Yugoslav boundaries, would materially assist Greece and Yugoslavia against any Balkan assault. It is clear that the strengthening of the Greco-Yugoslav Combination which always and in the nature of things, was steadfastly attached to the Allied democratic nations in all international crises will redound to the benefit of these Powers and will greatly lighten their strategic and political problems in Northeastern Europe.

6. Fortunately the territories to be affected by these suggested changes are very recent additions to the Nations of which they are now a part, having been appended to them since the Balkan Wars. This annexation was at best made at the expense of the principles

of nationality and the security of peace. The ethnological composition of those sections even today, notwithstanding the ad interim intentional and forced changes made by their present masters, is not such as to constitute a barrier to the proposed readjustment in the interest of Balkan Peace, especially as the extent of the territory involved is insignificant.

7. It is necessary moreover to note that such a readjustment is dictated by important considerations of political expediency. The nations which have provoked the present calamity and those which have aided and abetted it out of a disposition to plunder and pillage, must suffer the consequences of their conduct. Only thus can they be made careful in the event of similar circumstances arising in the future. On the contrary if those nations under the guise that they have been misled by the unwise counsel of their leaders, be placed in the same category with their victims, a bad precedent will be established for all and the wrongdoers of today would be encouraged to disregard their international obligations again, at the expense of their neighbors. A thorough and impartial investigation will reveal that the people of these nations cannot be absolved from responsibility, and the imputation of culpability solely to the leaders is untenable. Their rulers represent the national will which has always been dictated by a violent nationalism and which since 1912 has repeatedly manifested itself to disturb the peace of the Illyrian Peninsula. If the opposite were true the people would surely find ways of protesting against and opposing from the beginning and during the war the policies of Germany.

## II

8. In addition to the realignment of boundaries above mentioned, the questions which more directly concern the Greeks, and which we respectfully submit for your favorable consideration are:

- a. The question of N. Epirus,
- b. That of the Dodecanese,
- c. That of Cyprus, and
- d. That of the economic stability of Greece so that it may not after the war suffer a serious crisis either because of over population or because of inadequate production.

9. With reference to N. Epirus and the Dodecanese there is a detailed discussion in the introduction (signed by me) contained in the Greek *White Book*, published in London last month, about an Italian attack. We attach hereto two relative notes and a pertinent excerpt from this introduction.<sup>2</sup> The analysis of those questions indicates clearly that both Epirus and the Dodecanese are

---

<sup>2</sup> Attachments not printed.

Greek provinces, occupied by the enemy for almost 22 years, without right whatever. Consequently the matter relates to Greek territories just as for a year now the mainland of Greece has been occupied and oppressed by three enemies. There is nothing therefore to justify the enemy in continuing that occupation. In addition to our old claims to these provinces, our rights to them have been recognized by a series of international acts dating between 1914 and 1920, which remain unexecuted because of the violence and the stealth of the Italians.

### III

10. The question of Cyprus of course is different. It does not concern a demand arising out of the war and one might say that mention of it in this memorandum could be omitted. However, as our object is to submit a full and complete picture of Greek desires and aspirations for the information of the American Government we deemed it proper to include it. Moreover when the time comes, this question could well be settled directly between us and Great Britain, which has knowledge of it. This island is occupied and progressing under the guidance of a friendly nation, just as was the case with the Ionian Islands, whose return to Greece has been the cause of our profound gratitude toward Great Britain. The latter in 1915 offered to return Cyprus to Greece on condition that Greece abandon its neutrality and side with the Allies. Greece then did not accept that condition. However, since that time twice has she abandoned her neutrality, without imposing any conditions, and with all the means at its disposal fought on the side of the Allies for the same cause and against the same enemies. When peace was made in the last great war there was signed between us and Italy a separate agreement about the Dodecanese<sup>2a</sup> where mention is made about the concurrent return to Greece of Cyprus and Rhodes.

Five-sixths of the population of Cyprus, ethnically as well as in religion and language are Greeks. That one-sixth of the population is Turkish is no reason why the five-sixths of the Cyprians should not be permitted to enjoy the right of self-determination, which has been vouchsafed to the peoples.

The history of the last two great wars has shown that the strategic importance of that island is much less significant than is the naval and geographic location of the whole of Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean. During the last two world wars, Greece voluntarily offered to and did play its proper part which history and the geographical position of the country dictated. Consequently the union of all the islands with Greece, whose Greek character is clear from every point of view and cannot be questioned,

---

<sup>2a</sup> Signed August 10, 1920, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxiii, p. 1078.

did give Greece great power and did engender the obligation that it continue the same policy in the future by the side of the Allies. Moreover, this matter can be adjusted by special agreement.

#### IV

11. The economic stability of Greece is constantly precarious due to the mountainous composition of its soil and the consequent inadequacy of production. Notwithstanding the industriousness of its inhabitants, production is not sufficient to meet the needs of the country. Moreover, the effort of the people to raise sufficient wheat is constantly thwarted by the persistent increase in population, the birth rate in time of peace substantially exceeding the death rate.

Thus the population problem facing Greece is one of the most serious facing any European country, and the continued increase in population will in the near future create a difficult situation if adequate measures are not now adopted for its proper solution.

Of course, if Eastern Thrace, which due to its Hellenic character, had been awarded to Greece by the Treaty of Sèvres,<sup>2b</sup> had remained a part of Greece, then such a problem for us would not exist today owing to its wheat production. Hence Greece, in the peace that is to come, must secure its economic stability in order to escape in the near future complete economic suffocation and the social and political incongruities arising therefrom. Consequently the question of emigration of the surplus population must occupy the attention of the government equally with other national problems.

The present government does not demand colonies for the solution of this problem. Nevertheless it seems that some countries sparsely populated must be designated as places where the right of emigration shall be open and that this right be accorded as well to the Greeks whose emigration could serve no political purpose. One of those provinces is Cyrenaica, which as it appears from the map, faces Greece and where in the past flourished prosperous communities. Moreover, the problem of emigration of nations which have a surplus population to countries which are under populated does not concern Greece alone. The stabilization of peace will depend in a large measure from the careful and just solution of this problem too, generally considered. The Allies must win not only the war, but the peace also.

#### V

12. Continuing what has been stated in the preceding paragraph relative to the economic stability of Greece, its government is deeply

---

<sup>2b</sup> Treaty between the Allied Powers and Turkey, signed August 10, 1920, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxxiii, p. 652.

anxious as to how it shall face the complicated situation of economic ruin which immediately after the war will prevail in Greece. All its prewar economic structure will have deteriorated if it is not completely destroyed due to the war and from the intensive and long usage of all the means of production and communication. Thus put, the whole problem along with the urgent question of food replenishment of the country which is suffering from starvation, presents a truly gigantic problem, especially in view of its limited products and, in general, means of exchange. Only by the co-operation of our great companions-in-arms will it be possible for this problem to be solved in time with the establishment of peace.

Greece is a country which can serve as a center of enterprises with Northern Europe as its field of activities through which it would be possible to find speedily and soundly the necessary capital in order to make available in Greece economic reorganization and the indispensable imports for the adjustment of its various obligations.

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1942.

E[MMANUEL] J. T[SOUDEROS]

---

875.01/459

*The Greek Embassy to the Department of State*

MEMORANDUM

In connection with the recent statement made by the Secretary of State concerning the restoration of a free Albania,<sup>3</sup> the Greek Ambassador has been instructed to draw the kind attention of the United States Government to the following:

1. Greece, herself a victim of aggression and imbued by the ideals of the United Nations, cannot in principle object to the restoration of the independence of purely Albanian territories, but she is convinced that this restoration will be realized in a manner safeguarding her own vital and legitimate rights.

2. The Greek Government, moreover, feel that it is their duty to point out that this statement, made at this moment could create a painful impression upon the Greek people.

The Greek nation, enduring unspeakable suffering under the Axis yoke, will be at a loss to understand a step in the direction of the restoration of Albania, without a clear simultaneous recognition of their own rights in the districts of Northern Epirus, as set forth in the memorandum addressed on the 12th of June 1942 to the Secretary of State by the Prime Minister of Greece.

---

<sup>3</sup> Statement released to the press December 10, Department of State *Bulletin*, December 12, 1942, p. 998.

Such a disregard of this side of the question could undermine the morale of the fighting Greek people. Consequently the benefit which the Allies think they may obtain with the eventual assistance of a section of the Albanians would be incomparably less than the advantages to be derived by encouraging the fighting Greek people. Such an encouragement will obviously bolster the Greek resistance.

For historical and geographical reasons and for reasons of justice and security already embodied in international Acts and because there the Greek army won brilliant victories at the cost of much Greek blood, Northern Epirus belongs to Greece. And even though our Great Allies deem it proper to consider territorial questions at the end of the war, the Greek Government looks forward with hope that the United States Government would be willing to give now a formal assurance that in due time it will grant its full and precious support to the Greek rights. The question of Northern Epirus is so vital for the nation that the Greek Government feel compelled to declare categorically that the Greek people will be, more than ever, unable to acquiesce in any agreement disregarding their rights.

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1942.

---

875.01/459

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 21, 1942.

The Ambassador of Greece called to see me this morning at his request. The Ambassador said that he was instructed by his Government to read to me the statement comprised in the memorandum attached herewith.<sup>4</sup>

After the Ambassador had finished reading the memorandum, I stated to him that I was frankly surprised by the message which the Ambassador had communicated to me since all that the Secretary of State had said with regard to Albania was exactly what this Government had stated previously with regard to Greece and many other occupied countries, namely, that one of the objectives for which this country, with the other United Nations, was fighting was the restoration of the liberty and independence of the occupied countries, and that, inasmuch as the Secretary of State in his statement to which reference was made had made no reference whatever to territorial frontiers, I could see no valid reason why the Greek

---

<sup>4</sup> *Supra.*

Government should now request that the Government of the United States make some statement with regard to Greek territorial frontiers.

The Ambassador asked if this Government could not make some confidential communication to the Greek Government along the lines of the assurances requested in the memorandum. He also asked whether the Government of the United States would not be willing to make the same reservations with regard to Albania's future frontiers as those contained in the recent statement made in the House of Commons by the British Foreign Secretary.<sup>5</sup>

I replied that, with regard to point No. 1, this Government had not and would not make any secret commitments with regard to territorial changes to any other country; that if this Government had any views to express concerning its policy regarding territorial adjustments, these views would be made public, but that, as the Ambassador had already been several times informed, the President believed that none of the United Nations should make any final decision with regard to territorial readjustments until the end of the war.

With regard to the specific suggestion made by the Ambassador, namely, that the Government of the United States acquiesce in the reservations concerning Albania's northern [*southern?*] frontier made by the British Foreign Secretary, I said that this was a matter to which I would have to give consideration and that I would make some reply subsequently with regard thereto to the Ambassador.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

---

**SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION BY THE UNITED STATES OF GREEK  
PLEAS FOR LENIENT TREATMENT FOR PERSONS OF GREEK RACE  
FROM THE DODECANESE ISLANDS**

740.00115 European War 1939/1930

*The Greek Minister (Diamantopoulos) to the Secretary of State*

No. 3673

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1941.

**EXCELLENCY:** As the Department of State is aware a number of Greeks from the Islands of the Dodecanese entered the United States as Italian subjects. Today, after the declaration of war against Italy, these not only are considered by the American authorities as Italian citizens but they are dismissed from their employment where they had been engaged and have to endure many annoyances due to the fact that they are considered as enemy subjects.

---

<sup>5</sup> Statement by Anthony Eden, December 18, 1942, *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 385, col. 2114.



Anticipating such a situation, the Greek Government has authorized this Legation since last June to provide the above people with any certificates or identification papers which might be of some help to them in the present circumstances.

Since this Legation know that the true feelings of these persons are strongly anti-Italian, I should highly appreciate if Your Excellency approve of such a course and recommend to the proper authorities to treat these unfortunate persons as leniently as possible.

Accept [etc.]

C. DIAMANTOPOULOS

---

740.00115 European War 1939/1930

*The Secretary of State to the Greek Minister (Diamantopoulos)*

WASHINGTON, January 15, 1942.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note no. 3673 of December 18, 1941, stating that numerous persons of Greek race from the Dodecanese Islands have entered the United States as Italian subjects and requesting the Department's approval of the Legation's practice of issuing identification papers to them with a view to obtaining for them the most lenient treatment possible under the laws and regulations applying to enemy aliens in the United States.

I shall be pleased to inform the Secretary of War and the Attorney General concerning the status of such persons of Greek race and to request that your wishes with respect to them be given sympathetic consideration.

The Department would not wish to express approval or disapproval of the actions of a foreign mission at Washington in issuing identifying documents to persons considered by the mission to be entitled to them. It is the Department's understanding, in the present instance, that such documents would be intended and so worded as to indicate only the Greek race and sympathies of the persons to whom the Legation would issue them, and that they would contain no statement that might be construed as bestowing Greek nationality upon persons not already Greek subjects. The Department also assumes that no such document would be issued to a person entitled to claim American nationality.

Accept [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

UNWILLINGNESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO COMPLY  
WITH GREEK REQUEST THAT THE DEPARTMENT VERIFY CERTAIN  
FACTS IN A COURT ACTION BETWEEN PRIVATE PARTIES

868.85/118

*The Greek Minister (Diamantopoulos) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1942.

EXCELLENCY: The above named action<sup>6</sup> has been brought by Nicholas S. Coumantaros, a Greek citizen, owner of the Greek steamship *Ekaterini Coumantaros*, for the return of certain war risk insurance premiums against a group of underwriters. The prosecution of the action is conditioned upon Mr. Coumantaros' satisfying the court that the *Ekaterini Coumantaros* was requisitioned by and transferred to the use of the Greek Government.

In that connection there is attached hereto a certificate<sup>7</sup> of His Excellency, Ch. Simopoulos, Greek Minister in London and Chairman of the Greek Shipping Committee, certifying that the *Ekaterini Coumantaros* was requisitioned by the Greek Shipping Committee in London on November 22, 1940 and that the vessel was put at the disposal of and delivered to the Greek Government at Moji, Japan on the 26th of November, 1940. This is to certify that the attached certificate, dated June 28, 1941, bears the signature and seal of the Greek Minister in London, who at all times referred to was Chairman of the Greek Shipping Committee, and that said Committee, under the Greek Law, had authority to order the requisitioning of the *Ekaterini Coumantaros* and that said vessel was so requisitioned at the time and place stated.

The requisitioning of the *Ekaterini Coumantaros* was a compulsory act of the Greek Government made under Law 4442, published in the issue of the 8th September, 1929, Part I, Sheet No. 339, of the *Official Gazette*, compulsory Law No. 2906, dated 28th October, 1940.

During the period the *Ekaterini Coumantaros* was under requisition until noon April 7, 1942, the Greek Government undertook to pay to the owner a monthly hire on agreed scale basis per dead-weight ton per month, and undertook to cover the insurance of the vessel against war risks; to provide the bunkers; to pay port and other expenses, and the owners were charged for the crew's wages, the insurance of the vessel against marine risks and ship repairs.

It will be appreciated if you will request the Attorney General to instruct the appropriate United States Attorney to appear in the above named proceedings, involving this vessel, in the United

<sup>6</sup> *Nicholas S. Coumantaros v. Universal Insurance Company, et al.*

<sup>7</sup> Certificate returned; no copy found in Department files.

States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, with the suggestion that the statements of fact contained in this note, with enclosure, are true.

Accept [etc.]

C. DIAMANTOPOULOS

---

868.85/118

*The Secretary of State to the Greek Minister (Diamantopoulos)*

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1942.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of July 13, 1942 in regard to the case of *Nicholas S. Coumantaros v. Universal Insurance Company, et al*, which you state involves an action brought by Nicholas S. Coumantaros, a Greek citizen, owner of the Greek steamship *Ekaterini Coumantaros*, against a group of underwriters for the return of certain war risk insurance premiums.

You request, in order that Mr. Coumantaros may satisfy the Court that this vessel was requisitioned by and transferred to the use of the Greek Government, that I ask the Attorney General to instruct the appropriate United States Attorney to appear in the proceedings in question in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York with the suggestion that the statements of fact contained in your note, with its enclosure, are true.

Since the action is one between private parties, I am not in a position to comply with your request.

Accept [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

## HUNGARY

### DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES TO RECOGNIZE THAT A STATE OF WAR EXISTED WITH HUNGARY, BULGARIA, AND RUMANIA<sup>1</sup>

740.0011 EW 1939/20647

*Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*<sup>2</sup>

WASHINGTON, December 12, 1941.

I see by tonight's bulletins that the Government of Slovakia<sup>3</sup> has declared the existence of a state of war with the United States.

Also, that the Government of Hungary has done so, or is about to do the same thing.<sup>4</sup>

Other puppet governments may join.

It is my present thought that the United States should pay no attention to any of these declarations of war against us by puppet governments.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OSEVELT]

---

740.0011 European War, 1939/19353

*Memorandum by Mr. Carlton Savage, Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 16, 1941.

Mr. Gray<sup>5</sup> informed me on December 13 that the Secretary had just been informed of the President's desire that there be no declara-

---

<sup>1</sup> On December 12, 1941, in the case of Rumania, and December 13, 1941, in the case of Hungary and Bulgaria, the Governments of Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria notified the United States Government that a state of war existed between them and the United States. For previous correspondence regarding the declarations of a state of war between the Axis countries and the United States, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, pp. 587 ff.

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum dated December 13, 1941, from Under Secretary of State Welles to the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs, Ray Atherton, read as follows: "This memorandum from the President is self-explanatory. I fully and completely agree with the President's views."

<sup>3</sup> The United States had never recognized the existence of the Government of Slovakia. For the statement of United States policy regarding the nonrecognition of Slovakia, see instruction No. 372, August 28, 1939, to the Chargé in Hungary, *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. 1, p. 70.

<sup>4</sup> On December 13, 1941, the Hungarian Government declared that a state of war existed with the United States. See telegram No. 710, December 13, 1941, from the Minister in Hungary, *ibid.*, 1941, vol. 1, p. 592.

<sup>5</sup> Cecil W. Gray, Assistant to the Secretary of State.

tion of war on any of the small European countries, such as Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, who were reported in the press as having declared war against the United States. Mr. Gray said the Secretary desired that this information be given to any one at the Capitol who might be interested.

I gave the information to Senator Connally<sup>6</sup> by telephone on the afternoon of December 13 and he said he agreed absolutely with the President. I could not reach Mr. Rayburn,<sup>7</sup> Mr. McCormack,<sup>8</sup> or Mr. Bloom<sup>9</sup> on December 13, but I gave the information to Mr. Bloom's secretary on December 15 and to Mr. McCormack on December 16.

CARLTON SAVAGE

---

740.0011 European War 1939/20647

*Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State*<sup>10</sup>

WASHINGTON, January 31, 1942.

I think that for the record it would be a rather ingenuous thing to do if you were to send a letter to the Committee on Foreign Affairs<sup>11</sup> and the Committee on Foreign Relations<sup>12</sup> telling them that for their information Hungary and Roumania and Bulgaria and Siam have all declared war on the United States, giving the date of the action of each country.<sup>13</sup> Then I would merely add that this is sent for the information of the Committees only and that in your judgment no action is necessary, either by the Congress or by the Executive Branch of the Government!

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

P. S. If my boy Johnny were doing it he would add as a postscript "So WHAT!"

---

<sup>6</sup> Senator Tom Connally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

<sup>7</sup> Representative Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House of Representatives.

<sup>8</sup> Representative John W. McCormack, Majority Leader of the House of Representatives.

<sup>9</sup> Representative Sol Bloom, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

<sup>10</sup> The President's proposal contained in this memorandum had been advanced earlier in a telephone conversation between the President and Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr.; see memorandum by Mr. Berle, January 28, 1942, vol. I, p. 914.

<sup>11</sup> Of the House of Representatives.

<sup>12</sup> Of the Senate.

<sup>13</sup> Identical letters of this import were sent to the Committees on February 7, 1942 (not printed). Thailand declared war on the United States on January 25, 1942; for correspondence regarding the decision of the United States not to declare war on Thailand, see vol. I, pp. 913 ff.

740.0011 European War, 1939/19368a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey  
(Steinhardt)*

WASHINGTON, February 28, 1942—1 p. m.

68. With the approval of the President the Department requests you to approach the Turkish Foreign Office in the following matter:

On December 12 in the case of Rumania and December 13 in the case of Hungary and Bulgaria the Governments of Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria notified this Government that a state of war exists between Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, respectively, and the United States. It was the view of this Government that the Governments of Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria had been obliged to take this action under duress and at the instigation of other powers at war with the United States, and further that this action was contrary to the will of the majority of the peoples of the countries in question. Accordingly, the Congress of the United States has not made corresponding declarations of war against them, nor has the President issued proclamations in the matter.

This Government has viewed with increasing concern the aid given by Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria to the enemies of the United States and is constrained to assume that agreement has been given by them to the continuance of this participation in the war against the United States and the other United Nations. This Government has, therefore, the intention of declaring a state of war between the United States and the Governments of Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, respectively, unless in some definite form these Governments severally give prompt evidence that they will not engage in military aid or operations of assistance to the Axis powers.

In consulting with the Turkish Government in this matter the President and the Government of the United States have had very much in mind the complete and long standing identity of views of our two Governments regarding questions involving the peaceful relations among European nations, and the restriction of hostilities to areas which unhappily are already engaged. This Government feels that it should make known to the Turkish Government its intentions as outlined above, for such comment as the Turkish Government may care to make, and at the same time inquires whether the Turkish Government would be disposed to undertake some informal action through which these views may become known to the Governments of Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria.

You may communicate the foregoing textually but informally to the Turkish Foreign Office, expressing this Government's appreciation of whatever consideration the Turkish Government may find that it

can appropriately give to the matter. You may add that further communications of a formal nature would be transmitted through the Government representing the interests of the United States in the respective countries.

WELLES

---

740.0011 European War 1939/20828: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State*

ANKARA, March 13, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received March 14—11:22 a. m.]

158. In the course of a visit this morning to Numan Bey<sup>14</sup> he handed me a note containing the Foreign Minister's<sup>15</sup> reply to the inquiry contained in the Department's telegram under reference.<sup>16</sup> The substance of the reply is as follows: The Foreign Minister has given careful consideration to the communication received and thanks the President and the Government of the United States for the friendly confidence which they have evidenced towards the Turkish Government in consulting it on a question of undeniable importance. His opinion on the subject is as follows: The Bulgarian, Hungarian and Rumanian Governments having already manifested their complete solidarity with the Axis by their declarations of war against the United States it would be difficult to assume that these same Governments out of fear of a formal declaration of war by the United States could retract their position. It is certain that in taking so grave a step these Governments must have considered similar action by the United States as one of the most inevitable consequences of their declaration of war. In making this objective exposé of the situation the Foreign Minister hopes to have replied in the most friendly spirit to the question raised by the Government of the United States. He feels that he should add that the position of Turkey does not permit it to intervene in a question, the gravity of which requires that the directly interested countries should be the sole judges of the consequences of their position.

STEINHARDT

---

<sup>14</sup> Numan Menemencioğlu, Secretary General of the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>15</sup> Şükrî Saraçoğlu, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>16</sup> Apparently reference is to telegram No. 72, March 6, 9 p. m., to the Ambassador in Turkey, requesting a report as soon as possible regarding the reaction of the Turkish Government to the proposal set forth in telegram No. 68, *supra* (740.0011 European War 1939/19863a Suppl.).

740.0011 European War 1939/20323

*Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton) to the Acting Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] March 17, 1942.

MR. WELLES. I have redrafted the telegram concerning the declaration of war against Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria in order that the message may be conveyed through the Swiss Government. This draft is attached hereto<sup>17</sup> for your approval.

The objection to utilizing the Swiss authorities in the beginning was that a communication of this kind through the representing power seems almost automatically to take the character of an ultimatum. I am not sure that the Swiss, any more than would the Turks, will be willing to act along the informal lines suggested.

It was, as you know, my view that the advantages of our present status should be exploited, as a psychological warfare measure, before making the declarations which would irrevocably range the three countries as active enemies. After the meeting held in your office on February 26, and the sending of the telegram to Ankara, various plans were discussed for utilizing the interval for intensive press or radio work, to determine whether this weapon may in fact have value in promoting actual resistance to the Axis in the countries concerned. This program, in the form of directives based on an official statement, has been worked out in considerable detail by Mr. Hoskins (A-B/H),<sup>18</sup> in consultation with this Division and with Mr. Berle. It will be ready for presentation to you today for your approval, if Mr. Hoskins obtains some expected technical information from the Coordinator's office.<sup>19</sup>

I therefore suggest that we delay the telegram to the Swiss Government until you will have had an opportunity to look over this project.

Meanwhile, I think it is worth noting that the best information we can get from Bulgaria and Rumania indicates a stiffer attitude toward Germany, and recent developments in Hungary are especially significant. The new Hungarian Premier<sup>20</sup> is so notoriously anti-German that his appointment, following closely on the flouting of German ideas in the matter of the vice-regency, must be taken to mean that Hungary no longer feels that Germany is now in a position to exact complete subservience. If this is correct, there would seem to be an

<sup>17</sup> Not attached to file copy; for the telegram as sent, see *infra*.

<sup>18</sup> Harold B. Hoskins, Executive Assistant to Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr.

<sup>19</sup> Presumably the reference here is to the Coordinator of Information, whose foreign information activities were transferred to the Office of War Information on June 13, 1942, and whose other activities were transferred on the same date to the Office of Strategic Services.

<sup>20</sup> Miklós Kállay, Hungarian Premier from March 9, 1942.



advantage in delaying the formal declarations until we can see how effectively the propaganda elements can work.

RAY ATHONTON

---

740.0011 European War 1939/20585a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland  
(Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1942—4 p. m.

769. With the approval of the President, the Department requests you to approach the Federal Political Department and inquire whether it would be disposed to convey informally a message to the representatives of Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria accredited to Bern, in the sense of the following text, or to undertake some other informal action through which the views outlined below may become known to the Governments of Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

"On December 12 in the case of Rumania and December 13 in the case of Hungary and Bulgaria the Governments of Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria notified this Government that a state of war exists between Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, respectively, and the United States. It was the view of this Government that the Governments of Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria had been obliged to take this action under duress and at the instigation of other powers at war with the United States, and further that this action was contrary to the will of the majority of the peoples of the countries in question. Accordingly, the Congress of the United States has not made corresponding declarations of war against them, nor has the President issued proclamations in the matter.

"This Government has viewed with increasing concern the apparent intention of Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria to furnish material assistance to the enemies of the United States, and is constrained to assume that agreement has been given by them to participate actively and on a large scale in the war against the United States and the other United Nations. The President has, therefore, the intention of recommending to the Congress that it declare that a state of war exists between the United States and the Governments of Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, respectively, unless in some definite form these Governments severally give prompt evidence that they will not engage in military aid or operations of assistance to the Axis powers.

"The deep friendship of the people of the United States for the peoples of Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria prompts this Government to endeavor to make known its views to the respective Governments, without at this time specifying the terms, or a time limit therefor, on which the further action of this Government would be conditioned."

You may communicate the foregoing textually but informally to the Federal Political Department, expressing this Government's appreciation of whatever consideration the Swiss Government may find that it can appropriately give to the matter.

WELLES

740.0011 European War 1939/20683 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, March 28, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received March 28—3 : 42 p. m.]

1260. Text of message, your 769, March 24, 4 p. m., was handed in the form of an *aide-mémoire* to Mr. Bonna<sup>21</sup> Wednesday March 25. He assured me that he would consult with Federal Council or Pilet-Golaz<sup>22</sup> as soon as possible. Pilet who had been absent from Bern asked me to call today. He explained that as the channel of communication between the American and the three Governments concerned, he felt free and was most ready to convey the message "officially", but if this were not in accordance with your wishes he would have to consult his colleagues of the Federal Council. He was convinced he said that as soon as the message reached the Governments concerned, no matter in what form it should be delivered, they would immediately inform the German and Italian Governments thereof. He preferred not to approach the representatives of the three Governments in Bern and he did not feel that any attempt to convey the views outlined in the message through other channels would prove satisfactory. He proposed therefore provided you should be in agreement to transmit the message textually to the Swiss representatives in Bucharest, Budapest, and Sofia directing them to transmit the message to the Governments to which they are accredited respectively on the same day with, if you should so desire, a statement to the effect that "the American Government desires that the communication in question be considered as of an informal (*officieuse*) character".

The Federal Council will meet Tuesday for the last time before the Easter holidays. I shall, therefore, appreciate your instructions by Monday<sup>23</sup> if possible in the event that Mr. Pilet's proposal as outlined above should not meet with your concurrence.<sup>24</sup>

HARRISON

---

<sup>21</sup> Division Chief in the Swiss Federal Political Department.

<sup>22</sup> Marcel Pilet-Golaz, Chief of the Swiss Federal Political Department.

<sup>23</sup> March 30.

<sup>24</sup> Department's telegram No. 817, March 30, noon, instructed Minister Harrison to request the Swiss Government to communicate the text in question through the Swiss representatives in Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria in accordance with Pilet-Golaz's friendly suggestion.

740.0011 European War 1939/20897: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, April 8, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received April 8—5:09 a. m.]

1418. In further reference your telegram No. 769, March 24, this morning Federal Political Department received word without comment from Swiss Legation, Sofia, that message had been communicated to Bulgarian Foreign Office as directed yesterday at 11 a. m.

This afternoon I was furnished with text in French of telegraphic message from Swiss Minister, Bucharest, reading in translation as follows:

"The message of the Government of United States was handed this morning at 11 o'clock to Mihai Antonescu, Acting President of Council of Ministers, who took due note of it and who authorized me to inform the Government of United States that Rumania has not yet decided upon its program of cooperation in the current campaigns. He led me to expect a written reply in the near future."

HARRISON

[The records of the Department reveal no further correspondence from Bucharest or from Sofia regarding the American communication.]

---

740.0011 European War 1939/21138: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, April 22, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received April 22—2:33 p. m.]

1655. My telegram no. 1436, April 10.<sup>25</sup> Swiss Foreign Office has today advised me that the Swiss Minister in Budapest has reported by telegraph the receipt of a *note verbale* dated April 17 from Hungarian Foreign Office stating that in taking note of our communication Foreign Office recalls the attack by Soviet Air Forces on Kassa <sup>26</sup> June 26 last causing enormous losses in lives and property. Accordingly Hungary considers that she is carrying on a defensive war against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

HARRISON

---

<sup>25</sup> Not printed; it reported that the American communication to the Hungarian Government had been delivered by the Swiss Legation in Budapest at 11 a. m. on April 7; the Hungarian authorities had made no comment (740.0011 European War 1939/20921).

<sup>26</sup> City in that portion of Slovakia annexed by Hungary from Czechoslovakia as a result of the arbitral award by the Italian-German Commission made at Vienna, November 2, 1938. In Slovak, the name was Košice.

740.0011 European War 1939/21790: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1942—4 p. m.

265. Reference Moscow's 174 May 27, 8 p. m.<sup>27</sup> In reply to inquiries at press conference on April 13 the Under Secretary explained that a declaration of war against Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria had not been made because of general recognition that their respective declarations had been made under pressure and against the desires of their peoples. He added that he believed the President would be inclined to recommend to Congress that declarations of war be made if material and effective assistance is given to Germany by the respective countries. On May 12 the Secretary again referred to the matter and on May 15 he stated that the Department is examining the situation from day to day. He did not mention the Rumanian forces on the Russian front but observed that a large part of the army within Rumania was near the Hungarian frontier.

It has been observed that German propaganda has ostentatiously reported the participation of Rumanian troops in recent operations, doubtless in connection with German negotiations at the three capitals for more active assistance.

HULL

---

740 0011 European War 1939/22040a: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to All American Missions*

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1942.

You are instructed to notify the Government to which you are accredited that the Government of the United States, by unanimous resolutions of Congress signed today by the President, has declared that a state of war exists between the United States and Bulgaria, and Hungary and Rumania.<sup>28</sup>

---

<sup>27</sup> Not printed; it reported information that the Russians were much concerned over Soviet press reports of the Secretary of State's alleged explanation as to why the United States had not declared war upon Rumania. The Secretary was alleged to have stated that most of the Rumanian army was on the Hungarian frontier and very few Rumanians were actually fighting the Russians.

<sup>28</sup> For texts of the Joint Resolutions of Congress declaring a state of war with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 6, 1942, p. 510, and 56 Stat. 307. For text of the President's message to Congress, June 2, recommending that Congress recognize a state of war between the United States and those three Governments, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 6, 1942, p. 509. See also *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1943), vol. II, pp. 1175-1176.

The texts of the three resolutions are identical *mutatis mutandis* with the declaration of war on Germany.<sup>29</sup> See Department's circular telegram of December 11, 1941.<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>29</sup> For text of the Joint Resolution of Congress, December 11, 1941, declaring a state of war with Germany, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 590.

<sup>30</sup> Not printed.

## INDEX



# INDEX <sup>1</sup>

- Abetz, Otto, 154, 169, 190, 191, 367  
 Acheson, Dean G., 302-303, 436n, 785  
 Africa. *See* French Equatorial Africa;  
     French North Africa; French  
     Somaland; and French West  
     Africa.  
 Afrika Korps, 210  
 Afrique Occidentale Française (A.O.F.),  
     374-375, 378, 407, 408, 458, 465-466  
 Albania, 827-829  
 Algeria. *See* under French North  
     Africa.  
 Allard, Sven, 746, 763, 764, 788, 789  
 Allen, George V., 782, 783-784, 814  
 Alling, Paul H., 281, 330, 335-336, 591,  
     781-784, 801-802, 804n, 815  
 American economic aid program. *See*  
     under French North Africa and  
     French West Africa; *see also*  
     Greece: American aid to Greece.  
 American Red Cross, 151, 162, 207, 348,  
     354, 356, 499, 502, 728, 752, 770, 772,  
     782, 783, 788, 800  
 Anderson, Gen. Sir Kenneth A. N., 494  
 Annet, Armand-Prosper, 299n, 696-697,  
     703  
 Antoine, P., 597, 599, 611  
 Antonescu, Mihai, 840  
 Appleby, Paul, 474-475, 478, 479  
 Argentina, wheat shipment to Greece,  
     749-750, 751  
 Armstrong Cork Co., 347  
 Arnal, Pierre Albert, 315n, 315-316, 323,  
     325, 339, 351n, 363-364  
 Assarsson, Per Wilhelm Gustaf, 108n,  
     108  
 Atherton, Ray, 26, 33n, 85-86, 124n, 162,  
     272, 370, 468-469, 470, 492, 493, 503,  
     507-508, 544, 550-553, 637-638, 644,  
     664, 665-666, 668, 682, 690-691, 837-  
     838  
 Atlantic Charter, 55, 62, 99, 100, 106, 113,  
     472, 484  
 Auboyneau, Rear Adm. Philippe, 520  
 Auer, Theodore, 241-242, 254-255, 393  
 Auphan, Adm. Paul, 194, 199, 210-211,  
     213, 214, 215, 216, 402-403, 630  
 Australia, 724, 731, 732  
 Austria-Hungary, 794  
 Balkan Union, 823  
 Barclay, R. E., 272, 370, 707-708  
 Barnaud, Jacques, 274, 279, 351  
 Barnes, Maynard, 560, 572  
 Barrau, Gen. Jean, 458  
 Bayardelle, André, 608, 611  
 Beaulac, Willard L., 190  
 Beaulieu, Leroy, 274, 279  
 Beck-Friis, Baron Hans Gustaf, 103n,  
     104, 750n, 754, 760, 764  
 Belgium, 1-19  
     Agreements with United States:  
         Military Service Agreement,  
             effected by exchanges of notes,  
             *Mar. 31, July 31, and Oct. 10*  
             *and 16, citation to text, 1*  
         Mutual aid in the prosecution of  
         war against aggression, pre-  
         liminary agreement *June 16,*  
         *citation to text, 1*  
     Anglo-Belgian economic agreements  
     affecting the Belgian Congo, *Jan.*  
     *21, 1941, and June 4, 1942, cited,*  
     *1, 6, 9*  
     Belgian Congo, negotiations for a  
     tripartite agreement between  
     United States, United Kingdom,  
     and Belgium relating to imports  
     from and exports to, 1-19; draft,  
     14-16  
 Benoist-Méchin, Jacques, 154, 169, 883  
 Bentley, Lt. Col. William C., Jr., 242n,  
     254-255, 256, 323  
 Berle, Adolf A., Jr.:  
     Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania,  
     participation in discussions re-  
     garding existence of state of war  
     with, 834n, 837

<sup>1</sup> In indexing persons the intention has been to include all references to persons of significance for an understanding of the record, with the following exceptions: (1) The name of the Secretary of State or the Acting Secretary of State appearing as the signer of outgoing instructions unless there is a clear indication of the Secretary's or Acting Secretary's personal interest; (2) the name of an American officer in charge of a mission appearing as the signer of reports to the Department of State, except for personal items; (3) the names of persons to whom documents are addressed.

Persons are not identified by office in the index, but usually where a person is first mentioned in any section a footnote identification is given unless that person is identified in the text.



- Berle, Adolf A., Jr.—Continued  
 Free French, 440-442, 503-507, 514-515, 520-521, 524, 545, 548-550, 556-557, 636, 671; U.S. use of Pointe-Noire air base, 564-567, 568, 569-570, 571-572, 586, 590-591  
 French Africa, economic aid program for, 294-295, 336-338, 357-358, 403, 434-435, 440-442  
 Greece, relief supplies for, 730-731, 773-774, 785, 801, 813  
 Berry, Burton Y., 724, 727, 764  
 Béthouart, Gen. Emile-Marie, 241-242, 332, 447, 556  
 Biddle, Anthony J. Drexel, 6, 8, 12, 524, 772*n*  
 Blanchard, Gen. André, 134  
 Blockade. *See under* Greece: Relief supplies.  
 Blücher, Wipert von, 73, 101  
 Blum, Léon, 145, 542  
 Boegner, Jean Marc, 690-691  
 Boegner, Marc, 711  
 Boheman, Erik, 102-103, 744, 745-747, 748, 749, 753, 755, 756, 758-764, 765, 766, 768  
 Boisanger, Yves Bréart de, 226  
 Boisson, Pierre, 195, 248, 274, 287, 327, 341, 359, 367, 372, 374-375, 378-379, 389, 410-411, 431, 457, 458, 471  
 Bolte, Brig. Gen. Charles L., 534*n*, 536-539, 572, 576-577, 578, 584, 586  
 Bonbright, James C. H., 370  
 Boström, W., 74*n*, 74-75, 76  
 Bournat, Gilbert de, 661  
 Boyd, John H., 387  
 Bréart de Boisanger, Yves, 226  
 Brinon, Fernand de, 154, 190  
 Brown, Constantine, 119  
 Brunel, M., 759-760, 761-762, 765, 767, 770  
 Bulgaria, U.S. recognition of existence of state of war with, 833-842  
 Bunn, Charles, 814-815  
 Burckhardt, Charles J., 733-734, 760  
 Campbell, Sir Ronald I., 272, 445, 556-557, 662-663  
 Canada: Attitude toward Vichy Government of France, 178-180, 182; Canadian Red Cross, 771, 772, 788; discussions with U.S. and British Governments regarding St. Pierre and Miquelon Islands, 654-671 *passim*; wheat shipments to Greece, 751, 754, 756, 769, 779, 780, 781, 794, 807  
 Canfield, Cass, 335, 367-368, 375-376, 402  
 Caribbean area, French possessions in. *See under* France: Colonial possessions in Western Hemisphere.  
 Carl, Prince of Sweden, 744  
 Carretier, Col., 565, 567, 570, 588  
 Case, John Crowther, 591-593, 594  
 Casey, Richard Gardiner, 496  
 Castillo Nájera, Francisco, 203*n*  
 Catroux, Gen. Georges, 495, 520, 529, 555  
 Chambrun, René de, 154, 155, 156, 157, 187, 722  
 Chancel, Ludovic, 608, 608, 609, 610  
 Charles-Roux, François, 297  
 Chatel, Yves C., 248, 282, 289, 297-298, 426  
 Chautemps, Camille, 517, 519  
 Cherchel Conference, 394-395, 396, 405*n*, 409, 413*n*  
 Chevigné, Col. Count Pierre de, 504, 567  
 Chrétien, Lt. Col., 392, 425  
 Churchill, Winston S.:  
   Exchange of messages with Roosevelt, 445-446, 491, 491*n*, 499*n*, 667-668  
   Free French, relations with, 184, 495, 546, 656-657, 662, 663-670, 707  
   French North Africa, views regarding Darlan, 445-446, 484  
   Miscellaneous, 45, 100, 491, 726, 727  
   Vichy Government, 178, 179, 654-655, 662  
   Visit to Washington, Dec. 1941-Jan. 1942, 24*n*, 654*n*, 656-657  
 Ciano, Count Galeazzo, 127-128, 750  
 Clark, Maj. Gen. Mark W., 396, 405, 409, 413; agreement, Nov. 22, with Admiral Darlan, 453-457  
 Connor, Col., 498  
 Cooper, Comdr. Thomas V., 221*n*  
 Corbin, Charles, 243  
 Coumantaros, Nicholas S., 831-832  
 Crawford, Gen. Robert, 690-691  
 Culbertson, Paul, 451, 467, 479  
 Cunningham, Adm. Andrew Brown, 212, 221  
 Cutler, Lloyd, 467, 479  
 Cyprus, 824, 825-826  
 Cyrenaica, 826  
 Czechoslovakia, preliminary agreement with United States regarding mutual aid in the prosecution of war against aggression, July 11, citation to text, 20  
 Dahlquist, Gen. John E., 534*n*, 538-539, 585, 586  
 Dakar. *See under* French West Africa.  
 Daladier, Edouard, 145  
 Dalton, Hugh, 733, 736*n*  
 d'Argenlieu, Adm. Georges Thierry, 550-553, 675, 688-689, 690-691, 692, 694, 697  
 Darlan, Alain, 288-284, 396, 400-401, 425, 426, 427  
 Darlan, Adm. Jean François:  
   Cooperation with Allied cause, question of (*see also* Vichy collaboration, *infra*), 145, 221, 237, 248-249, 283-284, 303, 392-393, 394, 397, 399-400, 404, 425, 426-429, 473, 613

Darlan, Adm. Jean François—Con.

Death of, 492

French Fleet: Movement of the *Dunkerque* to Toulon, position regarding, 146, 205, 206, 208-209; prevention of Axis use of, 205, 210, 237, 548-549, 613

French Indochina, Japanese use of French ships, 137, 140, 672-673, 676-678

French North Africa, Darlan's position as High Commissioner. *See under* French North Africa: Invasion, etc.

French Somaliland, 597, 598, 599, 600, 602, 603, 666

French West Africa under orders of Darlan, 457-459, 471

Laval's return to power, 155, 156-157, 161, 169, 191, 276, 286, 289, 298, 404

Madagascar, 125, 299, 613

Miscellaneous, 124, 190, 223, 276, 286, 303, 319, 564, 630

St. Pierre and Miquelon Islands, 125, 149, 658

Vichy collaboration with Axis Powers, role in, 123*n*, 124-125, 127-130, 132-134, 136, 137, 140, 145, 148-150, 151, 152, 164, 205-206, 225-226, 237, 248-249, 258, 303, 548-549, 613

d'Astier de la Vigerie, Lt. Henri, 264

Davis, Norman, 728-729, 730, 752-753, 783-784

Day, Samuel H., 18

Déat, Marcel, 186, 289, 304, 389, 542

Decoux, Adm. Jean, 505, 674-675, 676, 687, 690, 693

de Gaulle, Gen. Charles:

Attitude toward Darlan, 441, 446, 488, 546, 548-549; Giraud, 441, 493, 494, 496, 496, 497, 499-501, 545, 546, 555-556; Laval, 175, 177

Free French, U.S. relations with (*see also* French National Committee and U.S. cooperation, *infra*), 502-503, 507-511, 515-516, 520, 524-527, 539-540, 546-547, 552, 553-555, 558; unification of French resistance, 493, 494-495, 495, 497, 500, 512-514, 515-520, 543, 545, 552, 553-556

French National Committee, U.S. and British position toward, 183-184, 509-514, 517-519, 521-524, 527, 528-533, 534, 535, 536-539, 540, 541-544, 571-572, 572, 576-577, 578

French North Africa (*see also* Attitude, *supra*), 389, 495, 545, 545*n*

French possessions in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, question of authority over, 689-692, 701, 701-703, 704, 705-708

de Gaulle, Gen. Charles—Continued

French possessions in Western Hemisphere, 636, 702-703; St. Pierre and Miquelon Islands, 655, 664-669

Messages to Roosevelt and Hull, 534, 541-544

Miscellaneous, 222-223, 226, 341, 358, 378, 380, 466, 520, 598, 602

Pointe-Noire air base, arrangements for U.S. use of, 565, 568, 569, 570, 571-572, 574, 576-577, 578, 579, 582-584, 587

Policies and views, 495, 510-511, 518, 522, 528, 540, 541-544, 563, 636, 666-668, 668, 675, 701-703

Sentiments of certain groups and individuals regarding, 222-223, 226, 341, 358, 378, 466, 507, 509, 510-511, 512, 518, 518, 519, 522, 528, 539, 544, 552, 553-554, 556, 569, 598, 599, 602-603, 604, 655, 667, 668

U. S. cooperation with de Gaulle, negotiations forming basis for, 523-524, 527, 528-533; appointment of military and naval representatives to consult with French National Committee in London, 534, 535, 536-539, 571-572, 572, 576-577, 578

Visit to United States, proposed, 493, 546, 547, 548, 549-550, 553, 555

DeGolia, Darwin J., 314

Dejean, Maurice, 537, 544, 707

De Vleeschauwer, Albert J., 5, 7, 10, 11, 18

d'Harcourt, Vice Adm. Count Armand, 256-257

Diamantopoulos, Cimon P., 725-727, 730-731, 736*n*, 737, 741, 747, 773-774, 784, 785, 797, 799*n*, 799-800, 801, 813, 814*n*, 814-815, 815-816, 820, 827, 828-829, 829-830, 831-832

Dodecanese Islands, 829-830

Donovan, Col. William J., 256, 286*n*, 302, 312

Doolittle, Hooker, 247, 322

Dorange, Maj. André, 396-400

Doriot, Jacques, 185-186, 191, 282, 289, 304, 307, 333, 429, 542

DuBois, Josiah Ellis, 479

du Gardier, Roger Robert, 254-255

*Dunkerque* (French battleship), 146, 204-209

Dunn, James C., 272, 350, 657, 663

Dupont, Gen., 597, 599, 603, 605, 608, 610

Easton, Maj. John, 465

Eddy, Lt. Col. William A., 238*n*, 252, 255, 256, 285, 272, 299, 413

- Eden, Anthony, 24*n*, 38, 174-176, 176-178, 179, 188, 387, 446-447, 490, 527, 528, 529-530, 581-532, 619-620, 666, 667, 700-701, 706, 732, 733, 739-741, 743, 781, 829
- Egger, Karl, 73*n*
- Egypt, shipments of wheat to Greece, 730, 734, 735-736, 739, 744, 803
- Eisenhower, Lt. Gen. Dwight D.:  
Designation of U.S. Army representative to consult with French National Committee in London, 534
- French North Africa:  
Darlan's role as High Commissioner in French Africa, Eisenhower's views and comments regarding, 453*n*, 471, 472-473, 481, 482, 483
- Invasion, preparations for, and plans for French cooperation, 258-259, 386, 394, 395, 396, 397, 405, 406, 410, 413*n*, 423, 426
- Occupation: Administration problems, 436, 438, 442-443, 445, 448, 451-452, 460, 463-465, 473-474, 477, 479, 480, 486, 499-501; Murphy's appointment as civil administrator under Eisenhower, and question of British counterpart, 379, 390*n*, 473-474, 475, 482, 490, 491, 495-496
- Erkko, Elias, 32-33, 61, 89, 95, 97, 103-104
- Esteva, Adm. Jean Pierre, 128, 145, 246-247, 248, 303, 304-305, 307, 322
- Evans, Col. F. W., 820
- Fagan, Mr., 356-357, 385-386, 398, 435
- Falvy, Gen., 466
- Feis, Herbert, 9*n*, 12
- Fénard, Vice Adm. Jacques, 236-237, 247, 248-249, 257-258, 275-276, 279-280, 283-284, 286, 292-293, 298, 301, 316-318, 323, 329, 361
- Ferenbaugh, Col., 498
- Fertig, Mr., 353
- Fierlinger, Zdenek, 108
- Finland, 21-122  
American citizens in Finland, question of return to United States, 56-57  
American motion pictures, question of obtaining raw film for, 92-94  
Atlantic Charter, Finnish attitude, 99, 100, 106, 113  
Attempts by United States to prevent further Finnish participation in war against Soviet Union in association with Germany:  
British attitude toward Finland, 29, 30, 52-53, 55, 56  
Cessation of Finnish-Soviet hostilities: Rumors concerning, and U. S. exploration of possibility
- Finland—Continued  
Attempts by United States—Con.  
ties of, 26, 28-30, 32-33, 34-35, 36-38, 43-44, 45, 52-53, 55-56, 57, 59-62, 66, 90-91, 98, 99, 101, 107-108, 110, 112-114; Swedish position, 36-37, 102-103, 116  
U. S. concern over Finnish attitude toward Germany (*see also* Finnish policy, *infra*), 37-38, 44-45, 46-47, 48-49, 75; U. S. representations, and Finnish replies, 33-36, 39-43, 81-85, 88  
Economic conditions and food supplies, 25, 27, 32-33, 35, 36, 39, 42, 43, 46, 51, 56, 68, 103-104; conclusion of a new German-Finnish trade agreement, 39, 66-67, 79, 111, 119  
Finnish Information Center in New York, closing of, 119-120  
Finnish policy and war aims, 24-25, 30-31, 32-33, 36, 41-43, 49-51, 53-56, 62, 87, 89, 107, 111-112, 114*n*, 117  
Finnish ships, claims regarding, 47-48  
German pressure resulting in Finnish cooperation with Germany (*see also* Economic conditions, *supra*), 24-25, 26-27, 45, 51-52, 78, 92*n*  
Hitler's visit, and Mannerheim's visit to Germany, 63-65, 67  
Japanese Legation, celebration of attack on Pearl Harbor, 109*n*, 117-120, 121-122  
Military situation, 33, 33-34, 36, 40, 41-42, 45, 51, 52, 53, 59, 60, 67-68, 79-80, 90, 106, 112  
Petsamo Nickel Mine, production capacity of, 96-97  
Press and propaganda, German influence and other problems, 25, 26-27, 45, 77-78, 91-92, 115-116, 119-120, 122  
Relations with United States (*see also* Attempts, etc., *supra*):  
Developments leading to deterioration of, and break of consular relations, 26-27, 34-35, 63-64, 68-75, 76-78, 79-80, 85-87, 89-90, 91-92, 106, 115-116, 117-122; restrictions on movements of consular and diplomatic personnel, and related matters, 21-24, 27-28, 32, 44, 48, 49, 58, 65, 72, 76, 85-86  
Public opinion in Finland, reports concerning, 24-25, 35*n*, 79-81, 83-89, 100, 101*n*; in United States, 29-30, 30, 64, 71  
*Rapprochement*, basis for, and evaluation of situation, 94-96, 97-101, 103-107, 108-110, 111-112, 117; recall of U.S. Minister for consultation, 107, 114-115

Finland—Continued

Social Democratic Party, position of, 25, 43, 56, 89, 97-98, 100-101, 105n  
Swedish attitude toward Finland, and concern over deterioration of U. S.-Finnish relations, 36-37, 38, 41, 43-44, 66, 74-75, 97, 102-103, 104, 108, 116

Treaty of commerce and consular rights with United States, *Feb. 13, 1934*, cited, 68, 69, 70

U. S. policy toward Finland, *résumé*, 112-114

Finletter, Thomas K., 314

First War Powers Act, 1941, 709

Fitzgerald, Brig. Gen. S. W., 489, 587, 588, 593

FLAGPOLE (*see also* Mast, Gen. Charles E.), 405, 405n, 406, 410, 423, 424, 426

Fleming, Horace Kingston, 385-386

Fortier, Maj. Louis, 278-279, 287

Fowkes, Maj. Gen. Charles C., 602, 607, 608, 609, 610

France (*see also* French Equatorial Africa; French North Africa; French Somaliland; and French West Africa), 123-224, 502-722

American motion pictures, U. S. representations to Vichy Government regarding ban of (in violation of 1936 trade agreement), 716-722

Armistice Agreements with Germany and Italy (1940): Cited, 131, 135, 141, 142, 205, 211, 211-212, 216, 217; miscellaneous references to, 145, 150, 154, 158, 167, 216, 217, 222, 632, 639, 640, 643, 645, 647-648, 654; U. S. views on French obligations under, 131, 135, 140, 183, 195, 215, 218, 219, 641

Armistice Commissions (German and Italian) at Wiesbaden and Turin, 154, 158, 166, 213, 215, 305, 307, 308, 309, 372, 377

Colonial possessions. *See* French Equatorial Africa; French North Africa; French Somaliland; and French West Africa; *also the following, infra*: Colonial possessions in Western Hemisphere; French Indochina; and French island possessions in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Colonial possessions in Western Hemisphere:

Caribbean possessions (Martinique and Guadeloupe), maintenance of neutrality of, 611-654

Axis vessels and planes:

German submarine entry into Fort-de-France, reports concerning, 611, 612-613, 615, 616, 618, 628, 638; British views, 619-620

France—Continued

Colonial possessions in Western Hemisphere—Continued

Caribbean possessions—Continued  
Axis vessels and planes—Con.

U. S. request for Vichy Government assurances of non-admission, and Vichy replies, 612-613, 614-618, 620-623, 627-630, 630-633, 639-640

Free French, attitude with respect to, 524-527, 701-703

Gentlemen's agreement reached between United States and Admiral Robert, *Nov. 7*: Drafts, information concerning, 644; Greenslade-Robert Agreement (1940) as amended by Horne-Robert Agreement (1941), relation to, 617, 620-621, 621, 622, 623, 625-626, 649-650; negotiations concerning communications, economic matters, and shipping, 625-648 *passim*, 651-654; Press Conference of Secretary Hull regarding, 649-650; severance of diplomatic relations by Vichy Government, *Nov. 8*, effect on agreement, 645-649, 650; views of General de Gaulle, 636

German armistice terms, relation to, 632, 635, 636, 639, 640, 641, 643, 645, 646, 647-648, 654

St. Pierre and Miquelon Islands, problems arising from seizure by Free French forces, 654-671

Discussions between United States, Canada, and United Kingdom, and proposed formula for solution, 654-655, 656-657, 657-658, 662-670, 671; views of de Gaulle and Churchill on proposed solution, 666-668

U. S.-Vichy discussions, 655-656, 657-662, 670-771

Consular convention with United States (1853), cited, 558, 560, 562

Free French forces, U. S. relations with (*see also* Colonial possessions: St. Pierre and Miquelon, *supra*; and French island possessions, etc., *infra*; *also* French Equatorial Africa; and French North Africa: American assistance, American plans, and Invasion), 502-557

## France—Continued

Free French forces, etc.—Continued

Appointment of U. S. military and naval representatives to consult with National Committee in London:

British-U. S. discussions leading to arrangement for consultation and cooperation with de Gaulle, 511-514, 517-520, 521-524, 527, 528-534; Free French attitude, 524-527, 528, 532-533, 534

Designation of representatives, 534

Suggestions by representatives as to procedure for dealing with Committee, 536-539

Vichy reaction to U. S. announcement concerning, 535-536

Colonial possessions in Western Hemisphere, attitude concerning, 524-527, 701-703

French National Committee (*see also* Appointment, *supra*, and Unification, *infra*):

de Gaulle: Letters to Hull and Roosevelt, 534, 541-544; proposed visit to Washington, 493, 546, 547, 548, 549-550, 553, 555

Delegation of French National Committee in United States: Establishment by decree of Dec. 2, 1941, 503; functions and activities of, 503-507; opinions of Tixier (Head of Delegation), and conversations with State Department, 509-511, 514-517, 520-521, 524, 540, 545-553, 555-556; Roosevelt meeting with members of, 546-547

U. S. attitude. *See* U. S. position and policy, *infra*.

Lend-Lease aid, 435-437, 444-445, 502-503, 523, 535, 539-540, 565-566, 567, 581; agreement between United States and Fighting France, Sept. 3, 708

Recognition, question of. *See* U. S. position and policy, *infra*.

Unification of French resistance: U. S. discussions with members of French National Committee, 545, 548-550, 555-556; with British diplomatic representatives, 553-555, 556-557

U. S. position and policy (*see also* Appointment, etc., *supra*), 503, 507-508, 510, 511-513, 514-515, 516, 521, 522, 523-524, 530-531, 535, 539-540, 544, 546-547, 548, 551-555, 556; Roosevelt's position, 546-547, 548, 553

## France—Continued

Free French forces—Continued

U. S. selective service, question of liability of Free Frenchmen to, 520-521

French Fleet:

French warships at Alexandria, Egypt, U. S. representations to French Government, 210-224

Concern over critical situation of French naval squadron in Alexandria in view of Rommel's advance in Egypt, 210-214; British position, 212, 215-216, 220, 221

Roosevelt proposals to French Government, and Laval's replies, 214-215, 216-219; U. S. request for British broadcast of U. S. proposals to French crews, 220

Views of Admiral Godefroy, and reaction to Roosevelt message, 212, 221, 221-224

Scuttling of, 221n, 549

Transfer of battleship *Dunkerque* from Oran to Toulon, U. S. representations to Vichy Government concerning, and Vichy replies, 143, 146, 204-209

French Indochina, Japanese use of French merchant vessels, 671-687

Agreement between Vichy Government and Japan, reports concerning negotiations for, 137, 140, 143, 146, 671, 673-674, 678-681; U. S. representations, and French replies, 671-673, 675, 676-678, 681-687

Decoux's cooperation with Japanese, 674-675, 675, 676

Japanese seizure of French merchant vessels, 686-687

French island possessions in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, 687-708

Axis use of Madagascar, anticipation of. *See* Madagascar, *infra*.

Madagascar, British occupation of: British-U. S. position in relation to Vichy Government, 698-705; Vichy protest, 699-700

Free French role in administration of Madagascar: British position, 701, 704, 705-708; Free French views, 701-703

Postwar status of Madagascar, U. S.-British policy concerning, 698-699, 701, 701-702

Reaction in French North Africa, 298, 299

Views of Governor General regarding status of Madagascar, 696-697

**France—Continued**

French island possessions—Con.

New Caledonia. *See* U. S. policy, *infra*.

U. S. policy regarding protection of: Discussions with Free French, 688-692, 697; discussions with representatives of Vichy Government, and Vichy protest, 687-688, 692-696, 697-698

French merchant vessels, use by Axis Powers. *See* French Indochina, *supra*, and Vichy collaboration, *infra*.

Jews, treatment of, U. S. representations on behalf of American citizens and other foreign nationals, 709-712; emigration of refugee children to United States, discussions concerning, 712-716

Madagascar:

British occupation of. *See* under French island possessions in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, *supra*.

Miscellaneous, 192, 298, 299, 514-515, 613, 678

Martinique:

Maintenance of neutrality of. *See* Colonial possessions in Western Hemisphere: Caribbean possessions, *supra*.

Miscellaneous, 145, 186-187, 187, 188, 301, 304, 306, 514-515, 574-575, 600, 657, 659, 663

Navy. *See* French Fleet, *supra*.

New Caledonia. *See* French island possessions in the Pacific and Indian Oceans: U.S. policy, etc., *supra*.

Parti Populaire Français (P.P.F.), 282, 289, 382-383, 393, 429

Political situation, evaluation of, 144-147, 150-151, 154-157, 181-182, 184-187, 188-189, 225-226

Riom trial, 145-146, 155

Severance of diplomatic relations with United States, 201-204

Ships. *See* French Fleet and French Indochina, *supra*; also Vichy collaboration: Accord with Germany and Italy, *infra*.

St. Pierre and Miquelon Islands. *See* under Colonial possessions in Western Hemisphere, *supra*.

Trade agreement with United States (1936), cited, 716, 718-719, 720

Vichy collaboration with Axis Powers, 123-204

Accord with Germany and Italy for use of French ships for transshipment of supplies to Axis forces in Libya (*see also* Delivery of gasoline, and French and foreign merchant tonnage, *infra*), 126-134, 153; Darlan's role in accord, 127-128, 129-130, 132-134, 136, 145, 237

**France—Continued**

Vichy collaboration, etc.—Continued

Agreement with Japan for use of French ships in the Orient, reports on negotiations for. *See* under French Indochina, *supra*.

Delivery of gasoline and other strategic supplies to Axis forces in Libya:

British position, 159

Economic aid program for North Africa, relation to, 134-135, 140-141, 151, 154, 160, 164, 165, 166-169, 188, 205-206, 243-251

Reports concerning, 134-135, 147-148, 153-154, 157-159, 163, 246-247, 257

U. S. request for assurances of cessation of, and Vichy replies, 131-134, 135-137, 139-142, 143, 144, 147, 148-152, 153-154, 162-163, 164-169; possible recall of U. S. Ambassador for consultation, question of, 132, 136-137, 139

"Delta Plan". *See* Accord, etc., *supra*.

French and foreign merchant tonnage, German demands for, and U. S. representations, 195, 196-197, 197-201

Laval's return as Chief of Government:

Canadian position, 178-180, 182

Eden's views concerning, 174-176, 176-178

Franco-German defense agreement for French North and West Africa, proposed, Laval's favorable attitude toward, 194

German pressure for a collaborationist government, 154-155, 169, 173, 174, 176

Political situation, evaluation of, 144-147, 154-157, 169, 184-186

Protest of Laval against Le Havre and Rouen bombing, U. S. position regarding, 196, 197

U. S. concern over reports regarding: Consideration of severance of relations, and recall of U. S. Ambassador for consultation, 160-162, 170-173, 176, 180, 189-194; policy discussions with United Kingdom and Canada, 178-180, 182-184

Views of Laval on foreign and domestic policy, 181-182, 184-187, 187-189

**France—Continued**

Vichy collaboration, etc.—Continued

Severance of diplomatic relations with United States by Laval government, *Nov. 8*, following landing of U. S. Forces in North Africa: Announcement of decision and arrangements for departure of U. S. consular and diplomatic personnel, 201-202, 202-203; Hull's letter to U. S. diplomatic missions abroad, 203-204; Roosevelt statement, 202

Turin Accord of *Dec. 12, 1941*. See Accord, *supra*.

U. S. Embassy in Vichy. See Severance of diplomatic relations, *supra*.

U. S. exchange of views with Pétain government, 123-126

Franco, Gen. Francisco, 338

Free French forces. See under France.

French Equatorial Africa:

Pointe-Noire air base, U. S. use of, 564-596

Negotiations with French National Committee, and Free French conditions for use of base, 564-568, 571-572, 574, 576-577, 579-580, 583-584, 585-586; difficulties between authorities in Africa and National Committee, 568-569, 573-575

Postwar rights to new installations, question of, 571, 579, 585, 586, 588-589, 590-596

U. S. troops, question of disembarkation, 578, 582-583, 584, 585

Utilization and improvement by U. S. Army (see also Negotiations, *supra*), 569-571, 572, 576, 577-582, 586-587; agreement with local government, preparation of, 587, 588-590

U. S. Consulate at Brazzaville, Vichy protest against establishment of, 172-173, 557-564

French North Africa (see also Morocco and Tunisia), 224-501

Algeria:

Allied landings, report concerning, 377

Delivery of gasoline and other supplies via Algeria to Axis forces in Libya. See under France: Vichy collaboration.

Desire of French military personnel and officials to transfer their activities to Allied Forces, 227-229, 237-238, 283-284, 376, 377

Economic and political situation, 236-237, 282-283

**French North Africa—Continued**

Algeria—Continued

Shipments of Algerian alcohol to French West Africa, U. S. policy regarding, 274-275, 292-293, 294

U. S. Consulate, report on safety of Americans following Allied invasion, 432

American assistance to French resistance movement (see also American plans, *infra*):

Desire of French military personnel and officials to resume hostilities against the Axis, and plans for defense of French Africa (see also Military intervention, *infra*), 227-236, 237-238, 241, 258-259, 283-284

French apprehension concerning Axis intentions in western Mediterranean, 224-226

Military intervention in North Africa, French plans for cooperation with United States, 263-272, 278-279, 283, 284, 285-287, 293-294, 298, 298-301, 331-333, 333-334, 362, 376, 377

American economic aid program, resumption and subsequent acceleration of, 224-379

Advisability of resumption of program pending clarification of relations with Vichy Government: American-French discussions, 248-252; Anglo-American discussions, 272-273; appraisal of Laval's policy, 285-286, 287-288, 289, 290-292, 293, 297-298, 306-307, 309; U. S. press release, 280-281

Agricultural machinery and other supplies, French request for, 240, 247-248, 367-368

American control officers, 254-257, 263, 273, 282, 287, 294-295, 295-296, 297, 301, 302-303, 304, 305, 307-308, 311-312, 313, 320-321, 323, 325-326, 330, 337, 340, 346, 350, 354, 376, 378, 401-402

Arrangements in connection with first vessels and cargoes under revived aid program, 238-239, 240-241, 246, 249-250, 273, 280-281, 290, 296-297, 311

Authorization for, and French reaction, 313, 316, 322, 333

British position: Policy and views, 243-246; suggestions regarding shipments of certain commodities, and desire for publicity in North African supply scheme, 336-338, 342, 345-347, 350, 357-358, 359, 364-365, 370, 371, 376-377

## French North Africa—Continued

## American economic aid—Continued

Cobalt and molybdenum, U. S. request for French assurances to prevent export to Germany and metropolitan France, and French replies (*see also* Oil shipments, *infra*), 314-317, 323-325, 327-328, 328-329, 343-344, 351-352, 360-361, 363-364, 365-366, 367, 369, 370, 374, 381-382

Cotton textiles for civilian use, question of possible military value, 343, 350-351, 371, 375-376, 377-378

Exports to United States from French North Africa, 238-239, 281, 296, 302, 313

French assurances to United States. *See* U. S. requests, *infra*.

French requirements and views, 225-226, 236-237, 240-241, 247-252, 257-258, 259-263, 274, 275-278, 279-280, 352-354, 367-368

Fueling and refueling of transport vessels, arrangements for and problems involved, 317, 326, 328, 329, 330, 334-335, 342, 347, 353-354, 356-357

German control of French ships in African ports, 323, 325-326, 326-327, 334-335, 338-340, 346

Implementation of program, difficulties regarding, 336-338, 340-342, 348-349, 352-357, 367-370, 376, 385-386, 397-398, 403; proposals for enlargement of program, 354-355

Murphy-Weygand Agreement (*Feb. 26, 1941*) as basis for, 224-379 *passim*; citation to text, 226*n*

Oil shipments to French North Africa, discussions concerning, 314-318, 323-325, 330, 335-336, 343, 353, 361, 364, 365, 369, 371, 373-374; approval of petroleum program, 401-402, 405-406

Review of program following invasion of French North Africa. *See* American economic aid under Invasion, *infra*.

U. S. relations with Vichy Government in connection with. *See* Advisability, etc., *supra*, and U. S. requests, etc., *infra*; *see also* France: Vichy collaboration with Axis Powers: Delivery of gasoline, etc.

U. S. requests for—

French assurances to prevent export of certain minerals to Germany and metropolitan France. *See* Cobalt and molybdenum, *supra*.

## French North Africa—Continued

## American economic aid—Continued

## U. S. requests for—Continued

Renewal of French assurances regarding military assistance to belligerents and other matters, 345, 358, 361-362, 362-363

American plans for securing French assistance for the landing in North Africa of American Military Forces, 379-429

Anglo-American invasion of North Africa, Axis reports concerning, 387-388, 392

Axis aggression against French North Africa, reports concerning imminence of, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396-397, 398-400, 425

Cherchel Conference, *Oct. 22*, between Gen. Mark Clark, Robert D. Murphy, and French resistance leaders (*see also* Discussions, *infra*), 394-395, 396, 405*n*, 409, 413*n*

Darlan's role in, 392-394, 397, 399-400, 404, 425, 426-429

Discussions and meetings between U. S. and French officials, 376, 381, 383-384, 385, 386, 387-388, 392-396, 398-400, 404, 408, 409-410, 424, 425; the Cherchel Conference, *Oct. 22*, 394-395, 396, 405*n*, 409, 413*n*

Eisenhower messages to Department of State, 258-259; to Murphy, 406

Giraud's role in, 394-396, 397, 405, 406, 409-410, 423, 424, 426; exchange of messages between Murphy and Giraud, 412-422

Giraud-Murphy "Agreement in Principle" of *Oct. 27*, text, 419-422

Roosevelt's directive to Murphy, 379-381

German agreement with Vichy Government for defense of French Africa, probability of, 194, 359, 375, 377, 389-391, 393

Invasion of, and occupation by Allied Forces, 429-501

American citizens, reports concerning safety of, 432, 440

American economic aid program, review of:

Acceleration of shipments of high priority materials, 433-435, 444-445, 449-451, 459

British cooperation in comprehensive economic and financial program in accordance with recommendations by Combined Chiefs of Staff, 438-439, 443-444, 451, 460, 463-465, 477-479



## French North Africa—Continued

## Invasion of—Continued

## American economic aid—Continued

Lend-Lease extension to French  
in North Africa, 435-437,  
444-445

Announcement of American land-  
ings, and reaction of Vichy  
Government, 429-432

Arrangements and plans for. *See*  
American plans, etc., *supra*.

## Civil administration:

Assignment of a civil mission to  
work under Murphy's direc-  
tion: Information concern-  
ing, 438, 443-444, 451-452,  
459, 462-463, 467, 473-474,  
475-476, 477-478, 478-479;  
Murphy given rank of Min-  
ister, 481-482; views of  
Eisenhower, 501

Boundary line between British  
and American jurisdiction in  
Northwest Africa, question  
of, 480, 486-488, 490

British desire for appointment of  
a British official to act jointly  
with Murphy under Eisen-  
hower's direction, 490-491,  
495-496; Churchill message  
to Roosevelt, and Roosevelt's  
reply, 491, 491*n*

Establishment in Department of  
State of an Office of Foreign  
Territories to deal with non-  
military matters, 474-476,  
478, 479-480

Consular officers in North Africa,  
instructions to, 435, 440

Darlan's position as High Com-  
missioner in French Africa:

British attitude, 445-447, 484

Clark-Darlan agreement of Nov.  
22, 453-457

Death of Darlan, 492

Free French opposition, 440-442,  
487-488, 548

U. S. policy toward Darlan (*see*  
*also* Clark-Darlan agree-  
ment, *supra*), 441, 442, 448,  
472-473, 476, 481, 482-484,  
551-552; criticism of policy  
by Fighting French and by  
Soviet press, 487-488

Death of Darlan, and Giraud's ap-  
pointment as High Commis-  
sioner, 492, 493

Economic and financial matters.  
*See* American economic aid  
program, *supra*.

Giraud as High Commissioner.  
*See* Unification, etc., *infra*.

Legal aspects of occupation, 461-  
462

Political prisoners, release of, 437,  
442-443, 448, 482

## French North Africa—Continued

## Invasion of—Continued

Roosevelt program, proposed, 437,  
442-443, 443, 448, 449

Soviet interest in developments in  
French North Africa, 448-449,  
468-470, 476, 488

Unification of all French elements  
outside Axis-occupied French  
territory: Discussions concern-  
ing roles of Giraud and de  
Gaulle, and other aspects, 492-  
493, 493-495, 497; U. S. posi-  
tion, 499-501

U. S. commendation of Murphy and  
other representatives in North  
Africa, 437, 447

Japanese Consulate at Casablanca,  
reopening of, 224

North African Accord (Murphy-Wey-  
gand Agreement, *Feb. 26, 1941*),  
224-379 *passim*; citation to text,  
228*n*

Soviet Union, interest in develop-  
ments in, 448-449, 468-470, 476,  
488

U. S. policy, résumé, 499-501

French Somaliland, U. S. efforts to  
bring about peaceful collaboration  
with United Nations, 596-611

## French West Africa:

Afrique Occidentale Française  
(A.O.F.), 374-375, 378, 407, 408,  
458, 465-466

American economic aid program,  
question of extension to, 274-275,  
330, 333, 341, 366, 372, 384-385;  
civilian supply problems, 489-490,  
498-499

## Dakar:

Analysis of situation and of French  
attitude in connection with  
Allied invasion, 367, 372, 374-  
375, 378-379, 391, 402-403, 403-  
404, 410-411, 458, 465-466, 489-  
490; evacuation of women and  
children, 387, 403-404, 407-408  
German intentions regarding, 194,  
367, 372, 378-379

Japanese desire for Consulate, 224

U. S. Consulate, situation following  
Allied invasion, 439, 457, 460;  
instructions to reopen, 471-472

Darlan, placement of West Africa  
under orders of, 457-459, 471

Oil products, U. S. policy regarding  
export to France, 274-275, 280,  
292-293, 294

French West Indies. *See* France:  
Colonial possessions in Western  
Hemisphere.

Freseman, Cmdr. W. L., 375, 402

Gamelin, Gen. Maurice Gustave, 146

Garreau, Roger, 488

Garthoff, Arnold A., 467, 479

- George II, King of the Hellenes, 736, 737, 741-743, 747, 748-749, 782, 797-798, 800, 800*n*, 802
- Georges-Picot, Guillaume, 492, 493
- Germany (*see also* Finland; France; French North Africa; French West Africa; Greece; *and* Morocco):  
Arrangement with United States pertaining to repatriation and hospitalization of prisoners of war, citation to exchange of notes, *Mar. 4 and 30*, 723; German Red Cross, 750, 752, 757, 759, 761
- Gibraltar, 226, 392
- Giraud, Gen. Henri H.:  
Appointment as High Commissioner of French North Africa following Darlan's assassination, 492-495, 496-497, 555  
Escape from Germany, 297, 331, 394*n*  
Role in invasion and administration of French North Africa, 297-298, 331-333, 394-396, 397, 405, 406, 409-410, 423, 424, 426, 441, 447, 483, 492, 499-500, 545, 546, 549, 550, 551-552, 555-556; correspondence with Murphy, and "Agreement in Principle" of Oct. 27, 412-422
- Glassford, Rear Adm. William A., Jr., 489*n*, 498
- Gleack, Lewis E., Jr., 68, 70, 78
- Godefroy, Adm. René-Émile, 212, 213, 216, 221-224
- Gray, Cecil W., 834-835
- Greece, 724-832  
American aid to Greece. *See* Financial assistance, Lend-Lease, and Relief supplies, *infra*.  
British relations with Greece. *See* United Kingdom, *infra*.  
Court action between private parties, U. S. unwillingness to comply with Greek request for verification of certain facts in, 831-832  
Cyprus, question of Greek claim to, 825-826  
Debt Agreement with United States of May 10, 1929, and supplementary agreement of May 24, 1932, cited, 794*n*, 796, 797  
Dodecanese Islands, Greek pleas for lenient treatment of persons of Greek race who had entered United States from, 829-830  
Financial assistance by United States, question of, 798-813  
Appeals for aid, and consideration by U. S. officials, 798-800, 800*n*, 813, 814-815; Roosevelt's position, 800*n*  
British financial relations with Greek Government, 802-804, 809-810  
Report of Greek Minister of Finance on details of Greek financial situation, 804-813
- Greece—Continued  
Formation of separate battalions of Greek subjects in U. S. Army, 815-822  
International Financial Commission, U. S. attitude toward Greek desire for abolition of, 794-797  
King George II: Exchange of messages with Roosevelt, and discussions concerning, 736, 737, 741-743, 747, 748-749; visit to United States, 797-798, 800*n*, 802  
Lend-Lease: Agreement with United States, signed July 10, conclusion of, 814-815; relief supplies for Greece under Lend-Lease, question of, 737, 773, 778, 785, 789-789, 790, 807, 814-815  
Postwar frontiers, Greek representations respecting, 822-823; U. S. position, 822, 828-829  
Red Cross functions in providing relief for Greece, 724-794 *passim*; Greek Red Cross, 757, 759, 761  
Refugees from Greece, problem of aid for, 798, 799, 801, 806, 807, 808, 809, 813  
Relief supplies for Axis-occupied Greece, negotiations concerning, 724-794  
Appeals for food, 725-727, 729-731, 731, 736, 737, 775-776, 779-780  
Appointment of an American to supervise relief measures, Greek suggestion and U. S. consideration, 736, 737, 741-743, 748, 749  
Argentine gift of wheat, 749-750, 751  
Blockade, British permission of relief shipments through, 725, 733, 734, 735, 739, 741, 744, 770, 773, 778, 784-785  
British role, and U. S.-British co-ordination of policy (*see also* Swedish plan, *infra*), 724-725, 727-728, 732, 733-736, 737-738  
Children, question of evacuation of, 733, 735, 736, 738  
Distribution of supplies. *See* Swedish plan: Implementation, *infra*.  
Exchange of messages between President Roosevelt and King George II, 736, 742-743, 747; and Prime Minister Tsouderos, 725-726, 729-730  
Financing of relief measures (*see also* Financing, etc., under Swedish plan, *infra*), 728, 736, 752-753, 784-785, 798, 803, 807, 808  
Lend-Lease supplies, question of, 737, 773, 778, 785, 788-789, 790, 807, 814-815  
Stureholm, sinking of, 769

## Greece—Continued

## Relief supplies—Continued

Swedish plan for Greek relief—  
British, U. S., and Swedish  
cooperation in development of:

British proposal regarding use of  
Swedish ships, 739-741; U. S.  
and Swedish concurrence,  
and discussions of plan, 743-  
747, 748, 748-749, 781-782

Consideration and acceptance by  
Axis, 746, 747, 750-752, 753-  
758, 760-761, 763-764, 765-  
766, 770, 772, 791-792, 793;  
Axis compensation for food  
used by occupying troops,  
741, 750, 789-790, 790-791,  
792

Expansion of agreement to items  
other than wheat, 769, 770-  
771, 773-776, 778-780, 785,  
787-789, 790

Financing of plan, questions re-  
garding, 748, 763-764, 769,  
770, 780-784, 791, 792, 803;  
President's War Relief Fund,  
question of possible use of,  
752, 782-784

Greek olive oil, question of use  
of, 760, 771, 779, 786-787

Implementation of plan through  
International Red Cross  
Committee, 754, 758-768, 770,  
772, 786, 789, 791-792, 792-  
794

U. S. press release, 771-772

Transferral of funds in connection  
with, question of, 728, 752-753,  
784-785

Turkish contribution toward relief  
in Greece, 724-725, 725, 727-  
728, 728-729, 730-731, 735,  
738-739, 772-773, 775-776, 777-  
778

Wheat shipments to Greece (*see*  
*also* Swedish plan and Turkish  
contribution, *supra*):

Argentine gift of wheat, 749-750,  
751

Axis propaganda regarding Aus-  
tralian wheat purchased by  
Greece, 724, 731, 732

Shipments to Greece from Cana-  
da, 751, 754, 756, 769, 779,  
780, 781, 794, 807; from  
Egypt and Haifa, 730, 734,  
735-736, 739, 744, 769, 803;  
from United States, 730, 737,  
738, 740, 743

United Kingdom, relations with:

Cyprus, question of Greek claim to,  
825

Financial aid to Greece, 802-804,  
806-810

## Greece—Continued

## United Kingdom—Continued

International Financial Commis-  
sion, British position in con-  
nection with Greek desire for  
abolition of, 795-796

Relief programs for Greece, par-  
ticipation in. *See* British role  
and Swedish plan under Relief  
supplies, *supra*.

U. S. military service, formation of  
separate battalions of Greek sub-  
jects in U. S. Army, 815-822

Visit of King George II to United  
States, 797-798, 800*n*, 802

Greek War Relief Association in United  
States, 728, 737, 749-750, 771, 772,  
777, 782, 788, 798, 807

Guadeloupe. *See* France: Colonial  
possessions in Western Hemi-  
sphere: Caribbean possessions.

Hackworth, Green H., 461-462

Hakkila, Väinö, 25*n*, 72-73

Halifax, Viscount, 177, 179-180, 182-  
184, 337, 371, 484, 486, 490, 502, 511-  
514, 516, 517-520, 521-523, 527, 528-  
529, 530, 531, 553-555, 604-605, 609,  
610, 619-620, 703, 705-707

Hall, Noel, 272-273, 336-338, 366, 370,  
788

Handy, Maj. Gen. Thomas T., 396-397,  
426, 570-571, 576

Harcourt, Vice Adm. Count Armand d',  
256-257

Harriman, W. Averell, 5, 6

Harrison, Geoffrey, 12

Helm, A. K., 272

Hemmen, Hans Richard, 226

Henderson, Maj., 580

Henry-Haye, Gaston, 129*n*, 129-131,  
142-143, 161-162, 172-173, 193-194,  
208, 210, 291, 351, 352, 408, 558-563,  
620-621, 627-629, 639-640, 655-656,  
657-659, 660, 670, 673, 674, 675, 676,  
682, 687*n*, 687-688, 692, 693, 694-695,  
697-698, 699

Herriot, Edouard, 520, 539, 542

Hershey, Gen. Lewis B., 520

Herviot, M., 241, 383

Hickerson, John D., 576, 669, 816-817

Higgs, L. Randolph, 21, 26-27, 29, 33*n*,  
56-57, 84*n*, 85-87, 92, 102, 118-121

Hiss, Donald, 451-452, 467, 479

Hitler, Adolf, 54, 63, 64-65, 67, 82, 107,  
202, 204, 541, 543, 552, 554, 628, 647,  
729

Hoare, Sir Samuel, 337, 467-468, 484

Hoover Commission of World War I,  
759

Hoover, Adm. John H., 624-627, 629,  
630-631, 633, 634, 635, 638, 640, 641,  
645, 646, 649, 702

Hopkins, Harry L., 485*n*, 499*n*

Hopkinson, Henry Lennox d'Aubigné,  
599, 608, 611

- Horne, Rear Adm. Frederick J., 617, 620, 621, 622, 623, 625, 649, 662
- Hoskins, Harold B., 837
- Hoyer Millar, F. R., 350
- Huber, Max, 784, 760
- Hull, Cordell:  
     Finland, U. S. relations with, 21, 32, 64-65
- France and French North Africa:  
         Communications to various officials, 311-312, 376-377, 467, 472-476, 486-487, 669-670; memoranda of conversations, 179-180, 182-184, 490, 493-495, 521, 530, 550-555, 610, 627-629, 655-656, 658-659, 662-663; press statements, 488-484, 493, 649-650
- Greece, 727-730, 800*n*, 814, 821-822, 830, 832
- Hull, Lt. Gen. John Edwin, 433-434, 461, 471
- Hungary, U. S. recognition of existence of state of war with, 833-842
- Hyde, Col. F. C., 489, 578, 580, 581, 582
- Indochina. *See* France: French Indochina.
- International Financial Commission, 794-797
- International Red Cross Committee, implementation of Greek relief plan through, 754, 758-768, 770, 772, 786, 789, 791-792, 792-794
- Italy:  
     French situation. *See the following under* France: Armistice Agreements, Armistice Commissions, and Vichy collaboration with Axis Powers.
- Swedish plan for Greek relief, Italian consent to, 746, 750-752, 753-756, 760-765, 772; Italian Red Cross, 750, 752, 757, 759, 761
- Ivalo, A., 121-122
- Japan (*see also* France: French Indochina, Japanese use of French merchant vessels): Desire for Consulate at Dakar, 224; Legation in Finland, celebration of attack on Pearl Harbor, 109*n*, 117-120, 121-122; reopening of Consulate at Casablanca, 224
- Jarnfelt, Eero, 49-51
- Jennen, Joseph, 7, 13, 14
- Jernegan, John D., 433
- Jester, Perry N., 591-592, 593-596
- Jews. *See under* France.
- Johnson, Col., 498-499
- Jones, Wesley, 707-708
- Jordana y Souza, Count Francisco Gómez, 467*n*
- Jordin, M., 714
- Jouhaux, Léon, 542
- Jousse, Col. Louis G. M., 264, 405*n*
- Juin, Gen. Alphonse, 264, 300-301, 377, 398-400, 424, 425, 426, 429
- Junod, Dr., 760-761, 762, 764-767, 770
- Kállay, Miklós, 837
- Kesselring, Field Marshal Albert, 399
- King, David W., 265, 332
- King, Adm. Ernest J., 625*n*, 645*n*
- King, William Lyon Mackenzie, 178-179, 655, 656-657, 664, 665
- KINGPIN (*see also* Giraud, Gen. Henri), 405, 406, 423, 424, 426
- Kivimäki, Toivo Mikael, 51*n*, 117
- Knox, Frank, 534*n*, 538
- Knox, John C., 282
- Kollontay, Mme. A. M., 28*n*, 29*n*, 47, 52
- Krug von Nidda, Hans Roland, 145, 564, 714
- Kuh, Frederick, 495, 497
- Land, Adm. Emory S., 674, 675, 677
- Lantsheere, Viscount de, 13
- Larminat, Lt. Gen. Edgar de, 520
- Lauraint, André, 580, 582
- Laurentie, Henri, 577-578, 580, 581, 588, 593
- Laval, Pierre:  
     Appraisals of Laval (*see also* Opinions, *infra*), 174-175, 177-178, 180, 184-187, 193-194, 285-286, 287-288, 291-292, 309, 310-311, 319, 333-334, 627-628
- Bombing of Le Havre, protest concerning, 196, 197
- Caribbean possessions, French, 188, 192, 625-626, 638-639, 650
- Collaboration with Nazi Germany (*see also* American economic aid program *under* Return to power, *infra*), 180, 181-182, 188-189, 194-195, 196-197, 198-199, 285, 288, 303, 304-305, 333, 367, 377, 388, 389, 625-626
- French Fleet at Alexandria, Egypt, 211-212, 213-215, 216, 217
- French National Committee, Laval's protest against U. S. attitude toward, 535-536
- Jews, discrimination against, 193, 709-712; U. S. plan to receive refugee children from France, 710, 712, 712-716
- Madagascar, 192, 299, 698, 699, 700
- Miscellaneous, 320, 402, 564, 720, 721-722
- North Africa, 390-391, 432
- Opinions of Pétain, Darlan, de Gaulle, and other Frenchmen regarding, 154, 161, 173, 177, 276, 279, 289, 290-291, 297, 298, 309, 404
- Return to power:  
         American economic aid program, effect on resumption of, 188, 190, 285-286, 289, 290, 292, 293, 295-296, 302, 306-307, 338, 362-363, 381-382, 405

**Laval, Pierre—Continued****Return to power—Continued**

German pressure for, and attitude toward Laval, 154-155, 169, 173, 174, 176, 185-187, 190-191, 289, 306-307, 309, 382-383

Pétain-Laval meeting, 155, 156-157; appointment of Laval as Chief of French Government, *Apr. 18, 276n, 285n*

U. S. concern over, and consideration of severance of diplomatic relations, 160-161, 161, 162, 169, 170, 170-171, 172-173, 179, 180, 186, 189-193, 289, 291

Severance of diplomatic relations with United States, *Nov. 8*, following the landing of U. S. Forces in North Africa, 201-202

League of Nations, 810

Leahy, Adm. William D., 123, 130, 132, 136-139, 144-147, 165, 175, 176, 291, 307, 355, 367-370, 373-374, 375-376, 400-401, 402, 409, 410, 423, 425, 431, 471, 480, 491

Leahy, Mrs. William D., 170, 171, 176

Leclerc, Gen. Jean, 520, 577, 580

Legentilhomme, Gen. Paul, 704, 706, 708

Léger, Alexis, 185, 519

Lemaigre-Dubreuil, Jacques, 227n, 229, 492-493, 493-495

**Lend-Lease program:**

Agreement between United States and Fighting France, *Sept. 3, 708*; Greece, *July 10, 814-815*; United Kingdom, *Feb. 23*, cited, 814

Assistance to Free French in North and Equatorial Africa, 435-437, 444-445, 502-503, 523, 535, 539-540, 565-566, 567, 581, 708; to Greece, 737, 773, 778, 785, 788-789, 790, 807, 814-815

Lend-Lease Act, *Mar. 11, 1941*, cited, 502, 565, 567

Lewis, Charles W., Jr., 240-241, 314-315

Libya. *See* France: Vichy collaboration with Axis Powers: Delivery of gasoline and other strategic supplies to Axis forces in Libya.

Long, Breckinridge, 23-24, 47-48, 58, 63, 162, 788, 830, 832

Lowrie, Donald, 711, 713, 715

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 551

MacArthur, Douglas, 2d, 125n

Macmillan, Harold, 491

MacMurray, J. V. A., 724

Madagascar. *See under* France.

Magruder, Col., 498

Maisky, Ivan M., 468-469, 783

Makins, Roger M., 2, 12, 13, 14, 17

Malige, Marcel Etienne, 635, 647, 649

Mallet, Victor Alexander Louis, 28n, 53, 740, 743n, 743-745, 745-746, 748, 753, 755, 756, 758, 759, 761, 765, 767, 768, 769, 774-775, 778, 781, 792, 798

Mallon, Patrick, 502n, 574

Mannerheim, Baron Karl Gustav, 25n, 34, 63, 67, 83, 85, 110

Marchal, Léon, 240-241, 249-251, 290-292

Marion, Paul, 390

Marshall, Gen. George C., 396, 397, 442-443, 448, 472, 481, 501

Martinique. *See under* France.

Massigli, René, 539

Mast, Gen. Charles E., 331-332, 394-396, 405n, 409-410, 423, 424, 426, 447

McCarthy, Leighton, 178-179

McClintock, Robert M., 68, 98-100

McCloy, John, 412

Menemencioglu, Numan, 836n

Ménétrel, Bernard, 156, 430

Mers-el-Kebir, 205, 205n, 211, 217, 222, 426

Moffat, Jay Pierrepont, 656-657, 663-667, 668-669

Mohammed Ben Youssef, Sultan of Morocco, 432n, 439

Molotov, V. M., 54, 62, 63n, 98, 108, 448-449, 466-469, 470

Morgan, Capt., 584, 585

Morgenthau, Henry, 737, 741

**Morocco:****French Zone:****Allied invasion:**

German concern over possibility of, and desire for defense agreement with Vichy France, 322-323, 372-373, 389, 391, 392, 393

Juridical status after Allied occupation, British and U. S. position regarding, 467-468, 484-485

Landing of American troops, 430

Laval's message to Noguès, and Noguès reply, 432; proclamation by Sultan of Morocco, 482

Liberation of internees, 485-486

Favorable disposition toward United States, 308, 310-311

French resistance plan for *coup de force* and establishment of provisional government, 252-254

German military intervention in Morocco, reports concerning plans for, 321-322, 393, 398; control of French ships leaving from Casablanca, 323, 325-326, 326-327, 334-335, 338-340, 346, 366

Giraud's appointment as High Commissioner in French North Africa, reaction to, 496-497

Morocco—Continued

French Zone—Continued

Japanese Consulate at Casablanca, reopening of, 224

Parti Populaire Français, activities of, 382-383, 398

Political and economic situation, 241-243, 319-322, 323, 325-326

U. S. Consulate at Casablanca, 440

Spanish Zone, Anglo-American discussions concerning economic aid agreement for, 386-388

Tangier: German activities in, 287, 288-289, 300, 301, 308-309; restriction on circulation of U. S. officials, 254-257, 263, 388; situation following American landings, 430, 439, 448

Motion pictures, American: Finland, question of obtaining raw film for, 92-94; France, U. S. representations to Vichy Government regarding ban on showing of, 716-722

Murphy, Robert D., mission to French North Africa:

Assignments and authority, 126*n*, 224*n*, 313, 440, 482; Presidential directive, 379-381

American economic aid to French North Africa: Political and economic situation in North Africa, reports concerning, 224-226, 229-230, 236-237, 241-243, 246-249, 257-258, 282-283, 289, 300-301, 319-322; resumption of aid program, negotiations and problems regarding, 274-275, 275-278, 279-280, 290, 292-293, 293, 301, 313, 316-318, 325-326, 326, 338, 340-342, 345-347, 350-351, 354-355, 364-365, 443-445, 449-451, 459; Vichy collaboration with Axis Powers, effect on resumption of program, 134-135, 153, 236-237

Extension of American aid to French West Africa, questions regarding, 274-275, 275, 333, 341

French resistance movement, Murphy's role in securing cooperation with United States, 227-236, 237-238, 252-254, 263-272, 278-279, 283-284, 285-287, 293-294, 297-300, 331-333, 333-334, 362, 376, 377, 379-429 *passim*; Cherchel Conference, Oct. 22, preparations for and attendance of, 376, 381, 394-395, 396, 397, 405, 405*n*, 406, 409; Giraud-Murphy exchange of messages, and "Agreement in Principle" of Oct. 27, 412-422

Murphy, Robert D.—Continued

Invasion and occupation of French North Africa, role in (*see also* French resistance, *supra*): Civil administration, 435, 438-439, 440, 442, 448, 451-452, 462-463, 467, 472-473, 473-474, 475-476, 477-478, 479-480, 482, 483, 490, 491, 495, 496, 499-501; commendations by President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull, 437, 447

Murphy-Weygand Agreement, Feb. 26, 1941, 224-379 *passim*; citation to text, 226*n*

Visit to United States for consultation, 343, 345, 349, 355, 365, 373, 385, 390

Murray, J. D., 780, 787-789

Murray, Wallace, 238-239, 251-252, 272, 290-292, 295-297, 339-340, 355-357, 386, 433, 434, 471, 591-593, 594, 814

Musa, Jean Leonard, 193*n*

Museller, Adm. Emile, 280, 504, 654, 660, 668, 669

New Caledonia. *See* France: French island possessions in the Pacific and Indian Oceans: U. S. policy.

Nidda. *See* Krug von Nidda.

Noguès, Gen. Albert, 241-242, 248, 256, 287, 308-310, 311, 319-321, 332, 372, 377, 381, 382-383, 389, 391, 393, 400, 432, 447, 556

Normandin, Albert Arthur, 241

North Africa. *See* French North Africa.

Nouillhetas, Pierre, 597, 601

Numelin, R., 78

Office Français d'Information (OFI), 196, 563

Office of War Information (OWI), 91, 92, 117, 119, 119*n*, 120

Oil:

Delivery of gasoline by Vichy France to Axis forces in Libya. *See under* France: Vichy collaboration with Axis Powers.

Exports from French West Africa to metropolitan France, U. S. policy concerning, 274-275, 280, 292-293, 294

Fueling installations at Pointe-Noire, French Equatorial Africa, post-war disposition of, 583-589, 590-596

Oil shipments to French North Africa under American economic aid program, discussions concerning, and approval of petroleum program, 314-318, 323-325, 330, 335-336, 343, 353, 361, 364, 365, 369, 371, 373-374, 401-402, 405-406

Orgaz, Gen. Luis, 242, 309, 336, 337

Paasikivi, Juho Kusti, 60*n*, 62, 101, 103-104

- Pakaslahti, Aaro, 78*n*, 97, 106  
 Panafieu, François de, 352-354, 365-366, 384, 397-398, 401-402  
 Patch, Maj. Gen. Alexander M., 550  
 Pearl Harbor, 109*n*, 117-120, 121-122  
 Pekkala, Mauno, 34-35, 88-89  
 Pétain, Marshal Henri Philippe:  
   Axis forces in Libya, Vichy collaboration, 128-129, 131-134, 135-137, 140, 141, 145, 151  
   Exchange of messages with Roosevelt, 131-134, 135-136, 141-142, 160, 429-430, 430-431, 661*n*  
   French colonial possessions, 627, 630, 647-648, 648, 661, 693, 698-699, 700  
   French North Africa, 225, 232, 283, 289, 303, 367, 882, 400, 427, 428, 430-432, 458-459  
   Japanese use of French shipping, 140, 146, 672-673, 676, 677  
   Laval's return to power, 154, 155, 156-157, 160-161, 173, 180, 276, 288, 297-298, 309, 334, 391  
   Miscellaneous, 138, 146, 222, 223, 283, 289, 519, 542, 598, 600, 648  
   Relations with United States, 180, 190, 191, 431-432, 562, 613, 630, 693  
 Petroleum. *See* Oil.  
 Petsamo Nickel Mine, 96-97  
 Peyrouton, Marcel, 473, 481  
 Philip, André, 541*n*, 548-547, 548  
 Pilet-Golaz, Marcel, 839  
 Platt, Lt. Gen. Sir William, 597, 599, 602-604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 708  
 Plevin, René, 502, 544, 569, 594, 596, 707  
 Portugal, 302, 329-330  
 Postwar questions: Disposition of fueling installations at Pointe-Noire, French Equatorial Africa, 588-589, 590-596; frontiers of Greece, 822-829; status of Madagascar, 698-699, 701, 701-702  
 Press. *See* under Finland.  
 Prisoners of war: Geneva Convention of 1929, question of Soviet adherence to provisions of, 733; U. S.-German arrangement pertaining to repatriation and hospitalization of, citation to exchange of notes *Mar. 4 and 30*, 723  
 Procopé, Hjalmar J., 21, 23-24, 27-28, 29, 30, 31, 37-38, 44-45, 46-49, 58, 63-64, 65, 66, 70-72, 76, 84*n*, 85-87, 88, 89, 90, 97, 104  
 Pucheu, Pierre, 135, 155, 156  
 Quisling, 191, 445, 446, 488  
 Rahn, Rudolf, 286, 359  
 Rangell, Jukka (Johan) Wilhelm, 25*n*, 33, 34, 67, 68, 84-85, 104, 105, 109, 117, 121, 122  
 Reber, Samuel, 272, 492-493, 498-495, 502-503, 508, 624, 625*n*, 680, 681, 633-634, 635-636, 636-637, 638-639, 641-642, 644, 645-646, 647-648, 649, 690-691  
 Recke, Col. Hans Jacob, 323  
 Red Cross functions in providing relief for Greece, 724-794 *passim*  
 Reed, Arthur G., 401-402  
 Refugees from Axis-occupied Greece, 798, 799, 801, 806, 807, 808, 809, 813; from France, refugee children, 712-716  
 Reid, W. Stafford, 256*n*, 398  
 Relief. *See* under Greece.  
 Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 190  
 Richert, Arvid G., 750*n*, 752  
 Rigaud, Jean, 229-236  
 Riom trial, 145-146, 155  
 Ritchie, W., 780-781  
 Robert, Adm. Georges, 515, 524, 525, 526, 600, 611*n*, 617, 620, 621-623, 627, 628, 629, 630-636, 638-644, 645-654 *passim*, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661-662, 702  
 Robertson, Norman A., 656-657, 664, 666, 667, 669  
 Rochat, Charles Antoine, 124, 126-127, 128, 136, 140, 142, 147, 163, 181, 187, 194, 197, 199, 201-202, 211, 213, 214, 215-216, 306, 361-362, 564, 615, 616, 616-617, 622, 631, 660, 692-693, 695-696, 699  
 Rommel, Marshal Erwin, 128*n*, 127, 140, 145, 210, 399  
 Roosevelt, Franklin D.:  
   Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, U.S. recognition of existence of state of war with, 833-835, 838, 841; message to Congress, *June 2*, regarding, citation to text, 63*n*, 841*n*  
   Exchange of messages with Churchill, 445-446, 491, 491*n*, 499*n*, 667-668; de Gaulle, 541-544; George II, King of the Hellenes, 736, 742-743; Leahy, 136, 139; Pétain, 131-134, 135-136, 141-142, 160, 429-430, 430-431, 661*n*; Tsouderos, 725-726, 729-730  
   Finland, 45, 62*n*, 82  
   France:  
   Free French, U. S. relations with, 435-437, 512, 541-544, 546-547, 548, 549, 553, 555, 574; St. Pierre and Miquelon Islands, 656-657, 661, 662, 663, 666, 667, 670  
   Vichy Government, relations with, 160-161, 170, 173, 202, 206, 214, 217-219, 221-222, 399, 416, 612, 647

## Roosevelt, Franklin D.—Continued

French North Africa: Civil administration following occupation, 379-381, 390*m*, 409, 418-419, 423, 443, 448, 451, 473, 474, 475, 480, 481-482, 491; economic aid program, 348-349, 350, 376; invasion-day messages to Algeria, France, Portugal, Spain, and Tunisia, cited, 429; policy toward Darlan, 204, 440, 448, 449, 468, 482-483, 546, 552

Greece: Exchange of messages with King George II and Prime Minister Tsouderos, 725-726, 729-730, 736, 742-743, 747; formation of Greek battalions in U. S. Army, 818-819, 819*n*; interest in aid for Greece, 737, 752*n*, 782, 800*m*, 815; visit of King George II to United States, 797-798

Miscellaneous, 188, 223, 228, 520, 558, 709, 829

Soviet Union, 62*n*, 469, 470

Statements, addresses, proclamations, etc., citations and references to, 121, 143, 202, 228, 553, 618

Rosenthal, Morris, 452, 467, 479

Ruanda Urundi (*see also* Belgian Congo under Belgium), 9*n*, 14

Rumania, U. S. recognition of existence of state of war with, 833-842

Rundstedt, Field Marshal Gerd von, 178

Russell, H. Earle, 256-257

Ryti, Risto H., 31, 35, 38, 49, 53-55, 60, 73, 82-83, 87, 89, 94, 96, 98*n*, 99, 104, 105, 106, 108-110, 114, 116

Saraçoğlu, Sükrü, 738 *n*, 836*n*

Savage, Carlton, 833-834

Schmittlein, Maj. Raymond, 487-488

Schwob, Maurice, 688, 697

Seppälä, R., 52*n*

Serrano Suñer, Ramón, 309

Shaw, G. Howland, 256*n*, 263

Sheets, Harold F., 590-593, 594

Sicé, Gen. Marie Eugène Adolphe, 520, 557*n*, 566*n*, 568-569, 570, 571, 574

Simopoulos, Ch., 831

Slovakia, 833, 840

Smith, Gen. Walter Bedell, 489

Smuts, Jan Christian, 138

Socony-Vacuum Co., 588-589, 590-596

Solanko, Risto, 21-23, 56-57

Solborg, Lt. Col. Robert, 332, 333

Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon, 462-463

Soviet Union (*see also* Finland: Attempts by United States to prevent further Finnish participation in war against Soviet Union in association with Germany): Anglo-Soviet treaty of alliance in the war

## Soviet Union—Continued

against Hitlerite Germany, *May* 26, cited, 63; German-Russian military front, 309-310; interest in developments in French North Africa, 448-449, 468-470, 476, 487-488

Spaak, Paul-Henri, 8

Spain and Spanish Morocco, 309, 315, 336-338, 340, 410, 421, 423

St. Pierre and Miquelon Islands. *See* under France: Colonial possessions in Western Hemisphere.

Stalin, I. V., 38, 45

Standard Oil Co., 153, 158

Stark, Adm. Harold R., 534, 536-539, 550

Starr, Harold, 467, 479

Stettinius, Edward R., Jr., 435-437

Stevens, Col., 690

Steyne, Alan N., 12, 13, 14

Stimson, Henry L., 304

Stone, William, 295

Stopford, R. J., 778-779

Strategic war materials. *See* France: Vichy collaboration: Delivery of gasoline, etc.; French North Africa: American economic aid program: Cobalt and molybdenum; and Oil.

Strubel, Capt., 348-349

Suez Canal, 211, 212, 214, 218, 220

## Sweden:

Attitude toward Finland, and concern over deterioration of U. S.-Finnish relations, 36-37, 38, 41, 43-44, 66, 74-75, 97, 102-103, 104, 108, 116

Swedish plan for Greek relief. *See* under Greece: Relief supplies for Greece.

Swedish Red Cross, 735, 740, 743, 744, 745, 746, 748, 752, 754, 755, 758, 761, 762, 765, 767, 768, 771, 780, 781, 782, 807

Switzerland: Communication of U. S. message to Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania with regard to existence of a state of war, 837-840; Swiss Red Cross, 761, 762, 765, 807

Taft, Charles, 782-784

Tanner, Vaino A., 34, 35, 62, 104, 116

Thailand, declaration of war on United States, *Jan.* 25, 834*n*

Thornburg, Max Weston, 595

Timberlake, Clare H., 604-605, 606, 607

Tixier, Adrien, 440-442, 508-511, 514-517, 520, 524, 540, 545-553, 555-556, 564-567, 568, 570, 571-572, 585, 590-591, 591, 636, 690-691

Toivola, Urho, 26-27, 92

Torch, 395, 409-410, 423, 424



## Treaties, conventions, etc.:

- Anglo-Belgian economic agreements affecting the Belgian Congo, *Jan. 21, 1941*, and *June 4, 1942*, cited, 1, 6, 9
- Anglo-Soviet treaty of alliance in the war against Hitlerite Germany and her associates in Europe, and collaboration and mutual assistance thereafter, *May 26*, cited, 63
- Finnish-German treaty of commerce (1934), extended 1941 and 1942, cited, 111
- Franco-Japanese agreements: Commercial accord (1941), cited, 674; mutual defense agreements regarding Indochina (1940 and 1941), cited, 389, 393
- Geneva convention regarding prisoners of war (1929), cited, 723, 733
- Geneva Protocol (Greek Loan Protocol, 1927), cited, 810
- Hague Convention (1907), cited, 614, 618
- Inter-American convention for the provisional administration of European colonies and possessions in the Americas (1940), cited, 619
- Italy-Greece, agreement relative to sovereignty over Aegean Islands (1920), cited, 825
- Lend-Lease agreements. *See* Lend-Lease program.
- Soviet-German non-aggression pact (1939), cited, 81
- Treaty of Sèvres (1920), cited, 826
- Treaty of Utrecht (1713), 668
- Turkey-Greece, Preliminaries of Peace (1897), cited, 794
- U. S.-Belgium. *See* Belgium: Agreements with United States.
- U. S.-Czechoslovakia, preliminary agreement regarding mutual aid in the prosecution of war against aggression, *July 11*, citation to text, 20
- U. S.-Finland, treaty of commerce and consular rights (1934), cited, 68, 69, 70
- U. S.-France: Consular convention of 1853, cited, 553, 560, 562; trade agreement of 1936, cited, 716, 718-719, 720
- U. S.-Germany, arrangement pertaining to repatriation and hospitalization of prisoners of war, by exchange of notes *Mar. 4* and *30*, citation to text, 723
- U. S.-Greece: Debt agreement of *May 10, 1929*, and supplementary agreement of *May 24, 1932*, cited, 794n, 796, 797; Lend-Lease agreement, *July 10*, 814-815
- Truffert, Gen., 597, 601
- Tsouderos, Emmanuel J., 725-726, 727, 729-730, 737, 739, 740, 742, 774, 775-776, 782, 797-798, 798-799, 800, 800n, 802, 814-815, 817-818, 818, 819, 820, 822-827
- Tuck, S. Pinkney, 136, 170, 176n, 189-190, 202-203, 712-713
- Tunisia (*see also* France: Vichy collaboration with Axis Powers: Delivery of gasoline, etc.), 226-227, 246-247, 281, 303, 304-305, 322, 347, 480
- Turkey (*see also under* Greece: Relief supplies), 725, 728, 759, 794, 833-836
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. *See* Soviet Union.
- United Kingdom:
  - Anglo-Soviet treaty of alliance in the war against Hitlerite Germany, *May 26*, cited, 63
  - Belgian Congo, negotiations for a U. S.-British-Belgian economic agreement relating to, 1-19
  - Churchill. *See* Churchill, Winston S.
  - Cyprus, 825
  - Eden. *See* Eden, Anthony.
  - Finland, British attitude toward, 29, 30, 52-53, 55, 56
  - France:
    - Free French, British policy toward (*see also* France: Colonial possessions, etc.: St. Pierre and Miquelon Islands; and France: French island possessions, etc.: Madagascar), 183-184, 511-514, 521-524, 527, 528-534, 553-555, 556-557
    - French warships at Alexandria, Egypt, 212, 215-216, 220, 221
    - German submarine entry into Fort-de-France, British views, 619-620
    - Vichy Government, British policy toward, 159, 178-180, 182-184; views on Laval, 174-176, 176-178
  - French North Africa:
    - American economic aid program, views and policy regarding, 243-246, 272-273, 336-338, 342, 345-347, 350, 371, 376-377, 438-439, 443, 460, 463-465, 477, 479; desire for publicity, 357-358, 359, 364, 365, 370, 371
    - Civil administration following invasion, 480, 486-488, 490, 490-491, 495-496
    - Darlan's position as High Commissioner, views regarding, 445-447, 484
  - Greece, relations with. *See* Greece: United Kingdom.

- United Kingdom—Continued  
 Lend-Lease agreement with United States, *Feb. 23*, cited, 814  
 Morocco (Spanish), discussions with United States concerning economic aid for, 336-338  
 U. S. citizens (*see also* France: Jews), 56-57, 432, 440  
 U. S. Congress: Joint Resolutions declaring a state of war with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, *June 5*, cited, 63, 841*n*; Joint Resolution declaring a state of war with Germany, *Dec. 11, 1941*, cited, 842*n*; United States Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, cited, 816  
 U. S. Selective Service Administration, 520-521, 816-817  
 Utter, John E., 147
- Vahervuori, Torsten Oskar, 115*n*, 118-121  
 Valin, Lt. Gen. Martial, 584, 585, 586  
 Van Hecke, Col. Jean, 264-265, 271  
 Vann, Capt, 574, 580  
 Varma, Aleksander, 51-52, 79  
 Varvaressos, Kyriakos, 795, 804-813, 817  
 Vienna arbitral award (1938), cited, 840*n*  
 Villard, Henry S., 244*n*, 249-251, 272, 314, 323, 340, 348-349, 365, 367-370, 375-376, 385-386, 397-398, 401-402, 404, 433-434, 471, 594-595  
 Vogl, Gen. Oskar, 427  
 Vyshinsky, A. Y., 26, 59
- Wadsworth, Elliot, 796*n*  
 Wadsworth, George, 764  
 Walden, Maj. Gen. Rudolf, 104  
 Wallace, Henry A., 386*n*, 403  
 Wapler, Arnauld, 145  
 Wasastjerna, Jarl Axel, 41, 76, 95*n*
- Wasson, Thomas C., 352-354, 384-385, 385-386, 407, 498-499  
 Welles, Sumner:  
 Finland, U. S. relations with, 37-38, 46-47, 49, 63-64, 70-72, 74-75, 88, 90  
 France and French North Africa: Communications to President Roosevelt and various officials, 155-156, 437, 443, 469, 481-482, 499, 561-563, 697; memoranda of conversations, 129-131, 142-143, 161-162, 172-173, 178-179, 193-194, 208, 210, 352, 408, 484, 507-508, 511-514, 515-517, 521-523, 540, 546-547, 555-556, 559, 579-580, 604-605, 619-620, 620-621, 694-695, 695  
 Greece, 731, 741-742, 748-749, 752-753, 799-801, 818-820, 828-829  
 West Africa. *See* French West Africa.  
 Western Hemisphere. *See* France: Colonial possessions in Western Hemisphere.  
 Westman, Karl Ivan, 43*n*, 43-44  
 Weygand, Gen. Maxime, 124, 125*n*, 169, 225, 227, 228, 232, 242, 259, 266, 277, 278, 287, 291, 295, 297, 305, 325, 331, 341, 391, 429; Murphy-Weygand Agreement, 224-379 *passim*  
 Wheat. *See under* Greece: Relief supplies.  
 White, Wyndham, 244, 272, 335, 336  
 Wilson, Duane, 314, 335  
 Witting, Rolf J., 29, 30-31, 35-36, 39-42, 43, 46, 62, 67, 68, 73, 76, 78, 83, 89, 91, 94-95, 96, 97-98, 103, 104, 105, 105-106, 109, 110*n*, 111-112, 115, 116, 120-121, 121, 122  
 Woodruff, Harry A., 147  
 Wrede, Baron Goddert, 22-23, 88
- Yrjö-Koskinen, Baron Aarno Armas Sakari, 59*n*, 60, 61, 66  
 Yugoslavia, 823









P  
4677

